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Foreword
The main purpose of the British Documents on the End of Empire Project (BDEEP)
is to publish documents from British official archives on the ending of colonial and
associated rule and on the context in which this took place. In 1945, aside from the
countries of present-day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma, Britain had over
fifty formal dependencies; by the end of 1965 the total had been almost halved and by
1985 only a handful remained. The ending of Britain’s position in these formal
dependencies was paralleled by changes in relations with states in an informal
empire. The end of empire in the period at least since 1945 involved a change also in
the empire as something that was more than the sum of its parts and as such formed
an integral part of Britain’s domestic affairs and international relations. In
publishing official British documents on the end of empire this project is, to a
degree, the successor to the two earlier series of published documents concerning
the end of British rule in India and Burma which were edited by Professors Mansergh
and Tinker respectively. The successful completion of The transfer of power and The
struggle for independence,1 both of which were based on British records, emphasised
the need for similar published collections of documents important to the history of
the final stages of Britain’s association with other dependencies in Africa, the Middle
East, the Caribbean, South-East Asia and the Pacific. These documents are crucial
research tools for scholars both from sovereign independent states which emerged
from colonial rule as well as those from Britain itself. BDEEP is also set in the much
wider context of the efforts made by successive British governments to locate
Britain’s position in an international order. Here the empire, both in its formal and
informal senses, is viewed as an instrument of the domestic, foreign and defence
policy of successive British governments. The project is therefore concerned with the
ending of colonial rule in individual territories as seen from the British side at one
level, and the broader political, economic and strategic considerations involved in
that at another.
Despite the similarities, however, BDEEP differs in significant ways from its
predecessors in terms both of presentation and content. The project is of greater
magnitude than that undertaken by Professor Mansergh for India. Four major
differences can be identified. First, the ending of colonial rule within a dependent
empire took place over a much longer period of time, extending into the final years of
the twentieth century while having its roots in the Second World War and before.
Secondly, the empire consisted of a large number of territories, varying in area,
population, wealth and in many other ways, each with its own individual problems
but often with their futures linked to those of neighbouring territories and the
1 Nicholas Mansergh et al, eds, Constitutional relations between Britain and India: the transfer of power
1942–47 12 vols (London, 1970–1983); Hugh Tinker, ed, Constitutional relations between Britain and
Burma: the struggle for independence 1944–1948 2 vols (London, 1983–1984).
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growing complexity surrounding the colonial empire. Thirdly, while for India the
documentary record for certain matters of high policy could be encapsulated within a
relatively straightforward ‘country’ study, in the case of the colonial empire the
documentary record is more diffuse because of the plethora of territories and their
scattered location. Finally, the documents relating to the ending of colonial rule are
not conveniently located within one leading department of state but rather are to be
found in several of them. As the purpose of the project is to publish documents
relating to the end of empire from the extensive range and quantity of official British
records, private collections and other categories of non-official material are not
regarded as principal documentary sources. In BDEEP, selections from non-official
material will be used only in exceptional cases to fill gaps where they exist in the
available official record. 
In recognition of these differences and also of the fact that the end of empire
involves consideration of a range of issues which operated at a much wider level than
that normally associated with the ending of colonial rule in a single country, BDEEP
is structured in two main series along with a third support series. Series A represents
the general volumes in which, for successive British governments, documents
relating to the empire as a whole are be published. Series B represents the country or
territory volumes and provides territorial studies of how, from a British government
perspective, former colonies and dependencies achieved their independence and
countries which were part of an informal empire regained their autonomy. In
addition to the two main documentary series, a third series—series C—has been
published in the form of handbooks to the records of the former colonial empire
which are deposited at The National Archives (formerly the Public Record Office).
Series C consists of two volumes which form an integral part of BDEEP and also
serve as former PRO guides to the records. Together they enable scholars and others
wishing to follow the record of the ending of colonial rule and empire to pursue their
inquiries beyond the published record provided by the general studies in series A and
the country studies in series B. Volume one of the handbooks, a revised and updated
version of The records of the Colonial and Dominions Offices by R B Pugh which was
first published in 1964, is entitled Records of the Colonial Office, Dominions Office,
Commonwealth Relations Office and Commonwealth Office (1995). It covers over
two hundred years of activity down to 1968 when the Commonwealth Office merged
with the Foreign Office to form the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Volume two,
entitled Records of the Cabinet, Foreign Office, Treasury and other records (1998),
focuses more specifically on twentieth-century departmental records and also
includes references to the records of inter-departmental committees, commissions of
inquiry and international organisations. The two volumes were prepared under the
direction and supervision of Dr Anne Thurston, at the time honorary research fellow
at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in the University of London, and more
recently executive director of the International Records Management Trust. 
In the two main series the research is organised in stages. Stage one, covering the
years 1925–1957, is now complete and consists of three general volumes and five
country volumes, collectively published in twenty-one individual parts. In series A
there are volumes on Imperial policy and colonial practice 1925–1945 in two parts
(1996), The Labour government and the end of empire 1945–1951 in four parts
(1992), and The Conservative government and the end of empire 1951–1957 in three
parts (1994). In series B there are volumes on Ghana in two parts (1992), Sri Lanka
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in two parts (1997), Malaya in three parts (1995), Egypt and the defence of the
Middle East in three parts (1998) and the Sudan in two parts (1998). Starting in
1999, the project began publishing volumes in a second stage which covers the
period 1957–1964. Here there are five volumes, a general volume on the
Conservative government and the end of empire 1957–1964 in two parts (2000), and
country volumes on the West Indies in one part (1999), Nigeria in two parts (2001),
Malaysia in one part (2004) and Kenya. Research for a third and final stage, covering
the years 1964–1971, began in 2000. It consists of a general volume and country
volumes on Central Africa, Southern Africa, the Pacific (Fiji), and the Mediterranean
(Cyprus and Malta). 
The criteria which have been used in selecting documents for inclusion in
individual volumes are explained in the introductions written by the specialist
editors. These introductions are more substantial and contextual than those in
previous series. Each volume also lists the sources searched at The National Archives.
However, it may be helpful to outline the more general guiding principles which
have been employed. BDEEP editors pursue several lines of inquiry. There is first the
end of empire in a broad high policy sense in which the empire is viewed in terms of
Britain’s position as a world power and of the inter-relationship between what
derives from this position and developments within the colonial dependencies. Here
Britain’s relations with the dependencies of the empire are set in the wider defence,
economic and foreign policy contexts of Britain’s relations with the United States,
with Europe, and with the Commonwealth and United Nations. Secondly, there is
investigation into colonial policy in its strict sense. Here the emphasis is on those
areas which were specifically—but not exclusively—the concern of the leading
department. In the period before the administrative amalgamations of the 1960s,2
the leading department of the British government for most of the dependencies was
the Colonial Office; for a minority it was either the Dominions Office and its
successor, the Commonwealth Relations Office, or the Foreign Office. Colonial policy
included questions of economic and social development, questions of governmental
institutions and constitutional structures, and administrative questions concerning
the future of the civil and public services and of the defence forces in a period of
transition from European to indigenous control. Finally there is inquiry into the
development of political and social forces within colonies, the response to these and
the transfer of governmental authority and of legal sovereignty from Britain to its
colonial dependencies as these processes were understood and interpreted by the
British government. Here it should be emphasised that the purpose of BDEEP is not
to document the history of colony politics or nationalist movements in any particular
territory. Given the purpose of the project and the nature of much of the source
material, the place of colony politics in BDEEP is conditioned by the extent to which
an awareness of local political situations played an overt part in influencing major
policy decisions made in Britain. 
Although in varying degrees and from different perspectives, elements of these
various lines of inquiry appear in both the general and the country series. The aim in
both is to concentrate on the British record by selecting documents which illustrate
2 The Colonial Office merged with the Commonwealth Relations Office in 1966 to form the
Commonwealth Office. The Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office in 1968 to form the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
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those policy issues which were deemed important by ministers and officials at the
time. General volumes do not normally treat in any detail of matters which will be
fully documented in the country volumes but some especially significant documents
do appear in both series. The process of selection involves an inevitable degree of
sifting and subtraction. Issues which in retrospect appear to be of lesser significance
or to be ephemeral have been omitted. The main example concerns the extensive
quantity of material devoted to appointments and terms of service—salaries,
gradings, allowances, pension rights and compensation—within the colonial and
related services. It is equally important to stress certain negative aspects of the
official documentary record. Officials in London were sometimes not in a position to
address potentially significant issues because the information was not available.
Much in this respect depended on the extent of the documentation sent to London by
the different colonial administrations. Once the stage of internal self-government
had been reached, or where there was a dyarchy, the flow of detailed local
information to London began to diminish. 
Selection policy has been influenced by one further factor, namely access to the
records at The National Archives. Unlike the India and Burma series and the current
Foreign and Commonwealth Office series of Documents on British Policy Overseas
(DBPO), BDEEP is not an official project. In practice this means that while editors
have privileged access (in the form of research facilities and requisitioning
procedures) to the records at The National Archives, they do not have unrestricted
access. For files which at the time a volume is in preparation are either subject to
extended closures beyond the statutory thirty years or retained in the originating
department under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act of 1958, editors are subject
to the same restrictions as all other researchers. Apart from cases where files or
series of files are withheld, official weeding processes now tend to remove sentences
or paragraphs from public view, rather than the whole document; such omissions are
indicated in footnotes. To date access has not impeded the research undertaken by
the project to any significant degree, and the project has been successful in securing
the release of a number of hitherto withheld documents from the Historical Section
of the Cabinet Office and the Records and Historical Department of the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office. 
A thematic arrangement of the documents has been adopted for the general
volumes in series A. The country volumes in series B follow a chronological
arrangement; in this respect they adopt the same approach as was used in the India
and Burma series. For each volume in both series A and B a summary list of the
documents included is provided. The headings to BDEEP documents, which have
been editorially standardised, present the essential information. Together with the
sequence number, the file reference (in the form of the call-up number at the
Archives and any internal pagination or numeration) and the date of the document
appear on the first line.3 The second and subsequent lines record the subject of the
document, the type of document (letter, memorandum, telegram etc), the originator
(person or persons, committee, department) and the recipient (if any). A subject
entry in a heading in single quotation marks denotes the title of a document as it
3 The call-up number at the Archives precedes the comma in the references cited. In the case of documents
from FO 371, the major foreign office political class, the internal numeration refers to the jacket number
of the file.
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appears in the original. An entry in square brackets denotes a subject indicator
composed by the editor. This latter device has been employed in cases where no title
is given in the original or where the original title is too unwieldy to reproduce in its
entirety. Security classifications and, in the case of telegrams, times of despatch and
receipt, have generally been omitted. In the headings to documents and the contents
lists, ministers are identified by the name of the office-holder, not the title of the
office (ie, Mr Macleod, not secretary of state for the colonies).4 In the same
contexts, officials are identified by their initials and surname. In general volumes,
ambassadors, governors, high commissioners and other embassy or high
commission staff are cited in the form Sir H Foot (Cyprus). Footnotes to documents
appearing below the rule are editorial; those above the rule, or where no rule is
printed, are part of the original document. Each volume provides an initial summary
list of which principal offices were held by whom, and a separate series of
biographical notes (at the end) for major figures who appear in the documents. Other
figures are identified in editorial footnotes on the occasion of first appearance.
Link-notes, written by the volume editor and indented in square brackets between
the heading and the beginning of a document, are often used to explain the context
of a document. Technical detail or extraneous material has been extracted from a
number of documents. In such cases omission dots have been inserted in the text and
the document is identified in the heading as an extract. Occasional omission dots
have also been used to excise purely mechanical chain-of-command executive
instructions and some redundant internal referencing has been removed, though
much of it remains in place, for the benefit of researchers. No substantive material
relating to policy-making has been excised from the documents. In general the aim
has been to reproduce documents in their entirety but where available space is a
major constraint on editors, a consideration which applies particularly in the case of
general volumes, where the documentation is voluminous, this is not always
possible, and some purely factual information may be omitted. It must also be
emphasised in this context that the BDEEP volumes do not remove the necessity for
researchers to study the original records themselves. The footnote reference ‘not
printed’ is used only in cases where a specified enclosure or an annex to a document
has not been included. Unless a specific cross-reference or note of explanation is
provided, however, it can be assumed that other documents referred to in the text of
the documents included have not been reproduced. Obvious typing errors in the
original are in the main silently corrected, but abbreviations and contractions stand.
Each volume has a list of abbreviations together with a consolidated index, and
country volumes include a chronology of principal events.
One radical innovation, compared with previous Foreign Office or India and
Burma series, is that BDEEP reproduces many more minutes by ministers and
officials.
Crown copyright material is used by permission of The National Archives under
licence from the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. All references and
dates are given in the form recommended in guidelines from The National Archives.
* * * *
4 This is an editorial convention, following DBPO practice. Very few memoranda issued in their name were
actually written by ministers themselves, but normally drafted by officials.
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Formally launched in 1987, BDEEP has been based since its inception at the
Institute of Commonwealth Studies. The work of the project is supervised by a
Project Committee chaired by Professor Andrew Porter, Rhodes professor of imperial
history in the University of London. Professor Porter succeeded Professor Anthony
Low, formerly Smuts professor of the history of the Commonwealth in the University
of Cambridge, who retired in November 1994. Professor Michael Crowder became the
first general editor while holding a visiting professorship in the University of London
and a part-time position at Amherst College, Massachusetts. Following his untimely
death in 1988, Professor Crowder was replaced as general editor by Professor David
Murray, pro vice-chancellor and professor of government at the Open University,
who played a critical role in establishing a secure financial base for the project and in
negotiating contracts with the volume editors and the publisher. His invaluable
advice and expertise in dealing with the early manuscripts are acknowledged with
particular gratitude. Mrs Anita Burdett was appointed as project secretary and
research assistant. She was succeeded in September 1989 by Dr Stephen Ashton who
previously worked with Professors Mansergh and Tinker during the final stages of
the India and Burma series. Dr Ashton replaced Professor Murray as project director
and general editor in 1993. 
The project benefited from an initial pump-priming grant from the British
Academy. Thanks are due to the secretary and Board of the Academy for this grant
and for the decision of the British Academy to adopt BDEEP as one of its major
projects. The Academy made a further award in 1996 which enabled the project to
employ a research assistant on a fixed term contract. The Managers of the Smuts
Memorial Fund in the University of Cambridge are also to be acknowledged. They
made possible the workshop from which the project developed and they have since
provided a further grant for work on two of the stage two volumes. The principal
funding for the project in stages one and two has been provided by the Leverhulme
Trust and the volumes are a tribute to the support provided by the Trustees. A major
debt of gratitude is owed to the Trustees. In addition to their generous grants to
cover the major costs of both stages, the Trustees agreed to a subsequent request to
extend the duration of the first grant, and also provided a supplementary grant which
enabled the project to secure Dr Ashton’s appointment. It is thanks largely to the
Leverhulme Trust that BDEEP has developed into one of the country’s most
successful historical research projects.
Members of the Project Committee, who meet annually at the Institute of
Commonwealth Studies, have provided valuable advice and much needed
encouragement. Professor Low, the first chairman of the Committee, made a
singular contribution, initiating the first exploratory meeting at Cambridge in 1985
and presiding over subsequent developments in his customary constructive but
unobtrusive manner. Professor Porter continues in a similar vein and his leadership
and experience are much appreciated by the general editor. The director and the staff
of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies have provided administrative support and
the congenial surroundings within which the general editor works. The editors of
volumes in both stages one have benefited considerably from the researches
undertaken by Dr Anne Thurston and her assistants which resulted in the
publication of the two handbooks. Although BDEEP is not an official project,
the general editor wishes to acknowledge the support and co-operation received
from the Historical Section of the Cabinet Office and the Historical and Records
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Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He wishes also to record his
appreciation of the spirit of friendly co-operation received from the editors of DBPO.
Dr Ronald Hyam, editor in stage one of the general volume on the post-war Labour
government and co-editor of the stage two volume on the Conservative government,
played an important role in the compilation of the house-style adopted by BDEEP
and his contribution is acknowledged with gratitude. Thanks also are due to The
Stationery Office for assuming publishing responsibility and for their expert advice
on matters of design and production. Last, but by no means least, the contribution of
the chief executive and keeper of the records and the staff, both curatorial and
administrative, at The National Archives must be emphasised. Without the facilities
and privileges afforded to BDEEP editors at the National Archives, the project would
not be viable.
S R Ashton
Institute of Commonwealth Studies
October 2003
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Malaysia
Schedule of Contents
Chapter 1 Prospects for the ‘Grand Design’, Nov 1957–May 1961: closer
association of the Borneo territories; self-government for Singapore;
Tunku Abdul Rahman’s initiative for a ‘Greater Malaysia’
(Document numbers 1–39)
Chapter 2 Principles for a Federation of Malaysia, June–Dec 1961: internal security
of Singapore; the Singapore base and regional defence; obligations to
Borneo peoples; the question of timing; London talks and the Anglo–
Malayan statement of Nov 1961
(Document numbers 40–88)
Chapter 3 The Cobbold Commission, Dec 1961–July 1962: the enquiry in North
Borneo and Sarawak; drafting the report; Anglo–Malayan differences;
London talks and the agreement of 31 July 1962
(Document numbers 89–140)
Chapter 4 Conflict, deadlock and agreement, Aug 1962–July 1963: Lansdowne’s
Inter-Governmental Committee for North Borneo and Sarawak; the
Brunei revolt; operation ‘Cold Store’ in Singapore; opposition from
Indonesia and the Philippines; attitudes of the UN and USA; British
financial and military assistance; deadlock in talks between Malaya and
Singapore, and between Malaya and Brunei; prospect of ‘Little
Malaysia’; the Malaysia agreement of 9 July 1963
(Document numbers 141–193)
Chapter 5 Malaysia postponed, July–Sept 1963: the future of Brunei; the Manila
Summit; Sandys’ mission to Kuala Lumpur; Lee Kuan Yew’s unilateral
declaration of independence; crisis over Sarawak appointments; the UN
mission; Malaysia Day 
(Document numbers 194–227)
Appendix The Origins and Formation of Malaysia
FCO Research Department memorandum, 10 July 1970
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Abbreviations
ADO Assistant District Officer
ANZAM Australia, New Zealand and Malaya
ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States (Pact)
ASA Association of Southeast Asia
BARJASA Barisan Rakyat (Ra’ayat) Jati Sarawak 
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BDCC(FE) British Defence Co-ordinating Committee (Far East)
BDEEP British Documents on End of Empire Project
BNB British North Borneo
BS/BSS/BS(S) Barisan Sosialis (Singapore) (Socialist Front)
BUNAP Borneo Utara National Party (North Borneo National Party)
C Cabinet memorandum/memos, Conservative (Macmillan) govern-
ment, 1957–1963
CAB Cabinet
CC Cabinet conclusions (minutes), Conservative (Macmillan)
government, 1957–1963
CCO Clandestine Communist Organisation (Sarawak)
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CDC Colonial Development Corporation
CD(&)W Colonial Development and Welfare
CEC Central Executive Committee
CENTO Central Treaty Organisation
CH Companion of Honour
C in C commander in chief
CMG Companion of the Order of St Michael and St George
Cmnd Command (parliamentary) paper
CO Colonial Office
col colonial
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com-gen commissioner-general
COS Chiefs of Staff
CPC Colonial Policy Committee (Cabinet, UK)
CPM Communist Party of Malaya (see MCP)
CRO Commonwealth Relations Office
DCC Defence Co-ordinating Committee (see also BDCC(FE))
Dept department
DO Defence Committee (Cabinet, UK); CRO file series; District Officer
DOPC Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (Cabinet, UK)
DSB Director, Special Branch
DSE Official Committee, Future Development in SE Asia
DTC Department of Technical Co-operation
ECAFE Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
EEC European Economic Community
EFTA European Free Trade Area
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FMS Federated Malay States
FO Foreign Office
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
FSU Factory and Shopworkers’ Union (see SFSWU)
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCMG Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St Michael and St George
GM Greater Malaysia Committee
GMD Greater Malaysia Discussions
GMT Greenwich mean time
GNP gross national product
gov governor
gov-gen governor-general
govt government
HC high commissioner
HCUKKL high commissioner for the UK in Kuala Lumpur
HH His Highness
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HM Her/His Majesty
HMG Her Majesty’s Government
HMOCS Her Majesty’s Oversea Civil Service
H of C Debs House of Commons Debates (Hansard)
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World
Bank)
ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trades Union 
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMP Independence of Malaya Party
ITC Inter-Territorial Conference
ISC Internal Security Council
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIC Joint Intelligence Committee
JPC Joint Planning Staff
KBE Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire
KCMG Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George
KL Kuala Lumpur
Kt Knight
Lab Labour Party
MAS Malay Administrative Service
memo memorandum 
MCA Malayan (Malaysian) Chinese Association
MCP Malayan Communist Party  (see CPM)
MCS Malayan (Malaysian) Civil Service
MIC Malayan (Malaysian) Indian Congress
MoD Ministry of Defence
MP Member of Parliament
MSCC Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NB North Borneo
nd no date
nn no name; no number
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xx ABBREVIATIONS
NUSU Nanyang University Students’ Union
OAG Officer administering government
OBA Old Boys’ Associations (Singapore)
OEEC Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
OM Order of Merit
OP/OPC Oversea Policy Committee (Cabinet Committee)
OPD Oversea Policy and Defence (Cabinet Committee)
O/S Overseas
OSAS Overseas Service Aid Scheme
PANAS Party Negara Sarawak 
PAP People’s Action Party (Singapore)
PAPAS Party Pesaka Anak Sarawak (also PESAKA)
PESAKA Party Pesaka Anak Sarawak (also PAPAS)
PKI Partai Kommunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)
PM prime minister
PMIP Pan-Malayan Islamic Party
PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party)
PP Parliamentary Papers
PPP People’s Progressive Party
PPS parliamentary private secretary
PPSO Preservation of Public Security Ordinance
PRB Party Rakyat (Ra’ayat) Brunei (Brunei People’s Party)
PREM Prime Minister’s Office files at PRO
PRM Party Rakyat (Ra’ayat) Malaya (Malayan People’s Party)
PRO Public Record Office
PUS permanent under-secretary
QC Queen’s Counsel
r reigned
RAF Royal Air Force
RN Royal Navy
SABAPA Sabah Alliance
SATU Singapore Association of Trade Unions
SBWU Singapore Bus Workers’ Union
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SCA Sarawak Chinese Association
SCMSSU Singapore Chinese Middle School Students’ Union
SCPA Singapore Country People’s Association
SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organisation
SGEU Singapore General Employees’ Union
SFSWU Singapore Factory and Shop Workers’ Union
SIC Sabah Indian Congress
SLO security liaison office/officer
SNAP Sarawak National Party
S of S/ Ss of S secretary of state/secretaries of state
SPA Singapore People’s Alliance
SRRA Singapore Rural Residents’ Association
STUC Singapore Trade Union Congress
STUWC Singapore Trade Union Working Committee
SUPP Sarawak United People’s Party
T Treasury
tel telegram
TNKU Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara (National Army of North
Kalimantan)
TUC Trade Union Congress
UDP United Democratic Party (Malaya)
UK United Kingdom
UMNO United Malays National Organisation (Malaya)
UNKO United National Kadazan Organisation (Sabah)
UN(O) United Nations (Organisation)
UNPMO United National Pasok Momogun (United National Party of Sons of
the Soil, Sabah)
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UNTAB United Nations Technical Assistance Board
UPP United People’s Party (Singapore)
US(A) United States (of America)
USNO United Sabah National Organisation
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU Western European Union
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Principal Holders of Offices 1957–1963
UNITED KINGDOM
Ministers in Conservative governments Jan 1957– Sept 1963
(a) Cabinet ministers
Prime minister Mr H Macmillan (10 Jan 1957–13 Oct 
1963)
Chancellor of Exchequer Mr P Thorneycroft (13 Jan 1957)
Mr D Heathcoat Amory (6 Jan 1958)
Mr J Selwyn Lloyd (27 July 1960)
Mr R Maudling (13 July 1962)
S of S foreign affairs Mr J Selwyn Lloyd (20 Dec 1955)
Earl of Home (27 July 1960)
S of S colonies Mr A Lennox-Boyd (30 July 1954)
Mr I Macleod (14 Oct 1959)
Mr R Maudling (9 Oct 1961)
Mr D Sandys (13 July 1962)
(office held jointly with S of S
Commonwealth relations)
S of S Commonwealth relations Earl of Home (12 Apr 1955)
Mr D Sandys (28 July 1960)
(office held jointly with S of S 
colonies from 13 July 1962)
Minister of defence Mr D Sandys (13 Jan 1957)
Mr H Watkinson (14 Oct 1959)
Mr P Thorneycroft (13 July 1962)
(b) Junior ministers
Colonial Office
Minister of state Earl of Perth (17 Jan 1957)
Marquess of Lansdowne (20 Apr 1962) 
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Parliamentary under-secretary of state Mr J Profumo (18 Jan 1957)
Mr J Amery (1 Dec 1958)
Mr H Fraser (28 Oct 1960)
Mr N Fisher (16 July 1962)
Commonwealth Relations Office
Minister of State Mr C J M Alport (22 Oct 1959–1 Mar
1961)
Duke of Devonshire (6 Sept 1962)
Parliamentary under-secretary of state Mr C J M Alport (18 Jan 1957)
Mr R H M Thompson (22 Oct 1959)
Duke of Devonshire (28 Oct 1960–6 Sept 
1962)
Mr B Braine (9 Feb 1961–16 July 1962)
Mr J D Tilney (16 July 1962)
(c) Cabinet Committee on Greater Malaysia
The Cabinet (Ministerial) Committee on Greater Malaysia, chaired by the prime
minister, met twice in Nov 1961 to prepare for talks with the Malayan government in
London later that month and a third time in Mar 1962 to consider a letter from Lord
Cobbold. Otherwise ministers considered Malaysian policy in the Defence
Committee, Colonial Policy Committee, Future Policy Committee, Oversea Policy
Committee and ad hoc meetings.
2. Civil servants
(a) Secretary to the Cabinet Sir Norman Brook (1947–1962)
Sir Burke Trend (1963–1972)
(b) Colonial Office
Permanent under-secretary of state Sir John Macpherson (1956–1959)
Sir Hilton Poynton (1959–1966)
Deputy permanent under-secretary Sir Hilton Poynton (1948–1959)
of state (joint) Sir John Martin (1956–1965)
Sir William Gorell Barnes (1959–1963)
Assistant under-secretary of state E Melville (1917–1961)
with superintending responsibility C G Eastwood (1962)
for Far East W I J Wallace (1963)
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Assistant secretary, head of Far J B Johnston (1956–1957)
Eastern Dept W I J Wallace (1956–1962)
J D Higham (1963)
(c) Commonwealth Relations Office
Permanent under-secretary of state Sir Gilbert Laithwaite (1955–Aug 1959)
Sir Alexander Clutterbuck (Sept 1959–
1961)
Sir Saville Garner (Jan 1962–1968) 
Deputy permanent under-secretary Sir Henry Lintott (1956–1963)
of state (joint) Sir Algernon Rumbold (1958–1966)
Sir Neil Pritchard (July–Nov 1961; 1963–
1967)
Sir Arthur Snelling (1962–1966)
Assistant under-secretary of state A W Snelling (1957)
with superintending responsibility D W S Hunt (1960)
for Malaya N Pritchard (1961)
G P Hampshire (1962)
C S Pickard (1963) 
Assistant secretary, head of dept covering G W St J Chadwick (1957)
SE Asia C S Pickard (1958)
W J Smith (1960)
R C Omerod (1961–1962)
A A Golds (1963)
(d) Foreign office
Permanent under-secretary of state Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar (1957–1962)
Sir Harold Caccia (1962–1965)
(e) Ministry of defence
Permanent secretary Sir Richard Powell (1956–1959)
Sir Edward Playfair (1960–1961)
Sir Robert Scott (1961–1963)
Chief of defence staff Sir William Dickson (1958–1959)
Earl Mountbatten of Burma (1959–1965)
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( f ) Cabinet (Official) Committee on Greater Malaysia
This interdepartmental committee of officials was set up by direction of the prime
minister to examine Tunku Abdul Rahman’s proposal for the creation of a ‘Greater
Malaysia’ incorporating Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories. Chaired by the
permanent under-secretary, CRO (first Clutterbuck and then Garner) and composed
of representatives from the CO, FO, MoD and Treasury, it met for the first time on 27
Sept 1961 and was dissolved on 22 Oct 1963.
SOUTH EAST ASIA
1. British officials in SE Asia and some other postings
(a) SE Asia, 1957–1963
Commissioner-general Sir Robert Scott (1955–1959)
Earl of Selkirk (1959–1963)
Deputy commissioner-general A M MacKintosh (1956–1960)
Sir Denis Allen (1959–62)
A C S Adams (Nov 1962)
(b) Federation of Malaya, 1957–1963
High commissioner Sir Geofroy Tory (1957–1963)
Deputy high commissioner, KL R C W Hunt (1957–1959)
E Crombie (1960–1961)
M J Moynihan (1961–1963) 
Deputy high commissioner, Penang, D J King (1957–1959)
terminated Oct 1962 J R Williams (1959–1962)
(c) Singapore, 1957–1959
Governor Sir William Goode (1957–1959)
Chief secretary E B David (1957–1959)
(c) Singapore, 1959–63
Yang di-pertuan negara Sir William Goode ( 3 June–2 Dec 1959)
UK commissioner Earl of Selkirk (1959–1963)
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UK deputy commissioner H T Bourdillon (1959–1961)
P B C Moore (1961–1963)
(d) Brunei
High commissioner Sir Anthony Abell (1950–1959)
Sir Dennis White (1959–1963)
A M MacKintosh (1963–1964)
Resident J O Gilbert (1954–1958)
D C White (1958–1959)
(e) North Borneo
Governor Sir Roland Turnbull (1954–1960)
Sir William Goode (1960–1963)
Chief secretary R N Turner (1956–1963)
(f ) Sarawak
Governor Sir Anthony Abell (1950–1959)
Sir Alexander Waddell (1959–1963)
Chief secretary J H Ellis (1955–1958)
J C H Barcroft (1958)
F D Jakeway (1959–1963)
(g) Federation of Malaysia, 1963
High commissioner Viscount Head 
Deputy high commissioner, KL J R A Bottomley
Deputy high commissioner, Singapore P B C Moore 
Deputy high commissioner, Eastern H P Hall 
Malaysia (Kuching)
(h) Select list of other British officials overseas
Ambassador, Washington Sir Harold Caccia (1956–1961)
Sir David Ormsby-Gore (1961–1965)
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Permanent representative, UN Sir Pierson Dixon (1954–1960)
Sir Patrick Dean (1960–1964)
Permanent representative, UN Sir Andrew Cohen (1957–1960)
Trusteeship Council Sir Hugh Foot (1961–1962)
Ambassador, Jakarta Sir Leslie Fry (1959–1963)
Sir Andrew Gilchrist (1963–1966)
Ambassador, Manila J (Sir John) Pilcher (1959–1963)
2. SE Asian governments, 1957–1963
(a) Brunei
Head of state HH Sultan Omar Saifuddin III (r 1950–
1967)
Mentri besar/chief minister under 1959 Datu Perdana Mentri Ibrahim Jafar 
constitution (1959–1961)
Datu Seri Paduka Awang Haji Marsal 
bin Maun (Aug 1961–1967)
(b) Federation of Malaya
(i) Head of state and Cabinet ministers, Aug 1957– Sept 1963
Yang di-pertuan agong HM Tuanku Abdul Rahman of Negri 
Sembilan (1957–1960)
HM Hisamuddin Alam Shah of Selangor
(1960)
HM Syed Putra of Perlis (1960)
Prime minister Tunku Abdul Rahman (1957–Apr 1959,
Aug 1959–1963)
Tun Razak ( Apr–Aug 1959)
Deputy prime minister Tun Razak (1957–Apr 1959, Aug
1959–1963)
Minister of external affairs Tunku Abdul Rahman (1957–Apr 1959, 
Aug 1959–1963)
Dr Dato Ismail (Apr–Aug 1959)
Minister of defence Tun Razak (1957–1963)
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Minister of internal security/ home Dr Dato Ismail (1961–1963)
affairs
Minister of finance H S Lee (1957–1959)
Tan Siew Sin (1959–1963)
(ii) Officials, 1957–1963
Permanent secretary, PM’s Department Dato Abdul Aziz bib Haji Abdul Majid 
(1957–1963)
Permanent secretary, Ministry of Othman bin Mohamed (1957–1959)
External Affairs Ghazali Shafie (1959–1963)
Permanent secretary, Ministry of F Brewer (1957–1959)
Defence R G K Thompson (1959–1961)
Abdul Kadir bin Shamsudin (1961–1963)
High commissioner, London Dato Nik Kamil (1957–1958)
Tunku Yaacob (1958–1963)
Ambassador in Washington and Dr Dato Ismail (1957–1959)
permanent representative at UN Dato Nik Kamil (1959–1962)
Dato Ong Yoke Lin (1962)
(c) Singapore, 1957–1963
Head of state/Yang di-pertuan negara Sir William Goode (3 June–2 Dec 1959)
Yusof bin Ishak (2 Dec 1959; president 
of Republic of Singapore, 1965)
Chief minister to May1959 Lim Yew Hock (1956)
Prime minister from June 1959 Lee Kuan Yew 
Deputy prime minister from June 1959 Toh Chin Chye 
(c) Federation of Malaysia, 16 September 1963
(i) Heads of state and ministers
Yang di-pertuan agong HM Syed Putra of Perlis 
Prime minister & minister of external Tunku Abdul Rahman
affairs
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Deputy prime minister & minister of Tun Razak
defence
Minister of internal security & interior Dr Dato Ismail
Minister of finance Tan Siew Sin
Federal minister for Sabah affairs Peter Lo
Federal minister for Sarawak affairs Temenggong Jugah anak Barieng
Sabah, head of state Datu Mustapha bin Harun
Sabah, chief minister Donald Stephens
Sarawak, head of state Datu Abang Haji Openg
Sarawak, chief minister Stephen Kalong Ningkan
Singapore, head of state Yusof bin Ishak
Singapore, prime minister Lee Kuan Yew
(ii) Officials
Permanent secretary, PM’s Department Dato Abdul Aziz bib Haji Abdul Majid 
Permanent secretary, Ministry of Ghazali Shafie 
External Affairs
Permanent secretary, Ministry of Abdul Kadir bin Shamsudin 
Defence
High commissioner, London Tunku Yaacob
Ambassador in Washington and  Dato Ong Yoke Lin 
permanent representative at UN
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Chronological Table of Principal Events
1957
Jan Harold Macmillan forms government
Mar–Apr Constitutional talks in London result in agreement on self-government
for Singapore
Mar Bermuda conference between Macmillan and Eisenhower restores Anglo–
American special relationship after Suez crisis
Treaty of Rome for formation of European Common Market
Apr New constitution for Sarawak comes into force including legislature with
an elected majority
Party Rakyat Brunei holds first congress
Aug Independence of the Federation of Malaya
Oct Anglo–Malayan Defence Agreement signed
Dec Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee authorises public discussion of closer
association in North Borneo and Sarawak
PAP wins 13 seats in Singapore City Council election
1958
Jan Federation of West Indies inaugurated
May London talks settle the constitution for the self-governing State of Singapore
1959
Apr Malaya and Indonesia sign treaty of friendship (ratified 30 Apr 1960)
May People’s Action Party wins 43 out of 51 seats in elections to Singapore
legislative assembly
June Singapore becomes self-governing with Lee Kuan Yew as premier
SUPP formed in Sarawak
Aug Alliance (under Tunku Abdul Rahman) wins Malayan federal elections
with reduced majority
Sept Promulgation of Brunei constitution and Anglo–Brunei agreement
Oct Conservatives (under Macmillan) win British general election with
increased majority 
Nov–Dec Elections in Sarawak on multi-tier basis
1960
Feb Harold Macmillan’s ‘wind of change’ speech in Cape Town
Apr PANAS formed in Sarawak
June Tunku Abdul Rahman raises possibility of Greater Malaysia with Lord
Perth
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July Belgium sends troops to Congo
Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee discuss Greater Malaysia proposal
Official end of twelve-year Malayan emergency
Oct Lord Monckton’s report on Central African Federation
Nov Sir R Scott reports to ministers on future developments in SE Asia 
1961
Jan J F Kennedy inaugurated as president of USA
Duncan Sandys visits Kuala Lumpur for talk about merger
Apr Further discussions on Greater Malaysia in Cabinet Colonial Policy
Committee
Ong Eng Guan defeats PAP in Hong Lim by-election, Singapore
SNAP formed in Sarawak
May Tunku Abdul Rahman publicly proposes Greater Malaysia, 27 May
South Africa leaves Commonwealth
June Lee supports Tunku’s proposal, 3 June
Macmillan welcomes Tunku’s proposal in parliamentary statement, 20 June
July Tunku’s goodwill visit to Borneo territories
David Marshall defeats PAP in Anson by-election, Singapore
PAP dissidents meet Lord Selkirk, ‘Eden Hall tea party’
Lee Kuan Yew wins vote of confidence in Singapore’s legislative assembly
Formation of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee, 23 July
(meets Aug–Feb 1962)
Formation of the Barisan Sosialis, Singapore
Aug UNKO formed in North Borneo
Aug–Sept Discussions between Malaya and Singapore resulting in broad agreement
on merger
Sept Jamaicans vote in referendum to secede from Federation of West Indies
First meeting of Greater Malaysia (Official) Committee
Macmillan’s memo, ‘Our foreign and defence policy for the future’, 29 Sept
Sept–Oct Lee Kuan Yew’s radio broadcasts, ‘Battle for merger’
Oct Reginald Maudling succeeds Iain Macleod as secretary of state for colonies
Malayan house of assembly approve concept of Greater Malaysia, 18 Oct
Greater Malaysia (Official) Committee reports to ministers, 20 Oct
Nov Singapore white paper on proposed terms for merger
London talks between British and Malayan governments on Malaysia,
20–22 Nov
Dec Singapore legislative assembly votes in favour of Malaysia
USNO formed in North Borneo
BARJASA formed in Sarawak
1962
Jan Appointment of Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak
(Cobbold Commission)
Sir John Martin and Ian Wallace visit Borneo territories and Singapore
Feb Report of MSCC broadly favours Malaysia
Feb–Apr Cobbold Commission tours Sarawak and North Borneo, 18 Feb–18 Apr
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Mar Harold Watkinson visits Kuala Lumpur and Singapore for defence talks 
Tunku accuses British officers in Borneo of hampering progress towards
Malaysia
Apr Federation of West Indies dissolved
Philippines house of representatives makes formal claim upon North Borneo
May Cobbold Commission reconvenes in the UK
June Lord Cobbold submits report to Harold Macmillan and Tunku Abdul
Rahman (21 June)
July Harold Macmillan reshuffles Cabinet (‘night of the long knives’) and
Sandys becomes secretary of state for the colonies (in addition to
Commonwealth secretary)
Lee Kuan Yew wins vote in legislative assembly on referendum bill
Lee Kuan Yew successfully defends referendum for merger at UN
Brunei legislative council supports participation in merger talks
Neutrality of Laos guaranteed at conclusion of Geneva Conference
President Macapagal (Philippines) suggests Maphilindo (grouping of
Malaya, Philippines and Indonesia)
London talks result in Anglo–Malayan agreement on Malaysia, 31 July
Aug Publication of joint statement on Malaysia and Cobbold Report, 1 Aug
Inter-Governmental Committee set up under Lord Lansdowne; first
meeting, 30 Aug
Party Rakyat wins Brunei elections
Netherlands and Indonesia reach agreement on West Irian dispute
Sept Singaporeans vote for Malaysia in a referendum, 1 Sept
Legislatures of North Borneo and Sarawak approve Malaysia in principle
Commonwealth premiers endorse British negotiations to join EEC 
Oct Transfer of West Irian to UN (later to Indonesia, 1 May 1963)
Formation of Sabah Alliance Party
Formation of Sarawak United Front (Sarawak Alliance, Nov 1962)
Nov Tunku’s second goodwill visit to North Borneo and Sarawak
Dec Dean Acheson says Britain has lost an empire but failed to find a role, 5 Dec
Brunei rising, 8 Dec 
President Kennedy and Macmillan meet at Nassau and agree that US
shall provide Britain with Polaris missiles instead of Skybolt
Britain acknowledges Nyasaland’s right to secede from Central African
Federation
1963
Jan De Gaulle vetoes UK application to join EEC
Dr Subandrio announces Indonesia’s ‘confrontation’ towards Malaysia,
20 Jan
Feb Operation ‘Cold Store’ leads to mass arrests of communists and their
supporters in Singapore
Quadripartite talks on Malaysia in Washington (Australia, New Zealand,
United Kingdom and United States)
Publication of the Report of the Inter-Governmental Committee (Lord
Lansdowne), 27 Feb
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Feb–Mar Talks between Brunei and Malaya result in heads of agreement 
Mar Executive Working Group on Malaysian matters set up in Whitehall
Sarawak’s Council Negri and North Borneo’s legislative council approve
Malaysian entry terms as set out in Lansdowne report
Apr Angus MacKintosh succeeds Dennis White as high commissioner of
Brunei
Sir Henry Lintott’s financial mission to Kuala Lumpur, 6–14 Apr
May Anglo–Malayan talks in London on financial provision for Malaysia
Tunku Abdul Rahman and Sukarno meet in Tokyo
May–June Lansdowne visits KL for talks
June Foreign ministers of Malaya, Philippines and Indonesia meet in Manila
IBRD mission (Jacques Rueff) reports on economic aspects of Malaysia
Talks in Kuala Lumpur between Malaya and Singapore and between
Malaya and Brunei reach deadlock  and Tunku suggests ‘Little Malaysia’
Off-shore oil discovered in Brunei
July London talks result in the Malaysia Agreement without Brunei, 9 July
Conclusion of elections in North Borneo and Sarawak
British Parliament enacts legislation for Malaysia
July–Aug Manila Summit between Tunku Abdul Rahman, Sukarno (Indonesia) and
Macapagal (Philippines), 30 July–5 Aug
Aug Macmillan and Kennedy correspond on Indonesian opposition to
Malaysia
Britain, US and USSR sign nuclear test ban treaty
Federal Parliament enacts legislation for Malaysia
Completion of British orders in council for constitutions of Sabah,
Sarawak and Singapore, and for compensation to overseas officers in
North Borneo and Sarawak
Postponement of Malaysia 
UN mission on Borneo opinion,  arrives in Kuching on 16 Aug
Duncan Sandys makes prolonged visit to KL, departs London 23 Aug
Lee Kuan Yew unilaterally declares Singapore’s independence on 31 Aug
Sabah and Sarawak achieve de facto self-government pending formation
of Malaysia
Sept Yang di-pertuan agong appoints heads of state for Sabah and Sarawak
Publication of the report of the UN mission to North Borneo and
Sarawak, 14 Sept
Inauguration of Malaysia, 16 Sept
Indonesian mob storms British embassy in Jakarta, 16–18 Sept
People’s Action Party wins general election in Singapore, 21 Sept
05-Malaysia-Chrono-cpp  21/9/04  9:03 AM  Page xxxiv
xxxv
Introduction*
The Foreign Office and the Foreign Office documents
The documents in this collection tell the story of the making of Malaysia from the
records and perspectives of British policy-makers. They narrate developments from
the achievement of Malayan independence in 1957 to the inauguration six years later
of a greater state incorporating Malaya, Singapore, Sabah (North Borneo) and
Sarawak. In so doing they reveal how statements of intent became detailed plans and
the extent to which these plans were brought to fruition. That some called it a ‘Grand
Design’ suggests a coherent scheme of decolonisation and, in so far as it was, it
appeared to be effective; after all, Britain managed to withdraw from remaining
dependencies in Southeast Asia while retaining interests and influence there. 
At first sight, therefore, the formation of Malaysia may appear to have been the
completion of unfinished business and the last, rather predictable, chapter in the
history of colonial empire in Southeast Asian. It came at the end of a spate of
decolonisation by the Macmillan government and at a time when European powers
were generally eager to detach themselves from overseas dependencies if, indeed,
they had not already done so. In fact, the principal components of the Malaysia
project had previously passed beyond colonialism: Malaya had been independent
since 31 August 1957 and, although sovereignty over Singapore lay with Britain until
its transfer to Malaysia, the island enjoyed internal self-government from June 1959.
Brunei (which had been expected to join the federation until the Sultan pulled out
on the eve of the signing ceremony) was a protected state with its own sovereign
ruler and, therefore, beyond British jurisdiction. Of the participating countries, only
North Borneo and Sarawak were crown colonies, and, in a manner of speaking, only
North Borneo and Sarawak were being decolonised. Indeed, as the final touches were
put to Malaysia, the British presented it to the United Nations, not as a new state, but
as an extension of an existing member-state, that is to say an extension of the
∗ During the course of research for this volume I have incurred debts to many people and institutions. I
wish to thank Shigeru Akita, Mandy Banton, Matthew Jones, Yoichi Kibata, Albert Lau, Edwin Lee, Roger
Louis, Mohd Samsudin, Andrew Porter, Kumar Ramakrishna, Tim Ross, the late Ralph Smith, and
Nicholas White. I am especially grateful to the BDEEP general editor, Stephen Ashton, for his support and
expert guidance throughout the preparation of this volume. I received a generous grant of sabbatical leave
from Royal Holloway, University of London to enable me to complete the volume and invaluable assistance
from the Bodelian Library (Rhodes House), British Library, Churchill Archives Centre at Cambridge, The
National Archives (Public Record Office), and the library of the School of Oriental and African Studies. My
research has benefited from discussion at the Imperial History Seminar (University of Cambridge), the
Imperial History Seminar (Institute of Historical Research, London), the seminar on ‘South Asia and the
Modern World-System’ (University of Tokyo, Bunkyo-ku, Nov 2000), the workshop on ‘Nation-building
Histories’ (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, Sept 2002), and a meeting of the Royal Society
for Asian Affairs (Feb 2003). Parts of articles published in the Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History, 26, 2 (1998), Asian Affairs, 24, 3 (2003), and Modern Asian Studies, 38, 4 (2004) were drawn from
material used for this volume. Finally, I thank Jane, whose encouragement has sustained me through the
years of research and writing.
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independent Federation of Malaya to which Sabah (North Borneo), Sarawak and
Singapore merely acceded. In short, the creation of Malaysia appears to have been an
undramatic piece of house-keeping, an operation to tidy up the remnants of empire. 
But the documents expose another, rougher side to the story: one in which policy-
making snagged on the contradictions of multiple objectives; one in which Britain
was buffeted by the conflicting demands of local politicians and interventions from
outside; one in which events frequently brought planning to a standstill and deadlock
fostered despondency; one in which resistance was met by guile or coercion, and the
prospect of failure provoked desperate measures; one in which not all of Britain’s
objectives were fulfilled while some of its fears were realised. Indeed, the Malaysia
that was inaugurated on 16 September 1963 failed wholly to satisfy any of the parties
to it. It was neither forged through nationalist struggle, nor did it reflect a
homogeneous national identity. Rather it was the product of grudging compromise
and underpinned by only fragile guarantees; its formation was peppered with
resistance and that it came into being at all was regarded by many at the time as a
close-run thing. 
Taken altogether the 227 documents in this collection are perhaps the equivalent
in size to a few of the bulkier files amongst the thousands consulted during the
research for this volume. Selection has, therefore, been brutal but it has been guided
by the overarching quest for those papers which shed light on the reasons, manner
and timing of the key decisions to end empire and create the successor state of
Malaysia. In providing a continuous record of such decisions, the editor has, firstly,
struck a balance between the principal themes of colonial obligations and imperial
interests, secondly, placed Malaysian policy in the context of domestic, regional and
global problems, thirdly, included material from various departments and levels of
government, and, finally, covered crises and the unexpected as well as the measured
products of calm deliberation. 
The documents are presented in chronological order and arranged in five chapters.
Each chapter deals with a distinct period which ends at the apparent closure of one
issue and at the start of another phase in policy-making. Chapter 1 covers the
tentative steps towards territorial integration following Malayan independence and
culminates in Tunku Abdul Rahman’s public initiative on 27 May 1961. The second
chapter, which is dominated by Anglo–Malayan discussions, concludes with the joint
statement following the London talks of November 1961. This publicised an
undertaking to proceed with Malaysia provided conditions about the future of
Singapore and the interests of Borneo peoples were met. Chapter three focuses,
though not to the exclusion of other problems, on the Cobbold enquiry into Borneo
opinion. During this period the crisis in Anglo–Malayan relations, which was
provoked by the Commission’s report, combined with the deterioration in Lee Kuan
Yew’s position in Singapore to threaten a break-down which was averted by the two
agreements (one public and the other secret) reached at the London conference at
the end of July 1962. Over the next year (chapter 4), the detailed membership terms
and constitutional provisions were worked out in inter-governmental discussions
between Malaya and Singapore, between Malaya and Brunei, and between Britain,
Malaya and the Borneo colonies. Steady progress towards the formal agreement on 9
July 1963 was disrupted, however, by the Brunei revolt, mass arrests in Singapore,
opposition from Indonesia and the Philippines, and the decision of the Sultan of
Brunei not to join the federation. The roller-coaster then entered its shortest but
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bumpiest passage (chapter 5) as the result of the Tunku’s decision to postpone
inauguration pending a UN inquiry. 
The chronological account given by the documents is supported by a narrative
which is reproduced as the appendix to this collection. Entitled ‘The origins and
formation of Malaysia’, this paper was produced in 1970 by the Research Department
of the FCO and, like the other documents here, its availability was subject to the
provisions of the ‘thirty year rule’. It represents considerable research and the
investment of much staff time but no explanation is provided for its origins and
purpose, about which one can only speculate. It may have been used to provide
background to the continuing dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines over
sovereign jurisdiction in Sabah (formerly North Borneo); a few lines on this subject
(Appendix, paragraph 141) have been retained under section 3(4) of the Public
Records Act of 1958. On the other hand, it should be noted that the dispute amounts
to a relatively brief section of the paper. Since narrative is well served by the appendix
as well as by the chronological arrangement of the documents, this introduction
approaches the making of Malaysia from two different angles: the first part, Aspects
of Policy, discusses the notion of the ‘Grand Design’, economic factors, defence
issues and the making and implementation of the Malaysia policy. The second part,
Dimensions of Merger, examines the Malaya-Singapore axis, Anglo–Malayan
differences over the decolonisation of Borneo, the United Nations mission and,
finally, Brunei’s decision not to join.
1 Aspects of Policy
The ‘Grand Design’: awaiting an initiative
Our ultimate objective is a Confederation between the five present territories of
the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei. We have
already agreed that this should be achieved in two stages: first by the combination
of (a) Singapore and the Federation and (b) the three Borneo Territories as
separate entities; and second, by bring [sic] together these two groups under one
appropriate constitutional government.
[Malcolm MacDonald, 2 April 1955 1]
The inauguration of the Federation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963 was the
culmination of a long-held objective of British government. Consolidation of
disparate Southeast Asian dependencies became a principle of policy during wartime
planning for the post-war region and was pursued erratically and unsuccessfully over
the next fifteen years. Six months after the fall of Singapore to Japan, the Foreign
Office and Colonial Office agreed on the desirability of a union of the Malay States,
Straits Settlements and Borneo territories. Although the final plans for the post-war
reoccupation of Southeast Asia fell far short of such a union, the government 
created a structure for regional co-ordination in the office of the governor-general
(later commissioner-general) and looked forward to the eventual creation of what
Malcolm MacDonald called a self-governing ‘British dominion of Southeast Asia’. The
post-war separation of Singapore and Malaya was deeply regretted in many
quarters—not least on economic grounds—but the prospect of their merger was
kept alive by the commissioner-general and by community leaders. Cautious
attempts were made to link the three Borneo territories, on the one hand, and, on
the other, to encourage politicians in Malaya and Singapore to discuss the feasibility
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of merging island with peninsula. It was envisaged that Malaya and Singapore would
unite in advance of the Borneo territories, and that integration of the two blocs lay
some distance in the future on account of their unequal political and economic
development. An alternative approach was to encourage the amalgamation of all five
territories, without the preliminary formation of the Malayan and Borneo blocs, but
until 1961 this was generally regarded as unrealistic. In any case, closer association
was expected to be a long-drawn-out process. Periodically, the British tried to
stimulate local interest in the concept, but they knew it would be counter-productive
to impose a scheme or to issue a directive and they steadfastly refrained from forcing
the pace.2
Notwithstanding declarations of intent, however, progress was slow. Malays of the
peninsula mistrusted domination by Singapore’s Chinese; Singaporeans feared their
subordination as the twelfth state in a Malay-controlled federation; business interests
of peninsula and island pulled in different directions; the Sultan of Brunei was on his
guard against loss of both sovereignty and oil revenue; non-Malay indigenous peoples
of Borneo had little love for Malays, while British governors of North Borneo and
Sarawak were adamant that their charges should be given sufficient, if unspecified,
time to prepare for merger. Momentum was lost during the worst years of the
Malayan emergency (1948–1960) when territories drifted further apart and their
separateness was reinforced by vested interests. In 1953 a Joint Co-ordinating
Committee was established to prepare for the merger of island and peninsula largely
because General Templer (high commissioner, Malaya, 1952–1954) and the Chiefs of
Staff sought to integrate the defence and internal security of Malaya and Singapore.3
At the same time fresh impetus was given to the integration of the Borneo
dependencies; in April 1953 MacDonald succeeded to the extent of establishing the
twice-yearly Inter-Territorial Conference for the co-ordination of policies and
common services. Neither initiative bore fruit. MacDonald was tireless and infinitely
optimistic in the pursuit of what he called ‘our grand design’, but on his departure
from Southeast Asia in 1955 it still seemed a long way off.4 If the union of Malaya and
Singapore presented difficulties, those related to its assimilation of the Borneo
territories were even greater: politically and economically they diverged from each
other and lagged far behind Singapore and Malaya. In March 1956 the Sultan of
Brunei publicly rejected the idea of a Borneo federation with the result that the
Colonial Office temporarily shelved a proposal for a Standing Joint Council to take
over from the Inter-Territorial Conferences. Meanwhile, Malaya and Singapore went
their separate ways. In August 1957 the Federation achieved independence on its
own and in 1957–1958 two constitutional conferences placed Singapore on course to
be a self-governing state in 1959. Thus empire ended in Malaya before three
frequently-stated pre-conditions for decolonisation were in place: firstly, the state of
emergency had not ended; secondly, a genuine multi-racial movement and sense of
nationhood had yet to emerge; thirdly, fusion with Singapore and the Borneo
territories seemed more distant than ever. 
Nevertheless, the British did not abandon the goal of regional consolidation. Three
months after Malayan merdeka (independence), the secretary of state for the colonies
returned to the question of the closer association of the Borneo territories. Still wary
of forcing the pace, Alan Lennox-Boyd recommended to the Cabinet Colonial Policy
Committee the encouragement of public debate in the two colonies about their
future (documents 1, 2). Following radio broadcasts by the governors (3), the
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Legislative Councils of North Borneo and Sarawak set up committees to ascertain
popular reaction to the idea of territorial integration. Largely owing to inter-ethnic
mistrust, the response was unenthusiastic. The chief obstacle once again proved to
be the Sultan of Brunei who resented current supervision by personnel from the
Sarawak government and suspected that further integration would result in the
distribution of oil revenue to poorer neighbours. When he returned to Brunei in
December 1958, MacDonald (who was then high commissioner in New Delhi), noted
impressive developments since his last visit just over three years before as well as ‘a
pleasing change in the Sultan himself ’. He observed ‘that his face reveals a much
more mature, self-confident character than before. Nor did I see in his eyes any hint
of the madness which one should perhaps look for in a member of the Royal House of
Brunei’ (5, see also 6). On these grounds MacDonald based a hope that his highness
might yet be persuaded to espouse closer association. 
In fact, however, Omar Ali Saifuddun explored the possibility of a different link-
up—a special relationship with the Federation of Malaya. In 1958–1959 he granted a
loan of M$100 million to the federal government which in turn seconded civil
servants to take the place of British expatriates in the fledgling modern state of
Brunei. Omar Ali also entertained Malay Sultans at the opening of the new mosque in
Brunei Town, visited Kuala Lumpur and received as his guest in Brunei the Yang-di
Pertuan Agong (the king of Malaya).5 The British had mixed feelings about this
Brunei-Malaya rapprochement: on the one hand it might constitute a breach of the
1905–1906 arrangement whereby Britain had assumed control of Brunei’s external
relations; on the other hand, it might usefully prepare Borneo for the ultimate stage
in regional consolidation. In any case, British officials had very little say in the
matter after Omar Saifuddin reinforced his autonomy by promulgating a written
constitution on 29 September 1959. ‘Brunei is now in practice no longer a Colonial
Office responsibility’, remarked a former high commissioner. ‘She will go her own
way’ (16, see also 4 and 9). 
As one cadre of senior officials was replaced by another at the end of 1959 and the
beginning of 1960—Scott by Selkirk as commissioner-general, Turnbull by Goode as
governor of North Borneo, Abell by Waddell as governor of Sarawak and by White as
high commissioner of Brunei—there was a general assessment of the prospects for
territorial consolidation. Scott suggested that the resurrection of the idea would be
something for the in-coming governors of North Borneo and Sarawak to address (11,
12, 14, 16, 17).6 While he emphasised ‘that the future holds great promise for the
Borneo Territories in conjunction and danger if they fail to unite’, he reiterated ‘that
no pressure should be put upon the Sultan to drive him in the direction of closer
association’ (11). Abell summed up the position as follows: ‘The case for a form of
closer association is as strong today as it ever was; the arguments used in its favour
are as unassailable as they ever were but the practical difficulties have grown
immeasurably and will continue to grow unless we do something about them.’ Abell
went further, however, in arguing that the time had come for London to take the
lead: ‘I think it is essential that Her Majesty’s Government should have a policy in
this matter which her representatives in Borneo should be instructed to follow. If we
are allowed to drift further apart we may find, as in the case of Malaya and Singapore
that the gulf is too wide to bridge’ (16). Two months later, Sir Denis Allen (out-going
deputy commissioner-general) similarly urged Whitehall to take the lead: ‘I confess
to some uneasiness whether, if … our attitude remained simply one of “wait and
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see”, we might not find ourselves missing important opportunities when the critical
moment came.’ He continued: ‘if we wish to use our remaining influence in those
territories to steer events in one direction rather than another we ought to begin
soon’ (18). 
The long-awaited initiative came from an unexpected quarter when Tunku Abdul
Rahman, prime minister of Malaya, explored the idea of a super-federation of Malaya,
the Borneo territories and possibly Singapore too. The Tunku was known to be
hostile to a bilateral merger with Singapore, but in 1958–1959 his interest in the
‘Grand Design’ may have been stirred by the possibility—deemed by British officials
to be unlikely—of Sukarno mounting a claim to northern Borneo on the lines of his
bid for Western New Guinea (7, 8, 10 and 19). While it may have been tempting to
move immediately to their ultimate objective—ie the integration of all five
territories—British representatives in Southeast Asia felt that the Tunku’s proposal
was unrealistic and even dangerous. Premature union with Malaya would set back
the steady development of North Borneo and Sarawak which, it was held, would be
better served by colonial rule for many years to come. ‘On the whole’, commented Sir
John Martin of the Colonial Office in a letter to Sir Denis Allen in Singapore,
‘benevolent neutrality, but with “later rather than now” the motto, seems our right
policy in this matter’ (20).7 For the time being the Tunku was persuaded that the
federation’s assimilation of the Borneo territories should remain a long-term goal
with an unspecified target date. Nevertheless, while in London for the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in May–June 1960, the Tunku raised
the subject in a talk with Lord Perth, minister of state for colonial affairs (21, 22).
Ministers might have allowed the matter to drop once again had it not been for
Selkirk’s intervention.
Selkirk, who had only recently taken up his appointment in Southeast Asia,
recognised the difficulties in merger: tension arising from communal and economic
differences, doubts over the future of the Singapore base and obligations to protect
the ‘more primitive peoples’ of Borneo. With respect to the last issue, he foresaw ‘the
possible danger of running into a situation somewhat similar to that in the Central
African Federation’, a comparison which would frequently be drawn by British
policy-makers during the course of the next three years. On the other hand, he felt
their membership of a ‘Greater Malaysia’ would provide the Borneo territories with
much-needed protection, for, even if they were to achieve independence on their
own, they would not be able to defend themselves without British assistance (23).
Defence and security were the key issues for Selkirk. It was most important to ‘give a
measure of stability to the area’ which was threatened by territorial fragmentation
and particularly by the political instability of Singapore. Now at last the Tunku, who
hitherto had raised all manner of objections to merger, offered an opportunity for
some movement in this direction to which, Selkirk was confident, Lee Kuan Yew’s
government in Singapore would ‘readily agree’. Inchoate though the Tunku’s
proposal was, the commissioner-general urged ministers to examine it ‘very closely
and urgently’.
Selkirk’s entreaty had its effect in that on 27 July the matter was considered by
the Colonial Policy Committee, chaired by the prime minister and with the
commissioner-general present (24, 25, 27). There was, however, no dramatic shift in
approach. On the advice of officials, Iain Macleod presented a cautious paper. The
secretary of state went only so far as to incline to the view that ‘the idea of an
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association of the five territories was likely to provide the least unsatisfactory future’
both for the Borneo peoples and for Britain, and that it might pave the way for the
merger of Malaya and Singapore which now seemed unlikely except within a wider
federation. He argued that ‘we ought to go slowly’ because ‘there are so many
unknowns here’ and ‘far too many imponderables for us to be certain’. Rather than
issue a policy statement, he instructed Selkirk to consult the governors of North
Borneo and Sarawak and the high commissioner of Brunei. Having conferred at a
meeting in Kuching, which was attended by Lord Perth, on 25 October Selkirk
formally requested ministerial endorsement of broad lines of a policy gradually
leading to the political association of the five territories (30). At the end of January
1961, after the matter had been aired in the annual conference at Eden Hall (the
commissioner-general’s residence), Selkirk followed up his October despatch with
another. Now he was more insistent that, against a backdrop of Singapore’s
deteriorating internal security, ‘Her Majesty’s Government should decide urgently
what its attitude should be towards the Grand Design’. He feared that, unless
ministers responded positively to Lee Kuan Yew’s commitment to merger,
Singapore’s prime minister would be challenged, possibly toppled, by the extreme
left. He also reported encouraging signs that the Malayan government was coming
round to the view that its own well-being depended on stabilising Singapore through
merger (32, 33, also 47). 
Ever since Malayan independence, British interest in closer association had
focused but snagged on the Borneo territories. From early 1961, however, the
potential insecurity of Singapore concentrated attention on the other dimension of
the ‘Grand Design’—the union of Malaya and Singapore. Since the Tunku would not
contemplate the latter without being sure of the former, the British faced a dilemma:
an accelerated advance towards ‘Greater Malaysia’ would have grave repercussions on
Borneo, but delay could be fatal for Singapore (26, 31, 36). In mid-April 1961, on the
recommendation of Macleod, the Colonial Policy Committee deferred a decision
pending further consultations, this time with the Australian and New Zealand
governments and also with the Tunku, Lee Kuan Yew and other local notables (34,
35). Ministers had not turned their backs on the ‘Grand Design’, but they were
reluctant to run the risk of pressing ahead with it until they had were assured that it
had significant support and a reasonable chance of success.
The determination driving the ‘Grand Design’ at this stage lay in Southeast Asia,
not in London, and more in Singapore than in Kuala Lumpur. A few days after the
Colonial Policy Committee had confirmed its cautious approach and had authorised
Selkirk to take soundings locally, Lee Kuan Yew himself broached the matter with
the Tunku. Lee was faced with dissent in his party and opposition to his government,
and it was imperative to persuade the Tunku of the need for an early agreement on
merger in principle. After their meeting and having consulted Selkirk and Philip
Moore (Selkirk’s deputy), Lee composed a secret paper on how merger might be
achieved which he completed on 9 May and despatched to Kuala Lumpur (37).
Although the commissioner-general had doubts about its practicality, especially
regarding the integration of the Borneo territories for whose closer association he
recommended a number of immediate measures (36), a break-through was in the
offing. Tun Razak, Malaya’s deputy prime minister, accepted Lee’s arguments and in
turn convinced the Tunku that Malaya could no longer stand alone. In a speech to
foreign correspondents at the Singapore Press Club on 27 May 1961, Tunku Abdul
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Rahman announced his conversion to ‘Greater Malaysia’ in general but unmistakable
terms. He later described its ‘electrifying’ effect: ‘Suddenly everyone was sitting bolt
upright, hardly believing their ears. … My reference so discreetly but publicly to
“Malaysia” took all the territories by storm.’ 8 Tory was delighted: ‘Given his violent
prejudice hitherto this represents almost miraculous change of heart. As suspected,
now penny has dropped.’ He urged ministers to seize the opportunity and press
ahead towards long-held objectives, for, while the Tunku was ‘perhaps moving ahead
faster than we were prepared to go… we have more hope of steering him if we go
along with him than if we try to restrain him at this juncture’ (39). 
Although the integration of the five territories had long been pivotal to British
strategy in the region, the mood in London was neither triumphant nor even
optimistic. For years ministers had awaited a local initiative; but, now that it had
been offered, the way forward was unclear and success uncertain. The Tunku, by
contrast, tried to force the pace. Unnerved by the deteriorating situation in
Singapore, he wanted an early decision on the Borneo territories and, with the zeal of
a convert, he pressed the British government for an explicit policy statement (41,
46). While Selkirk was anxious not to waste this chance, he and other British officials
in the region were appalled by the Tunku’s haste with respect to North Borneo and
Sarawak (40, 42–44, 47, 48, 55, 58). At home ministers were careful not to give the
impression of wanting Malaysia either forthwith or at all costs. In any case, they
preferred to enter negotiations without having first revealed their fundamental
desiderata. Macmillan, therefore, parried the Tunku’s demands while he awaited the
views of the Australian and New Zealand governments (51–53, 57). When, however,
the Tunku made it clear that he would not engage in talks without a firm British
commitment to Malaysia, Macmillan, who had so far merely welcomed the proposal
in a parliamentary statement at the end of June, had no option but to adopt it as a
principle of policy (61, 63, 66, 67). It was not until the end of September, four
months after the Tunku’s public announcement, that the British prime minister set
in train formal preparations for Anglo–Malayan discussions (60, 62, 71, 75–78).
The ‘Grand Design’ might have appeared to offer a future for Singapore and the
Borneo territories, long-term security for Malaya and guarantees for Britain’s
interests and influence in the region, yet at this stage it was more a rhetorical
flourish than a template for territorial integration, let alone for nation-building.
Duncan Sandys for one criticised the term as ‘pretentious and vague’.9 In itself,
‘Grand Design’ did not provide practical answers to the pressing questions now
facing ministers and their officials. How was continued British use of the Singapore
base to be guaranteed? How was the union of independent Malaya and the British
dependency of Singapore to be effected? How were the Borneo territories to be
integrated within Malaysia without contravening British trusteeship obligations to
their peoples? What were the likely costs and benefits of Malaysia? 
Economic aspects
My own personal feeling is that the economic aspects of these proposals are not
likely to be of paramount importance.
[C C Lucas (Treasury), 21 Aug 1960 10]
The making of Malaysia was not simply a colonial issue. It has to be considered, as it
was by politicians and policy-makers at the time, against a backdrop of balance of
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payments problems and galloping defence costs, of the Cold War and the special
relationship with the US, of Commonwealth allegiances and the anti-colonialism of
the UN. Strategies of decolonisation could help Britain address these other problems
if, by moving from formal to informal empire, it found a new role in the world.11
With respect to Southeast Asia, the ‘Grand Design’ for a ‘Greater Malaysia’ might
perpetuate Britain’s influence in the post-colonial period. Those in British governing
circles who welcomed Malaysia did so on account of its expected benefits for Britain.
It was these very expectations, on the other hand, that moved Malaya’s Socialist
Front, Singapore’s Barisan Sosialis and Brunei’s Party Rakyat to condemn Malaysia
as neo-colonialism, as the pursuit of imperialism by other means. The charge that it
was ‘in fact, nothing but a smokescreen behind which the old colonialist activities
continue’ was also energetically articulated by the Indonesian government and the
Soviet bloc in the United Nations. A month after its inauguration, Khrushchev
condemned Malaysia as ‘a new form of the old colonialist policy’. He continued: ‘The
British imperialists want to hold onto their colonial domination in South East Asia,
and in creating this State they are merely changing the label’.12 Associated with the
transparent polemic of President Sukarno’s rickety regime, these claims may now
appear an easy target.13 Nevertheless, the economic aspects of neo-colonialism have
found support in so much of the scholarly literature, that their significance in
driving and shaping British policy should be reassessed. 
Certainly there is plenty of data indicating that British business continued to dom-
inate the trade, investment, planting and mining sectors of the ‘Greater Malaysia’
region and enjoyed a favourable position in the post-colonial state of Malaya. Indeed,
British business had huge assets in the Federation, Singapore and the Borneo terri-
tories. British private capital investment in Malaya was estimated at about £400 mil-
lions (compared with £335 millions in India and £108 in Pakistan) while British
exports were approximately £60 millions or, according to another evaluation, about
22 per cent of Malaya’s total imports. At the time of Malayan independence British
officials emphasised the country’s value as a source of essential raw materials and a
substantial dollar-earner.14 After independence economic links between Malaya and
the United Kingdom intensified and, when the British government was calculating
its financial settlement for Malaysia in 1963, Sir Geofroy Tory (high commissioner in
Kuala Lumpur) advocated generous provision on the ground that Britain had ‘a very
big financial stake in Malaya and a considerable vested interest in the maintenance of
a stable and prosperous Malayan economy’ (170). 
In the long-term, however, Malaya’s economic importance for Britain was on the
wane.15 Whereas Britain had valued Malaya for the dollar-earning capacity of rubber
and tin (it had been the principal dollar-earner at the onset of the communist
insurrection), by 1960 ‘the importance of Malayan dollars to the strength of sterling
had now declined with the spread of convertibility’.16 Competition with synthetic
rubber tended to drive down the price of natural rubber and make it a decreasingly
attractive investment. A similar trend towards substitution affected Malayan tin
exports. As the significance for Britain of Malaya’s dollar earnings diminished and
interest faded in commercial development within the sterling area, so Malayan
investment groups diversified into western economies in the 1950s. British exports
to the region also fell off conspicuously and, although this trend was reversed, the
improvement was short-lived. When Sardon Jubir (Malaya’s minister of transport)
visited London in May 1961 with an estimated purse of £17 million, the British
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government laid on a ‘show’, including a meeting with Macmillan, in an attempt to
win contracts for manufacturing industry in the UK. Although Sardon was
impressed, he admitted that, in order to escape accusations of neo-colonialism,
British business had to be exceptional to win contracts in post-colonial Malaya.17 So
far as capital contracts were concerned, it was reported that ‘British firms have not
secured any major civil engineering contracts in Malaya’ and only one, Taylor
Woodrow, had shown an interest in tendering for the construction of the
international airport at Subang (outside Kuala Lumpur).18 At the same time British
capital was losing its bargaining power. Until the early 1960s British business was
said to be enjoying a honeymoon with independent Malaya, a relationship that was
reinforced by its contributions to the Alliance’s election expenses. Yet a mood of
pessimism affected British businessmen who foresaw difficulties ahead such as
economic nationalism, or economic mismanagement, or the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism, or the revival of communist insurgency.19
Britain’s economic importance for Southeast Asia and the region’s economic
significance for Britain were declining together. All the more reason, one might
think, for the government to promote British enterprise, as, indeed, they did by
sending out trade missions to the area in 1961. It is not surprising, therefore, that
Malaysia has been described as the extension of the neo-colony of Malaya. For
example, Greg Poulgrain has stated that one of the guiding principles in the
decolonisation of Southeast Asia was ‘that the new political leaders who assumed the
reins of power when the Colonial Office departed should be known to be amenable to
continued British investment’.20 Yet the records are almost silent on the economic
benefits which the ‘Grand Design’ might bring to Britain. Of course, historians
should look outside government files for information on the views of businessmen,
but, had their activities significantly affected policy-making, it is reasonable to
assume that the impact would have been noted in the official papers. In contrast,
however, to the documents at The National Archives on Malaya for 1948 which reveal
business pressures on government for firm action over communist insurgency, those
for 1960–1963 contain relatively little on business relations with government. There
is, indeed, hardly any evidence of representations from manufacturers seeking
contracts, or from traders concerned about possible tariff changes, or from investors
apprehensive about the likely nationalisation of foreign assets. Even the concerns of
Brunei Shell appear to have been peripheral to the pre-occupations of policy-makers:
company spokesmen informed the high commissioner and CO officials of their hopes
and fears, but these did not alter the course of British policy. Although one of the
principal reasons for the collapse of the negotiations over Brunei’s entry into
Malaysia was the dispute over the allocation of mineral revenues between federal and
state governments, it was the political rather than the economic aspects of this issue
that principally exercised British policy-makers. In any case, until the discovery of
rich, off-shore deposits was confirmed in June 1963, the prognosis of Brunei Shell
throughout the planning of Malaysia was that mineral sources were in decline and
that oil was a diminishing asset. ‘The oil will not last for ever’ (25; also 165). In short,
there is nothing in the record of policy-making to suggest that the government set
out to advance business interests, or was swayed by the concerns of British
companies, or thoroughly explored the likely impact of territorial integration on
British trade and investments, or made use of British business connections to further
its case. 
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When Whitehall first addressed the economic aspects of the ‘Grand Design’, it
concentrated on its implications for the component territories (in terms of
development, tariffs and inter-territorial trade) rather than its possible benefits for
the United Kingdom. Officials at the Treasury, CO and CRO formed the view early on
that the economic aspects of the Malaysia proposal were ‘not likely to be of
paramount importance’, since the ‘concept is essentially a political one and it is on
political considerations that it will stand or fall’. With this in mind, they expected
political integration to produce economic difficulties for the territories involved.
Primary producers of Malaya and Borneo might suffer from internal competition.
Furthermore, without safeguards or assistance, the economic inferiority of the Malay
community might be aggravated. In addition, burgeoning industries in the peninsula
might be nipped in the bud by those in Singapore. Officials presciently foresaw that
the benefits that Malaya might derive from ‘Brunei’s money bags’ would be counter-
balanced by the costs of North Borneo and Sarawak. With respect to the United
Kingdom’s economic interests, however, they reckoned that these ‘would be little
affected either way’.21
Although economics were subordinated to political issues, they were nonetheless
an important aspect of strategies for territorial integration. Thus, as part of the drive
to consolidate Borneo interests, activities and services, in March 1961 a small
committee chaired by J L Rampton (who had been seconded from the Treasury as
financial adviser to the British high commission in Kuala Lumpur) recommended
new machinery to facilitate economic co-operation. It also proposed a free trade
arrangement for North Borneo and Sarawak and this led to the creation of a common
market in January 1962 and the appointment of H P Hall to serve as co-ordinator
based in Jesselton (36). British officials took a close interest in the IBRD mission, led
by Jacques Rueff, which was originally appointed to examine the feasibility of closer
economic co-operation between Malaya and Singapore and which later extended its
scope to include the Borneo territories. Its proposal for a common market would be a
bone of contention between Malaya and Singapore in the final run-up to Malaysia, as
would worries about the migration of Singapore’s surplus population to other parts
of the new federation (143, 185, 191, 220). 
Once agreement had been achieved in July 1962 on the principles of federation, a
key matter to be decided was the size of the colonial dowry. Lord Lansdowne
(minister of state for colonial affairs) urged generosity towards North Borneo and
Sarawak because Britain was withdrawing from them before they were ready for
independence on their own (146). The Treasury saw financial assistance, not as a way
of reinforcing Britain’s hold on the Malaysian economy, but as an unavoidable
burden: ‘We have reluctantly had to accept that, up to the creation of Malaysia and at
any rate for a short while thereafter, we have an inescapable responsibility to help the
new state in the military field as a legacy of our Colonial responsibilities.’22 The
federal government, which was already committed to an expensive five-year plan at a
time when the price of rubber was dropping sharply and its balance of payments was
deteriorating, would require outside assistance in order to meet the defence and
internal security budget of Malaysia. ‘The Malayans’, it was reported, ‘are seriously
afraid that they are being asked to take on more than they can manage, and they are
afraid that the United Kingdom may not appreciate the scale of their difficulties
when it comes to negotiation.’ (165, also 170, 173) Macmillan assured the Tunku
that ‘we are anxious to do what we can, within the limits of our capabilities, to help
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you with the kind of difficulties which you foresee’. Just as emergent Malaysia faced
financial problems, so, too, did Britain.23 When ministers succumbed to pressure to
increase their offer, they did so for political purposes, in order, as Lansdowne put it,
to buy good will (170, 173–177, 179, 181, 196). 
Throughout the planning of Malaysia, one set of economic considerations was
invariably subordinated to another: the possibility of future economic benefits took
second place to the reality of public expenditure. British exports, overseas
investments and control of extractive industry were secondary objectives; priority
was given to the reduction of defence costs. The mantra is repeated in every
assessment of British obligations in the region and of the region’s costs and benefits
for Britain: ‘expenditure in South and South East Asia, largely for military purposes,
was high in comparison with our earnings from investment in, and trade with, the
area as a whole’.24 By 1960 ‘there was no material asset in the area essential to our
national economy to compare with, for example, oil in the Middle East. … Rubber
and tin were no longer essential to our balance of payments and we were spending
money in the area for political reasons rather than for any prospect of financial gain’
(28). In the list of five general aims, which were itemised in October 1960 by Sir
Robert Scott’s Committee on Future Developments in Southeast Asia, trade and
economic development appeared after the containment of communism,
maintenance of western influence and the preservation of peace and the security of
non-communist societies. (29) A year later the prime minister himself identified
economic interests as the third of three general objectives of overseas policy, and in
so doing had in mind particularly ‘our oil interests in the Persian Gulf’. (65). The
costs of Southeast Asian defence commitments far outweighed any economic
benefits, as Sir Arthur Snelling (deputy under-secretary, CRO) pointed out:—
The resources of the area, especially rubber, oil and tin, are considerable but not
indispensable. British trade with South East Asia is only about 3 per cent of our
total trade. The foreign exchange we earn from our investments in all countries in
Asia between West Pakistan and Japan is smaller than the foreign exchange we
disperse for defence purposes in the same area. The conclusion is inescapable that
our defence expenditure in the Far East is now out of all proportion to our
economic stake there (166). 
Summarising overseas commitments in a paper for the Cabinet Defence Committee
in mid-June 1963, Sir Burke Trend (Cabinet secretary) pointed out that, while
Britain had a wide measure of commercial interests in the Far East, no single
interest carried the same importance as Middle East oil. Furthermore, defence costs
in the Far East were far higher than in the Middle East: ‘Our expenditure in the Far
East, at a level more than twice that of our expenditure in the Middle East, is
therefore devoted primarily to maintaining a politico-military position, based on
Singapore’ (180).
The record establishes that what was uppermost in the official mind at this time
was not British investments, nor the dollar-earnings of rubber and tin, nor the
reactions of plantation and mining companies, but rather the security of the region
and the expense of maintaining it. The documents reveal an indifference to the
economic potential of Malaysia, on the one hand, and, on the other, an
overwhelming anxiety about the cost of defence commitments. The government’s
priority was to reduce public expenditure, not to promote private enterprise. Senior
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officials, ministers and the prime minister himself were attracted to the ‘Greater
Malaysia’ scheme on account of the solution it seemed to offer to a particularly
knotty problem of maintaining regional stability at minimum cost to the British
taxpayer. By the early 1960s it was recognised that British trade and investments
were reducing in a region which was becoming less and less valuable to Britain as a
supplier of primary products, as a market for manufactured goods and as a dollar-
earner, and more and more expensive so far as defence commitments were
concerned. The prospects for the ‘Grand Design’ were, therefore, assessed from the
strategic perspective not the economic. Bases not markets, security not commerce,
international influence not investment opportunities dominated the thinking of
British ministers and officials. 
Defence strategy 25
One final point: why are we continuing to retain armed forces in this area at all? I
put this question to one of the shrewdest Chinese in Singapore. After a little
thought he said: first, in the interest of Malaysia; secondly, in the interest of
America; thirdly, in the interest of Australia; fourthly, in the interest of New
Zealand; and lastly in the general interest of the United Kingdom. I agree with this
assessment. Our interest is not so much in the extent of our economic
investments and trade as in our vested interest in world peace. If we accept this as
the basis of our policy in the Far East, I believe our whole position would become
more natural and understandable to the people of the area. 
[Lord Selkirk to Harold Macmillan, 3 Sept 1963 26]
If ending empire was a device to enable Britain to maintain global influence on the
cheap, by the early 1960s it had not adequately reduced either overseas expenditure
or overseas expectations. As a result Britain was suffering the strain of punching
above its weight in world affairs. Two years after the 1957 defence review, which had
shifted resources from conventional to nuclear weaponry with the intention of
cutting military expenditure yet retaining commitments east of Suez,27 Macmillan
initiated a major study of future overseas policy. He first primed senior civil servants
and Chiefs of Staff in June 1959 28 and the review gathered momentum after the
Conservatives’ landslide victory in the general election of October. When the
ministerial Cabinet Future Policy Committee met for the first time on 23 March
1960, it considered a wide-ranging paper produced by a group of senior officials
chaired the Cabinet secretary, Sir Norman Brook.29 This spawned a number of inter-
departmental committees to study specific regions. One of these was the Committee
on Future Developments in Southeast Asia which was set up in June under the
chairmanship of the former commissioner-general of Southeast Asia, Sir Robert
Scott. 
Instructed to review the likely course of developments in the region during the
next ten years as well as British aims and the means to secure them, the Scott
Committee produced a summary report in mid-October and its final report in
November (28, 29).30 In addition to general aims held in common with western allies
(the containment of communism, maintenance of western influence, preservation of
peace and reinforcement of non-communist societies, fostering trade, political
stability and economic development), the Scott Report identified a number of
commitments peculiar to the region: membership of the Southeast Asia Treaty
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Organisation, the Anglo–Malayan Defence Agreement of 1957, the ANZAM
arrangements with Australia and New Zealand for the defence of the Malayan area,
and the Geneva Agreement for Indo–China (which Britain had co-chaired in 1954
and would do so again when the Geneva Conference resumed to consider the crisis in
Laos in 1961–1962). With the US taking the lead in Southeast Asian defence, Britain
would be obliged to play its part, particularly in the internal security and external
defence of dependencies, in supporting the strategic deterrent against China and in
contributing to any SEATO land operations. 
Macmillan was keen to maintain the momentum of this review of future policy as
well as to impress the new American president, J F Kennedy, with his grasp of world
affairs. During the Christmas recess of 1960–1961 he drafted a major ‘think piece’
which he ‘half-jokingly’ entitled ‘The Grand Design’. In this paper he set out ‘all
the economic, political and defence problems confronting the free world’ and, in the
realisation that Britain could no longer fulfil its policing role, emphasised the
‘interdependence’ of the western alliance.31 His concern was not simply to cut his
coat according to his cloth or merely to live within his means—such shibboleths had
pervaded policy reviews since the Second World War—but rather to discover a way, a
middle way perhaps, of reducing expenditure without losing influence. This
conundrum lay at the heart of another paper, ‘Our Foreign and Defence Policy’,
which he presented to the Cabinet Future Policy Committee in September 1961 (65,
also 68, 70). This was an attempt to establish criteria for assessing the importance of
traditional activities and for the most effective deployment of limited resources. It
was becoming clear, though not yet to all ministers of overseas departments, that the
reduction of expenditure would necessitate the reduction of commitments, rather
than run the risk of spreading resources too thinly. 
How far did the ‘Grand Design’ for ‘Greater Malaysia’ match the greater design for
British future policy? The compelling attraction of ‘Greater Malaysia’ was the
prospect of both retaining influence and reducing expenditure (45). It would secure
Singapore from subversion, reinforce the Commonwealth and enhance British
relations with, as well as influence upon, the United States. Escaping from costly
responsibilities for needy dependencies, Britain might yet sustain its position in the
front line of the Asian Cold War. As the US ambassador to Malaya put it cryptically,
but approvingly, in a telegram to Washington, ‘UK objective will be to continue to
play dominant role in local defense picture at reduced cost.’32 Reducing military
costs was imperative, as Lord Selkirk observed from his vantage point in Singapore:
‘we are stretched to a point where our strength might snap under the strain’ and ‘our
present position would be highly perilous were it not for our basic dependence on the
USA’. The commissioner-general was desperate to disabuse those who ‘still seem to
assume that we are in a position to mount an expedition from Singapore and Malaya
as it were from a secure base’(54). Singapore’s constitution was due for review in the
spring of 1963: were the island to remain separated from the peninsula, it would be
exposed to riot and revolution, and might offer a bridgehead for Chinese
communism. If, on the other hand, Singapore were to merge with Malaya, both the
island and Britain’s military base on it would be safe. In Selkirk’s view, long-term
defence interests would be better served through the implementation of the ‘Grand
Design’ than by upholding the status quo.
The strategic case for Malaysia did not go uncontested. The Chiefs of Staff, at least
to begin with, disputed the supposed advantages of the ‘Grand Design’ and expressed
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concern lest the run-down of Britain’s presence in Singapore would discourage
friends and allies (45). Julian Amery shared these misgivings. As a backbencher in
1953 Amery had argued against evacuation from the Suez Canal Zone on the
grounds that it would both jeopardise access to the base and diminish Britain’s
prestige in the Middle East and beyond, bringing an end to the Commonwealth as ‘an
independent force in the world’.33 As minister of state at the Colonial Office, Amery
had been centrally involved in the long and complex negotiations whereby Britain
retained ‘in perpetuity’ the bases of Akrotiri and Episcopi in the independent republic
of Cyprus. Now secretary of state for Air, Amery argued that the project for ‘Greater
Malaysia’ would weaken Britain’s title to the Singapore base and consequently reduce
Britain’s capacity to influence developments in Southeast Asia. ‘The fact remains that
if we want to contribute to keeping the communists out of South East Asia and if we
want to maintain our influence with Australia and New Zealand on the one hand and
the United States on the other, we must have the effective use of Singapore. Without
it our influence in the area could sink to the level of that of France.’ 34 In his view,
Singapore’s integration within Malaysia would place intolerable limitations on
Britain’s use of the base. 
The pros and cons of Singapore’s merger with Malaya seemed finely balanced.
Some, like Selkirk, held that the Singapore base would be reinforced by membership.
Others, like Amery, maintained that it would be undermined. Yet others (such as the
Joint Planning Staff of the Chiefs of Staff) reckoned that, whatever happened,
‘Singapore, in or out of the “Grand Design”, will eventually become unreliable as a
main base’.35 Advantages and disadvantages seemed evenly balanced; the Joint
Planning Staff of the COS reached the conclusion that the ‘Grand Design’ was ‘the
least harmful of the possible developments’, 36 while the prime minister himself
concluded that ‘the matter was one of great difficulty since it seemed likely that we
should be faced with grave problems whether or not Greater Malaysia were achieved’
(74). When Macleod had pointed out to the Colonial Policy Committee in late July
1960 that merger would end Britain’s constitutional right to the base (25), ministers
had noted that it might be easier to maintain defence facilities in Singapore by a
treaty concluded with a new Federation of Malaysia of which Singapore was a part
(27). This option was explored further as officials and ministers prepared for the first
round of formal talks with Tunku Abdul Rahman regarding his proposal for
territorial integration.
After several postponements the Anglo–Malayan talks took place in London on
20–22 November 1961 (79–84). At their conclusion the two prime ministers issued a
joint statement accepting Malaysia as a desirable aim. They also set out two
fundamental conditions for the proposed state: firstly, the views of the peoples of
North Borneo and Sarawak should be ascertained; secondly, the Anglo–Malayan
Defence Agreement of 1957 should be extended to all territories of the new
federation. As regards the second of these conditions, particular care was taken over
the wording of the arrangements governing the Singapore base. The British
government, which was determined to play its full part in SEATO, did not wish to be
restricted in its use of the base. The delegation from Malaya, which had steadfastly
remained outside SEATO, was anxious lest the sovereignty of Malaysia were impaired
at the outset by British military activities that did not accord with Malaya’s national
interest. Each side sought to preserve its freedom and also to avoid future
embarrassment—the British with their SEATO allies, the Malayans with their
06-Malaysia-Introduction-cpp  21/9/04  9:04 AM  Page xlix
l INTRODUCTION
electorate—but it proved difficult to reconcile Anglo–Malayan differences in a public
statement without leaving some things unsaid. The final version stated:—
the Government of the Federation of Malaysia will afford to the Government of the
United Kingdom the right to continue to maintain the bases and other facilities at
present occupied by their Service authorities within the State of Singapore and
will permit the United Kingdom to make such use of these bases and facilities as
the United Kingdom may consider necessary for the purpose of assisting in the
defence of Malaysia, and for Commonwealth defence and for the preservation of
peace in South East Asia. 37
Although it did not spell out rights, powers and purposes, the British were satisfied
by the Joint Statement. Its general phraseology amply covered their strategic needs,
while the omission of explicit terms reduced, so they hoped, the scope for political
controversy. The British government set immense store by this Joint Statement on
defence; it guided subsequent discussions over the next eighteen months and was
reproduced word for word in article 6 of the final and binding Malaysia Agreement of
9 July 1963.38
Nevertheless, the Joint Statement of November 1961 by no means resolved all the
questions related to the future of the Singapore base. First of all, Anglo–Malayan
differences were immediately exposed when, to the consternation of Sandys
(Commonwealth secretary) and Watkinson (minister of defence), the Tunku and Tun
Razak (deputy prime minister and minister of defence) were tempted to reassure
their public that Britain’s use of the base would be subject to a Malaysian veto (85,
86). Secondly, continuing doubts about the future reliability of Singapore caused the
Chiefs of Staff to examine the feasibility of alternative sites for a military base, such
as the island of Labuan or northern Australia. Thirdly, not only did Singapore’s
political instability draw the British further into the management of the internal
security of a territory that was already internally self-governing, but ministers were
also persuaded to authorise the deployment of British troops for internal security
operations after the inauguration of Malaysia. They took this unusual decision
because emergent Malaysia lacked resources. Nevertheless, although ministers
attempted to minimise the risks by stipulating that they would intervene only at the
express invitation of the independent government of Malaysia, it was clear that any
such move would expose Britain to international opprobrium, accusations of neo-
colonialism, complex political and legal difficulties as well as unknown financial
burdens (167).39
Just over a year after the Anglo–Malayan Joint Statement, the Anglo–American
agreement at Nassau established new strategic parameters for British defence policy
and gave a further twist to the review of overseas commitments. Crucial to Britain’s
global position was the possession of an independent nuclear deterrent and, at
Nassau in December 1962, Macmillan succeeded in persuading Kennedy to provide
Britain with Polaris in place of the discredited Skybolt. Meeting at Chequers on 9
February 1963, the Cabinet Defence Committee considered future policy, firstly, on
the assumption that expenditure on the strategic deterrent had been largely settled
at Nassau and, secondly, in the light of current balance of payments difficulties.
While the costs of maintaining forces East of Suez made withdrawal tempting,
ministers accepted that savings would have to be set against likely political and
economic consequences. As regards the Far East, since Singapore had a four-fold
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role to play (with respect to Malaysia, SEATO, Indonesia, and Hong Kong), any
substantial retrenchment would be regarded ‘as a major political defeat’. It would
have a ‘serious effect’ on Australia, New Zealand and the United States, encourage
‘the spread of Communism’ and amount to the abandonment of Malaysia. The
Defence Committee accepted, nevertheless, that the defence budget should be
contained, if possible, within a limit of 7 per cent of the GNP and it commissioned
studies of, firstly, the costs and value of the Aden base and, secondly, the political and
economic consequences of withdrawal from, or substantial reduction of forces in, the
Far East.
The question of retrenchment in the Far East was referred to the Official Oversea
Co-ordinating Committee for which Sir Arthur Snelling (deputy under-secretary at
the CRO) wrote a comprehensive review of the many issues with which ministers and
officials had been grappling throughout the planning and implementation of the
Malaysia project. Having identified policy objectives and summarised the political
and military arguments for and against withdrawal, Snelling proceeded to assess the
extent to which non-military methods (for example diplomacy and aid) and a more
effective redistribution of the load between allies might lighten Britain’s budget from
the mid-1960s onwards. Of his many conclusions, three stand out: firstly, defence
costs far outweighed economic benefits from the region; secondly, total British
military withdrawal would have ‘disastrous political and military effects, particularly
in the face of Indonesian pressure’; and, thirdly, few objectives could be achieved by
entirely non-military methods. Damned if they left, the British risked being damned
if they stayed (166). 
By this time Britain’s sponsorship of Malaysia was being contested by Indonesia,
the Philippines and at the United Nations, with the result that Australia, New Zealand
and the United States were reluctant to give Britain their wholehearted support
(160–163).40 It was now becoming clear that unless Indonesia were appeased through
tripartite talks with Malaya and the Philippines or through UN mediation, the
creation of Malaysia was likely to increase Britain’s defence costs instead of reducing
them (168, 169). Defence estimates were continuing to rise inexorably. When the
Cabinet Defence Committee resumed its consideration of future policy on 19 June
1963, forecasts indicated that defence expenditure would breach the limit of 7 per
cent of the GNP (180). Maudling (chancellor of the Exchequer) argued strenuously
for cuts but Home (foreign secretary) reminded his colleagues: ‘We have rejected the
idea that we should choose between Europe and a world role.’ 41 In spite of the need
to make cuts, the committee saw no prospect of savings with respect to either the
independent deterrent or Europe and it dismissed the possibility of early withdrawal
from Singapore. Although Macmillan hoped that the burden of protecting Malaysia
might be mitigated by drawing further on the support of Australia and New Zealand
and by negotiating a political understanding with Indonesia, the Malaysian die was
cast and the final agreement was due for signature within a few weeks. 
The making and implementation of policy
It is Rhodesia all over again. 
[Harold Macmillan 5 Apr 1962 42]
Malaysia was forged in a furnace of conflicting objectives and mounting pressures. It
was the product of prolonged and frequently interrupted negotiations that oscillated
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between Britain and Southeast Asia. London remained the seat of sovereignty (as
regards North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore) and also the scene of the principal
conferences. Talks were held here in November 1961, July 1962, May and July 1963
when the principal differences between the prospective members of Malaysia, as well
as between them and Britain, were addressed and up to a point resolved. But much of
the power in the new federation was brokered and many of the crucial details of
membership were worked out in the region itself, where inter-governmental
discussions took place between Malaya and Singapore, between Malaya and Brunei,
and between Britain, Malaya and the Borneo territories. 
The capacity of the British government to control the final outcome, or even to
adjudicate between contesting leaders, was reduced by its declining power in
Southeast Asia and also by its conflicting commitments there. While there was
consensus that the fundamental purposes in promoting Malaysia were to stabilise
Singapore, secure the base and safeguard the interests of the Borneo peoples, there
was a profusion—sometimes confusion—of British views regarding the balance to be
struck between these objectives and also with respect to the manner and speed of
their implementation. Policy-making for Malaysia, therefore, became a process of
arbitrating between competing views within British government as well as between
the competing interests of participating territories. British perspectives were affected
by departmental responsibilities, for example, whether they were for imperial defence
or colonial welfare. Political considerations and military costs were two of the factors
that caused disagreement. For example, when Whitehall began to take Malaysia
seriously in early 1961, officials at the Ministry of Defence, which was hoping for
political change in order to reduce military expenditure, fretted at what they took to
be a willingness in the CO, CRO and FO to accept the status quo. 43 Yet attitudes did
not coalesce for long round this stark polarity: opinion within defence circles was
itself divided over the merits of retrenchment east of Suez, while any unanimity in
the other oversea departments regarding the primacy of political issues collapsed
over their interpretations. Two and a half years later, when plans for Malaysia had
been completed but when its future appeared to hang by a thread, a Foreign Office
official writing to the British ambassador in Jakarta noted worrying differences
between Whitehall departments:—
I have a strong feeling, from looking back through recent telegrams before
dictating this letter, that we are not altogether en rapport with you and Singapore
about our basic Malaysia policy … lack of understanding could quite easily have
arisen because of the fact that the Colonial Office often reflect a rather different
focus from that of the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations Office so that
there is quite a lot of room for doubt as to what Her Majesty’s Government want.
…44
The most serious clashes occurred between the Colonial Office and Commonwealth
Relations Office, especially with respect to the Borneo territories. Each had
responsibility for different, yet interlocking, elements of the ‘Grand Design’. The
Colonial Office was accountable for the crown colonies of North Borneo and
Sarawak, and to a lesser extent (in that they were internally self-governing from
1959) for Singapore and Brunei. The CRO supervised British relations with sovereign
Malaya and liaised with Australia and New Zealand regarding the defence of their
Near North. The welfare of the Borneo peoples and the well-being of the
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Commonwealth pulled planners in opposite directions; whereas the CRO pressed for
the early creation of Malaysia, the CO advocated delay until the conditions were
right. These differences were pronounced at every level: in the region, Whitehall and
Cabinet. 
British approaches were also affected by location—be it London, or Kuala Lumpur,
or Singapore, or Jesselton, or Kuching, or Brunei Town—and were influenced by
territorial pre-occupations as well as by institutional loyalties. Lord Selkirk and
Philip Moore (commissioner-general and deputy) had regular confabulations with
Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, as did Sir Geofroy Tory (high commissioner to Malaya)
with Tunku Abdul Rahman in Kuala Lumpur. Sir William Goode (North Borneo), Sir
Alexander Waddell (Sarawak) and Sir Dennis White (Brunei) conveyed the diverse
interests of the Borneo peoples both to the CO and at regional gatherings convened
by Selkirk. Selkirk, who reported directly to the prime minister with respect to the
co-ordination of foreign, colonial, Commonwealth and defence policies, urged speed
in the implementation of the ‘Grand Design’ for the sake of regional stability.45 He
was also anxious to ensure an effective presence for Britain in Southeast Asia once
Malaysia had been formed and the commissioner-general’s office had been wound up
(88, 90, 171). By contrast, Goode and Waddell emphasised a much more measured
approach in the interests of indigenous peoples. Of the two governors, Goode was
more influential—or more ‘difficult’—but both expressed the fear that the CRO
would have no compunction in standing aside while Tunku Abdul Rahman colonised
Borneo. On at least one occasion Goode argued against a role for the CRO in North
Borneo since it would undermine local confidence (104) and both Borneo governors
let it be known that they had ‘no high opinion’ of Sir Geofroy Tory.46 As British high
commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, Tory’s job was, of course, to convey to the CRO the
views of the Tunku and his Cabinet. Sometimes, however, he appeared to champion
the Malayan cause. Alastair Morrison, Sarawak’s information officer, described him
as ‘a mediocre man… who, as viewed from Sarawak, seemed at times to regard
himself as a supernumerary member of the Tunku’s staff’.47 Indeed, Ghazali Shafie
(permanent secretary at Malaya’s Ministry of External Affairs) valued Tory as
providing a more direct line to the heart of Whitehall than did the Malayan high
commissioner in London. Ghazali has also recalled how, during the London
conference that followed the Cobbold inquiry, Tory did ‘his best, short of being
accused of being a Malayan ambassador’. 48
In Whitehall, Sir John Martin, who had served briefly in the MCS during the 1930s
and had risen to the rank of deputy permanent under-secretary by 1956, was the
most senior CO official closely involved in Malaysia policy. He was assisted by E
Melville, C G Eastwood and particularly W I J Wallace, who was an old Burma hand
and head of the Far Eastern Department from 1956 to the end of 1962 when he was
promoted to assistant under-secretary with superintending responsibilities for the
Far East. Accompanied by Wallace, Martin conducted an assessment of Borneo
opinion preparatory to the Cobbold Mission and he was subsequently the
administrative anchor of Lansdowne’s Inter-Governmental Committee. Martin
stalwartly defended the Borneo interest in inter-departmental discussions but was
hampered in this by indifferent ministerial leadership. Sir Saville (Joe) Garner,
permanent under-secretary at the CRO from January 1962, was better placed; he
chaired the Greater Malaysia (Official) Committee and enjoyed a close working
relationship with a strong secretary of state. 
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During this period the CRO was led by two secretaries of state. Lord Home,
confidant of the prime minister, was particularly exercised by the international
aspects of the ‘Grand Design’ which he continued to follow when he became foreign
secretary in July 1960. Home was succeeded at the CRO by Duncan Sandys who, as a
former minister of defence, also took a keen interest in the broader context of
Malaysia policy. By contrast, notwithstanding the activity of Lord Perth (minister of
state for colonial affairs) at an early stage in the project, before July 1962 none of the
colonial secretaries took the lead in promoting the ‘Grand Design’. Alan Lennox-
Boyd went no further than cautiously to foster the closer association of the Borneo
territories. Iain Macleod was the most pro-active of the three but was pre-occupied
with Africa. Reginald Maudling led the department for less than a year and during
that time showed little interest in Southeast Asia unless prompted. In the minds of
ministers from other departments, the CO became identified with a fastidious
interpretation of trusteeship obligations which they found to be irksome. Even
Macmillan felt that the zeal with which governors and colonial administrators
championed the Borneo peoples betrayed an inability to appreciate the wider,
international picture and Britain’s reduced place in it.
Policy-making for Malaysia, therefore, was by no means the preserve of any one
department. As has been seen in the discussion of its economic and strategic aspects,
the CO, CRO, FO, Ministry of Defence and Treasury were all involved. Distinctive
departmental approaches converged upon, and up to a point were resolved within,
the Cabinet and its committees, notably the Colonial Policy Committee, Defence
Committee and the ad hoc Greater Malaysia Committee, all of which were chaired by
the prime minister. The Colonial Policy Committee was replaced at the end of June
1962 by the Oversea Policy Committee whose more wide-ranging terms of reference
were to consider questions of oversea policy (other than defence policy and external
economic policy) which concerned more than one of the oversea departments. Each
ministerial committee was shadowed by an official committee (ie an inter-
departmental committee composed of officials). For example, the Greater Malaysia
(Official) Committee (September 1961 to October 1963), which was chaired by the
permanent under-secretary at the CRO, briefed ministers for the London talks of
November 1961 and of July 1962 and also assessed the Cobbold and Lansdowne
Reports on Borneo. The OPC was supported by the Oversea (Official) Co-ordinating
Committee which was chaired by A L M Cary (deputy secretary, Cabinet Office) and
consisted of representatives of the Treasury, FO, CRO, CO, Ministry of Defence,
Board of Trade and Department of Technical Co-operation. The Co-ordinating
Committee met ten times in the second half of 1962 and examined in particular: the
economic aid requirements of North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore; the strength of
the Malaysian armed forces; the extent to which Malaya would be in a position to
contribute financially to the defence and development of Malaysia. The defence
implications of the Malaysia project were also scrutinised by the Chiefs of Staff
Committee (chaired by the chief of the defence staff) and its planning staff, and were
informed by reviews produced by the prime minister’s Future Policy Committee and
by Sir Robert Scott’s Committee on Future Developments in Southeast Asia. 
The extent of Macmillan’s involvement in the making of Malaysia is remarkable. It
indicates the departmental complexities of the project as well as its significance for
Britain’s international standing. During 1961–1963 Malaysia policy disturbed the
prime minister and was addressed by the Cabinet on many more occasions than had
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Malayan matters previously, even during the twelve-year communist emergency. The
prime minister chaired Cabinet committees dealing with Malaysia, presided over
constitutional conferences and corresponded directly with the prime minister of
Malaya. At key moments—in the run-up to the London talks of November 1961,
before and during the London conference in July 1962 and following the Manila
summit in August 1963—Macmillan personally intervened to save the project from
foundering. But the host of problems claiming his attention— balance of payments
difficulties, Cold War crises, Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent, European
membership, the decolonisation of Africa, by-election defeats, the Profumo
scandal—meant that, though he was fully briefed by the Cabinet secretary and his
private office, it was inconceivable that the prime minister should attempt to direct
policy. Nevertheless, the ominous parallels which he and his colleagues could not
avoid drawing between Malaysia and the Central African Federation convinced
Macmillan that a senior figure should assume overall charge. Having recognised that
it was impossible for Central Africa to be handled by two secretaries of state and still
reeling under the intolerable burden which that had placed on himself, Macmillan
accepted that as regards Malaysia ‘we must do all we can to avoid a repetition of the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland’.49
The Central African Federation differed from the Malaysian ‘Grand Design’ in that
its problems centred upon the entrenched position of white settlers, dominated
colonial affairs for over a decade and spilled into Britain’s domestic politics, even
inducing two colonial secretaries to threaten resignation. In many other respects,
however, the schemes were similar. Both federations appeared to offer stability to a
strategically significant area, yet provoked inter-territorial and inter-racial
resentments. Moreover, each was dominated by a single, independent or semi-
autonomous territory, Malaya in the one and Southern Rhodesia in the other. In
addition, each experienced unrest (the Brunei revolt and the Nyasaland emergency),
mass arrests of suspected subversives (operation ‘Coldstore’ and operation ‘Sunrise’),
a proconsular resignation (White from Brunei and Armitage from Nyasaland ), and a
commission of inquiry (Cobbold in Borneo and Monckton in Central Africa).
Furthermore, both were targets of international criticism and, finally, both suffered
from continual tension between two lead departments—the CO and CRO. In March
1962 Macmillan attempted a fresh start by transferring the affairs of Central Africa
from the CRO and CO to the new Central Africa Office under R A Butler. Nevertheless
Central Africa ‘haunted, not to say poisoned’ the last years of his premiership 50 and
similarities between it and Malaysia depressed him further. In spite of regular inter-
departmental communication, policy-making for Malaysia suffered from the same
lack of cohesion as did that for Central Africa. As the possibility of Malaysia’s
unravelling grew more likely and Macmillan awaited an opportunity to appoint a
ministerial supremo, Duncan Sandys was itching to take charge. The moment came
in mid-July 1962 when, facing economic problems and increasing unpopularity,51
Macmillan uncharacteristically lost his nerve and so bungled the dismissal of his
chancellor of the Exchequer, Selwyn Lloyd, that he proceeded to sack one third of his
Cabinet in ‘the night of the long knives’ which seriously damaged his reputation for
‘unflappability’ and left him exhausted and demoralised.52 This domestic crisis had
important repercussions for Malaysian planning; Thorneycroft replaced Watkinson
as minister of defence and, more significantly, Maudling was succeeded at the
Colonial Office by Sandys who now combined this position with that of
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Commonwealth relations. Although the CO and CRO were not amalgamated until
1966, responsibility for Malaysia was hereafter vested in a single Cabinet minister. 
By the time Sandys assumed overall control of Malaysia, the project had been
designed but had yet to be delivered. During the next fourteen months the principal
role of the secretary of state would be that of enforcer and trouble-shooter. Tough,
energetic and a perfectionist who did nothing by halves, Sandys shouldered a massive
workload as territory after territory claimed his attention. Used by successive
Conservative prime ministers as ‘a kind of political commando’,53 Sandys spared
neither himself nor his staff in efforts to resolve crises and achieve agreement. Even
with Sandys at the helm, however, ambiguity and drift were not eradicated from the
Malaysian project. In February 1963 de Zulueta, the prime minister’s private
secretary for overseas matters, considered that ‘the whole Malaysian situation looks
to me to be getting out of hand’ (164). Indeed, the completion of technical matters
were in danger of becoming an irrelevance in the face of the Brunei revolt,
Indonesian confrontation, Singapore’s security problems and America’s lukewarm
support. The conduct and implementation of Britain’s policy still lacked coherence
and direction; too many Whitehall departments had their fingers in the pie and
momentum had slackened. The Greater Malaysia Committee, which was a
deliberative rather than executive group, now seldom met since the time for
deliberation had been succeeded by a time for execution. Yet the execution of policy
faltered. Moreover, the lack of co-ordination and drive in Whitehall had been
compounded by the decision to wind up the British Defence Coordinating
Committee Far East.54 To get the project back on course, de Zulueta suggested the
appointment of an executive committee ‘under a powerful chairman’ such as Edward
Heath, who, as chief whip and then lord privy seal with FO responsibilities, had
acquired a reputation for getting things done. Sir Burke Trend, who had recently
taken over from Sir Norman Brook as Cabinet secretary, ruled out a ministerial
appointment on the grounds that it would conflict with Sandys’ role and instead
proposed an inter-departmental executive working group of officials. While existing
Cabinet Committees would continue to deal with broad policy issues, the function of
the executive group would be to ensure prompt, day-to-day action on the
international, Commonwealth, colonial and defence aspects of Malaysia. It met for
the first time on 5 March and thereafter on a frequent, even daily, basis with the
result that by early May 1963 inter-departmental co-ordination had markedly
improved.55
If lack of co-ordination was an impediment to the making of policy, lack of clout
was an obstacle to its implementation. As in the transfer of power to Malaya in
1955–1957, so with the creation of Malaysia in 1961–1963, the British found they
could not dictate terms. Such an argument may be difficult to sustain in the light of
instances of forceful intervention such as military action in Brunei, the arrest of
Barisan supporters in Singapore and the detention of members of the Clandestine
Communist Organisation and their sympathisers within the Sarawak United People’s
Party.56 Yet the weight of evidence indicates the limitations of Britain’s power as well
as British forebodings about the untoward effects of the use of force. When crises
blew up Britain was often wrong-footed and vulnerable; for example, the Brunei
revolt turned out to be a close-run thing, while ministers were most reluctant to
sanction arrests in Singapore on account of the world-wide criticism operation
‘Coldstore’ would provoke. Moreover, far from being in the driving-seat during the
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run-up to Malaysia, British ministers and officials frequently felt that they were being
taken for a ride by Lee Kuan Yew, the Tunku, or the Sultan of Brunei. When Sultan
Omar Saifuddin decided at the last minute against joining, there was simply nothing
the British government could do to induce him to change his mind. Similarly,
although British administrators were appalled by Kuala Lumpur’s colonial designs
upon the Borneo territories, they were scarcely in a position to halt them and were
hard-pressed even to moderate them. When Lee Kuan Yew unilaterally declared
independence two weeks before Malaysia Day, the British circumspectly turned a
blind eye to his ‘brinkmanship’. It was, after all, because Britain’s interest in Malaysia
derived from its loss of power in the region that the Malaysia it got was not exactly
the Malaysia it wanted. 
Lacking compliant proxies and mistrustful of force majeure, the British relied on
painstaking negotiations in order to reconcile the contradictory objectives of the
participating territories. Months of discussions and consultations identified interests,
assessed opinion, established principles, brokered compromises and eventually
resulted in an uneasy agreement on the nature of the new federation. Its constitution
was not the fulfilment of nationhood but a structure for nation-building. Ultimately
nationhood would legitimate the state; at the moment of its inauguration, however,
Malaysia was a state without a nation. In his advocacy of Malaysia in May 1961, Lee
Kuan Yew foresaw the new federation instilling ‘pride in a more powerful and viable
state’ which ‘would give a boost to nation-building’ (37). This point was echoed some
weeks later by the Tunku: ‘It is a matter for emphasis that such a federation,
comprising a grand total of nearly ten million, in an area of 130,000 square miles, as
against a Federation of 50,000 square miles, will have the effect of creating a greater
importance in the hearts and minds of the people of these territories and a national
pride which would go a long way in building up a feeling of loyalty to the country.’
(46) As Lord Cobbold commented in his conclusions to the Commission’s report, ‘It
is a necessary condition that, from the outset, Malaysia should be regarded by all
concerned as an association of partners, combining in the common interest to create
a new nation but retaining their own individualities.’57 But, given the strength of
those individualities, perhaps the most that could be expected of Malaysia was a
federation of nations rather than a nation-state. By setting out at length and in detail
the provisions for federal and state institutions, citizenship, legislative powers,
administrative arrangements, financial and public services, the protection of the
special interests of the Borneo states and Singapore, and temporary arrangements
covering a transitional period for the Borneo states and Singapore, the Malaysia
agreement of July 1963 allocated powers and apportioned responsibilities,
acknowledged majority interests and safeguarded minority rights, enshrined public
service and reduced opportunities for corruption and arbitrary rule. In short, the
constitution of Malaysia was an elaborate set of contracts concluded after prolonged
and elaborate multi-lateral negotiations. It may subsequently have disappointed
many, provoked active opposition in some quarters and been breached later by its
very guardians, but the complex, inter-active process of its making refutes the stark
simplicity of the charge that the British government devised Malaysia both single-
mindedly and single-handedly. When Goode urged a tougher approach to the Tunku,
Macmillan rejected the suggestion as misplaced: ‘the whole mood is based on a false
assessment of our power’ (117). 
What resources could it draw upon when differences seemed irreconcilable and the
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scheme appeared to be on the verge of collapse? Little more, it seemed, than force of
personality. At three moments of crisis Malaysia was salvaged by Sandys
administering bruises while Macmillan applied the balm. The first occasion was in
July 1962 when the Tunku was pulled back from the brink of withdrawal at a hastily
arranged lunch at Chequers. The second came a year later when Sandys broke the
deadlock in talks between Malaya and Singapore by calling the participants to
London for arbitration. On this occasion, only a few days remained before the
Malaysia Agreement was due to be signed and he applied his technique of
meticulously reading through proposals sentence by sentence with all concerned
sitting round a table in all-night meetings ‘in order to wear down the opposition and
grind out the solution he wanted’.58 ‘It was’, Lee Kuan Yew recalled, ‘his method of
dealing with stubborn parties, wringing concessions from both sides until they
finally reached agreement’ and, Lee added, ‘not unlike what the communists did to
us at committee meetings’.59 While he could be ‘forceful and, where necessary,
brutal’,60 Sandys was ‘by no means deficient in charm’61 for he knew that ultimate
success lay in patience. 
The final crisis came in August 1963 when the Tunku agreed at the Manila
Summit to postpone Malaysia until a United Nations inquiry had ascertained the
wishes of the Borneo peoples. Macmillan despatched his secretary of state to Kuala
Lumpur to ‘hold the Tunku’s hand’, as Sandys put it to the Australian premier,
Robert Menzies.62 In fact several crises kept Sandys in the region for about four
weeks. These were: firstly, the danger the Tunku might put off the inauguration of
Malaysia indefinitely in order to appease Sukarno; secondly, the risk Lee Kuan Yew
ran in irretrievably damaging relations with Malaya by taking advantage of the
postponement of Malaysia Day to strengthen the terms of Singapore’s membership;
and, thirdly, the dispute between Malayan and Sarawakian politicians over the
selection of Sarawak’s first head of state. By now the Tunku was said to be ‘suffering
seriously from cold feet’ (221) and ‘in a highly emotional and touchy state’ (214) but
Sandys knocked heads together with ‘many rough words on all sides’ (224) in a series
of last-minute deals. Greatly relieved that Malaysia did not come unstuck at the
eleventh hour, Macmillan congratulated Sandys on having ‘done wonders’ and
despatched an emollient message to the Tunku.63 Notwithstanding the celebrations
on 16 September (226, 227), Sandys’ earlier, unceremonious conduct rankled with
the Tunku for some time to come (224).
2 Dimensions of Merger
Malaya and Singapore
The PAP are of course co-operating closely with the Alliance in pushing through
the Malaysia scheme, but in their political outlook the Alliance and the PAP are
like oil and water.
[Sir Geofroy Tory, 18 June 1962 64]
Throughout history the island of Singapore has fluctuated in its relationship with
the Malayan peninsula, sometimes in union with it and sometimes in isolation from
it. When Stamford Raffles established a British settlement there in 1819, it was
severed from what remained of the Johor empire but a few years later the East India
Company linked it with Penang and Malacca to form the Straits Settlements. In
the ‘high colonial’ period administrative and economic rivalry between the Straits
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Settlements and the Federated Malay States led to a tension between their capitals—
Singapore and Kuala Lumpur—that has waxed and waned ever since. 
While there were strong reasons for including Singapore in the post-war Malayan
Union, it was omitted principally on account of its Chinese population which would
have challenged Malay paramountcy in the peninsula. Instead, Singapore was
established as a crown colony on its own. Its first elections were held in 1948, when 6
representatives were elected to a legislature of 23 member. The constitution of 1955
provided for a Council of Ministers who were collectively accountable to a Legislative
Assembly with an elected majority. Under this arrangement David Marshall of the
Labour Front became the first chief minister but he held office for only fourteen
months. It was a period of labour and student unrest and Marshall was a mercurial
figure. He resigned in June 1956 after talks with the British had broken down over
his demand for self-government.65 Lim Yew Hock, also of the Labour Front, then
took over. In spite of his apparent success in countering subversion and negotiating
the advance of Singapore to internal self-government at the London conferences of
1957 and 1958, Lim was defeated in the 1959 elections by the People’s Action Party
(PAP) led by Lee Kuan Yew. 
An English-educated Chinese meritocrat, Lee Kuan Yew had practised law and acted
as legal adviser to many trade unions before becoming Singapore’s first prime minister.
His career has become synonymous with the growth of independent Singapore; for
example, Lee’s memoirs for the period to 1965 are called The Singapore story.
Sometimes he appears to have taken on single-handedly the enemies of his country,
but he was ably assisted by Toh Chin Chye (deputy prime minister), Goh Keng Swee
(minister of Finance) and S Rajaratnam (minister of culture). Singapore was now self-
governing in all domestic matters including internal security, although the Internal
Security Council (on which Britain, Malaya and Singapore were all represented) had
power to take decisions which were binding on the Singapore government. Lee’s
government started with the advantages of popular support and strong leadership. The
PAP had appealed to the electorate because it was ‘founded on principle, not
opportunism’66 and it now commanded an apparently unassailable majority on the
Legislative Assembly (43 of 51 seats). Exuding confidence and also a ‘sober dignified
dedication to the task of governing for the benefit of the masses’, it made an immediate
impact (13, 15, 33, 38). It also faced immense problems, notably a rising population,
increasing unemployment, economic problems and plenty of activists looking to
subvert the government. Like Marshall and Lim Yew Hock before, Lee rode the tiger
of communism which threatened to devour him as it had them. Unlike his
predecessors, however, Lee adopted the strategy of absorption and containment, at
least at first. Thus he refused to take office as prime minister until the British governor
released eight detainees (including Lim Chin Siong) with whom he had been closely
associated and some of whom he tried to neutralise by appointing to government posts.
A meticulous planner who was by no means averse to taking staggering risks, Lee
sought to win the support of workers without alienating businessmen, to attract the
Chinese-educated without offending the westernised middle class, to pursue socialist
policies without becoming the handmaiden of communism, to achieve independence
without losing British support, to cultivate Malayan nationalism without sacrificing
Singapore’s interests. He may have resorted to dramatic gestures, cynical stratagems
and the rhetoric of anti-colonialism to distract attention from his dilemmas, but he
rarely lost his instinct for what was politically possible.
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The constitution of Singapore was due for review in the spring of 1963. The next
stage would surely be independence; anything less would have been unacceptable to
the people of Singapore. Yet, because the island was regarded as too small and
therefore too vulnerable to survive on its own, many believed that union with the
peninsula was essential to the island’s future stability and prosperity. Lee himself
consistently and strenuously advocated independence through merger with Malaya.
He was also convinced that it should come sooner rather than later, since the
communists, who opposed closer association with the staunchly anti-communist
regime in Kuala Lumpur, were working to undermine his government, cause dissent
in the PAP and stir up unrest amongst the workforce. Lee assiduously wooed the
Malayan government but the more he pressed his case the more it resisted, and as his
domestic position worsened so the Tunku steadfastly kept his distance.
While there is more to the story of merger than the relationship between the two
prime ministers, it contributed as much as their policies to the initiation, set-backs
and outcome of the Malaysia proposal. In addition to a common antipathy towards
communism, they shared a mistrust of each other. Although they occasionally
relaxed together on the golf course, Tunku Abdul Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew were
never close—the Tunku’s bonhomie was not Lee’s style, while the former was
frequently overawed by the intellectual brilliance of the latter. The Tunku’s
background, temperament and working methods were very different from those of
Lee. Son of the former Sultan of Kedah, the Tunku had acquired the reputation of a
playboy in his youth. As a statesman, he was frequently ‘breezy and charming … and
determined to avoid close discussion on any particular problem’.67 He was also
content to leave the detail of policy-making and government to others. The anchor of
his administration was his deputy, Tun Abdul Razak, who was also minister of
defence during this period and who led the Malayan delegation through the more
arduous negotiating sessions. Dr Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman, the Malayan
representative on the ISC, participated in many of the key meetings while Tan Siew
Sin, minister of finance, was central to financial and commercial discussions. As
minister for external affairs as well as prime minister, the Tunku delegated
generously to Ghazali Shafie, permanent secretary since 1959. At the Ministry of
Defence, Abdul Kadir bin Shamsudin succeeded Robert Thompson as the top civil
servant in April 1961. In addition to Thompson, other British expatriates were
employed by the federal government including Claude Fenner (Police) and C M
Sheridan (attorney-general). 
If not a painstaking administrator, the Tunku was an astute politician and an
emollient national leader. He had negotiated the independence settlement and before
that the formation of the Alliance of three communal parties (United Malays National
Organisation, Malayan Chinese Association, Malayan Indian Congress) which
dominated politics until its reformulation as the Barisan National (national front) in
1973–1974.68 As prime minister of independent Malaya his priorities were to prevent
racial conflict and a recrudescence of communist insurgency. Domestic politics in
large measure determined the Tunku’s approach to closer association with
neighbouring territories. As leader of the United Malays National Organisation, the
dominant party in the governing Alliance, the Tunku was somewhat unnerved by
electoral setbacks in 1959. This is largely to be explained by changes in the electorate
which had doubled since the first federal elections in 1955 and included seven times
the number of Chinese voters. In the state elections of 1959 the Pan–Malayan Islamic
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Party won Kelantan and Trengganu, and, while the Alliance just clung to a two-
thirds’ majority in the federal house of representatives (which was essential in order
to carry any constitutional amendment), the 30 opposition members in the 104-seat
parliament included 13 from the Pan–Malayan Islamic Party and 8 from the Socialist
Front. Tunku Abdul Rahman was naturally attentive to Malay hostility to any kind of
union with Chinese-dominated Singapore. He feared it would end Malay
paramountcy in the federation, undermine his leadership of the Malay community
and rekindle the insurgency that had only recently ended after a twelve-year state of
emergency. He was also sensitive to the expansionist aspirations of the leaders of the
PMIP who, while eschewing merger with Singapore, looked forward to the
achievement of Melayu raya, a greater Malay world embracing kith, kin and co-
religionists overseas. UMNO’s Chinese partner in the Alliance (the MCA) also looked
askance at their southern neighbour and were alarmed by the possibility of political
annihilation at the hands of the PAP and economic subordination to the business
interests of Singapore. Amongst Malayans in general there was a desire to bring to an
end the federation’s commercial dependence on Singapore and a ‘craving for
economic self-sufficiency’—a desire for a major port, an international air-port, a
national industrial policy, a federal stock exchange (32). 
An ardent cold-warrior, Abdul Rahman also regarded Singapore as a potential
Cuba endangering the non-communist Malay world. He abhorred the unruliness of
its labour relations and mistrusted the socialism and international neutralism of its
leader. For all these reasons, the Malayan prime minister would probably have
preferred the indefinite continuation of arrangements whereby the island’s defence
remained Britain’s responsibility while its internal security was administered by the
Internal Security Council on which the Malayan government had a representative.
Yet, although in his heart of hearts he may have believed that Britain would never
allow Singapore to fall to communism, he was sufficiently alarmed by that possibility
to consider merger as a way of strengthening Lee Kuan Yew’s non-communist
regime and thereby reinforcing regional stability. It was Lee Kuan Yew’s
deteriorating position that convinced the Tunku of the need to absorb the restless
island in order to control it. At the end of April 1961, Lee’s former minister of
national development, Ong Eng Guan, contested the Hong Lim by-election and,
capitalising on labour disputes, anti-colonialism and support for separate
independence, he defeated the PAP candidate. Although Hong Lim was a serious
reverse for the strategy of ‘independence through merger’, Lee was determined to
push on with it because information from ‘The Plen’ (a high-level contact within the
Singapore communist organisation) indicated that the communists would exploit
delay to foment unrest.69 In the end the Tunku was persuaded to have Lee inside,
rather than outside, the Malaysian tent on condition that his presence be offset by
the inclusion of the Borneo territories (37, 39).70
If the PAP had been shaken by the Hong Lim by-election, it was rocked by
subsequent reverses. The Tunku’s speech of 27 May 1961 exacerbated Lee domestic
troubles. Rebels within the PAP rejected the Malaysia initiative and at the Anson by-
election on 15 July Lim Chin Siong and other PAP assemblymen transferred their
support from the PAP candidate to David Marshall who was campaigning for
‘independence before merger’. Marshall’s victory left Lee and his colleagues ‘pretty
broken men, extremely jumpy and uncertain of their political future’ (50). They cast
about for scapegoats—the Malayan government and the British—for their
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difficulties. After the Anson by-election, a delegation of four PAP dissidents met
Selkirk at the so-called ‘Eden Hall tea-party’. They sought a reassurance that the
British would not suspend the constitution and impose direct rule in a situation
where Lee fell from power and they succeeded in forming a government (49, 50).
Fearing that the British would ditch him, Lee accused them of machiavellian
conspiracy and called for a vote of confidence in the Legislative Assembly which he
won after an all-night session, although he was ‘within an ace of falling’ (72). By the
end of the month the dissidents had defected to form the Barisan Sosialis, leaving
Lee with a majority of one in the assembly (26 out of 51). It was ‘a staggering reverse’
(72). Clearly, Lee Kuan Yew had ‘not been successful in riding the communist tiger
and was in danger of being gobbled up’ (55). As the Barisan exploited a network of
contacts by retaining control over many PAP constituency organisations and as it
shifted its stance on Malaysia to one unrealistically promoting a ‘full merger’, Lee
abandoned the strategy of containing communism and embarked on confrontation
which would culminate in February 1963 with the arrest of some 120 suspects,
including Lim Chin Siong. In the meantime, however, and with his back to the wall,
he battled for merger on several fronts: through marathon radio broadcasts; in a
victorious, if controversial, referendum; by an appearance before the UN’s
Committee of Seventeen in July 1962; and at talks with the Malayan government on
the terms and conditions of Malaysian membership.
Apart from matters relating to the military base and the operation of AMDA, by and
large the British left the Malayan and Singapore governments to work out on their
own the terms and conditions of Singapore’s membership of Malaysia. Sovereignty in
Singapore still lay with Britain and would in due course be transferred by an act of
parliament, but the British refrained from intervening in merger talks unless they
reached deadlock, as they did in June and again in September 1963. To begin with,
however, inter-governmental discussions made good progress. On 23 August 1961
the Tunku and Lee reached preliminary agreement on the principle of merger as well
as on the degree of autonomy to be retained by Singapore. In September a working
party was established to examine the detailed arrangements and by November—just
before the first Anglo–Malayan conference in London—Heads of Agreement were
drawn up and set out in a Singapore white paper (59).71 Using the ‘Ulster model’,
Singapore was allowed to keep its free-port status, control its labour and education
policies, and retain a large proportion of its revenue to cover these functions.
Enjoying greater autonomy than other states within the federation, it would have
fewer seats in the federal parliament than its population warranted. Moreover, its
citizens would be known as ‘Malaysian nationals’ (not ‘Malaysian citizens’) and would
therefore be ineligible to vote outside Singapore. When these terms were presented
to the Singapore Legislative Assembly on 6 December 1961, they were carried by 33
to 0, with 18 Barisan supporters absenting themselves (79, 87). Because the Barisan
attacked the ‘unequal citizenship’ terms and pressed for ‘genuine merger’, Lee
sought popular endorsement through a referendum. The referendum was a risky
course for a weak and unpopular government, but, having improved the chances of
success by restricting the questions to alternative forms of merger and by counting
all blank or spoiled ballot papers as votes in support of the government’s line, his
policy won a ringing endorsement of policy (131). 
Whereas Lee Kuan Yew was a consistent and single-minded advocate of merger,
the Tunku blew hot and cold (64). After his dramatic announcement on 27 May 1961,
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the commitment of the Malayan prime minister wobbled. Each of the three major
London conferences on Malaysia—November 1961, July 1962 and July 1963—was
almost sabotaged by a threat from Abdul Rahman to pull out of the project
altogether. He constantly needed reassurance on what were for him three
fundamental conditions: firstly, the participation of the Borneo territories, secondly,
the exclusion of Singapore from federal politics, and, thirdly, federal control of
Singapore’s internal security. Internal security was the burning issue which forged
the rapprochement between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur in May 1961 but prised
them apart thereafter. Both the Tunku and Lee opposed communism but they did so
in different ways: the Tunku had hunted the tiger which Lee had tried to tame.
Whereas Abdul Rahman had rejected Chin Peng’s peace offer in 1955, in 1959 Lee
awarded a government position to Lim Chin Siong on his release from detention. Of
course, different circumstances called for different strategies; Malaya’s shooting war
with its communal undertones was not reproduced in Singapore. Nevertheless,
remembering the Malayan emergency, the Tunku was predisposed to mass arrests in
Singapore, though, it must be said, he was much more sensitive to the political
implications of detaining federal citizens. 
Lee, too, manipulated detention for political, not simply security, purposes. Thus,
the release of detainees in June 1959 was both a gesture of respect to comrades in the
struggle against colonialism and an attempt to contain communism. After the PAP
rebels had defected to form the Barisan Sosialis, Lee awaited an opportunity to round
up political opponents on the grounds of suspected subversion. Because he knew that
he would be finished politically if he acted on his own accord, he hoped to use the
ISC as a front for unpopular decisions initiated by the Singapore government (33).
Selkirk, however, was not readily compliant. After the Tunku had threatened to
withdraw from the ISC, Selkirk avoided convening it. Moreover, just as Selkirk had
assured Lim Chin Siong and his colleagues at the ‘Eden Hall tea-party’ in July 1961
that, provided they acted constitutionally, there would be no justification for Britain
to suspend the constitution, so the commissioner-general now protested that there
was no case for blanket detentions of political activists. 
The rise of the Barisan Sosialis called into question the future stability of
Singapore. The Malayan prime minister had no wish to be saddled with a turbulent
island, but he veered in his reaction from demanding arrests, to offering to
accommodate radicals who worked within the constitution, to threatening to
abandon merger altogether. Meanwhile, discussions about a security sweep took
place between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur without involving Britain or the ISC. In
February 1962, in an attempt to induce British co-operation, Abdul Rahman offered
to resume participation in the ISC on condition that it authorised arrests. The
following month Lee Kuan Yew accepted that those suspected of subversion should
be detained before merger but, in order to preserve his nationalist credentials, he
urged Britain to take responsibility for what could be presented as a characteristically
colonial act. The British, for their part, remained unconvinced that the situation
warranted such an operation and in any case refused to assume entire responsibility
for it should it later be deemed necessary. While Maudling reassured Lee that ‘we
have broad backs and are not afraid to carry our share of the burden’, he insisted that
he ‘must…be convinced that the action taken will make things better not worse’
(129). 
The possibility of a breakdown of internal security in Singapore was addressed at
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the London Conference in July 1962 when Tunku Abdul Rahman and Harold
Macmillan concluded a secret agreement to bring Malaysia into being as soon as
practicable ‘if the present Government of Singapore fell or appeared to be about to
fall’ (134–140). Lee and the Tunku then urged a pre-emptive round-up of
subversives, but Sandys categorically refused to take unilateral action, arguing that it
should be a matter for the ISC (137, 138). Selkirk also hung back; he was not
convinced that there was evidence to justify arrests and he maintained that any such
operation might be counter-productive by, firstly, making martyrs of the detainees,
secondly, strengthening the cause of the opposition and, thirdly, provoking
international outcry (144). As Abdul Rahman became more militant, Lee grew
nervous; he speculated whether the Tunku would use arrests to disrupt the Barisan,
discard the PAP and prepare the way for the restoration of Lim Yew Hock. Indeed,
Lansdowne believed that the Tunku wished ‘to be quit of Lee at the earliest
convenient moment, and replace him with Lim Yew Hock who would, I suppose do
what he was told’.72 It was an unlikely prognosis but their mutual mistrust ran so
deep that Lee suspected that the Tunku would take measures to undermine, rather
than reinforce, the PAP regime (144). 
Selkirk and Sandys accepted that the time had come for action when the Party
Rakyat of Malaya and the Barisan came out in public support of the Brunei rising of
December 1962. With Macmillan’s approval, Selkirk convened the ISC which agreed
to mount an operation that was immediately aborted on account of disagreements
between Malaya and Singapore regarded the list of suspects (147, 148).73 In spite of
Lee’s misgivings regarding the Tunku’s intentions, the British were now convinced
that such action was the only way to induce the Federation to agree to merger with
Singapore. Code-named ‘Cold Store’, it was authorised on 1 February (156, 158).74
Some 120 suspected subversives were detained and, as the British had foreseen, the
operation resulted in demonstrations in Singapore and international protests. ‘Cold
Store’ was uncannily similar to ‘Operation Sunrise’ which rounded-up Africans
implicated in Nyasaland’s so-called ‘murder plot’ and which marked the beginning of
the end of the Central African Federation.75
Far from being prepared to join Malaysia at any price, Lee was by no means averse
to tough bargaining with the Malayans and subsequently succeeded in improving the
terms—or at least the presentation of those terms—on which Singapore would join
Malaysia. He was particularly anxious to neutralise his opponents’ criticisms of the
citizenship provisions and at the London conference in July 1962 he successfully
pressed Abdul Rahman and Razak to accept Singapore citizens as citizens of
Malaysia, rather than as nationals of Malaysia (137, 140).76 Lee also tried to improve
the financial and commercial arrangements. In 1961 Jacques Rueff, a distinguished
French economist and financier, was appointed to lead the World Bank Mission to
examine the feasibility of closer economic co-operation between Malaya and
Singapore. Rueff recommended a common market but Malaya feared that
competition from Singapore would suffocate its infant industries. By mid-June 1963
negotiations between Malaya and Singapore on financial and commercial
arrangements had reached deadlock. The sticking points were the terms of their
common market, the apportionment of federal revenues arising in Singapore and the
extent of financial assistance from Singapore to the Borneo territories. An additional
issue was authority over broadcasting and television in Singapore. In his frustration
with both Singapore (and also with Brunei), the Tunku proposed a ‘Little Malaysia’,
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ie a merger of only Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak. As we have seen, in order to
prevent the project foundering on technical issues Sandys intervened and invited all
parties to London for arbitration (182–184, 186–191). Lee led the Singapore side in
these sessions, but the Tunku played no part. He relied on Tun Razak and his
minister of finance, Tan Siew Sin. But when he arrived in London for the final
ceremony, he was prevailed upon by Lee to accept a few more conditions which were
scribbled on the back of an envelope for the Tunku to sign before they both hastened
to Marlborough House for the formal signing of the Malaysia Agreement at twelve
midnight (192, 193).77 Because little progress had been made either on these issues
or with respect to legislation for the tariff board, Lee took advantage of the
postponement of Malaysia Day from 31 August to 16 September, first, to declare
independence unilaterally and then to insist on a supplementary agreement to the
agreement of 9 July relating to specific inter-governmental arrangements between
Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. This was not concluded until 11 September,78 only a
few days before the inauguration of Malaysia and even then Kuala Lumpur held up its
implementation (209, 215–219, 221, 222).
Lee Kuan Yew entered Malaysia on his fortieth birthday and the prospects were far
more favourable than at one time seemed possible. Through hard and persistent
negotiation he had improved at least the presentational aspects of the citizenship
terms and had achieved agreement to a common market. No matter that the gesture
was legally invalid, he had taken the political step to declare independence before
Malaysia Day. Now, as the result of merger, Singapore seemed economically secure
in its wider hinterland. Most significantly, Lee had recovered his strength at home, as
was confirmed by elections to Singapore’s Legislative Assembly held five days after
Malaysia Day. The results (PAP 37, Barisan Sosialis 13, United People’s Party 1)
shattered the Tunku’s hopes for Alliance control. Instead the PAP was restored to the
commanding position which it had lost in July 1961 when, following by-election
defeats and the Tunku’s Malaysia initiative, dissidents had defected to form the
Barisan.
British colonialism in Borneo
HMG’s accepted policy… is that the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak should,
subject to their own wishes, ultimately achieve self-government. Attractive as is
the prospect (not least to many of their own inhabitants at present) of their
remaining Crown Colonies, experience shows that we must not delude ourselves
into thinking that can be a permanent state.
[Sir John Martin (CO) to Sir Denis Allen (Singapore), 18 May 1960 (see 20)]
Britain’s responsibilities in Borneo originated in the activities of nineteenth-century
freelance imperialists operating at the frontiers of empire and frequently beyond
London’s control. By the 1890s the sultanate of Brunei, which had once exercised
suzerainty over much of coastal Borneo and parts of the Philippines archipelago, had
been reduced to two tiny enclaves as the result of territorial concessions to the
Brookes of Sarawak and to European traders. Having interceded in a dispute between
the sultan’s viceroy and Malays and Dayaks of Sarawak, in 1841 James Brooke was
appointed the sultan’s governor of this district. Two years later the sultan ceded
Sarawak in perpetuity to James and his heirs. In 1864 Britain recognised Sarawak as
an independent state but in 1888 it became a British protectorate and surrendered
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control of its external affairs, as did Brunei and North Borneo at the same time.
Committed to the eradication of piracy and head-hunting, James (reigned
1841–1868) and his nephew and successor, Charles (reigned 1868–1917), had by
1890 extended the frontier of their kingdom as far as the Limbang river. This last
annexation dissected all that remained of the sultanate and caused deep resentment
amongst Brunei Malays and their royal family. During the century of Brooke rule,
the economy of Sarawak remained undeveloped and, making a virtue of their lack of
resources, the Brookes preferred informal methods and personal rule to a structured
bureaucracy.79 In the centenary year of the regime and only three months before the
Japanese occupation, the third and last rajah, Charles Vyner (reigned 1917–1946),
issued a constitution which contained the Cardinal Principles of Brooke rule. These
principles, one of which promised that ‘the people of Sarawak shall be entrusted in
due course with the governance of themselves’, would be incorporated into the
constitution of the post-war crown colony. It would be upon the Cardinal Principles
that those Sarawakians and old Sarawak hands who objected to Malaysia would build
their case.80
To the north of the Brookes’ domain British, European and American merchants
negotiated concessions with the rulers of Brunei and Sulu. One of these treaties,
signed with the Sultan of Sulu in January 1878, either ceded or leased (depending on
the translation used) in perpetuity much of what later became known as North
Borneo. (In this ambivalence lay the origins of the Philippines claim to North Borneo
made by Macapagal at the time of the creation of Malaysia and reiterated by
subsequent presidents.) These pioneers sold out to a British commercial syndicate
which, having received a charter from Gladstone’s government in 1881, restructured
itself as the British North Borneo Chartered Company and administered the territory
until the Japanese occupation in January 1942. Although it retained the outward
form of a commercial concern with shareholders and the occasional distribution of
dividends, the Company did not itself engage in trade. Managing ‘a gambling style of
government’ in its early days,81 it later followed many of the norms of British colonial
rule but it lacked ‘the resources, experience, or international authority to exercise
sovereign functions over a backward people’.82
In addition to loss of territory,83 the Sultan of Brunei relinquished control of
external relations, when his kingdom became a British protectorate in 1888, and he
surrendered power over domestic affairs in 1906, when he accepted a British resident
whose advice he agreed to follow in all matters save those relating to religion and
custom. Although Brunei’s fortunes improved dramatically in 1929 with the
discovery of a large oil field at Seria by the British Malayan Petroleum Company
(later Brunei Shell), this did nothing to restore its independence. Moreover, the
upheaval in the region during and after the Japanese occupation called into question
the future viability of this kingdom.
Already regarded as anachronisms by the 1930s, the Brunei sultanate, the Brooke
regime and chartered company rule were closely scrutinised by wartime planners in
London. None was deemed to be a ‘modern form of authority’ or capable of meeting
the economic, political and international challenges of the post-war world. It was
concluded, therefore, that the restoration of pre-war systems would be ‘undesirable
in the interests of security and of our declared purpose of promoting social,
economic and political progress in Colonial territories’ which required ‘growing
participation in the Government by people of all communities in each territory’.84 As
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has been seen, the most radical scheme for post-war reconstruction would have
subordinated all three Borneo dependencies to direct British rule under a governor-
general in Singapore, but in the end only North Borneo and Sarawak became crown
colonies in July 1946 while Brunei remained a protected state. It was decided not to
tamper with the sultan’s sovereignty, in contrast to the treatment meted out to the
rulers of the Malay states. Negotiations over the cession of North Borneo went
smoothly enough with the company directors, whose principal concern was adequate
financial compensation. Any proposal affecting Sarawak’s independence required the
acquiescence of his people but, although the highly contentious arrangement by
which Charles Vyner ceded Sarawak to the Crown was accepted by the Council Negri
(state council) during the post-war military administration, virulent Malay
opposition continued, reaching a climax in 1949 when Governor Stewart was
assassinated. The episode revealed the passions that could be aroused when the
autonomy of the Borneo territories was threatened.85
As has already been discussed, ‘closer association’ had been a key feature of the
wartime plan for reconstruction and remained a principle of policy over the next two
decades. In spite of the fact that the Borneo territories had ‘few racial or other
affinities’ and that ‘the basis for closer union between them hardly exists’, the British
government insisted that ‘the promotion of closer union should be a continuing
matter of our policy’ and expected the governor-general (later commissioner-
general) to sponsor ‘community of policy and of administrative action’.86 Although
the sovereignty of the Sultan of Brunei remained intact after the war, in May 1948
his government was brought under the control of his former vassal—Sarawak. The
governor of Sarawak became ex officio high commissioner of Brunei; the British
resident of Brunei now reported to the high commissioner in Kuching; British
officers from the Sarawak government were seconded for service in the sultanate.
From the time of his accession in 1950, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III was
determined to cut this humiliating connection, to regain Limbang from Sarawak
(thereby ending the partition of his kingdom), to roll back British control over his
domestic affairs without damaging British guarantees of defence, and to obstruct any
attempt to bring about the union or federation of the three Borneo territories. When
in 1953 he publicly announced his intention to draw up a written constitution, he
turned what might have been a constraint into an enhancement of his authority.87
After prolonged discussions, including London talks in September 1957 and March
1959, a constitution was promulgated and a new treaty concluded with Britain on 29
September 1959 (4, 9).88 The treaty guaranteed British protection in defence and
external affairs. It also replaced the British resident with a British high
commissioner whose advice the Sultan was to accept ‘on all matters connected with
the government of the state other than matters relating to the Muslim religion and
the custom of the Malays’. In practice, however, the high commissioner would
refrain from interfering in domestic affairs since the ‘advice clause’ was qualified by
an exchange of letters between the secretary of state and the Sultan specifying the
areas for British guidance. Clearly, it was to the Sultan’s advantage that the high
commissioner had neither a formal role in internal administration nor a connection
with the government of Sarawak. It was also to his advantage that, notwithstanding
the provision of a partially elected legislature, the constitution invested supreme
executive authority (including all appointments) in the Sultan. Hereafter, his
highness would be assisted, not by a British officer, but by a Malay mentri besar
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(chief minister), a state secretary and an executive council with an official majority.
As one authority has commented, the constitution of 1959 was ‘no victory for
parliamentary democracy, but it was a victory for the Sultan. The British had granted
internal self-government to the Sultan, not to the people.’ 89
It has been argued that the British devised the 1959 arrangements in order to
strengthen the Sultan and Brunei Shell against A M Azahari whose Party Rakyat
Brunei opposed colonialism, favoured the democratisation of government and
advocated the restoration of Brunei’s historic grandeur through merger with North
Borneo and Sarawak in a United State of North Kalimantan.90 The records show, on
the contrary, that the British, who had hoped that a written constitution would act as
a check on the Sultan, were wrong-footed when Omar Saifuddin used it as a buttress
for monarchical authority. They were dismayed by the deep-rooted autocracy of his
highness, the incompetence of his courtiers and by the replacement of British
expatriates with Malay officers seconded from the Federation of Malaya. Impatient
with the lack of progress in the modernisation of government and the liberalisation
of the constitution but now debarred from intervening in domestic matters, the high
commissioner became ‘an impotent onlooker’ as ‘the affairs of Brunei began to slip
slowly but steadily from his control’ 91 while his masters in London could do little
other than sympathise with him in this ‘typically oriental imbroglio’.92
As regards the post-war development of North Borneo and Sarawak, administrative
and economic reconstruction was the first priority of the new colonial regimes. Of
the three Borneo territories, North Borneo had been the most devastated by the war
and the new colonial regime launched its first rehabilitation and development plan
in 1948 and its second in 1956. Recovery rested largely on the timber industry and,
when he arrived as governor in mid-1960, Sir William Goode was ‘astonished’ by the
‘remarkable’ progress. ‘There is a general air of progress, prosperity and smiling
happiness,’ he noted. The government was also committed to the extension of social
services and the association of the local populace in the work of government. As
regards the latter, the 1950 constitution provided for executive and legislative
councils while town boards and district councils were set up at local level.
Amendments in 1960 introduced an unofficial majority in the Legislative Council
and increased the unofficial membership of the Executive Council, the unofficials
being nominated by the governor. Although Goode reported at the end of 1960 that
there were no political parties and the country’s claim ‘to have no politics’ was still
broadly true, he noted that this was unlikely to last much longer in the light of
outside influences and growing pressures for closer association with neighbouring
countries (31).93 Goode advocated the development, particularly the education, of the
‘happy’, ‘friendly’ yet ‘backward’ people of North Borneo before their merger with
others. After the ‘Greater Malaysia’ initiative was launched in mid-1961, Goode, like
Sir Alexander Waddell in Sarawak, was a champion of the interests of the Borneo
peoples and would fervently and consistently warn against a precipitate rush to their
merger with Malaya and Singapore.
After the Japanese occupation Sarawak made fewer strides economically than did
North Borneo. Constitutionally, however, it advanced more rapidly and its peoples
were more politically active.94 Sir Charles Arden-Clarke (governor, 1946–1949) pro-
moted institutions of local government. Sir Anthony Abell (governor, 1950–1959)
introduced in 1956 a constitution providing for a majority of unofficial members
on both the Legislative Council (Council Negri) and the Executive Council
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(Supreme Council) most of whom were to be elected.95 The introduction of elec-
tions led to the formation of the Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP) in June
1959 and the Party Negara Sarawak (PANAS) in April the following year. Ong Kee
Hui and other moderate, English-educated Chinese leaders were the driving force
behind the formation of SUPP although it was later infiltrated by radicals from the
Clandestine Communist Organisation who largely recruited from amongst the
rural poor. PANAS was led by Datu Bandar Abang Haji Mustapha who had
supported cession in 1946.96 Although both parties claimed to be multi-racial,
SUPP was almost exclusively associated with the Chinese while PANAS was identi-
fied with pro-cession Malays. Neither made much headway with the Dayaks who
mistrusted both other communities and largely stayed outside party politics until
the launch of ‘Greater Malaysia’ and the Cobbold enquiry. In contrast to the racial
harmony reported from North Borneo by Goode, Tory noted a dangerous racial
problem in Sarawak which was ‘very similar to that which the Malayans have had
to face’ in the federation. In Tory’s opinion, this tension plus the country’s poverty
could only delay progress towards self-government. As regards the timing of
constitutional change, it was the view of senior officials on the spot that none of
the territories would be ready for self-government earlier than 1970 (26), and that
they should advance together rather than follow separate courses or adopt different
timetables. While ‘closer association’ and self-government were interrelated, long-
term objectives for the Borneo territories, it was axiomatic that the achievement of
these goals would depend on the acquiescence of the people and should not be
jeopardised by any hasty action. 
Britain, Malaya and the Borneo territories: the Cobbold Enquiry
We are all in favour of Greater Malaysia but it will have to be handled with more
finesse than the Tunku is showing. 
[E M West (CO) to Reginald Maudling, 21 Mar 1962 97]
The Tunku’s ardour for assimilating the Borneo territories contrasted with his
aversion to merger with Singapore. He wished to be certain of North Borneo,
Sarawak and possibly Brunei too, before tying the knot with Lee Kuan Yew. In many
ways an Anglophile, he had no wish to be left ‘holding the Singapore baby’ (63) for
the British or to be cast as their ‘running dog’ in Borneo. He was, after all, the head
of the government of a sovereign state with an international reputation to protect
and project. More significant in his calculations than international kudos, however,
were the likely domestic repercussions of territorial integration. These hinged on
demographic arithmetic and the communal composition of the new state. According
to figures used in 1961, Malays accounted for 49.3 per cent of the population of
Malaya compared with 37.6 per cent Chinese. The bilateral merger of Malaya and
Singapore would have shifted the balance to 45 per cent Chinese and 42.3 per cent
Malays. Within ‘Greater Malaysia’, however, Chinese numbers would have been
trimmed as follows: Chinese 42.7 per cent, Malays/Borneo Muslims 39.8 per cent,
non-Muslim indigenous peoples of Borneo 5.8 per cent, others (including Indians)
11.7 per cent (73). The Tunku concluded that the non-Chinese communities of
Borneo would go some way towards neutralising the Singapore threat to the Malay
position. Indeed, to be on the safe side he went so far as to demand Malaya’s union
with the Borneo territories in advance of that with Singapore (57, 61, 63, 64, 66, 67).
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Whether it was out of ignorance of Borneo (for example, several years later he told a
Dayak leader ‘there is no such thing as the Dayak language’)98 or enthusiasm for
Melayu raya (the greater Malay world), the Tunku was misled into believing that the
peoples of Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak would welcome his intervention. In
fact he soon encountered antagonism from local leaders who were suspicious of a
stratagem which threatened to replace one colonial regime with another and to
subordinate their rights and interests to those of Kuala Lumpur.
Not long after his speech of 27 May 1961 the Tunku paid a ‘goodwill’ visit to the
Borneo territories. It coincided with a crisis in Kuala Lumpur’s relations with Brunei
where local resentment had boiled over towards officials seconded from Malaya (91).
The Tunku’s high-handed response to this issue alienated Bruneians and added to
their fear of a Malayan take-over, a fear that spread to North Borneo and Sarawak. As
a result Ong Kee Hui (SUPP), Azahari (PRB) and Donald Stephens (Kadazan
Association, forerunner of UNKO) joined in a United Front to protest against the
Tunku’s proposed Malaysia. (SUPP and the PRB would remain opposed to Malaysia,
though they would part company from each other, but Donald Stephens was later
converted to the project.) Waddell reported from Sarawak that ‘the feeling has grown
that the Tunku’s object is a Greater Malaya, not Greater Malaysia’ and he warned that
‘if merger is forced by 1963 or at all prematurely there is a real prospect of racial
conflict and outright rebellion’.99 Goode (North Borneo), Waddell (Sarawak), White
(Brunei) and CO officials accepted Malaysia as their goal but were perturbed by what
they saw as the Tunku’s headlong rush towards it. Goode and Waddell insisted that
the Borneo colonies were not yet ready for self-government within Malaysia which,
they feared, would turn out to be an unequal partnership between the Bornean horse
and the Malayan rider. They warned of the dangers of a shot-gun marriage when
Selkirk recommended to Macleod and Macmillan a ‘crash programme’ for merger
(55, 58). 
No matter the posting or departmental affiliation of individuals, there was general
agreement amongst the British that the Tunku’s conduct immediately after his
speech of 27 May 1961 put the scheme at risk and, at the Anglo–Malayan talks in
London in November 1961, the British side insisted that progress towards Malaysia
should be conditional upon a favourable report on Borneo opinion. (Britain’s other
stipulation was, as we have seen, a guarantee for the continued use of the Singapore
base.) How opinion was to be ascertained posed a problem that would dog the
scheme until the eve of its inauguration. All three territories were as yet ‘quite
unfitted’ to enter Malaysia on the basis of popular representation and Selkirk gave
‘Sarawak about ten years and North Borneo at least twenty years before a clear-cut
electoral opinion could be given on this subject’ (55). In the frequent parallels drawn
by policy-makers between Malaysia and the Central African Federation, the position
of Borneo was compared with that of Nyasaland in that both were under-populated,
undeveloped and, at least to begin with, almost innocent of party politics. At the time
of the Tunku’s announcement there were few registered parties: SUPP, PANAS and
SNAP in Sarawak, Party Rakyat in Brunei, but none yet in North Borneo. Because
there was as yet little political awareness with which to fashion political activity, it
was decided not to test public feeling at the polls in the first instance. Instead, in the
colonies of North Borneo and Sarawak opinion was assessed by an Anglo–Malayan
commission of enquiry, while as regards Brunei both London and Kuala Lumpur
courted Sultan Omar Saifuddin as the sole spokesman of his people. Critics of
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Malaysia condemned the exercise as a smoke-screen behind which British
colonialists collaborated with their ‘stooges’. Largely because the Tunku suspected
that the enquiry was a delaying tactic on the part of the British, however, the
Anglo–Malayan Commission was troubled from the outset by the markedly different
approaches of the British and Malayan governments to the manner and timetable for
territorial integration and transfer of power. In addition, there was considerable
divergence of views within British circles: on the one hand, CO officials and colonial
administrators emphasised trusteeship obligations and the wisdom of making haste
slowly; on the other hand, the CRO, the office of the commissioner-general and
increasingly the prime minister himself were worried lest procrastination allowed
the Tunku’s enthusiasm to cool, Lee’s regime to fall and the Malaysia project to fail. 
The nomination of members of the commission revealed the differences between
London and Kuala Lumpur that would subsequently bring the enquiry to the brink
of failure (89). Many were considered for the chairmanship but rejected for one
reason or another. Malcolm MacDonald was the British first choice but was
discounted by the Tunku for having been too pro-Dayak during his time as
commissioner-general.100 The Tunku, for his part, preferred a man who had assisted
Malaya along the road to Merdeka, such as Lord Ogmore (formerly David Rees-
Williams, whom the British regarded as inappropriate as a consequence of his
involvement in the cession of Sarawak to the Crown in 1946),101 or Lord Boyd
(formerly Alan Lennox-Boyd, whom the British rejected as being too political). In the
end Lord Cobbold, a former governor of the Bank of England, was accepted by both
sides as sufficiently detached from colonial affairs. Since the Tunku suggested Sir
David Watherston as one of the British members (in what turned out to be the
misplaced belief that as a former chief secretary of the Federation he would be
sympathetic to Kuala Lumpur), the British chose the late, popular governor of
Sarawak, Sir Anthony Abell, to serve as the other British commissioner. The Malayan
commissioners were Dato Wong Pow Nee, chief minister of Penang, and the more
dominant Ghazali Shafie, permanent secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs, to
whom the Tunku was already accustomed ‘to give an unusually wide measure of
responsibility’.102
In January 1962 Sir John Martin and Ian Wallace reconnoitred the colonies in
advance of the enquiry (92). Harking back to Sir Harold MacMichael’s disastrous
mission to extract fresh treaties from the Malay sultans in 1945, Martin warned the
minister of state against rushing the people of Sarawak and North Borneo: ‘You will
remember the unhappy history of the MacMichael agreements in Malaya. More
recently we have the lesson of our failure to reconcile people to federation in Central
Africa at the outset. We cannot afford to repeat these mistakes in this sensitive region
of the world.’103 As for Brunei, Wallace reported that the sultan was ‘not going to be a
push-over for Malaysia’.104 A fortnight before the British commissioners left London,
however, they were heartened to learn that the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative
Committee, composed of non-British representatives of the five territories (including
observers sent by the Sultan of Brunei) and chaired by North Borneo’s Donald
Stephens (who had initially attacked the Tunku’s proposal), had concluded in favour
of the ‘concept’ of Malaysia.105
During their tour of the Borneo colonies, the commissioners worked together ‘as
well as could be expected’ but, Cobbold observed, ‘the prospects of unanimous
recommendations were extremely dim’ (94). Fairly soon into the enquiry, the British
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reached the view that local mistrust of Kuala Lumpur plus the countries’ dependence
on expatriate officials required a transitional period during which Britain would
transfer control in stages for the sake of administrative continuity. Such gradualism
was unacceptable to the Malayan commissioners. When members of the colonial
services in Borneo also expressed reservations about Malaysia, Ghazali accused them
of old-fashioned paternalism and wilful sabotage. This spat is documented in British
archives and vividly recalled by the leading Malayan commissioner in his Memoir.
Observing the Sarawak river from a window in the Kuching istana (palace), Ghazali
mused:—
The river was tidal. Quite often it did not appear to know which way it was flowing.
Even if it did flow it was very slow and with it were drift woods and flotsam
creating impediments to boats cruising by. It was almost a grotesque mimicry of
the attitude of the colonial expatriates towards the Malaysia Concept! 106
On another occasion he refers scathingly to ‘hard core die-hard colonialists who were
living in the past’ and ‘who thought it was the white man’s burden to take care of the
noble savages who should remain so for them to patronise and gloat’.107 Ghazali has
presented the Tunku as ‘a true democrat and a people’s prince’,108 liberating Borneo
from the yoke of colonialism while British ministers and officials (with a few
exceptions such as Malcolm MacDonald, Harold Macmillan and Duncan Sandys)
tried to stop the onward march of freedom. He reported that colonial administrators
were apathetic, if not hostile to Malaysia, and suggested that the truculence of
Sarawakians was probably the result of having been ‘coached’ by expatriates.109
Ghazali himself had been coached at the start of his diplomatic career by Malcolm
MacDonald. His ‘thrusting self-confidence’ had taken him to the top of the tree at an
early age with the result that he had ‘developed a keen sense of his own importance’
which indeed was ‘real enough’. He was observed by the British to have ‘a certain
unscrupulous streak of self-aggrandisement’ and, while he conveyed ‘a sense of
considerable bonhomie’, he was ‘given to bursts of temper if he feels he has been
slighted’.110 Ghazali did indeed feel slighted during the tour of Borneo and he sent
the Tunku reports of ‘rude treatment’ including an occasion when a British resident
allegedly snubbed the Malayan commissioners at a cocktail party ‘in full view of
everybody’ (96).111 When Tunku Abdul Rahman realised that the enquiry might not
endorse Malaysia unequivocally and whole-heartedly, he went on the offensive and
publicly accused colonial officials of hampering preparations. 
The governor of North Borneo, whose knowledge, ability and experience were
widely respected, strenuously denied ‘foot-dragging’ over Malaysia.112 William Goode
had entered the Malayan Civil Service in 1931 and, apart from four years in Aden, he
spent his entire career in Southeast Asia. His experience of internment during the
Japanese occupation and his sense of having ‘let the people down’ in 1941–1942
reinforced an instinctive commitment to trusteeship obligations during the period of
decolonisation.113 In 1961–1963 he was appalled by Malayan insensitivity to Borneo
and particularly by the Tunku’s ignorance, naivete and indifference to local
resistance to Malaysia. While the enmity of many people in North Borneo was
‘probably a relic of the old repression by Malays from Brunei’, it was nonetheless real
in 1962.114 Goode reminded London that the peoples of North Borneo ‘had only been
steam-rollered once, by the Japanese, and they exacted a price of heads for that’
(100).115 More than twenty years later he recalled how ‘one Native Chief, a Dusun,
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said to me “If the British are unwilling to stay longer, I’d rather have the Japanese
than Malays taking over”.’ When years later he reflected on the making of Malaysia, it
seemed to him that a project which was ‘merely a desperate political device to enable
KL to deal better with Chinese Singapore under the PAP’ was not only ‘hopelessly ill-
founded and unreal’ but also ‘most unfair on the happy and friendly peoples of North
Borneo’.116 After the commissioners departed, Goode elaborated his ideas: he
accepted Malaysia—even advocating that it should be inaugurated while the iron was
hot—but he insisted that, before sovereignty was transferred to Kuala Lumpur, there
should be a prolonged transitional period during which expatriate officials would
administer the country. 
Since the establishment of crown colony rule in 1946, the old ethos of government
had been changing in both territories. Development funds, directives from the
Colonial Office and the recruitment of cadets or transfers from other colonies meant,
as has been written of Sarawak, that the practice of ‘the eccentric Brooke officer
reigning over his “subjects” in a remote outstation without much interference from
the centre of government in Kuching’ was no longer acceptable.117 Nevertheless, in
the view of Goode, Waddell and the proponents of progressive colonialism, North
Borneo and Sarawak still required both time to prepare for Malaysia and British
officials to guide the localisation of administration and the growth of self-governing
institutions. Neither was guaranteed. Time was running out; as Philip Rogers noted,
‘we may have to try and achieve in perhaps as little as two or three years what we
ought to spend at least twenty years in doing’.118 Moreover, the prospect of a Malayan
take-over discouraged expatriates from staying-on. This was a problem affecting
other territories, too, and in the early 1960s the terms and conditions of the Oversea
Civil Service (HMOCS) were amended to provide not only compensation for loss of
employment but also financial inducements to continue in post. While North Borneo
and Sarawak shared with dependencies elsewhere the problem of lack of
preparedness, the Treasury recognised their ‘unique’ predicament in that, ‘if the
expatriates were to go, we should be leaving the inhabitants at the mercy of the
Malayans’.119
Tunku Abdul Rahman’s criticism of colonial officials in March 1962 received wide
publicity in the region. It reached the British press and was sufficiently grave to
catch the attention of the British prime minister. Any hint of blinkered
sentimentalism on the part of the Colonial Office and the overseas colonial service
disturbed Macmillan and he requested an explanation from the colonial secretary.
Reginald Maudling was advised by CO officials against any tendency to ‘bounce
Borneo on the basis of the Tunku’s thinking’,120 and he strongly defended the
colonial service: ‘The administration in Borneo are not being paternalistic but
realistic. They are entirely with us in wanting to see Malaysia brought about.’ (97)
The CO felt that a riposte to the Tunku would be in order, pointing out that the
success of Malaysia would depend on the continuity of administration provided by
British officials. In the CRO, however, it was felt that the Tunku may have had a
point. The Commonwealth secretary was impatient; six months previously Sandys
had allegedly said that ‘we could not allow the susceptibilities of headhunters to
wreck the project’ 121 and he was now eager to take it in hand. On reading Goode’s
submissions to Cobbold, in which the governor had stated that ‘North Borneo is not
ready for Malaysia’, one CRO official concluded that they provided ‘ample
justification for the Tunku’s feeling that the N.B. administration have not put their
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heart in Malaysia. Sir W Goode has pulled no punches and, considering the papers
were intended for both the British and Malayan members of the Commission, they
are astonishingly frank.’122 On balance, however, ministers preferred to let the
matter drop. To pursue it further would have aggravated tensions between Malaya
and the Borneo territories and also between Malayan and colonial officials ‘to the
point of generating an atmosphere of mistrust, such as had developed in the Central
African Federation’ (98). When Lansdowne referred to the episode several months
later the Tunku took it ‘in very good part’. With respect to his remarks about ‘the
British yoke’, he reminded the minister of state, ‘with a big twinkle in his eye’, that
when he was fighting for Malayan independence ‘he had used the same tactics to
build up a national spirit’ (142).
Cobbold returned from Borneo full of foreboding: the commissioners were divided
and strife was brewing in the Borneo colonies. Unless the Tunku behaved sensibly
and the government seized the initiative to act promptly, he warned, ‘there will be
some slitting of throats’ (101, also 102). The commissioners reconvened in Britain in
early May and spent the rest of the month and much of June drafting their report in
which Watherston took the lead (106–116). They agreed that there was significant
support for Malaysia but serious mistrust of it. Where they differed was over
recommendations for a transitional period. Watherston and Abell (with Cobbold
largely in support) were concerned that sufficient safeguards (regarding the official
language, appointment of state governors and expatriate officials) should be built
into the transitional arrangements to meet the special interests of the territories and
to ensure continuity of administration. Alarmed by the prospect of the simultaneous
withdrawal of British governors and imposition of Malayan government, they
suggested a compromise whereby, on the inauguration of Malaysia, sovereignty
would be transferred to Kuala Lumpur which would immediately assume
responsibility for the defence and external relations of the Borneo territories while
the British governors of North Borneo and Sarawak would remain in post to ensure
administrative continuity and to supervise the localisation of public services. Since
such an arrangement was bound to inflame Malayan opinion, they recommended
that the details be worked out after the publication of the report. Ghazali Shafie and
Wong Pow Nee were shocked by Watherston’s draft, which, in Ghazali’s view
portrayed a colonial golden age plunged into chaos, and they set about drafting an
alternative version. Not surprisingly Ghazali showed no particular tenderness
towards Borneo peoples; 123 rather his object was to secure a report that neither
fudged issues nor brooked delay in the transfer of complete control to Kuala
Lumpur. Anything less would have played into the hands of critics keen to brand the
Tunku a ‘British lackey’.124 Tunku Abdul Rahman wanted a unanimous report that
supported the Malayan viewpoint and, when he learned of the commissioners’
disagreements, he issued instructions to the Malayan commissioners, threatening to
recall them for consultations. Although Ghazali was able to reassure him that their
return would be unnecessary, Abdul Rahman’s intervention in what was supposed to
be an independent enquiry upset both sides of the Commission and added to their
difficulties.125 At last, on 21 June Cobbold submitted the report simultaneously to the
prime ministers of Britain and Malaya, who agreed to keep it confidential until they
had decided a course of action (124).126 At the same time, Cobbold also sent
Macmillan, the Tunku and Maudling a number of letters (including a memorandum
by Abell and Watherston) which amplified contentious issues that were not
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mentioned, or were only partially covered, in the report (118–122). Here he was
more explicit in his views regarding transition. In his private and personal letter to
Macmillan, for example, Cobbold emphasised that British governors would be
‘essential’ in North Borneo and Sarawak ‘for the next few years’ because the
government in Kuala Lumpur was both ‘fully stretched’ and largely ignorant of
conditions in Borneo (118). 
Securing agreement had been touch and go. The talks had nearly collapsed;
Ghazali and Wong Pow Nee had been on the point of returning to Kuala Lumpur; the
British and Malayan commissioners had considered submitting separate reports.
That none of this happened was because, on the one hand, the commissioners’ views
tallied on many issues while, on the other hand, the presentation of their
disagreements was effectively managed. First of all, they were in broad agreement in
their assessments of Borneo opinion: they estimated that about one-third strongly
favoured Malaysia, another third favoured it provided that there were adequate
safeguards, and the remaining third was divided between those seeking
independence in advance of the inauguration of Malaysia and those resisting it
outright.127 Secondly, they were unanimous on a number of major
recommendations, for example: that a decision in principle should be taken by
governments as soon as possible; that the new state should be called Malaysia; that
the constitution of the Federation of Malaya should be adapted for Malaysia, instead
of drafting a completely new one; that there should be no right to secede from
Malaysia after merger; that Borneanisation of the public services should proceed as
quickly as possible and that, in the interim, every effort should be made to encourage
British officers to remain in the service; that citizens of North Borneo and Sarawak
should become citizens of Malaysia.128 In general, they concluded that ‘a Federation
of Malaysia is an attractive and workable project and in the best interests of the
Borneo territories’.129 Thirdly, the British commissioners agreed to eliminate
references to the appointment of British governors and to accept an arrangement
whereby new governors would be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (on the
joint nomination of the Agong and the Queen). Fourthly, as regards the areas where
they diverged, their differences were set out in separate sections, not in the form of
conflicting reports but as an agenda requiring further consideration. Finally, the
Commission left the controversial points (including the precise constitutional
arrangements for the transition and internal security) to be decided in negotiation
between the British and Malayan governments. Cobbold saved the Commission from
collapse by remitting to inter-governmental negotiations the ‘one big and difficult
problem’ of the transitional stage (124). 
Copied into the communications between London and Kuala Lumpur, the
governors of North Borneo and Sarawak picked up on the disputes over drafting
without being privy to the full contents of the report (103–105, 116). Tit-bits of news
fuelled the fears of the guardians of Bornean interests that the British were prepared
to compromise principles and suppress awkward issues in order to appease the
Malayans. A forceful telegram from Goode, which reiterated the danger of ignoring
popular opinion, ‘shocked’ the prime minister prompting him to ask the Cabinet
secretary: ‘Does he [Goode] realise (a) our weakness in Singapore (b) our need to
hand over the security problem there. If this is the Colonial Office point of view, we
shall fail. What are we to do?’ (117). To the embarrassment of the prime minister’s
private office, a copy of Macmillan’s minute was inadvertently sent to the colonial
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secretary and, not surprisingly, ‘it made him—and the Colonial Office—angry’.
Tartly rejecting the implication that governors made policy, Maudling replied: ‘I have
not yet made up my mind what the Colonial Office point of view is to be on the
matter. The Governor is fully aware of the importance of Malaysia and I am sure his
concern is to see it achieved without serious troubles in Borneo.’ Tim Bligh,
principal private secretary to the prime minister, managed to persuade Maudling to
withhold his paper from Macmillan who remained unconscious of the consternation
aroused by his question which he himself was to answer a few weeks later by
reshuffling the Cabinet in ‘the night of the long knives’.130
Britain, Malaya and the Borneo colonies: inter-governmental negotiations
I am afraid that the Tunku still shows little sign openly of understanding the
difficulties involved over the accession of the territories to Malaysia. I suspect,
however, that he may well understand more than he wishes to disclose. I doubt
whether any useful purpose can be served by the British emphasising the difficul-
ties. He is a man of great perception and I feel certain that if he is able to have
informed talks both with the peoples and the British officers, he will quickly grasp
the realities of the situation, though he may well not show that he has done so.
[Lord Lansdowne to Sir William Goode, 11 Sept 1962 131]
Although the Tunku had authorised the Malayan commissioners to sign the report,
he was unhappy with it. He was ‘very nervous about the effect of Malaysia on his
political position’ (123) and about its repercussions on Malaya’s relations with
Indonesia and the Philippines. Having consulted his Cabinet at the hill resort of
Fraser’s Hill, the Tunku rejected the report and suggested the postponement of
Malaysia until Britain was ready for it (125). In London the Oversea Policy
Committee realised the need to avoid repeating the mistake already made in Central
Africa where, by hanging on too long to responsibility in Nyasaland and Northern
Rhodesia, Britain had contributed to the difficulties of the Central African
Federation. Since British ministers had no doubt that ‘Malaysia offered the best and
possibly the only hope for longer term stability in Singapore’, they accepted that, if it
were to be achieved, ‘it would have to be achieved quickly in view of the deteriorating
position of Mr. Lee Kuan Yew’s Government’ as well as the pending claim of the
Philippines to North Borneo. Rather than antagonise Malaya and lose Malaysia,
therefore, they concluded that full responsibility for the Borneo territories should be
conceded to the federal government on Malaysia Day (126).132 The immediate
priority, however, was to re-engage the Tunku in discussions. Intervening personally,
Macmillan reassured the Malayan prime minister that the views of Cobbold and the
other British commissioners were not those of the British government, that the
British government had no wish to retain authority in the Borneo territories during
the transition stage, and that he would approach the report ‘with a completely open
mind’. Macmillan’s diplomacy rescued the Anglo–Malayan talks on Malaysia (127,
128).
There was now less than a fortnight before the talks were due to start in London.
As part of the preparations, the inter-departmental Committee on Greater Malaysia
completed a comprehensive brief for ministers (129, 130). Notwithstanding an
apparent consensus, CO officials feared that safeguards for Borneo would be
sacrificed on the altar of Anglo–Malayan partnership. They believed it would be bad
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tactics to allow Macmillan and the Tunku to meet in private, without officials in
attendance and before the formal talks got underway. They accordingly advised their
secretary of state to be alert and to stand up to the CRO: ‘The Tunku, we fear, is
coming over expecting to have everything buttoned up in a week or two. Even if
there were no major difficulties such as the transitional period this would not be
practicable.’133 Noting how in ‘recent official discussions on Malaysia (and I think
also in some of the Ministerial consideration of the subject) there have been signs of
a tendency to believe that Malaysia is so desirable that we must be prepared to pay
any price which the Tunku demands’, Sir John Martin felt that the time had come for
his secretary of state to fire a shot across the bows of the Oversea Policy Committee.
Martin submitted a draft minute for Maudling to sign and send to his Cabinet
colleagues. This stated without equivocation that ‘it will be paying too high if we
agree to terms for the Borneo territories’ admission to Malaysia which could
frustrate its successful creation’. By such action, Britain would not only be in breach
of its trusteeship obligations, but would also risk ‘breakdown in administration’,
‘economic chaos’ and ‘bloodshed’ which ‘would infect Malaysia from the start with a
fatal instability’.134 It would appear that the paper had been drafted with Duncan
Sandys in mind, but, before it could be signed and circulated, Maudling had been
replaced as secretary of state by Sandys himself. 
Within a few days of the dramatic Cabinet reshuffle, the Malaysian talks got
underway in London (132). They started on the morning of 17 July with the private
meeting between Macmillan and Abdul Rahman, which CO officials had hoped either
to avert or to attend, and this was followed at 12 noon by the first plenary session.
The Tunku’s delegation met with Sandys’ team that afternoon and the next morning.
Thereafter detailed negotiations were conducted in a steering committee chaired by
Lord Lansdowne (minister of state, CO). The Borneo peoples were represented by
their governors. Judging by the pencilled notes (‘Points for Sandys’) which he jotted
down on the eve of the talks, it is unlikely that Goode’s views would have been
warmly welcomed by the new secretary of state: ‘Wholly support Malaysia but …
Tunku must avoid “taking over” Borneo territories as Colonies. Any impression of
being transferred as Colonies from Britain to Malaya will provoke a Merdeka
[independence] Movement against K.L.—potentially irresistible’.135 The talks went
badly. After ten days they were in danger of breaking down altogether. The initial
meeting between prime ministers, where Macmillan seems to have encouraged the
Tunku to believe that the British government would in the end be willing to achieve
agreement at almost any price, had unrealistically raised Malayan expectations. A L M
Cary of the Cabinet Office noted that ‘unless there is some dramatic change in the
situation it looks as though a solution may emerge which will cause serious trouble
in Borneo and by repercussion, in this country’.136 The stumbling blocks were, firstly,
the implications of extending the existing federal constitution to North Borneo and
Sarawak (particularly with respect to religion, language and education) and,
secondly, the crucial question of timing. On the one hand, the sound preparation of
the Borneo territories warranted the gradual implementation of a measured
programme; on the other hand, instability in Singapore and the Tunku’s self-esteem
necessitated the swift advance towards an early date. Discussions about Singapore’s
membership of Malaysia were going on in London at the same time as those
regarding Borneo, but, because the Tunku was pessimistic about the chances of
synchronising both sets of merger and could not, in any case, accept the staged
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approach whereby Singapore acceded before the Borneo territories, he threatened to
pull out of the talks altogether (133).
Breakdown would have been in nobody’s interest, least of all the Tunku’s who
could not risk returning to Kuala Lumpur empty-handed. In order to get
negotiations back on track, Macmillan invited the Tunku to lunch at Chequers on 28
July when Macmillan outlined a formula to enable the establishment of Malaysia
(134–137). First of all the governments should jointly declare their intention to
conclude a formal agreement which would provide for the transfer of sovereignty to
Malaysia by 31 August 1963, safeguards for Singapore and the Borneo territories and
also the extension of the existing defence arrangement. Secondly, the prime
ministers of Malaya and the UK would exchange secret letters agreeing that ‘if the
present Government of Singapore fell or appeared to be about to fall, the new
Federation of Malaysia should be brought into being as soon as practicable’. This, as
has already been discussed in the section on relations between Malaya and Singapore,
was a contingency plan in the event of Lee’s regime collapsing, but it also had
implications for the control of the Borneo territories. If Malaysia was brought into
being prematurely (ie before 31 August 1963), the British governors would cease to
be responsible to the British government but would continue to exercise executive
powers until the appointment by the Yang di-pertuan Agong of new governors with
effect from 31 August. Three days after the Chequers lunch an agreement in
principle for setting up the Federation of Malaysia by 31 August 1963 was signed by
Macmillan and the Tunku, with Lee Kuan Yew in attendance (139). The following
day, a joint statement to this effect was made in both Houses at Westminster as well
as in the Federal Parliament and the Cobbold Report was published.137 But the
agreement itself was not released, nor were its annex and most of its appendices. The
reasons for this secrecy were, firstly, the sensitivity of the Chequers formula allowing
pre-emptive action, and, secondly, the likely opposition of the peoples of Borneo to
the constitutional structure. As CO officials and governors had always feared would
happen, ‘the agreement records an acceptance (not achieved by the Malayan
members without hard bargaining) of the view of the Malayan members of the
[Cobbold] Commission’ (140).138 Indeed, the Tunku’s private observation to Goode,
made the day after the agreement had been signed, did nothing to reassure the
governor: ‘The peoples of the territories are good, simple people. They will be easy to
handle if ideas are not put in their heads.’ 139 Prolonged discussions within the forum
of an inter-governmental committee were now required if Borneo leaders were to be
persuaded to accept the timetable for merger and the Anglo–Malayan framework for
their state constitutions.
The announcement of the early target date came as a great shock to many in
British Borneo. It seemed to confirm that Malaysia was to be a Malayan ‘take-over’.
On 13–14 August Donald Stephens convened a meeting of North Borneo political
leaders who drew up a fourteen-point (later twenty-point) programme of minimum
demands. These demands went far beyond what the Malayans had conceded at the
London talks and gained added weight by attracting support in Sarawak. Although
the Legislative Councils of both North Borneo and Sarawak accepted Malaysia in
principle in September, they did so on condition that state rights were
constitutionally safeguarded. The task of drafting these safeguards had been devolved
by the London conference to the Inter-Governmental Committee working in
consultation with the two legislatures. Chaired by Lord Lansdowne, with Tun Razak
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as deputy chairman, the IGC consisted of representatives from Malaya, North Borneo
and Sarawak (141–143). Specific topics were handled by five sub-committees, each of
which was chaired by Sir John Martin. The IGC’s first task was to allay anxieties and
secure local co-operation. One of the most intractable problems was the extent of
development aid for the Borneo territories (146). This was later dealt with as part of
the financial settlement which British ministers discussed with the Malayan
government in May 1963 (145, 173–177, 179, 181). With respect to constitutional
relations, although they failed to secure an initial seven-year period during which
legislative power should remain within the state (rather than being delegated to it),
North Borneo and Sarawak did win a number of safeguards which could not be
changed by the federal government without the concurrence of the state
government. The committee’s final report was initialled on 22 January 1963,
published on 27 February and adopted by the Council Negri and North Borneo’s
Legislative Council on 8 and 13 March respectively.140
Although local opposition to Malaysia had not evaporated in North Borneo, by now
much of it was being channelled through an increasing number of parties which, in
response both to the previous practices of colonial rule and to the communal
imperatives of Malaysian politics, championed particular ethnic and regional
interests. In addition to SUPP and PANAS in Sarawak, by the end of 1962 the
following parties had been registered and were active: the Sarawak National Party
(SNAP, predominantly Ibans of the Second Division), Barisan Ra’ayat Jati Sarawak
(BARJASA, a Malay party in competition with PANAS), Party Pesaka Anak Sarawak
(PAPAS or PESAKA, largely Ibans of the Third Division), and the Sarawak Chinese
Association (SCA). In November 1962 BARJASA, PANAS, PESAKA, SCA, and SNAP
formed the Sarawak Alliance (though PANAS later defected) to fight elections in
1963 as the result of which a pro-Malaysia coalition was formed with Stephen Kalong
Ningkan (SNAP) as chief minister designate (198). In Sabah, the formation of Donald
Stephens’ United National Kadazan Organisation (UNKO) was followed by the United
Sabah National Organisation (USNO) led by Dato Mustapha bin Dato Harun (Sabah’s
first head of state) and a number of other parties (United National Pasok Momogun
Organisation, Democratic Party, United Party, Sabah Indian Congress). In various
combinations these parties composed the Sabah Alliance that supported Malaysia in
elections as the result of which Donald Stephens emerged as chief minister designate
of Sabah. The staged electoral process was concluded in North Borneo and Sarawak
by July 1963 (Appendix, paras 311–317).
The Malaysia Agreement was signed in London on 9 July 1963.141 Neither sovereign,
nor even self-governing, strictly speaking North Borneo and Sarawak were not of a
status to be parties to the formal agreement. It would have been injudicious, however,
to have stuck to the letter of the law in this matter. In fact, the British recognised the
presentational importance of ensuring that leaders of indigenous peoples of Borneo
participated in the signing ceremony alongside representatives of the British, Malayan
and Singapore governments (178). Dato Mustapha bin Dato Harun and Donald
Stephens were amongst the six signatories for North Borneo. Sarawak’s five
representatives included Temenggong Jugah (who would be federal minister for
Sarawak Affairs), Dato Abang Haji Openg (the future governor) and Dato Abang Haji
Mustapha (of PANAS which would shortly split from the Sarawak Alliance), but
Stephen Kalong Ningkan was not present. Annexed to the Malaysia Agreement were a
number of constitutional instruments. These included: the Malaysia bill to enable the
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admission to the federation of the three former British dependencies; state
constitutions for Sabah (as North Borneo would be called), Sarawak and Singapore; a
scheme to compensate officers retiring from government service in North Borneo and
Sarawak; terms and conditions by which expatriates would continue to be employed
in the public services of Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore. 
Legislation ending British jurisdiction in North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore
was enacted at Westminster.142 It did not provide for the separate independence of
the three territories but transferred sovereignty to the new Federation of Malaysia.
Since it involved amendments to the constitution of the Federation of Malaya,
legislation to set up the Federation of Malaysia was enacted by the Yang di-Pertuan
Agong and the Malayan parliament. The state constitutions of Sabah, Sarawak and
Singapore were authorised in London by Orders-in-Council, as were arrangements
for the compensation of retiring officers. The conditions of service of those officers
continuing in the employment of the governments of Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore
would later be confirmed by an agreement concluded between the UK and the new
Federation of Malaysia.143 A last-minute dispute between Malayan and Sarawak
leaders over the nomination of Sarawak’s first head of state was resolved through the
personal intervention of Sandys but it did not bode well for future relations between
Kuching and Kuala Lumpur (210, 224).
The UN Mission to Borneo
… there is no doubt about the wishes of a sizeable majority of the peoples of these
territories to join the Federation of Malaysia. 
[U Thant, 13 Sept 1963 (225)]
As preparations for Malaysia proceeded, opponents contested its legitimacy by
appeals to the United Nations. Decolonisation through the integration of a non-self-
governing territory with an already independent state would be regarded as
legitimate provided that, firstly, the acceding territory had ‘attained an advanced
stage of self-government with free political institutions’, and, secondly, its peoples
had expressed their wishes through democratic processes based on universal adult
suffrage. It was also expected that, notwithstanding constitutional variations between
them, the peoples of the acceding territory would enjoy equal rights and status with
those of the already independent state (205).144
After they lost the debate on Singapore’s referendum bill in July 1962, a group of
assemblymen led by the Barisan Sosalis and David Marshall sent an appeal to the UN’s
Committee of Seventeen (the decolonisation committee; later the Committee of
Twenty Four). Both the petitioners and Lee Kuan Yew in due course appeared before
the committee and Lee’s rebuttal of his critics made such an impression that no
further action was taken. In September 1962 a joint appeal from the United National
Pasok Momogun Organisation (North Borneo), Party Rakyat Brunei and the Sarawak
United People’s Party requested UN intervention to prevent the transfer of sovereignty
without the exercise of self-determination. However, the Brunei revolt broke this
alliance; in January 1963 SUPP submitted a petition on its own and in February (after
the suppression of the Brunei revolt) Azahari contemplated putting his case to the
UN.145 By this time both the Sabah Alliance and the Sarawak Alliance were preparing
cases in favour of Malaysia. The British had carefully monitored all such submissions
and mentored Malayan representatives in techniques of lobbying for UN support (159). 
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The last and potentially most damaging appeal to the UN was submitted following
an agreement at the Manila Summit in August 1963. Macapagal, Sukarno and the
Tunku met in Manila to discuss ways of improving their relations through
international association (Maphilindo) and, in particular, of resolving their differences
over Malaysia. Their accords included a request that the UN secretary-general, or his
representative, should ‘ascertain’ the extent of support in the Borneo territories for
Malaysia, that observers from all three governments should accompany the UN
mission, and that the formation of Malaysia should be postponed until the completion
of the UN report. The British were dismayed by this proposal (200). They argued that
the legitimacy of Malaysia had already been established; so far as North Borneo and
Sarawak were concerned it rested on the Cobbold Enquiry, the report of the IGC,
resolutions in the legislatures of the Borneo colonies and recent popular elections. Not
fully appreciating the pressure upon the Tunku to maintain a semblance of good
relations with his neighbours, they rejected the view that the Manila initiative might
actually assist the cause of Malaysia by appeasing Sukarno. On the contrary, believing
the Tunku to have surrendered to enemies of the project, Sandys intervened directly
in a vain attempt to hold the Malayan prime minister to the agreed timetable
(201–203). Ministers and officials were also concerned by the implications of Manila
for Britain’s use of the Singapore base and its likely impact upon the PAP regime; any
delay might force Lee Kuan Yew to hold a general election which could result in a
Barisan victory. Furthermore, the British were apprehensive lest the Manila Accord
opened up differences between them and the US administration. It was largely to
prevent such a deterioration in Anglo–American solidarity that Macmillan allowed
himself to be persuaded by Kennedy of the diplomatic value of offering Sukarno the
‘fig leaf ’ of the UN mission (204–208). 
Led by Lawrence Michelmore (the American deputy director of the UN Office of
Personnel) the mission consisted of Argentinian, Brazilian, Ceylonese, Czech,
Ghanaian, Pakistani, Japanese, and Jordanian members of the UN Secretariat. It was
accompanied by observers from Indonesia and the Philippines—an arrangement
which the British government grudgingly accepted. The mission arrived in Kuching
on 16 August and divided into two teams, one for Sarawak and the other for North
Borneo. From 24 August to 4 September they held public hearings in widespread
locations and reconvened in Kuching on 5 September (the day when Sarawak’s newly
elected Council Negri endorsed the Malaysia agreement). Meanwhile, under pressure
from Sandys, the Malayan government did not wait on the results of the UN enquiry
before agreeing a new date for Malaysia Day, but announced that the federation
would be inaugurated on 16 September (211–214). The postponement of Malaysia
Day did not, however, interfere with the award of internal self-government to North
Borneo and Sarawak. On 31 August powers were ‘arrogated’ and the governors
declared that, until the day of Malaysia’s inauguration (when they would stand
down), they would retain all those powers that would in future be federal powers and
that they would act only on the advice of their chief ministers in respect of matters
within the province of state government. As we have seen, Lee Kuan Yew unilaterally
declared independence on 31 August, an action which caused consternation in Kuala
Lumpur but to which the British turned a blind eye. 
In case the mission found against Malaysia, Sandys, who remained in the region
until the last crises were over, took the precaution of drafting a joint Anglo–Malayan
statement setting out the history of consultations with Borneo peoples. In the event
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this document was not required. The UN report, which was published on 14
September, was generally favourable to Malaysia ( 223, 225). In his assessment of the
mission’s findings, U Thant was in no doubt that ‘a sizeable majority of the peoples’
wished to join Malaysia, although he also rebuked the Malayans for fixing a new
Malaysia Day before the mission had completed its work. Even before the survey was
finished, however, Indonesia and the Philippines were attempting to discredit it and,
on its publication, they rejected the report and refused to be bound by its findings.
Nevertheless, the Tunku’s tactics had paid off: Malaysia was inaugurated with the
ringing endorsement of the United Nations which endowed the federation with the
international legitimacy that it might otherwise have lacked.
Brunei 146
[I] implore whatever gods may be to use everything up to and including
thumbscrews to oblige the Sultan to decide to join Malaysia before August 31st,—
for his own good, certainly, but more importantly for the good of more important
people like ourselves.
[Sir Paul Gore-Booth to Sir Saville Garner, 15 July 1963 147]
Whether or not Brunei joined the new federation was a matter for its sovereign ruler
to decide. Having vacillated since the inception of Malaysia, his highness delayed his
decision to the very last minute when he resolutely refused to join. There has been
considerable speculation as to his reasons: oil, status, popular opinion and the
repercussions of the Brunei rising have all been suggested. As we have seen, the
Sultan of Brunei was jealous of his autonomy and had opposed various forms of
closer association since his accession in 1950. His attitude to Malaysia was
determined by the terms for entry and also by the likely impact of membership upon
his position at home which was challenged, though more indirectly than head-on, by
A M Azahari and the Party Rakyat. 
Azahari campaigned against union with Malaya, favouring instead a unitary state
of Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak. He also advocated further constitutional reform and
was equivocal regarding the future role of the monarchy. A mercurial leader whose
cause suffered from poor organisation and financial problems, Azahari could
mobilise considerable popular support and represented a nationalist threat to the
status quo. The Sultan was anxious to restrict his activities; thus, he delayed
elections under the 1959 constitution and, when the PRB won control of all the
elected seats on the Legislative Council, he put off its first meeting.148 Frustrated by
this postponement and already in self-imposed exile as a protest against the Sultan’s
apparent predilection for Malaysia, Azahari launched a coup. On 8 December 1962
the PRB’s military wing (Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara or North Kalimantan
National Army) attempted to seize the Sultan and set up the United State of North
Kalimantan. Colonial critics hailed the rising as an heroic challenge to a decadent
sultan who was conspiring with outsiders to propel his subjects into a federation
which they did not seek.149
The British immediately sent in troops under the terms of the 1959 treaty and,
although Selkirk reckoned it ‘came within an inch of being completely successful’
(151), the revolt was suppressed within a few weeks. Amongst its consequences were
a prolonged state of emergency, the suspension of the constitution and the
proscription of the PRB. It also raised questions regarding the aims and objectives of
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the TNKU, the quality of British intelligence, the effectiveness of the British high
commissioner, the extent of popular support, the involvement of Indonesia, the
complicity of the sultan, and, not least, Brunei’s future prospects. With respect to the
last issue, the revolt convinced the British of the necessity to press ahead with
modernisation and constitutional reform. They even investigated the possibility of
collaborating with Azahari and, when his links with Indonesia ruled out a deal with
him,150 they worked strenuously to rehabilitate key detainees as progressive leaders
of the future (153 N). The British soon discovered, however, that their military
intervention in defence of the Sultan had consolidated the royal ascendancy. Sultan
Omar Ali Saifuddin III emerged from the crisis more determined than ever to thwart
liberal measures and loss of autonomy (149–155, 157). 
Having incurred financial expense and international embarrassment to protect a
discredited autocrat, the British put pressure on his highness to join Malaysia.
‘Unless Brunei enters Malaysia soon,’ Selkirk signalled on 13 December, ‘we may
never get her in’.151 On 28 December he reported that his highness had decided to
accept Malaysia in principle and to resume negotiations with the Tunku. In February
the Sultan conferred with the Tunku in Kuala Lumpur and working parties were set
up to examine constitutional and financial matters. By early March they had drawn
up heads of agreement that included favourable conditions for Brunei (165). From
this point, however, relations deteriorated as the Malayans whittled down Brunei’s
privileges. In early April, the Conference of Rulers (ie the rulers of the Malay states)
reduced the sultan’s chances of being elected the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (or King of
Malaysia) by stipulating that his precedence would be determined by the date of
Brunei’s entry into Malaysia instead of his accession to the throne. In June relations
between Brunei and Malaya were transformed by the announcement of the discovery
of considerable, off-shore oil resources (190). Notwithstanding Bruneian protests,
the Malayans now insisted on oil revenues wholly falling to the federation after ten
years as well as on the right to tax any new oil discoveries in the interim (188). When
the Tunku issued an ultimatum containing Kuala Lumpur’s final offer, his highness
withdrew from the negotiations although he did come to London for the final round
of talks in early July. Here he asked Sandys to mediate with the Malayans, but on this
occasion Sandys’ skills failed (184, 188, 190). 
Why did the Sultan decide not to join Malaysia? At the time and since, attention
focused on the question of the allocation of oil revenue between federal and state
governments. Omar Saifuddin stated publicly that he had declined to sign the
Malaysia Agreement because the government of Malaya had been unable to give
effect to previously agreed terms. In fact, as time ran out the Malayan delegation
wooed Omar Ali with substantial concessions, even at the risk of alienating the del-
egations from North Borneo and Sarawak who were not being so favoured. The
Tunku and his Malay colleagues did their utmost not to lose Brunei; after all, as a
Malay sultanate it made a better fit with the federation than did the other acceding
territories. Furthermore, its revenues would have compensated for the expenditure
needed in the development of Malaysia’s other Borneo territories. For his part, the
Tunku, who was bitterly disappointed by the outcome and later withdrew the hun-
dreds of federal officers and teachers on secondment to Brunei, claimed that his
highness’s position in the hierarchy of Malay rulers had been the cause of the
breakdown. In addition to oil and status, Omar Saifuddin would have been influ-
enced by public opinion in Brunei. It is clear that he emerged from the Brunei
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revolt in no mood to surrender to democratic demands, but at the same time he
‘saw no reason to flout the strong anti-Malaysia feelings revealed by the rising’.152
Sensing widespread opposition to closer association with Malaya, he was willing to
make a popular gesture. The British had long been urging him to appeal to the
wishes of his people and it was ironic that he chose to do so by rejecting the centre-
piece of their Southeast Asian strategy. On his return from London after the July
talks, Omar Ali received a rapturous welcome from the crowd gathered to meet him
at the airport. Bruneians were ‘particularly grateful to Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin
III for extricating himself from a scheme that was handed down to him almost as a
fait accompli by both the British and the Malayan Governments’.153 In this way he
avoided the constitutional reforms which membership of Malaysia would have has-
tened by virtue of the requirement for Brunei to send elected representatives to the
Dewan Ra’ayat (house of representatives) in Kuala Lumpur. Perhaps the outcome of
the revolt had convinced his highness that he could spin out his special relation-
ship with Britain more or less indefinitely and therefore had no need to subordinate
himself to Kuala Lumpur. Whatever his reasons for not joining Malaysia, Angus
MacKintosh (British high commissioner) was of the view that ‘if all the difficulties
raised by the Sultan could have been overcome at the wave of a hand, he would
have invented others’.154
The British were displeased by the Sultan’s decision, but no matter how
convincingly ministers argued that ‘the best future for Brunei’ would be to join the
federation (194, also 197, 199) and in spite of Macmillan’s advice to Lansdowne that
‘ultimately pressure will have to be exerted by the threat that we cannot protect him
indefinitely’ (195), the Sultan adamantly refused to relinquish his bilateral
relationship with Britain. The British were worried by their open-ended commitment
to the protection of Brunei since it could make the sultanate a target of Indonesian
subversion. Hoping that progress towards complete independence might draw
Brunei towards Malaysia, the British continued to press for constitutional reform in
Brunei. Their style may have grown harsher and more direct but their options were
limited to warnings, such as that issued by Sandys during a four-hour stop-over in
Brunei two days before the inauguration of Malaysia: unless constitutional progress
was volunteered, the secretary of state might have to instruct the high commissioner
to tender formal advice on this matter according to the 1959 treaty. The fact that
Britain did not—or could not—coerce the Sultan goes some way to countering the
claim that Malaysia was a neo-colonial plot. Indeed, and in keeping with its desire to
avoid any appearance of ‘recolonising’ Brunei, the British government transferred
responsibility for the affairs of the sultanate from the Colonial Office to the
Commonwealth Relations Office in November 1963. 
There are perhaps parallels, although contemporaries were reluctant to draw
them, with the treatment of the Indian princes in 1947.155 One is the disquiet of
politicians, both in India and in Malaya, about the potential problems of
accommodating autocracies within a democracy. Another is British unease over
defence commitments. Just as the British government pressed the princely states to
join either India or Pakistan because it would be unable to honour military
guarantees to them without offending the successor states, so in 1963 it feared that
‘if Brunei did not join Malaysia, there would be an increasing likelihood of political
and other troubles, both arising inside Brunei and originating in Indonesia’. In a
desperate attempt to change the Sultan’s mind, Sandys insisted:—
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It simply would not be possible for Britain to deal as effectively as before with
internal security problems in Brunei if she did not join Malaysia. Moreover,
Britain could not guarantee on future occasions, as had happened in December,
1962, to resist with British troops the demands of the people of Brunei for a larger
measure of democracy. In addition, once Britain’s defence system in South East
Asia had been largely merged with that of Malaysia, it would be more difficult than
in the past for Britain to discharge her responsibilities for the protection of the
State and Government of Brunei.156
Whereas their integration within the successor states extinguished the power and
privileges of Indian princes and reduced the Malay sultans to constitutional
monarchs, by resisting assimilation within Malaysia the Sultan of Brunei succeeded
in retaining the autonomy of his kingdom and kept at bay democratic politics.
* * * *
The ‘Grand Design’ for Malaysia was central to Britain’s post-colonial role in Southeast
Asia. It was shaped, however, as much by Britain’s declining power and its incapacity
to control developments as by a forceful strategy of planned decolonisation. Ministers
and officials differed in their priorities while Southeast Asian leaders pursued
competing objectives. Recognising their dependence upon the initiative of local leaders
and the acquiescence of their peoples, the British at first refrained from forcing the
pace and later concentrated on managing conflicts between territories. Constrained
by circumstances beyond British control, plans were deflected by events and the
outcome fell short of expectations in several respects. As inauguration day drew near,
Malaysia was placed in jeopardy by greater or lesser crises: unresolved disputes between
Malaya and Singapore; a last-minute hitch in the relations between Malaya and
Sarawak; the United Nations mission to Borneo; Indonesian ‘Confrontation’; an attempt
by Kelantan to win an injunction against the implementation of the Malaysia Act.157
Indeed, a nation-state had yet to be fashioned from Britain’s former dependencies and
in the following years resentment of control from Kuala Lumpur would fester in Sabah
and Sarawak and force Singapore to secede. 
Meanwhile, the benefits of Malaysia to the British looked uncertain. The ‘Grand
Design’ turned out to be trouble, almost more trouble than it was worth. Britain was
encumbered with the embarrassing obligation to protect the micro-state of Brunei.
Moreover, Singapore’s separation in August 1965 seemed a disaster, since the British
government had always regarded the merger of Malaya and Singapore as the principal
advantage of Malaysia, if not its raison d’être. In addition, the three-year
‘Confrontation’ with Indonesia aggravated regional instability and damaged
Anglo–American relations. It also resulted in untoward military expenditure that
would be a major factor leading to the decision to withdraw from Southeast Asia by
the end of 1971. It was with these consequences in mind that in 1984 Sir William Goode
wondered ‘whether if HMG had foreseen the cost of “confrontasi”, Harold Macmillan
would have agreed so readily to the Tunku’s bright idea of forming Malaysia’.158 As has
been seen, in the early 1960s Goode had condemned the scheme as too much too soon
for the Borneo territories, yet, reflecting on two decades of progress, he could only
conclude that ‘North Borneo’s decision to join Malaysia in 1963 was right’.159
A J Stockwell
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Sabah and Sarawak (Kuala Lumpur, 1974).
95 Elections followed a three–stage process: the popular vote returned representatives to district and
town councils; these members then elected representatives from their number to serve on divisional
councils who in turn elected members to the Council Negri. The elected members of the Council Negri
decided which amongst them should fill the seats allocated to elected members on the Supreme Council.
96 Ong Kee Hui, Footprints in Sarawak; Bob Reece, Datu Bandar Abang Haji Mustapha of Sarawak
Sarawak Literary Society (nd).
97 CO 1030/987, no 1146.
98 Tunku Abdul Rahman to Stephen Kalong Ningkan, July 1966, cited in Vernon L. Porritt, Operation
Hammer: enforced resettlement in Sarawak in 1965 (Hull, nd) p 6.
99 Waddell to Tory (Kuala Lumpur), 27 July 1961, CO1030/981; Waddell to Melville (CO), 26 Aug. 1961,
CO1030/982.
100 For the appointment of the commission, see CAB 21/4626 and CO 1030/1009 and 1010. Ghazali
Shafie, the leading Malayan commissioner, advised the Tunku against the nomination of ‘my old and dear
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friend Malcolm MacDonald’ on the grounds that, firstly, he ‘had his own view of the grand design which
might contradict the Malaysia plan as we had envisaged’, secondly, he ‘had a great deal of influence
amongst the Iban [Dayak] and Chinese which might work against the interests of the other communities’
and, finally and most importantly, since ‘all the credit would go to MacDonald… it would be easy for the
opponents of Malaysia to brand it as a British design’. Memoir p 171.
101 David Rees-Williams visited Sarawak with David Gammans in 1946 to assess whether there was
sufficient support for placing the cession bill before the Council Negri.
102 Confidential brief on Mohamed Ghazali bin Shafie, Sept 1961, CAB 130/179.
103 Sir J Martin (Jesselton) to Lord Perth (CO), tel 16, 31 Jan, Goode Papers, box 2, file 1, f 23.
Immediately after the Japanese occupation Sir Harold MacMichael was sent from London as special envoy
to conclude with the Malay rulers new treaties whereby they surrendered jurisdiction to the crown and
enabled the introduction of the Malayan Union which, in dispossessing the sultans, introducing direct
British rule and providing for a multi-racial citizenship, provoked a Malay outcry. See Stockwell, ed,
Malaya, Part 1.
104 Wallace to Eastwood, 17 Jan 1962, CO 1030/1012, no 67.
105 See CO 1030/1000, 1001 and 102. Its ‘Memorandum on Malaysia’ was submitted to the Cobbold
Commission and printed as appendix F of its report.
106 Ghazali Shafie, Memoir pp 197–198.
107 ibid, p 242.
108 ibid, p 304.
109 ibid, p 210. 
110 Confidential brief on Mohamed Ghazali bin Shafie, Sept 1961, CAB 130/179.
111 Tory to CRO, tel 161, 12 Mar 1962, CO 1030/987 no 1109.
112 Goode to CO, 14 Mar 1962, CO 1030/987, no 1114.
113 cf his testimony in the programme on Malaya in Granada TV’s series on ‘End of Empire’, 1984.
114 Goode to Tory, 14 Mar 1962, CO 1030/987, no 1131.
115 The governor of Sarawak agreed with this view, cf. Waddell to Wallace, 3 May 1962, PREM 11/3866.
116 Goode to Mubin Sheppard, 2 Oct 1984, Goode Papers, box 5, file 5, f 45.
117 Naimah S Talib, Administrators and their service: the Sarawak Administrative Service under the
Brooke rajahs and British colonial rule (Kuala Lumpur, 1999) p 142.
118 Rogers to Goode and Waddell, 1 Nov 1961, CO 1030/1005, no 4.
119 Sir R Harris (Treasury) to Sir H Poynton (CO), 26 Oct 1962, CO 1030/1064. Having accepted this
principle, however, the Treasury refused to make a financial commitment until the scheme had been
costed, see 143 and 145. 
120 E M West to Maudling, memo in preparation for a meeting of the Cabinet Greater Malaysia
Committee on 21 Mar 1962, CO 1030/987, no 1146.
121 As reported by Wallace to West, 29 Sept 1961, CO 1030/983.
122 Goode, ‘Timing of Malaysia’, 7 Apr 1962, and CRO minute 17 May 1962, DO 187/21. Papers issued by
the governments of North Borneo and Sarawak to inform the public about the Malaysia proposal, the
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purpose of the commission and the issues on which views would be sought were reproduced as appendix E
of the Cobbold Report. 
123 See ‘Malaysia: Gossip’, memo by Sir A Snelling (CRO), 24 May 1961, on which Martin (CO)
commented ‘very unpleasant’, CO 1030/1016, no 74.
124 For an account of the Malayan political developments which largely accounted for the Tunku’s
changeable attitude to Malaysia, see Tory’s despatch no 3 of 18 June 1962 (which was distributed as CRO
Confidential Print on 4 July as a background for the London talks), CO1030/989, no 1260. 
125 Hall to Wallace, 19 June 1962, PREM 11/3867; minute by Martin, 6 June 1962, CO 1030/1016;
Ghazali Shafie, Memoir p 240 ff.
126 The report was styled ‘interim report’ although it did not differ from the version published on 1 Aug
1962 as Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak, 1962, Cmnd 1794.
127 Report, chapter 3, paras 141–144.
128 Report, chapter 4, section A, paras 145–148.
129 Report, para 237.
130 Maudling to Macmillan, 22 June 1962, PM(62)38, but not seen by the prime minister; J H Robertson
to Sir N Brook, 22 June; T Bligh to Brook, 22 June; Brook to Bligh, 3 July, CAB 21/4847.
131 CO 967/414, emphasis in the original.
132 On the following day, the Cabinet agreed to proceed with talks for the formation of Malaysia at the
earliest possible date on condition that Borneo interests were safeguarded during the transitional period,
CAB 128/36 pt.2, CC44(62)1, 5 July 1962.
133 West to Maudling, 11 July 1962, CO 967/407.
134 Martin to Maudling, 11 July 1962, CO 967/407. Goode, who was in London for the conference, also
received a copy of this draft minute, Goode Papers, box 3, file 1, f 2.
135 ‘Points for Sandys’, Goode Papers, box 3, file 1, f 6.
136 Cary to Brook, 27 July 1962, CAB 21/4847, and de Zulueta to Macmillan, 27 July 1962, PREM
11/3865.
137 H of C Debs, vol 664, cols 584–590, 1 Aug 1962; H of L Debs, vol 243, cols 286–292, 1 Aug 1962.
138 Memorandum by the Far Eastern Department, CRO, 29 Oct 1962, DO 169/215.
139 Minute by Goode of a conversation with Tunku Abdul Rahman on 1 Aug 1963 at the Ritz Hotel, 2
Aug 1963, Goode Papers, box 3, file 1, f 89.
140 Malaysia: Report of the Inter-Governmental Committee, 1962, Cmnd 1954 (Feb 1963).
141 See note 77 above.
142 For briefing papers see DO 169/329.
143 Public Officers’ Agreement between Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the
Government of Malaysia in respect of Singapore, Cmnd 2468, … in respect of Sabah, Cmnd 2469 and …
in respect of Sarawak, Cmnd 2670 (1963–1964).
144 The UN General Assembly had defined the process of integration in Resolution 1541 (XV) (Annex) of
15 Dec 1960. Other examples, of decolonisation through integration are Somaliland in Somalia, Togoland
in Ghana, the Northern and Southern Cameroons in Nigeria and Cameroun respectively, and Zanzibar in
06-Malaysia-Introduction-cpp  21/9/04  9:04 AM  Page xciii
xciv INTRODUCTION
Tanzania. In theory the integration of the smaller Caribbean islands with Britain would have been a way of
completing the decolonisation of the West Indies but was never seriously considered on account of its
implications for immigration policy, see Rafael Cox-Alomar, ‘Britain’s withdrawal from the Eastern
Caribbean 1965–67: a reappraisal’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 31, 3 (Sept 2003) pp
84–85 and notes 62–63; also S R Ashton & David Killingray, eds, The West Indies.
145 CO 936/839–841; Lee, Memoirs pp 434–436.
146 For a fuller discussion of Brunei’s decision not to join Malaysia, see Stockwell, ‘Britain and Brunei,
1945–1963’.
147 CO 1030/1469, f 20. Gore-Booth had been observing developments from his post as high
commissioner in New Delhi. 
148 The 1959 constitution provided for a two-tier electoral system: direct elections were held to 55 seats
on the District Councils which returned 16 representatives to the 33-member Legislative Council (17 of
whom were ex officio, official or nominated members). The PRB won 54 out of the 55 District Council
seats and thus secured control of the electable seats on the Legislative Council. In fact 15 PRB
representatives were immediately returned to the legislature and a week later the single independent
member joined the PRB. Although it did not command an overall majority on the Legislative Council, the
PRB had won a sweeping popular mandate which the Sultan would ignore at his peril.
149 eg, R W Sorrenson MP in the Guardian 14 Dec 1962.
150 See FO 371/169694, D1071/3, D1071/5 and D1071/12.
151 Selkirk to Colonial Office, tel. 357, CO 1030/1071, no 344.
152 Saunders, A history of Brunei pp 157–158.
153 Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and Britain p 218.
154 The same point was added as a confidential note to a parliamentary brief, which the secretary of
state was advised not to use in the House: ‘Our view is now that the Sultan never intended to sign the
Agreement and would have found some pretext even if his demands on the question of precedence had
been fully met.’ Brief no 2, Malaysia Bill—Brunei, 16 July 1963, CO 1030/1510, no 137.
155 When, however, Gore-Booth remarked that the ‘parallel to the late Maharajah of Kashmir is
positively uncanny’, Garner retorted: ‘I am not sure that I quite understand the parallel which you see. …
The Sultan is certainly a very troublesome person, but the sort of trouble he is brewing for us will surely
be rather different from that which arose over Kashmir.’ Gore-Booth to Garner,15 July 1963 and Garner to
Gore-Booth, 30 July, CO 1030/1469. For the Labour government’s policy towards the Indian princes,
Mountbatten’s role and the action of Congress politicians, see Ian Copland, The princes of India in the
endgame of empire 1917–1947 (Cambridge, 1997) p 217 ff.
156 Note of a meeting between Sandys and the Sultan of Brunei, 8 July 1963, CO 1030/1469, f 91.
157 The government of Kelantan (controlled by the PMIP) applied to the High Court in Kuala Lumpur
for a declaration that the Malaysia Agreement and the Malaysia Act were ‘void and inoperative’, or
alternatively that they were not binding on Kelantan, and sought an injunction to restrain the Federation
government from implementing the Act on Malaysia Day. It argued that the Act would abolish the
Federation of Malaya, thereby violating the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1957; that the proposed
changes needed the consent of each state of Malaya and that this had not been obtained; that the Sultan of
Kelantan should have been a party to the Malaysia Agreement in the same way as the Malay rulers had
been signatories of the Malaya Agreement of 1957; that constitutional convention called for consultation
with the rulers of individual Malay states regarding subsequent changes to the constitution; and that the
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federal parliament had no power to legislate for Kelantan in this matter. On 14 September the chief justice
ruled that both the Malaysia Agreement and the Malaysia Act were constitutional. See Tan Sri Mohamed
Suffian bin Hashim, An introduction to the constitution of Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, 1972) pp 13–14;
Allen, Stockwell and Wright, eds, A collection of treaties, II, p 277; Richard Allen, Malaysia: prospect and
retrospect: the impact and aftermath of colonial rule (London, 1968) pp 174–175.
158 Goode to Mubin Sheppard, 2 Oct 1984, Goode Papers, box 5, file 5, f 45.
159 Goode to Mubin Sheppard, 16 Nov 1984, ibid, f 48.
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[1–10] xcvii
Summary of Documents
Chapter 1
Prospects for the ‘Grand Design’, Nov 1957–May 1961: 
closer association of the Borneo territories; self-government for
Singapore; Tunku Abdul Rahman’s initiative for a ‘Greater Malaysia’
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE
1957
1 29 Nov 1
2 4 Dec 4
1958
3 7 Feb 5
4 30 July 10
5 18 Dec 14
6 20 Dec 18
7 22 Dec 19
8 24 Dec 24
1959
9 3 Jan 25
10 [16 Jan] 28Brief on the future of the British
Borneo territories for S of S’s visit to
Malaya
CRO
for Lord Home 
Letter on the political situation in
Brunei after his first six months as
British Resident
D C White 
to Sir A Abell
Note of talk with Tunku Abdul Rahman
on preparations for elections in 1959
M MacDonald
Note of talk with Tunku Abdul Rahman
on the closer association of Malaya with
Singapore and the Borneo territories
M MacDonald
Letter on developments in BruneiM MacDonald 
to Sultan of Brunei
Note of talks with the Sultan of BruneiM MacDonald
Letter on Brunei, + Enclosure: ‘A brief
appreciation of the political situation in
Brunei – June, 1958’ by E R Bevington
Sir A Abell 
to W I J Wallace
Broadcast over Radio Sabah on closer
association of Borneo territories
Sir R Turnbull
Minutes of meeting on CO proposals in
1
Cabinet Colonial Policy 
Committee
Memo, ‘Borneo Territories’Mr Lennox-Boyd 
for Cabinet Colonial 
Policy Committee
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1959
11 29 Jan 29
12 7 Mar 34
13 26 June 36
14 14 Oct 40
15 23 Nov 42
16 2 Dec 48
17 7 Dec 50
1960
18 5 Feb 53
19 23 Feb 54
20 18 May 57
21 9 June 59
22 10 June 61
23 17 June 63
24 30 June 64
25 15 July 66
26 20 July 69Report on his visit to North Borneo and
Sarawak in May 1960
Sir G Tory
Memo, ‘Possibility of an association of
the British Borneo territories with the
Federation of Malaya, and Singapore’
Mr Macleod 
for Cabinet Colonial 
Policy Committee
Letter on closer association, requesting
that it be referred to the Cabinet
Colonial Policy Committee
Sir H Poynton
to Sir N Brook
Note on 22, commenting on Lord
Perth’s talk with the Tunku
Lord Selkirk
for Mr Selwyn Lloyd
Note of his talk with Tunku Abdul
Rahman about closer association of
Malaya and British dependencies in  SE
Asia
Lord Perth
Brief for the minister of state for his
talk with Tunku Abdul Rahman
CO
for Lord Perth 
Letter (in reply to 18) summarising
inter-departmental discussions in
London
Sir J Martin
to Sir D Allen
Letter on possible merger of Borneo
territories with Malaya and Singapore
Sir G Tory
to Sir A Clutterbuck
Letter on closer association of the
Borneo territories and Brunei-Malaya
relations
Sir D Allen
to E Melville
Memo, ‘Closer association between the
British Borneo territories (with special
reference to the position of Brunei)’
Office of the
Commissioner-General,
Singapore
Letter on the closer association of
Borneo territories
Sir A Abell
to F D Jakeway
Despatch on the first six months of the
PAP government
Sir W Goode
to Mr Macleod
Letter (commenting on 11) on the
future of the Borneo territories
Sir G Tory
to D W S Hunt (CRO)
Despatch on the People’s Action Party
government of Singapore
Sir W Goode
to Mr Lennox-Boyd
Letter on the future of North BorneoSir R Turnbull
to E Melville
Letter on the future of the Borneo
territories
Sir R Scott
to Mr Lennox-Boyd
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE
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1960
27 27 July 73
28 29 Sept 75
29 12 Oct 76
30 25 Oct 82
31 30 Dec 83
1961
32 30 Jan 88
33 17 Mar 95
34 14 Apr 102
35 18 Apr 104
36 2 May 106
37 [9 May] 108
38 19 May 112Despatch on political developments in
Singapore since the PAP came to power
and commenting on the impact of the
Hong Lim by-election
Lord Selkirk 
to Mr Macleod
Memo, ‘Paper on the future of the
Federation of Malaya, Singapore and the
Borneo Territories’
Lee Kuan Yew 
for the government of 
the Federation of 
Malaya
Letter on discussions of closer
association at the 13th Inter-Territorial
Conference of Borneo Territories in
Jesselton
Lord Selkirk 
to Mr Macleod
Minutes of discussion of 34Cabinet Colonial Policy 
Committee
Memo, ‘Possibility of an association of
the British Borneo territories with the
Federation of Malaya and the State of
Singapore’
Mr Macleod 
for the Cabinet 
Colonial Policy 
Committee
Report, ‘The Outlook in Singapore for
the next twelve months’
Joint Intelligence
Committee (Far East) 
for British Defence 
Co-ordinating 
Committee (Far East)
Despatch on closer association, urging a
government statement of policy, +
Annex A by H T Bourdillon, and annex
B by Sir G Tory
Lord Selkirk
to Mr Macleod
Despatch, ‘North Borneo: review of
affairs’
Sir W Goode
to Mr Macleod
Despatch on prospects for closer 
association following high-level 
discussions in Kuching
Lord Selkirk
to Mr Macleod
Report, ‘Future developments in South
East Asia’
Committee (Official) on
Future Developments in
SE Asia
Minutes of a meeting [Extract]Committee (Official) on
Future Developments in
SE Asia
Minutes of a meeting with Lord Selkirk
about closer association
Cabinet Colonial Policy
Committee
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE
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1961
39 26 May 116
Chapter 2
Principles for a Federation of Malaysia, June–Dec 1961:
internal security of Singapore; the Singapore base and regional
defence; obligations to Borneo peoples; the question of timing;
London talks and the Anglo–Malayan statement of Nov 1961
1961
40 1 June 117
41 3 June 119
42 6 June 120
43 7 June 122
44 14 June 123
45 21 June 126
46 26 June 132
47 27 June 136
48 27 June 143Letter, reinforcing the points made in
47
Lord Selkirk 
to Mr Macmillan
Despatch on recent developments,
urging a decision on the ‘Grand Design’
Lord Selkirk 
to Mr Macleod
Letter, + Enclosure: ‘Integration of
British North Borneo territories and
Singapore with the Federation of
Malaya’
Tunku Abdul Rahman 
to Mr Macmillan
Report, ‘Defence implications of an
association of the British Borneo
territories with the Federation of
Malaya and the State of Singapore’ 
Joint Planning Staff 
for COS Committee
Letter on North Borneo and the ‘Grand
Design’
Sir W Goode 
to E Melville
Letter on Brunei and the ‘Grand Design’D C White 
to E Melville
Minute, ‘Possibility of an association of
British Borneo territories with the
Federation of Malaya and the State of
Singapore’
Mr Macleod 
for Mr Watkinson
Tel (399) on his talk with the Tunku
about reactions to his Speech of 27 May
(see 39)
Sir G Tory 
to Mr Sandys
Letter on prospects for the closer
association of North Borneo and
Sarawak
Sir A Waddell 
to E Melville
Tel (no 382) on Tunku Abdul Rahman’s
forthcoming speech about ‘Greater
Malaysia’
Sir G Tory 
to Mr Sandys
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE
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1961
49 18 July 145
50 21 July 147
51 3 Aug 149
52 5 Aug 150
53 11 Aug 154
54 14 Aug 155
55 24 Aug 158
56 26 Aug 161
57 4 Sept 165
58 16 Sept 166
59 18 Sept 170
60 25 Sept 172
61 26 Sept 175
62 27 Sept 177
63 28 Sept 180
64 28 Sept 182
65 29 Sept 183Memo, ‘Our foreign and defence policy
for the future’ [Extract]
Mr Macmillan 
for Cabinet Committee 
on Future Policy
Tel (716), forwarding a message from
Tunku Abdul Rahman for Mr Macmillan
Sir G Tory 
to Mr Sandys
Tel (715) on the Tunku’s reaction to Mr
Macmillan’s recent message, amplifying
61
Sir G Tory 
to Mr Sandys
Minutes of discussion of 60Greater Malaysia 
(Official) Committee
Tel (705) on the Tunku’s reaction to 
Mr Macmillan’s recent message
Sir G Tory 
to Mr Sandys
Memo, ‘Summary of Malayan proposals
and issues to be considered by the
British Government’
CRO 
for Greater Malaysia 
(Official) Committee
Tel (387), reporting agreement between
Tunku Abdul Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew
P B C Moore 
to Mr Macleod
Letter on ‘a crash programme’,
amplifying the case put in 55
Lord Selkirk 
to Mr Macleod
Letter, proposing talks in LondonTunku Abdul Rahman 
to Mr Macmillan
Letter on the ‘Grand Design’Sir A Waddell 
to E Melville
Letter on prospects for merger, urging
‘a crash programme’
Lord Selkirk 
to Mr Macleod
Letter on ‘Greater Malaysia’ and
Britain’s role in SE Asia
Lord Selkirk 
to Mr Macmillan
Letter, replying to 51Tunku Abdul Rahman  
to Mr Macmillan
Letter on Tunku Abdul Rahman’s
reactions to 51
Sir G Tory 
to N Pritchard
Letter, replying to 46Mr Macmillan 
to Tunku Abdul 
Rahman
Tel (278) on Lee Kuan Yew’s allegations
in the Singapore Legislative Assembly
Lord Selkirk 
to Mr Macleod
Note (dated 31 July) of a meeting of
Lord Selkirk and P B C Moore with J
Puthucheary, Lim Chin Siong, Fong
Swee Suan and S Woodhull.
Office of UK 
Com-General 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE
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1961
66 3 Oct 189
67 3 Oct 189
68 6 Oct 191
69 7 Oct 193
70 10 Oct 194
71 12 Oct 196
72 18 Oct 203
73 20 Oct 207
74 25 Oct 227
75 30 Oct 230
76 8 Nov 233
77 9 Nov 238
78 15 Nov 242
79 20 Nov 245
80 20 Nov 249Minutes of the second meeting of
Anglo–Malayan discussions
London Talks
Minutes of the first meeting of 
Anglo-Malayan discussions about
‘Greater Malaysia’
London Talks
Minutes of discussions in preparation
for the London talks
Cabinet Greater 
Malaysia Committee
Minutes of discussions in preparation
for the London talks
Cabinet Greater 
Malaysia Committee
Letter, providing a brief for the London
talks regarding the Tunku’s likely
criticism of British policy for Singapore
P B C Moore 
to W I J Wallace
Letter on issues raised by North Borneo
and Sarawak in connection with
‘Greater Malaysia’ [Extract]
Sir J Martin 
to Sir A Waddell
Minutes of discussion of ‘Greater
Malaysia’
Cabinet Defence 
Committee
Report of the Greater Malaysia (Official)
Committee, + Appendices B:
‘Population figures of the territories in
the proposed Greater Malaysia’; C: ‘The
Malayan defence agreement’
Sir A Clutterbuck 
for ministers
Letter on Singapore attitudes to
‘Greater Malaysia’ and the prospect of
the Barisan overthrowing the PAP
government
P B C Moore 
to W I J Wallace
Despatch on Malayan background to
‘Greater Malaysia’
M J Moynihan 
to Mr Sandys
Minutes of discussions of ‘Greater
Malaysia’ and regional security [Extract]
Cabinet Committee on
Future Policy
Tel (746), forwarding Tunku Abdul
Rahman’s reply to 67
Sir G Tory 
to Mr Sandys
Minutes on discussions leading to
agreement in principle on ‘Greater
Malaysia’ [Extract]
Cabinet Committee on 
Future Policy
Tel (1478), forwarding a message from
Mr Macmillan to Tunku Abdul Rahman
about talks in London
Mr Sandys 
to Sir G Tory
Minute on rescuing the London talksMr Macleod 
to Mr Macmillan
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE
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1961
81 21 Nov 253
82 21 Nov 255
83 22 Nov 258
84 22 Nov 260
85 27 Nov 262
86 2 Dec 262
87 2 Dec 264
88 19 Dec 265
Chapter 3
The Cobbold Commission, Dec 1961-July 1962:
the enquiry in North Borneo and Sarawak; drafting the report; 
Anglo–Malayan differences; London talks and the agreement of 
31 July 1962
1961
89 29 Dec 267
90 30 Dec 269
1962
91 15 Jan 271
92 16 Jan 275Note of a meeting with Lee Kuan YewSingapore Commission
Despatch on political developments in
Brunei during 1961
Sir D White 
to Mr Maudling
Letter in reply to 88Lord Selkirk 
to Mr Macmillan
Tel (1829), forwarding a personal
message from Mr Macmillan for the
Tunku about the selection of the
chairman of the Commission of Enquiry
Mr Sandys 
to Sir G Tory
Letter, replying to 87Mr Macmillan 
to Lord Selkirk
Letter, proposing formal machinery for
Anglo–Malayan defence co-operation
and the extension of his term as
commissioner-general
Lord Selkirk 
to Mr Macmillan
Tel (1719), reporting a conversation
with the Tunku on defence issues
Mr Sandys 
to Sir G Tory
Note of a discussion between Mr
Watkinson and Tun Abdul Razak on
Anglo–Malayan differences over defence
C Benwell
Minutes of the sixth meeting of
Anglo–Malayan discussions
London Talks
Minutes of the fifth meeting of
Anglo–Malayan discussions
London Talks
Minutes of the fourth meeting of
Anglo–Malayan discussions
London Talks
Minutes of the third meeting of
Anglo–Malayan discussions
London Talks
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE
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1962
93 20 Feb 278
94 6 Mar 280
95 9 Mar 282
96 12 Mar 284
97 19 Mar 285
98 21 Mar 287
99 31 Mar 288
100 19 Apr 289
101 19 Apr 293
102 25 Apr 294
103 23 May 296
104 4 June 299
105 5 June 302
106 8 June 303
107 11 June 304
108 12 June 305
109 12 June 307
110 12 June 307Note of a ministerial meeting at
Admiralty House on commissioners’
report
T J Bligh
Note of a telephone conversation with
Lord Cobbold on commissioners’
differences
Sir S Garner 
Note and supplementary note on
commissioners’ differences
Sir S Garner 
for ministers
Minute on commissioners’ differences
over final report
Lord Cobbold 
to Mr Sandys
Letter on commissioners’ differences
over final report
Lord Cobbold 
to Mr Sandys
Letter on the need for the Tunku to
make concessions
Sir W Goode 
to C G Eastwood
Letter in reply to 103, on the need to
retain British officers
Sir W Goode 
to C G Eastwood
Letter in reply to 100, on transitional
arrangements
C G Eastwood 
to Sir W Goode
Minute on Lord Cobbold’s views on the
prospects for Malaysia
Sir J Martin 
to C G Eastwood
Minute on Lord Cobbold’s views on the
prospects for Malaysia
C G Eastwood 
to E M West
Letter on transitional arrangements for
Borneo territories
Sir W Goode 
to W I J Wallace
Letter on Sarawakian suspicions of
‘Greater Malaysia’
Lord Cobbold 
to Mr Maudling
Minutes of meeting on progress of
Cobbold enquiry
Cabinet Greater 
Malaysia Committee
Minute, rejecting the Tunku’s
allegations reported in 96
Mr Maudling 
to Mr Macmillan
Tel (160) on the Tunku’s allegation that
British officials in the Borneo territories
were obstructing Malaysia
Sir G Tory 
to Mr Sandys
Letter on the advantages for Brunei of
membership of Malaysia
Mr Maudling 
to the Sultan of Brunei
Letter on the progress of the
commission of enquiry + Enclosure:
note by Lord Cobbold
Lord Cobbold 
to Mr Maudling
Letter on the Sultan of Brunei’s attitude
to the Cobbold Commission
Sir D White
to C G Eastwood
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE
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1962
111 13 June 308
112 13 June 311
113 15 June 311
114 15 June 312
115 15 June 313
116 19 June 313
117 21 June 314
118 21 June 315
119 21 June 317
120 21 June 319
121 21 June 320
122 21 June 321
123 28 June 323
124 2 July 327Memo, ‘The Cobbold Commission
Report. Interim Report by the
Committee on Greater Malaysia’, +
Annex A: ‘Main points of agreement
between British and Malayan sides of
the Cobbold Commission’; Annex B:
‘Main points of difference between
British and Malayan sides of the
Cobbold Commission’
Greater Malaysia 
(Official) Committee
Memo, ‘The Tunku and Malaysia’Sir G Tory
Letter on points not included in the
report
Lord Cobbold 
to Mr Maudling
Letter on points not included in the
report
Lord Cobbold 
to Mr Macmillan 
(also to Tunku Abdul 
Rahman)
Memo on transitional arrangementsSir A Abell and 
Sir D Watherston
Letter on transitional arrangementsLord Cobbold 
to Mr Macmillan
(also to Tunku Abdul 
Rahman)
Letter on difficulties encountered in
writing the report
Lord Cobbold 
to Mr Macmillan
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1 CAB 134/1556, CPC(57)34 29 Nov 1957
‘Borneo Territories’: memorandum for Cabinet Colonial Policy
Committee by Mr Lennox Boyd, assessing the possibility of closer
association of the Borneo territories
[Despite the separate constitutional development of Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo
territories, their eventual closer association was a declared principle of British policy
from 1945 onwards. As early as Aug 1942 the FO and CO agreed on the desirability of
a union of the Malay States, Straits Settlements and Borneo territories (BDEE:
Malaya, document 8). Although the final plans for the post-war reoccupation of
Southeast Asia fell far short of such a union, the government created a structure for
regional co-ordination in the offices of the special commissioner and governor-general
(later commissioner-general) and held out the prospect for the closer association of
Malaya, Singapore and the three Borneo territories (BDEE: Malaya, 293). The post-war
separation of Singapore and Malaya was deeply regretted in many quarters, and
Malcolm MacDonald encouraged thinking about merger in his governor-general’s
conferences, the Communities Liaison Committee and local branches of the
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (BDEE: Malaya, 112, 115, 121, 141, 143).
Senior officials and ministers envisaged parallel developments leading to the merger of
Malaya and Singapore, on the one hand, and the merger of the Borneo territories, on
the other. It was expected that Malaya and Singapore would complete their process
sooner than the Borneo territories, and that merger of the two blocs would take place
in the end, although an alternative option might be merger of the five territories at a
stroke but only when the time was right (BDEE: Malaya, 288). Although territorial
mergers were their objective, the British government refrained from forcing the pace.
They believed that it would be counter-productive to impose a scheme or to issue a
directive, and preferred that the impetus should come from community leaders. Thus,
they attempted to stimulate local interest in closer association or in the formation of a
territorial conglomerate which MacDonald referred to as a self-governing British
dominion of Southeast Asia. Despite declarations of interest and good intentions,
however, the pace was slow: Malays mistrusted domination by the Chinese and
commercial interests of Singapore; Singaporeans mistrusted subordination as a twelfth
state in a Malay-controlled federation; the Sultan of Brunei was on his guard against
loss of both sovereignty and oil revenue; Sarawak and North Borneo would be at a
disadvantage in any merger with Malaya and Singapore on account of their economic
and political backwardness. Momentum towards merger was lost during the worst
years of the emergency and there was a danger of drift during which territories moved
further apart and separateness became entrenched and underpinned by vested
interests. In 1952 Templer and the Chiefs of Staff pressed for a merger between Malaya
and Singapore for purposes of defence and internal security with the result that in
1953 the policy for closer association was reviewed and a Joint Co-ordinating
Committee established to plan for the merger of island and peninsula (BDEE: Malaya,
286, 292, 293, 300). Fresh impetus was also given to the scheme for closer association
of the Borneo territories; in April 1953 MacDonald chaired a conference in Kuching
which established the Inter-Territorial Conference for the co-ordination of policies and
common services in British Borneo. MacDonald was tireless and infinitely optimistic in
encouraging closer association of the five dependencies (BDEE: Malaya, 267, 276, 324,
346) and on the eve of his departure from Southeast Asia he was looking forward to
the eventual realisation of the ‘grand design’ (as he called it, BDEE: Malaya, 346).
Meanwhile, politically, economically and constitutionally the Borneo peoples lagged far
behind the Singaporeans and Malayans with the result that Malaya achieved
independence on its own in 1957 when Singapore was also on course for self-
government. Nevertheless, if a ‘Greater Malaysia’ consisting of the Federation of
Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak now looked remote, the closer
association of the three Borneo territories became more pressing. Anxious about their
vulnerability and keen to shape their political development, British officials suggested
a fresh initiative. Lennox-Boyd responded cautiously; in recommending to the Colonial
Policy Committee that steps be taken to encourage public debate about the territories’
future, he reiterated the dangers of forcing the pace and of imposing any specific
constitutional model.]
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Introductory
1. A short background note on the three British territories in Borneo, namely,
the Colonies of Sarawak and North Borneo and the protected state of Brunei, is at
Annex I. A map is also attached.1
2. There is already some degree of co-operation between the three territories in
the administrative field. Apart from the secondment of staff from Sarawak to Brunei,
there is, for example, successful joint machinery for the Geological Survey, and for
the Judiciary and Civil Aviation. But this co-operation cannot be carried much
further without the creation of new links, the political implications of which have to
be taken into account.
Present state of political opinion
3. The possibilities of closer association between these three small territories
have been canvassed for some years, both locally and in this country. Our line in
public statements has been that we support it, but that the form that any political
association might take is for the people of the territories themselves in the first
instance to discuss and reach a view on. More recently, local opinion in North
Borneo and Sarawak has come out openly, if mildly, in favour of some form of closer
association and of there being public discussion to explore the idea. The
Commissioner-General in South East Asia and the Governors of Sarawak and North
Borneo strongly urge that the time has come for us to take an initiative and
encourage discussion. If we delay, they say, we shall lose the power we still have of
influencing the direction to be taken.
4. In Brunei the danger lies in the extreme Malay nationalism which already
exists and is being encouraged by elements from outside. This might well develop
quickly into rabid opposition to the Sultanate and to the British connection, with
grave prejudice to the stability of the administration and the security of the oilfield at
Seria, which is the largest single oilfield in the Commonwealth.2 Pressure from
Indonesia, Malaya and Singapore and from extremists in the United Malays National
Organisation cannot be ruled out.
Sarawak’s danger is Communist subversion among the Chinese. There is evidence
of Communist infiltration in the Chinese schools. These threats are contained at
present. But events outside Borneo (e.g. in Malaya or Singapore) might increase
them.
North Borneo is not as yet subject to these threats.
Indonesian irredentism lays claim to all three territories. The Philippines have a
dormant claim to North Borneo.
5. The Sultan of Brunei, whose views I have taken, is naturally suspicious of any
plans which might reduce the status of his territory, impinge on his sovereignty or
involve a sharing of Brunei’s revenues, which come from oil. He has not, however,
closed his mind to the idea of public discussion in Brunei of the idea of closer
association and I do not think that we should be deterred by his present reluctance to
commit himself from exploring the possibilities further.
1 Not printed.
2 The large oilfield was discovered at Seria in 1929 and was later developed by the Brunei Shell Petroleum
Co Ltd.
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The political case for closer association
6. The basic argument in favour of some form of closer political association is
that it will be more difficult for each of these small territories individually to resist
such externally supported pressures and claims as are mentioned above than it would
for the three of them standing together.
7. In any event, we must envisage progressive moves in each of them towards
forms of self-government. All three territories are still politically backward, but
nationalist politics have begun in Brunei and will undoubtedly start up in the others.
Closer association would provide a larger stage for political leaders. This can have its
disadvantages. It might stimulate the growth of nationalist parties and increase the
status of their leaders. But it could have the great advantage of reducing the
influence of extremists: a Malay nationalist should be of much less importance in
the wider area, where Malays would not preponderate, than in Brunei alone; and it
might in the long run help to preserve our influence in the area beyond the time
which would be possible if separatist policies were allowed to develop in each
territory individually. That is certainly the view of our representatives on the spot.
Other considerations
8. It is less easy at this stage to assess the practical administrative and economic
advantages, which might flow from closer association, particularly as we cannot
foresee the precise form which it might take. On the administrative side, the
Governors have discussed tentative proposals for the creation of an office of High
Commissioner for the Borneo territories, possibly in Labuan,3 together with an
Executive Council of representatives of all three territories; for the administrative
separation of Brunei and Sarawak; and for the subordination of the Governors of
Sarawak and North Borneo to the new High Commission. Such arrangements would
clearly not bring any immediate administrative economies, and the extent to which
the relative burden of administrative costs could later be reduced (it is at present
heavy, particularly in Brunei) would depend on the economic results of the new
arrangements which are hard to estimate now. The immediate benefit of closer
association to Sarawak and North Borneo would lie in the sharing of Brunei’s greater
wealth, which is scarcely likely to commend itself to the Sultan. In the longer run,
however, the economic strength of the whole area may come to depend more upon
the development of the resources of North Borneo and Sarawak, which are more varied
and durable than the oil wealth of Brunei. The common planning of economic
development which closer association might be expected to achieve would,
particularly in relation to communications, the recruitment and exchange of labour
and technical staff and the provision of external capital, assist greatly in exploiting the
potential wealth of North Borneo and Sarawak to the benefit of all three territories.
Conclusion
9. While I accept that it is not possible to state now an overwhelming case in
favour of closer association, I consider that, taking all the factors together, the political
3 Ceded by the Sultan of Brunei to the British in 1846 as a place where ships might refit, the island of
Labuan was administered as a separate colony until 1907 when it was incorporated in the Straits
Settlements, becoming a separate settlement in 1911. In 1946 it became part of the crown colony of North
Borneo.
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balance is in favour of some discreet move in that direction. I am much impressed by
the consensus of views amongst our representatives on the spot, including the
Commissioner-General for South East Asia, that in such an association, guided by us,
there lies a better chance of ultimate preservation of British links than if the territories
are treated independently. Closer political association will, of course, take a long time
to come about, and there is no question of hurrying it. It is not proposed at present to
suggest a political union or even to put forward any cut and dried proposals about the
lines along which closer association might develop. And we shall have to have careful
regard to our defence needs in the area. The men on the spot say that we must no
longer delay initiating public discussion on the subject, ascertaining the views of the
people and exploring the possibilities: failure to do this now would in their opinion,
lose us the chance of taking the lead in the future.
10. The purpose of this paper is to tell my colleagues of the lines on which my
discussions with our representatives in the area have been proceeding and to say that
I propose to authorise the initiation of public discussion in North Borneo and
Sarawak and have urged the Sultan of Brunei to give a lead to similar discussion in
his own territory. These discussions will be exploratory at this stage. I shall inform
my colleagues of the result and will seek their concurrence in any further steps
which appear to me to be necessary or desirable thereafter.
2 CAB 134/1555, CPC 14(57)2 4 Dec 1957
‘Borneo territories’: Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee minutes
approving initiation of public discussion of closer association
[Chaired by Lord Kilmuir (lord chancellor) in the absence of the prime minister, the
meeting was attended by Home (foreign secretary), Lennox-Boyd (Colonial Office), Lord
Hailsham (lord president).]
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C.
(57) 34)1 about the possibility of a closer association between the Colonies of Sarawak
and North Borneo and the protected state of Brunei.
The Colonial Secretary said that this possibility had already been canvassed for
some years both locally and in the United Kingdom. There was already some degree
of co-operation between the three territories administratively, and local opinion in
North Borneo and Sarawak had recently appeared to favour public discussion of the
conception of a closer association. He had felt some hesitation in encouraging such a
process, which, by creating a larger political unit, might stimulate the growth of
nationalist parties and pressure for independence. He had, however, been impressed
by the consensus of view between the Commissioner-General in South East Asia and
the Governors of Sarawak and North Borneo that our influence in these territories
could best be preserved by encouraging the movement towards closer association. It
would therefore be right to take such opportunities as occurred to suggest that the
possibility of some form of association between the territories concerned might
merit public discussion. This policy should, however, be launched tentatively and we
should be prepared to withdraw it if it was not well received. Much, for example,
would depend upon the reaction of the Sultan of Brunei.
1 See 1.
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In discussion it was suggested that any public discussion of closer association
between these territories might merely stimulate the tendency towards nationalism
(with possibly serious strategic consequences for the future control of the important
oil fields in Brunei). But the danger of separatism was inherent in the present
situation, and it was to counter this danger that any federal movement would be
designed. Notwithstanding the risks involved, the balance of advantage lay in the
initiation of public discussion of the kind proposed.2 While it would be premature at
this stage to envisage the lines upon which a closer association might develop, any
federal system might well be administered by a Commissioner for the Borneo
Territories (whom it would be important to distinguish from a High Commissioner),
together with an Executive Council representative of all three territories.
The Committee:—
Approved the proposals in C.P.C. (57) 34.
2 Public discussion included broadcasts by the governors of North Borneo and Sarawak. Sir Roland
Turnbull spoke on Radio Sabah in Feb 1958 (see 3), followed by Sir Anthony Abell on Radio Sarawak in Apr
1958.
3 DO 35/6297, no 70 7 Feb 1958
[Closer association of Borneo territories]: text of an address broadcast
by Sir R Turnbull over Radio Sabah
[Turnbull followed up his broadcast with a resolution passed in North Borneo’s
Legislative Council in March that the three territories discuss their constitutional
association but this initiative was blocked by the Sultan of Brunei. In Oct 1959, as he was
preparing to leave the post of commissioner-general, Sir Robert Scott came across the
text of Turnbull’s radio address. He forwarded it to Goode, who was about to take over as
governor, North Borneo, with a commentary on developments over the intervening
period: ‘Since then, our ideas for closer association between the three territories in
Borneo have got into the doldrums and made no headway, chiefly because of the
opposition of Brunei. . . . But I hope they will not drift too far apart. For practical reasons
of geography and administration there must be contacts between the three, and we are
trying to keep these contacts alive by the six-monthly (in fact, usually nine-monthly)
“Interterritorial Conference” . . .’ By this time, however, the British were uncertain
whether to let things slide or push ahead with the closer association of North Borneo and
Sarawak alone. Scott concluded his letter in the manner of someone who was demob-
happy: ‘These questions are being left in abeyance for the time being. They will be for you
and the new Governor of Sarawak to think about next year’ (Scott to Goode, personal, 13
Oct 1959, Goode Papers, box 1, file 1, f 13).]
When I spoke to you on the 9th November on the second anniversary of Radio Sabah,
I forecast that this station would in its third year be most concerned with political
matters. I suggested that we must now begin to think of the political structures that
go to the building of a nation and in that phrase I included the relations of the
several communities within North Borneo, each with the others, the association and
identification of all the people of the country with its government, and the relations
of this country and government with others external to it—particularly with its near
neighbours, Brunei and Sarawak. I was not then being prophetic, for I had every
reason to believe that at no distant date I would be talking to you, as I do to-night,
about a matter of very especial importance to you all, the constitutional future of the
three countries of North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. Together these countries are
commonly spoken of as British Borneo, but the term is of course only one of
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convenience. Two of them, Sarawak and North Borneo, are indeed British, but
Brunei is an Islamic State with its own sovereign head, His Highness the Sultan, who
is in treaty relations with Her Majesty the Queen and by that treaty accepts Her
Majesty’s advice and protection. It is of the utmost importance that that cardinal fact
should be kept in mind when thought is given, as I am sure it will be given, to what I
am about to say.
The possibility of the closer political association of these three countries is no new
subject. Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, through individual
Ministers, have several times spoken of the suggestion with favour. From time to
time the newspapers of the world have featured articles representing their political
association as a natural and seemingly inevitable development, and our failure to
bring it about has more than once been criticised. For five years an inter-territorial
committee1 has met at regular intervals in one or other of the countries to consider
the application in practice of a policy that has all along been assumed, that the three
countries should work together.
The difference to-night is that I, as the responsible head of your Government, am
asking you to consider, in all gravity, the merits from the point of view of you, the
people of North Borneo, of the proposition that North Borneo should enter into with
Brunei and Sarawak, some kind of firm constitutional pact. Whenever Her Majesty’s
Ministers in the United Kingdom have expressed themselves as being in favour of some
kind of political association of these countries, they have always said that the question
was ultimately one for the people here to decide for themselves. Permit me to be more
precise as to the meaning of that phrase. It means that the Governments of North
Borneo and Sarawak must be satisfied both that it is a desirable development and that
there exists in their countries bodies of opinion in favour of federation sufficiently
substantial to make it workable; in the case of Brunei it would mean that His Highness
the Sultan and his Government were convinced that it would be to the advantage of
His Highness’s country and acceptable to a substantial body of his people.
This is the only sure foundation for such a departure as I now propose. This also explains
what may have already occurred to those of my Legislative advisers who are listening to
me, why I should have chosen to broach this subject on the radio rather than in the
constitutional body which determines your affairs. I did of course give very careful
thought to the choice of medium. At first sight the obvious course would have been to
address the Legislative Council. But I considered it unfair to do so without due warning,
the absence of which would deny to my Councillors the opportunity for consultation and
deliberation provided by the course I have in fact adopted. So fundamental a change is
not a matter on which any man should be asked to utter at short notice. I have no doubt
that many of you have considered it already. But I ask you now to consider it anew. There
are advantages and disadvantages, and second thoughts after the event are of
immeasurably less value than considered thoughts before it. That does not mean that I
have any doubts. It is a subject on which I have pondered for years and there remains no
question in my mind that it is to the long term advantage of the peoples of all three
countries that they should join together to become as nearly as possible one country as
their many differences may permit. But in this matter my opinion is only one opinion.
1 The inter-territorial committee or conference (chaired by the commissioner-general) was initiated by
Malcolm MacDonald in Apr 1953.
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I shall go, regretfully, perhaps long before this dramatic adventure is embarked on; it is
you who will live in the federated country if it is brought about and it is your opinion
that, at any rate as far as North Borneo is concerned, must be decisive.
I can describe very readily, and later will describe, what to my mind would be a
workable form of association for the three countries. But I think you know me well
enough to realise that I never have and never would seek to impose on the people of
this country a political structure for which you are not ready. I have many times
expressed the hope that North Borneo, which I am quite sure will ultimately emerge
as a strong country, would evolve in accordance with its own genius. Anything that I
suggest to-night must be accepted as no more than a suggestion, a possible
framework which it is for you to consider, and so far at any rate as North Borneo is
concerned, to accept, to refuse, or to amend. But whatever opinion you may
ultimately arrive at, let there be no doubt in your mind, as there is none in mine, of
the advantage of the proposal in theory. The history of the world in recent centuries
leaves no room for such doubt. The free association of peoples everywhere results in
an accretion of strength far beyond the sum total of their individual capacity. It is not
the case where nations are concerned that 1 + 1 + 1 will make 3; together they make
a unit that is much more powerful, more effective, more efficient and more capable
of making life better for its members than the sum total of their individual strengths
would ever suggest. For instance, it is usual here to speak of England, but in fact
England is only one of the four countries that go to make up the United Kingdom.
America is the combination of forty-eight States, many of which wrangle between
themselves and with their Federal Government, but all of which stand as one where
the rest of the world is concerned. Do you suppose for one moment that, if they were
separate, those States, the names of all of which I doubt whether some of you even
know, could command such a voice in the affairs of the world as they do together in
the might of the United States of America. A few years ago the countries of Southern
Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland joined together—after much
controversy, much difficulty, much deliberation—as a Federation.2 As units, each
was relatively unimportant. Together, I believe that in time they may point the way
for the whole of an as yet uncertain Africa. A few weeks ago there was created the
Federation of the West Indies,3 and in welcoming that event, Mr. Casey, the Minister
for External Affairs in the Commonwealth of Australia, said it was the outcome of
‘patient and constructive effort by local leaders working closely with the United
Kingdom Government’, and he added that ‘as we found in Australia, experience in
working together builds up habits of co-operation and a sense of nationhood’. But I
must point out, here, that the experience, and the nationhood, and indeed the
strength, came after the six states of the Commonwealth of Australia had engaged to
submerge their differences in the act of faith which made them one. There are so
many examples, nearly all of them provided by the British Commonwealth, itself the
greatest aggregation of diverse peoples, moved ultimately by a single common love of
freedom, that the world has ever known. One instance, closest of all to your own
knowledge, is the Federation of Malaya, the emergence of which as an independent
2 For the Central African Federation, 1953–1963 see Murphy, ed, BDEE: Central Africa (forthcoming).
3 For the West Indies Federation, Jan 1958–May 1962 see Ashton and Killingray, eds, BDEE: The West
Indies.
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member of the Commonwealth we so warmly welcomed only a few months ago.4 The
voice of that country will be heard in the councils of the world, as the separate voices
of Pahang or Perlis or Negri Sembilan could never have been heard.
In this address I use the word ‘federation’ as one of convenience to describe the
formal political association of two or more separate countries for the furtherance of
their joint interests. There are many different kinds of federation, some of them very
close, some very loose, and I do not attempt to forecast what particular form of
association will emerge as most appropriate for these countries if, in fact, agreement
is reached for the creation of any.
But let us accept it, being guided by experience elsewhere, that some form of
federation is in principle both desirable and advantageous. That does not mean that
you should not look closely to your own interests before changing from principle to
practice. Such association has not always proyed possible, even between countries
where it seemed most likely. The three Scandinavian countries of Sweden, Norway
and Denmark, closely related as they are, have always found their local, separate
interests more important than their common interests.
Again, close at hand, although the states and settlements of the mainland of Malaya
have found it possible to join in a single federation, and although their affairs and those
of Singapore are inevitably entwined, it has not been found possible to agree on the
inclusion of Singapore in the Federation. It may be that you here in North Borneo, or
our neighbours in Brunei or Sarawak, may come to a similar conclusion, albeit—as I
think—unwisely, for whereas the geographical proximity of the three countries makes
the rest of the world regard them as naturally akin, in truth they are surprisingly
different. All I would say about that is this: North Borneo is developing quickly, and
developing upon its own lines; so also are Brunei and Sarawak. With time the differences
will become greater, and not less, and if you desire to grasp the advantages of federation
you should do so soon, for in time the differences could be too great to overcome. But
just as one should give sober thought before entering into marriage, so, before entering
into a partnership, particularly a permanent partnership, you must give thought not
only to what you yourself have to offer but to the merits of your prospective partners.
We here can offer a country of great economic potential, which is already growing
rapidly, with a record of political stability. In Brunei I see two particular advantages,
the wealth it draws from oil and the personality of its present Ruler. The State has, I
think, few natural advantages other than oil, but the riches it draws from oil are very
great. Let there be no misunderstanding. Federation would not mean that Brunei
money would be shared with North Borneo or Sarawak. The money is Brunei’s, and
would remain Brunei’s. In the event of federation being brought about, Brunei would
contribute its share of the cost of joint services just as we should. Nevertheless, it would
be not unnatural to assume that the Government of Brunei might be prepared to invest
some at any rate of its surplus wealth in the territories of its new partners as, indeed,
Brunei has already done in a small way. Brunei is also fortunate in having at its head
a forward-looking ruler dedicated to the service of his people. There is a Malay proverb
which speaks of ‘Katak di-bawah tempurong’, of a frog beneath a coconut shell which
believes that shell to be the whole world. In a small country there is always the danger
of the people developing a mentality akin to that of the frog, but His Highness the
4 See Stockwell, ed, BDEE: Malaya, part III.
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Sultan, on the contrary, is extremely anxious to groom his people for the responsibilities
that wealth places on them in a turbulent world. Sarawak is larger, richer and more,
populous than North Borneo. But it may not always be richer, perhaps indeed not for
so very much longer, and even now it certainly has no revenues to spare. Looking at
the other side of the account, the peoples of the three countries are very far from being
homogenous, Sarawak has been touched by communism in a way that we here have
not,5 and even Brunei is politically a little yeasty. But it must be admitted that of the
three territories, Sarawak with 50,000 square miles and between 6 and 700,000 people,
North Borneo with 30,000 square miles and less than 400,000 people, and Brunei with
2,000 odd square miles and some 60,000 people, none is a very considerable country;
but with more than 80,000 square miles (much larger than the Federation of Malaya)
and well over a million people we might build a country of some importance in South
East Asia. And against the larger background, the problems of each would appear so
much the smaller.
Formal political association could be secured, of course, only at a price, and that
price you must now assess. To enable you to do so, I had best outline the kind of
association that I think will be possible. But I must emphasize that these are my ideas
and not in any way specific proposals. Clearly, recognising the special position of
Brunei, amalgamation of the three countries into one is impracticable even if it were
desirable, which I do not think would be the case. Their constitutions apart, the three
countries are very individual and their individuality is worthy of retention. On the
other hand, if their association is to be effective, they must be clearly identified to the
rest of the world as one. The mere superimposition of yet another constitutional body
over the three Governments, with limited and begrudged authority, would be
extravagant, ineffective and otiose. It would be essential that the three Governments
should define those interests that they regard as common, and be prepared to surrender,
of their own will, the control of those interests to a central body representative of all
of them. Obviously the first of such common interests would be our relations with
other countries, for which Her Majesty’s Government are in any case responsible.
Secondly would come those matters that are already the responsibility of joint
departments, although those joint departments must for the present look for their
authority to the several separate Governments. To my mind the next most obvious
responsibility to be given to the Federation Government would be internal security.
We have already helped each other on several occasions, and there is much duplication
of effort. Nor is it possible to say that disturbance in Sarawak or Brunei is of no concern
to North Borneo. I have not the slightest doubt that in this, as in many other fields,
our individual resources when combined could be deployed to the much greater
advantage of all. Customs, immigration policy, health, education are all subjects in
which we have already sought to secure unanimity but in which, because we are not
bound together, local interests have so far won the day. Some or all of them could be
made the ultimate responsibility of the central authority. But perhaps I go too far and
too fast. These are matters that would necessarily be the subject of much thought
5 Sarawak’s first experience of communist terrorism was dated from an incident at Batu Kitang (ten miles
from Kuching) in August 1952 perpetrated by members of the Sarawak Peoples Army. The government
adopted the term the Clandestine Communist Organisation to embrace all such groups, see Sarawak
Information Service, The Danger Within: A History of the Clandestine Communist Organisation in
Sarawak, 1963.
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before agreement could be reached. But of this I am quite sure. That we could all profit
very greatly in all these fields by the joint use of the resources that are available to us
individually. And I personally would like to see the identity of interests personified in
a single Governor and High Commissioner for all three territories who would be advised
by counsellors coming from all three.
Economically small countries suffer from their excessive dependence on foreign
trade. The economic success of federation would depend largely on the extent to which
we are prepared to abandon internal trade barriers and to pool our productive resources.
But in this too, we need not go too quickly for, as Mr. Casey said, it is experience in
working together that builds up the habit of co-operation and emphasizes its worth.
I think I know you well enough to guess the question that will now be uppermost
in your minds. Where, in all this, stands Her Majesty’s Government in the United
Kingdom? You are all aware that it is the policy of Her Majesty’s Government—and
this is true of all likely Governments in England—to lead colonial peoples towards
self-government. I know that many of you will now think that the proposal for the
federation of the three territories denotes the desire of the British Government to
transfer responsibility for the three territories to a local Government. I can say in all
certainty that that is not true. It is not the case that Her Majesty’s Government have
any desire to shed responsibility for these countries. I said recently that, although
the number of officers from the United Kingdom would inevitably decrease as more
local officers became experienced, it was my hope that the association of the United
Kingdom Government with North Borneo would subsist as long as sentiment and
need demanded. I am certain that Her Majesty’s Government would confirm that
statement, whether it related to North Borneo alone or to the possible federation of
which I am now speaking. Indeed, the Federation would be an association not of
three countries, but of four, of Sarawak, Brunei, North Borneo and the United
Kingdom, and I am sure that the United Kingdom would not set a term to its interest
and its association in advance of the wishes of the people of these countries.
I have given you much to ponder on. Nobody is committed to any decision in the
matters of which I have spoken, not Her Majesty’s Government, nor His Highness
the Sultan nor the Governments of Sarawak and North Borneo. And all four must
needs consent before such an association can be brought about. But if it is brought
about, it will closely affect your own children and their future. I trust you will think
about it soberly and gravely.
4 CO 1030/658, no 11 30 July 1958
[Brunei]: letter from Sir A Abell1 to W I J Wallace. Enclosure: ‘A brief
appreciation of the political situation in Brunei—June, 1958’ by E R
Bevington2
[By the end of the nineteenth century Brunei, which had once exercised suzerainty
over much of Borneo and parts of the Philippines archipelago, had been reduced to two
1 As governor of Sarawak 1950–1959, Sir Anthony Abell also served as high commissioner of Brunei.
2 E R Bevington had served in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands and in Fiji before being seconded to Brunei as
commissioner for development, 1954–1958, when amongst other tasks he supervised the construction of
the National Mosque.
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enclaves, as the result of territorial concessions to the Brookes of Sarawak and to
European traders (notably the North Borneo Company). In 1888 Brunei became a
British protectorate, thereby losing control of external relations, and in 1906 the sultan
accepted a British officer, or resident, whose advice he agreed to follow in all matters
save those relating to religion and custom. Although the discovery of a large oil field at
Seria in 1929 transformed its fortunes, the upheaval of world war and nationalist
movements across the region called into question the viability of the tiny state. On 1
May 1948, the government of Brunei was in effect placed under the supervision of
Sarawak whose governor acted as high commissioner for the sultanate and whose
officials were seconded to its administration. Since Brunei had formerly ruled Sarawak,
this measure caused considerable resentment and dampened enthusiasm for any closer
association with Sarawak or North Borneo. In 1953 Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin, who
had ascended the throne in 1950, responded to popular demands for political change by
preparing a written constitution that, on its promulgation in Sept 1959, would
introduce representative government and reduce the role of the British in domestic
affairs. The prospect of reform triggered a contest between the conservative ‘palace
party’ of pengirans (hereditary nobles) and the radical Party Rakyat Brunei led by
Azahari, see 9.]
You may be interested to read the enclosed paper by Mr. E. R. Bevington; it is on the
whole, I think, a fair assessment of the present situation in Brunei and I am in
general agreement with his views as to the root causes of the present difficulties.
There is, however, one other fact which bedevils the present situation and will have
a considerable influence on the future course of events. That is the struggle for
personal power and position among the principal performers. This struggle has, of
course, gone on throughout the history of Brunei and all the refinements of the
known methods of liquidation of rivals and removal of obstacles have been practised
freely and with considerable originality. I have no doubt at all that if it suited a
group who felt sufficiently strong to do so they would without hesitation or regret
remove the Sultan from his throne. In fact I have been told by a politically
disinterested Malay from Malaya that His Highness would remain but a fortnight on
his throne if the British buttress was removed. I think that is an exaggeration
because I believe His Highness to be still generally popular. But I would add to
Bevington’s three main sources of present difficulties in his paragraph one the
struggle for personal power. At present the ambitious politician requires His
Highness’ patronage and until he has satisfied his ambition he must toe the line.
There are plums in the future to be picked—various high state appointments, such
as Mentri Besar open to commoners. His Highness while hinting that he has
candidates for these posts is careful not to tell me or anyone else who they are—
hence his reluctance to agree to a period of training. Then the Palace and family
group though strongly entrenched do not approve of and distrust His Highness’ new
friends among the school teachers. The young educated element, who support the
M.T.U.,3 despise and dislike the Palace toadies and the Party Ra’ayat dislike
everything to do with the present Government. There are signs that all these
antagonistic groups are at present uneasily allied in a common determination to
bring the present administration into disrepute and so force out of business the one
element which keeps the ring—the British. It is vital in my view that we should
remain in the ring as a referee who interprets the rules and we must retain our
powers at least until a new constitution with a competent system of popular election
is working smoothly.
3 Malay Teachers Union.
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Enclosure to 4
The administration has for some few months been faced with great difficulty, not
only in obtaining consent to constructive forward moves, but even to the
maintenance of normal constructive Government. The difficulty has arisen
apparently from three sources:—
The Sultan
A section of State Council (M.T.U.)
The Party Ra’ayat.
Had there been any one underlying motive directing the apparent obstructions, it
would have been possible to appreciate it and take steps either to accommodate it or
to meet it. Difficulty has arisen because there seems to be no clear motive and
generally the actions and reactions of the first two parties mentioned above have
been well nigh unpredictable.
After mulling over this problem for some months it seems possible that the motive
is obscured because it has three root causes. It is suggested that these are:—
Nationalism-as to approximately 30%
Xenophobia ′′ ′′ ′′ 20%
fear ′′ ′′ ′′ 50%
the proportions must vary according to the party considering any given problem
(para. 1 above) and the problem under consideration.
The first two ingredients need little elaboration and are common to nearly all the
non-self governing territories to-day. Nationalism in Brunei has its major negative
manifestation in an anti-Chinese attitude, an attitude undoubtedly motivated by fear.
Brunei nationalism demands that the country shall be governed solely and absolutely
by Brunei Malays who are some 50% of the present total population.
The second ingredient—xenophobia—extends to all ‘outsiders’, whether they are
British Indian or even Malaya Malays. Of these the British, so long as they are not in
key administrative positions, are the most acceptable: the Bruneis know (but will not
admit) that one day the British will go as in India, Ghana, Ceylon, Malaya. Not so the
others: they are tropical people who are born, marry or die in this part of the world.
The Bruneis fear that they will provide the expertise, technical crafts and ability to
make themselves indispensable: they will settle, and one day with their greater drive
and initiative they will possess the country. And until then, they will take the best
jobs and block promotion for Bruneis.
The third ingredient—fear—is a general fear of the future based on a secret and
inward knowledge that the Bruneis are unable to deal with the technological
complications of life in the modern world. To technological complications must be
added political complications. The Sultan sees the lesser status to which the Malaya
Sultans have been reduced. Members of State Council see the political troubles of
Singapore and the ‘Emergency’ in the Federation. Only the leader of the Party
Ra’ayat 4 has shown any willingness to grapple with technological and political
complications. But even if he came to power he would be held firmly back by his
following.
4 A M Azahari, see 9, note 2.
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Oddly enough, the first 5 years Development Plan has increased fear. It has gone
too fast. The new members of State Council in particular realise that one thing leads
to another, that all the time they must bring in outside staff to man the new services,
that more and more of the State’s funds are pre-empted to pay for the new services. It
is possibly not an exaggeration to say that they fear they are on a Gadarene slope
being rushed to their doom—or rather to the doom of the dream of a paradisaical
Brunei wholly preserved for the Brunei Malays. This explains their resistance to new
development projects and even the desire to terminate old ones. In their view the
previous decisions of State Council are suspect, and must be revised: those decisions
were no more than assent to the advice of an administering authority. They were not
the freely expressed will of the people: in their minds the fact that the people had no
way of freely expressing their will merely begs the issue. This explains the desire to
go back over formerly approved decisions—to try and regain ground that was ‘lost’ in
the past.
None of these factors are new: they have all arisen in other places. But in Brunei
the handling of the problem is made much more difficult by the constitutional
position which must now be dealt with.
The constitutional position
De jure, Brunei is an autocracy. The Sultan must accept and act on the advice of the
British Resident. The administration is a bureaucracy.
De facto, Brunei has a State Council and Legislative body with an overwhelming
unofficial majority, and a power of veto in the hands of the Sultan which is exercised
almost exclusively against the official advice.
The foregoing two factors are the immediate cause of the present impasse. The
administration’s advice (and often its day to day actions) can be and are flouted either
by the State Council in its executive or legislative capacity (for as at present
constituted it is both legislative and executive council) or by the State Council’s
Finance Committee by refusing supply.
British administration has therefore lost the substance of power while retaining
the form. How has this position come about? The process was all too simple, and one
which gives hindsight easy wisdom.
From 1906 the British Resident was in fact Administrator of Brunei. Sultans were
simple men of little or no education. Following the policy of indirect rule, the desire
to train the local people in government, and the obvious wisdom of maintaining the
trappings of government known and understood by the people, the old State Council
nominated by the Sultan was retained. From 1906 to about 1956 all went well:
Sultan and Council were amenable, and were even glad to leave the cares and chores
of government to their British advisers. Education, newspapers, the affairs of
Singapore and Malaya, and the sheer march of time, have had their cumulative effect.
The Sultan became worried about his dynasty, a local political party was formed, and
the Malay Teachers Union sought to defend their own position when they saw
expatriate teachers necessarily brought in to provide secondary education. These are
the three groups cited in the first paragraph.
The Party Ra’ayat being unrepresented in either State Council or the
administration has had little more than a nuisance value so far. The first signs of
difficulty arose when the Sultan started using a de facto veto power—a power which
arose out of the administration’s natural reluctance to use its Treaty powers and
08-Malaysia-01-29-cpp  21/9/04  9:05 AM  Page 13
14 PROSPECTS FOR THE ‘GRAND DESIGN’ [5]
compel acceptance of advice. These early difficulties were greatly increased when
members of the Malay Teachers Union were appointed to State Council. It is they
who have brought about the present near-impasse. The administration is faced with
the task of obtaining legislative authority and funds for administration from the
virtually hostile body.
These are the essential factors which make up the present situation. The future, as
always, is less easy to see.
One factor which does seem to be of growing importance is a confluence of the
three parties mentioned in paragraph 1. While each may have different motives, one
self-preservation, another self-aggrandisement, another political power, there are
signs that they are coming to realise that a marriage of convenience would serve
their immediate ends—which are absolute control of Brunei by Brunei Malays with
all others on suffrance. Once they have that power, their individual manoeuvres for
position can be resumed, in an atmosphere free from interference by the British or
anyone else.
There is little doubt that the M.T.U. members of State Council are often (although
not always) the spokesmen of the Sultan in sessions of State Council. There is
evidence that they meet in advance and agree on the action to be taken in Council.
There is also evidence that the M.T.U. Members are not unconnected with the Party
Ra’ayat and at least compare notes as to possible lines of action in Party Congress or
State Council. Xenophobia and Nationalism are probably the amalgam which has
brought them together.
Additional difficulty is lent to the situation by the fact that neither the M.T.U.
members nor the Party Ra’ayat have responsibility or power (other than negative
power). Their influence is therefore wholly destructive and obstructive.
Here are all the ingredients of as knotty a problem as could exist—and the
smallness of the State makes it more difficult and parochial rather than the reverse.
It is possible that the only solution lies in finding means of transferring
responsibility to Brunei Malays, provided always that those to whom responsibility is
transferred have reached their position as responsibly elected representatives of the
people, and not by nomination by the Sultan or the administration. The difficulties
are immense: there is no one fitted to assume responsibility and the three existing
Malay Heads of Department are examples. Undoubtedly there would be a hiatus and a
slowing down of advancement coupled with inefficiency in administration. But it is
possible that the only alternative may prove to be (one day) the use of force with all
the stigma that that carries in a world where information travels literally with the
speed of light.
The Brunei Malays wish to build a fence around their country. So long as oil flows
they can do that, until they themselves start dismantling the fence. But in those
circumstances can the flow of oil be assured—it is doubtful.
5 DO 35/10019, no 12, E/2 18 Dec 1958
[Developments in Brunei]: note by M MacDonald of talks with the
Sultan of Brunei on 13–14 December
[Malcolm MacDonald, high commissioner to India, 1955–1958, had promoted the closer
association of British dependencies in Southeast Asia during his time as governor-general
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of Malaya and Bornco, 1946–1948, and commissioner-general in SE Asia, 1948–1955 (see
1, note), so much so that he would be the British government’s first choice to lead the
commission of enquiry to Borneo in 1962. During a visit to the region in Dec 1958
MacDonald held informal and secret talks with the Sultan of Brunei and Tunku Abdul
Rahman and these are reported in documents 5, 6, 7 and 8. Having cleared drafts with
local British officials, MacDonald sent copies of the final versions to Sir Gilbert
Laithwaite, permanent under-secretary at the CRO, 1955–1959, for circulation to
appropriate Whitehall departments whose officials would regularly refer to these reports
during the initiation of the ‘Grand Design’ for ‘Greater Malaysia’.]
1. I visited Brunei on December 13th and 14th, and Kuching on the 15th and
16th. I was very impressed by the developments which have occurred in Brunei since
my last visit just over three years ago. Moreover, I noticed a pleasing change in the
Sultan himself. Immediately on meeting him I observed that his face reveals a much
more mature, self-confident character than before. Nor did I see in his eyes any hint
of the madness which one should perhaps look for in a member of the Royal House of
Brunei. All my conversations with him confirmed my impression of a responsible and
statesmanlike young Ruler. But these are comparatively early days, and heredity may
yet catch up with His Highness.
The constitution
2. I had several talks with him on numerous subjects, and one long, sustained
discussion on political affairs. The Resident (Mr. Dennis White) accompanied me,
and the Pengiran Bundahara, the Pengiran Pemancha and Data Perdana Mentri were
with the Sultan on that occasion.
3. After various courteous preliminaries and some exchanges on topics of lesser
importance, I asked His Highness how he thought affairs were developing in Brunei.
Was he satisfied, for example, with the stage of economic, social and educational
progress which had so far been reached? Quite a lengthy discussion on these topics
followed, the details of which I need not report since they included nothing of
particular significance. The Sultan did, however, pay tribute to the soundness of the
planning and of the implementation of plans which had occurred in recent years, and
by implication expressed gratitude to the British authorities for their guiding part in
all this. Mr. Dennis White said this was the first time he had heard the Sultan express
any such appreciation.
4. I then turned the talk to political questions, saying I was glad to know that His
Highness intended to press ahead with a new, more democratic Constitution for the
State.1 I remarked that it was wise of him to wish to introduce the Constitution soon,
because by doing that he would give some early satisfaction to local Nationalist
opinion, retain his influence over the moderate progressive movement, and avoid
being forced into a position of making more far-reaching concessions to extremist
1 Following talks in London in late Mar-early Apr 1959, the Sultan proceeded to grant Brunei’s first written
constitution on 29 Sept 1959. Under its terms, supreme executive authority was vested in the sultan, the
old State Council was replaced by an Executive Council and a Legislative Council, and the administration
was to be run by the mentri besar (chief minister), state secretary, attorney-general and state financial
officer. On the same day he also concluded a new treaty with Britain by which Britain granted self-
government but retained control over external affairs, defence and internal security. The post of resident
was abolished and a high commissioner was appointed to advise the Sultan. The governor of Sarawak ceased
to act as high commissioner (thereby ending administrative ties with Sarawak which had long been a source
of resentment in Brunei) and the resident, D C White, was appointed high commissioner.
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political leaders. In my view it was of great importance that he himself should move
with the times and retain the leadership of his people.
5. He said he entirely agreed with this conception, and that he favoured a slow,
steady constitutional advance in the government of Brunei. In reply to a question from
me he said he expects to go to London next March for discussions with the Secretary
of State with a view to the details of the new Constitution being finally agreed.
6. I said that, as he well knew, Mr. Lennox Boyd is a Minister with great
experience and wisdom in such matters, who would do his utmost to reach accord,
and who would have a conciliatory approach to any difficult problems. If it were
possible for the British authorities to make one or two concessions on points of
outstanding disagreement, Mr. Lennox Boyd would be inclined to make them. The
Sultan replied that he also had great confidence in the friendly and constructive
spirit in which the Secretary of State would negotiate.
7. I remarked that the negotiations would nevertheless fail if he himself did not
respond to the Secretary of State’s conciliatory spirit by being ready to make
concessions himself on points of difficulty. He must be flexible in his approach and
meet the British authorities half-way. Only if both sides were so disposed could a
settlement be reached. He said that he understood this position, and that he would
be ready to reach compromise agreements.
8. In further discussion he agreed that it might take between nine months and a
year after negotiations had been successfully concluded before the new Constitution
could be introduced in practice.
Inter-territorial conference
9. I then raised the question of the Inter-Territorial Conference, pretending
ignorance of the present situation concerning it, and expressing a hope that its
meetings were as regular and as helpful as they had been in the past. He replied that
unfortunately things in the Conference were not going well, and that he was
considering whether he should continue his membership of it.
10. I said I was surprised and sorry to hear this, and asked what the difficulty
was. He answered that on one or two occasions recently tentative agreements
reached in the Conference had been regarded as firm decisions, and that action
implementing them had been taken before he had an opportunity to consult his
State Council and have the agreements confirmed. This had put him in an impossible
position.
11. I commented that I thought there must be some misunderstanding, for I felt
sure that all the other authorities concerned intended that proposals made in the
Conference should not prejudice in any way his and his Government’s complete
freedom either to adopt or reject agreements tentatively reached there. That was the
basis on which we had originally formed the Conference, and I was certain that Sir
Robert Scott2 and the others involved intended no change in that position.
12. His Highness said that if the Conference had continued to work in that way,
there would be no difficulty; but that things had changed. I repeated that I was sure
there must be a misunderstanding somewhere, and added that, if His Highness wished,
I would have a personal word with Sir Robert or anyone else, to let him know that His
2 Commissioner-general SE Asia, 1955–1959.
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Highness was troubled on this point of the implementation of tentative agreements
ahead of such agreements being confirmed by the Brunei Government. I said I felt sure
that if I reported this, Sir Robert and his British colleagues would at once see that any
misunderstandings were removed or unintentional mistakes corrected.
13. The Sultan thanked me for this suggestion, but said that for the present he
would prefer me not to say anything. He was considering the whole position, and if
he found that the difficulties which he had mentioned no longer existed, it would be
unnecessary for me to speak to anyone. If, on the other hand, the difficulties,
continued, he would send me a message, and would be grateful if I would speak
informally to others concerned.
14. I promised to say nothing now, but reiterated that I would be ready to speak
if he wished me to do so. I urged him to feel confidence in the Conference, and said I
hoped he would attend the next meeting on January the 21st.
Relations with Sarawak and North Borneo
15. I said I was glad His Highness had established friendly relations between
Brunei and Malaya.3 He smiled and remarked that he had been a bit criticised for this.
I said I thought he was wise, and that I hoped he would maintain at least as friendly
relations with Sarawak and North Borneo as he had established with Malaya. It would
strengthen Brunei’s position if she had the most cordial relations with all her
neighbours.
16. He answered that he wished for good relations with all other countries. I
remarked that this was right, but that some countries were of particular importance
as near neighbours to Brunei. Sarawak and North Borneo were in this special
category. He agreed that he should maintain the best possible relations with them.
17. I would have liked to discuss the point further, and to urge him to give the
same generous terms for loans to Sarawak and North Borneo as he had accorded
recently to Malaya; but I judged that if I pressed this matter in that conversation, he
would suspect that I had been especially briefed by the Colonial Office, that our
whole conversation had been officially inspired, and that any good that the talk had
done on one or two previous points might be undone. I therefore switched the talk to
the innocent question of building a museum in Brunei.
18. After discussion with Mr. Dennis White, and with Sir Anthony Abell in
Kuching on the following day, I decided to write a letter to His Highness mentioning
in it not only the point about the Inter-Territorial Conference, but also the matter of
the loans to Sarawak and North Borneo. I attach to this Note a copy of the letter
which has now been sent to His Highness.4 Its terms were agreed with Sir Anthony
and Mr. White.
19. It was very pleasing to see the excellent relations which Mr. White has
established with the Sultan. His Highness evidently feels entirely at his ease with the
Resident, likes him and trusts him, is ready to discuss any question frankly with him,
and is beginning to be influenced by Mr. White’s opinions on affairs. If I may say so,
on his side Mr. White is conducting his personal and official relations with the Ruler
with conspicuous tact, skill and wisdom.
3 But relations between Brunei and Malaya deteriorated after the inauguration of the Brunei constitution
as a result of the influx of Malay administrative officers seconded from the Federation of Malaya.
4 See 6.
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6 DO 35/10019, no 12, E/1 20 Dec 1958
[Developments in Brunei]: letter from M MacDonald to the Sultan of
Brunei
Your Highness,
I very much enjoyed my visit to Your Highness in Brunei. Again, I congratulate you
very warmly on your great achievements in the State since I last visited it three years
ago. I was delighted with everything that I saw last weekend, much of it obviously the
results of your leadership.
I also benefited greatly from my talks with you, and was happy to hear of the progress
being made in various directions. I was very sorry to learn, however, that difficulties
seem to have arisen in the Inter-Territorial Conference of Brunei, Sarawak and North
Borneo. I shall say nothing about this to Sir Robert Scott or others whilst I am here
in Singapore; but, as I promised, shall be ready to speak personally later if you send
me a message that you would like me to do so. As it happens, I shall be back in Singapore
between the 11th and the 17th of January, when I return here for the annual conference
of British Ambassadors and other high officers in the Far East. Sir Robert Scott, Sir
Anthony Abell and Sir Roland Turnbull will all be here then for that conference, so it
will be easy for me to have a word with any or all of them, if you so wish.
However, I hope that the difficulties may be overcome in the meantime. I am sure
that the Conference is intended to function in exactly the same way as it did when we
started it a few years ago, and that its discussions are therefore not intended to
prejudice in any way your and your Government’s freedom either to adopt or to
reject any suggestions made at the Conference. If action has been taken recently on
one or two matters ahead of your being able to consult your State Council about
them, I am sure that this is owing to a misunderstanding or a mistake, and that it
will not recur. I therefore hope that the consideration which you are at present
giving to the problem will result in your being able to attend the next meeting of the
Conference, when I am sure that the question can be cleared up to your satisfaction.
You are, of course, right in saying that Your Highness’s and the Brunei
Government’s autonomy must be fully preserved.
As I said in our talk, I am glad that you have established such good relations with
the leaders in Malaya. This will not only help Brunei as well as Malaya, but also
spread good-neighbourliness amongst different Governments in this region. If I may
say so, I do hope you will also maintain unimpaired similar friendly relations with
your immediate neighbours, Sarawak and North Borneo. Since our talk I have heard
that there might be a suggestion of the Brunei Government lending money to
Sarawak and North Borneo on terms different from the terms arranged in Malaya’s
case. I venture to express a hope that Your Highness will not support this suggestion,
and that your generous act of friendship will be similar in the cases of all the three
countries whom you intend to help. Like other of your admirers, I look forward to
seeing your influence increase steadily in this part of the world, and your fame as an
enlightened Ruler and statesman grow. I believe that a helpful policy towards all your
neighbours will greatly assist in achieving this.
You are always good enough to let me speak with the frankness of true friendship
to you, and therefore I venture to write the above. As you know, I have your and your
country’s well-being very much at heart, and am always ready to do anything I can to
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help you. I prize Your Highness’s and my friendship—which is now more than a
dozen years old—very highly.
I greatly look forward to seeing you when you come to Delhi on your way back from
your next visit to England. Mr. Nehru1 will also be happy to meet you, but I can assure
you that there will be no formality whatever attached to the visit. You will be my private
guest at my house, and the programme will contain nothing that will not be congenial
to you. It will be a light programme, and will include visits to the beautiful Taj Mahal
and other places of Moghul and Muslim interest. My colleagues and I in Delhi will
gladly take care of as many travelling companions as you like to bring with you.
I am writing to the headmaster of Bedales School in England about the admission
of your four children and their four young friends to the school in September 1960.2
With renewed thanks for all your kindness and hospitality in Brunei, and with
warm regards.
1 Jawaharlal Nehru, prime minister of India, 1947–1964.
2 Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin was the first ruler of Brunei to have received a modern education. He had
attended Malay College, Kuala Kangsar (‘the Malay Eton’) in the Malay state of Perak. MacDonald
recommended his old school, Bedales, for the Sultan’s sons. Bedales was a co-educational school in
Hampshire. However, the crown prince and his brother were sent to Jalan Gurney School, Kuala Lumpur,
to prepare for entry into Victoria Institution, KL, which they attended in 1961–1963. The crown prince
then went to Sandhurst. Lord Chalfont, By God’s will: a portrait of the Sultan of Brunei, London, 1989,
pp 53–54.
7 DO 35/10019, no 12, E/3 22 Dec 1958
[Closer association of Malaya with Singapore and the Borneo
territories]: note by M MacDonald of his talk with Tunku Abdul
Rahman on 20 December
When I returned to Singapore from Brunei and Sarawak, I received a message from
Tunku Abdul Rahman through a personal friend saying that if possible he would like
to talk with me before I returned to India; so I flew to Kuala Lumpur on Saturday,
December 20th and spent an hour-and-a-half with him.
2. He said that this was a purely personal conversation. He had received a verbal
message from the British Ambassador in the Philippines, through the Malayan Head
of Protocol, who had just visited Manila, warning him that when he arrived in Manila
in January either the Filipino authorities or the local pressmen, or both, would raise
with him the question of the Philippines Government’s claim to North Borneo.1 The
message indicated that they intended to ask him his opinion on the point. The Tunku
then said to me that he also anticipated that at some future date the Indonesian
1 The Philippines’ claim to North Borneo originated in the 1878 agreement between the Sultan of Sulu and
a British commercial syndicate. Indonesia was also demanding West Irian from Holland, and the Tunku’s
interest in federating with Singapore and the Borneo territories appears to arise from anxiety about the
possible territorial ambitions of his neighbours, whereas in 1962–1963 such threats inhibited his
enthusiasm for Malaysia. During his visit to Manila in Jan 1959 the Tunku agreed with President Garcia to
forge a regional association for economic and cultural co-operation. In due course this would be known as
the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA).
08-Malaysia-01-29-cpp  21/9/04  9:05 AM  Page 19
20 PROSPECTS FOR THE ‘GRAND DESIGN’ [7]
Government would make a claim to Sarawak and perhaps Brunei. He was anxious to
say the right thing in Manila, and would like my views on this. He would also like to
know my ideas about broader future policy concerning the British Borneo territories.
3. I replied that with regard to any possible Indonesian claim to Sarawak or
Brunei, I had been gratuitously assured by Indonesian authorities in Djakarta in two
or three informal conversations when I was Commissioner-General that they had no
intention of making any such claim at any time. My own interpretation of this was
that there was at any rate no likelihood of the Indonesians making any claim in the
foreseeable future, but that this would not necessarily always remain the position.
(The Tunku commented that he accepted this, but that he thought the Indonesians
might some day try to subvert Malay and other opinion in Sarawak and Brunei in
order to create a local opinion in favour of joining Indonesia.)
With regard to the Filipino claim to North Borneo, I said that this had been put
forward periodically in recent years, and was a claim based on some Filipino notions
of early ancient history. I added that H.M.G.’s advisers had always assured the
Government that the claim had no proper legal basis, and could be resisted without
qualification. We invariably adopted that attitude whenever the matter was
mentioned. I said I would suggest to Sir Robert Scott on my return to Singapore that
he should send the Tunku a brief on the subject, so that he was fully aware of all the
facts before he went to Manila. I also suggested that the Tunku should discuss the
matter with the Governor of North Borneo when he visits Jesselton in the course of
his forthcoming travels.
4. The Tunku said he would be very grateful for a brief from Sir Robert, and that
he would also be ready to seek the Governor’s authoritative information on the
subject in Jesselton. He then asked me again what were my ideas about the more
distant future in British Borneo, saying that these would guide him if ever the matter
were raised with him. He would not of course quote me or any other British
authority, but would be assisted in his own thinking.
5. I answered that I was more than three years out-of-date on Borneo affairs, and
that my views were therefore not authoritative or official; nevertheless I would speak
to him personally and non-committally on the clear understanding that my remarks
had no other significance. I then said that when I was Commissioner-General my
British colleagues and I thought tentatively along the following lines:—
(a) Our first long-term task in all the three Borneo territories was to assist the
gradual constitutional advance of the local peoples towards self-government in their
internal affairs. Those peoples were politically backward and had no particular
yearnings for self-government, and therefore this would be a long process.
(b) Ultimately the question of independence for the territories might arise. It
seemed to us that the idea of three tiny independent states in British Borneo was
rather impractical in the modern world, and therefore we contemplated as one
possibility closer association—perhaps a federation—between the three countries.
But this could only be if the local governments and peoples wished for such a
development. We would not impose any policy against their wills, though if they
liked the idea of federation we would in due course encourage and help them to
achieve it. It was much too early to formulate precise ideas; indeed, a federation
might never be a practical proposition, though we favoured it in principle.
(c) We also considered as a possibility a larger federation: i.e., if the Government
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of Malaya, the Government of Singapore and the Government of the three Borneo
territories thought they would be individually and collectively stronger by joining
in some sort of super-federation, this might be a beneficial development for them
all. But again, this was looking far ahead, and would depend entirely on the wishes
of the governments and peoples concerned. If they all wished to come politically
closer together, the British authorities would no doubt give any proper assistance
that they could. We had it in mind that this large federated group of lands in
South-East Asia would remain a member of the Commonwealth.
6. I reiterated that these were not only my personal ideas, but also wholly
tentative and rather vague, and not necessarily realisable or wise in the
circumstances of the future. Nor did I know whether the British Government still
contemplated any or all of these possibilities, for circumstances and attitudes might
have altered since I was officially concerned with South-East Asian affairs.
7. The Tunku said he had been thinking of these problems recently, and that his
thoughts had become more focused since the warning which he received of the
question that might be put to him in Manila. His own ideas were very similar to
mine. For one thing, he said, the conception of a larger federation of South-East
Asian countries in the Commonwealth would help to settle decisively the problem of
relations between the Federation of Malaya and Singapore. He and his Ministerial
colleagues could not and would not consider a merger between Malaya and
Singapore alone. Even if Singapore came in as an additional State in the Federation,
the Malays could not regard with favour the idea of the Singapore Chinese
reinforcing the Chinese in Malaya, with the effect of establishing, in due course, a
Chinese political predominance. However, if the three Borneo territories could also
come into the Federation, the non-Chinese populations in those territories would be
a counter-weight to the Singapore Chinese. Such a plan would be acceptable to him.
He said that he had not discussed the idea with anyone else, not even Dato Razak yet;
but he himself had considered it, and liked it. He thought the Government of the
Federation would be ready to contemplate in due course Singapore and the three
Borneo territories all becoming units in the Federation.
8. I said I did not think the proposal for the Borneo territories to become units in
the Federation of Malaya would work. That was not my idea. There would be strong
opposition to it in all the three Borneo territories. For example, the people of
Sarawak were very jealous of their independent entity, and H.M.G. were pledged not
to prejudice that. Again, the Brunei authorities would not agree to any plan which
involved their wealth being put at the disposal of a central Federal Government in
Kuala Lumpur, or anywhere else except Brunei. My conception was therefore rather
different. I had thought that the Federation of Malaya, a possible Federation of the
three Borneo territories, and Singapore either as a separate State or as part of the
Federation of Malaya might all form what I called a ‘Super-Federation’. They would
have a common government for foreign policy, defence and certain co-operative
services, but otherwise would each enjoy complete autonomy in their own internal
affairs. I remarked that I agreed with his view that the non-Chinese peoples of the
Borneo territories could be an effective counter-weight in such a Super-Federation
to any predominance by the Chinese population. In my opinion the Dyaks of
Sarawak, for example, would become during the next few decades a quite formidable
political force, who would be ready to co-operate well with the Malay peoples in
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preventing any undue Chinese domination. They would be ready to accept the
Chinese as partners, but not as masters.
9. I added that my views were not at all dogmatic; it might be that the peoples of
the Borneo territories would oppose anything in the nature of a Super-Federation,
and wish to remain a separate, independent group on their own. On the other hand
someday something along the lines of the closer Federation which he envisaged
might prove possible; though I did not think this would be practical politics at any
time in the foreseeable future.
10. The Tunku said that the idea of a Super-Federation was a new conception to
him, and that it attracted him. He presumed that in such a set-up Brunei, for
example, would be ready to contribute some of its wealth to the common defence,
and that he personally would be entirely ready for Brunei and other units in the
association to keep as much autonomy over other expenditures as they wished. One
of his prime concerns was the defence of the whole area, and Malaya could of course
give very effective defence aid to the Borneo territories in case of need.
11. He observed that his immediate problem was what he should say in Manila,
and added that from our conversation it looked as if he might say that the future
destiny of the peoples of the three Borneo territories must remain their own choice,
but that they were likely to choose eventually to come in with Malaya rather than
with some other State. I answered that if he made any such statement it would do
more harm than good. If such a pronouncement were published in Sarawak, North
Borneo and Brunei, the peoples there might well react against it. They had scarcely
begun to consider these long-term problems, being solely concerned at present with
their internal economic and political development; and they would resent any
suggestion from outside that they might wish to join Malaya.
12. I added that I thought the Tunku should speak with Sir Robert Scott before
he went to Manila. Sir Robert would know much better than I what official policy is,
and what line he might properly take in Manila.
13. The Tunku said he would gladly speak with Sir Robert. He added that he
agreed he should not say in Manila what he had just suggested. He thought he might
confine himself to saying that the future destiny of the Borneo peoples was entirely a
matter for them to decide when the time came—and leave it at that.
14. I reiterated that he should discuss the matter with Sir Robert Scott before he
considered it any further. I also suggested that he might like to ask the Governors of
Sarawak and North Borneo what were the ideas of the peoples of their territories on
these questions when he met them in Kuching and Jesselton. He replied that he
thought he should not talk with the Governors about these matters, but that he
would like to discuss them with Sir Robert Scott or (if he could not come to Kuala
Lumpur in the near future) with Mr. Angus MacKintosh.2 I promised to report this to
Mr. MacKintosh, in Sir Robert’s absence, on my return to Singapore. The Tunku said
that I could tell him that he would be ready to see Sir Robert or him at any mutually
convenient time in Kuala Lumpur after December 28th.
15. I remarked that he had told me that he had not yet broached these problems
with Dato Razak. Might I suggest that he should not do so at present? It would be
better in my view if, following his and my talk, the matter were kept between him, Sir
Robert Scott and Mr. MacKintosh. The broad ideas that we had considered could not
2 Deputy commissioner-general, SE Asia, 1956–1960.
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be implemented until the rather distant future, if at all; and there was no hurry to
start anything but a tentative and even academic consideration of them.
16. He said he had intended to talk to Dato Razak soon after his talk with me,
and that there was a particular reason why he should do so. This is that he intends to
take ‘a long holiday’ after his return from the Philippines, and to hand the conduct of
the Government over to Dato Razak for several months. He will not in fact spend his
time holidaying, but preparing for the General Elections next year. (I shall dictate a
separate note3 on his plans about this, which might even involve his resigning the
Prime Ministership and making Razak Prime Minister in his place at least until after
the Elections.) For this reason he thought he must tell Razak of his ideas about
Borneo in relation to what might come up in talks in Manila. I repeated that these
matters were very tentative and long-term, and that there was nothing that Razak or
anybody else need do about them in the near future. The Tunku agreed with this in
general, but thought that one or two particular practical matters might arise which
could only be settled the right way if those concerned had the longer view of the
possible future. I think he will talk with Dato Razak quite soon.
17. He then said that he understood that the Sultan of Brunei would go to London
in March for discussions about a new Constitution for Brunei. He wondered whether
it might be useful to H.M.G. for the Federation Government to be represented in that
conference, either by a member of the conference or by an observer, as had been the
case in the similar discussions about the Singapore Constitution. He said that he only
put forward this suggestion to be helpful. I could assure the British authorities that
his Government would be willing to assist in any way they properly could regarding
developments in the Borneo territories, especially on the defence side.
18. I said I would report what he had said to Sir Robert Scott and that the Tunku
should discuss it with him in the first instance before taking the matter any further.
19. I then said I was glad that the Sultan of Brunei had established friendly relations
with Malaya, but that I personally was concerned lest the Sultan developed closer
relations with Malaya at the expense of closer relations with Sarawak and North Borneo.
The first need in British Borneo was that the three territories should cultivate the most
co-operative neighbourly relations. I hoped that if the Tunku had any opportunity to
express to the Sultan the view that he should have at least as good relations with Sarawak
and North Borneo as he had with Malaya, he would do so. The Tunku replied that, he
wholly agreed with me. He had been impressed with what he saw of development works
in Brunei during his recent visit, but wondered whether the Brunei Malays would really
be able to take advantage of them. He felt that they were being too much ‘pampered’,
and that instead of strengthening their characters their wealth might weaken them.
20. The Tunku had met me at the airport on my arrival and insisted on seeing
me off at the airport when I left, though I urged that he should not bother to do so.
As we drove to the airfield I said that if any newspapers reporters had noted my visit
to Kuala Lumpur and asked me questions about it, I would tell them I had come to
discuss with him questions concerning the new constitution of the University of
Malaya.4 He laughed and remarked that this would be very prudent. Five minutes
later a reporter from the Straits Times accosted us in the V.I.P. room at the airport
and asked what was the significance of our meeting. The Tunku smiled blandly and
3 See 8. 4 MacDonald was chancellor of the University of Malaya, 1949–1961.
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replied ‘We have spent an hour talking about the new constitution of the University
of Malaya’. This fiction was duly reported in the newspapers the next morning.
8 DO 35/10019, no 12, E/4 24 Dec 1958
[Malayan politics]: second note by M MacDonald of his talk with
Tunku Abdul Rahman on 20 December about preparations for
elections in 1959
1. As I have mentioned in paragraph 16 of my other Note on my talk with Tunku
Abdul Rahman on December 20th,1 he spoke to me about his plan to take ‘a long
holiday’ soon after his return from the Philippines next month. He said that he is
very overworked and tired; he has to spend a lot of time dealing with the tasks of the
leader of the Government in Kuala Lumpur and doing all sorts of courtesy duties
with visitors and others there, and at the same time must tour the country, keeping
in touch with the voters. He finds that he does not get enough time for all this work;
and that it is becoming increasingly essential that he personally should spend more
time in the constituencies preparing for the General Elections next year. Therefore,
he has decided to take the ‘long holiday’.
2. In fact it will not be a holiday at all. He will devote months to travelling
throughout the Federation preparing for the Elections. His primary task will not be
to organise support amongst the voters, for that already exists in goodly measure. His
chief concern—and the chief reason for his rather drastic decision—will be to persuade
a number of constituencies dominated by Malay voters to choose Chinese or Indian
candidates to champion the Alliance’s cause. This has become a serious problem. At
the last Elections he took great trouble to induce various constituency branches of
UMNO to adopt Chinese candidates, who were subsequently elected.2 Many of those
Chinese have since ‘let him and the M.C.A. down badly.’ Some had not even visited
their constituencies since, and their Malay supporters are thoroughly disgruntled. The
Tunku feels it imperative to have proper representation of the Chinese and the Indians,
and he will therefore study the position in all the constituencies to see which will be
the best for the adoption of Chinese and Indian candidates next year. He will have to
examine carefully various local situations, and do a lot of arguing and persuading with
UMNO organisations. This job will take several months; hence his decision to abandon
his duties as leader of the Government in Kuala Lumpur during that period. He will
put Dato Razak in charge of affairs. He told me that he had not yet discussed the matter
fully with Razak, but that he would do so in the next few days.
3. I asked whether this meant that he would cease to be Prime Minister. He replied
that he had not absolutely settled this yet, and would not do so until he had talked with
Razak; but he thought that he would at least temporarily resign the Premiership. In
any case he would take his ‘holiday’ without pay. Assuming that the Alliance won the
Elections, he would probably become Prime Minister again afterwards.
1 See 7.
2 At the time of the first federal elections in July 1955 the Malays accounted for 84 per cent of the
electorate (out of all proportion to their share of the total population) and some UMNO branches were
persuaded to adopt non-Malay candidates in order to demonstrate the Alliance’s multi-racialism. See
BDEE: Malaya, 360, 361 and 362.
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4. I asked him when the Elections would be. He answered that no date had yet
been settled, but that it would probably be at the beginning of August or even the end
of July. He was anxious to get the Elections over as soon as possible. He would not be
able to fix a date until he had been in the constituencies for a month or two and studied
the situation. He would then let Razak know what date would be most convenient from
the Government’s point of view, and Razak would announce that date.3
3 The Tunku’s UMNO suffered setbacks in the east-coast states and the Alliance’s majority was reduced in
the 1959 federal elections, see 71, n 3.
9 CO 1030/658, no E13 3 Jan 1959
[Political situation in Brunei]: letter from D C White to Sir A Abell
reporting on his first six months as British resident
I have now been about six months in Brunei, and it might be of some value if I record
my impressions on the political situation as it exists today.
Party Ra’ayat
When I was here in 1956, the Party Ra’ayat was probably at its peak; subscriptions
were pouring in, meetings were well attended, and it would not have needed a very
large spark to have caused an explosion.1 There was, I should say, a good deal more
anti-British sentiment than there is now. The Party today is in the doldrums; easy
money is unobtainable and even keen supporters are no longer gullible enough to
provide further funds for the pleasure of a handful of Party leaders. Azahari is almost
all the time in Singapore running his Press—it is hard to see where he got the
money for it, except by a manipulation of funds from Brunei, and all his interests
here are now more or less insolvent.2
1 Founded by A M Azahari in Jan and registered in Aug 1956, Party Rakyat (or Ra’ayat) Brunei was
modelled on Party Rakyat Malaya, led by Ahmad Boestamam, whom Azahari had met in Malaya in 1955.
Attracting considerable Malay support, especially from teachers, PRB held its first congress in Apr 1957.
While it opposed colonialism and favoured the democratisation of government, it advocated constitutional
methods and was not openly hostile to the position of the sultan. Aspiring to the restoration of Brunei’s
lost territories through merger with North Borneo and Sarawak (‘Kalimantan Utara’ or north Kalimantan)
and ultimately the creation of ‘Melayu raya’ (the unity of all Malays), the PRB rejected Anglo-Malayan
proposals for Brunei’s incorporation within Malaysia.
2 Sheikh A M Azahari bin Sheikh Mahmoud was born in 1928. His father was of Arab descent and his
mother was a Brunei Malay. During the Japanese occupation he was sent to study veterinary science in
Indonesia where he later joined the republicans in their struggle against the restoration of Dutch rule. He
returned to Brunei in 1952 and organised a party inspired by Indonesian nationalism but was jailed for six
months on account of unlawful assembly. After his release and a further period abroad, he came back to
Brunei and was involved in a number of unsuccessful business ventures. In Jan 1956 he founded the Party
Rakyat Brunei. As a member of Brunei’s Legislative Council, in Apr 1962 he failed to secure the passage of
a motion seeking to restore Brunei’s sovereignty over northern Borneo. He was in Manila at the outbreak
of the Brunei revolt in Dec 1962 and it was from there that he proclaimed the ‘Unitary State of North
Kalimantan’, embracing Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak. On the failure of the revolt he took refuge in
the Indonesian embassy in Manila and later moved to Indonesia. In an assessment dated Sep 1961, Dennis
White commented: ‘His two main personal troubles are money and women; he always has too little of the
former and too many of the latter. As Nationalist leaders go, he is now moderate and far from unpleasant
to deal with.’ See CO 1030/1075, no 620.
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Salleh3 and his clique are now merely strong-arm racketeers. Efforts are being
made to whip up more enthusiasm, but cash is not forthcoming. The danger
potential lies more in the criminal rather than the political sphere, as there are large
numbers (for Brunei) of young men of low educational standards for whom jobs
cannot be found, and who might well join Salleh in his activities.
The Sultan
The Sultan himself has matured. In 1956 he was still very much inclined to lean on
his British Resident and Gilbert’s stock was high.4 I do not know what caused the
deterioration in their relationship, but it is clear that the Sultan encouraged certain
Members of State Council to bait the Resident and oppose all his projects, in an
attempt, I assume, to get him removed.
As you foretold, my arrival was regarded as a local victory and an unnatural
honeymoon has resulted, but on a limited scale! The vociferous Members of State
Council have no doubts about their own abilities and have an inflated sense of their
own importance. They take a fiendish delight in digging up anything they can find
which may further discredit my predecessor.
The Sultan’s own views are not easy to assess. He has been lauded to the skies,
acclaimed as a gifted and wise Ruler with modern ideas, wooed by Malaya (with
excellent results for Malaya), and it is hardly surprising if he is now suffering from
‘folie de grandeur’.
Sarawak
The Sultan’s hostility to Sarawak is not difficult to assess. In his view, Brunei has
become subordinate to what was once a province of his ancestors and which was,
to the extent that tribute was paid, still in theory subordinate to him when under
the Brookes.5 This explains his attitude over the outright purchase of Cession
Monies.
He is encouraged in his attitude by many of his advisers, not all on State Council,
who genuinely think that independence will be accelerated if the connection with a
Crown Colony can be broken. I do not think there is anything altruistic in their
views. As an independent State, Brunei would be a gold mine for the chosen few and
the ‘protection’ of Malaya, a good deal further away than Sarawak, would leave them
more or less unfettered in their handling of Brunei’s internal affairs. They do not
3 Salleh bin Masri was deputy president of Party Rakyat Brunei but more militant and confrontational than
Azahari.
4 J O Gilbert, of the Sarawak Civil Service, succeeded J H Barcroft as resident in 1953. In 1958 Abell
replaced Gilbert with White in an attempt to break the stalemate in Anglo-Bruneian negotiations over the
proposed constitution.
5 Resentment of Sarawak derived from past territorial losses and current administrative subordination.
Rajah Charles Brooke’s annexation of Limbang in 1890 had split Brunei into two enclaves and had been
made the more galling by the fact that the British government, in allowing the annexation, appeared to
have neglected its obligations under the Anglo-Brunei treaty of 1888. Furthermore, in 1948 the
administration of Brunei had been attached, if not subordinated, to Sarawak whose governor became high
commissioner of Brunei. The British resident of Brunei reported to the governor of Sarawak and Sarawak
officers were seconded to the Brunei administration. On the introduction of the Brunei constitution in
1959, the governor of Sarawak ceased to be high commissioner for Brunei and White took over as high
commissioner.
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seem to realise that Malaya is primarily interested in their money and that a
federation with Malaya might well mean an inrush of Malayan Chinese, to the
detriment of their own policy of Brunei for the Bruneis.
From what is known of the political aspirations of the Party Ra’ayat, their attitude
towards Sarawak and North Borneo is considerably more liberal and realistic, and
they apparently would be willing to share most of their revenue. Cynically, it could
be observed that they have next to no chance of furthering their own financial
interests with independence, whereas the local nobility have every hope and indeed a
very good chance of being able to do so.
Constitution
It is not easy to form an appreciation of the Sultan’s real feelings over a Constitution.
It is a Western concept which he was persuaded to accept and, unless he can so
manipulate negotiations that any failure to implement a Constitution can be blamed
on the British Government, he is committed to granting one. He is being put under
heavy pressure by certain Members of State Council, particularly Chegu Marsal, and
to a lesser extent by Pengiran Ali and Pengiran Yusof, and also by a Nationalist
element among the Brunei Malay Teachers’ Association. Marsal, Ali and Yusof may
well have aspirations for advancement, and Yusof is regarded in some quarters as a
possible Mentri Besar; though the Sultan’s reluctance to mention his choice of
Mentri Besar perhaps indicates that he intends to look to Malaya for his man.6
The Party Ra’ayat’s attitude to the Constitution is considerably more democratic
than anyone else in Brunei. They want popular franchise and an elected Government,
and would at once deal with the local nobility, though they would retain the Sultan
as a Constitutional Head of the State.
The Sultan’s continued support of the local nobility and his undercover counter-
attack on the Party Ra’ayat (which has been highly successful) will undoubtedly do
6 Brunei’s first mentri besar (chief minister) under the 1959 constitution was the Sultan’s private
secretary, Dato Peduka Haji Ibrahim bin Jafar, who originated from Labuan and had previously served as
secretary to the British resident. The Tunku proposed his own private secretary, Wan Ahmed bin Wan
Omar, and Ali bin Hassan for the posts of state secretary and attorney-general respectively and both were
appointed, despite British misgivings that Wan Ahmed was of ‘very limited ability’. In addition, the Tunku
offered some forty school-teachers as well as ten Malays for so called ‘key posts’, including Dr Wan Ahmed
(state medical officer) and Mohd Yakim bin Haji Long (state forestry officer). After a year White was
reporting a gathering tension in Brunei’s administration which reached a crisis in mid-1961: His
Highness was acting arbitrarily; the mentri besar was powerless and medically unfit; Malayan officers were
unhappy in their posts and resented by Bruneians; the British high commissioner was constitutionally
prevented from intervening. In Apr 1961 it was reported that the medical service was about to collapse on
account of the incompetence of the state medical officer. Then, in June 1961 Mohd Yakim bin Haji Long
(state forestry officer) was assaulted by some Bruneians. This incident provoked, firstly, the seconded
officers to demand repatriation to Malaya and, secondly, clumsy intervention from the Tunku. The crisis
led to changes of personnel: Haji Ibrahim took sick leave prior to retirement and was succeeded as mentri
besar by Marsal bin Maun; Wan Ahmed bin Wan Omar was replaced as acting state secretary by Haji
Mohamed Yussof; Dato Abdul Aziz bin Haji Mahomed Zain took over from Ali bin Hassan as attorney-
general. The new mentri besar, Marsal bin Maun, had once been close to the PRB but his rapid rise within
the ‘palace party’ ended their association. Dato Abdul Aziz, like his predecessor as attorney-general, was
seconded from the federation and, having been selected by the Tunku to supervise the constitutional
issues connected with Brunei’s prospective membership of Malaysia, he was regarded in some quarters as
‘the Tunku’s spy’. See CO 1030/529, 533 and 1147; see also documents 52 n 4, 91 and 93.
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him and his family harm in the long run. There is already a good deal of discontent
amongst the peasantry at the rapacity of some of the Pengirans.7
Conclusions
The proposed Constitution will, undoubtedly, help to clip the wings of the local nobility,
and an elected element could well introduce a more reasonable attitude in the
Legislative Council towards Sarawak and North Borneo, but the danger to relationship
with these territories is acute, both here and in Sarawak, where the loan interest rate
could well spark off a strong anti-Brunei campaign. It is neither politically desirable
nor practical to arrest the pro-Malayan swing and, with Singapore’s future uncertain,
to say the least of it, probably all three territories would be wise to look to Malaya for
help. I feel, therefore, that it is expedient to let the Sultan know as soon as possible
that Sarawak would not be averse to relief from the thankless task of trying to staff
Brunei, who would then have to face the realities of the staff position, instead of needling
Sarawak, but falling back on them for help when they need it.
7 Aristocrats of Brunei.
10 DO 35/10019, no 17 [16 Jan] 1959
‘Future of the British Borneo territories’: CRO brief for Lord Home’s
visit to the Federation of Malaya
The Tunku has apparently been giving a good deal of thought recently to the future of
the British Borneo Territories (North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei) and their possible
association with the Federation. The Tunku discussed this subject with Mr. Malcolm
Macdonald [sic] in Kuala Lumpur on 20th December (a copy of Mr. Macdonald’s record
of and note on the discussion is attached),1 and he has recently paid flying visits to
North Borneo and Sarawak en route to and from the Philippines. The Tunku is, of
course, a close friend of the Sultan of Brunei and has recently negotiated a loan of 100
million Malayan dollars from the Sultan on most generous terms.
2. Since returning from Brunei the Tunku has told Sir G. Tory that he feels that
the question of the association of Borneo with the Federation of Malaya may be
precipitated within the next few years by claims from either the Philippines or
Indonesia or both for one Territory or another, and he hopes that, if this happens, the
Territories would indicate that they wished, when politically more advanced, to be
free to decide on the question of an association with Malaya. This seems to the Tunku
to be a more attractive solution than any alternative. The Tunku realises, however,
that the process of bringing the Borneo Territories to political maturity is likely to
take from ten to twenty years and that the question of an association with the
Federation is a very long term prospect.
3. The Tunku’s thinking may have been stimulated by the idea of a ‘super
Federation’ comprising the Federation and the Borneo Territories, thrown out by
Mr. Malcolm Macdonald (paragraphs 5(c) and 8 of Mr. Macdonald’s note refer). This
suggestion has caused surprise in the Colonial Office because Her Majesty’s
Government has not given serious consideration to the idea.
1 See 7 and 8.
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4. The possibilities of closer association of the three Borneo Territories have,
however, been canvassed for some years. People of the Borneo Territories are
backward and there is no intention of hurrying them into a political union. In 1957,
however, it was felt that the time had come for Her Majesty’s Government to take the
initiative and encourage local discussion of proposals for closer association, and in
Sarawak and North Borneo there is a desire to explore possibilities further. The
Sultan of Brunei has, however, steadfastly refused to join in any discussion on closer
association and the Secretary of State for the Colonies feels that for the present it
would not be right to press the matter further against his will, although the Colonial
Office considers that an association restricted to North Borneo and Sarawak would
not be in the best interests of either Brunei or the other Territories.
5. It is suggested that the Secretary of State should be non-committal if the
Tunku raises the subject of future Malaya/Borneo relations. He might point out that
the peoples of the Borneo Territories are still politically backward and that it is too
early to formulate precise ideas as to their future. These are matters to be decided in
the light of the wishes of the Borneo Governments and their peoples.
6. Paragraph 17 of Mr. Macdonald’s record mentioned that the Tunku suggested
that it might be helpful to the United Kingdom if the Federation were represented at
forthcoming constitutional discussions between the Sultan of Brunei and the
Secretary of State for the Colonies in London. The presence of a Malayan
representative at these talks would almost certainly give rise to embarrassing
speculation, and Sir G. Tory2 was instructed to ensure that the Tunku did not pursue
this idea. Sir G. Tory has reported that the Tunku has accepted our point, apparently
with some relief. Sir G. Tory has, however, told the Tunku that we should like to call
on his assistance if this seemed desirable during the talks.
2 Sir Geofroy Tory, Britain’s high commissioner to independent Malaya, 1957–1963.
11 DO 35/10019, no 21 29 Jan 1959
[The future of the Borneo territories]: letter from Sir R Scott to Mr
Lennox-Boyd
[The commissioner-general recognised the benefits of a non-military pact between
Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines, on the one hand, and, on the other, a union of
Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories. But he argued that the Tunku’s exuberant
pursuit of both objectives would be counter-productive and that a rushed attempt to
incorporate North Borneo and Sarawak within the Federation would antagonise their
non-Malay majorities. Commenting on Scott’s recommendation that the British continue
to work steadily towards the development and closer association of the Borneo territories,
the high commissioner in Kuala Lumpur pointed out that the emergence of what looked
like a Malaya-Brunei axis was alienating North Borneo and Sarawak, see 14.]
This letter is about the future of the Borneo Territories and is written in the light of
some general discussion of the subject during the recent Eden Hall Conference,1 and
1 Each year, usually in Jan, the commissioner-general held a conference on regional affairs at Eden Hall,
his residence in Singapore. It was attended by heads of mission, governors and high commissioners as well
as by representatives from Australia and New Zealand and usually by a minister from London.
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of a more detailed talk which I had in Kuching last week with Sir Anthony Abell and
Sir Roland Turnbull.
2. These talks were to some extent stimulated by the ideas recently canvassed in
public by Tunku Abdul Rahman for some new form of non-military association
between the countries of South-East Asia, and by the suggestion which he made
privately to Mr. Malcolm MacDonald last month that the Federation of Malaya,
Singapore and the Borneo Territories might enter into a political union of some
kind.2 Although these two propositions are no doubt linked—at least, in the Tunku’s
mind—our interest lies in keeping them separate: indeed, we should discreetly
encourage exploration of the former not only because it merits cautious
encouragement but also because we may by that means hope to discourage the latter,
which at this stage offers no advantage and considerable disadvantage to the Borneo
Territories.
3. The Tunku’s motives in using his visit to the Philippines to launch an appeal
for a cultural and economic pact between the independent nations of South-East Asia
are clearly mixed. Among them are fear of Communist China and suspicion of all
overseas Chinese, a consequent desire to align and combine the influences of the
Muslim religion and the Malaysian racial group, dislike of the Afro–Asian bloc as
such, and the hope, particularly in an election year of cutting a dash in the
international arena. Whether he will in fact get very far with this idea in its present
form is doubtful, since it has had on the whole a poor reception in Indonesia and
does not seem to have evoked much enthusiasm in the Philippines who have been
toying with somewhat similar concepts for some time but for quite different motives.
Determined to remain a Christian country, there are few developments the Filipinos
fear more than an extension of Moslem influence in their direction. Nor are they
greatly flattered to be reminded of their Malay racial origins. Nevertheless, the idea of
a regional association appeals in principle to them, and indeed they are inclined to
wonder how the Tunku has managed to gain credit for an initiative which they
imagined was their own. In recent years they have begun to meet their neighbours
and to find that they apparently have quite a lot in common—fear of China, chafing
at Western assumptions of superiority, sharing many of the social and economic
problems of the Philippines and the same administrative weaknesses. In their
current anti-American mood the Filipinos, by nature ‘joiners’ and always ready to
take part in any international gathering, are particularly attracted by the idea of a
group which will exclude the United States.
4. At present it looks as though the outcome would at most be a series of
bilateral agreements between Malaya and a few other South-East Asian countries.
Nevertheless, the Tunku has committed himself pretty deeply to the pursuit of a
multilateral agreement and, as I have said, we should in my view give him such
support as we safely can, not merely in the interests of relations with Malaya but also
because the interests of the free world might well be served by the establishment in
South-East Asia of a loose association (without overt Western participation) of
independent countries sharing a resolute open aversion from Communism, a
watchful but not actively hostile attitude towards the overseas Chinese and
2 The idea of a non-military association stemmed the Tunku’s meeting with Garcia (see 7, n 1); for the
Tunku’s meeting with MacDonald, see 7 and 8.
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combining sturdy, even assertive, independence with readiness to co-operate with
the West.
5. The Tunku made clear to Mr. MacDonald that his main reason for seeking to
incorporate the Borneo Territories in the Federation of Malaya or, failing that, to
enter into a federal union with them as a whole, is due mainly to a feeling that the
indigenous races and the Malays living in those territories would be an accretion of
strength, tipping the racial balance against the Chinese, which might provide a
safeguard sufficient to justify the risk of accepting the incorporation of Singapore.
No doubt the Tunku is aware also of the relative stability and prosperity of Sarawak
and North Borneo, and the oil revenues of Brunei must appear a prize worth much
effort to acquire. From the Tunku’s point of view this is a natural and sensible line of
thought, but it does not suit the present position and interests of the Borneo
Territories and it is therefore satisfactory that Sir Anthony Abell and Sir Roland
Turnbull appear, for the time being at least, to have persuaded the Tunku that it
would not serve even his own purposes to give any immediate, open indication of his
aims. I would not by any means rule out the possibility that a union of Malaya,
Singapore and the Borneo Territories might at some future date prove advantageous
to them all as well as to Britain and the free world, but the Borneo Territories must
first both approach much more closely than today to the stage of general
development of the others and must also first have determined their relations with
each other.
6. Fortunately, neither of the Tunku’s two propositions has any substantial
appeal to Sarawak and North Borneo today. Both Governors are satisfied that, apart
from the Malay communities, the peoples of both territories would react strongly
against any suggestion that they should now accept a commitment, however
remote and tentative, to future political association with Malaya (and possibly
Singapore) or anywhere else. In their view the peoples of the two Colonies
recognise clearly that they are as yet in no position to make up their minds on so
fundamental an issue, that it will be many years before they reach a degree of
political maturity that will enable them to judge it for themselves or justify their
being asked to make such a judgement, that they have no desire to force the pace,
and that meanwhile they are anxious to continue to enjoy all the help that Britain
can give them in prosecuting their political, economic and social development at a
rate commensurate with their resources. This attitude is sound and we should do
all that we can to encourage it and to preserve the safeguards necessary to maintain
it. It may be that as has happened elsewhere the forces of local nationalism will
develop faster than we all should like, and that politicians will arise in Sarawak and
North Borneo demanding independence before either territory is anywhere near
ready for it or their peoples as a whole really want it. But there is so far no sign of
this and on present evidence we have a good chance of preventing it if we keep our
policies imaginative and flexible, promoting the growth of informed, reasonable
public opinion and leading it.
7. Nor is there any general attraction for Sarawak and North Borneo in a racial
appeal directed to the Malay communities. It is true that in Sarawak the Malay
community amounts to about a third of the population; and to it, of course, such an
appeal would undoubtedly be attractive as the position of the Malays has much
weakened since the days of the Brooke Rajahs and they are conscious that they have
already been outstripped by the Chinese and that the Dyaks will rapidly catch up with
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them in the years to come.3 But these very considerations are bound to strengthen
the aversion of the other two-thirds of the population to any political appeal which
seemed likely to lead to revival of a Malay hegemony. Such an appeal could therefore
have only a disruptive effect in Sarawak and could not command general acceptance.
In North Borneo the Malay community is negligible in numbers and influence: there
an external appeal to Malay nationalism would be rejected with little or no
discussion, although it would disturb the Philippines (which is anxious that North
Borneo should develop preferably as a Christian and above all not as a Muslim
country) and might produce repercussions in Brunei and Indonesia.
8. The situation in Brunei is different on both scores. It is an entirely Malay State
led by a Sultan devoted to the Muslim Faith and, together with his closest associates,
anxious to keep his rich country so far as possible free from non-Malay influence,
even if this costs him progress in the social and political fields. It might therefore be
expected that the eyes of Brunei should turn with much more favour than those of
Sarawak or North Borneo to the possibility of some form of political association with
Malaya, and we know that the Sultan at least has of late been looking in that
direction. There is, however, reason to believe that by no means all his people share
his view and in any case the practical obstacles in the way of an agreement acceptable
both to the Sultan of Brunei and to the Government and Council of Rulers in Malaya
are so formidable that political association of the two countries cannot be regarded
as likely in the near future.
9. It is not only to the Malays that appeals from outside might be made. There is
already some evidence that Chinese leaders in Singapore are ready to work on the
Chinese communities in Sarawak and North Borneo. To the extent that their
overtures evoked any response at all, the effect would be disruptive and harmful to
racial unity.
10. All this adds up to the need of the Borneo Territories for protection against
external influences likely to breed communal tensions and to impede orderly
progress. This does not, of course, mean that the territories should be cut off from
outside influence of the right kind. To mention only two institutions, the
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association4 and the Colonial Development and
Welfare Funds have made notable contributions.5 But it does mean that at present
the principal desideratum for the three territories is that they should look inwards
upon themselves and concentrate upon their own internal development and the
improvement of relations between them. Sarawak and North Borneo are still
encouragingly free from racial conflict and Communist subversion, economically
sound and promising for the future, demonstrably capable of a sober approach to
political evolution. There seems no reason why, with sustained British guidance and
support, they should not maintain a steady rate of progress unimpeded by major
3 Sarawak was ceded in stages to the Brookes, rajahs of Sarawak from 1841 to 1946 (discounting the
Japanese occupation); Rajah Charles Vyner ceded the country to the British crown in 1946. For population
figures, see 73 appendix B.
4 While commissioner-general, MacDonald had used the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association as a
forum to foster inter-territorial co-operation and it was at its regional conference in Singapore in July
1961 that the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee was set up.
5 From 1947 to 1964 Colonial Development and Welfare funding provided 19 per cent of Sarawak’s capital
programme and in the early post-war years most of its development was funded in this way.
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upheavals. In Brunei, too, the ground is not fertile either for racialism or for
Communist subversion, but the Sultan comes of a notoriously unstable line and has
of late been behaving erratically and obstinately. The average Brunei Malay is an
indifferent character and revolutionary possibilities already lurk in the wide gulf
between the Sultan and his immediate advisers and supporters on the one hand and
the mass of the people on the other. Despite the wealth of the State it is still
extremely backward and badly needs the moral, administrative and other assistance
from its neighbours from which it is at present turning away.
11. British policy towards the Borneo Territories rests upon four pillars which
we should strive to strengthen.
12. The first is that Britain should make it clear to the Borneo peoples and to the
outside world that there is no intention of withdrawing. The more that we can induce
the Borneo peoples openly to declare their need and desire for our continued
support, the more likely it will be that that support can go on being given so long as
the need lasts. This is in the interests not only of the Borneo Territories but also of
ourselves and the Commonwealth and the free world, for it is increasingly clear that
in the contexts both of Defence and of Commonwealth policy the Borneo Territories
have an important role to play.
13. The second is a steady process of internal development in all fields—
economic development, chiefly agricultural, social development with the main
emphasis upon education and especially the teaching of English, political
development through the creation and extension of local government institutions at
a pace and on a scale matching the desires and capacities of the people.
14. The third pillar is recognition of the vital necessity of achieving an amicable
and stable settlement of our relations with Brunei and of hers with her neighbours.
Here the first step is agreement upon a constitution for the State and its complete
separation from Sarawak under a High Commissioner directly responsible to you,
Sir. The talks to be held in London in March will be crucial. It is reasonable to hope
that the introduction of a constitution providing the foundations for democratic
progress in what has hitherto been essentially an autocratic State will stimulate the
normal process of social, economic and political development in which Brunei is
today so far behind Sarawak and North Borneo. The attainment of a constitutional
settlement should also be considerably facilitated by agreement—which, I
understand, you, Sir, have already accepted in principle—to separate Brunei entirely
from Sarawak. I need not repeat or elaborate the reasons for this, as they have
already been fully set before you, but I reiterate my conviction that this step is
essential to satisfactory further progress both internally in Brunei and externally in
her relations with Britain and with her neighbours.
15. Moreover, a settlement with Brunei on these lines should in due course
buttress the fourth pillar of British policy, our plans for closer association between
the three Borneo Territories. Once more, it is unnecessary for me to recapitulate the
arguments already submitted to you at length and in detail for the desirability of
closer association. I would say now only that the future holds great promise for the
Borneo Territories in conjunction and danger if they fail to unite.
16. I agree entirely with you, Sir, and with Sir Anthony Abell and Sir Roland
Turnbull that no pressure should be put upon the Sultan to drive him in the
direction of closer association, but I also think that he should be kept aware how
desirable it seems in our eyes and that everything possible should be done to induce
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him of his own accord to modify his opposition to it. Once he ceases to feel himself
tied in a semi-subordinate position to the apron-strings of Sarawak, I believe there to
be a chance that he will adopt a more relaxed and [less] intransigent posture in this
context as in others.
17. Meanwhile, Sarawak and North Borneo should quietly proceed to examine
the practical implications of closer association and to formulate considered
judgement upon them and upon the concept in principle. In so doing they should
continue to take account of Brunei without either literally or figuratively trespassing
upon Brunei ground. It is to be hoped that as they do so they will adhere to the view
that the participation of Brunei in any form of closer association in British Borneo is
at least highly desirable, but I would not regard it as a serious matter if they more
and more came to think that union between the two territories would be worth while
even if Brunei resolutely refused to join them, and I see no reason to believe that this
need necessarily exclude the adhesion of Brunei at a later date, since this
development, if it is to take place at all, will (and should) be of slow growth. I foresee,
for instance, that the proposed joint mission of representatives of Sarawak and North
Borneo which is to visit both territories to test public sentiment on the question of
closer association will do the job with very deliberate speed over many months.
18. I am copying this letter to Sir Anthony Abell and Sir Roland Turnbull.
12 DO 35/10019, no 23 7 March 1959
[Future of North Borneo]: letter from Sir R Turnbull to E Melville on
the eve of his departure as governor
When Wallace was here he suggested that I might with advantage tell you rather
more of what I saw for the future of this country, and I admitted the soft
impeachment. It would seem that Rob Scott has very largely done the job for me in
his secret letter of the 29th January to the Secretary of State,1 with none of the
contents of which I would differ except perhaps in matters of minor emphasis.
2. It may help to record the advantages that this country possesses:—
(i) it is peaceful;
(ii) race relations are good: this is in part a bequest from the Chartered Company,2
but it is also the consequence of current policies consciously and conscientiously
pursued, though without suggestion of complacency. The cultures, the economic
and educational standards and, indeed, the ambitions of the Chinese and the
indigenous peoples differ so widely that there is always the possibility of strife, but
we have the inestimable advantage that racial differences are not here exacerbated
by the existence of exclusive religions (as, for instance, Islam in Malaya);
(iii) the overall standards of living are, in the Asian context, good. There are no
very rich people, but there is no urban poverty and, except in pockets that can be
eliminated, remarkably little rural poverty. It is a country of the middle class.
1 See 11.
2 Under a charter granted by the British government in 1881, the British North Borneo Company governed
the country until it fell to the Japanese in January 1942. In July 1946 North Borneo became a crown
colony.
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Again by Asian standards, the country and its population are relatively healthy.
Much of its soil is very fertile, certainly a great deal more so than has been believed
in the past, so that the agricultural potential is great and is in fact in process of
realization;
(iv) the discovery of oil is more a probability than a possibility.
3. Against all this must be set one fact, that a country capable of providing a
livelihood for millions is populated by less than half a million. There are other
relatively vacant spaces in South-East Asia, but none, I think, with the attractions of
this country. India, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia
have all, in recent years, shown interest in North Borneo as a depository for their
surplus population. I have written of this elsewhere at length; here it is sufficient to
say that I believe, firstly, that if we fail to people the country H.M.G. will in the
foreseeable future be subject to many pressures and, secondly, that if such
embarrassment is to be avoided we must add to the population people of our own
selection who are reasonably acceptable to those already in the country, and that we
must pursue its economic development to that end.
4. You will ask what there is for H.M.G. in such an apparently eleemosynary3
policy. The answer, apart from the long-term economic prospects, which are
considerable, lies in defence. I have been beating this drum to little effect for a long
time, and I have no wish to arouse any perturbation by exaggerating the interest
recently displayed by the defence authorities, but I have no doubt that ultimately it
will be Borneo that will prove to be the meeting place of British, American and
Australian strategic interests in South-East Asia, and that our influence here will be
recognised as vital to the maintenance of British interests in Asia if, as I presume, it
is indeed the intention of H.M.G. to remain a power in this part of the world.
5. The corollary is significant. It is that, in her own interest and those of the
people of this country, H.M.G. must be prepared to tolerate the stigma of
‘colonialism’ for many years by their retention of this, or these, countries amidst a
welter of independence, some of it less than edifying.
6. Scott is quite right in saying that the Borneo peoples should openly declare
themselves in support of the connexion. There will be no difficulty in North Borneo,
and I have long had it in mind to secure, before I go, an even more overt and
unequivocal declaration than has as yet been given of the local desire for our
continued partnership.
7. Despite all that we say about race relations, the indigenous peoples are
nervous of the fate that would be theirs, in our absence, at the hands of the Chinese.
The Chinese, on the other hand, would take political power only if it were forced on
them by us; if they did so, they would have little care for the others. The more
intelligent of the ‘natives’ are very well aware of their deficiences. The Chinese of this
country will be satisfied to pursue their economic concerns for a long time; the few
who take part in politics, and they for the most part must be persuaded to do so, are
with few exceptions those who are relative failures in commerce or those who
consider that political influence would further their commercial or professional
success; in both cases the economic interest is preponderant. The Chinese are not in
3 Eleemosynary = charitable
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the least afraid of the indigenous peoples, and are entirely ready to pay us a
reasonable share of their profits in order that we should look after the native peoples
and assure to them, the Chinese, the peace and time to pursue their own
preoccupations. It is in the interests of both parties (though it is a mistake to speak
or think of the native peoples in the singular) that we should remain.
8. It is in this context that the oft-declared policy of H.M’s Government to lead
her dependent peoples to self-government must be considered. Nobody would seek to
argue with that policy insofar as it is designed to serve a long-term objective, but
what is regarded here as the sometimes unseemly haste of its application elsewhere
does cause concern. If on some appropriate occasion the reaffirmation of the policy
could be associated with the declaration that in such territories as this H.M’s
Government intend to continue their association as long as it is desired and so long
as it can contribute to the welfare of their peoples, fears would be quieted, and the
creation of the circumstances that make difficult the continuation of such an
association would be forfended.
9. Meanwhile, of course, as I have written elsewhere, we should continue to
educate the people in the management of their own affairs, but should not transfer
authority at any level so quickly as to leave the unprepared indigeneous people
lagging hopelessly, and fearfully, behind the Chinese.
10. Finally, I think it most unlikely that this country will offer political difficulty
for a long time to come provided always that we can secure for it the economic
investment for which it is now ripe. You do not need me to tell you how many
expensive political difficulties in other places could have been avoided by relatively
minor, but judicious, financial generosity at an earlier stage. North Borneo is a good
financial investment; unfortunately, private investors are nowadays inclined to look
askance at the whole of South East Asia, without particular discrimination, and it
may prove wise to make more public money available at an economic rate.
13 CO 1030/652, no 103 26 June 1959
[People’s Action Party government of Singapore]: despatch from Sir
W Goode to Mr Lennox-Boyd
[Singapore’s first elections were held in 1948 when 6 of 23 Legislative Council members
were elected. In 1951 the number of elected members was increased by 3. In 1955 a large
measure of responsible government was granted with a Council of Ministers being made
collectively responsible to a Legislative Assembly of 32, 25 of whom were elected.
Following talks in London in 1957 and 1958, Singapore achieved Statehood in 1959 (see
Hyam and Louis, eds, BDEE: The Conservative Government and the End of Empire
1957–1964, 256). The new constitution provided Singapore with full internal self-
government, a Singapore citizenship scheme and a Cabinet responsible to a wholly
elected Legislative Assembly of 51, although internal security was managed by the
Internal Security Council of 3 British, 3 Singaporean and one Malayan representatives.
Elections were held on 30 May 1959 and the People’s Action Party won 43 out of 51 seats
and 53.4 per cent of the votes cast by 90 per cent of the electorate. Lee Kuan Yew was
sworn in as prime minister on 5 June and Goode stood down as governor to fulfil the joint
roles of UK commissioner and head of state (ie the queen’s representative) or Yang di-
Pertuan Negara. When Goode departed Singapore in early Dec, Yusof bin Ishak became
Yang di-Pertuan Negara and Lord Selkirk assumed the duties of UK commissioner in
Singapore as well as those of commissioner-general in SE Asia. Goode’s despatch of 26
June was subsequently printed for confidential circulation. In his memoirs Lee Kuan Yew
refers to Goode’s ‘dispassionate assessment’ of the PAP’s first six months in office and
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quotes extensively from his despatches of 26 June and 23 Nov, see document 15 below
(see also Lee Kuan Yew’s memoirs, The Singapore story, Singapore, 1998, pp 337–341).]
I have the honour to submit the following observations on the new People’s Action
Party Government of Singapore led by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew.
2. The new Ministers are intelligent men. They have given much thought to
their political programme which was put to the electorate in carefully prepared
speeches (later published in the two enclosed pamphlets).1 They are extreme
Socialists by conviction, but they realise the practical limitations imposed by
Singapore’s peculiar circumstances as an international trading centre. They also
realise the gravity of the economic problem presented by a rapidly increasing
population expecting a high standard of living in a city which depends for its income
upon winning business against keen competition. Above all else, they are obsessed by
the threat of Communism. They propose to meet this threat not by repressive police
action but by winning the minds of the people of Singapore to democratic socialism,
by fostering loyalty to Singapore and Malaya in the Chinese population, and by
showing that in Singapore’s circumstances democratic socialism is effective in
providing a welfare state without the rigours of Communism.
3. To succeed they must retain the support of the Chinese working and student
classes. In this lies their weakness, since they will be obliged to indulge in popular
gestures which will antagonise the business and commercial class upon whom they
depend for economic progress. Their obsession with the political and ideological
struggle to win the minds of the masses to democratic socialism in preference to
Communism is likely to prejudice a competent approach to the other problems of
making Singapore’s economy work.
4. Like the Marshall Government in 1955,2 the new Ministers have begun by
trying to show that they are different from the previous Ministers and closer to the
people. They have changed the names of the Ministries; appointed Parliamentary
Secretaries (for whom there is no provision in the Constitution) instead of Assistant
Ministers; and moved the Cabinet Offices from Government House to the City Hall
(which is available since they are abolishing the City Council). The new Government
has been publicly presented as a people’s government deriving its strength from the
masses. For public occasions Ministers and P.A.P. Assemblymen have adopted a
uniform of open-necked white shirts and white linen trousers. The Ministers have
also decided to restrict attendance at social functions such as cocktail parties or
garden parties. The general impression which they are trying to foster is that of sober
dignified dedication to the task of governing for the benefit of the masses. They have
immediately carried out easy changes appealing to the puritanical spirit of the
younger Chinese generation such as banning sexy magazines, rock-and-roll and pin-
tables; measures which the previous Government contemplated but abandoned as
likely to provoke opposition.
5. Their economic and social programme, as set out in their party pamphlet,
contains measures which are common form in democratic, Western countries and
1 Not printed.
2 David Marshall was the first chief minister of Singapore holding office for 14 months in 1955–1956. It
was a turbulent period and he resigned when talks with the British over self-government broke down; he
was succeeded by Lim Yew Hock.
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whilst the pace they are setting themselves may prove to be unduly ambitious, the
P.A.P. have shown a complete awareness of the limits which the economic facts of life
in Singapore and the Federation must impose on doctrinaire, socialist ideas. Their
championing of Malay as the national language of a predominantly Chinese city,
their positive discouragement of communal attitudes, their condemnation of
‘Chinese chauvinism’ and the over-riding importance they attach to winning the
confidence of the Federation with a view to merger show admirable political courage
and good sense. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew has also made it clear that the P.A.P. stand by the
constitutional agreements to which they were a party, and that in their view full
independence can only be obtained through merger with the Federation. He has
accepted that the British bases, though not desired, will have to remain for the five,
ten, fifteen or twenty years that it may take to achieve merger. Even then, he
recognises that any change would have to be gradual so that the Government could
find alternative work for the many thousands of civilians employed by the Services.
6. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew stated clearly during the election campaign that the Party
would not tolerate subversion from any quarter, whether from left or right. Although
Formosa and ‘Russian imperialism’ were specifically mentioned, the implication that
the M.C.P. and China were also included was clear. Moreover, immediately after the
Party’s victory, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew unequivocally stated that the Party did not intend
to be or even appear to be the handmaid of Communism.
7. On the other hand, the P.A.P. leaders believe that it is no good being anti-
Communist in a Chinese city where ‘anti-Communist’ has come to mean ‘pro-
Western capitalism and imperialism’ and ‘anti-Chinese’. They therefore call
themselves non-Communist and are at pains to show that they are not puppets of the
West. They are sensitive even to praise from the West, since they consider that it
damages the popular support of the left-wing Chinese population of Singapore which
they must firmly retain against the alternative leadership of the Communists. They
are therefore allergic to anything which they think makes them appear to be siding
with the West against the East. They believe that to beat the Communists they must
offer an alternative socialism that is equally dynamic and equally successful. They
also believe in using the Communist technique. In this there are obvious dangers.
Their organisation in ‘cadres’, their discipline, their emphasis on party rule, their
doctrinal approach and their ruthless methods are characteristic of Communism and
could well prepare the way for the Communists to take over. Their present policy of
publicly welcoming the detainees back into the fold has obvious dangers: the
detainees3 have lost no time in re-establishing their contacts with trade unions. Six
of the new P.A.P. Assemblymen are Communist suspects. Two, who were previously
detained for short periods, have been made Parliamentary Secretaries to the Prime
Minister and the Minister for Finance. I am confident, however, that Mr. Lee Kuan
Yew sincerely intends to counteract any attempt by such persons to engage in
Communist activities inside or outside the Party. He has expressed cautious
3 Riots in Oct 1956 (arising from a crisis in the Chinese middle schools and leaving 13 dead and 123
injured) had resulted in hundreds of arrests. The detainees included leading communists with whom Lee
Kuan Yew was closely associated: Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan, Devan Nair, James Puthucheary,
Sidney Woodhull and three others. On winning the election of May 1959, Lee refused to take office until
the eight had been released. He then tried to neutralise their influence by appointing some of them to
government posts.
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optimism that they have had a change of heart or can be controlled. But he may well
be over-confident in his estimate of personalities and his ability to beat the
Communists at their own game.
8. The will and ability of the P.A.P. to face and fight the challenge of
Communism will obviously be one of the major concerns of the United Kingdom and
Federation in the days to come. For the present, however, the auguries are good. The
M.C.P. are unlikely for some time to challenge a Government which undoubtedly
commands the enthusiastic support of the Chinese-speaking mass of the population.
Mr. Lee Kuan Yew himself estimates this period of grace as being probably a year or
more. But even if this estimate is correct, the months ahead will present many
problems and worries.
9. The most difficult and dangerous of these is growing unemployment in the
face of population pressure. The new Government has promised much. Mr. Ong Eng
Guan,4 in particular, will lose no time in trying to make his mark as Minister for
National Development in which capacity he will be responsible for a manifold variety
of tasks impinging directly on the daily lives of the people. In doing so, he will no
doubt stir up a good deal of dust and he may well give offence to various sections of
the community. The patience, understanding and tolerance of the British business
community and the English-educated sections of the local population will be severely
strained. So far they have shown commendable restraint which I hope will be
continued in the future. But the problem of finding employment for the thousands of
young people leaving school each year remains to be solved, and as economic and
social difficulties prove stubborn or intractable and political pressures mount, the
new Government will increasingly find themselves in a dilemma which has been
familiar to other governments in Singapore and elsewhere. The temptation to
distract discontent and disillusion into more dangerous channels may be strong,
particularly as, at that stage, they will undoubtedly be faced with that challenge from
the left which their recent manoeuvres were intended to thwart. Their political
ideologies and sensitivities throw doubt on the determination of the P.A.P. leaders to
do what they know to be right when they judge that it will weaken their popularity.
10. Much will depend on the political and economic relationship which is
developed with the Federation. As is well known, the Federation is not ready to
accept merger of Singapore and is likely to remain cool if not hostile to the idea as
long as the U.M.N.O.–M.C.A. Alliance provides the ruling party and Government in
the Federation. The present Federation Government are suspicious of the true
character of the P.A.P. and of the ability of its present leaders to maintain their
control against the Communist threat. It will be our constant concern that these
feelings of suspicion should not harden into outright hostility which might lead to
the Federation refusing to participate in the work of the Internal Security Council5
and to the Chinese population of Singapore abandoning the aim of merger as
impractical and turning back to China for guidance. So far the Federation Ministers
have publicly appeared to be friendly to the new Singapore Government and the first
4 Ong Eng Guan was expelled from the PAP in 1960 and won the Hong Lim by-election in April 1961, see
38.
5 The Federation of Malaya had the right to withdraw from the Internal Security Council on giving six
months’ notice.
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informal meeting between the two Cabinets on June 13th was encouraging; but
there are underlying suspicions and prejudices. Whether the Federation will be
willing to adopt a more friendly economic policy towards Singapore must depend on
the political relations between the two countries. But the Federation Government
will in any case be fully stretched in dealing with its own economic difficulties and it
can hardly be expected that even with goodwill the Federation will provide any great
help towards the solution of Singapore’s serious economic problems. If the
Singapore Government is to deliver the goods to the people of Singapore, it is
difficult to see how they will be able to do so without substantial help from outside
Malaya.
11. In conclusion, therefore, it may be said that while there is cause in recent
events for guarded optimism about at least the immediate future, the main battle
with Chinese chauvinism, Communism and, above all, with the grave economic
problems of Singapore, has not yet been joined.
12. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the U.K. High Commissioner, Kuala
Lumpur, and to the Deputy Commissioner General in Singapore.
14 DO 35/10019, no 26 14 Oct 1959
[Future of the Borneo territories]: letter from Sir G Tory to D W S
Hunt1
You have asked for our comments on Scott’s letter of the 29th January to the
Colonial Secretary2 about the future of the Borneo territories. I have seen Turnbull’s
views,3 enclosed with Smith’s letter MAL.236/1 of the 6th May to Roland Hunt, and
now understand that there are no comments from Sarawak.
I agree with Scott in saying that the two ideas in the Tunku’s mind at the time of
his Manila visit,4 (a) the closer association of South East Asian countries, and (b) the
political union of the Federation and the Borneo territories, should be kept distinct,
the first to be encouraged, the second to be treated with great caution, if not actively
discouraged, at least until the territories have reached a much more advanced stage
of constitutional development. Since January the two projects have, in fact, gone their
separate ways. The scheme for the closer association of South East Asian countries has
been regularly aired and has acquired the imposing name of the South East Asia
Friendship and Economic Treaty (SEAFET) though little else as yet in the way of
positive attributes. Now that the Federation elections are over we may expect a fairly
early meeting between the Filipinos and the Malayans to draw up a suitable agreement.
The intention is then to invite other S.E. Asian countries to attend a conference with
the object of commending the purposes of the agreement to them, and encouraging
them to accede to it. The Borneo project, on the other hand, has had no further
mention from the Tunku since we discussed it in January (my telegram No. 25). I think
he is aware of the fact that association with N. Borneo and Sarawak should be regarded
1 D W S Hunt (later Sir David) was assistant under-secretary at the CRO, 1959–1960, and accompanied
Macmillan on his ‘wind of change’ tour of Africa in Jan–Feb 1960.
2 See 11. 3 cf 12. 4 See 7, n 1.
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as a very long term prospect. But the idea is not dead. In particular he fears that the
question of the future of these territories may be precipitated by the Philippines or by
Indonesia, or both, and thinks that we ought in the meantime at least to clear our own
minds about the sort of future we consider best for them in their interests as well as
those of the Commonwealth. He is convinced that these interests would ultimately be
best served by the Borneo territories joining a wider Federation of Malaya, which could
in those conditions include Singapore.
The main theme of Scott’s letter is that while association between the Borneo
territories and Malaya may be desirable at some point, the time is not yet; that for the
present the Borneo territories should be protected from external interference, and
from any suggestion that their future may be bound up with a Muslim Malayan
Federation; and that they should be encouraged to develop their links with one
another. With all this I agree, and if need arises, I shall reiterate our advice of
December to the Tunku against ventilating his ambitions. My only comment is that it
may not be so easy to provide a long, safe incubation period of the kind Scott envisages.
The scene has already changed. Since January, there has been a noticeable
strengthening of the links between Brunei and the Federation. Brunei has given the
Federation a loan of M$100 million on extremely generous terms. The Sultan has paid
an official visit here; he is always made much of and is on close personal terms with
the Tunku. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong made a return trip to Brunei in May. The
Sultan has also made determined efforts to recruit Malays from the Federation for his
civil service. He has, in fact, succeeded in acquiring a Federation State Secretary
(formerly the Tunku’s Private Secretary), and other appointments are under
consideration.5 Federation Ministers attach considerable importance to placing their
Malay officials in influential positions in Brunei, and have disregarded the advice of
their Establishment Office in doing so. I doubt if this is solely because of interest in
Brunei as a source of future loans. On the Sultan’s motives I am not competent to
comment. The new Brunei constitution and the separation from Sarawak may, as
suggested in paragraph 14 of Scott’s letter, open the way to closer connections
between Brunei on the one hand and Sarawak and North Borneo on the other. But the
present danger seems to be that Brunei may seek her friends elsewhere and develop
relations with the Federation to the detriment of those with her immediate
neighbours.
If this movement continues, it might eventually result in the demand for some kind
of Federation/Brunei union. Given a strong desire on the part of the Sultan of Brunei
and of all the Malay rulers here, for such a union, I do not think the practical obstacles
to its consummation would be insurmountable. Brunei could readily be incorporated
as another state in the Federation; the Constitution (para. 2(a)) provides for just such
an event. If the union were one between equal partners, difficulties in the way of
negotiation would, of course, be greater, but not insuperable. I agree that from our
point of view any movement in this direction would be an undesirable trend, but it is
one we may find it hard to counter; and we should not exclude the possibility of
Federation/Brunei relations and eventually some form of Federation/Brunei
association cutting across our plans for the Borneo territories as a whole.
I am sending copies of this letter to Rob Scott, Turnbull, Abell and also to White in
Brunei
5 See 9, n 6.
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15 CO 1030/652, no 113 23 Nov 1959
[People’s Action Party government of Singapore]: despatch from Sir
W Goode to Mr Macleod, assessing the first six months of the PAP
government
[This was Goode’s valedictory despatch. On 2 Dec he departed Singapore for home leave
before taking over from Turnbull as governor of North Borneo. There was a general
stock-taking towards the end of 1959 as Scott prepared to give way to Selkirk, as Abell left
Sarawak to be succeeded by Waddell, and as (in consequence of Brunei’s constitution)
White assumed the position of high commissioner of Brunei which had formerly been
filled by the governor of Sarawak (see also 16 and 17).]
I have the honour to refer to your Despatch No.371 about the performance of the
new Government of the State of Singapore, and to submit, as my last general report
before my departure, the following comments on developments since my Despatch
No.7 of 26th June.1
2. It is now nearly six months since the P.A.P. took office, and their record
during that period has in several important respects confirmed earlier favourable
impressions. Thus in the field of subversion and security, their electoral stand as a
democratic, socialist, non-Communist party has been confirmed and reinforced.
They have been frank and unequivocal in the presentation of their position in the
Internal Security Council, where I have been impressed by their patience and
flexibility and by their readiness to meet the difficulties of the Federation
Government. It is particularly encouraging that they have now publicly declared
their attitude on the problem of security in a statement made by the Deputy Prime
Minister in the Legislative Assembly on 14th October, immediately before they
renewed for five years the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance, which provides
the powers of arrest and detention without trial which are essential to deal with
Communist subversion. A copy of this statement is enclosed.2
3. It is unlikely that the present leadership of the P.A.P. will ever commit
themselves publicly as anti-Communist. They are obsessed with the need to persuade
the politically unsophisticated masses that the P.A.P. is ‘on their side’, and this
involves demonstrating that the P.A.P. is not a friend of the foreigner and the rich
man, nor of the English-educated middle class. Thus while the Government are fully
committed to opposing Chinese chauvinism and other communal attitudes and to
the promotion of a new loyalty towards Malaya, they will continue, within this policy,
to act and speak in a way which may seem equivocal towards Communism and
Communist China and which will often be offensive to Western or English-educated
minds. Indeed, it is possible that the process of fostering a Malayan nationalism may
lead to a real or apparent intensification of hostility towards the ‘Colonial’ past and
its associations. The Government’s attitude towards Communism is, however,
fundamentally sound, and for this fact we have profound cause to be grateful. I
remain convinced that to regard the present P.A.P. leaders as crypto-Communists
would be an entire mistake. To describe them as crypto-anti-Communists would be
much nearer the mark.
1 See 13. 2 Not Printed.
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4. The P.A.P. Government have also lived up to expectation in their attitude
towards the military base. This attitude has of course never been one of warm
friendship, but the P.A.P. came into power with the declared policy of abiding by the
Constitution and of tolerating British bases in Singapore at least until merger with
the Federation had been achieved. Privately the Prime Minister relies on the British
military power here as effectively ruling out violence from Communist tactics as well
as for its value to the economy. They have since done nothing to belie their declared
policy. It is true that public references to the British strategic hold over the island
tend, for obvious reasons, to be in somewhat derogatory terms. Inevitably, too, we
have had a number of minor administrative difficulties over Service facilities, but
these have been amicably resolved. Again, the strong desire of the Government not to
be seen to be associated in any way with Western defence policies or with their local
manifestations has led to difficulties, notably in connection with visits by allied
warships to Singapore harbour. These difficulties, too, have been largely resolved and
the Prime Minister has accepted the visit of large numbers of U.S. sailors during a
SEATO exercise next spring, subject to any unexpected political development. I have
no doubt that particular difficulties will continue to arise, but I think it would be
quite mistaken to regard them as evidence of a desire by the Singapore Government
to undermine the British strategic position here. On the contrary, the Prime
Minister has recently welcomed public reference to the presence of British armed
force to remind the people of Singapore that it is part of the essential background to
their lives.
5. Another welcome feature of the P.A.P. Government’s performance since they
came into power has been their good relationship with myself and with the United
Kingdom Commission as a whole. My personal relationship with the Prime Minister
remains frank and cordial, and he and his colleagues have been prepared to conduct
themselves in a similar way in their dealings with members of my staff. They might
so easily have been difficult, touchy and suspicious, but so far they have shown little
sign of this in their direct dealings with the Commission. Some trouble has arisen
from their tendency to do things first and consider the implications (including the
international implications) afterwards; but they have at least been ready to go over
the consequential difficulties with us in a frank and objective spirit and even,
occasionally, to consult us about their problems. Their unwillingness to accept social
invitations remains a bar to close personal relationships, but there are signs that
even this is beginning to break down.
6. Relations with the Federation continue to be polite but cool. Despite the best
endeavours of the Singapore Ministers to win acceptance by the Federation
Ministers, the attitude of the Federation remains distrustful. The Prime Minister now
realises that there can be no hope of merger during the lifetime of the present
Federation Government and he also appreciates that public emphasis on merger in
Singapore causes political embarrassment and consequent public rebuffs in the
Federation. But he is concerned to hold Singapore to its present constitutional
modus vivendi, and to keep the aim of merger as the decisive influence on Singapore
politics. He rightly believes that it would be disastrous for both Singapore and the
Federation if merger became discredited as unattainable and Singapore turned
elsewhere for its future. It is of paramount importance to all of us that this should
not happen. Meanwhile the maximum co-operation by the Federation is vital in
dealing successfully with Singapore’s two great problems of providing a living for its
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teeming population and stemming Communist subversion. A stable Singapore is
essential to the well being of the Federation, and I hope that the Federation
Government will come to realise where their true interest lies.
7. In their external relations the Government have behaved better than I feared
they might. The Finance Minister, Dr. Goh Keng Swee, attended the Conference of
Commonwealth Finance Ministers in London in September. I think he made a good
impression and he was certainly very favourably impressed himself by the spirit of
co-operation he found in all discussions. The Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Toh Chin
Chye, represented Singapore at the Colombo Plan Meeting in Indonesia this month,
at which Singapore was elected to full membership. He thus met Ministers from
many countries and had his outlook broadened. He also followed up in Djakarta
personal relations with Indonesian Ministers which he and the Prime Minister have
been cultivating at every opportunity in order to build up at least a facade of goodwill
towards Singapore. Ministers have also met a number of distinguished visitors
passing through Singapore, including the Prime Minister of Australia. I have no
doubt that these contacts have been valuable in educating these young men and I
hope in breaking down some of their callow prejudices. Although they are anxious to
get outside help in money and expertise, they have an immature sensitivity to
anything that savours of paternalism, and they are at pains to show themselves Asian
and not pro-European. This explains the unfortunate criticisms of Australia made by
Dr. Toh Chin Chye at the Colombo Plan Meeting. Psychologically he responded to
the allegation of racial discrimination and had no inhibitions about giving offense
[sic] himself. The fact remains, however, that Ministers have been readier than I
expected to take up Commonwealth associations. The more they do this, the quicker
they will acquire a more mature and enlightened understanding of world affairs. But
we must beware of seeming to push the Commonwealth at them and we must not be
surprised if they redress the balance in their own minds by public emphasis on
contacts with Asian nations such as Indonesia, Japan or even China or by petty
criticisms of the West.
8. Against these encouraging features of the P.A.P. Government’s performance
during the past five months must be set the damage done to the public service. This
has mainly been the work of Mr. Ong Eng Guan, the Minister for National
Development, but other Ministers have contributed. There have been many
resignations of senior staff both local and European, and others, not protected by the
Public Service Commission, have been summarily dismissed. The worst damage is in
the Singapore Improvement Trust and the Public Works Department, but
throughout the public service morale has been badly shaken. I am glad to be able to
report that the worst now seems to be over. The Prime Minister, who has always
appreciated the folly of wrecking the public service, has at last judged the time to be
ripe to intervene. He has removed from the charge of Mr. Ong Eng Guan most of the
City Council Departments, including the important public utilities, and has taken
charge himself. More pointedly, he has had posted to his own Ministry to administer
these departments and the Singapore Harbour Board (transferred from the Minister
of Finance) an able European officer, Mr. P. H. Meadows, who had previously been
the victim of one of Mr. Ong Eng Guan’s worst outbursts of personal animosity.3 A
3 See Lee’s account of Ong Eng Guan’s treatment of his deputy secretary, P H (‘Val’) Meadows, in The
Singapore story, pp 335–336.
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new Ministry has been formed under the Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Toh Chin Chye,
consisting of other departments previously under Mr. Ong Eng Guan and some from
the Minister of Finance who was over-burdened. To restore morale generally the
Prime Minister has given public assurances to the old City Council staff and has
declared in an address at the Staff Training School that Singapore has the best
administrative machine in South East Asia and that it is the business of Ministers
and Assemblymen to make the machine work at its best. He added that the political
leadership must get away from the atmosphere of smear and character assassination.
He is encouraging some of those who resigned from the City Council, including
three European officers, to continue, and has sharply shattered the personal
expectations of a 27 year old Chinese, put in to act as City Treasurer by Mr. Ong Eng
Guan, by declaring that a more competent and experienced officer is required to take
charge of public accounts amounting to $120 million per annum. There have also
been reassuring instances of the Public Service Commission asserting its
independence of Ministers.
Nevertheless much damage has been done and it will take time and good
behaviour by Ministers and their attendant Assemblymen to restore morale in the
public service.
9. It is not yet possible to judge the effectiveness of the Government’s efforts to
defeat Communist subversion. There has been no real evidence of any extensive
underground Communist organisation. Nor has there been any open issue between
known Communists and the Government. Most of the detainees released before the
P.A.P. took office have been brought into the Government in some way. Only a few
are regarded as dangerous. Of these Lim Chin Siong is by far the most capable. He
has been appointed Political Secretary to Dr. Goh Keng Swee, the Minister of
Finance, but appears to devote his time and energy to trade union organisation. The
Singapore General Employees Union shows signs of developing into the powerful
mass organisation which the Communists had in the Factory and Shopworkers
Union in 1956, and several Communist dominated unions in the building and motor
trades are amalgamating into two more powerful groups. It is significant that the
Government have had second thoughts about their election policy of creating a
unified trade union movement. They have modified their intention of forming a
single all-embracing transport union to a much looser federation of unions. They
have been much impressed by advice given by the Permanent Secretary of the
Australian Ministry of Labour and National Service who has been here on a short
visit at their request. They have realised the danger of two or three powerful unions,
each covering all the workers in one industry or trade. The Prime Minister has
spoken of the need to take the initiative against Lim Chin Siong before his position
becomes too strong. At the same time it is likely that Lim will also move cautiously
and be careful not to go too far in building a trade union empire which the
Government could crush as an obvious threat to its authority. It is most improbable
that Lim wishes to provoke an issue with the Government yet. The Prime Minister
has also become more cautious about releasing more detainees, despite his repeated
assertion that it is politically necessary for him to release all who were detained by
the previous Government. He seems well content to shelter behind the Internal
Security Council, allowing the impression to be given that he has been overruled. He
is worried about Nanyang University which is not only a most awkward claimant for
Government finance but a breeding ground for Communists of high quality. Here
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again he seeks the help of the Federation which supplies 60% of the students, but
which yet appears to be refusing to face the problem they present. The Chinese
schools are quiet and healthier.
Over all I think the general position has not changed significantly. The
Communists are working hard to gain mass support through trade unions and
peasants, but Ministers realise the threat and are less likely to take risks. The position
must be watched, but I see no reason for alarm.
10. Although the Government has on the whole behaved responsibly during the
past six months, there is still a distressing stagnation of commerce and industry. Retail
trade has been very slack and there is a general atmosphere of waiting to see what will
happen. The sudden cut in the pay of the public service undoubtedly seriously affected
purchasing power. Precipitate legislation to tax the film business and dramatic (and
illegal) increases in assessments for rates frightened businessmen. Now they are waiting
for the budget. While this hesitation is understandable, it is bad for Singapore, and I
hope very much that businessmen will soon pluck up their courage and get to work
to revive the economy. Ministers are learning from their mistakes and Mr. Ong Eng
Guan’s responsibilities have now been limited. I hope, too, that the budget with a large
sum for development expenditure will provide the needed primer. For the economic
problem of providing a living for the population must be solved if Singapore is to have
stability. The Government can help by firmly following its declared policies of building
up a climate of business confidence and industrial peace; and commercial enterprise
must not be too sensitive to the comparatively minor gestures the Government feel
obliged to make to show their loyalty to the workers. The more pressing need is
economic assistance, and I hope that substantial aid will be forthcoming from western
sources. This is the best way to help Singapore today.
11. The picture of this initial period of the P.A.P. stewardship presents
bewildering contradictions and often their behaviour is open to both good and bad
interpretations. Their concentration on maintaining their political strength is both
welcome for its promise of firm and stable government and disturbing for its
totalitarian character. P.A.P. Assemblymen and ex-detainees have been brought into
the business of governing to commit them to support of Ministers’ actions and
policies, but inevitably this has led to undue political interference with day to day
administration and to suspicion that they are political commissars. Sound measures
have been taken in a damaging manner. Public attitudes have been struck for
political reasons in apparent conflict with more sober policies. The explanation of
these inconsistencies is complex. To a great extent Ministers are the prisoners of the
political propaganda they used to win mass support. They therefore wish to present
themselves as extremists while carrying out the moderate policies they know to be
right for Singapore. Individually, too, several, if not most, of them are emotionally
antipathetic to the European and the West, suspicious of the motives of others, and
too ready to find evidence to support their own pre-conceived ideas. And as a party
they are young, impatient, arrogant and intolerant of the past achievements of
others. Even the Prime Minister himself, in spite of the impressive way in which his
personality has matured over the past few years, is not yet entirely devoid of these
weaknesses. But these defects should not blind us to the main features of this
Government: its genuine opposition to Communist subversion, its unceasing drive to
inculcate a new loyalty towards Malaya particularly in the Chinese masses of
Singapore, its acceptance of the Constitution and British rights here, and the
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amicable attitude so far adopted in dealing with matters of common concern to the
Singapore and United Kingdom Governments. I hope that with time, patience and
understanding they will grow out of their disquieting features and come to a better
understanding of the art of public administration.
12. In the Cabinet the outstanding ability of the Prime Minister has firmly
established his position as leader. His closest associates are Dr. Goh, the Finance
Minister, and Dr. Toh Chin Chye, the Deputy Prime Minister. Dr. Goh has obvious
qualities of intelligence and some experience of public administration and the
outside world, though in my judgment he falls a long way short of the Prime Minister
in general competence. Dr. Toh Chin Chye is an unimpressive little man who appears
to me to be small minded and petty in his outlook; but the Prime Minister holds him
in high esteem. The outstanding political figure in the Cabinet is Mr. Ong Eng Guan,
the Minister for National Development. He commands the mass support of the
Chinese speaking population, and has long been regarded by many as likely to oust
the more moderate English educated Mr. Lee Kuan Yew from the leadership. I have
never been able to find evidence to support this view. Today Mr. Ong Eng Guan’s
prestige has undoubtedly fallen. His hasty and unsound measures as a Minister have
embarrassed his colleagues, and discredited him. He has had to retract dramatic
increases in the assessment of business properties because they were illegal, and it is
common knowledge that he has been relieved of most of the old City Council
responsibilities because of the damage he was doing. With shrewd political judgment
the Prime Minister deliberately delayed making this move until it was clearly
justified, but he has paid a sad cost in damage to the departments concerned. The
Prime Minister still assures me that Mr. Ong Eng Guan is a great asset to the Cabinet
for his sure touch with the mass of the electorate. However, for the present at least
he does not have the respect of his colleagues and is no danger to Mr. Lee Kuan Yew.
In addition to his administrative failure, he recently declined to make the
Government’s Assembly statement on security and it is accepted by his colleagues
that this was because he was frightened.
13. So the position today is that Mr. Lee Kuan Yew is very much in command of
the Cabinet and the Cabinet are impressively united. They have made mistakes, as
was to be expected, and with the exception of the Prime Minister I doubt they are as
able as they first appeared to be. They are finding it much more difficult to run a
government than to organise a successful political party. But on the whole they have
made a good start to carry out their declared policies. The Prime Minister tells me to
postpone judgment on their competence until they have had a year in office. So far
most of what he has said has been proved right.
14. There is still no sign of any effective opposition party and only Mr. A.P. Rajah
of the Assemblymen has made any serious attempt to provide intelligent opposition
there.4 Mr. David Marshall occasionally raises a lone cry in the political wilderness.
The only dangerous threat to the present Government is Communism.
15. Our policy must continue to be to work with the P.A.P. Government and to
do all we can to secure their goodwill and confidence. Thus we shall be able to help
them to give Singapore a stable and competent government, and only thus shall we
overcome the constant minor difficulties and provocations which I am sure we shall
4 A P Rajah was the one independent candidate returned to the Assembly in the elections of May 1959.
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encounter. While firmly maintaining our essential rights under the Constitution, we
should not be too sensitive on minor details. Experience over the past six months has
been that Ministers have responded helpfully to a patient and sympathetic approach,
whereas they harden into precipitate action if they consider that they are being
opposed by failure to understand their basic political principles. These last are not in
themselves incompatible with our basic interests.
16. I am sending copies of this Despatch to the Acting Commissioner General for
South East Asia and to the United Kingdom High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur.
16 DO 35/10019, no E/195 2 Dec 1959
[Closer association of Borneo territories]: letter from Sir A Abell to F
D Jakeway1
[At the end of his governorship Abell noted that, while the need for the closer association
of Borneo territories was as great as ever, the practical difficulties were growing. Rather
than allow Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak to drift further apart, he suggested that
Iain Macleod should give a lead and issue a policy directive, something which the previous
secretary of state had been reluctant to do. Sir D Allen expressed similar impatience two
months later, see 18.]
I promised to let you have my views on the closer association of North Borneo,
Sarawak and Brunei before I leave South-East Asia. You can of course make what use
you wish of this letter.
The case for a form of closer association is as strong to-day as it ever was; the
arguments used in its favour are as unassailable as they ever were but the practical
difficulties have grown immeasurably and will continue to grow unless we do
something about them.
Brunei is now less likely than ever to favour a closer relationship with neighbours
and Sarawak and North Borneo continue to drift further apart. The time may shortly
be reached when the whole conception may have to be discarded and this I firmly
believe would be against the best interests of the three territories and of Her
Majesty’s Government. In trade, in the development of natural resources, in
research, in defence and internal security, in administration, in bargaining power
and in international esteem the Borneo territories would be greatly strengthened by
a firm partnership, working under joint direction to a common plan. I agree with my
colleagues that at the present time there is little that Her Majesty’s Government or
her local officers can do publicly to encourage closer association but I do believe that
it is possible to prevent some of the greater divergencies in policy becoming definite
barriers to closer association in the future.
Brunei is now in practice no longer a Colonial Office responsibility. She will go her
own way. She may follow an historic xenophobic line or she may move closer to
Malaya. She will not favour a closer relationship with any country which has a
dominant Chinese community. If she goes on her own independent way she may in
time, in her own interests, seek an accommodation with her two neighbours. On the
1 Having served in Nigeria, the Seychelles, the CO (briefly) and British Guiana, F D Jakeway (later Sir
Derek), assumed the post of chief secretary of Sarawak in April 1959 and was appointed governor of Fiji on
Sarawak’s merger with Malaysia.
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other hand, if she joins a pan Malayan islamic anti-Chinese Block she will certainly
take no part in any scheme for a United Borneo and she may well cause a final and
irreparable split between the Malays and the Chinese in Sarawak.
I do not therefore believe it is in the interests of a future which includes plans for
uniting Borneo or in the interests of Sarawak that Brunei should become wholly
identified with Malaya, nor incidentally do I believe it to be in the best interests of
Brunei either. The Chinese are going through a lean time in South-East Asia but I do
not believe this phase will last. The Chinese problem in Malaya has yet to be resolved
and I do not believe the Malays have it in them to hold down the Chinese politically,
or commercially as in Indonesia, for long.
If Brunei were to become the twelfth state of Malaya it would probably become a
focus for Malay discontent or Malay irredentism throughout Borneo. We in Sarawak
do not wish our considerable Malay population to look to Brunei or Kuala Lumpur for
salvation any more than we wish our Chinese to look to Peking. Furthermore, I would
deprecate reducing a politically immature community for whose welfare we have been
responsible for half a century to the status of a colony of another power.
There is probably little that we can do to influence the course of events in Brunei
but I suggest that the High Commissioner should receive clear instructions in the
matter so that he can use his influence when it can be applied with effect and without
danger to our relations with Malaya. I suggest that these instructions should state
that nothing should be done to encourage a closer relationship with Malaya than at
present exists.
Sarawak and North Borneo are drifting apart for some of the reasons given by Sir
Roland Turnbull in his paper of 21/10/59. Sarawak still adheres to a paternal regime
in regard to its native people (and is glad to do so) and its economy is based on the
small holder. The native of the country has certain rights in the land and these the
Government will protect. Promises have been made by the Rajah and confirmed by
the Queen that the policy of the Government will be to prepare the people for self-
Government. In Sarawak people are proud to be described by a word2 which
elsewhere is regarded as derogatory because they know that it carries with it
promises and guarantees that the resources of Sarawak will be developed for their
use and in the interests of the people of Sarawak as a whole. The policy of the
Government is to establish a plural society in which all citizens of Sarawak will have
equal rights and opportunities. We hope to raise the native races to standards of
living and education comparable to the Chinese and to give the Chinese a good title
to what land is available for them. A great deal of this may differ radically from the
North Borneo policy of an economy based on large-scale capitalist enterprise
particularly if that means a dominant Chinese or other foreign community with the
native reduced to the state of a landless labourer.
Whether two countries geographically so close together and with so much in
common should have been allowed to develop so divergently is another matter.
Perhaps it was inevitable. It is certain that Sarawak could not have pursued the policy
of North Borneo. North Borneo will undoubtedly get rich quickly but may in doing
so inherit some of the problems of East Africa. Sarawak may fail to establish a
balanced plural society and have to bow to Chinese domination. Whatever may
2 This reference to ‘a word’ is not made clear and it puzzled officials in Whitehall.
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happen in the future I am convinced that these two countries who are about the
same stage of political development would be better to face the future together. It is
the outside influences which are most likely to dictate events and they will most
certainly not take into account the interests of two small countries whose interests
are in fact identical but who have failed to show sufficient foresight to realise the fact.
The difference in policy may appear to be fundamental and such as to give little hope
of a successful experiment in closer association but I do not think anything irrevocable
has been done as yet and we should strive to ensure that no new barriers to closer
association are created. A lead must be given and it can only come from the Secretary
of State who if convinced that a form of closer association is in the best interests of these
three territories, should instruct the Governors and the High Commissioners that this
is Her Majesty’s Government’s long term policy and while recognising that nothing
immediate can be done expects each to keep this ultimate goal in the forefront of his
mind and give practical effect to this policy when it is expedient and possible to do so.
In questions of immigration, free trade areas, removal of customs barriers and the like
no progress can be made unless each country is prepared to make the relatively small
sacrifices required now in the interests of the future and without a clear directive from
above it seems unlikely that any move will be made. In fact, I would go so far as to
suggest that where a difference in policy clearly jeopardises closer association, the
question should be referred to the Secretary of State for a directive. The Governors of
both territories still have power to influence unofficial opinion.
As Sir Roland Turnbull says, our inter-territorial conference has for obvious reasons
deliberately avoided controversial topics, but such matters as the immigration policy
of the countries might well be discussed with benefit. There are empty spaces in North
Borneo which the Government is anxious to exploit, in Sarawak there are over-
population problems in certain districts. In the Second Division there are Ibans with
insufficient or exhausted land who should be moved elsewhere. There are Foochows
in the Rejang Delta, excellent industrious farmers and good citizens who are very short
of land. We have both Iban and Foochows trained as administrative officers who might
accompany groups of immigrants. In this way it is possible that North Borneo and
Sarawak could be of assistance to each other—at least the possibility should be explored
before other arrangements are made.
To sum up, I think it is essential that Her Majesty’s Government should have a
policy in this matter which her representatives in Borneo should be instructed to
follow. If we are allowed to drift further apart we may find, as in the case of Malaya
and Singapore that the gulf is too wide to bridge.
17 DO 35/10019, no E193 7 Dec 1959
‘Closer association between the British Borneo territories (with
special reference to the position of Brunei)’: memorandum prepared
by the Office of the Commissioner General, Singapore1
Closer association between the three British Borneo territories is an ideal which has
so far been frustrated by the unco-operative attitude of the Sultan of Brunei. The six-
1 This memorandum was prepared by Sir R Scott, Sir D Allen and other senior officials in Singapore.
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monthly Inter-Territorial Conferences, originally aimed at welding into a single
compact unit the three territories with their historical, economic and political
differences, have in fact been restricted, despite the Sultan’s absence, to a lowest
common level of non-controversial discussion on administrative matters. This has
been done in the hope that the gradual progress made by Sarawak and North Borneo
towards closer association would tempt the Sultan of Brunei to join in. He may still
do so but there are no signs that he will make such a move in the near future; and so
long as the High Commissioner can act as the Sultan’s ‘observer’ at the Inter-
Territorial Conferences, Brunei will not miss any important development, even
though in his present mood, the Sultan is unlikely to take any step in co-operation
with it. The JIC(FE) paper on the ‘Outlook in Borneo’ (DCC(FE)(59)367) concluded
that by 1964 ‘no major step towards closer association between the three territories
will be possible during this period. Some progress will doubtless be achieved.’
2. Given the new Constitution recently granted to Brunei,2 the present seems a
good moment at which to review (a) the direction in which Brunei is heading and (b)
the possibility of making closer association between the other two territories more of
a reality.
Position of Brunei
3. The High Commissioner for Brunei, in his memorandum of October 27, has
discussed the development of close links between Brunei and Malaya and pointed out
that an identification of interests between Malaya and Brunei could act as a brake on
Indonesian designs. Sir Roland Turnbull on the other hand, in his memorandum of
October 21, foresees political complications for the British Borneo territories in the
event of the identification of Brunei with Malaya. But while problems would certainly
arise in such an event, they might well be a lesser evil and more readily solved than
those that would confront us if Brunei turned to Indonesia. It is most unlikely that
the Sultan himself would turn to Djakarta but if a Malay Nationalist party with left-
wing sentiments grew up in opposition to the Sultan it might well turn to Indonesia
for sympathy and support. By opening the way to Indonesian penetration of the
Borneo territories, this would be a prelude to a far more awkward situation for us
than Brunei’s identification with Malaya.
4. Perhaps the Sultan’s ideas about getting closer together with Malaya should
therefore be regarded, if not with benevolence, at least with equanimity. Moreover,
the disparity of interests between the two states is such that closer association
between them cannot take place easily or quickly. On the one hand the cold
shouldering of the Malayan officials in Brunei, and other local factors to which Mr.
White refers, and on the other the Tungku’s rather cynical view of Brunei as his
banker, will ensure that. The Brunei Constitution though not a good one, seems
likely to prove a fair safeguard of the United Kingdom’s position for at least about five
years, simply because it will be difficult for the Sultan and his advisers and the people
of Brunei to agree on how to modify it. The risk that Brunei might become a ‘colony’
of Malaya is perhaps exaggerated, though we should not exclude the possibility that
Brunei—and other territories—might take a proper place in some such looser
South-East Asian Federation headed by Malaya, as has been sketched by the Tungku.
2 The Sultan granted the constitution on 29 Sept 1959, see 5, n 1.
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Closer association of Sarawak and North Borneo
5. Even if the idea of a loose South-East Asia Federation on an Indian or Swiss
model is a long way ahead, there is much to be said for our taking steps now to
ensure that the two territories in the area which are still under direct British control
bring their policies, economies and administrations more closely into line with each
other, so a viable unit of a reasonable size can contribute to the stability of the
region. Each of the Governors is still in a position to control his Executive Council,
through it to influence public opinion and thus to impose far-reaching but possibly
unpopular policies: though North Borneo may be able to keep this control for a few
years longer, Sarawak is likely to have to yield to popular clamour within the next
few years and thereafter there is a risk that the territories may develop on narrow
parochial lines.
6. Seen from a distance, the closer association of the two—or even the three—
territories seems an obvious development. At closer range the outside observer is
struck by the contrast between Sarawak and North Borneo: in the former the poor
soil, the Brooke tradition, the smallholder system and consequent land-hunger, and
the growing political consciousness of the Malays, Ibans and Singapore-looking
Chinese; in the latter the rich soils and valuable timber, the ‘Company’ tradition, the
large plantations with their chronic labour shortage, and the political apathy of the
Dusuns, Malays and Hong Kong-looking Chinese. For reasons which flow from this
different historical and economic background North Borneo sees no advantage in
drawing closer to Sarawak unless Brunei can be brought in too; Sarawak on the
other hand sees an outlet for its land-hungry native population in parts of North
Borneo which are being made available to Timorese and Bugis labourers drifting in
from Indonesia or to Chinese deliberately imported from Hong Kong. Communalism
is a danger in Sarawak and, to a lesser extent, in North Borneo: it can be inflamed by
poverty and it may be in the longer-term interest of the two territories to share their
economic and manpower assets more evenly. Even though North Borneo has greater
potential wealth than Sarawak, the latter can contribute a historical tradition and a
sturdily native background which may go some way to offset the growing domination
of the Chinese in both territories and create a national consciousness.
7. The internal divergencies of the two territories, though considerable on a
close inspection, appear on a wider view to be not such as to outweigh the more
numerous points of similarity which should in the long-term bring them together.
They are both British colonies, both under-developed, both in Borneo, both with
mixed races, both with Indonesian frontier problems, both prizes which Indonesia,
China and Japan, will sooner or later try to secure for themselves, both run on
similar lines by officers with the same training and traditions, both with the same
systems of justice and education and pattern of government, and both having
English as the language of government.
8. Though we should not try to force the pace, there seems much to be gained by
not letting the idea of closer association die of inanition or even remain at the level of
the non-controversial administrative topics which have made up the agenda of recent
Inter-Territorial Conferences. The natural process of economic rationalisation
between two friendly administrations will lead easily enough to sharing of experts,
etc. but this alone, without a clear policy directive, will not enable the two territories
to embark on long-term policies of mutual interdependence and assimilation in
more difficult fields such as immigration. It is not too late to start on this course; and
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Brunei, when the advantages of closer association between Sarawak and North
Borneo become more apparent, may yet perceive where its own best interests lie.
18 DO 35/10019, ff 71–72 5 Feb 1960
[Closer association of the Borneo territories and Brunei-Malaya
relations]: letter from Sir D Allen to E Melville
Thank you for your telegram No. 24 of January 16 to the United Kingdom
Commission about closer association of the British Borneo Territories and Brunei-
Malaya relations. As foreshadowed in my letter R. 1013/102/59G of December 7 to
Dennis White, an informal meeting to discuss Borneo problems was held during the
course of the Eden Hall Conference, and I enclose a brief summary record.1 As you
will have realised we could not take the discussion very far in the absence of a
representative from North Borneo. But one point on which there seemed to be fairly
general agreement was that it would be desirable, if possible, to clear our minds
about the attitude to be adopted by Her Majesty’s Government towards any move by
the Sultan of Brunei in the direction of closer association in Malaya, bearing in mind
that any such move would be likely to affect not only the problem of closer
association between Sarawak and North Borneo but also the eventual possibility of
some wider confederation in this part of the world in which Singapore as well might
find her place. It might indeed present opportunities as well as dangers.
2. You have no doubt been considering this problem in the Colonial Office. I
understand that Dennis White has had some correspondence with you on the subject
and I believe that Tory has also written to the Commonwealth Relations Office about
it. I have not, I think, seen all the correspondence and will not venture any views
from here at this stage. But it seems to me important that we should be as clear in
our minds as we can about the probability of such a move by the Sultan and about
what our attitude towards it should be if it took place. Such an estimate would help
us, for example, in deciding how rapidly we should try to push ahead with a policy of
closer association between Sarawak and North Borneo. And in general I confess to
some uneasiness whether, if as suggested in your telegram our attitude remained
simply one of ‘wait and see’, we might not find ourselves missing important
opportunities when the critical moment came. I know that it is always difficult and
often unwise to try to define one’s attitude too clearly in advance when so much is
bound to depend upon just how and when a particular happening takes place. But in
this case it seems important that we should all have at least some idea of the various
wider issues that would be involved. I am not sure that we are yet clear about this and
it would be very helpful to us here2 to know of any conclusions that you and the
Commonwealth Relations Office may have reached about the longer term direction
in which you would like to see the relationships between the various Commonwealth
and dependent territories in South-East Asia develop over the coming years. One
thing that is pretty clear is that our own ability to influence those relationships is
declining fast. Already it is only in North Borneo and to a lesser extent in Sarawak
that we can exercise any direct control, and if we wish to use our remaining influence
1 Not printed. 2 ie, Singapore.
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in those territories to steer events in one direction rather than another we ought to
begin soon.
19 DO 35/10035, no 6 23 Feb 1960
‘Greater Malaysia’: letter from Sir G Tory to Sir A Clutterbuck on
possible merger of Borneo territories with Malaya and Singapore
During the last few years there has been talk from time to time about the possibility
that the Borneo Territories might ultimately join the Federation of Malaya and that
the Federation Government might be willing to absorb Singapore into this wider
system. The Tunku discussed this possibility with Malcolm MacDonald1 and myself in
December, 1958, as you will know from the correspondence ending with my
telegram No. 25 of the 13th January, 1959.
It emerged at that time, however, and subsequently at the Eden Hall conference
last year, when the matter was further ventilated,2 that the Governors of North
Borneo and Sarawak in particular were most anxious that the Tunku should be
discouraged from saying anything at all about this possibility at the present time lest
this should distract the three Borneo Territories from the immediate aim of
achieving closer integration amongst themselves. It was argued that only Brunei had
a Malay majority and that the prospect of association with a predominantly Malay
Islamic Federation might encourage fissiparous tendencies in the Chinese and Dyak
populations who formed the majority in the other two Territories. The two
Governors did not, however, rule out the possibility that joining the Malayan
Federation might prove in the end to be the correct solution.
When I discussed this matter with the Tunku in December, 1958, he accepted
these points but maintained that whether we liked it or not the question of the future
of the Borneo Territories was almost certain to be precipitated by developments
outside our control in this part of the world—possibly by attempts on the part of
Indonesia to absorb the rest of Borneo, with perhaps counter-claims from the
Philippines—and that we in the Commonwealth ought in the meantime to clear our
minds about the long term policy which would be best likely to serve the interests of
ourselves and of the Commonwealth as a whole. It seemed clear to him that there
could be no doubt that the best ultimate solution would be for these Territories to
attach themselves to the nearest appropriate Commonwealth country, namely, the
Federation of Malaya. Subsequently the Tunku visited the Borneo Territories himself
and when he came back he realised that North Borneo, in particular, was a long way
yet from the stage of self-determination and that if matters were left to themselves
the prospect of North Borneo and Sarawak joining the Federation through normal
constitutional developments was a long term one. He was, however, I think, still left
with the feeling that developments in the area might not allow these constitutional
developments to run their normal course.
In the meantime there has been a very marked drawing together of Brunei and the
Federation (see my letter of the 14th October, 1959, to Hunt).3 Royal visits have been
1 See 7 and 8. 2 See 11. 3 See 14.
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exchanged and the Sultan of Brunei, with the reluctant consent of his Advisory
Council, has granted the Federation a $100 million loan on uneconomic terms. The
Sultan, on the basis of understandings arrived at personally with the Tunku and
Razak at the time of his visit here, has since acquired the services of Malayan officials
for key appointments in the Brunei administration, and both he and the Tunku show
signs of wishing to continue this process despite the manpower strain which this
obviously places on the Federation. The Sultan has decided to educate his children in
the Federation and is coming here, ostensibly for the purpose of placing them in
schools, for a period of several months starting from the end of March.4 He intends,
we are told, to build himself an Istana (palace) in Kuala Lumpur.
Latterly there has been speculation amongst well placed Federation Civil Servants
to the effect that the Tunku would like to see the Sultan of Brunei become the next
Yang di-Pertuan Agong of the Federation. This could, of course, only happen if
Brunei had in the meantime become a part of the Federation and the signs as a whole
therefore seem to suggest that we should not rule out the possibility that the U.K.
Government may be faced before very long with a request from the Sultan of Brunei,
on the one hand, and from the Federation Government on the other, for the
incorporation of Brunei into the Federation of Malaya. The fact that the health of the
Yang di-Pertuan Agong is very delicate, that he might not survive very long, and that
there is no obvious suitable successor amongst the present collection of Sultans,
suggests to me that the U.K. Government ought quickly to consider this possibility
and to make up their minds what attitude they would adopt.5
This matter was discussed again during this year’s Eden Hall conference in very
general terms and without any very clear recommendation emerging. White, the
High Commissioner for Brunei, shared my own feeling that Brunei and the
Federation were drawing closer together and did not, for his part, see how we could
very well prevent the two from joining each other if they ever wished to do so. As
regards the other two Territories, however, the consensus of opinion was that,
although federation with Malaya might well be the eventual answer, the territories
still had a very long way to go constitutionally before they reached the stage at which
they might reasonably be expected to express worthwhile views about their own
future. The general feeling seemed to be that we should sit back and await
developments with regard to Brunei and the Federation, without interfering in any
way, and that North Borneo and Sarawak should continue their efforts to draw closer
to each other as an essential preliminary to possible federation with Malaya in the
distant future.
I said that although at the time of Independence, and at the time of his talk with
Malcolm MacDonald, the Tunku had contemplated the possibility of absorbing
Singapore provided that he could at the same time absorb the Borneo Territories,
developments in Singapore since then might well have hardened the Tunku against
4 See 6, n 2.
5 The Yang di-Pertuan Agong was the constitutional monarch of the Federation of Malaya elected every five
years by and from among the rulers of the Malay states, see BDEE: Malaya, 449, 453, 455 and 459. The
first Agong, His Highness Tuanku Abdul Rahman of Negri Sembilan died a few days after Tory’s despatch
of 23 Feb; he was succeeded as Agong by Hisamuddin Alam Shah of Selangor who himself died on 1 Sept
1960, the day he was due to be installed. Syed Putra of Perlis was the third Agong, 1960–1965. For the
Sultan of Brunei’s interest in becoming Agong, see 41.
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accepting Singapore in any circumstances so long as the present P.A.P.
administration continued. He had shown lately very clearly that he believed that we
were wrong in allowing the P.A.P. Government to carry out its policy of trying to
absorb and contain the Communist elements in Singapore, that the situation was
bound to deteriorate to the point at which the Communists would take over, that this
was a problem of our own making and that it was up to us to sort it out. In the
meantime the Federation would have nothing whatever to do with Singapore, apart
from their unwelcome, and I think now much regretted, commitment to play a part
in the Internal Security Council.6 From an informal conversation I have had lately
with Razak this impression of mine has been confirmed. Razak said that the
Federation would accept Brunei at any time but that they would not want Singapore
which should, in their view, continue for a considerable further period as a colony
‘like Hong Kong’. This was all in the course of light-hearted banter and not to be
quoted against Razak as a statement of his Government’s policy, but I am sure it
reflected something of his thinking and that of the Tunku.
When Laithwaite7 paid his visit here I mentioned these matters to him and said
that the Governors of North Borneo and Sarawak, and Rob Scott himself, had all
expressed the view that I ought some time to pay a visit to the Borneo Territories so
as to be able to deal more effectively with the Tunku if necessary when this subject
cropped up. I have been waiting for a suitable time for this. Goode, who takes over as
Governor of North Borneo in April, has actually invited my wife and myself to visit
him after he is settled in and it had been my intention to suggest to you that I might
pay a visit of a few days at that time, visiting Sarawak and Brunei as part of the same
operation. White, the High Commissioner in Brunei, has however urged me to visit
Brunei before the Sultan comes to stay in Kuala Lumpur and the Sultan himself
tackled me on the subject during the Coronation celebrations in Johore last week8.
The Sultan was extremely friendly and made the personal suggestion that my wife
and I should visit Brunei during the early part of March before he himself left for the
Federation. I understand that the R.A.F. would be able to fly us there in the course of
their normal operation on the 8th March, but we should have to return by a
commercial service. I should very much like your authority to pay this visit in this
way. The journey by air only takes a few hours and we could make a worthwhile visit
within the compass of four or five days.
I should be most grateful if you could let me know by telegraph whether you
approve.
This would, I am afraid, mean that a visit to [North] Borneo and Sarawak would
have to be made at another time, perhaps in May.9 That again might be done within
the period of about a week. I would propose to approach you again about this second
visit nearer the time but if you could say now whether the C.R.O. would be content in
principle for me to undertake it I should find this very helpful for planning purposes.
On that occasion, too, I should expect to be able to fly at least in one direction by
R.A.F.
6 See 13, note and n, 5.
7 Permanent under-secretary of state, CRO, 1955–1959.
8 This was the coronation of Ismail, former Tunku Mahkota or crown prince of Johore and eldest son of
Sultan Ibrahim who had reigned from 1895 to 1959.
9 Tory visited Sarawak and North Borneo in May, for his report, see 26.
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20 CO 1030/1126, no. 5 18 May 1960
[Closer association of Borneo territories and Brunei–Malaya
relations]: letter from Sir J Martin to Sir D Allen replying to 18 and
summarising interdepartmental discussions in London
[Copies of this correspondence were distributed widely in Whitehall, for example it was
reproduced for the committee (chaired by Sir R Scott) examining future developments in
SE Asia (CAB 134/1644, DSE(60)6; CO 1030/1078, no 16A/21; DO 169/24, no 1).]
This is in reply to your letter to Melville of the 5th February1 about closer association
of the British Borneo territories and Brunei–Malaya relations, with which you
enclosed a brief, but most interesting, note of the side-talk you had on the Borneo
territories at the Eden Hall Conference in January. (Melville is still in Cyprus, where
he has been with Mr. Amery for the better part of three months)2.
We took the opportunity of Sir William Goode’s presence in this country to discuss
these questions with him, not only because of his future interest in North Borneo,
but because of his recent experience of the problems of the area as seen from
Singapore. The Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office joined in our
discussions. These talks revealed a general agreement and the following paragraphs
summarise the views common to us all. In fact MacDermot of the Foreign Office and
Hunt of the Commonwealth Relations Office have seen this letter in draft and agree
with it. The views here expressed do not purport to be firm policy decisions (we have
made no submissions to Ministers) and are of course subject to your comments and
those of the others to whom I am sending copies of this letter. But they will give you
an idea of how our minds are moving here and, unless any of you have different
views, can serve as a general background guide to policy in the Borneo territories.
We took as our starting point H.M.G.’s accepted policy, which is that the peoples of
North Borneo and Sarawak should, subject to their own wishes, ultimately achieve
self-government. Attractive as is the prospect (not least to many of their own
inhabitants at present) of their remaining Crown Colonies, experience shows that we
must not delude ourselves into thinking that that can be a permanent state. (I recur
to the question of the pace of this change below.) That means that sooner or later we
shall move out and they will be left, either each alone, or in association with each
other, or (either individually or as a Borneo entity) inside some wider association, to
face the South East Asian world without our protection. They are very vulnerable,
both because of their geographical position and because of their racial make-up.
China, Indonesia, the Philippines all have, or could easily work up, interests of one
kind or another. Nor, I suppose, could one exclude the possibility of a revived
Japanese interest. It could be a very uncomfortable world for a little North Borneo or
Sarawak trying to stand alone and we certainly have no intention of moving out so
that someone else should step in. Even an associated North Borneo–Sarawak would
1 See 18.
2 Julian Amery, parliamentary under-secretary of state for the colonies 1958–1960, was negotiating the
final arrangements relating to Cyprus’s independence and the extent of the areas to be retained by Britain
as military bases (see 59 para 5). As secretary of state for air (1960–1963), Amery argued in Oct 1961 that a
Greater Malaysia would weaken Britain’s title to the Singapore base, see Hyam and Louis, eds, BDEE:
Conservative government 1957–1964, 1, 263.
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not be a very strong state. With Brunei in also it could be more viable (though the oil
won’t last for ever). But here we come to our second assumption, namely, that there
is no prospect in the foreseable future of Brunei’s joining an association with North
Borneo and Sarawak alone. We were led by these paths to the conclusion that, as
seen at present (and I must emphasise the ‘at present’, for most of the circumstances
we do not control) the most hopeful ultimate solution would be an association of the
Federation of Malaya, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei, with, if possible,
Singapore in also—MacDonald’s ‘Grand Design’3—which, one might hope, might
stay within the Commonwealth. That can be no more than a hope. Some of the
difficulties in the way are obvious—not least the present remote prospect of the
Federation and Singapore forming an association together. But at least it seems to us
the most sensible goal to have before us.
Given this as the goal, we went on to consider what our attitude should be
towards a proposal for political association of Brunei and the Federation, if one
eventuated. It seemed to us that we should not resist it, since it would be a step
towards the ultimate goal. Indeed, we might view it with benevolence. On the other
hand, we noted that there might well be opposition to it in Brunei itself and we
ought to avoid getting involved in an internal Brunei argument of this kind. (We
also noted that an element in the opposition to it within Brunei might be an
unpleasing preference for Indonesia, though this doesn’t seem a very important
factor at present). We also did not forget that a political association of Brunei with
the Federation of Malaya might cause the Malays in Sarawak to begin looking the
same way. But, given that the ‘Grand Design’ is accepted as the ultimate aim this
would not necessarily be bad in the long term, though in the short term it could of
course give rise to difficulties in Sarawak. The likelihood of a sudden movement
towards Malaya on the part of the Sultan has possibly been reduced by the recent
death of the Agong and the election of a successor for a full five-year period. On the
whole, benevolent neutrality, but with ‘later rather than sooner’ the motto, seems
our right policy in this matter.
We next considered the question of closer association between Sarawak and North
Borneo alone, Brunei being left aside. Clearly, this would fit in with the general aim,
just as closer association between Brunei and the Federation would. And the
disadvantages would seem less. There is the risk of pushing Brunei quicker into the
arms of Malaya but, for the reasons I have already given, though we don’t want to
hurry this it would not be disastrous. There need therefore be no doubt here on
which side our influence should generally be exercised. But there should be no
question of forcing the pace (too enthusiastic expressions of Chinese opinion in
3 MacDonald had used ‘grand design’ to describe the ultimate federation of Malaya, Singapore and the
Borneo territories, see 1, note. By Jan 1961 the phrase would be used as short-hand for the policy of closer
association (see, for example, 32). When the CRO opened a file series on the Malaysia project, it was
entitled ‘Greater Malaysia and the Grand Design’ (DO 169/25-43). The committees of officials and
ministers dealing with the subject in 1961–1963 were known as ‘Greater Malaysia’ committees (CAB
134/1949-1953). Although Sandys thought ‘grand design’ was ‘a bad description of the plans for closer
association in Malaya and Borneo’ since it was ‘pretentious and vague’, alternative nomenclature proved
hard to come by. In the view of officials, the advantage of ‘grand design’ lay in its very lack of specificity
which avoided ‘prejudging any possible solution of the question’ (minutes by S Martin, 9 June, and R
Omerod, 14 June 1961, DO 169/25).
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favour of closer association have already tended to frighten off the indigenous races).
How progress can best be made is for the two Governors to consider together after
they have had time to get the local ‘feel’, but it certainly seems to us that the closer
association of the two territories should be pursued by every reasonable means that
offers.
I revert now to the point we started from—that sooner or later self-government
must come to Sarawak and North Borneo—and I do this to emphasise that there is
no question of H.M.G. wanting to get out in the near future. To do that prematurely
would be the exact reverse of helping the territories, where we still have an immense
task before us of trying to bring forward the indigenous peoples to a level where,
subject to their innate capabilities, they have the opportunity to compete with the
Chinese on reasonably equal terms in political and economic life. The indigenous
races at present do not want us to leave (this, we think, still includes the Malays in
Sarawak) and even the Chinese, except for a section in Sarawak, in the light of the
recent treatment of their compatriots in Indonesia, are well content with things as
they are. But because we cannot count on things remaining thus we have had to take
this look into what is a very hypothetical future and make a rough guess at what
looks likely to be the best future for the territories if events, some of which are
outside our control, permit it to come to pass.
We should welcome comments on the views in this letter, of which I have sent
copies to Goode in North Borneo, Waddell in Sarawak and White in Brunei. I have
also sent a copy to Bourdillon.4
I have also sent copies (together with spare copies), to MacDermot and Hunt. The
former is, I understand, sending copies to Djakarta and Manila, to which posts you
copied your letter, and no doubt the latter will wish to send a copy to Tory.
4 H T Bourdillon was seconded from the CO as deputy UK commissioner, Singapore, 1959–1961, see 32,
annex A.
21 DO 35/10019, no 42 9 June 1960
‘Brief for the minister of state for talk with Tunku Abdul Rahman’:
CO memorandum for Lord Perth
[The Tunku came to London for the meeting of Commonwealth prime ministers in May.
This was the occasion when Eric Louw, the South African foreign minister, opened the
question of his country’s continuing membership of the Commonwealth by announcing
its intention to become a republic (Hyam and Louis, eds. BDEE: The Conservative
Government and the end of empire 1957–1964, lxxiv-lxxvi and 450). The Tunku stayed on
after the Commonwealth conference to discuss with British ministers the situation in SE
Asia and the possibility of Malaya’s closer association with the Borneo territories. His
meeting with Lord Perth, minister of state at the Colonial Office, was scheduled for 11
am, Friday, 10 June, see 22.]
The Tunku has asked for a talk with Lord Perth about the future of Sarawak and
North Borneo. He told Lord Home on the 3rd June that we must be ready for ‘an
Indonesian move’ against these territories and he spoke to Miss Vickers, MP,1 a few
1 Joan Vickers (later Dame Joan), MP for Devonport since 1955, had served in the British Red Cross in SE
Asia in 1945–1946 and maintained a strong interest in the region.
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days ago about a possible federation between Malaya, North Borneo, Brunei and
Sarawak, with, if this came off, a possibility of Singapore then joining with certain
safeguards. Presumably he is going to press the desirability of a scheme of this sort
with Lord Perth.
2. It so happens that the future of the British Borneo territories has quite
recently been considered at official level between the Foreign Office, the
Commonwealth Relations Office and ourselves. The upshot is Sir John Martin’s letter
to Sir Denis Allen of the 18th May—copy attached2—and there can be no better brief
than that letter.
3. I would add only the following points:—
(a) The Tunku knows very little about the Borneo territories (except Brunei) and
almost certainly over-estimates the attractiveness of Malaya to Dayaks, Dusuns,
etc., who have memories of past (Brunei) Malay oppression and who want nothing
better than a continuance of the present regime.
(b) That cannot last forever, so in due course an association with Malaya would,
so far as we can see at present, be the best answer. But we must not rush it. In
the long run it is the people of the territories who have got to decide what they
want.
(c) At present there is not any Indonesian heat turned on our territories. Every
now and again an Indonesian does make a noise about them. On the most recent
occasion the Indonesian Government commented that they did not claim any
territory except that which the Dutch had held. At present Dutch New Guinea
entirely occupies their attention.3 That is not to say that later they may not begin
an ‘anti-colonial’ campaign about our territories and the Tunku may well be
inclined to exaggerate the likelihood of this. What is certain is that if we or the
Tunku start talking about a future association of the territories with Malaya that
will set off the rush of other claimants. Let sleeping dogs lie.
(d) We have no intention at all of seeing our territories pass to Indonesia.
4. Lord Home has left a very curious record of what the Tunku said to him about
Singapore at the same time as he made his mention of the Borneo territories. It runs
as follows:—
2 See 20.
3 The status of the western half of New Guinea or Irian Jaya had been a matter of dispute since the
international recognition of Indonesian independence in 1949. The Dutch insisted on retaining control of
the territory while President Sukarno prosecuted the nationalist claim through coercive diplomacy which
he called ‘Confrontation’. In grappling with the task of welding the vast and diverse archipelago of
Indonesia into a nation-state, Sukarno resorted to ‘Guided Democracy’ from 1957 and foreign adventures.
Consequent power struggles culminated in the coup and counter-coup of 1965 which brought the military
to power, although Sukarno remained nominal president until 1968. With respect to Irian Jaya, in Aug
1962, following US intervention, Indonesia and Holland concluded an agreement, whereby the territory
would be transferred first to the United Nations on 1 Oct 1962 and ultimately to Indonesia on 1 May 1963.
It was also stipulated that, with UN assistance, an assessment would be made of the inhabitants’ wishes
regarding continued Indonesian jurisdiction. Although the enquiry was clearly stage-managed, Irian Jaya
was formally incorporated into the republic of Indonesia on 17 Sept 1969. Sukarno’s designs upon New
Guinea had implications for any plans to merge the Borneo territories with Malaya and the scheme for
assessing local wishes in West Irian became the model proposed by Indonesia and the Philippines for the
‘ascertainment’ of Borneo opinion in 1963.
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‘The Tunku approved our veto on Russian aid to Singapore. He said he could deal
with the Prime Minister of Singapore and had some money with which to help.
He felt convinced there was no need for a sum anything like the one named by
the Russians.
‘He thought we must be absolutely firm about Russian aid. It would be seen as a
Communist victory and would undo all the good achieved by the defeat of the
Communists in Malaya. He asked that he should be consulted at all times on any
move in Singapore. He claimed to be on good terms with the Prime Minister.’
The statement at X is incomprehensible, since the Russians have never named
any sum or even given the slightest indication that they are prepared to help
Singapore in any way at all. (The recent row has simply been about a representative
of a Russian state trading organisation who was to come to Singapore on a six-month
visit to buy rubber. We saw this as the thin end of the wedge. But there has been
absolutely nothing more than this.) It seems just possible that the Tunku is
misquoted and what he said was that there was no need for a sum anything like that
being put forward by the Singapore Government as necessary outside help towards
their development plan. No doubt, for tactical reasons, they are opening their
mouths pretty wide. Nevertheless there is no doubt whatever that they do need
external assistance in a big way.
5. We had hoped to take advantage of the Tunku’s presence at the Commonwealth
Prime Ministers’ Conference to have a talk with him about Singapore/Federation
relations so as to impress on him that, however much he may innately dislike the
present Chinese and left-wing government of Singapore, it was nevertheless the best
bet that he and we had of stability in Singapore and that therefore it was to our joint
interest to help the Singapore Government and not make things difficult for it. In the
event the Tunku declined to talk about Singapore because the Russian rubber buying
affair blew up and he was in a bad temper about it. An opportunity may be now presented
for Lord Perth to get across some of the points which we had hoped to make earlier. I
attach a copy of the brief for the earlier abortive talk.4
4 Not printed.
22 CO 1030/1126, no 10 10 June 1960
‘Note of my talk with Tunku Abdul Rahman 10 June, 1960’:
memorandum by Lord Perth recording Tunku Abdul Rahman’s
proposal for closer association of independent Malaya and British
dependencies in SE Asia
[Perth’s note was widely circulated and elicited immediate response. Knowing the
Tunku’s reluctance to contemplate merger with Singapore and conscious of the
vulnerability of Singapore without merger, Selkirk urged that the Tunku be encouraged
in this initiative (see 23). Macmillan commented: ‘All this seems to me rather doubtful
but I suppose it is worth considering’, and was persuaded by the Commonwealth
secretary and Cabinet secretary that it should be followed up (Macmillan to Brook, 19
June 1960, Home to Macmillan, 21 June 1960 and Brook to Macmillan, 27 June 1960,
PREM 11/3418). The Colonial Office was concerned about the implications for the Borneo
territories and Sir Hilton Poynton requested Sir Norman Brook to refer the matter of
closer association to the Colonial Policy Committee (see 24, 25 and 27). CO unease was
X
08-Malaysia-01-29-cpp  21/9/04  9:05 AM  Page 61
62 PROSPECTS FOR THE ‘GRAND DESIGN’ [22]
not alleviated a month later by the report from the British high commissioner in Kuala
Lumpur that the Tunku was firmly in favour of the alternative ‘solution’ developed in his
talk with Perth, namely Malaya’s merger with the Borneo territories rather than with
Singapore (Tory to Hunt, 19 July 1960, CO 1030/977 no E/43).]
After the usual courtesies the Tunku plunged into the purpose of his visit, namely
the possibility of federation of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and
Brunei. He wanted the British Government to know that he would be prepared to
face such a happening although it would give him a great number of headaches. I
replied that this was something which we hadn’t really given a great deal of thought
to. It was a comfort to know his willingness as outlined above. I pointed out that
Indonesia recently had disclaimed any territorial ambition and that at the moment it
seemed wise to let sleeping dogs lie. If there was any hint of a move such as he
mentioned I could imagine all sorts of agitation by other potential claimants. I
pointed out that politically North Borneo and Sarawak were backward and how it was
clearly important that they should learn the art of running themselves before they
were asked to face decisions on their ultimate future. I feared that if we pressed the
pace too fast it would lead to the predominance of the Chinese because they were the
most advanced from an education point of view in both territories. Later on the
indigenous people and the Malays would be more able to play their part in deciding
the future of their country. This seemed to me another reason to go slowly. I of
course mentioned the idea of closer association between the territories (North
Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak) which at one time or another had been suggested.
The Tunku then came back again on another tack which was: what would be our
attitude if the Sultan of Brunei asked to join the Federation, and he added as an
afterthought that the Sultan had shown nervousness himself at this, the Tunku
thought because it might cost him money. I would gather from this that the Tunku
has in fact at some time pressed him quite hard to be a member of the Federation
and that the Sultan has held back, even though there was held in front of him the
possibility of his one day being Yang di-Pertuan Agong. I said that this was
something which I really had not considered, but offhand it surely had to be
something for the people of Brunei themselves to decide and that as they had only
just embarked on a new Constitution perhaps it was important to see how that
worked out.
The Tunku then tried a slightly new line and suggested Brunei and Sarawak
joining the Federation while the British Government remained in North Borneo to
develop it economically and to use it as a military base. The people of Sarawak, Dyaks
and so forth, were of Malay origin and he felt confident that it would be a good move.
I pointed out the real economic difficulties that faced development in Sarawak.
From all the above it seems clear to me that he is really quite keen on getting
something more to add to the Federation and I think he felt that the sort of deal—
H.M.G. to hang on to North Borneo, he to take over Brunei and Sarawak—would be
something which we might be willing to accept. I did what I could to leave him with
the feeling that we were neither for nor against the general principle, that it was
early times to say anything more, although naturally the linking up of our friends
would be a logical course to see followed.
I then took the opportunity of touching once more on relations between Malaya
and Singapore and stressed how important it was to try and help Singapore in its
economic development. I also told him how I felt that the Security Council had
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worked well because he and we understood each other and that our firmness at times
was probably something equally acceptable to Lee Kuan Yew. On the whole he was
not too negative about giving a helping hand and he said that one day he had very
much in mind to have a real talk with Lee Kuan Yew, a fellow undergraduate of
Cambridge. All the same I think there is a pretty deep-rooted suspicion of all that the
present Singapore Government stands for.
23 PREM 11/3418 17 June 1960
[Lord Perth’s talk with Tunku Abdul Rahman]: note by Lord Selkirk
for Mr Selwyn Lloyd
I have just seen a note of Lord Perth’s discussion with Tunku Abdul Rehman dated
June 101 in which the Tunku expressed interest in the possibility of an association,
perhaps amounting to political federation, between the Federation of Malaya,
Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei.
2. The Tunku has had this in mind before. He has now quite specifically declared
his interest in the development of his case and, in the very short time I have been in
Singapore, it has become abundantly clear to me that some association of this sort is
the only evolution which I could envisage which can give a measure of stability to the
area. I must therefore recommend that these proposals be examined very closely and
urgently.
3. I have no doubt that Singapore would readily agree to them, and have little
doubt that Brunei would also agree. North Borneo and Sarawak obviously present
greater difficulties. Even if at the end of twenty years they would be capable of
managing their affairs they could not defend themselves. Moreover, if any difficulties
in government arise in Sarawak or North Borneo, which is possible, if not
immediately imminent, it would be extremely difficult for us to defend the position
without using a considerable measure of force to maintain order. The Tunku would
do it far more easily.
4. In present circumstances the merger of the Federation and Singapore does
not seem practical. If she is to be independant for ten years, Singapore will either
become viable herself and not wish to join the Federation or, alternatively, she will
have to be carried by heavy external subsidies. Accordingly, the opportunity to bring
Singapore into a wider Federation may be lost by deferment.
5. These proposals raise very big questions with regard to the protection of the
more primitive people of the Borneo territories, with the possible danger of running
into a situation somewhat similar to that in the Central African Federation. But I
believe these problems would be much more easily dealt with by a government from
Kuala Lumpur than from London.
6. The proposal also raises problems of defence. In his present mood, the Tunku
could not agree to a similar arrangement to that which now exists with Singapore.2
1 See 22.
2 Britain had the constitutional right to use the Singapore base for SEATO purposes, whereas Britain’s
defence interests in Malaya were determined by AMDA, which, by contrast, was a treaty between sovereign
powers and excluded SEATO operations.
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On the other hand, he could not possibly take over Singapore and then seek to
denude it of the economic advantages of defence installations. But, however that
might be, I do not believe that, in the long run, our defence position would be any
worse off within a wider federation showing some measure of stability than it is at
the present time. The detachment of Labuan from North Borneo, making it at least a
useful base with certain specific functions, particularly connected with R.A.F. and
Royal Navy, might be necessary.3
7. I have suggested that this should be dealt with urgently because I do not think
it can wait indefinitely. The Tunku has still some years to run as Prime Minister 4 but
a succeeding Government might not be so willing to take any step to bring the five
territories closer together, politically or economically. The forces dividing the
territories are likely to become stronger as time passes at the same time as the
cohesive factor—the imprint of British rule—becomes less marked.
8. I shall be visiting North Borneo in August and Sarawak in September.
9. I am sending copies of this minute to the Secretary of State for the Colonies,
the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, the Minister of Defence and the
Private Secretary at No. 10.
3 The Chiefs of Staff would continue to consider Labuan (and also Australia) as an alternative to the
Singapore base, see COS(61)259, 8 Aug 1961, DO 169/28, no 110A; cf 45, note and para 18, 73 para 32, 74
point (a).
4 The Tunku’s Alliance had won the 1959 elections, albeit with a reduced majority. The next state and
federal elections were due in 1964.
24 CO 1030/1126, no 32 30 June 1960
[Lord Perth’s talk with Tunku Abdul Rahman]: letter from Sir H
Poynton to Sir N Brook requesting that the matter of closer
association be referred to the Colonial Policy Committee
You spoke to me the other day about Lord Selkirk’s minute of the 17th June
commenting on Lord Perth’s note of a discussion with Tunku Abdul Rahman on the
10th in which the Tunku expressed interest in the possibility of an association,
perhaps amounting to political federation, between the Federation of Malaya,
Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei.1 You asked me to let you have our
views on this.
2. The idea is not a new one. It was, I think, first floated as a future possibility by
Malcolm MacDonald when he was High Commissioner [sic] in South East Asia at
Singapore ten years or so ago. For some years we have been considering the
possibility of a closer association of the three Borneo territories. That has not got
very far because local feeling about it in North Borneo and Sarawak while mildly
favourable, has not yet developed much enthusiasm and because the Sultan of
Brunei has made it quite clear that he is not interested. We have also kept before us
the hope that the Federation of [? and] Singapore would one day merge. We have also
always had in mind the ultimate possibility of an association of all five territories.
1 See 22 and 23.
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3. On the 18th May, John Martin wrote a letter to Denis Allen in Singapore
summarising the agreed thoughts at official level of the Foreign Office, the
Commonwealth Relations Office and ourselves about the political future of
the Borneo territories, and the possibility of their ultimate association with the
Federation and Singapore.2 I enclose a copy of that letter. It presumably arrived in
Singapore after Lord Selkirk had left. (A copy has been sent to him here.) I also
enclose a copy of Allen’s reply just received3 (a copy of which has also been sent to
Lord Selkirk). You will see that Allen suggests that these questions should be
discussed at the October meetings of the Borneo Inter-Territorial Conference and the
Joint Advisory Defence Committee (Borneo). These are high-level bodies of very
limited membership. The first consists of the Governors of North Borneo and
Sarawak and the High Commissioner for Brunei, with senior officials plus an
unofficial (local) Executive Council member from each of the two Colonies and,
possibly, the Chief Minister from Brunei. The Commissioner General for South East
Asia (Lord Selkirk) goes over to Borneo to preside. The second body has the same
membership but without the unofficial members and with the addition of one of the
Commanders-in-Chief, Far East. It is a ‘UK eyes only’4 body. These bodies, which
meet normally twice a year, provide a useful forum for joint discussion (the most
valuable part of which sometimes takes place outside the Conference room). The
Commissioner General has of course no authority over, or constitutional function in,
North Borneo and Sarawak, the Governors of which must speak for them—and,
mutatis mutandis5 the High Commissioner in the case of Brunei. But his central and
impartial position in Singapore and close connection with the Commanders-in-Chief
there enable him to play a co-ordinating role.
4. A paramount factor is going to be what the heterogeneous people of the
Borneo territories will want, and this is not easy to predict. In Sarawak and North
Borneo the predominating strong feeling at present is to remain with us. Even in
Brunei our latest information is that there would certainly be opposition to any
attempt by the Sultan to link up with Malaya. We think that the Tunku is too
optimistic about the feelings of the inhabitants of the Borneo territories towards
Malaya, and if we want to guide them in that direction we shall be able to do so only
gradually. Admittedly our power to influence them will decrease rather than
increase, and admittedly the Indonesians might (at least if they got the West New
Guinea question out of the way) begin to agitate.6 But we cannot force Borneo
opinion.
5. As regards Singapore, we should like to see the closest possible co-operation,
especially economic, short of political union, between the Federation and the State
and ultimately, if and when we no longer need the Singapore base, probably political
union. This is a stated objective of the Singapore Government, one of their reasons
for wanting it being that they see in it the best way of attaining independence. We
recognise that such political union is ‘out’ for the present anyway, because the
Federation don’t want it. But from the defence point of view that suits us. Union with
2 See 20. 3 Not printed.
4 ‘UK eyes only’ meant that the records were not distributed to the US government.
5 ‘Mutatis mutandis’ means ‘with necessary changes’ or ‘similarly’.
6 For the New Guinea question, see 21 note 3.
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the independent Federation would end our constitutional right to the base in
Singapore and we should be dependent on a treaty arrangement. Paragraph 6 of Lord
Selkirk’s minute recognises this, but I am not sure that it recognises the
disadvantages from the defence point of view of early termination of the present
constitutional arrangements.
6. Lord Perth got the impression that the Tunku was very much more interested
in getting some or all the Borneo territories into the Federation than in a five-
territory Federation including Singapore.
7. I have shown this in draft to the Secretary of State who thinks that before this
matter is discussed by the Governors and Lord Selkirk when they meet in the
autumn, there should be some Ministerial consideration of the matter. He would
therefore like the question to be brought before the C.P.C.—if possible while Lord
Selkirk is still in this country. If the Prime Minister agrees, we will prepare a C.P.C.
paper.7 Alternatively an ad hoc meeting could be arranged if the Prime Minister
preferred, in which case the Ministers concerned, apart from the Prime Minister
himself if he wished to take the Chair, would, I suggest, be the Colonial Secretary,
the Commonwealth Secretary, the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Defence.
8. I am sending copies of this letter and enclosures to Hoyer Millar, Clutterbuck
and Playfair.
7 See 25 for the CPC memorandum and 27 for the CPC meeting with Selkirk.
25 CAB 134/1559, CPC(60)17 15 July 1960
‘Possibility of an association of the British Borneo territories with the
Federation of Malaya, and Singapore’: memorandum by Mr Macleod
for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee
Introduction
The three British territories in Borneo are the Colonies of North Borneo and
Sarawak and the Protected State of Brunei. A note on them is at Annex 1.1
2. During his recent visit to London for the Prime Ministers’ Conference, Tunku
Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, raised informally the
possibility of a federation of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei.
Lord Perth’s note of his discussion with the Tunku on this subject is at Annex 2.2
Lord Selkirk has urged that early consideration should be given to the idea.3
Previous consideration of the idea
3. Ten years or so ago Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, then High Commissioner [sic] in
South East Asia, put forward the idea that the most favourable plan for our South East
Asia territories might be some sort of association, perhaps amounting to political
federation, between the Borneo territories, the Federation of Malaya and Singapore.
4. In recent years consideration has been given to the possibility of a closer
association of the three Borneo territories. This has not got far because local feeling
about it in North Borneo and Sarawak, while mildly favourable, has not developed
1 Not printed. 2 See 22. 3 See 23.
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much enthusiasm and because the Sultan of Brunei is not interested, his eyes being
turned towards the Federation of Malaya.
5. We have always had in mind that Singapore and the Federation of Malaya
would one day merge and have publicly blessed this idea on more than one occasion.
The idea from the Borneo angle
6. Our stated policy for Sarawak and North Borneo is that, subject to their own
wishes, the peoples should ultimately achieve self-government. At present many of
their inhabitants have no wish other than that the territories should remain with us
as Crown Colonies. Experience elsewhere shows that it would be a delusion to think
that this state can last for ever. If we move out they will be left, either each alone, or
in association with each other, or (either individually or as a Borneo entity) inside
some wider association. They are very vulnerable, both because of their geographical
position and because of their racial make-up. China, Indonesia and the Philippines
all have, or could easily work up, interests of one kind or another. We certainly would
not wish to move out so that anyone else might step in. Even an association of North
Borneo and Sarawak would not be a very strong state. With Brunei in it could be
more viable (though the oil will not last for ever), but it looks unlikely at present that
Brunei would join an association with North Borneo and Sarawak alone. An ultimate
solution might therefore be an association of the Federation of Malaya, Sarawak,
North Borneo and Brunei with, if possible, Singapore in also—which, one might
hope, might stay within the Commonwealth. From this point of view the Tunku’s
idea is not unattractive to us. There are, however, some important further
considerations.
7. The whole idea hangs in any case on what the peoples of the Borneo territories
will themselves want. No sign[s] whatever of a wish to link with Indonesia or the
Philippines have shown themselves in the territories. The great majority of the
peoples of Sarawak and North Borneo undoubtedly are quite content with their
present status. There are, however, the beginnings of talk about ‘self-government’ in
Sarawak. Neither of the territories has shown any interest in a closer association with
Malaya. In North Borneo the Malays are a very small minority; in Sarawak the Malay
minority is larger but even here the above holds. As for Brunei, recent events have
shown that, although the Sultan may see his future in the union of his State with
Malaya, he may by no means carry his people with him. It now appears that about the
time of his talk with Lord Perth, Tunku Abdul Rahman told some Brunei students in
London that he was going to sound the Sultan on the possibility of Brunei joining
the Federation. This caused a sharp reaction in Brunei when it got back there and the
Sultan himself felt obliged to issue a denial that he had had any discussions with the
Tunku on this subject. Even in Brunei we cannot count on a wish to join up with
Malaya.
8. The Tunku in his conversation with Lord Perth suggested that he might take
over Brunei and Sarawak, ourselves retaining North Borneo for defence purposes. We
have a brigade training area in North Borneo at present and consideration is being
given to more permanent installations there, in view of the possibility that our use of
the base in Singapore may in the future become restricted or be lost. It is true of
course that we ought to be able to enjoy a longer peaceful tenure of defence facilities
in North Borneo than we can in Singapore. It is true also that North Borneo is
behind Sarawak in political development and that, as between the two, we could
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expect to retain it peacefully as a Crown Colony for a longer time. I do however, feel
very great doubt whether it is realistic to think of our retaining North Borneo as a
Crown Colony after Sarawak has either become self-governing on its own or had
merged with the Federation of Malaya. From the point of view of the Borneo
territories it does not seem to me that we need expect, or hope for, any early move
towards an association with Malaya. They are happy as they are and this can go on for
quite some time, possibly even a decade. There is one qualification to this, which is
that, if the West New Guinea question gets settled, Indonesian attention might turn
to our Borneo territories; from that point of view a settlement of the future of the
territories might be come to with less outside interference if it took place sooner
rather than later.
The idea from the Singapore angle
9. As regards Singapore, we should like to see the closest possible co-operation,
especially economic, short of political union, between the Federation and the State
and ultimately, if and when we no longer need the Singapore base, probably political
union. This is a stated objective of the Singapore Government, one of the reasons for
wanting it being that they see in it the best way of attaining independence. We
recognise that such a political union is not likely to take place in the near future,
because the Federation do not want it. But from the defence point of view that suits
us. Union with the independent Federation would end our constitutional right to the
base in Singapore and we should become dependent at best on a treaty arrangement.
From the defence point of view therefore an early merger with the Federation would
not suit us.
Tentative conclusions
10. There are so many unknowns here, notably the future feelings of the peoples
of the Borneo territories, that I feel this is a matter where we ought to go slowly. On
balance I incline towards the idea of an association of the five territories as likely to
provide the least unsatisfactory future for them and for us which we can at present
envisage for the long term, but there are far too many imponderables for us to be
certain about this. I think our attitude to the Tunku in this matter should be one of
benevolent neutrality. He ought to be left in no doubt that this is a matter where the
Borneo peoples have got to have their own say in due course and in which we are not
going to try to force them. The result of his recent indiscretion about Brunei may
cause him to realise that this is the best possible attitude even from his own point of
view.
11. Before the Tunku made his approach, there had already been some
discussion between ourselves and our representatives in the area about the questions
dealt with in this paper and we had had it in mind that they should be further
discussed between the Governors of North Borneo and Sarawak, the High
Commissioner for Brunei and Lord Selkirk when they meet together in Borneo in
October for the Borneo Inter-Territorial Conference and the Joint Defence Advisory
Committee (Borneo).
12. I think the best thing would be to let discussions proceed on the basis
suggested in the preceding two paragraphs. In particular I would like to have the
views of the men on the spot on the likely feasibility of our remaining in North
Borneo alone after we have abandoned our position in Sarawak and Brunei.
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26 DO 35/6297, no 92 20 July 1960
[Impressions of Sarawak and North Borneo]: report by Sir G Tory of
visits to the Borneo territories in May 19601
Sarawak
After my short stay in Sarawak my strongest impression was that it was very
backward and that it would be 10 or 15 years before it would be ready for self-
government, other things being equal. There is a racial problem there very similar to
that which the Malayans have had to face. The Chinese are very far ahead of the other
races in education, skill, industry and wealth and would be likely to dominate the
country politically and economically if power were transferred within the next
decade. The Sea Dyaks, or Ibans, who are the principal indigenous race, could, in my
view, be developed to a point at which they might balance the Chinese but they have
been neglected for a very long time and serious attempts to educate them both
generally and agriculturally have only just been started. They are much more like the
Chinese than like the Malays and are promising material. The Malays are few in
numbers, indolent and apparently without ambition.
2. There are two political parties in Sarawak. One is the Party Negri, which is run
by a Malay.2 This is alleged to be multi-racial but it is, in fact, more concerned with
the welfare of the Malays than that of the other races. Its policy, I understand, is that
Sarawak should hurry slowly towards independence, the obvious reason being that if
it hurried quickly the Chinese would dominate the country. The other party, the
United People’s Party, is run by the Chinese Mayor of Kuching, a very go-ahead
Chinese who has extensive commercial interests in Sarawak. This is also multi-racial
in theory.3 The policy is, if I remember rightly, to press for independence sooner than
later, for the obvious reasons that the sooner power is transferred the more likely the
Chinese will be able to maintain a position of dominance. When the Governor of
Sarawak at successive Eden Hall conferences has stated that the people of Sarawak
are not interested in independence what he has really meant, I suspect, is that the
indigenous peoples are clinging to the protection of H.M.G. against the Chinese.4
3. Economically the country is in a very poor condition and my impression was
1 As high commissioner to Malaya, Tory was responsible to the CRO and not to the CO. Since this report
was an account of his impressions of territories under CO jurisdiction, he explicitly requested that it
should not be circulated outside the CRO.
2 Party Negri: this is a reference to Party Negara Sarawak (or PANAS, meaning ‘hot’), a right-wing Malay
party which was led by Dato Haji Abang Mustapha and was registered in Apr 1960. It would favour Malaysia
but withdrew from the Sarawak Alliance in the 1963 elections.
3 The Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP) was formed in June 1959 and, though it claimed to be multi-
racial, was primarily Chinese. SUPP’s chairman was Ong Kee Hui. It opposed the formation of Malaysia.
4 Other parties were later formed in response to the Malaysia proposal and the introduction of elections:
Sarawak National Party (SNAP, predominantly Ibans of the Second Division), Apr 1961; Barisan Ra’ayat
Jati Sarawak (BARJASA, a Malay party that competed against PANAS, although they merged as Party
Bumiputra in 1967), Dec 1961; Party Pesaka Anak Sarawak (PAPAS or PESAKA, largely Ibans of the Third
Division), June 1962; Sarawak Chinese Association (SCA, opposed SUPP), June 1962. The Sarawak
Alliance, which was formed in Nov 1962 in support of Malaysia, consisted of BARJASA, PANAS, PESAKA,
SCA, and SNAP, but PANAS withdrew on account of tensions within the politics of the Malay community
dating from the conflict between pro-cessionists and anti-cessionists in 1946. For the elections of June
1963, see 198.
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that this was due largely to the fact that the Sea Dyaks had been permitted, and
indeed encouraged by the Brooke regime and by our colonial regime since then, to
continue their wasteful nomadic system of land tenure. Rather like the aborigines in
Malaya they squat on land for a number of years, growing hill paddy and other crops,
and then they move on leaving the land behind them to lallang and ruin.5 Over the
years they have, by these peripatetic habits, and in the process of felling timber,
acquired rights to land over large areas of Sarawak, which are now protected as
native reserves. These lie mostly inland from the banks of the rivers which are mainly
occupied by Chinese descended from those Chinese imported by the Brookes to
introduce wet paddy techniques amongst the Dayaks. The Dayaks were encouraged
to spread themselves in this way as a safeguard against the possibility of further
Chinese revolts on the scale of those which took place in Sarawak in earlier years.
4. As stated above, the Governor of Sarawak has now started seriously to
implement a policy of bringing on the Dayaks. The best of the teachers passing out
from the Training College are being sent willy-nilly for two years to the Dayak areas
and the Agricultural Research Station has started an extension course for teams of
two men and one woman from various backward areas with the idea that they should
be trained for a year in agricultural techniques which they can then take back and
disseminate amongst their own people. The Agricultural Research Station are also
developing high grade seeds and fruit stocks for distribution. It will be some years
before they develop the best type of rubber clone and in the meantime they depend
entirely on Malaya for their supply. Everywhere I went I heard complaints about the
recent increase in the export duty on Malaya rubber seeds. The Temenggong, the
leader of the Dayaks,6 even said that it was beyond his comprehension how Malaya
could strike this blow at the Sarawak replantation scheme when they had provided
the Malayans with the Sarawak Rangers to fight the Communists. This duty looms
large in Sarawak and has definitely affected the attitude of the Sea Dayaks towards
Malaya.
5. These measures cannot hope to bring the Sea Dayaks to a position remotely
approaching competition with the Chinese for at least a decade in my opinion. It will
probably be 15 years before self-government for Sarawak could be on a genuine
multi-racial basis.
North Borneo
6. The situation in North Borneo is very different. Politically it is even more
backward than Sarawak and the same interval would be likely to lapse before it was
ready for multi-racial self-government. Since Sir Roland Turnbull’s Governorship
the Government have concentrated on economic development and have not been in a
hurry to introduce constitutional reform. There are no elections whatsoever in North
Borneo at the present time so far as I remember.
7. Economically North Borneo is very far ahead of Sarawak thanks to Sir Roland
Turnbull’s determination to encourage British commercial interests to open up
5 Slash-and-burn methods of growing hill rice embodied Iban rituals and beliefs which the government
was committed to uphold, yet shifting cultivation was regarded as uneconomical by developers. ‘Lallang’ is
coarse grass.
6 In Jan 1955 Jugah anak Barieng became Temenggong or paramount chief, although his letter of
appointment did not clarify whether his paramountey covered all the Ibans in Sarawak.
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estates there.7 This is in direct contradistinction to the situation in Sarawak where
the Brookes and successive Colonial Governors have adhered to the policy of
preserving the native races from outside exploitation. The native system in Sarawak
has, so to speak, been deliberately, even artificially, preserved. In North Borneo on
the other hand the country has been opened up by companies such as the Bombay
Burmah Trading Corporation, which concentrates on timber, and Borneo Abaca
Limited, run at present by the Colonial Development Corporation, which grows
rubber, hemp and cocoa extremely successfully there, and other companies which
develop timber and natural resources of various kinds. Most of the buildings in North
Borneo were completely destroyed in the course of the Japanese occupation or
withdrawal and most of the Asian middle class were killed off. There has been no
replacement of this middle class and this in itself has delayed constitutional and
economic progress. Some advance has however been made recently with rebuilding
the waterfront at Jesselton and Sandakan.
8. Here again the Malay element is very small almost to the point of
insignificance. The main native ingredient of the population is the Dusuns who are
in no way related to the Malays and have no desire to join Malaya. When North
Borneo initiated the idea of closer association between the three Borneo territories
the people of North Borneo showed that they wanted the British connection to be
safeguarded. This again, I assume, is largely due to fear of domination by the Chinese
who are here also far ahead of the other Asians in every way. The desire to strengthen
the British connection is reflected in the demand for the English language to be
developed as the main medium of education in North Borneo. There is in fact at
present a swing away from Malay.
9. Economically there is also no link with Sarawak or Malaya. The Chinese on
the east coast at Tawau look to the Philippines, Formosa, Hong Kong, Australia and
Japan for their trade whereas Sarawak, i.e. Kuching, looks towards Singapore. In the
view of Sir R. Turnbull, the former Governor of North Borneo, if North Borneo were
to turn or to be directed towards Singapore and the Federation this would increase
the likelihood that the Philippines and Indonesia would close in on North Borneo.
Any serious proposal for confederation with Malaya, for example, would, in Sir R.
Turnbull’s view, be likely to start a separatist movement in the Philippines amongst
those inhabitants of the south parts of it who are Muslim. This would, it is argued, be
likely to produce some counter-action on the part of the Philippine Government.
There is also outstanding a claim by the Sultan of Sulu to a part of North Borneo
which is still held from him under a rental agreement; this also might be pursued in
an embarrassing way if the question of integration with Malaya were raised. There is
a big Christian element amongst the native population in North Borneo and this
factor too would militate against any easy merger with Muslim Malaya and might
encourage separatist tendencies.
10. It certainly seems therefore that North Borneo will be unlikely for a long
time to welcome any form of integration with the Federation of Malaya. My own
feeling is that all three Borneo territories will in the end join the Federation of
Malaya, that this is the best possible solution of the problem of their future and that
we should, as the Tunku himself advises, start as soon as possible to make this
7 See 31 for Goode’s review of 1960.
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integration feasible. In particular it seems nonsensical to me that in this small
territory set in Malaya-speaking [sic] Borneo, neighbouring on Malay-speaking
Brunei, and Malay and Iban-speaking Sarawak (Iban is closely related to Malay and
the Ibans are supposed to have come from Sumatra, the Tunku says the Ibans are the
purest of all Malays) the Government should be deliberately turning away from Malay
in favour of English. It would seem the merest commonsense to teach Malay equally
with English. For example, Malay in the primary schools and Malay and English in
the secondary schools as in the Federation of Malaya itself.
11. The Governor of North Borneo and the Chief Secretary make much of the
fact that there is no desire to join Malaya and a continuing wish for the British
connection to be maintained. As I said, this is undoubtedly due to fear of the Chinese.
When the people of North Borneo come to realise that the British connection cannot
be indefinitely prolonged they might, I suppose, regard confederation with Malaya as
providing them with a safeguard against the Chinese, which after all the Tunku
himself is anxious to achieve by this very process.
12. Meanwhile the only thing approaching a political movement in North
Borneo appears to consist of the activities of a Mr. Stevens [sic],8 a Eurasian with
Dusun blood, who owns the only substantial newspaper there and who has set
himself up as the representative of the native races. He is constantly advocating
political and economic advancement on an emergency basis lest there should be
trouble between the races. He obviously feels that the Government are working in
much too low a gear and that history is leaving North Borneo behind.
The attitude of the governors to integration with the Federation
13. In general the attitude of the two Governors is very much the same. They
both feel that in the long term some form of political association between all three
territories and the Federation of Malaya, together with Singapore, will probably be
the best solution of the future of these three small territories, which cannot hope to
survive the strong gravitational influences which will be brought to bear on them
once we move out. But they are both very conscious, and justifiably so, of the
political and economic backwardness of the indigenous races—apart from the
Chinese—and of the danger of prejudicing progress in the shorter term by putting
forward the idea of association with Malaya to native people who are not as a whole
likely to be attracted by the prospect at the present time and who might in fact react
against it, by seeking affiliations and protection elsewhere.
8 Donald Stephens was chairman of the Kadazan Society (1958), founder-president of the first political
party (United National Kadazan Organisation, UNKO) from Aug 1961 and Sabah’s first chief minister in
1963. Other parties were later formed: United Sabah National Organisation (USNO, led by Dato Mustapha
bin Dato Harun), Dec 1961; United National Pasok Momogun Organisation (UNPMO, ‘Pasok Momogun’
means ‘sons of the soil’ and the organisation consisted mainly of Muruts), late 1961; Democratic Party
(primarily Chinese), 1961; United Party (Chinese), Feb 1962; the small Sabah Indian Congress (SIC).
These parties combined in various coalitions: first the Democratic and United Parties came together in the
Borneo Utara National Party (BUNAP, later Sabah National Party); towards the end of 1962 UNKO, USNO
and BUNAP formed the Sabah Alliance (SABAPA) which favoured Malaysia; finally UNPMO and SIC joined
the Sabah Alliance. The Sabah Alliance, which was increasingly dominated by USNO, was unopposed,
although its component parties competed against each other in local elections, see 198, note.
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27 CAB 134/1559, CPC(60)20 27 July 1960
[Closer association]: Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee minutes of a
meeting with Lord Selkirk
[This was an ad hoc, rather than formal, meeting of the CPC held with the dual object of
allowing ministers to hear Selkirk’s views, especially on Singapore, and to give
preliminary consideration to the possibility of merger of Malaya, Singapore and the
Borneo territories. It was chaired by Macmillan and attended by Selwyn Lloyd (FO),
Home (CRO), Macleod (CO), Watkinson (Ministry of Defence), Selkirk (commissioner-
general for SE Asia), and Brook (secretary to the Cabinet). The discussion was informed
by Macleod’s memorandum (see 25) and shaped the subsequent meeting of Selkirk with
governors in Kuching on 20 Oct and the Eden Hall Conference in Jan 1961.]
Lord Selkirk said that, given the intrinsic difficulties of governing a State comprising
four different races, the present Government of Singapore had dealt with the
situation a good deal more satisfactorily than could have been expected, and it was in
our interest to satisfy their natural aspirations, for improved status in the
Commonwealth. Although they could not be regarded as an independent country,
they were equally no longer a colony, but enjoyed a greater degree of independence
than the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It was also important that we should
try to accommodate them in their current request for financial aid, since our
response would be regarded locally as the measure of our confidence in the
Singapore administration. It would also be helpful if outlets could be found for
migrants from Singapore, where the population was increasing at a rate of 4 per cent
per annum.
In discussion the following points were made:—
(a) Since Singapore was not an independent country it would not be appropriate
for her Prime Minister to be invited to attend meetings of Commonwealth Prime
Ministers. In their report1 on future constitutional development in the
Commonwealth a group of Commonwealth officials had suggested that countries
which had reached a similar stage of constitutional development to Singapore
might be allowed to improve their status in the Commonwealth by sending in
their own right representatives to Commonwealth meetings on specific subjects,
e.g. finance and education, instead of, as at present, attending as part of a
composite delegation from the Colonies. If this recommendation were to be
accepted by Commonwealth Governments it might go a considerable way towards
satisfying Singapore aspirations at the present time. The question of which
Department in Whitehall should be responsible for relations with Singapore, and
with other territories which might attain similar status, raised the wider question
of the future arrangements for conducting relations with the Commonwealth,
both independent and dependent, as a whole; this would need further careful
study.
(b) The possibility of an invitation being extended to the Prime Minister of
Singapore to visit London in the course of next year might be considered.
(c) As regards Singapore’s request for financial aid, we could offer a total of £7.6
1 An extract from the report is reproduced in Hyam and Louis eds, BDEE: the Conservative government,
1957–1964, II, 534.
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millions, mostly by way of loan but some in the form of a grant, in response to
Singapore’s request for £28 millions. It would not be possible for us to offer more
than this, but in view of the risk that if Singapore could not obtain sufficient
financial assistance from the West she might seek aid from Soviet bloc countries,2
the United States authorities should be informed of the position before the
Singapore Finance Minister made his forthcoming visit to Washington.
(d) It might be suggested to the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya that
he should consider a loan to the Government of Singapore, and also that Malaya
might enter into a closer economic relationship with Singapore, possibly by
establishing a free trade area.
(e) As regards Singapore’s surplus population it might be suggested to the Singapore
Government that they should approach the Government of British Honduras, which
had recently notified other Governments of its desire to receive immigrants.
(f ) It might not be desirable to seek to include Singapore in a wider Malayan
federation since the subsequent emergence of a Communist dominated
Government in Singapore would threaten the political situation in the whole of
the Federation. On the other hand we might find it easier to maintain our defence
facilities in Singapore by means of a defence treaty if Singapore were part of the
Federation; Singapore could not be expected to be content with her present
relationship with the United Kingdom for more than a few years.
(g) So far as the Borneo territories were concerned our attitude towards their
association with the Malayan Federation should be one of benevolent neutrality. It
would be useful however if Lord Selkirk were to discuss the matter further at the
meetings of the Borneo Inter-territorial Conference and the Joint Defence
Advisory Committee (Borneo) to be held in October, 1960. In view of the reactions
of the Sultan of Brunei to the Tunku’s suggestion that Brunei should join the
Federation, it seemed unlikely that the Tunku would for his part wish to press
matters further at this stage.
In the course of further discussion it was suggested that there might be advantage in
suggesting to a new administration in the United States, that a study might be made
of a joint United States/United Kingdom approach to problems in the Far East. It was
for consideration whether the maintenance of our base at Singapore should become
a S.E.A.T.O. responsibility, in which case some of the cost which we were at present
incurring in the area might be more widely shared. We might also wish to conduct a
reappraisal of our military commitments to N.A.T.O. and in particular the strength of
our armed forces in Germany. Now that a significant military contribution was being
made by the Federal German Republic it might, for instance, be desirable for much
of our military effort there to be redeployed in areas outside continental Europe.
The Meeting:—
(1) Took note that further consideration would be given to the relationship of
Singapore to the Commonwealth in the light of the report of Commonwealth
officials on the future constitutional development of the Commonwealth.
(2) Invited the Foreign Secretary to inform the United States Government, in
advance of the Singapore Finance Minister’s visit to Washington, of our
2 See 21, para 4.
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apprehensions lest in the event of Singapore being unable to secure sufficient
financial assistance from the West, she might seek it from the Soviet bloc.
(3) Invited Lord Selkirk:—
(i) to suggest to the Government of Singapore that they should approach the
Government of British Honduras regarding the migration of Singapore
citizens to that Colony;
(ii) to discuss with the Prime Minister of Malaya the possibility of the
Federation adopting a policy of closer economic co-operation with Singapore,
including the granting of a loan for development purposes;
(iii) to discuss at the forthcoming meetings of the Borneo Inter-territorial
Conference and the Joint Defence Advisory Committee (Borneo) the possibility
of the future association of the Borneo territories with a wider Malayan
federation.
28 CAB 134/1644, DSE(60)15th meeting 29 Sept 1960
[Future developments in SE Asia]: Committee on Future
Developments in SE Asia minutes [Extract]
[As part of a comprehensive study of Britain’s global role during the decade 1960–1970, a
committee of officials chaired by Sir Norman Brook recommended in Feb 1960 that, for
economic reasons, Britain should reduce its forces in SE Asia and plan for the eventuality
of losing the Singapore base. A specialist, inter-departmental committee, the Committee
on Future Developments in SE Asia, was then charged to identify likely developments in
the region over the next ten years as well as Britain’s aims, obligations and means for
achieving them (see ‘Study of future policy 1960–1970’, issued by the Cabinet Office on 9
June 1959, DO 35/8864). Chaired by Sir Robert Scott, who had returned from Singapore
to the post of commandant of the Imperial Defence College, this committee met for the
first time on 13 June 1960 and produced the ‘gist’ or summary of its report in mid-Oct (see
29). Its final report, which was completed on 3 Nov, consists of 37 pages and 159 paragraphs
and includes the ‘gist’. The minutes and some memoranda are open at CAB 134/1644 while
the memoranda and final report held in CAB 134/1645 were released in Sept 2002 (D(60)50,
CAB 131/24; CAB 134/1644; DSE(60)25(Final) and DSE(60)30(Final), CAB 134/1645;
FP(60)1, CAB 134/1929; also Hyam and Louis eds, BDEE: the Conservative government,
1957–1964, xxxiv–xxxvi, 4–17).]
Future developments in South East Asia: draft summary of conclusions
The Committee had before them a note by the Secretaries D.S.E. (60) 25 circulating
a draft concluding chapter for the Committee’s report.
In discussion the following points were made:—
(a) It was generally accepted that this chapter would be of more value as a summary
placed at the beginning of the report, and that it should include the military facilities
available in Singapore in order to show more clearly the present position.
(b) It would be helpful to have some form of balance sheet for the area. This presented
some difficulty as there was no material asset in the area essential to our national
economy to compare with, for example, oil in the Middle East. Most of our assets in
East Asia were intangibles, the containment of communism, the Commonwealth,
relations with the United States and our general influence and trade in the area.
Rubber and tin were no longer essential to our balance of payments and we were
spending money in the area for political reasons rather than for any prospect of
financial gain.
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(c) Both for financial reasons and for reasons of man-power the size of forces
which we could afford to maintain in the area might not be militarily sound. Any
sudden change of policy or reduction of our military presence might be taken by
the countries of East Asia to be weakness, but this could to some extent be
overcome by effecting changes gradually. In the meantime, we should take every
opportunity to help with the training of local military and police forces and to
train technicians. In this way we could help to ensure stability in the area at the
same time reducing our expenditure on defence there. A comprehensive
programme would be too great for us to undertake on our own. We should
however do as much as we could in this field and encourage others to follow suit.
In order to ensure their co-operation we should have early discussions with
Australia, New Zealand and America and we should encourage the use of the
United Nations in the area.
(d) It was hard to estimate what our security of tenure might be in the Borneo
Territories. Once a move for independence was started events were apt to move very
quickly. However, it seemed likely that we could enjoy facilities in North Borneo for
as long as we remained in Hong Kong, though it would not be necessary for these
to be on the same scale as those at present available in Singapore. It would also be
worth considering housing the Gurkha Brigade, withdrawn from jungle operations,
in Johore rather than in Borneo. Some savings might be possible from this and it
might also be possible to sell the accommodation there when we vacated it.
(e) Though India should have a very high priority in any economic programme it
would be incorrect to indicate that she should have an overriding priority.
29 CAB 131/24, D(60)50 12 Oct 1960
‘Future developments in South East Asia’: gist of report by the
Committee on Future Developments in SE Asia, circulated to the
Cabinet Defence Committee by Sir N Brook
Terms of reference
The Committee was appointed by direction of the Prime Minister with the following
terms of reference:—
‘To study the likely course of developments during the next ten years in
South and South East Asia and the Far East; and to review our aims in this
area and our means of securing them.’
2. Subsequently certain questions about the loss of bases and Gurkhas and the
deployment of nuclear weapons in the area were remitted to the Committee. Their
answers are contained in an earlier report (D.S.E. (60) 26 (Final), circulated to the
Defence Committee as D.(60) 46).
3. The area covered by the following study is bounded by Pakistan on the West,
Japan on the East and Indonesia on the South. For convenience the area as a whole is
referred to as Eastern Asia.
Assumptions
4. The Committee adopted the following assumptions:—
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(a) In the period under review there will be neither a global war nor a genuine
détente between the two power blocs.
(b) There will be no major split between Russia and China, but they will be rivals for
Communist leadership throughout Asia and Africa and relations between them will
at times be strained because of Chinese arrogance and Russian fears.
(c) Among the free countries of South East Asia some progress may be made towards
regional association; but national differences will still be strong throughout Eastern
Asia, and Asian countries will find it easier to rally together for negative purposes (anti-
West, anti-Colonial, anti-China) than for positive ones (a genuine pooling of effort).
Policies of non-alignment between East and West are likely to be followed by many of
the free countries, and neutralist sentiment will retain some anti-Western bias.
(d) China will, in terms of power, increasingly over-shadow the area. She will seek
to expel the West from Formosa, Japan, Korea and Indo-China by all means short
of deliberate overt armed aggression, and will generally seek to weaken the West
throughout Asia and in Africa and Latin America.
(e) The free countries of the area will be preoccupied by social and economic problems
and by the search for external assistance to solve them. Amongst China’s immediate
neighbours there will be mounting fear of Chinese imperialism and in a few cases an
inclination to come to terms with her. Japan will be playing a major political as well
as economic role in the area. With the exception of Japan and possibly India the free
countries in the area will not have achieved self-sustaining economic growth.
(f ) The United States will continue to maintain a considerable capacity for
military intervention in the area.
(g) The United Nations will still be in existence, with China as a member and the
Formosa issue not yet resolved to China’s satisfaction.
(h) Whatever the course of constitutional developments in other dependent
territories in the area, Hong Kong will still be a British responsibility.
Forecast
5. The area will continue to be a major scene of conflict in the East/West
struggle. There will be no defections of major countries, now free, to the Communist
bloc, provided that they continue to receive Western support, including military
backing, without which they are unlikely to maintain their independence.
Aims
6. In common with the rest of the Western world the United Kingdom shares
certain general aims in the area:—
(a) to contain Communism;
(b) to maintain Western influence;
(c) to preserve peace and strengthen non-Communist societies, especially India;
(d) to foster trade;
(e) to maintain political stability and economic development.
7. The United Kingdom also has certain special obligations in the area:—
(a) as the centre of the Commonwealth and the sterling area;
(b) to her dependent territories, notably responsibility for Hong Kong and
prevention of Communist control over Singapore;
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(c) as a member of S.E.A.T.O.;
(d) under the Malayan Defence Agreement;
(e) under the Geneva Agreement of 1954;
(f) under the ANZAM Agreement.
8. Nearly two-thirds of the population of the non-Communist countries of the
area are in the Commonwealth (India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Malaya). In addition
Australia and New Zealand are vitally interested. It is a major United Kingdom
interest to fortify these Commonwealth links, which are a source of strength to us
and help us to exercise influence in the area, and to maintain our large stakes and
influence in the individual Commonwealth countries.
9. In Eastern Asia the collapse of sterling would have grave consequences. The
United Kingdom shares her interest in maintaining the strength of sterling with the
other members of the sterling area, but the main burden falls on the United
Kingdom. This places a limit on the amount of United Kingdom expenditure that can
safely be incurred in Eastern Asia as in other areas. However desirable it might be for
us to play a greater role there in all spheres, the Committee has felt obliged to accept
that even the continuance of our present role with consequent increases in
Government expenditure would weaken the economic position of this country and
sterling. The Committee has therefore sought ways in which our present role might
be modified without undue detriment to our interests in Eastern Asia.
10. The United States must inevitably make the largest single contribution to the
pursuit of Western aims in the area, but the United Kingdom must continue by
political action, economic aid and military backing to play her part in this process,
working as closely as possible with her friends and Allies, and in addition to maintain
her own special interests.
Political action
11. We must clearly maintain and foster our established relationships with the
Commonwealth and other free countries of Eastern Asia, if we are to influence
developments in the area, including the evolution of United States policy. If, for
example, the United States were obliged to retreat from her present China policy in
circumstances which looked like a political defeat, this would be a major setback for
the whole Western position. We should therefore aim to maintain such influence as
we may have on the evolution of American policy in order to reduce the possibility of
any such damaging consequences.
12. Information work, broadcasting and cultural work (especially English
language teaching) make an important contribution to the maintenance of United
Kingdom and Western influence and the understanding of Western policies, and must
continue to play a significant part in countering Communist penetration in the area.
Economic aid and technical assistance
13. The requirements are:—
(a) for capital loans where they can be used with the best chance of being effective
(India is the outstanding example); and
(b) for training—administrative, technical, police, military—throughout the area
to promote administrative and technical efficiency and security, and hence
political stability and the foundations of economic and social progress.
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14. As a long-term policy the emphasis of our efforts in the area should shift
increasingly towards economic and technical aid.
Defence policy
15. The main roles of British defence forces and facilities at present in the area
are:—
(a) internal security and external defence of British dependent territories;
(b) a contribution to the strategic deterrent against China;
(c) a contribution to operations on land (for example, a S.E.A.T.O. operation).
16. The United Kingdom cannot continue for another decade to play all three
roles on present scales and in present forms. Political currents in Malaya and
Singapore might turn against the presence of British bases and forces. Direct
communications to Singapore from Gan and Australia might be insecure because of
uncertainty about the Indonesian attitude in a crisis. The Services’ man-power
situation is already difficult, and if (as is possible) we have lost the Gurkhas it will
become acute. Though these are possibilities and not certainties they must
cumulatively cast doubt on the long-term availability or value of the bases in Malaya
and Singapore. Furthermore, a future Australian or New Zealand Government might
withdraw its component from the Strategic Reserve now in Malaya. Sterling crises
might enforce cuts in expenditure, or emergencies elsewhere in the world might
require the sudden withdrawal of forces from Eastern Asia.
17. More decisive and also more certain is the cost factor. At present direct
United Kingdom expenditure in the area for defence purposes is about £50 millions
annually, and at least twice as much again is incurred in the United Kingdom in
connection with it. If this defence effort continues on present lines, defence
expenditure for the area is bound to increase. In the light of our present economic
and man-power situation any such increase is hard to justify on direct political or
economic grounds or in relation to inescapable defence commitments.
18. A review of present defence roles in the area is therefore needed. The total
withdrawal of forces cannot be contemplated, because this would mean abandoning
our Colonial responsibilities, our obligations to Malaya and S.E.A.T.O., and the
playing of a significant part in containing China and resisting the spread of
Communism; it would also damage our relations with Australia and New Zealand to
an unacceptable extent and would seriously harm our relations with the United
States. For general political reasons—influence with the United States, the
Commonwealth connection, and our status as a power with a worldwide stake in
stemming Communist expansion—the United Kingdom must continue to make a
contribution to the nuclear deterrent against China. In addition, the United
Kingdom cannot avoid her special obligations to her dependent territories, notably
Hong Kong.
19. If for the reasons given above some cut must be made in our defence effort in
the area, it is only in the third defence role (a contribution to land operations) that
we could afford to risk some reduction. To drop it completely during the next ten
years would have unacceptable political consequences: it would encourage the
Communists, weaken S.E.A.T.O. and the free countries of the area, upset political
stability and damage our relations with Australia and New Zealand and also with
America. No modification can be made without some adverse effects. However, the
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scale of British participation in S.E.A.T.O.-type operations in the area by 1970 might
be reduced to our contribution to the Commonwealth Brigade (stationed in Malaya if
the base is still available, but otherwise in Australia) and a carrier-borne Royal
Marine Commando, with air and naval support but without Gurkhas. In the
meanwhile it would be politically acceptable to limit the participation of British
ground forces in future limited wars in Eastern Asia to the scale of forces now there
for the purpose.
20. The central problems for British defence policy in the area in the long-term
are to determine in detail the scale and form of a reduced contribution to a land
campaign on the mainland of Eastern Asia and the timing and manner of progress to
that end.
21. Everything possible should be done in advance to offset the weakening of the
defences of the area which will result from the eventual achievement of the restricted
scale of British defence effort suggested above. A major drive is needed to promote
stability in friendly countries through administrative and technical training, and to
strengthen their security forces by police and military training. This would call for
action in the area, additional training facilities in the United Kingdom and co-
ordination with Commonwealth and Western Powers.
22. Thus the Committee envisages the following main roles for British defence
forces in the area by 1970:—
(a) the security of remaining British territories;
(b) a contribution to the strategic deterrent;
(c) a much reduced contribution to land operations;
(d) training and otherwise strengthening defence forces of friendly countries.
23. The first is primarily a United Kingdom commitment. The others should be
discharged in the closest co-operation with our Allies.
24. As regards bases, in the long run our strategy in the area must come to
depend increasingly on airborne and seaborne forces operating from Australia and
New Zealand, the only permanent and reliable Western bases in the Eastern
Hemisphere. In addition, some centrally placed cantonment is needed for certain of
the ground forces required to discharge our Colonial responsibilities, so long as they
exist in the area. This cantonment should be as free as possible from risks of local
political blackmail and insecure communications, and these considerations point to
North Borneo. Although North Borneo cannot be expected to remain indefinitely free
from political pressures, at least for the period under review it is likely to be freer
from them than Malaya or Singapore. While nothing should be done which might
hasten the loss of facilities in Malaya and Singapore, these factors should be
considered in connection with any future programmes for building permanent
accommodation for forces in the area.
Conclusions
25. Western policy in the area, in which the United Kingdom must play her part,
must continue to be to maintain peace and to sustain the free countries by political
action, economic aid and military backing. In addition, the United Kingdom has
certain special interests and obligations as the centre of the Commonwealth and to
her dependent territories and as a signatory of various international treaties. She has
a further special responsibility for the strength of sterling.
08-Malaysia-01-29-cpp  21/9/04  9:05 AM  Page 80
[29] OCT 1960 81
26. At least throughout the next decade it will be necessary for the United
Kingdom to maintain a military presence and capacity to intervene in Eastern Asia.
The long-term trend during this period should be towards reducing capacity to
intervene in operations on the East Asian mainland with ground and tactical air
forces.
27. The Committee is driven to the concept of a diminished British military
presence in the area by 1970, not because interests and obligations will have been
reduced but because man-power and financial difficulties, coupled with uncertainties
about bases, force this upon the United Kingdom. The Committee further accepts the
concept (subject to balance of payment considerations) of more stress on economic
programmes. Such changes of role and of emphasis carry political and military risks.
It is therefore necessary to do what is possible to lessen these risks by, for example:—
(a) helping the countries of the area to stand on their own feet and so lessen the
need for intervention; and
(b) sharing with friends and Allies commitments which in many cases are more
vital to them than to us.
28. A major effort to improve the strength and efficiency of the defence forces of
non-Communist countries in the area e.g. by military training would contribute to
their stability and security. Our efforts in this direction should be co-ordinated as far
as possible with Commonwealth and Western countries.
29. The Committee believes that Australia should make a bigger effort to provide
for her own defence and vital interests, but does not favour putting pressure on
Australia to do this. The United Kingdom could, and may have to, put itself in a
position where pressure comes from Australia and New Zealand on the United
Kingdom rather than vice versa.
30. There is every reason for the closest consultation with Australia and New
Zealand as well as with the United States in formulating United Kingdom defence
policy for the area. Our ANZAM obligations to Australia and New Zealand could not
be modified without their agreement.
31. Increased United Nations presence in the area might promote stability and
lessen the risks of incidents and hence the need for Western intervention or support.
It could take many forms—technical missions, political observers, or even in some
circumstances United Nations gendarmerie forces. American views on the advantage
of increased United Nations presence, if it connoted neutralism, would be important
and probably decisive. It is recommended that possible roles for, and consequences
of, United Nations activity in the area be studied.
32. Finally, the Committee wishes to stress that policy towards Eastern Asia and
the scale of the United Kingdom effort there cannot be considered in isolation. They
are affected by the political and military situation elsewhere and by the strength or
weakness of sterling. For this reason and because the above conclusions flow from
assumptions which only time will test, United Kingdom interests in and policy
towards the area should be reviewed from time to time.
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30 CO 1030/977, no 75 25 Oct 1960
[Prospects for closer association]: despatch from Lord Selkirk to Mr
Macleod reporting his personal views following high-level discussions
in Kuching
On the occasion of the recent meetings in Kuching of the Inter-Territorial
Conference for the Borneo Territories and the Joint Advisory Defence Committee
(Borneo) I took the opportunity to hold a discussion with the Governors of North
Borneo and Sarawak and the High Commissioner for Brunei on the future evolution
of these territories and their relationship with the Federation of Malaya and the State
of Singapore. We were greatly assisted in our consideration of these questions by the
presence of The Right Honourable The Earl of Perth, Minister of State, of Mr. Eugene
Melville of your Department, and of General Sir Richard Hull, Commander-in-Chief,
Far East Land Forces.
2. A summary record of the discussion is enclosed.1 The main conclusion which
emerged was that we must now seek endorsement from Ministers in London of
certain broad lines of policy to guide the future shaping of our course in Colonial and
Commonwealth affairs in South-East Asia so as to safeguard as fully and as long as
possible our defence and other interests in this area.
3. Our first recommendation is that Her Majesty’s Government in the United
Kingdom should accept as the ultimate aim of their policy the development of a
political association between Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories such as
would enable them to take their place within the Commonwealth as a single entity
strong enough to resist encroachment from their neighbours or from Communist
China. Though the exact form of union, federation or confederation that might
emerge cannot be foreseen at this stage, we consider that some such broad
association provides the only satisfactory evolution which will safeguard in the
longer term not only the security, economic development and welfare of the
territories themselves, but also, on a basis of consent, the United Kingdom’s own
essential defence interests consisting of the base in Singapore and the necessary
deployment areas outside it.
4. We hold it important to avoid any appearance that Her Majesty’s Government
are actively pushing such a solution or seeking to impose it upon the peoples
concerned, and we consider that in public, if the need arose, no more should be said
for the present than that a broad association of this kind is among the possible
outcomes to be studied by the peoples concerned and one that Her Majesty’s
Government would not themselves regard as excluded from consideration. At the
same time we are sufficiently impressed by the growing interest of all the territories
concerned, despite the very real and obvious differences between them, in some such
eventual solution to their problems, to believe that with discreet encouragement on
our own part a general desire for it might in time arise. And we think that the
moment has come when we should be ready to begin discussing the matter in
confidence as occasion may arise with interested parties such as Tunku Abdul
Rahman, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew and the Sultan of Brunei. In particular, we should use
1 Not printed.
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the possibility of some eventual political association as an argument with which
meanwhile to resist any retrograde step in the economic field such as the break up of
the existing currency union of the five territories or the imposition of new
restrictions on trade between them.
5. In any such discussions we should make it plain that progress towards the
ultimate goal must be gradual and adjusted to the rate of political evolution in the
Borneo territories. We consider that our first step in such evolution must be
the strengthening of existing links between North Borneo and Sarawak with the
intention that they might eventually enter the wider association as a single unit.
Some further steps in this direction were agreed upon at the recent Twelfth Meeting
of the Inter-Territorial Conference in Kuching.
6. We recommend that this gradual bringing together of the two Borneo
colonies should henceforth proceed without expectation of Brunei’s participation,
but so far as possible without prejudice to her joining in later should it be found
possible to bring about any modification of the Sultan’s present attitude of
opposition.
7. This despatch has not been agreed textually with the Governors of North
Borneo and Sarawak and the High Commissioner for Brunei, but it represents my
own interpretation of the sense of our discussions and the agreement emerging from
them. They will no doubt send you any further comments they may wish to offer
from their own viewpoints. Subject to any such comments, I trust that you will agree
to seek the endorsement of Her Majesty’s Government for the policy I have outlined.2
8. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretaries of State for
Commonwealth Relations and Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence, to the
Governors of North Borneo and Sarawak and the High Commissioner for Brunei, to
the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur and the United Kingdom
Commissioner, Singapore,3 and to the three Commanders-in-Chief in Singapore.
2 While Selkirk mentioned the need for a gradual approach towards the Borneo territories, the CO noted
that his views did not altogether accord with those of governors Goode and Waddell.
3 This post was also held by Selkirk.
31 CO 1030/1153, no 3 30 Dec 1960
‘North Borneo: review of affairs’: despatch from Sir W Goode to Mr
Macleod, reviewing his first eight months as governor of North
Borneo
[This despatch, which was printed for wider circulation on 20 Feb 1961, develops themes
to which Goode frequently returns during the planning of Malaysia: North Borneo is ‘a
happy country’ which is ‘still content with colonial rule’ and should be protected from the
political aspirations in neighbouring countries while being assisted in the development of
its economic potential and social services (especially education). Although Goode accepts
that ‘the best future for North Borneo lies in association with its near neighbours and
with Malaya’ (paragraph 10), he argues that closer association should not be rushed. Sir
Alexander Waddell wrote in a similar vein from Sarawak, although he painted a slightly
darker picture of a less developed and a more politically aware country where the
Chinese-dominated Sarawak United People’s Party was active and where, unless there was
greater investment particularly in roads and education, economic disparities might be
exploited by the Clandestine Communist Organisation to provoke racial clashes (see
Waddell to Macleod, 21 Apr, 15 July, 17 Aug and 13 Dec 1960, CO 1030/1154).]
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I have the honour to report on conditions and problems in North Borneo as I see
them after eight months here.
2. North Borneo is a strikingly beautiful country of happy, friendly people, busy
building and planting for the future, and still content with Colonial rule. On arrival I
was astonished to find how much had been done since I last visited North Borneo in
1957. The main towns have now been rebuilt from the ruins of the war; Government
offices, hospitals and schools have also been built; and thousands of acres of land are
being cleared and planted, mostly for rubber, by native smallholders and Chinese,
though two British companies, following the lead given by the Colonial Development
Corporation, are developing large areas for cocoa and palm oil. The timber industry
flourishes particularly on the east coast and now provides the largest export. It is well
founded on two strong British firms, the British Borneo Timber Co. (Harrisons &
Crosfield) and the Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation. There is a general air of
progress, prosperity and smiling happiness.
3. Economically 1960 has been a wonderful year. The total value of trade for the
year will be over $400 million, some 27 per cent. better than last year, and there will
be a favourable trade balance of some $24 million. Much of this is due to the thriving
entrepôt or barter trade with Indonesia and the Philippines, based on the import of
copra and spices in exchange for cigarettes and other consumer goods. Government
revenue this year will also break all previous records: $58 million, as compared to the
original estimate of $45 million and $46 million collected in 1959. It has been
possible to pay $15 million into the Development Fund and still leave a general
revenue balance of $151⁄2 million at the end of the year. It would be unwise to count
on repeating this next year, since revenue is much affected by the price of rubber and
the volume of the entrepôt trade, both of which can fluctuate for causes outside our
control. Given reasonable world conditions, however, there is every reason to expect
that North Borneo’s national income will increase steadily as increased areas under
rubber, cocoa, oil palm and coconuts come into bearing.
4. Progress over the last few years has been remarkable. There is still much to
do. We are only beginning a big programme of road construction; a main road to join
Jesselton to Sandakan by crossing the mountains and a series of other roads to
provide a continuous road system from Kudat in the north down the west coast to
Sipitang in the south. New wharfs are needed at Kudat and elsewhere. At least three
hospitals badly need replacing. And schools are needed all over the country. There
are still rural areas where the native peoples live in scattered villages along rivers at a
bare subsistence level beyond reach of existing services with little to distinguish their
conditions to-day from those of the past centuries.
5. So much has been done during the past few years that the administration
generally is now stretched to the utmost. Available funds have rightly been spent on
capital investment: reconstruction of war damage and new development; recurrent
commitments have been held down. There has been little expansion of the public
service and it is too thin on the ground to meet the needs of a rapidly developing
country. Land offices are choked with thousands of land applications awaiting survey
and settlement; more agricultural officers are needed to advise the thousands of
smallholders opening up new land; and rural areas need teachers and doctors. Nor is
it only quantity that is lacking; there is also a lack of quality in senior posts. North
Borneo is no longer a rustic backwater; it is thriving and stirring and is surrounded
by the complex political conditions of South-East Asia. If North Borneo is to hold its
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own with its more advanced neighbours in a difficult world, it needs men of real
ability, imagination and leadership in the top ranks of its administration to build fast
and soundly. Local resources are sadly limited. Less than half of the children get any
education at all; only 3,000 were in secondary schools last year, and only 78 achieved
a school certificate. Standards of local public servants are inevitably low. Yet already
there is the natural pressure to staff the public service with local men and women.
Overseas officers have to work with very weak clerical and executive assistance (as
emphasised by the critical reports each year from the Director of Audit) and must
devote more time than they can spare to training staff. There is no place in North
Borneo for the weaker overseas officer.
6. Not the least of the attractions of this lovely country is its claim to have no
politics, no secret societies, no trade unions and no Communist subversion. Broadly,
this claim is still true. There is no political party.1 There is no sign whatsoever of
secret societies, incredible though this may be to anyone with experience of the
Chinese in Malaya. Nor is there any interest in trade unions. There is a general
shortage of labour and there are no large industrial works. The individual still seems
to be well able to look after his own interests with occasional assistance from officials
of the Labour and Welfare Department. The threat of Communist subversion is as yet
negligible, though it needs careful watching.
7. The North Borneo Chinese are very different from the Chinese communities
in Singapore and Malaya. There has been no mass immigration into North Borneo of
Chinese labour. The Chinese came here in small family groups, most of them many
years ago. They settled on the land, and still to-day most Chinese here have an
interest in the land. In the towns there are many small shop-keepers and few wealthy
business men. The towns and villages are still small communities where everyone
knows everyone else, everyone mixes, and there is a common language, Malay.
Interests are parochial: in local events, in personal advancement in a land of
opportunity, and in getting more land. The native peoples are mainly pagan or
Christian, and this has led to intermarriage with Chinese. There is not the
fundamental antipathy found in Malaya between the Muslim Malays and the Chinese,
each at heart disliking and despising the other. There are few newspapers and those
there are also tend to be mainly interested in parish doings and people. Places and
events outside Borneo are a long way away. In so far as the Chinese take an interest
in other Chinese, they are probably more interested in Hong Kong, with which they
have business and often family ties, or in Formosa than in mainland China. As always
the Chinese have provided themselves with schools. One-third of the primary schools
are Chinese run by committees of local Chinese. But there is comparatively little
Chinese secondary education, most of the children going on from a Chinese primary
school to an English secondary school run by one of the many Christian missions.
Thus, although primary education fosters Chinese communalism, there is not the
menace from the big Chinese middle schools that creates such problems in Malaya,
and to some extent in Sarawak. Some attempts have been made by the clandestine
Communist organisation in Sarawak to penetrate one or two of the larger Chinese
schools in North Borneo, but so far only a handful of boys has been interested in
Communist ideas. It would be rash to say that this happy state of affairs will
1 For a summary of the subsequent development of political parties in North Borneo, see 26, n 8. 
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continue. The Sarawak Communist organisation will exploit every opportunity to
organise cells in North Borneo schools. But at present the general tone of the schools
is sound; the management committees are on the best terms with the Education
Department and are themselves, with a very few exceptions, opposed to their schools
going the way of Chinese schools in neighbouring countries. Moreover, there is a
most encouraging degree of acceptance of the Government’s declared policy of
making English the common language of North Borneo and the language of
education.
8. The absence of political parties does not indicate lack of political consciousness.
Inevitably there are repercussions here from the constitutional changes and political
excitements of nearby territories, particularly Brunei and Sarawak. If it were not for
these outside influences, North Borneo would wish to be left alone: to get on with
developing the country, each individual working for the betterment of himself and his
family; to raise the general level of education, especially in the rural areas; and
generally to catch up with conditions in the more advanced territories around before
embarking on political and constitutional progress. It is North Borneo’s misfortune
that it is 30 years behind the rest of South-East Asia, and is unlikely to be given that
important 30 years before to-day’s troubles invade it. Even if the political leaders of
nearby countries would leave North Borneo alone, it just is not possible to exclude
outside influences. In Sandakan, the prosperous commercial capital of North Borneo,
the wealthy Chinese business man is emerging, flexing his muscles in a small tightly
knit Chinese community, conscious of the local power his success in business has
given him, and I suspect slightly embarrassed in relation to associates in Sarawak and
Singapore, who live in the more up-to-date world of political parties and emancipation
from Colonial rule. To a lesser extent the same thing is happening in Tawau and
Jesselton. In all the towns there is the usual Chinese Chamber of Commerce, acting
as the governing body of the Chinese community, offering a platform for personal
advancement and influence, potentially a parallel authority to the Government. As the
towns get bigger, they will become more Chinese and there will be less personal
mixing of the different races. The more far-seeing of the Chinese leaders are taking
heed of what is happening to the Chinese in Sarawak, Indonesia and Malaya, and give
thought to their own future. Should they now take control of political developments
here, as they so easily can, and ensure their future before the backward native peoples
get the education that will enable them to hold the Chinese, as the Malays have done
in Malaya? So there are amongst the Chinese those who are inclined to respond to the
approaches from the Sarawak United People’s Party to start an associated political
party in North Borneo.
9. The native peoples, however, are apprehensive of any extension of Sarawak or
Brunei politics to North Borneo. They are conscious of their backwardness. They fear
that the formation of political parties here will mean that political power will go to
the Chinese. They distrust what they know of recent developments in Sarawak. They
would prefer that there should be no political development here until they have had
time to catch up, mainly in education, so that they will be able to hold their own. Nor
do they have any kindred feelings for Brunei; they inherit resentment from the past
domination of North Borneo by the Muslim Malays of Brunei. The leading natives
have rejected discreet approaches by Chinese leaders to join in starting a political
party, with the warning that any political move by the Chinese will arouse the
hostility of the natives and destroy the present happy harmony between the various
09-Malaysia-30-56-cpp  21/9/04  9:06 AM  Page 86
[31] DEC 1960 87
communities. I think the majority of politically conscious people here realise the
danger of provoking communal tension, and for this reason are in no hurry to start
politics in North Borneo. They do not wish to arouse here the tensions they believe to
trouble Sarawak, and they are worried by the way politics are developing in Sarawak.
10. So at present there is virtually no enthusiasm to start political parties here.
The question is how long will it be so, or will outside influence allow it to be so? Of
one thing I am sure; it will not be long enough. The leaders of political parties in
Sarawak and Brunei are already advocating some form of political association
between the three Borneo territories; the Sultan of Brunei may well cherish ideas of
restoring to his rule the lands ceded by his predecessors to the Brookes and the
Chartered Company;2 and in the Federation Tunku Abdul Rahman has hinted at
linking the Borneo territories into the Federation of Malaya. I have no doubt that the
best future for North Borneo lies in association with its near neighbours and with
Malaya, all having a common heritage from British rule. Given time and the help she
needs, North Borneo could join such an association from a position of strength. But
to-day the country just is not capable of looking after its own interests.
11. The greatest and most urgent need is education. Hundreds of schools are
needed to give the majority of the population, the natives who live in the rural areas,
universal primary education and enough secondary education to produce their fair
share of the leaders, merchants, professional men and civil servants, while ensuring
that they are not turned into unemployed white-collar workers but remain firmly
rooted to the land. This task is only partly a matter of money. The real difficulty is
teachers. Teachers to staff teacher training colleges and teachers to set standards in
the secondary schools. They can only be found from overseas; and so far our efforts to
get them have met with little success. We still have a great opportunity here to avoid
one of the most serious mistakes of Malaya; our failure to establish a system of
education common to all who live in the country, in which children of every race are
taught in the same language the same syllabus using the same text-books, thus
producing a united people. It is accepted that the language of education should be
English, though no doubt Malay will long remain the lingua franca of daily life; and
there is acceptance of a common school system. The opportunity will not wait
indefinitely, and until we can get the teachers we need from overseas we can make no
serious start.
12. Economically the country is developing soundly and as fast as is practical.
Thousands of acres of land are being cleared and planted, mainly with rubber, but if
all goes well cocoa and oil palms will soon broaden the agricultural economy. There
is plenty of good land available and some exceptionally good land. The limits on
agricultural development are set by the capacity of the administration, particularly
the Lands and Survey Department, and the supply of labour. Large estates manage
with difficulty to get enough labour, much of it supplied by Dusuns and Muruts from
the interior who return at intervals to their villages and padi fields. Additional labour
comes in from the Philippines and to a greater extent from the Celebes, Timor and
Kalimantan in Indonesia. The Indonesians are the main supply. They come because
conditions are bad in their own country, and most return home when they have
2 For documents on the Sultan of Brunei’s cessions see J de V Allen, A J Stockwell and L R Wright, A
collection of treaties and other documents affecting the states of Malaysia 1761–1963, volume II (London,
1981).
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accumulated some savings. Though many are critical of their own central
Government in Djakarta, they are now here in sufficient numbers to present a
potential problem for the future, particularly in the Tawau area. For the present,
however, they are most useful and the risk must be accepted. For its future supply of
labour North Borneo should look to its own people. If the current campaign
eradicates malaria and communications can be built into the rural areas, there
should be an adequate supply of young people growing up to provide for steady
development. It would be unwise to disturb the present racial composition of the
country by any mass immigration of Chinese or Indians or other race not akin to the
native peoples. Meanwhile the Indonesians meet to-day’s needs and those of them
who decide to settle permanently should be more readily assimilated than any other
race.
13. To sum up my impressions: I find North Borneo a happy country, going
ahead fast, with a great potential for the future and as yet untroubled by the
problems which bedevil the rest of South-East Asia, but ill-prepared to meet those
troubles when they come, as surely they will and sooner than all but a very few here
realise. It must be our task to do all we can as quickly as we can to strengthen these
warm-hearted friendly people to meet their future. And I urge that their claim upon
our resources should not be subordinated to generous but largely futile efforts to
rescue others who are incapable of being helped. A tithe of the aid given to Indonesia
would build a North Borneo worthy of our tutelage. The most obvious, urgent, task is
to bring on the backward native peoples who are three-quarters of the population.
For this we need capital works such as roads, wharfs, airfields, and buildings for
hospitals, offices and schools. We also need more staff and of high quality for the
administration. But most of all we need teachers to educate the people of North
Borneo to develop for themselves the resources of their country and to produce men
and women to manage their affairs.
32 CO 1030/978, no 119 30 Jan 1961
[The ‘Grand Design’]: despatch from Lord Selkirk to Mr Macleod
following up his despatch of 25 Oct and urging a government
statement of policy on the closer association. Annex A by H T
Bourdillon;1 Annex B by Sir G Tory
[Whereas interest in closer association had hitherto focused on the Borneo territories,
from this point the instability of Singapore increasingly became a major factor in British
calculations. Selkirk repeatedly argued that, unless Britain responded positively to local
interest in merger, Lee Kuan Yew would be challenged, and possibly toppled, by the
extreme left, see 33. To counter this threat and also to satisfy the PAP’s demand for
independence through merger, Selkirk believed that the British government would need
to advance the ‘grand design’ more quickly than the Borneo territories would wish.
Moreover, progress with the larger grouping of territories might reduce Malaya’s
abhorrence of closer association with Singapore.]
In my Despatch No. 3 of the 25th of October2 I set out my recommendations
concerning Her Majesty’s Government’s policy towards the development of a
1 Deputy UK commissioner in Singapore 1959–1961. 2 See 30.
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political association between Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo Territories. Since
that Despatch was written there have been certain changes in the situation which are
relevant to the recommendations I made then. I therefore took the opportunity of
the Eden Hall Conference to hold a discussion with the Governors of North Borneo
and Sarawak, the High Commissioner for Brunei, the United Kingdom High
Commissioners from Kuala Lumpur and Canberra, Her Majesty’s Ambassador in
Djakarta and representatives from the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations
Office.
2. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew has recently on more than one occasion talked with me and
my staff about the Grand Design, and most recently he discussed it with the
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. He has given the clear impression
that, since the Peoples’ Action Party’s declared aim of independence through merger
with the Federation is vulnerable to destructive criticism because the Federation’s
attitude is so unforthcoming, he is keen to explore the idea of a route to
independence through a wider political association which would include the Borneo
Territories. This would not be an immediate goal but it would come to replace
independence through merger with the Federation alone as the ideal to which the
Singapore people can eventually aspire.
3. The reasons behind this new line of thought by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew and some
reflections on its implications for Her Majesty’s Government are set out in a paper by
Mr. Bourdillon which is attached to this Despatch at Annex A. I agree with the
arguments and conclusions in this paper.
4. In Kuala Lumpur, Sir Geofroy Tory has had an interesting discussion which
reveals that at any rate one senior Federation Minister is also thinking about the
possibility of a Grand Design. I enclose at Annex B a copy of the record of this
discussion which has already been given to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Relations. While it is clear that the ideas of Tun Razak have not yet been discussed
with the Tunku, nor their practical implications thought out very far, it is
nevertheless possible that they may provide a means of persuading the Tunku to
adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards Singapore, through the medium of the
Grand Design.
5. At the discussion of these developments during the Eden Hall Conference
everyone present agreed that some form of Grand Design should be our ultimate goal
in this area, but that questions of timing were important and the precise form that
the Design should take could not be decided at this stage. On timing it was
recognised that the Federation and Singapore would be likely to want to move more
quickly than North Borneo and possibly Sarawak. It was however clear that there is a
distinct possibility that, whatever we do, a proposal for some kind of Grand Design
will be launched sooner or later by the Federation or by Singapore. It therefore
seemed important to us all that Her Majesty’s Government should decide urgently
what its attitude should be towards a Grand Design in order to be in a position to
influence its shape and character during the formative period. This shape and
character will naturally depend on the wishes of the various peoples involved, but
this should not preclude us from studying possible alternatives and where advisable
discussing them with the interested parties. If, as I hope, we accept it as the best
ultimate goal for the area from our point of view, then we were agreed that Her
Majesty’s Government should in the near future, after consultation with the
Governments involved and particularly after discussion with the Federation and
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Singapore, (the former because it is the only completely independent country
directly concerned, and the latter because its Prime Minister is at present showing
such an active interest in the subject), make a statement in whatever manner would
be most appropriate. This statement should be on the lines recommended by the
Governor of North Borneo in his Despatch No. 766 of the 11th of November, namely
that a broad association between the Federation and Singapore and the Borneo
Territories has great possibilities for the future of this area, provided it is acceptable
to the peoples concerned.
6. In the light of these developments I feel bound to renew the recommendation
made in my Despatch No. 3 of the 25th of October that Her Majesty’s Government
should reach an early decision on this matter.
7. In the latter part of Annex A attention is drawn to some of the implications of
the concept of the Grand Design from the political, economic and strategic points of
view. I would not wish the decision in principle or the resultant action advocated in
paragraphs 5 and 6 above to be delayed pending consideration of these implications.
On the contrary, I am convinced that this action must be taken soon if we are to
retain the initiative and if, in particular, we are to prevent the pressure for separate
independence for Singapore, which is accumulating under the surface and by which
Mr. Lee Kuan Yew is plainly embarrassed, from becoming unmanageable, with
extremely embarrassing effects on our own position here. I think you will agree,
however, that it is important that the implications should be spelt out and
considered rather than being left to emerge of their own accord. I propose to address
you further on this aspect of the matter when I have received, as I hope to do very
shortly, your approval for the proposals in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Despatch.
8. I am sending copies of this Despatch to the Secretaries of State for
Commonwealth Relations and Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence, to the
Governors of North Borneo and Sarawak, and the High Commissioner for Brunei, to
the United Kingdom High Commissioners in Kuala Lumpur, Canberra and
Wellington, and the United Kingdom Commissioner, Singapore, to Her Majesty’s
Ambassador in Djakarta and to the three Commanders-in-Chief in Singapore.
Annex A to 32: by H T Bourdillon
I am becoming more and more convinced that the main policy objective advocated in
the Commissioner General’s despatch No. 3 of October 25, 1960 to the Colonial
Office will be necessary in order to hold the political situation in Singapore as well as
from the broader points of view which were considered in Kuching. Most of my
reflections on this topic will not be new, but it may be useful if I put them on paper as
a basis for further thought and discussion.
2. Ever since the P.A.P. came into power they have continued to proclaim that
independence through merger with the Federation is their objective and that
separate independence for Singapore would be a dangerous illusion. That they have
hitherto successfully held this line in spite of repeated rebuffs from across the
Causeway and in spite of the emotional appeal of ‘independence’ as a slogan is a
testimony to the Prime Minister’s consistency of thought, to his moral courage and
to his grip on the local situation. At the moment, indeed, he seems to be more firmly
entrenched than ever—on the basis of a policy which tells the people of Singapore in
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slightly different words that they cannot achieve independence for a long time to
come. We have almost come to accept this remarkable phenomenon (doubly
remarkable if we consider the helter-skelter rush towards independence which is
going on elsewhere in the world) as a permanent feature of the Singapore scene.
Nevertheless, I think we must all doubt whether the present situation can last
indefinitely. Is not the time coming, perhaps quite soon, when the P.A.P. will have to
choose between the alternatives of changing their line on independence or of
destroying themselves by adhering to it?
3. This conclusion would be less compelling if the attitude of the Federation
Government were less bleak. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew has repeatedly said that he does not
want the Federation leaders to welcome the idea of merger, but only to keep the door
ajar and to offer some immediate cooperation in the economic field. At present he is
not getting even this minimal measure of assistance. The Tengku’s suspicion and
dislike of the P.A.P. Government is said to have diminished, and it will probably
diminish still further as the latter come out more and more into the open in their
struggle against the Communists; but unfortunately the good effect of this
improvement is counteracted by another tendency in the Federation which is very
strong and which is not fundamentally due to any hostility towards Singapore as
such. I refer to the craving for economic self-sufficiency, to the urge on the part of
the Federation to have its own separate national institutions under its own
undisputed control—its own major port, its own industrial policy, its own rubber
market, its own airport, its own stock exchange. This urge is of course mixed up with
envious feelings towards Singapore as the big Chinese city which has hitherto
provided these amenities, but it is basically a product of nationalist sentiment
spurred on by the attainment of independence in 1957. It may well continue even if
the attitude towards Singapore goes on improving, and so long as it continues it is
bound to make the P.A.P. policy of independence through merger look more and
more unrealistic even to P.A.P. supporters.
4. It is implicit in this P.A.P. policy that it cannot survive indefinitely in static or
deteriorating circumstances. In proclaiming independence through merger as their
objective the P.A.P. Government have recognised that in their statement of aims the
word ‘independence’ cannot be omitted, or in other words that the demand for
independence is an aspiration which must ultimately be met somehow. It follows
that if time goes on and independence by the chosen means comes no nearer, the
policy will sooner or later collapse. It is very convenient for H.M.G. that the status
quo in Singapore should be maintained for the time being by the Singapore
Government’s habit of forecasting independence in conditions which are not within
sight of being realised, but it would be folly to assume that a permanent settlement of
Singapore’s future can be established on this foundation.
5. The relevance of all this to the despatch of October 25th is obvious. If we are
doubtful whether the policy of independence through merger can be indefinitely
maintained, and if on the other hand we share Mr. Lee Kuan Yew’s conviction that
separate independence for Singapore is a dangerous nonsense, the conclusion that
H.M.G. ought to encourage the ultimate participation of both Singapore and the
Federation of Malaya in a wider political grouping follows almost automatically. We
know moreover that there is at least the possibility that the Tengku might not feel
the same repugnance towards association with Singapore in a wider grouping as he
feels towards merger in its simple form—though his feelings on this matter seem to
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fluctuate a good deal. Finally, it is clear from all our recent conversations with Mr.
Lee Kuan Yew himself that he is now strongly attracted by the idea of the larger
grouping both as a solution to his own dilemma and as a desirable development in its
own right. These considerations seem to me to make the case for the larger
grouping, as H.M.G.’s best bet for solving the present and future problem of
Singapore, almost unanswerable.
6. If this is accepted, we shall next have to consider what positive steps on our
part may be desirable, over and above those already contemplated. First, however, I
should like to emphasise certain dangers which it is necessary to avoid:—
(a) We must in no way relax our efforts to improve relations between the Federation
and Singapore. There is a temptation to conclude that if from now on we are going
to attach increasing importance to the larger grouping, the problem of the bilateral
relationship between Singapore and the Federation of Malaya can be put on one
side. This would be a dangerous fallacy. In the first place we are not yet entitled to
assume that the larger grouping will come off. In the second place the improvement
of relations between the Federation and Singapore, particularly on the economic
side, is an urgent necessity in its own right, whatever the political future may hold.
In the third place the improvement of these relations will be a necessary element in
the success of any plans for the larger grouping itself. If the relationship between
the Federation and Singapore continues poor or becomes exacerbated, this may tip
the scales in the Federation not only against merger with Singapore but also against
association with Singapore in a wider group.
(b) Nor must we encourage the Prime Minister of Singapore to switch his line too
rapidly from merger to the Grand Design. There is a real danger of his doing this,
and in fact we have very recently had to discourage him from coming out in public
in favour of the larger grouping in a way which might have caused adverse
reactions both in the Federation and in the Borneo territories. In making this
point I do not mean that we should urge Mr. Lee Kuan Yew to go on pressing for
merger in and out of season. We all know the reaction which this causes in Kuala
Lumpur, and in any case H.M.G.’s disinterested attitude towards merger must of
course be maintained in everything that we do. On the other hand the Prime
Minister will not do himself any good politically if he appears to change horses in
mid-stream. Any change on his part must be gradual and must be presented as an
expansion rather than an abandonment of previous ideas. Moreover, he cannot
afford any more than we can to forget that the improvement of relations between
Singapore and the Federation remains his most pressing immediate problem,
whatever the long-term objective may be.
(c) Finally, we should not abandon the idea of trying to give Singapore and its
Prime Minister a more dignified place in Commonwealth councils, within the
framework of the present Constitution. It is tempting to argue that this idea can
also be put on one side, but it is in no way incompatible with the ultimate
absorption of Singapore into a larger group. Moreover it is bound to be some years
before the Grand Design can actually come into being, and in the meanwhile it
may be very important to hold the position in Singapore by making the present
status of the island as politically palatable as possible.
7. So much for the dangers to be avoided. In my opinion the most important
positive step which we should now take in furtherance of the Grand Design is to
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examine more closely the implications of the concept from the political, economic
and strategic point of view. I have the following comments on these three aspects:—
(a) Politically we are faced with the problem that the Borneo territories will not
be ready for independence (even as part of a larger grouping) for a number of
years, while on the other hand the whole idea of the larger grouping may lose
impetus and be lost if it is held up because of the relative constitutional
backwardness of the Borneo territories. It is tempting to believe that one might
devise a constitutional framework, on the lines of the Central African
Federation, which could include both self-governing and non-self-governing
territories, but I am afraid this would not be possible in the present case.
Southern Rhodesia, which is the most ‘advanced’ territory in the Central African
Federation, is not a sovereign independent state, and I do not see how it would
be possible to include fully independent and dependent territories in the same
federation without either trammelling the independence of the former or
entirely relinquishing control over the latter. I think, therefore, that progress
must be found in the evolution in the first instance of consultative institutions
which could bring the territories closer together and pave the way for an
ultimate constitutional association.
Then again, the composition of the federal legislature in an ultimate federation
of the five territories needs to be thought out. The Prime Minister of Singapore at
present seems to believe that the legislatures in the individual territories could
constitute themselves into a kind of electoral college which would choose the
members of the central parliament. This is an attractive idea, since it would
emphasise the self-governing status of the individual territories, but the whole
concept needs further examination. I am fearful lest in the last resort any federal
parliament which is not based on a popular vote may come to be regarded as
unrepresentative and therefore to be an object of suspicion and discontent. We
may use loose terms like ‘confederation’, but we cannot blink the fact that in any
effective political grouping there must be a real pooling of sovereignty, with all the
problems that that involves.
(b) Economically we are faced with the problem (among others) that a customs
union is usually regarded as being an indispensable condition of a political
federation, however loose. On the other hand the Malayan Government is at
present averse even to a limited common market with Singapore. This difficulty is
not necessarily fatal, since the Malayan Government might be prepared to look
with a more favourable eye on a full customs union with Singapore within a larger
grouping which would provide a more capacious home market for the products of
both territories. Further examination of the economic implication is, however,
clearly required in relation to this problem if to no others.
(c) Strategically we are faced with the problem that if Singapore were to become
part of an independent Malaya/Borneo federation, the United Kingdom’s strategic
position in Singapore could no longer be maintained on the present basis. We
should either have to rely on a defence treaty or on territorial enclaves [as] in
Cyprus. The latter idea may not be so ridiculous if we consider Singapore as part of
an extensive federation as it seems to be when we consider Singapore as a separate
political unit. Here again, however, further examination of the implications is
needed in the near future if not immediately.
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Annex B to 32: by Sir G Tory
Immediately before my departure for the Eden Hall Conference last week I had an
interesting talk with Mr Thompson, the Secretary for Defence,3 which indicated that
Tun Razak, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, is modifying his
attitude towards the relations between the Federation and Singapore.
I had asked Mr Thompson what he was going to do when he retired in April next
but he said there was a chance that he might stay on in Malaya to take charge of
planning for some future constitutional association between the Federation and
Singapore and also with the Borneo Territories. Tun Razak was, he said, now
becoming convinced that the Federation would have to accept responsibility for
Singapore in the end. It was of course Tun Razak’s view, like that of everyone else in
Malaya, that Singapore could not be assimilated without the addition also of non-
Chinese peoples from some or all of the Borneo Territories. Malaya had hitherto been
working on the assumption that only Sarawak and Brunei could be accepted by the
Federation in the foreseeable future but Tun Razak was now reconciled to the fact
that a solution on these lines would not be acceptable and that there would have to
be a ‘package deal’. Tun Razak’s present idea was said to be that Mr. Thompson
should work out a scheme accordingly.
Mr. Thompson said that the sort of plan he was going to put forward was that the
Federation should be prepared to absorb Sarawak and Brunei in three years’ time,
Singapore in five years, and North Borneo in ten years. This was only a cock-shy but
it reflected:—
(a) the inability of the Federation to assimilate too much at once;
(b) the Federation’s awareness that North Borneo was still some way behind the
others from the political point of view; and
(c) the Federation’s hope that in the meantime we should develop North Borneo’s
defence potentialities.
I reminded Mr. Thompson that Tun Razak had once said to me that if the Federation
ever accepted Singapore, even with the addition of the Borneo Territories, it would
be impossible for the Federation Government to allow us to keep our base there
because one Defence Agreement was all that they could politically sustain. Mr
Thompson said at once that he was confident of being able to shift Tun Razak from
this point of view. His idea was that the existing Defence Agreement would simply
have to be amended to cover the Singapore base also.
Mr. Thompson said that the Tunku was still rigid in his attitude to Singapore and
would not, in his present mood, begin to look at a Grand Design on the above lines.
But Mr. Thompson thought that Tun Razak would be able in the end to bring him
round. He was quite certain that Tun Razak was the only person who could do this
and that it would be a mistake for anyone else to tackle the Tunku on the subject in
the meantime. The Tunku, as everyone knows, is very stubborn and there is a risk
that he would adopt an intransigent position from which he would find it difficult to
withdraw if we attacked him too soon.
3 R G K (later Sir Robert) Thompson, former member of the Malayan Civil Service who played a significant
role in the counter-insurgency operations of the Malayan emergency, was permanent secretary for defence
in the Federation of Malaya, 1959–1961, and head of the British Advisory Mission to Vietnam, 1961–1965.
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33 DO 169/18, no 11 17 Mar 1961
‘The outlook in Singapore for the next twelve months’: report
(DCC(FE)61/90) by the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) for
the British Defence Coordinating Committee (Far East)
[This paper, prognosticating that Lee Kuan Yew ‘will continue to be faced with potential
opposition from the extreme left but he and his party will maintain their position and
power’, was circulated to the Chiefs of Staff as the annex to COS(61)107, 24 Mar 1961.]
Aim
By examining the developments which have taken place since JIC(FE)(59)93(Final)+
was written, to assess the Political and Economic outlook in Singapore for the next
12 months.
Internal
2. Political. The PAP has increasingly emphasised that it is a democratic, socialist,
non-Communist Party. Neither its programme nor its methods are revolutionary or
even extreme, but it frequently employs Communist jargon and techniques in what
are essentially anti-Communist contexts. This tends to make the public picture of the
PAP somewhat equivocal. This equivocal impression is reinforced by dictatorial
tendencies, such as restriction of the freedom of the press and radio and political
indoctrination of the administration. The influence of the right wing opposition
remains negligible. In the industrial field, despite further Communist penetration
among certain trade unions, the Government have for the moment contained the
extreme left by providing for compulsory arbitration in industrial disputes, by holding
back on previous proposals to consolidate trade unions under an all powerful TUC, and
by driving home to the public the paramount importance of industrial peace.
3. The relations between the Government and the trade unions will continue to
be a major problem in the next twelve months. Although these improved towards the
end of 1960 as a result of a lull in industrial strife, the unions will continue to press
the Government to approve the constitution of the new TUC and to pass the Trades
Union Bill to consolidate unions under the TUC’s control. The Government are,
however, likely to go slow as long as they cannot rely on a majority in the TUC
Secretariat. The danger of the TUC pursuing an independent and aggressive line
comes not from the pro-Communist element alone led by Lim Chin Siong and Fong
Swee Suan, but rather from a combination of this element with other left wing
members of the Secretariat led by Woodhull, Bani, Dominic Puthucheary and Jamit
Singh.1 The Government is, however, still contemplating sterner measures against
pro-Communist elements in the unions as part of its general drive to defeat the
Communists. A more immediate problem for the Government is the nuisance value
constituted by an impending by-election resulting from Ong Eng Guan’s resignation
from the Assembly.2 This nuisance value derives from Ong Eng Guan’s appeal to anti-
+ DCC(FE)(59)261 (COS(59)237)
1 Together with Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan and Sidney Woodhull, S T Bani, Dominic Puthucheary
(younger brother of James) and Jamit Singh were the so-called ‘Big Six’ trade union leaders.
2 Having resigned office and membership of the PAP, Ong Eng Guan challenged the PAP candidate at the
Hong Lim by-election in late Apr 1961 and won, see 38.
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colonialist feeling in general, and, in particular, his attack on the Internal Security
Council and the privileged position of the British Armed Forces in Singapore. The
most difficult problem for the Government, however, will be to contain the slowly
mounting pressure for independence without merger. This pressure is being applied
by a combination of extreme left and Chinese chauvinist elements and builds upon
disillusion over the chances of merger with the Federation, distaste for the economic
policy of attracting free enterprise investment founded on industrial peace with
justice, and impatience with the constitutional limitations in internal security and
external affairs. Against this pressure the Government continue to take an aggressive
and courageous stand in favour of creating a non-communal pan-Malayan loyalty.
Whether the Government succeed will depend on progress made towards
industrialisation and on improving relations with the Federation.
Internal Security Council
4. The Internal Security Council has been working for over a year. It has dealt
successfully with the tricky question of the detainees remaining in custody after the
leading eight had been released before the Government took office.3 The Government
has now released others and some further detentions have taken place, mostly under
the umbrella of the Internal Security Council. The United Kingdom and Federation
Governments are willing to bear part of the burden of responsibility, as the Council
undoubtedly does have a collective responsibility for its decisions, even though these
may be based on initiatives taken by the Singapore Government. If and when the
Government proceed, however, with their new policy of detaining Communists in
various fields including the trade unions, it will become increasingly difficult to use
the Council as a front for unpopular decisions initiated by the Singapore
Government. In the long run, this issue of responsibility could assume very serious
proportions in event of any disorders involving the use of British troops, since the
Prime Minister has indicated that it would finish him politically to assume
responsibility for bringing in British troops of his own accord.
Nanyang University and Chinese schools
5. The Government has been pursuing a policy of opening opportunities in the
Civil Service for the Chinese educated. An important part of their programme is to
offer equality of treatment between Nanyang and the University to Malaya [sic], and,
for this purpose, to make available large sums of money to Nanyang University in
return for reforms at Nanyang. The Chinese businessmen who, with Tan Lark Sye,
control Nanyang University, are, however, resisting the Government.4 The
Government is proceeding slowly and has gained some support from the students. Its
3 See 13, n 3.
4 Tan Lark Sye came to Singapore in his youth and became a wealthy rubber merchant and industrialist. In
1953 he proposed the foundation of a Chinese-medium university as a counter to the English-medium
University of Malaya. As a result of massive public subscription the Nanyang University opened in 1956 but
three years later the Prescott Commission reported adversely on its academic standards. There were
protests over lost employment prospects for Nanyang graduates but violence was avoided by a compromise
whereby they were admitted to the public services as probationers. After the elections of Sept 1963, Tan
Lark Sye’s citizenship was revoked and he resigned from the chairmanship of the Nanyang University
executive council.
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attempts to exercise stricter control over the Chinese Schools have also been
proceeding without any open reaction. However, the potential threat of the puritanical
and chauvinistic appeal of Communism to Chinese speaking students remains.
Communalism
6. The dissensions in UMNO, Singapore, are now being patched up, but Malay
antipathy to the predominantly Chinese population continues despite constant
efforts by the Singapore Government to promote Malay as the national language and
to create a pan-Malayan loyalty. This antipathy can be exploited by small, but
dangerous groups of political extremists or opportunists as in the case of the abortive
ARTIS plot in January, 1961.5 This plot, which mainly involved elements of Javanese
and Boyanese origin, did not have the backing of any reputable Malay organisation,
nor did it attract general support among Malays in the island, but the wide-spread
fears and rumours engendered by the plot showed the dangerous potentialities of the
communal feeling which remains in Singapore.
Police
7. The police force has recovered from the pay cuts and its relations with the
public have improved but it is several hundreds below strength in its present
establishment and the Commissioner’s request for an increase in the establishment,
particularly in the rank and file, is being resisted by the Government, partly on the
ground that quantity is less important than quality and partly on financial grounds.
Attempts to attract a better class of candidate for various ranks have not, however,
been very successful so far. The Police are therefore likely to remain below strength
for some time to come, particularly in the rank and file, and this is bound to affect
their confidence in their own ability to carry out their tasks. Moreover, their morale
has also been adversely affected by Ministerial interference or undue influence upon
promotions and disciplinary matters and by the restrictions placed upon them in
their handling of strike pickets. In this last aspect the Government have in the very
recent past displayed a more satisfactory attitude.
8. The Gurkha contingent of the Police Force is still reliable but they need an
infusion of new recruits. The prospect of obtaining suitable replacements for the two
British officers is not promising.
Special Branch
9. The Government has now decided to train a senior administrative civil servant
as Director of Special Branch. Meanwhile, they have asked for and are using two
members of the United Kingdom Security Service within the Special Branch for
reorganisation and training purposes. The Prime Minister clearly places great value
on the Special Branch as the source of expert assistance against the subversive threat
and in the process the Special Branch has gained confidence and greater influence
on the Government. The burden mainly rests however, on the remaining expatriates
(European and Pakistani). Their immediate departure would gravely affect the
efficiency of the Branch.
5 ARTIS (Angkatan Revolusi Tentera Islam Singapore or Singapore Islamic Revolutionary Armed Forces)
was a Malay militant group that received funds from the Indonesian consulate-general in Singapore. In
Jan 1961 the Singapore police uncovered an ARTIS plot to foment Sino-Malay race riots.
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External relations
Relations with the Federation
10. Singapore is no closer to merger with the Federation and the situation is
unlikely to alter in the next twelve months. The Federation Government do not
approve of the Singapore Government’s attempts to ‘ride the tiger of Communism’
by appointing ex-detainees to be Political Secretaries and members of the TUC
instead of keeping them locked up. While they expect the Singapore Government to
contain and even attack Communism in Singapore they are most reluctant to co-
operate with the Singapore Government on this. Nevertheless, the Tengku, in
response to advice from the United Kingdom Government and assiduous personal
cultivation by Lee Kuan Yew, has recently made a much more forthcoming
statement about Federation/Singapore relations. While still maintaining that merger
is not possible at this moment, the Tengku has for the first time said complimentary
things about the PAP, and their policy of fostering Malayan consciousness in
Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew could not have expected more at this stage.
Relations with the United Kingdom
11. Relations with the United Kingdom have improved. The Singapore
Government has shown itself ready to accept HMG’s advice on a number of occasions
and has even listened to views on matters which are rightfully within its own
competence. Despite goading from Ong Eng Guan it has refrained from agitation
against the presence of British forces on large areas of Singapore land. In fact Lee
Kuan Yew clearly regards the presence of British forces as the ultimate safeguard
against Communist subversion inside Singapore. He also recognises the economic
importance of the Services as the largest employers in Singapore. For both these
reasons he has in private encouraged HMG to declare that it intends to maintain its
bases and forces in Singapore.
12. The Singapore Government has also resisted the temptation to call for full
independence. It has repeatedly stressed that while independence must be its
ultimate goal, it can only be obtained through merger with the Federation, and that
meanwhile Singapore has full internal self-government under the present
Constitution which will be reviewed in 1963.
13. If Her Majesty’s Government were involved in a limited war in South East
Asia whether under SEATO auspices or not, opposition from left-wing elements in
Singapore would almost certainly be strong. The three bases on the Island are
dependent on local civilian labour, and their effective working can be rapidly
impaired by a withdrawal of local labour. The attitude of the Government and the
consequent likelihood of civil disorder would depend on whether HMG came into
direct conflict or was likely to come into direct conflict with Indonesia or China. It is
also clear that relations may undergo strain from time to time on external issues
which can be exploited by the extreme left, e.g. Algeria and the Congo.
Relations with other countries
14. In South East Asia Singapore has shown a healthy desire to play a constructive
role and to add to her reputation. This has been fostered by her promotion to full
membership of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee and to separate associate
membership of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE).
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15. Singapore’s relations with her two major trading partners, the Federation of
Malaya and Indonesia, are the most important. The Federation is dealt with in a
separate section (paragraph 10 above). With Indonesia, the economic aspect is all
important, since Singapore’s exports have declined alarmingly during the past two
years and are still declining. Singapore is trying assiduously to improve the
economic relationship. A permanent trade and cultural post is to be established and
current inter-Governmental trade negotiations seem likely to result in the signing of
a trade agreement.
16. After Malaya and Indonesia, Singapore is probably most interested in the
Borneo territories. The Yang di-Pertuan Negara and the Prime Minister were official
guests at the Sultan of Brunei’s birthday celebrations in September, 1960, and the
Prime Minister took the occasion to pay informal visits to Sarawak and North
Borneo. The Prime Minister spoke, with commendable tact and restraint, of the need
for the smaller countries in the region to hang together and of his hope that
Singapore’s experience could be of benefit to them in their progress towards
independence. Since then the Prime Minister has shown increasing interest in the
possibilities of the Grand Design, e.g. some form of Federation between Malaya,
Singapore and the Borneo territories, as something above and beyond merger with
the Federation through which he can divert the aspirations of the people of
Singapore towards an ultimate, constitutional goal.
Economic
The basic problem
17. Singapore’s great problem is to provide employment for her rapidly
increasing population. On 30th June, 1960, the population was estimated at
1,634,100 which represents an increase of more than 188,000 since the last census in
June, 1957. The rate of increase has recently declined from about 66,000 a year to
44,000, but this decline is due more to population movements than to a slowing
down in the rate of natural increase. The movement of population cannot be relied
on to continue, and the mounting numbers coming into the age group of maximum
fertility will tend to make the natural increase higher rather than lower.
18. In mid-1960 over 10% of the economically active population of about
500,000 were unemployed, and the Singapore Government have estimated that a
further 10,000 will be seeking employment each year until 1962, and nearly 16,000 a
year in 1963/64.
Government’s economic policy
19. After a slow start the Government is now facing the economic problem more
realistically. A five year development plan has been prepared with two main objects;
first to create employment by industrialisation and the development of the entrepot
services, and second, to provide social services for the expanding population. The
plan includes improvements to harbour and airport facilities and more roads, houses;
schools and hospitals. In the industrialisation programme Singapore will rely
primarily on private investment, but the Government is prepared to consider limited
state participation on an empirical basis. Its aim is to supply the framework for
industrialisation by the creation of industrial estates and by the establishment of an
Economic Development Board. In suitable cases, new or expanding industries will be
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given ‘pioneer’ status (i.e. relief from income tax for 5 years); a further incentive in
some cases (but subject to consideration of Singapore’s ‘free port’ interests) may be a
protective tariff. To determine which industries should be encouraged, the
Government is seeking advice from the United Nations Technical Assistance Board,
who are undertaking a survey and should report in early 1961.
20. The estimated cost of the plan over the five year period is $968M. Of this, the
Government hopes to raise some $685M from local resources. Singapore recently
received $43M in loans, together with $22M in grants, from the United Kingdom, and
further United Kingdom aid under the Colonial Development and Welfare will be
considered in 1963 in the light of Singapore’s needs at that time. The Government
has had preliminary discussions with the World Bank, and the latter has agreed to
consider the request for loans in the light of a survey of Singapore’s credit
worthiness. The development programme is unlikely to be held up by lack of finance;
it is more probable that because of shortage of technical staff, the Government will
find difficulty in spending the available money within the time proposed.
Local confidence
21. Singapore Ministers have to walk a tight rope, between their socialist
principles and the need to woo left-wing extremists on the one side, and a realistic
appreciation of Singapore’s necessary dependence on commerce and on private capital
on the other. Recently they have made it clear that they regard thoroughgoing
socialism as impracticable in Singapore, at any rate within the foreseeable future.
There has been no substantial migration of capital during the period, because a
responsible body of opinion in local business circles (though more in the European
than in the Chinese section) recognises that the present Government is, from their
point of view, the best they can hope for and is thus worthy of support. Apart, however,
from a few mildly encouraging moves (e.g. new Shell and Japanese refineries, and
some applications for ‘pioneer status’), local confidence has not brought about any
large scale investment in local industry. There is a fair hope that local confidence will
grow during the coming twelve months. It would be greatly strengthened by a closer
economic understanding between Singapore and the Federation. The Singapore
Government recognises this and has been trying to establish a limited Common
Market with the Federation. This has not, however, made much progress and there is
already a tendency in the Federation, to reduce the traditional dependence on
Singapore by establishing in the Federation, wherever possible, the communications
and commercial services in which Singapore specialises. Examples of this are a
proposal to create a rubber market in Kuala Lumpur, and competition with Singapore
in the development of an international airport and of port facilities. If this trend
continues, it is bound in time to prove harmful to Singapore.
External confidence
22. Although tendencies may develop in other surrounding countries to bypass
Singapore as entrepot centre, world trade conditions should be favourable for South
East Asia over the next twelve months and Singapore should retain its commercial
position and prosperity during the period. It is still regarded as an efficient port and
entrepot centre; the volume of traffic at the harbour is as high as ever and shows no
signs of contracting. Singapore’s geographical position and trade links are an asset,
but the cost of labour is about twice as high as in Hong Kong. Various industrialists
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and bankers have commented encouragingly during recent months on Singapore’s
economic situation and potentialities, but there has been no rush to seize whatever
advantages it may offer. Even Japan, with its pressing need for economic outlets is
hesitant. On the other hand if the various outside missions (UNTAB, World Bank)
report favourably, and if some impetus is imparted by the Economic Development
Board, then prospects should improve. More generally, there is an indefinite asset in
the native wits and resourcefulness of the Singapore Chinese. However, it must be
emphasised that any optimism depends on Singapore achieving a fair measure of
industrial peace; unless this is done, so far from industrialisation getting under way,
existing firms may move out of Singapore.
Prospects of bloc aid 6
23. Singapore Ministers are well aware of the menace of Communist China and it
is unlikely that it would seek or accept economic aid from this source. Their attitude
to the Soviet Union is somewhat different and they have over the past year shown
interest in economic aid from Soviet sources. However, HMG has taken a firm line
and forbidden any acceptance of Soviet aid and at the same time has brought home
to the Singapore Government the serious effect that the encouragement of Soviet
connections could have on its relations with the Federation. There is no reason to
suppose that Ministers are at present contemplating further approaches to the Soviet
Union or that they are in a mood to risk defiance of the UK. Moreover, there has
developed over recent months a healthy westward and free world orientation. As
against that, however, Singapore Ministers have undoubtedly observed with interest
the tactics of the other South East Asian countries which play off one bloc against
the other; it would be unwise to rule out any future emulation of these tactics. If
there were to be any serious stagnation in industrial development or a major
recession in world prices, and if the Russians, perceiving their political opportunity,
were to come forward with some attractive offer of aid (e.g. the provision of a
factory), Singapore might well have difficulty in turning it down, and a veto by the
UK might lead to serious tension. On the whole, however, prospects seem just
sufficiently encouraging to make this improbable during the next year.
Conclusions
24. We conclude that:—
(a) Lee Kuan Yew will continue to be faced with potential opposition from the
extreme left but he and his party will maintain their position and power.
(b) The Government’s present policy towards the trade unions might lead to an
open breach between the Government and the pro-Communist elements, but so
long as the Government retains its determination and is supported by the United
Kingdom and Federation in the Internal Security Council it is likely to be able to
hold its position at the cost of some of its popular support.
(c) Relations with HMG have improved and so long as Lee Kuan Yew’s position is
not undermined should remain good on basic issues although there may well be
strain from time to time on external questions such as the Congo where he has to
retain left-wing support.
6 See 21, para 4 and 27, para (c).
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(d) In the event of the UK becoming involved in a limited war, the danger of
serious interference with the operation of the military bases remains likely.
(e) Relations with the Federation, both political and economic, did not improve
during 1960, but 1961 has started out hopefully, with a more forthcoming
statement by the Tengku. Nevertheless, the Government will probably pursue its
increasing interest in the Grand Design.
(f ) Unless there is a major recession in world prices, or unless continued
irresponsibility or aggression in trade union tactics frighten off all investments,
the economy will not be impaired sufficiently in the next twelve months to weaken
the Government’s authority. In these circumstances the Government is unlikely to
seek aid from the Communist Bloc. Its prestige will, however, suffer if its
cherished major industrial projects do not show signs of coming to fruition or if
no progress is made in economic co-operation with the Federation.
34 CAB 134/1560, CPC(61)9 14 Apr 1961
‘Possibility of an association of the British Borneo territories with the
Federation of Malaya and the state of Singapore’: memorandum by Mr
Macleod for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee reporting on
developments since July 1960
[In his assessment of Selkirk’s recommendation publicly to accept closer association,
Macleod argued against such a statement of policy but in favour of consultations with
Australia and New Zealand followed by confidential discussions with the Tunku and Lee.
The prime minister was briefed on this paper but was not present when it was discussed
by the Colonial Policy Committee (PREM 11/3418; see 35).]
The problem and previous consideration
At a meeting on the 27th July, 1960, there was discussion of my memorandum (C. P.
C. (60)17) on the long term possibility of a political association of the British Borneo
territories (the Colonies of North Borneo and Sarawak, and the Protected State of
Brunei) with the Federation of Malaya and the State of Singapore.1 Such an
association, which one would hope would remain within the Commonwealth, would
provide a possible future home for the small Borneo territories, which, trying to
stand alone or even in association together, might find themselves up against heavy
pressures from Indonesia, the Philippines and China. It would also seem to offer the
best answer to the future problem of Singapore. The conclusion of the meeting was
that Lord Selkirk, who was present, should discuss the matter in Borneo. This
discussion was held at Kuching, Sarawak, on the 20th October, 1960.2 In addition to
the Governors of Sarawak and North Borneo and the High Commissioner for Brunei,
Lord Perth was also present.
Lord Selkirk’s recommendations
2. In accordance with the conclusions of that meeting, and of a further
discussion at the time of the Eden Hall Conference in January this year, at which, in
1 See 25 and 27. 2 See 30.
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addition to the two Governors and the High Commissioner for Brunei, our High
Commissioners from Kuala Lumpur and Canberra and our Ambassador from
Djakarta were also present, Lord Selkirk has submitted recommendations for
consideration by Her Majesty’s Government.3 The recommendations, which have the
general support of those present at the meetings, may be summarised as follows:—
(a) Her Majesty’s Government should accept as the ultimate aim of their policy
the development of a political association between Malaya, Singapore and the
three Borneo territories;
(b) progress towards this goal must be gradual and adjusted to the rate of political
evolution in the Borneo territories; the first step must be the strengthening of
existing links between North Borneo and Sarawak with the intention that these
two territories might eventually enter the wider association as a single unit; this
gradual bringing together of the two Borneo colonies should proceed without
expectation of Brunei’s participation, but without prejudice to her joining later
should this be found possible;
(c) while progress is being made under (b) we should do our best to avoid political
or economic developments in the area which would cut across the idea of an
ultimate association of the five territories, and, conversely, should encourage any
development leading to co-operation between them;
(d) we should be ready to discuss this matter in confidence, as occasion may arise,
with interested parties such as Tunku Abdul Rahman, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew and the
Sultan of Brunei;
(e) after consultation with the Governments involved Her Majesty’s Government
should in the near future make a statement in whatever manner would be most
appropriate to the effect that a broad association between the Federation and
Singapore and the Borneo territories has great possibilities for the future of the
area, provided it is acceptable to the peoples concerned.
Timing
3. Lord Selkirk has emphasised that it is important to avoid any appearance that
Her Majesty’s Government are making the pace in this matter or seeking to impose
the idea upon the peoples concerned. I strongly endorse this (though of course some
development outside our control might force our hand). If the plan is to be
successful, it cannot be rushed. The parties to it must evolve it as their own plan.
4. Nor is it in our interest to rush it. The present situation suits us. The political
association of the five territories which we are now considering fits into a future
when we can no longer, or need no longer, insist on maintaining our present
constitutional defence rights in Singapore and the Borneo territories and can be
content to safeguard what defence interests we may still wish to retain, as Lord
Selkirk puts it, ‘on a basis of consent’ by a friendly independent country.
5. In C.P.C. (60) 17, in reference to the Tunku’s suggestion made to Lord Perth
last June that he might take over Sarawak and Brunei while we retained North
Borneo for defence purposes, I said that I felt very great doubt if it was realistic to
think of retaining North Borneo as a Crown Colony after Sarawak had either become
3 See 32.
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self-governing on its own or had merged with the Federation. This view was
confirmed at Lord Selkirk’s Kuching meeting and I am sure we should give the
Tunku no encouragement on this score. If Brunei alone were to want to join the
Federation in advance of the other two, we could not, and need not, object; though
here again we should not encourage it. Brunei, the wealthiest and most Malay of the
three territories, is the plum from the Tunku’s point of view and once he had got it
his interest in the rest might decline.
Should Her Majesty’s Government make a public statement?
6. Paragraphs 3 and 4 above argue against the desirability of an early statement
by Her Majesty’s Government. The reason why such a statement has been
recommended is the growing pressure in Singapore for ‘separate’ independence. Mr.
Lee Kuan Yew’s policy of independence through merger with the Federation of
Malaya has come under fire because the Federation’s unwillingness to merge in the
foreseeable future is only too clear. This remains so even though the Tunku recently
made some friendly statements about Singapore. Lord Selkirk thinks it would fortify
Mr. Lee and frustrate his and our enemies if the possibility of independence through
a wider association were to be produced as an attainable goal. There is clearly much
in this. Nevertheless I am not in favour of a public statement by Her Majesty’s
Government ‘in the near future’ in advance of evidence of some weight of local
opinion in favour of such an association.
Consultation with other governments
7. The interests of Australia and New Zealand are closely involved in the future of
the area and I accept the advice of the Commonwealth Relations Office that our next
step should be to take these two Governments into our confidence and give them a
chance of expressing their views.
Sounding of Tunku Abdul Rahman and others
8. Subject to the result of these consultations we should then, as may seem
appropriate, sound confidentially Tunku Abdul Rahman and Mr. Lee Kuan Yew,
probably in that order, and possibly also the Sultan of Brunei and, subject to the
views of the Governors, selected local notables in Sarawak and North Borneo.
Recommendations
9. I recommend that my colleagues should endorse the recommendations in
paragraph 2 above, as modified and expanded in paragraphs 3 to 8.
35 CAB 134/1560, CPC 4(61)1 18 Apr 1961
‘The possibility of an association of the British Borneo territories with
the Federation of Malaya and the state of Singapore’: Cabinet Colonial
Policy Committee minutes
[Chaired by Lord Kilmuir (lord chancellor) in the absence of Macmillan, the committee
endorsed Macleod’s paper, including the recommendation that no public statement of
policy should be made for the time being. Selkirk was informed of the outcome by
telegram on 21 Apr 1961 (CO 1030/1079, no 1). After the 13th Inter-Territorial
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Conference of the Borneo Territories at the end of April, Selkirk wrote to Macleod urging
more rapid advance towards closer association (see 36).]
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C.
(61) 9)1 on the possibility of an association of the British Borneo Territories with the
Federation of Malaya and the State of Singapore.
The Colonial Secretary recalled that Ministers had agreed in July 1960 (C.P.C. (61)
20) that Lord Selkirk, the Commissioner General for South East Asia, should discuss
at the Borneo Inter-Territorial Conference at Kuching in October, 1960 the
possibility of a political association between the five territories. In the light of this
Conference Lord Selkirk had recommended that the Government should adopt the
concept of association as an ultimate aim of policy and should work gradually
towards it in full consultation with the various local interests concerned. He had also
suggested that the Government should make a statement to the effect that
association between the territories had great possibilities for the future of the area,
provided it was acceptable to the peoples concerned.
He generally endorsed Lord Selkirk’s proposals; but, since it was essential that the
United Kingdom Government should not appear to be trying to impose a political
association and that support for it should be seen to come from those concerned in
the area, he was not in favour of a public statement by the Government at the present
time. He proposed to give Lord Selkirk appropriate instructions in time for a further
meeting which Lord Selkirk was holding on 26th April with the Governors of North
Borneo and Sarawak and the High Commission for Brunei. It was also desirable that
Australia and New Zealand should be taken into our confidence and given a chance of
expressing their views before we come to any final decision. Subsequently
consultations might be held with the Prime Ministers of Malaya and Singapore and
possibly also with the Sultan of Brunei and selected local notables in the North
Borneo territories.
Discussion showed general agreement with these proposals. They were acceptable
from a defence point of view, and would need to be taken into account in considering
the future defence arrangements and deployment of troops in the area; and they were
also to the long-term advantage of Malaya. But the Prime Minister of Malaya, who
wished to extend his influence into the North Borneo territories, was at present
opposed to a wider federation which included Singapore, since he felt that the
Chinese majority there might threaten the political stability of Malaya. On this point
however much would depend on the form of political association proposed; it would
be necessary to consider at a later stage whether it should take the form of a
federation or whether some looser organisation would be more appropriate.
The Committee:—
(1) Agreed that Lord Selkirk should be authorised at the meeting to be held on
26th April to discuss the future of the British Borneo Territories on the lines
indicated in paragraphs 2(a) to (c) and 5 of C.P.C. (61) 9.
(2) Agreed to consider the matter further in the light of the discussions referred to
at Conclusion (1) above.
(3) Agreed that no statement should meanwhile be made by Her Majesty’s
Government.
1 See 34.
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36 CO 1030/1079, no 2 2 May 1961
[Closer association of the Borneo territories]: letter from Lord Selkirk
to Mr Macleod, reporting on the 13th Inter-Territorial Conference of
Borneo Territories in Jesselton
[Despite an attempt to present consensus, these discussions revealed significant
differences between the commissioner-general and British representatives in North
Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei. Whereas Selkirk argued that the stability of Singapore and
hence the ‘Greater Malaysia’ scheme would be jeopardised by delay, Goode, Waddell and
White feared that a precipitate approach to merger would endanger the interests of the
‘more backward’ Borneo territories to the lasting detriment of the larger project.
Identifying one reason for delay to be the fact that North Borneo was less advanced
educationally and politically than Sarawak, Selkirk recommended the appointment of a
senior officer to co-ordinate the development of the Borneo colonies and assist their
union. This suggestion led to the posting of H P Hall from the CO to Jesselton where his
first task was to follow up the Rampton Report on the economic development of the
Borneo territories (CO 1030/1080). As regards the comment on the political
backwardness of North Borneo compared with Sarawak, it might be noted that on 26 Mar
1961 a decision had been taken in Donald Stephens’ house to form the first political
party, United National Kadazan Organisation (UNKO), although the party was not
formally inaugurated until Aug.]
I have just returned from the Thirteenth Inter-Territorial Conference of the Borneo
Territories in Jesselton. The questions we discussed were nearly all related in one
way or another to the central problem of closer association between North Borneo
and Sarawak and I naturally took the opportunity to have a full exchange of views
with the two Governors about it. We did not attempt to formulate joint conclusions,
but it was agreed that it might be useful if I were to let you have my own thoughts
about the position we have now reached.
2. Some modest progress has been made over the past year towards better
cooperation and coordination between the two Administrations. Exchanges of visits
between unofficial representatives of the two territories are being encouraged. It has
been agreed to aim at bringing the Free Trade Area into being by the beginning of
next year as a first step towards a Customs Union.1
3. But advance is still too slow. It is, I fear, bound to remain slow so long as we
continue to allow the pace to be set by North Borneo’s very natural fears of
‘contamination’ from Sarawak. I believe that we can no longer afford this and that
the time has come when we must give more positive leadership to local opinion and
confront it with firm decisions.
4. The core of the difficulty is that educationally and politically Sarawak is far
ahead of North Borneo. There can be no question of waiting for North Borneo to
catch up; on the contrary, the gap between the two is bound to increase. This means,
to my mind, that unless we can firmly set the two territories on the road to union
within the next year or so the opportunity will be lost for ever. It will not be easy now
to convince the people of North Borneo that union will not mean subordination to
1 In Oct 1960 it was agreed that the financial secretaries of North Borneo and Sarawak should meet under
the chairmanship of J L Rampton (seconded from the Treasury as financial adviser to the UK high
commissioner in Kuala Lumpur) to study the question of establishing a common market or free trade
area. They reported on 6 Mar 1961 recommending an agreement (largely based on the European Free
Trade Association) which came into force in Jan 1962 (CO 1030/1382, 1383 and 1384).
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Sarawak and contamination by its left-wing politics. But this task will grow still
harder as time passes and the alternative for North Borneo is isolation and eventual
absorption by Indonesia. In North Borneo the people would respond to a clear and
firm lead. In Sarawak impatience is growing and the Government is being criticised
for not being active enough in the pursuit of closer association. These problems are
the more difficult because in each territory the Chinese development is far ahead of
that of the indigenous people.
5. I remain convinced that union is the right course for the two territories, whether
or not Brunei joins them and whether or not means can eventually be found of bringing
them into some broader association with Malaya and Singapore. And I believe, for the
reasons I have indicated, that if union is to be achieved Her Majesty’s Government
must be prepared to announce publicly during the course of the present year that it is
their firm policy that North Borneo and Sarawak shall achieve independence as a single
unit, preferably in some form of association with Malaya and Singapore.
6. We need not attempt to set a date for independence, though I doubt myself
whether we shall be able to delay it beyond about 1970. But we should, in my
opinion, decide now that in, say, two years’ time a single Governor of the two
territories shall be installed, as a first step towards the later merger of the two
Administrations and the separate legislatures.
7. The form of eventual union and sequence of constitutional steps to be taken
on the road towards it will of course call for careful working out over the years. To
this end I believe that a suitable senior officer should be appointed now with the task
of considering these problems in the regional context and of stimulating and
coordinating the necessary joint studies by the individual Governments.
8. A suitable opportunity for making such an appointment will arise with the
creation of the projected joint committee which is to work out the proposed Free
Trade Area and later Customs Union. The independent chairman of that committee
will have a key role to play in maintaining the drive towards economic unification
which will do more than anything else to prepare the way for eventual political
union; and he will be well placed to plan the stages of constitutional advance.
9. A key factor in progress towards joint economic development and political
unity is the improvement of communications between the two territories. A through
road linking Jesselton with Kuching is the most important and urgent single need of
the two territories. This work should in my opinion be set in hand at once as a large
scale international project with whatever outside assistance can be mobilised from
the International Bank and other sources and with the firm resolve to complete it in
five years.
10. Finally, very high priority must be given to the improvement of education
facilities, especially in North Borneo. A first class secondary school from which
leaders can be trained from all races is the immediate requirement for North Borneo.
Her Majesty’s Government must be prepared to give increased and urgent help in
providing teachers and, if need be, money to make possible a rapid expansion.
11. I am aware that these are far reaching proposals, going far beyond the most
cautious line indicated in your telegram No. 28 of April 21.2 But I have not put them
forward without careful thought and, while there is of course room for much
2 Not printed but see 35, note.
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discussion on individual points, they represent my own firm conviction of the scale
of effort and degree of urgency that is now essential if we are to keep pace with events
in this fast moving region and enable the Borneo Territories to achieve and maintain
their independence in reasonable security and prosperity.
12. In sum, what I should like to see is:—
(i) An early statement by Her Majesty’s Government that union of the two
territories is their aim;
(ii) A decision now to appoint a single Governor in about two years;
(iii) Early appointment of an official to coordinate economic economic unification
and plan constitutional advance;
(iv) Inauguration of a trunk road project with massive outside aid;
(v) Active help in the field of education.
13. I am sending copies of this letter to the two Governors, to White in Brunei
and to Tory in Kuala Lumpur. A copy is also being put on my United Kingdom
Commission files.
37 CO 1030/973, no E203 9 May 1961
[‘Paper on the future of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore and the
Borneo Territories’]: memorandum by Lee Kuan Yew for the
government of the Federation of Malaya
[In this paper Lee puts the case for independence through merger. The merger he
proposes is not simply of Singapore and Malaya but the larger federation embracing the
Borneo territories. The background to this paper is as follows. On 24 Apr Lee Kuan Yew
informed Selkirk that on the previous day he had spoken to the Tunku for the first time
about the Grand Design. Dr Goh Keng Swee, Tun Razak and Dr Ismail bin Abdul Rahman
had also been present. At the end of this meeting the Tunku had invited Lee to prepare a
paper setting out his ideas on how merger might be achieved. Lee, who later stated that
he was encouraged to write the paper by Selkirk and Philip Moore (Selkirk’s deputy),
discussed the matter with Moore on 28 Apr but insisted that the Tunku should not be told
of their meeting. On 9 May Lee showed the final version to Selkirk before giving it to
Ismail for transmission to the Tunku and Razak in Kuala Lumpur, without the Malayans
being aware that Selkirk had seen it first. Selkirk sent a copy of Lee’s paper to London on
10 May. Although they had doubts about its practical value, especially as regards the
Borneo territories, senior British officials in Singapore thought the exercise worthwhile if
only to persuade Kuala Lumpur of Lee’s honourable intentions. Indeed, Lee tried to make
palatable the case for an early agreement on merger in principle by stressing that an
independent Singapore on its own would be a greater risk than in combination with other
territories and by reassuring the federal government that Malay political predominance
would not be threatened by Singapore’s Chinese. On 11 May, Fang Chuang Pi (‘the Plen’
of Singapore’s communist organisation) set up a secret meeting with Lee to ascertain the
likelihood of merger. Lee came away convinced that, if merger did not take place soon,
the communists would gain time to foment unrest. On 16 May Selkirk reported to
London on a further meeting between Singapore and Federation leaders and noted that
Razak was attempting to convince the Tunku of the need for merger (CO 1030/973, nos
132 and 133; also ‘The origins and formation of Malaysia’, memorandum by the FCO
Research Department, 10 July 1970, FCO 51/154, paragraphs 58-61 (the document is
reproduced as an Appendix to this volume), and Lee, Memoirs, pp 357-361, 364).]
Introduction
1. These three territories comprise what were the British colonial possessions in
South East Asia. Since the end of the Second World War great political and
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constitutional changes have taken place in the whole of this region. The Federation
of Malaya has become independent, and Singapore an internally self-governing state
with defence and foreign affairs in the hands of the British and internal security
under the joint control of an Internal Security Council. Constitutional changes have
also taken place in Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo. It is evident that in the next
few years even greater and more rapid constitutional changes will take place both in
Singapore and the Borneo Territories.
2. What is to become of all these territories? In the Annex are two tables
(Annexes A & B) which show a breakdown of the area and population of each of these
territories, and a map of this region (Annex C).1
3. Historically, Singapore has always been much closer to the Federation of
Malaya. The Borneo territories, although not altogether different in population
composition, have always been a little further away, and the concept of the political
unity of these three territories has not been as much in the forefront as the concept
of merger between Singapore and the Federation. Therefore, a plan to create a
federation of these three territories must be tactfully and gradually introduced into
the minds of the peoples of the three territories, and should be presented as a desire
of the peoples living in this region, and not initiated by the British.
The alternatives
4. There are two alternative ways in which political development in these three
territories could evolve:—
(A) Federation of Malaya independent, Singapore independent and the Borneo
territories independent in three separate units. If this alternative develops, it
means that merger between Singapore and the Federation is abandoned as a
political objective, and power in Singapore would pass to a China-minded group
with strong cultural and economic links with Communist China.
In the opening phase, it may be that an independent Singapore government may
come to some defence treaty arrangements with the British, but being
independent these treaty arrangements would be discarded and revoked and
replaced by ties with the Chinese mainland. This would ultimately lead to a
Chinese Communist base right in the heart of South East Asia with incalculable
consequences to all territories of the whole region. Knowing this, it is not unlikely
that the British and even the Americans, may go to great pains to prevent an
independent Singapore from ever emerging. However, if the desire of the people in
Singapore for political independence through merger with the Federation is
constantly frustrated and no progress is apparent either in common economic
links, let alone political links, then frustration and desperation would drive them
to the extremes of Communist policy and help the Communist pay the price in
blood if necessary, to secure their political objective of an independent Singapore
from which to undermine and subvert the Federation of Malaya.
Recent statements by open front Communist leaders have shown a positive
change of line. The long-term M.C.P. policy of a united Singapore and Federation
of Malaya is now glossed over. It is likely that knowing the strength of a Malay-
based Federation Government, the M.C.P. would strongly resist proposals for
1 Annexes not printed.
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merger between Singapore and the Federation, which would leave them at the
mercy of a Malay-based Federation Government able to take unpleasant measures
against the Communists with electoral impunity.
(B) A larger federation of the three territories—Federation of Malaya, Singapore,
Borneo territories. This is the most satisfactory solution for the peoples of the three
territories and also one which the British could accede to. It would also preserve the
common economic, social and political ties that have existed between these
territories as part of a common Empire in this region. But in working out the
constitutional arrangements, care must be taken not to upset the sense of security
and stability of the people of the Federation of Malaya, nor to arouse fears among
the peoples of the Borneo territories that they are being swamped by more active
and sophisticated people from the big cities of Singapore and the Federation.
5. However, the pace of political changes taking place throughout the whole
world and the rate at which pressure is mounting in Singapore, with or without the
aid of the M.C.P. makes it imperative that agreement on principle on some
constitutional arrangements must be achieved soon, or they may never be achieved
at all. In the spring of 1963 the Singapore Government, by agreement recorded in
the constitutional discussions with the United Kingdom in 1957,2 is obliged to re-
open talks on the constitutional future. The next step forward from the present
constitutional position in Singapore is independence. The alternative is a standstill
with minor constitutional re-adjustments of a purely window-dressing nature. If no
constitutional advance takes place, the PAP cannot hold the position in Singapore. It
will probably be replaced by a pro-M.C.P. and pro-China Singapore Government. It is
likely that this Government would be intelligent enough to avoid a direct clash of
arms with the British until the international position is such that direct Chinese
armed intervention is possible. The effect of a pro-M.C.P. and pro-China Government
in Singapore on the Chinese in the Federation will accentuate in the Federation the
communal conflicts and dissolve the Chinese will to resist ‘Chinese’ Communism.
This will sooner or later end up in an independent Singapore. A Singapore
independent by itself must pander to its 75% Chinese population and will end up
with greater appeals to Chinese chauvinism and eventually all talk of Malayan
culture, national language, national solidarity and nation-building will disappear
with tremendous adverse repercussions on the Chinese in the Federation of Malaya.
The consequences are incalculable and would certainly put an and to any hope of
building a united community composing of Malay, Chinese, Indian and other races
in Malaya. The solution lies in the larger federation, with the strength and stability
from the centre. This course of events can only be avoided if Singapore is merged
into the larger entity described below, and such tendencies contained.
Alternative (B) or the ‘Grand Design’
6. In broad outline, the scheme is to use the stable Malay-based Federation
Government as the sheet anchor of the whole of this region. In grand total population
2 Three all-party delegations went to London for talks about self-government. Marshall demanded too
much and came away empty-handed from the first (Apr 1956). Lim Yew Hock was more successful; the
framework of the State of Singapore was agreed in Apr 1957, the details were settled in May 1958 and the
new constitution was inaugurated following the elections of May 1959. 
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the Federation of Malaya has 6.82 million people, Singapore 1.63 million people, and
the Borneo territories 1.25 million people. How each state is to elect its own government
can be left to existing state arrangements and can remain flexible. In the Borneo
territories some definite proposals will have to be reached as to how future
representation from the Borneo territories in the larger Federation is to take place.
7. Roughly speaking, the three states of the larger Federation would be entitled
to the ratio of 68(Federation of Malaya) : 16(Singapore) : 12(Borneo) seats in the
larger Federation Parliament. Representation from each state will be that of
the government’s side only, i.e. there is no direct election to the government of the
larger federation. It will be noted that the population breakdown of the three
territories, if we include the indigenous population together with the Malays, would
mean that the Malays would constitute the largest ethnic group in the larger
federation—4.5 million Malays and indigenous population as against 4.1 million
Chinese, 0.9 million Indians and 0.2 million others. But because only the
Government side is represented in the larger Federation Government, the effective
vote is the 3.4 million Malays in the Federation who can in effect decide the vote of
68 out of 96 seats of the larger federation. Elections will be held in the respective
states and each government of the respective states is entitled to nominate from
among its members the number of seats agreed in the constitution in proportion to
its population. In other words, it means that the Federation of Malaya government
would be entitled to 68 out of 96 seats in the Parliament of the larger federation.
Thus the government of the Federation of Malaya will automatically control the
government of the larger federation.
8. To protect the susceptibilities of the Borneo people and the present balance of
power between Singapore and the Federation of Malaya, provisions will have to be
built into the constitution of the larger federation to ensure that voting by citizens of
the respective three states can only be done in their own states, e.g. a Singapore
citizen can only vote in Singapore, a Federal citizen can only vote in the Federation,
and no Singapore or Federal citizen can vote in Borneo. Provision can be made in the
constitution for review after 5 or 10 years. This safeguard would prevent upsets in the
balance of power.
9. The powers of the larger federation Government should include defence,
foreign affairs, police and security and such matters which like currency and
common economic development could be more efficiently discharged by a central
Government. A working party of administrative experts should put up a working
paper for consideration at a later stage. The cost of running the central Government
should be borne by the three states in proportion to their representation in the larger
federation parliament.
10. There are no constitutional problems however novel or difficult which
cannot be resolved. The main problem will be how to present the ‘Grand Design’
politically to the people of the three respective territories. In this informal discussion
on the ‘Grand Design’, both the Federation of Malaya and Singapore can express their
own will through their own elected representatives. But the people of the Borneo
territories are in that stage of political development where there are no elected
representatives who can speak in the name of the Borneo people. Therefore, final
arrangements will have to be carefully worked out so that they can be accepted and
endorsed by the hereditary, community and the newly elected leaders of local
government bodies of the Borneo territories.
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11. In such a framework it is possible to govern Singapore with considerable
firmness and success. National identification in a large and powerful federation
comprising a grand total of nearly 10 million people with a total of 130,000 square
miles as against the Federation’s 50,000 and Singapore’s 225 square miles would
hold the hearts and loyalties of the people. Pride in a more powerful and viable state,
which may be called the ‘Federation of Malaysia’ or the ‘United States of Malaysia’,
would give a boost to nation-building to the mutual advantage of the three territories
and would help to stabilise the future of the whole region.
12. In discussions from time to time with the United Kingdom Commissioner, it
would appear that whilst they may go a long way to accede to this larger federation,
they would want to have special defence treaty arrangements about their bases in
Singapore and the Borneo territories. This is not an insoluble matter.
13. After discussions on the principle of this paper, it will be useful if a working
party of top administrative officials could work out the constitutional arrangements
and administrative implications. At the same time a working party of ministers could
hammer out the details of presentation and political strategy. If the plan is to
succeed, it must be fairly well crystallised and advanced soon, before the position in
Singapore hardens against merger and before divergent constitutional developments
take the Borneo territories on a separatist path.
38 CO 1030/1149, nos 68–71 19 May 1961
[Political developments in Singapore since June 1959]; despatch from
Lord Selkirk to Mr Macleod, surveying developments since the PAP
came to power and commenting on the impact of its defeat in the
Hong Lim by-election
[Growing opposition to Lee Kuan Yew from the left within his PAP, called into question
the long-term political survival of the prime minister as well as prospects for ‘Greater
Malaysia’. Ong Eng Guan’s defeat of the PAP candidate at the Hong Lim by-election at the
end of April was a serious reverse for Lee who was by now clearly committed to merger.
Selkirk believed that the island’s merger with the federation was the best way of
reinforcing Lee’s position and ensuring Singapore’s security. He advised continuing
support for the PAP, though not at all costs; if negotiations with Malaya on merger
showed signs of foundering, it would be wise to make separate plans for the constitutional
development of Singapore which would satisfy aspirations for independence while
guaranteeing Britain the ‘permanent and effective use of our bases’. CO officials were
relieved that Selkirk, who had been a critic of the Singapore constitution, had become far
less pessimistic. Selkirk’s depatch was subsequently printed for confidential circulation
(CO 1030/1150 no 164 and DO 169/18, no 21).]
I have the honour to submit the following brief survey of the main trends of political
development since the P.A.P. came into power in June 1959. Although I have myself
only been in Singapore since January 1960, the period is, I think, best taken as a
whole.
2. There was much natural apprehension as to what would happen when the
Government came in. In the result, a fair amount of capital left the State for Hong
Kong and the Federation of Malaya. The Civil Service had their pay docked and the
English-speaking Chinese came in for a good deal of criticism. This was relatively
mild after the antics of Ong Eng Guan as Mayor of the City Council and it was in
their attitudes rather than in their actions that the P.A.P. first revealed their
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weakness. What had been noted as self-confidence before the P.A.P. took power soon
became touched with arrogance, their energy became aggressive and their party
loyalty marked with extreme intolerance of any opposition or criticism. Their
discipline was characterised by bullying. I was disappointed that the Opposition had
not shown themselves capable of pricking the bubble of the P.A.P.’s claim to
omnipotence and omniscience, let alone providing an alternative for the electorate.
3. After their first errors, however, a number of clear, sound, policies emerged.
They have produced a well-founded if slightly ambitious Development Plan. Their
budgets have been orthodox and sound. They have maintained wholeheartedly their
policy of independence only through merger with the Federation of Malaya even
when public opinion seemed to be turning towards complete independence for
Singapore on her own. The administrative services have been well maintained. They
have up to now behaved with great restraint and understanding in regard to the
military establishments and bases in Singapore and have only asked that we should
be as reasonably unostentatious in their use as possible. They have shown a
surprising willingness to get advice from all kinds of outside authorities, though
naturally enough they do not always accept what these bodies say. Of particular value
have been the visits of U.N.T.A.B. and I.B.R.D. representatives. Although the
responsible conduct of Lee’s Government has almost inevitably led to loss of support
among more irresponsible elements of the community, he has gained a great deal of
sober regard from the business community and generally with the English-speaking
Chinese. Dr. Goh’s sense of reality has enabled him to state quite frankly ‘that
nobody owes Singapore a living’; Singapore can only depend on Singapore’s own
efforts. The P.A.P. political journal ‘PETIR’1 has stated publicly and frankly the
economic benefits which Singapore derives from the military base and has said that
if the British Services were not here, Singapore would have to create her own army,
thus losing $250 million a year and having to expend a further $150 million a year
herself.
4. Throughout this period, the central point of anxiety has been the attitude of
the trade unions. It was inevitable that, with a Government which can blandly say
that all its legislation is biased in favour of its workers, the trade unions should
endeavour to take advantage of the situation. The number of man hours lost in 1960
went up considerably, although in many cases unnecessarily. This was the period in
which the new Singapore T.U.C. was building itself up. The T.U.C. Secretariat is
nearly half composed of pro-communist or extreme left ex-detainees. The
Government had planned to set up a strong Singapore trade union organisation with
executive powers. I warned them of the dangers of this type of organisation and they
changed their plans when they realised I was right in suggesting that it was likely to
be used against the Government itself. At this moment, I believe that they are
uncertain of the best way in which to proceed on this problem. Meanwhile, a larger
number of individual unions have come to be controlled to a substantial degree by a
group under Lim Chin Siong, the leading pro-communist ex-detainee. This group
have strengthened their position for future action but at one and the same time have
been able to claim that they have reduced the number of strikes. (They have found it
more profitable to ‘negotiate’ concessions from the better-off firms). The
1 Literally ‘thunder’.
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Government has set up an independent Industrial Arbitration Court which could
provide a measure of stability, but has not yet been able to assert itself, largely
because of fumbling by the Minister of Labour.
5. The Internal Security Council has developed in directions that can hardly have
been envisaged by those who wrote the Constitution. Only on two subjects has the
I.S.C. exercised its constitutional powers of decision: first in regard to the continued
detention of agitators held under the P.P.S.O. and secondly in regard to the
introduction of a Russian trade mission. In the former, the I.S.C. was advised by Lee
Kuan Yew to accept responsibility for the detention of subversives when he did not
want to accept it himself. In the second, the United Kingdom and the Federation
Government, which holds very strong views on the admission of communist
nationals for more than a fortnight at a time, in effect over-rode the Singapore
Government. For the rest, the I.S.C. meetings have developed into social occasions
which provide the only regular and easy communication between Federation and
Singapore Ministers and are largely characterised by convivial entertainment and
golf.
6. The I.S.C. has, however, been the subject of attack on various political
platforms by the extreme left. Our agreement that the detailed work should remain
confidential has allowed rumours to circulate, some fairly accurate, some without
the slightest justification. The Prime Minister has not helped matters by his
equivocal approach on certain occasions to the question of responsibility. The future
of the I.S.C. in its present form will be in the forefront of the constitutional talks
when these take place.
7. Where, however, the Government have chiefly fallen down is over their
complete failure to understand the mechanics of successful democratic government.
The outstanding example is the manner in which they handled the case of Ong Eng
Guan. Lee Kuan Yew thought he must crush rather than tolerate him and tried to do
this by casting reflections on his personal veracity and private life in a series of
elaborate enquiries and debates. I warned him nearly three months before the
election that all this publicity would inevitably result in Ong Eng Guan’s re-election
for the Hong Lim Constituency. But in spite of warnings, the Prime Minister insisted
on harrying Ong Eng Guan and regarding the election as a test of confidence in his
Government and in his own position.
8. I believe nonetheless that he has acted with honesty and with some courage,
and indeed he has sought to denounce the ‘lunatic left’ as he calls it, or left wing
adventurers, on more than one occasion and notably at the last May Day Rally. But I
doubt how much this really gets across to the ordinary man in the street. Even Mr.
Strachey during a recent visit remarked to him in a kindly vein that he had found his
Hong Lim speeches far more intellectual than he would himself ever dare to make to
his own constituents.2
9. The P.A.P. have been severely shaken by their heavy defeat in the Hong Lim by-
election. Their first reaction was to consider a General Election but commonsense
2 John Strachey, Labour intellectual, MP and secretary of state for war, 1950–1951. He had been secretary
of state at the War Office during the lowest point in British fortunes in the Malayan emergency. During
the years of parliamentary opposition from 1951, he developed a theoretical position on empire, for
example in his book, The end of empire (1959). He was briefly shadow Commonwealth secretary in 1963,
the year that he died.
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prevailed and they are now taking their defeat more calmly. Lee is not so much
concerned with the evident, considerable loss of public support, which frankly is not
unexpected after the first two years of Government, as with a weakening within his
own party which he ascribes primarily to the sapping of Party loyalty inspired by Lim
Chin Siong, whom the Prime Minister still regards as his chief opponent. No doubt
much of this anxiety is justified. Lim Chin Siong’s grip on the Unions, if not the
electorate, is strong, and he benefits by, even if he does not at present encourage,
Chinese chauvinism which is still fundamental. Mr. Tan Lark Sye, multi-millionaire
supporter of Nanyang University, recently told me that it would take a long time for
Chinese chauvinism to be replaced by true Malayan loyalty. Anti-colonialist sentiment
is the standard of all parties, of the right or left, however jocularly it may be referred
to in private. The body of the people are politically uneducated and the more
intellectual leaders, such as students, are going through a phase of political ferment.
The economic problems of Singapore are very intractable. Any stabilised alternative
to the P.A.P. Government is still not in sight. A General Election could well produce
a number of smallish groups, none of which would be strong enough to form a stable
government. This would probably lead to the formation of a new party to the left of
the P.A.P. which would sooner or later win decisive political power in Singapore.
10. In spite of the uncertainty which I always feel of Lee’s reaction to a given
circumstance, there is a most interesting long term consistency in his political view.
So, today, he continues to look three years ahead. His dilemma is how to maintain
political momentum in the face of increasing pressures for constitutional advance,
when he believes that major constitutional changes could be dangerous and
independence disastrous but is receiving only limited encouragement from the
Federation for the cause of ‘Grand Design’ and Merger. Either he must obtain in
the next eighteen months some advance or commitment towards a merger with the
Federation of Malaya, or he has to face up to the prospect of going to London for
constitutional talks in 1963 where he could ask for virtually no significant changes
and lose the General Election or ask for big changes which he does not at present
consider to be in Singapore’s best interests. This does emphasise, however, that as far
as he is concerned, the obvious and immediate goal is advance towards a form of Grand
Design in which both the Federation and the Borneo Territories must participate.
11. In all the circumstances, we should continue to encourage the P.A.P. to
pursue a patient and sensible policy until the end of its term, although we should not
appear to be ready to keep them in power at all costs. If, however, it appears that the
discussions with the Federation on Grand Design are never likely to succeed, then we
must begin to think about constitutional developments in Singapore which will
satisfy aspirations for independence while guaranteeing permanent and effective use
of our bases. Although, in fact, the present Constitution is admirably suited to serve
Singapore, it has failed to command the broad measure of support necessary for its
continuance beyond 1964, and I doubt now if it ever will before irresponsible
elements are likely to gain power.
12. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Governors in Hong Kong,
Jesselton and Kuching on a personal basis; to the United Kingdom High
Commissioners in Canberra, Wellington, and Kuala Lumpur; to H.M. Ambassador in
Djakarta; and to the High Commissioner for Brunei. I also enclose extra copies for
you to pase to the Foreign Secretary, the Commonwealth Secretary and Minister of
Defence.
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39 PREM 11/3418 26 May 1961
‘Grand Design’: inward telegram no 382 from Sir G Tory to Mr
Sandys, giving advance notice of Tunku Abdul Rahman’s speech to
the Press Club lunch in Singapore on 27 May
[The Tunku’s speech marked, not the start of the Malaysia story, but the end of one
chapter and the beginning of the next. The Tunku later described the ‘electrifying’ effect
of his announcement at the Press Club lunch: ‘Suddenly everyone was sitting bolt
upright, hardly believing their ears . . . My reference so discreetly but publicly to
“Malaysia” took all the territories by storm.’ What was remarkable about the speech was
not the suggestion of merger but its apparent espousal by the Tunku. It provoked mixed
reactions. In Singapore, Selkirk and Lee were encouraged by the Tunku’s apparent
change of heart regarding association with Singapore, but the speech triggered a political
crisis culminating in July with Lee’s critics leaving the PAP to form the Barisan Sosialis.
In the Federation most Malays were wary of any connection with Chinese-dominated
Singapore, so much so that, to avoid dissent, the Tunku soon shifted his emphasis to the
alternative plan of merging the Federation with the Borneo territories in advance of
union with Singapore. In North Borneo and Sarawak, British officials and community
leaders grew more mistrustful of Malayan ‘colonialism’, preferring progress towards a
federation of Borneo territories. The Sultan of Brunei, on the other hand, declared an
interest in taking part and the Tunku recalled that, when he returned to Kuala Lumpur
after his speech, ‘the first person to come and see me was the Sultan of Brunei. He
showed great excitement over my speech and urged me to carry out the plan for merger
without delay.’ In London ministers had hitherto refrained from forcing the pace towards
‘Greater Malaysia’ and had, instead, awaited a major, local initiative in that direction.
Now, at the Tunku’s instigation, the British government addressed the issue of the ‘grand
design’ and on 20 June the prime minister made a parliamentary statement about it (H of
C Debs, vol 642, 1171–1173; see also Tunku Abdul Rahman, Looking Back, Kuala
Lumpur, 1977, pp 81–82).]
As you may know Lee Kuan Yew has several times visited Kuala Lumpur recently to
press Grand Design upon Tunku having regard particularly to his need to offer some
evidence of Constitutional advance before Spring 1963 when Singapore Constitution
is due for review.1 Lee had formed conclusion (I believe correctly) that Razak was
already converted and he has I suspect relied largely on Razak to break down Tunku’s
prejudice. Complete break through has in fact now been made.
2. Tunku told me this morning that in speech to Press Club in Singapore
tomorrow afternoon 27th May at lunch for International correspondents he intends
to include passage on following lines. Begins: Malaya cannot stand alone. Sooner or
later she must have an understanding with the Territories of Singapore, North
Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. It is premature at this stage to say how this could be
brought about but we have got to plan ahead now with this as our objective. Ends.
3. Tunku said that as I knew he had hitherto argued that Federation’s interest
would be better served by keeping Singapore independent of it and that it would be
easy for Federation to insulate herself from effects of any political deterioration there
by physical means (e.g. closing the causeway) or by relying on friendly Western
Powers. He had now come to realise that this would only be short term solution at best
and that in Malaya’s interests she should find some means of absorbing Singapore
safely and constructively. The Grand Design offered only means of doing this.
4. He made it clear from his remarks he was thinking of Brunei, Sarawak and
North Borneo being absorbed into Federation of Malaya as integral states with
1 See 37.
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Singapore alone enjoying substantial self government. I said present tendency was
for North Borneo and Sarawak to draw together and that I thought it likely they
would have to be offered considerable measure of self government also if it were to be
made worth their while to be associated. He said however that these were all matters
that could be thrashed out. He expected that when the time was ripe he would be
asked to go to London to enter into negotiations.
5. I said this was most welcome information. As regards his proposed public
conference tomorrow I thought there might be some danger of adverse reaction in
North Borneo and Sarawak (or even in Brunei) where public opinion still needed to
be conditioned. He said however with a laugh that nothing would happen at all
unless someone gave a lead. He was obviously determined to make his statement but
he wished to give me opportunity to inform you and others concerned in advance so
that you ‘would not be taken by surprise’.
6. I very much hope we can leave Tunku to take this initiative. Given his violent
prejudice hitherto this represents almost miraculous change of heart. As suspected,
now penny has dropped, he is perhaps moving ahead faster than we were prepared to
go but we have more hope of steering him if we go along with him than if we try to
restrain him at this juncture.
40 CO 1030/1079, nos 3–6 1 June 1961
[Closer association of North Borneo and Sarawak]: letter from Sir A
Waddell to E Melville
[The Tunku’s speech of 27 May opened a new phase in policy-making in which the British
government addressed the implications of the ‘grand design’ for the development of the
Borneo territories, on the one hand, and for regional security, on the other. Over the next
five months, these issues dominated discussions which veered one way and another in
response to the growing crisis in Singapore, the Tunku’s desire for a quick decision and
the anxieties of the Borneo governors. After erratic preparations involving at times tense
Anglo–Malayan diplomacy, a conference was held in London where the British and
Federation governments agreed two key principles for planning a ‘Federation of
Malaysia’: firstly, the inclusion of the Borneo territories would depend on the views of the
peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak as well as the view of the Sultan of Brunei;
secondly, the Anglo–Malayan defence arrangement would be extended to the new state. In
the first document of this chapter (40), the governor of Sarawak reported a generally
favourable response to the Tunku’s speech and he advised the British government to take
a lead in effecting the closer association of North Borneo and Sarawak in the first
instance. But he warned against an over-hasty approach to their unification. In doing so,
he compared the predicament of the Borneo territories with that of Northern Rhodesia
and Nyasaland within the Central African Federation, whose problems were frequently
cited during the planning of Malaysia over the next two years. Melville replied to Waddell
on 8 Aug—and sent a similar letter to Goode, governor of North Borneo—stating that the
government would appoint a co-ordinator for North Borneo and Sarawak to follow up the
Rampton Report on economic development (CO 1030/1079, nos 26/29 and 30).]
The Secretary of State’s telegram to the Commissioner-General, No. 36 of 24th May
invited comments on the latters [sic] demi-official letter R.1011/49/61 of 2nd May on
closer association in Borneo.1 And all this has been overlaid by the Tunku’s speech
last Saturday on the Grand Design.2
1 See 36. 2 See 39.
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2. I have little that is new to add but to restate my position which is briefly that
we should hasten along with Borneo unification or federation with the longer term
aim of association as a reasonably viable and influential unit with Malaya.
3. While supporting the Commissioner General’s emphasis on greater speed I do
not quite subscribe to the method described in paragraphs 5 and 6 of his letter,
namely that H.M.G. should declare now its firm intention of uniting the Borneo
territories (as a prerequisite to self-government) and that in two years time a single
Governor should be installed for both territories. Such a shot-gun marriage would I
am sure give rise to reactions not entirely unlike those experienced in the Central
African Federation. Notwithstanding this I believe that a definite lead from H.M.G. is
required and, locally, a declaration of intention as I believe that we have very nearly
exhausted the possibilities of closer administrative and departmental association
which can profitably be undertaken without clearly stating the final objective. Given
a clear objective, ratified by the legislatures and with the fullest backing (including
financial) by H.M.G. we can get on with the job. Otherwise we will jog along and be in
danger of being picked off singly by Indonesia (or by Malaya, for it seems from
paragraph 4 of Tory’s telegram No. 382 to C.R.O. of 26th May that the Tungku
envisages the absorption of the Borneo territories as integral states without any
substantial measure of self-government). Or if that does not occur we will be faced
with the problem in due course of Sarawak (pop. 750,000) seeking independence
with entry to the Prime Ministers Conference, United Nations and with
ambassadorial commitments and the other expenses of independence which she
cannot afford—far less its own army for protection. Then H.M.G. will have to pour in
money to keep the place going and you can be sure that the bidding from the
Communist bloc would push up the stakes. Far better to spend some of that now to
build a United Borneo—and here I echo the plea made by Bill Goode in the last
paragraph of his despatch No. 876 of 30th December 3 although he was referring to
North Borneo alone.
4. My recommendation is this. That H.M.G. should declare at an early date that it
firmly believes that the interests of the people of the Borneo territories will best be
served by the creation of a viable unified state or federation and that it is prepared to
give all possible assistance to that end. Such assistance would take the form of
providing (and paying for) an inter-territorial organisation charged with the
responsibility in the first instance of working out for approval by the Governments
the details of this common market recommended by the Rampton Report,4 for the
correlation of economic activity and for the promotion of joint departments and of
joint activities in the fields of research, communications, training and higher
education (and here although we are struggling against time and shortage of funds
in the field of primary and secondary education it is in fact time that we were
thinking of a University College for even the most modest institution of that kind
takes years to create). And to make the organisation effective H.M.G. should be
prepared to make substantial additional grants for inter-territorial projects, one of
which, as Lord Selkirk strongly recommends, would be the inauguration of a trunk
road project linking Sarawak with North Borneo (and this means Jesselton to
Kuching or such part of this as we have not already built or can build from our own
3 See 31. 4 See 36, n 1.
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resources). The Administrator of this inter-territorial organisation (which partakes
of Sir Stephen Luke’s West Indian Welfare and Development organisation, East
Africa High Commission and the former West Africa Inter-territorial Secretariat)5
would need to be a man of the highest calibre who, in addition to the tasks indicated
above, could as the Commissioner General suggests initiate the studies required for
planning constitutional advance towards federation or unification.
5. In this way we could make quicker progress locally and be in a much better
position when we come, as we should, to negotiate terms on the Grand Design.
6. With these qualifications, which are only of method and approach, I support
Lord Selkirk’s views. The matter has now of course become more pressing with the
Tunku’s initiative on the Grand Design. The pointed references to Indonesia in his
speech may well provoke increased attention by the latter to the Borneo territories,
so the sooner we strengthen our own position the better.
7. With regard to the Tunku’s statement on the Grand Design the local reaction
as far as it has had time to be expressed is generally favourable, the Chinese in full
support and also seeing it as a means of early self-government for Sarawak, the
Malays much more cautious as they do not in fact have much fellow feeling for
Malaya, as Malayans incline to look down on our local Malays, as indeed they do from
all accounts on Brunei Malays. The Ibans have not yet uttered but their greatest fear
as I have said before would be that Sarawak would be swamped with surplus Chinese
from Singapore. They and I will need assurances on that.
8. I enclose the copy of an article from the Sarawak Tribune of Wednesday, 31st
May, which gives the official utterances of the parties, and a copy of a cutting from
today’s issue correcting the last sentence of the PANAS statement.6 You will note that
they agree with me that Borneo federation should come first.
9. I am sending a copy of this letter to the recipients of the Commissioner
General’s letter of 2nd May.
5 Sir Stephen Luke was comptroller for development and welfare in the West Indies and British co-
chairman of the Caribbean Commission, 1953–1958; commissioner for the preparation of West Indies
Federal Organisation, 1956–1958; senior crown agent for overseas governments and administrations,
1959–1965.
6 Not printed; for PANAS see 26, n 2.
41 PREM 11/3418 3 June 1961
‘Grand Design’: inward telegram no 399 from Sir G Tory to Mr
Sandys, reporting a talk with the Tunku on reactions to his speech of
27 May]
Tunku sent for me this morning to speak of a number of matters but obviously with
intention of finding out how United Kingdom Government had reacted to his
announcement. He said he had been thinking over what I had told him about North
Borneo and Sarawak but was still determined that if Grand Design were to be
implemented at all they should be absorbed into existing Federation of Malaya as two
member states or as one state if they should merge.
2. Sultan of Brunei had told him he would be glad to bring Brunei in on same
basis. Indeed he would according to Tunku not be prepared to come in otherwise.
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Sultan felt that incorporation as a Malayan state would alone give him ‘protection’ he
needed (presumably of his purely Malay way of life and religion). Tunku admitted
that another factor weighing with Sultan was prospect which integration would offer
him of eventually becoming Yang Di-Pertuan Agong.1
3. As regards Singapore Tunku said he was now clear that only possible solution
from his standpoint would be on Ulster pattern with Singapore sending a number of
representatives to Federal Parliament in Kuala Lumpur. This had at one time been
put forward in discussions by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew. He is not prepared to consider a
confederation with the Federation of Malaya, Singapore and perhaps a unified North
Borneo and Sarawak sending representatives to a higher Parliament with limited
responsibility, for example, over Foreign Affairs, Defence and Currency.
4. I again warned Tunku that so far as North Borneo and Sarawak were concerned
his proposal might not find ready acceptance. I reminded him that these two states at
least seemed likely on present showing to wish to draw together first and pointed out
that comment by such political community leaders as there were in Kuching and
Jesselton as quoted in Straits Times of 2nd June tended to confirm this. I was, however,
expressing my own personal view since there had not yet been time for considered
comment from North Borneo and Sarawak or indeed from the United Kingdom.
5. Tunku said he was now working on a memorandum setting out his view and
hoped to let me have it within a week. He trusted that when Mr. Macmillan came he
and Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew would be able to clinch matters.2 Again I warned
Tunku that I thought he was going too fast for us and that to force the pace to this
extent might set up adverse reactions which might fatally prejudice the Design.
Tunku, however, made it clear that he was impatient to get on with the plan and that
he thought it would become more difficult to implement the longer we delayed.
6. Tunku was obviously anxious to have early reaction from London. I told him
he had given us rather large morsel to digest. In any event now that he was going to
convey his idea to us in the form of a memorandum it would surely be best for us to
defer our observations until this could be studied.3 He agreed. This will give us a little
time. We will telegraph effect of Tunku’s memorandum when received.
1 For the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, see 19, n 5.
2 A visit by Macmillan was mooted at one time but was overtaken by events and replaced by plans for the
Tunku to go to London.
3 The Tunku sent the memorandum with his letter to Macmillan of 26 June, see 46.
42 CO 1030/979, nos 242–247 6 June 1961
‘Possibility of an association of British Borneo territories with the
Federation of Malaya and the State of Singapore’: minute from Mr
Macleod to Mr Watkinson
[In this minute Macleod refers to the following documents which are printed in this
collection: the meeting of the Colonial Policy Committee on 18 Apr (see 35), Lord
Selkirk’s reports from Singapore (for example 36 and 38) and Tory’s telegram number
399 (41). On reading Macleod’s minute on 7 June, Macmillan noted: ‘This must go to the
Cabinet—or perhaps Defence Committee’ (CO 1030/979 and PREM 11/3418). Following
Macleod’s minute to the minister of defence, the Joint Planning Staff prepared a paper for
the Chiefs of Staff Committee (45) which examined the defence implications of the
decision taken by the Colonial Policy Committee on 18 Apr 1961.]
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This question of the ‘Grand Design’ was considered at a meeting of the Colonial
Policy Committee on the 18th April. As a result, Lord Selkirk and others concerned
in the area were told that before coming to a final decision H.M.G. proposed to give
the governments of Australia and New Zealand an opportunity of expressing their
views and that in the meantime our representatives might be guided by the
assumption that H.M.G. accepted the development of a political association between
Malaya, Singapore and the three Borneo territories as an ultimate aim of policy.
2. I understand that it has since been agreed that before the governments of
Australia and New Zealand are consulted the Chiefs of Staff should have an
opportunity to express their views on the defence implications and that the necessary
steps to this end are now being taken.
3. I should, however, draw your attention to recent developments in the area
which make it urgent for us to reach a decision in principle on the desirability or
otherwise of this ultimate aim.
4. First, Lord Selkirk has been reporting recently the anxiety of Mr. Lee Kuan
Yew to be in a position to show the people of Singapore some progress towards the
achievement of his policy of ultimate merger with the Federation of Malaya and his
hope that to this end it might be possible for the Prime Minister on his visit to
Singapore to be able to say something favourable about a future association of
Singapore and the Borneo territories with the Federation.
5. Secondly, Tunku Abdul Rahman himself has now come out with a public
statement the special importance of which is that for the first time he acknowledges
the desirability of a future association between the Federation and Singapore. He said
in Singapore on the 26th May:—1
‘Malaya today as a nation realises that she cannot stand alone and in isolation.
Outside of international politics the national one must be broad based.
Sooner or later she should have an understanding with Britain and the
peoples of the territories of Singapore, Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. It is
premature for me to say now how this closer understanding can be brought
about but it is inevitable that we should look ahead to this objective and think
of a plan whereby these territories can be brought closer together in a
political and economic co-operation.’
6. The Tunku has followed this up with the demarche reported in Sir G. Tory’s
telegram No.399 to the Commonwealth Relations Office and is preparing a
memorandum setting out his views. He is pressing for our reactions.
7. These developments make it essential that we should reach our own decision
in principle on the Grand Design as quickly as possible. Before we can do this we
must, as already agreed, consult with the governments of Australia and New Zealand.
Assuming that our decision then is that in principle we support the idea, there will
then be need for much further consultation with our authorities in the area and with
the Prime Ministers of the Federation and of Singapore before September, when
Tunku has put us on notice he will want to raise the matter with the Prime Minister
during his visit.
1 In fact the Tunku delivered the speech on 27 May, although London was informed of its content on 26
May (see 39).
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8. I am sending copies of this minute to the Prime Minister, the Foreign
Secretary, the Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the
President of the Board of Trade.
43 DO 169/25, no 63: 7 June 1961
[Brunei and the ‘Grand Design’]: letter from D C White to E Melville
The latest report from Geofroy Tory1 on his talks with Tungku Abdul Rahman in
Kuala Lumpur makes it essential that I should receive guidance as a matter of
urgency on the line to take with the Sultan when he returns from Malaya, which we
now hear will be on the 21st June.
I have never personally doubted that the Sultan himself was ready to consider
making Brunei an additional State of the Federation and take his place in the queue
for the Agong’s job. If the Sultan was honest in his remarks to Lord Selkirk (see para.
4 of Lord Selkirk’s telegram to you numbered 183 of 29th May), it is clear from Tory’s
para. 2 of his telegram of 3rd June that he had no difficulty in making up his mind as
to his reply to the Tungku. This is interesting, in view of Tory’s remarks in his
despatch of 19th July, 1960, when the Tungku reported the Sultan as ‘not very keen
on integration at the present time because of his fear that Malaya would use Brunei
as a milch cow’. He seems to have gained assurance in the face of local opinion.
Sir John Martin, in his letter to Sir Denis Allen of 18th May last year,2 indicated
that we must regard with benevolence any proposal for Brunei to federate with
Malaya, and he noted that moves for closer association between Sarawak and North
Borneo might push Brunei more quickly into the arms of Malaya. The recent move of
the two colonies towards a free trade area, together with the Economist article on
‘glittering isolation’, may have influenced the Sultan to be more forthcoming with
the Tungku, and provided the ‘push’.
I entirely agree with Waddell’s views in his despatch of the 1st June, 1961,3 that
Borneo federation should come first (if possible), and the remarks of the Datu Bandar
of Sarawak, Abang Haji Mustapha, as leader of Party Negara, Sarawak,4 are most
significant and indeed represent in the main the views expressed here by the Party
Rakayaat [sic].5 I expect you have seen the Borneo Bulletin of 3rd June but, in case
you have not, I enclose a copy of the relevant articles.6 The North Borneo News &
Sabah Times (Donald Stephens,7 I assume) remarked that ‘history has changed but
not to the extent where the three should not be able to get together again and the
Royal House of Brunei be given the place it once had in these parts.’
1 See 41. 2 See 20. 3 See 40.
4 Abang Haji Mustapha championed Japanese interests in the occupation but after the Second World War
he favoured cession of Sarawak by Rajah Charles Vyner Brooke to the crown. This made him a
controversial figure in Sarawak politics, though he was rewarded when the last Rajah designated him Datu
Bandar in June 1946. He was leader of the Party Negara Sarawak (PANAS) which was registered as a party
on 9 Apr 1960. Modelled on the multi-racial, Malayan Alliance, it became increasingly identified with
right-wing Malay causes. Dato Haji Mustapha was later appointed CBE.
5 But the Party Negara came to support Malaysia (see 26, n 2) while the Party Rakyat opposed it (see 9, n 1).
6 Not printed.
7 Stephens was owner, editor and publisher of the North Borneo News and Sabah Times.
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The Brunei Party Rakayaat has consistently advocated re-unification of the Borneo
territories under the Sultan as a Constitutional Ruler and it is difficult to see how re-
unification could be achieved without the Sultan taking a prominent part.
While it is probably correct to say that it was preferable for someone other than
Her Majesty’s Government to take the lead in introducing the Grand Design, there
seems every likelihood of the Tungku and Lee Kuan Yew setting far too hot a pace to
be comfortable over here. I have always hoped to see some of Brunei’s wealth used for
the mutual benefit of herself and her neighbours in projects such as the University
College that Waddell mentions. Is there enough sugar to coat the pill of accepting
the Sultan as a Consitutional Ruler?
I suppose that, if Lee Kuan Yew does not achieve some form of merger or promise
of a merger before the next Singapore election, he will fall and the chance of
unifying the Federation and Singapore will be lost, perhaps for ever, with the
alternative of an extremely left wing, if not openly Communist, City State posing a
serious threat to both Malaya and the Borneo Territories. We cannot, therefore, drag
our feet without upsetting both the Tengku and Lee. Nevertheless, I hope that the
Tengku can be made to realise the weight of popular opinion in the Borneo
territories in favour of re-unification in some form and use his influence in this
direction with the Sultan.
In the event of integration, as I interpret the Federal Constitution document,
grants and sources of revenue assigned to States, Brunei would retain about $70
million per annum at present (over 50% emanating from investment income and
much of the rest from the 121⁄4% ad valorem Royalty on oil) and hand over about $60
million, receiving a capitation grant of $1,550,000/-; North Borneo would hand over
about $30 million and retain about $28 million, with a capitation grant of about
$4,750,000/-; while Sarawak would hand over about $55 million, retaining about $23
million, with a capitation grant of $7,750,000/-. Brunei’s contribution would more
than cover the cost of the services which Malaya would have to provide; so would
Sarawak’s. North Borneo’s contribution would probably need a further subsidy.
Jointly, about $130 million would be available for development in the three
territories.
While Brunei’s surplus will decrease if new oil is not found, nevertheless it will
decrease mainly in the contribution to the Federation (i.e. the income from
Company Tax), as interest from investments is still increasing and the revenue
from the 121⁄2% Royalty ad valorem will decrease more slowly than the
contribution from the Company’s profits. There is the sugar. Should I raise the
question of re-unification with the Sultan, in the light of what has been said in
the Press?
I am sending copies of this to Lord Selkirk, Waddell, Goode and Tory.
44 CO 1030/1079, no 11 14 June 1961
[North Borneo and the ‘Grand Design’]: letter from Sir W Goode to E
Melville
[Like Waddell and White (40 and 43), Goode expressed reservations about rapid advance
towards a federation of Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories. Instead, developing
a theme introduced in his despatch of 30 Dec 1960 (see 31), he advocated a step-by-step
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approach. He focused on greater co-operation between North Borneo and Sarawak,
although even in this respect he felt that the accelerated union of North Borneo and
Sarawak would be unwise given the differences between them. For, while North Borneo
was ahead of Sarawak economically, it lagged behind politically.]
I am sorry I have been so long commenting on Lord Selkirk’s letter of 2nd May.1 It
has been over-taken by the Tunku’s statement on which my telegram No. 117 of 14th
June gives the local reactions. I have subsequently received a copy of Nick Waddell’s
letter of 1st June.2
2. The background to the problem in North Borneo is as follows:—
(i) The end of the war found North Borneo completely devastated and it has taken
time to rebuild our towns and ports and to start providing essential requirements
such as hospitals, teachers’ training colleges and schools. It was inevitable that
educationally and politically we should be behind Sarawak, for not only was North
Borneo more backward educationally before the war, but also so many of those
who had some education were killed during the war. We are taking such steps as
we can to catch up, but all the indications are that Sarawak is going ahead equally
fast.
(ii) On the economic front the picture is different. Since the war North Borneo
has concentrated on economic development. It is now going ahead of Sarawak and
all the indications are that its natural advantages in soils, relative ease of
communications and geography will put it further and further ahead. Hence there
is a distinct feeling that North Borneo should not have to carry a poor and
troubled relation.
(iii) It is unfortunate for closer association that the tempo of political
development in Sarawak has gone so far ahead of that in North Borneo. For there
is not the slightest doubt that this is the main obstacle to closer association, and
an obstacle which will become very considerably greater if the member system is
introduced in Sarawak. There is in North Borneo a general feeling of apprehension
over the way politics have developed in Sarawak and a widespread mistrust of
political parties and politicians, especially Chinese. I find reluctance here even to
start limited elections at the local government level.
(iv) It follows that in the interest of closer association Sarawak must be
prepared to slow down her tempo of political development to suit North Borneo
and that any mention of independence should be avoided. The British
association is greatly valued in North Borneo and talk of independence will be
interpreted locally as surrender to the left wing politicians and political troubles
of Sarawak.
(v) The special position of Brunei and the difference in outlook between the
Sultan and the Party Raayat are appreciated in North Borneo. Public opinion
would welcome Brunei in a Borneo Union or Federation. It is therefore
essential that at every stage the door should be seen to be open for Brunei
participation.
3. Against this background, I agree with Lord Selkirk that we cannot wait for
North Borneo to catch up, that the task of bringing North Borneo and Sarawak
1 See 36. 2 See 40.
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together will become harder as time passes, and that North Borneo would respond to
a clear, firm lead by H.M.G.
4. But, like Waddell, I consider that the announcement recommended in
paragraph 5 of Lord Selkirk’s letter, namely that it is H.M.G’s firm policy that North
Borneo and Sarawak shall achieve independence as a single unit, preferably in some
form of association with Malaya and Singapore, goes too far for North Borneo’s
present thinking. Independence is not yet attractive; it is important not to give the
impression that we are about to abandon the loyal and peaceful people of North
Borneo to the political parties of Sarawak, Singapore and Malaya; nor must we
weaken confidence in our continued acceptance of responsibility for the well-being of
North Borneo.
5. I, therefore, prefer the alternative declaration of policy suggested by Waddell
in paragraph 5 3 of his letter, that H.M.G. firmly believes that the interests of the
people of the Borneo territories will be best served by the creation of a viable, unified
state or federation, and that it is prepared to give all possible assistance to that end.
6. I believe that if we give the right lead, we shall be able to move forward at an
ever increasing speed as public opinion comes to accept the main principle.
7. I agree with Lord Selkirk that a single Governor for Sarawak and North
Borneo would be the most effective administrative step to achieve our purpose (and
conversely, that as long as there are two Governors a divergence of views will
inevitably seep through both Governments). This step may be politically practical in
two or three years; but the time is not yet ripe, and I advise against committing
ourselves to it now.
8. I strongly support Lord Selkirk’s proposal in paragraph 7 for the appointment
of a suitable senior officer—and he must be of the highest calibre, as Waddell
states—to consider the problems of bringing the territories together, not excluding
Brunei, and to stimulate and co-ordinate the necessary joint studies by the
Governments. I am less confident than Waddell is of the value of an inter-territorial
organisation charged primarily with co-ordinating economic policies. As reported
separately (my savingram No. 413 of 30th May) I do not think such an organisation is
required in the early stages of setting up a free trade area; and I am doubtful whether
the precedents of inter-territorial organisations quoted by Waddell are sound. I
would rather find the right man and proceed empirically from there. I agree with
Waddell that H.M.G. should pay the cost.
9. I fully agree that H.M.G. must be prepared to make substantial additional grants
for inter-territorial projects such as trunk roads. North Borneo has already started
work on making a through road from our boundary with Sarawak to Beaufort and
thence to Papar and Jesselton, on another road which will join Kudat in the north with
Jesselton, and on the first stage of a trunk road between Jesselton and Sandakan. But
the rate of construction will be slow and some sections will not be all weather.
10. I also wholeheartedly endorse Lord Selkirk’s view in paragraph 10 of his
letter that we must make a much bigger and more vigorous effort to improve
education in North Borneo. Our present rate of progress is far too slow to keep pace
with events. We are drawing up a new development programme for education of the
order of $40 million in capital costs and additional recurrent expenditure of some
3 In fact he is referring to paragraph 4.
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$12 million per annum. If this is to be practical, we shall need powerful backing in
both staff and finance.
11. To sum up, I support the five recommendations set out in paragraph 12 of
Lord Selkirk’s letter, subject only to the comments on points of detail made above.
12. I have two final comments:—
(a) If we are to make real progress quickly we must be prepared to find the
necessary resources; and we must also be prepared to surmount the inevitable
misrepresentation of our policy before world opinion by those who seek every
opportunity to discredit us. Our prospects for a successful outcome will be greatly
prejudiced should our policy become a party issue in the House of Commons.
(b) It will not be easy to bring the Borneo territories together and it will be more
difficult to achieve their further association with Malaya and Singapore. But both
can be done if we make the necessary effort and get the timing right. Already we
have made some progress and there are a number of practical administrative steps
such as the free trade area, unifying departments, (for example Posts and
Telegraphs, Broadcasting, Customs,) and improving communications, which
present no serious political difficulty.
13. I am copying this letter to Lord Selkirk, Tory, Waddell and White.
45 DEFE 4/136, annex to JP(61)57(Final) 21 June 1961
‘Defence implications of an association of the British Borneo
territories with the Federation of Malaya and the State of Singapore’:
report by the Joint Planning Staff for the Chiefs of Staff Committee
[This report was prepared by the Joint Planning Staff (D L Powell-Jones, E B Ashmore, E
V M Strickland and D C Stapleton) in accordance with the instructions of the chief of the
defence staff following discussions in the Colonial Policy Committee on 18 Apr 1961
(document 35). The planners concluded that the Grand Design would improve Britain’s
defensive position in the region, save money, allow the re-deployment of forces outside
Singapore (which was likely to become unreliable in the long term) and require advance
base facilities on the island of Labuan. In their covering note they recommended that, if
they approved the report, the chiefs of staff should forward it to the minister of defence.
The chiefs of staff discussed the report on 27 June, with Lord Mountbatten in the chair.
The COS objected to the speed of change, cast doubt on the advantages of the Grand
Design, expressed concern lest the run-down of Singapore would discourage Britain’s
friends and allies, and instructed the JPS to revise their report. Selkirk, who was invited
to attend the COS meeting on 4 July, argued that long-term defence interests would be
better served by the Grand Design than by upholding the status quo, although he added
the rider that ‘our defence facilities would be orientated towards maintaining the stability
of the area rather than towards furnishing a base for SEATO or British operations outside
this Organisation’. The revised version of the Joint Planners’ report made the point that
the status quo would provide necessary facilities but, since it was unlikely that the status
quo could be preserved for much longer, accepted that the Grand Design ‘appears the
least harmful of possible developments’. On 3 Aug 1961 the chiefs of staff (with Lt General
Sir William Pike in the chair) were still cautious, stating that, while they preferred the
status quo, they accepted the possibility of the need for change on political and economic
grounds. The chiefs of staff continued to examine the feasibility of establishing a base on
Labuan, although it was ruled out by the British Defence Co-ordinating Committee (Far
East) (see 47 para 23). For these discussions see COS 40(61)6, 27 June 1961, and COS
42(61)1, 4 July 1961, DEFE 4/136; JP(61)57(Revised Final), 17 July 1961, and COS
50(61)1, 3 Aug 1961, DEFE 4/137; COS 67(61)6, 3 Oct 1961, COS 69(61)3, 10 Oct 1961,
DEFE 4/139.]
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Introduction
1. Subject to final political decision after consultation with Australia and New
Zealand, Her Majesty’s Government may accept as an aim of their policy in South
East Asia the development, in step with the wishes of the peoples concerned, of a
political Association between the Federation of Malaya, the State of Singapore and
the three Borneo territories$.
2. We are advised that the alternative in Singapore to the prospect of an
Association on the lines of the ‘Grand Design’ is increasing pressure for separate
independence. If this were not granted, we should have to deal with a city a large
proportion of whose population would be hostile, and be involved in an internal
security situation which might largely nullify the value of the base if not, in fact,
make it untenable. If independence were granted, the new government of Singapore
would be likely to be orientated towards Communist China and less inclined to grant
us satisfactory defence facilities than the government of an Association led by a
friendly-disposed Malaya. It would no doubt be possible to hold something like our
present position in Borneo for longer than we can in Singapore but the facilities
which we could expect to have there would be limited compared to those in
Singapore and the period during which we could expect full and unfettered use of
them would also be limited eventually by political factors.
Aim
3. To examine the defence implications of the proposed Association.
Assumptions
Political
4. We assume for the purpose of this paper that whatever form the Association
takes there will be a central government responsible for defence, foreign affairs and
internal security. The precise form is uncertain and will no doubt be the subject of
prolonged negotiation. It is perhaps unlikely to take the form of a straight federation
between the existing units of Singapore and the Federation of Malaya and a possible
union of the Borneo Territories, if only because this would involve a triple-tier
government in the existing Federation of Malaya, which would be impracticable.
Present indications are that a likely form of government would be an extension of the
existing Federal Government in Kuala Lumpur to Brunei, with Singapore and
possibly North Borneo and Sarawak (the last two perhaps united) joining as
additional units on special terms. Whatever the form of the Association we assume
that the United Kingdom will wish to relinquish direct responsibility for internal
security in it.
5. Prima facie we may expect that the new Association will seek to have the
present Malayan Defence Agreement1 extended to the whole of the Association. In
$ Colonial Office to Singapore Telegram No. 28
1 At this point in the report the authors refer to a footnote citing the parliamentary paper, Cmnd 263 (Sept
1957). The Anglo–Malayan Defence Agreement was negotiated before Malayan independence but signed in
Oct, after Malaya became independent, see BDEE: Malaya, lxxvii-lxviii, lxxx, and 402, 407, 408, 410, 414,
417, 431, 432, 441, 462.
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short, the new Association would be likely to agree to British bases and the stationing
of British forces in their territory but to retain restrictions on their use in a SEATO
context. On the other hand we would have bargaining counters in seeking to
negotiate arrangements to retain forces in these territories with safeguards to enable
their effective use. These are the contribution we could make to external defence,
internal stability and prosperity. We discuss these in paragraphs 6–8 below.
6. External defence. The present Malayan Government is seriously concerned at
the trend of development in the Protocol States2 and also at the situation which
would follow from an invasion of West New Guinea by Indonesia, in which the Tunku
expects that international communism would speedily involve itself.3 Indeed by the
time the Association comes about there is a possibility of its having to face other
external threats.
7. Internal stability. Overseas Commonwealth forces are still being employed
against Communist terrorists in the north of Malaya and the need for this may
continue for some time.4 Moreover, in view of the Tunku’s motives in now accepting
the ‘Grand Design’ proposals, he is likely to welcome the presence of overseas
Commonwealth forces in the new Association as some reassurance against internal
trouble even though he would not necessarily wish to ask for the assistance of these
forces to put down disturbances except in the last resort. These arguments cannot be
applied to Singapore, which is a special internal security risk and will remain so for
the new Association.
8. Economic factors. The overseas Commonwealth forces in Malaya and
Singapore are important employers of labour and providers of external currency. In
view of the rapidly increasing population and difficult employment situation in
Singapore, the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, has let it be known privately that
he is anxious to preserve this source of income. This is a consideration which would
also weigh with Malaya in negotiations for the new Association.
9. The attitude of Australia and New Zealand. Australia and New Zealand have at
least as great an interest as ourselves in a satisfactory solution, and we assume that
we should carry them with us in our policy on the ‘Grand Design’.
Implications of the proposed association on United Kingdom defence arrangements
10. From these political assumptions, and having regard to treaty obligations
and conclusions already reached by HM Government, we assume that our defence
aims in South East Asia, should the ‘Grand Design’ come about, would be:—
(a) The external defence and internal security of the remaining British dependent
territories, i.e. Hong Kong and the Pacific islands, and the external defence of the
Maldives.
2 The Protocol States were South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, so called because a protocol to the SE Asia
Collective Defence Treaty of 1954 placed them under the SEATO’s protection. In 1960 war resumed
between communist and non-communist forces in Indochina and an international crisis over Laos was
resolved only by agreements in July 1962 for the political unity and neutralisation of the country.
3 For Indonesia’s claims upon West New Guinea, see 21, n 3.
4 Although the twelve-year Malayan Emergency officially ended on 31 July 1960, sporadic engagements
continued on the border with Thailand where remaining communist forces had retreated. The CPM did
not abandon the armed struggle until its general secretary signed agreements with the governments of
Malaysia and Thailand in Dec 1989.
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(b) The ability to provide an independently controlled contribution to the nuclear
deterrent against China.
(c) The ability to contribute to land operations in support of SEATO, together
with the appropriate naval and air support.
(d) To meet the requirements of any defence agreement with the new Association.
11. We are able to meet our present aims, which include those above, by the
stationing of troops in Malaya and Singapore (and, shortly, Borneo) and in particular
by the unrestricted use of Singapore as a naval/land/air base for the mounting and
support of external operations. The situation has not proved entirely satisfactory in
the planning for the ANZAM5 support of SEATO because of the attitude of the
Malayan Government towards the direct use of forces stationed in the Federation. In
Singapore, also, we are involved in considerable overheads owing to the need for
substantial garrison and reinforcement commitments to maintain internal security;
these amount in the worst case to 14 major units plus one equivalent unit from the
RAF.
12. It is the availability of Singapore which is above all called in question if the
Association is formed.6 If the Association were to be responsible for the internal
security of Singapore, we would not be able to rely on its use as a main base.
Provided, however, that a satisfactory agreement could be negotiated with the
Association, allowing us freedom of action for our forces in exchange for an
undertaking to help in the external defence of the Association, it should be
possible for us to continue to meet the defence aims set out in paragraph 10 by
relying on our present facilities at Malacca and Butterworth and by establishing
elsewhere, free from the special risks of Singapore, the minimum facilities now
there which it would be desirable to replace. These would comprise for the Royal
Navy a fleet anchorage and for the RAF an airfield. The Army would require new
base facilities sufficient to provide forward support to forces deployed in any of the
roles described in paragraph 10 above. These facilities would allow us to suspend
or discontinue the use of residual installations in Singapore at our convenience. A
new defence agreement on these lines should not explicitly exclude and therefore
should tacitly safeguard our ability to deploy and maintain nuclear forces in the
new Association.
13. On the other hand the new Association, though wishing us to accept
responsibility for external defence, may not be prepared to afford us acceptable
freedom of action in the use of our forces based in their territory in support of
Commonwealth or SEATO interests. While we do not believe that we or the
ANZAM powers would stand by and see the Association attacked, it would not be in
the United Kingdom’s interest to accept a defence agreement which limited us in
this way. The aims in paragraph 10 would then have to be met by some other
means.
14. There appear to be the following alternatives:—
5 ANZAM a consultative arrangement set up in 1948 through which (from 1950) Australia and New
Zealand made contributions for the defence of British Malaya. ANZAM was largely subsumed within the
structure of the Anglo–Malayan Defence Agreement.
6 It was this likelihood that worried Julian Amery, secretary of state for air, see 74.
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(a) To secure sovereign areas.
(b) To station ANZAM forces in SEATO countries, possibly under strengthened
SEATO organization.
(c) To provide a military force for the area based on Australia.
We consider these in paragraphs 15 to 22 below.
Sovereign areas
15. The day-to-day operation of Sovereign Areas, especially one including an urban
complex, depends to a very large extent on local goodwill over such things as public
utilities, particularly water and local labour. The danger always remains that freedom
to use Sovereign Areas in support of national policy, e.g. the use of nuclear forces from
them, will be inhibited by political pressure. Sovereign Areas must be chosen so that
consideration of internal and external defence does not nullify their value as bases.
16. Malaya and Singapore. For political reasons there could, of course, be no
hope of securing Sovereign Areas in Malaya, though it might be possible to preserve
our position in Malacca, Butterworth and Penang. In Singapore—political objections
aside—such areas would be most difficult to delineate and would have to include
several different parts of Singapore Island. The maintenance of their security and
contact between them would tie down many troops.
17. Borneo Territories. It is in the Borneo area that the possibility of Sovereign
Areas and for that matter, leases, appears most promising. We have in mind
particularly Labuan where there would be great advantage for the United Kingdom in
retaining sovereign control, whether or not a satisfactory defence agreement were
reached with the Association.
18. Labuan. Labuan, an island of 35 square miles with a population of
approximately 15,000 people, traditionally separate from neighbouring territories,
could readily be developed as an advance base with a fine anchorage in Brunei Bay.
The airfield would have to be improved but installations on the scale of our facilities
in Singapore are not contemplated. It would be especially valuable to us as a
refuelling base for strategic nuclear forces based in Australia; on the other hand it
could not replace Kota Belud as an army training area and we would therefore wish
to retain training facilities in this small area of the North Borneo mainland.
Information on Labuan is given at Appendix.7
Stationing ANZAM forces in SEATO countries
19. Another way in which the United Kingdom might be able to fulfil at least part
of her SEATO commitments would be by stationing land and air forces in Thailand. It
is doubtful, however, if she could obtain the necessary base facilities there. In any
case, we are advised that HM Government might not agree to such a course, since
the cost in foreign currency would be high, the use of forces in defence of British
interests outside SEATO might be prejudiced and the United Kingdom would be
committed in advance to operations in South East Asia.
20. The idea, however, has positive attractions in that it would contribute to a
permanent SEATO military presence as a deterrent against further Communist incursion
and should obviate delay in mounting operations on the mainland with forces fully
7 Not printed.
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equipped and supported with heavy weapons. Indeed, from the military point of view, this
is the most satisfactory and timely way of meeting the needs of SEATO military action.
21. Although the political circumstances are widely different, from the military
standpoint the reorganization of the SEATO alliance on NATO lines with, for
example, declared forces, common defence responsibilities, a defended frontier and
common logistics, offers a far more certain means of ensuring the physical security
of the remaining free nations of South East Asia in defence against Communism. We
recognize that, apart from the difficulties for the United Kingdom referred to in
paragraph 19 above, these South East Asia nations might not be persuaded of the
advantages of having SEATO forces on their territory in peace-time. This is a course
of action, however, which must depend essentially on political judgement of the
chances of success.
Providing a military force based on Australia
22. This alternative is under separate examination£, in which the possible effect
of ‘Grand Design’ will be taken into account.
Strength of United Kingdom forces
23. At present our initial contribution to external defence of the area under ANZAM
and for SEATO purposes consists of the British element of the Commonwealth Brigade
Group with naval and air support, reinforced if necessary from the United Kingdom.
24. In addition we plan* to have available in the Theatre against the internal
security threat in Singapore eight army units, one Royal Marine Commando, and one
equivalent unit of the RAF. For some of these units internal security is their prime
role and a significant reduction could be made if we gave up our internal security
responsibilities. There may, however, be some commitments to help with the
formation of the Association, but these would have to be studied as negotiation
proceeds. Our eventual contribution to internal stability would be implicit in our
forces provided in the area for other purposes.
The alternative to ‘Grand Design’
25. A hostile Singapore held down by force, or a separately independent and
possibly communistic Singapore, and the weaknesses of the separate Borneo territories,
whatever their political status, would seriously extend the defence responsibilities of
the United Kingdom and indeed for the ANZAM powers and the West as a whole.
Timing
26. The problems associated with becoming militarily independent in all
essentials of Singapore before it becomes unreliable as a main base are complex.
Apart from possible political and economic objections to a precipitate or complete
withdrawal, we should not wish, from the military point of view, to lose useful
facilities prematurely. Moreover, detailed studies by the Principal Administrative
Officers will be required to decide what must be provided elsewhere and when. These
studies can hardly be carried out realistically at this stage in the launching of the
‘Grand Design’, nor until the place of Australia in our plans has been decided. That
they will ultimately be essential seems certain.
£ JP(61)67 * COS(61)13
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Conclusions
27. The formation of the ‘Grand Design’ should in the long term free our forces
from substantial internal security commitments. In the short term we may be called
upon for some assistance during the formation and development of the Association.
28. Singapore, in or out of the ‘Grand Design’, will eventually become unreliable
as a main base. The negotiation of the ‘Grand Design’ offers an opportunity of
recognizing this fact and planning the deployment of our forces in the area on a
firmer long-term basis.
29. We should, as part of the ‘Grand Design’, acquire advanced base facilities in
Labuan.
30. From the military point of view, therefore, the ‘Grand Design’ would improve
our defence position in the Theatre, providing that satisfactory agreements could be
reached on the various points discussed above. Moreover, if it comes about and we
exploit it to realign our defence arrangements, the longer-term improvement in our
defence position in the area as a whole could be substantial.
46 PREM 11/3418 26 June 1961
[The Grand Design]: letter from Tunku Abdul Rahman to Mr
Macmillan. Enclosure: ‘Integration of British North Borneo territories
and Singapore with the Federation of Malaya’
[Ghazali Shafie, permanent secretary of the Malayan Ministry of External Affairs, brought
this letter from Kuala Lumpur to Selkirk in Singapore for forwarding to Macmillan. The
Tunku remained mistrustful of Lee’s intentions and ever wary of dissent amongst Malays
in the Federation. For these reasons he hoped to minimise the Singapore threat by first
securing merger with the Borneo territories. Since the principal attraction of the Grand
Design for the British was to ensure the stability of Singapore through integration with
the Federation, they did not welcome the Tunku’s ‘further thoughts’. Selkirk received
the letter, just after he had concluded with Goode, Waddell and White the terms of a
despatch to Macleod (see 47). In forwarding the Tunku’s letter to Macmillan, Selkirk
commented: ‘The views which the Tunku puts forward are much on the lines anticipated
in the despatch and are, in some ways, harder than I had hoped.’ Waddell was ‘extremely
irritated’ and told Tory that the feeling had grown in Sarawak that ‘the Tunku’s object is
a Greater Malaya, not Greater Malaysia’. CO officials were alarmed by the Tunku’s change
of tack, although they were somewhat relieved that Selkirk was becoming more aware of
the difficulties emanating from Kuala Lumpur (Selkirk to Macmillan, 27 June 1961,
PREM 11/3418; Waddell to Tory, 27 July 1961, CO 1030/981, no 412c; CO 1030/980, no
340). The Tunku’s letter and its enclosures were later circulated to the inter-
departmental committee of officials which was set up in Sept to prepare for the
Anglo–Malayan talks on ‘Greater Malaysia’ (CAB 134/1949 and also CO 1030/1079, no 4).
Macmillan did not reply to the Tunku until 3 Aug and then he evaded the issue of a prior
Malaya/Borneo merger by proposing talks for the autumn (see 51). The Tunku and
Macmillan corresponded at key moments and particularly when the possibility of
Anglo–Malayan differences jeopardised Malaysia, for example, as we shall see below, over
the recommendations of the Cobbold Commission in June-July 1962 or the financial
settlement in 1963.]
I was gratified to read your encouraging statement in Parliament last week about the
proposed association of the Borneo territories, Singapore and the Federation of
Malaya.1 As you may already be aware, I have written to Mr. Sandys regarding this, in
1 H of C Debs, vol 642, cols 1171–1173, 20 June 1961.
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particular about the future relationship of Brunei and the Federation.2 I am now
forwarding a memorandum giving in some details our further thoughts on the
subject, which I hope may serve as a basis for discussions.
Enclosure to 46
Introduction
It is generally agreed that all dependent territories should in due course attain
Sovereign and Independent status, an objective over which the United Kingdom and
the Federation Government have no differences. Indeed, the Federation Government
has followed the policies pursued in various parts of the world by the United
Kingdom Government in this regard with appreciation and sympathy, being aware of
the delicate balance required between progressive policies and the realities of
particular situations. The immediate areas of concern to the Federation Government
is Singapore, and further away, however, are the neighbouring territories, namely
North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. The future must inevitably require careful,
longterm and in the present political climate, urgent consideration.
2. Annexes A and B show a breakdown of the area and population of each of these
territories, and a map of this region.3
3. The history of the Federation of Malaya is interrelated with the history of the
Sultanate of Brunei which was formerly a powerful state with authority over those
other two Borneo territories and territories of the Malay archipelago. There had been
trade and political, social and cultural ties between those territories and Malaya from
time immemorial. Racially the various indigenous peoples of those territories are
related to the Malays, in fact they come of the same stock. The British domination in
various degrees in this region during recent history brought about a closer political
and administrative connection between the British North Borneo territories and
British Malaya. There was established a currency union which still exists in the form
of a Currency Agreement and there was interchangeability of the civil, police,
educational and technical services, and in the case of the State of Brunei, many
Malayan Civil Service, Medical Service and Technical Service officers are serving on
secondment with the Brunei Government.
Proposal
4. Under the Defence Treaty with the United Kingdom, Malaya is committed for
the defence of the Borneo territories, Singapore and Hong Kong in the event of
external aggression or outbreak of hostilities in these territories. With regard to
Singapore the Federation of Malaya is represented in the Internal Security Council.
It would not be out of place therefore if these territories were brought into closer ties
with the Federation of Malaya. It is proposed therefore as a first step that the
territories of Brunei, Borneo and Sarawak be brought into the Federation as units of
2 Sandys was in Central Africa at the time of the Tunku’s speech on 27 May, but on his return he sent a
message to the Tunku on 5 June welcoming his suggestion and the Tunku replied on 15 June (DO 169/25,
nos 45 and 55).
3 Annexes A and B are not printed. A more accurate population table than that at appendix C is at 73,
appendix B.
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the Federation, enjoying the same rights and privileges as the States which presently
form the Federation of Malaya, namely, Johore, Malacca, Negri Sembilan, Selangor,
Pahang, Perak, Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, Perlis and Penang. Brunei, being a
Sultanate, would have a Sultan as Head of State, the other two territories would be
headed by Governors as is done with Penang and Malacca. It would be better of
course if Sarawak could be returned to Brunei, at least the northern part of Sarawak,
where the population is mainly Malays and Dyaks.
5. After the merger of these territories with the Federation of Malaya, the next
logical step would be to form a greater federation with Singapore. As the present
Constitution of Singapore requires to be reviewed in 1963, the most appropriate time
for preliminary discussions with Singapore would be before that date. It would be
difficult at this stage, to determine the position of Singapore in its relation with the
Federation, but it is obvious that once they become part of the greater federation,
Singapore would be subject to the influence of the Federation, with rights to
determine fully its internal affairs, except with regard to matters of national
importance, such as internal security, defence, development finance, immigration,
education and internal defence, and so it follows with regard to foreign affairs the
Greater Federation Government will assume sole responsibility.
6. The next matter which will require attention will be the question of British
bases in Singapore which are now used as part of SEATO defence. But after the
merger of Singapore with the Federation it is obvious that these bases would no
longer be at the disposal of SEATO but could be maintained as bases for the defence
of the Commonwealth.
7. The administration of Singapore, Brunei and the Federation presents no
difficulties whatsoever because the system of civil administration in these territories
follows the same pattern based on British administration. It only remains to
maintain the present administrative system, and in the future the officers of these
territories would be interchangeable or transferable as they belong to the same
service. It is proposed however that Singapore should maintain their own civil
service but with rights to claim for secondment of officers from the Federation.
8. It is proposed that a discussion on this line mentioned above should be held
when the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom visits the Federation in September,
after which a formal discussion can be arranged with representatives of the
Federation Government on one side and the United Kingdom as representing the
United Kingdom Government and these other territories on the other side.
9. There are no Constitutional problems however novel or difficult which cannot
be resolved. The main problem will be how to present the plan for Greater Malaysia
to the peoples of three respective territories.4 Singapore can express their own will
through their elected representatives, but in view of the political immaturity of the
people of Borneo it is not anticipated that they will have politicians who can
represent them. It is to be expected therefore that the representation of the United
Kingdom Government will include representatives from each of these territories as
well. This meeting should decide on the appointment of an independent Commission
with terms of reference to work out the Constitutional details of such a federation of
4 Apart from the substitution of ‘Greater Malaysia’ for ‘the “Grand Design”’, the first two sentences of para
9 are identical with the beginning of para 10 in Lee Kuan Yew’s paper of 9 May (see 37).
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territories. It is suggested that this Commission should, if possible, be made up of
those members of the Commission who drafted the Constitution of the Federation of
Malaya, with the exception of the Chairman, Lord Reid,5 who it is understood is
indisposed. In his place it is proposed that Lord Ogmore6 who is conversant with
affairs in this part of the world should be invited to serve as Chairman.
10. It is a matter for emphasis that such a federation, comprising a grand total of
nearly ten million people, in an area of 130,000 square miles, as against a Federation
of 50,000 square miles, will have the effect of creating a greater importance in the
hearts and minds of the people of these territories and a national pride which would
go a long way in building up a feeling of loyalty to the country. The federation of a
Greater Malaysia or a Greater Malaya, whichever name may be decided upon, will be
powerful and viable and will be able to give greater contribution in the support of the
Commonwealth association.
11. It has been suggested in some quarters that the merger of these territories is
a matter for a long term objective and should be considered as such. The Federation
Government however does not share this view. It is felt that the time is opportune to
give immediate consideration to a plan for an early integration of these territories
with the Federation of Malaya. A delay will only result in many undesirable
consequences. For example, the Federation is one of the participating Governments
to the present Currency Agreement. The other four participating Governments are
those whose territories are the subject of this proposal. It will be appreciated that this
participation in an Agreement which requires unanimity on all major issues
derogates materially from the Federation’s sovereignty as an independent nation in
currency and financial matters. It is therefore natural that continued participation in
such an Agreement under such conditions would be unsatisfactory from a long term
point of view. The Federation Government is already being subjected to constant
criticism by political opponents and the matter has become a live issue in recent
election campaigns. In fact the Federation Government is actively considering
withdrawing from this Agreement in accordance with the agreed procedure specified
therein. At the same time it is felt that it would be a pity to break up an Agreement
which has served all concerned so well in the past, but this Government would have
no alternative, unless there is a reasonable prospect that all the territories covered by
this Agreement will, in the near future, form an integral part of the Federation.
12. It is hoped that the British Government would give favourable consideration
to this proposal for a Greater Malaysia. While relationship between the Federation of
Malaya and the United Kingdom has been most cordial and the ties of friendship and
common interest are inseparable, such a federation of territories as proposed will do
much to arrest the spread of Communism in this region of Asia, and this is
particularly urgent in view of the recent intensive Communist activities in South
East Asia as a result of their success in Laos.
5 Lord Reid chaired the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission, 1956–1957, see BDEE: Malaya,
lii, lxxvii, 401 n 1, 404, 423, 424, 427–430, 438, 439, 443, 448, 453.
6 Lord Ogmore (formerly David Rees-Williams) had known the Tunku since the 1930s. He had practised
law in Penang before the Second World War and had served as parliamentary under-secretary of state, CO,
1947–1950; parliamentary under-secretary of state, CRO, 1950–1951; minister of civil aviation, June–Oct
1951. The Tunku proposed him as chairman of the Borneo commission, see 89, note.
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47 CO 1030/980 no 324A 27 June 1961
[The ‘Grand Design’]: despatch from Lord Selkirk to Mr Macleod
reporting recent developments and urging a decision on policy
[The Tunku’s speech of 27 May provoked a confrontation between Lee and the moderates,
on the one hand, and their left-wing critics in the PAP, on the other. Fearing the fall of
Lee’s government, Selkirk convened in Singapore a high-level conference of British
representatives who were ‘in broad agreement with the terms of this despatch’ which was
written in anticipation of the Tunku’s memorandum regarding merger (see 46). Selkirk
identified in the Tunku’s proposal significant problems regarding the Borneo territories
and regional defence, but he urged the secretary of state to decide on a policy and take
advantage of the Tunku’s initiative in order to shape its development. On the same day
Selkirk reinforced his despatch to Macleod with a letter to Macmillan (see 48). Shortly
afterwards, Selkirk flew to London for meetings with Macmillan, Macleod, the chiefs of
staff and Whitehall officials (CO 1030/980, no 340; CO 1030/1079, no 14A; COS 42(61)1, 4
July 1961, DEFE 4/136; draft minutes of Selkirk’s meeting with Goode, Waddell, White
and others, DO 169/27, no 37; PREM 11/3418).]
I have the honour to refer to my despatch No. 2 of the 30th January 19611 and to
address you on the subject of recent developments on the Grand Design. I held a
meeting in Singapore on the 26th June with Sir William Goode, Sir Alexander
Waddell, Mr. D. C. White and representatives of the United Kingdom High
Commission in Kuala Lumpur and they are in broad agreement with the terms of
this despatch. I had previously had discussions with the Tunku and Tun Razak in
Kuala Lumpur.
British interests
2. The United Kingdom has a strong interest in peace and stability in the area.
The United Kingdom Government have a constitutional responsibility for Singapore
and the Borneo territories and for guiding their future as far as practicable in the
direction of the agreed aim for all United Kingdom dependent territories of full self-
Government within the Commonwealth. In the long run the political stability and
prosperity of the area is the best if not the only guarantee against subversion by
Communist movements and against outside aggression. We have political interests
and strategic obligations connected with the defence of Malaya, Australia, New
Zealand and Hong Kong, the protection of our communications with these countries
and our obligations to S.E.A.T.O. The United Kingdom also has important economic
interests in the region.
3. Grand Design is the most likely policy to satisfy long-term United Kingdom
interests in the area. The formation of a larger group under the leadership of the
Federation of Malaya would give a greater strength to the territories concerned than
they could hope to achieve individually; this would help them to resist internal and
external pressures. In the long term there are threats to the area from both China
and Indonesia and the Philippines have shadowy claims to North Borneo. Grand
Design would provide a political solution for the territories for which the United
Kingdom Government is at present responsible and would provide an answer to the
pressures which may arise in the United Nations for the grant of early independence
to these territories. Economically Grand Design would be likely to provide a broader
1 See 32.
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base for the territories in the area which should help to promote economic
development and political stability. If Grand Design were brought about with the
goodwill of the United Kingdom Government it seems probable that the United
Kingdom economic interests would not be seriously affected—certainly not more so
than if we retained political control against the will of the local people—and might
even benefit. Arrangements would, however, have to be made to safeguard our
strategic obligations.
The Tunku’s initiative
4. On the 27th May, 1961 the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya made a
speech at a luncheon given in his honour in Singapore by the Foreign
Correspondents’ Association of South East Asia in which he referred to Grand Design
in the following terms:—
‘Malaya today as a nation realises that she cannot stand alone and in isolation.
Outside of international politics the national one must be broad based.
Sooner or later she should have an understanding with Britain and the
peoples of the territories of Singapore, [North] Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak.
It is premature for me to say now how this closer understanding can be
brought about but it is inevitable that we should look ahead to this objective
and think of a plan whereby these territories can be brought closer together
in a political and economic co-operation.’
Reasons for Tunku’s change of attitude
5. This statement indicated a remarkable and welcome change of attitude on the
Tunku’s part. Among the factors contributing to this were no doubt the talks which
the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations had with the Tunku in January
and the Prime Minister of Singapore’s recent representations to him on the subject.2
Hitherto the Tunku had argued that the interests of the Federation would be best
served by keeping Singapore separate and that it would be easy for the Federation to
insulate herself from the effects of any political deterioration there by physical means
(e.g. closing the Causeway) and by relying on friendly Western powers. He has,
however, now, according to his own admission, come to realise that this would only
be a short term solution at best and that the Federation’s interests would be better
served by finding some means of absorbing Singapore. The main difficulty in this was
that it would lead to an overall Chinese majority. If, however, the Borneo territories
were included as well, the overall proportion of Chinese would be only about 42%.
For this reason, in the Tunku’s view Grand Design offered the only safe means of
absorbing Singapore.
Singapore
6. For Singapore there is some urgency if Grand Design is the only method by
which the Tunku can be persuaded to accept Singapore. Since the P.A.P. came into
power in June 1959 they have consistently advocated a policy of ‘independence
through merger’. But the position of the P.A.P. leadership is weakening and they are
being subjected to increasing pressure for outright independence—or for
2 See 37.
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independence before merger which might well postpone merger indefinitely. The
P.A.P. Government have recently announced that at the 1963 Constitutional Review
Talks they will demand independence through merger with the Federation or merger
in a larger federation, and they have said to me and to members of my staff, though
not in public, that they will stand or fall by this. If the P.A.P. were ousted, it seems
likely that the major political force in the State would be the extreme left group, led
by the communist or near communist trade union leaders, who have recently urged
the abolition, as a first step, of all existing British powers in relation to the internal
government of Singapore.
The Borneo territories
7. The position of the Borneo territories is entirely different. Politically and
economically North Borneo and Sarawak are much less developed than Malaya or
Singapore and it would be fair to say that North Borneo needed British
administration for a number of years before being ready for full self-government
which, while it need not depend on direct elections, will only be a reality if the people
take a part in the administration. In Sarawak there are elected representatives
elected by indirect means but the territory still has a considerable way to go to self-
government and will continue to need a strong British element in the administration
for some years. There are risks in trying to push the two territories too fast. The first
step clearly is for them to be linked with each other and, although it has been slow,
there has recently been some progress in this direction.
8. Up to 1959 Brunei had a Treaty with the United Kingdom Government under
which the Sultan agreed that the foreign relations of the territory should be
conducted by Her Majesty’s Government, who were represented in the territory by a
Resident. In 1959 the Sultan promulgated a written constitution which inter alia
commits him to introduce elections within two years. Under a new Agreement
concluded with the Sultan, Her Majesty’s Government continues to be responsible
for defence and external affairs through a High Commissioner who advises the
Sultan on these matters, and by an Exchange of Letters between the Sultan and your
predecessor it was agreed that the High Commissioner would not normally be
expected to advise on other matters unless the Sultan so wished.
Reactions to the Tunku’s statement of 27th May
9. The Prime Minister of Singapore has welcomed the Tunku’s declaration as
something that should accelerate the speed of independence through merger for
Singapore. In Sarawak and North Borneo, while some association of the Borneo
territories with Malaya and Singapore has been welcomed as a long-term aim, it is
felt that the first step should be a closer association of the Borneo territories, that
time should be allowed for them to evolve their own institutions and that
incorporation as an integral part of the Federation of Malaya would not be acceptable
today.
10. The indications are that there may well be adverse reactions from the
Indonesians, who themselves have vague aspirations to leadership of the area. The
newspaper ‘Suluh Indonesia’3 attacked the Tunku’s statement as a ‘manifestation of
3 Literally ‘torch of Indonesia’.
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lack of understanding of the historical development of mankind’. Dr. Subandrio4
recently passed through Singapore and his attitude to the Tunku’s proposal was
apparently one of truculence. Dr. Subandrio is reported in the Press as having said
that his country was not interested in the plan and that it was a matter for the
countries concerned to decide for themselves. The possibility cannot, however, be
ignored that developments on Grand Design may antagonise the Indonesian
Government and might conceivably lead them to attempt an irredentist movement
in the Borneo territories.
Form and timing
11. A number of suggestions have been put forward as regards the form which
Grand Design might take. One suggestion proposed for the Federation and Singapore
is an arrangement on what has been termed an Ulster model. Under this the
Federation would take over from Singapore external affairs, defence and internal
security, including the Police, for which Singapore would pay a financial subvention
to Kuala Lumpur. Otherwise Singapore would retain a large measure of self-
government—certainly greater than that allowed to the existing States in the
Federation. In return for this Singapore would have to agree to send only say five to
ten representatives to Parliament in Kuala Lumpur instead of the eighteen to twenty
to which she would be entitled by reason of her population. This would not upset the
Malay/Chinese equilibrium. Both the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew appear to consider
that something on these lines would be the most practicable solution. Similarly the
Ulster model could be applied to the Borneo territories.
12. A possible alternative to the Ulster model would be some kind of
confederation under which each constituent territory had its own elected parliament
and nominated members to a confederation parliament in proportion to its
population. So long as the Alliance Government were in power in the Federation,
this would ensure that the Malays were not swamped by the Chinese. Such an
arrangement would however be open to a number of objections. It would lead in
effect to three-tier government in Malaya. Unless a strong confederal government
were established it would not be able to deal effectively with internal security
problems in Singapore.
13. According to the Tunku, the Sultan of Brunei is anxious to have Brunei
incorporated as a State of the Federation as quickly as possible. We know that the
Tunku would like this, but there seems to be some doubt what the Sultan actually
said and moreover it is far from certain to what extent he is supported by the people
of Brunei. An important political factor is the Party Ra’ayat which seeks closer
association with Sarawak and has said that it does not want integration with Malaya
except in conjunction with the other two Borneo territories. The situation may
become clearer as a result of the Tunku’s visit.
14. The Tunku is having a memorandum prepared setting out his views on
Grand Design but this has not yet been received.5 As far as they are known at present,
his ideas are somewhat vague but the Federation Government appear to be thinking
4 Dr Subandrio, foreign minister of Indonesia, 1957–1966, directed the radical, leftist foreign policy of
Sukarno’s ‘Guided Democracy’.
5 See 46. The Tunku’s memorandum reached Selkirk after this despatch had been drafted and agreed.
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on the following lines. The Borneo territories should associate with Malaya at the
same time as Singapore; the Federation Government would not be willing to absorb
Singapore in advance of the other territories. They agree that the association with
Singapore should come into operation by 1963 but do not see why the Borneo
territories should not also be associated within that period. They recognise that the
Borneo territories are in a very early stage of political and educational development
but are prepared to take over the United Kingdom responsibility for administering
them. They accept the need to maintain continuity of administration and would be
willing to provide safeguards for the British Administrative Service. They would also
consider assuming responsibility for the provision of development finance. They
apparently envisage that the territories would be represented in the Federal
Parliament by members of the Council Negri in Sarawak and members nominated by
the Government of North Borneo. In the interim period, while British
administration was still required, some form of condominium between the
Federation and the United Kingdom might be feasible and desirable.
15. These Federation proposals would raise extreme difficulty for the United
Kingdom Government. In the first place, the territories could not be joined with
Malaya without an opportunity being given to their peoples to indicate whether they
had any objections to this course. It would hardly be practicable to consult the
people, particularly in North Borneo, until there is a much greater degree of
education and self-government. Secondly, North Borneo in particular needs British
administration for a number of years yet. Thirdly, the reports that have been
received from the Borneo territories indicate that if eventually they are associated
with Malaya they would not wish to be absorbed as additional states of the
Federation.
16. The Tunku is still vague on some points. At present he appears to be firmly
wedded to the idea that the Borneo territories should join Malaya at the same time
as, if not before, Singapore and that the Borneo territories should join as integral
states, although he might accept some form of condominium.
17. There could be many different variations on the theme of an Anglo–Malaya
condominium, according to the extent of the responsibilities of the Malayan and
United Kingdom Governments. Among the possible advantages of a condominium
would be that it would help to reassure the peoples of the territories that the United
Kingdom Government were not abdicating their responsibilities towards them. It
would also serve to introduce the Federation to the problems of the area. I do not
under-estimate the difficulties of operating a condominium but, in the last resort, we
might have to consider something on these lines.
18. An alternative to condominium would be for the United Kingdom to
continue to administer the Borneo territories for a period of years on an agency basis
on behalf of the Federation Government. This would have the advantage that it
would oblige the Federation to cultivate good relations with the territories. If this
were done there would have to be some undertaking that after a period of five to ten
years the territories would be free to dissociate themselves if they so wished. Both
this arrangement and condominium would involve a transfer of sovereignty and any
early transfer of sovereignty would be difficult.
19. Another possible alternative would be the establishment of some consultative
and administrative arrangement, not involving transfer of sovereignty, whereby the
Federation could be practically associated with the administration of the territories
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during an interim period at the end of which the peoples would be asked to approve
their inclusion in the Federation.
20. Discussion with the Tunku indicates that he may not yet fully appreciate the
need to carry the peoples of the Borneo territories with him in any arrangements
made. Moreover, it appears that his knowledge of the Borneo territories is slight. At
the moment the impression I have is that the Tunku may feel that we are making
difficulties whereas in fact these difficulties are inherent in the situation. The Tunku
must make or be given early opportunities to learn of the difficulties from the
representatives of the territories themselves, preferably meeting them in the
territories, instead of merely from representatives of the United Kingdom
Government. If the Borneo territories are to come in, the Tunku must sell the idea to
them and the Federation Government must become aware of the realities in these
territories.
Defence aspects
21. The Chiefs of Staff are considering the defence aspects in some detail: I have
shown this despatch to the Commanders-in-Chief but it has not been formally
cleared with the B.D.C.C.
22. Our military aims in the area are to discharge our reponsibilities in ANZAM,
SEATO and the Malayan Defence Agreement, to defend Singapore, the Borneo
territories and Hong Kong and to protect our communications. In order to fulfil
these reponsibilities we need the physical presence of forces in the area and a base
from which to sustain them. If these forces are to operate in furtherance of United
Kingdom and Commonwealth policy, we must have the ability to operate the base as
we require. We recognise, nonetheless, that in the long run we cannot maintain our
military presence in the area without the consent of the indigenous peoples who
need to be brought to realise that we are not here for repressive purposes. If
Commonwealth forces cease to be in the area a strategic vacuum will exist between
China, Australia and the Indian Ocean with nothing to prevent the spread of
Communism to these areas.
23. One of the Tunku’s early ideas was that the United Kingdom bases would be
transferred to North Borneo, which would remain indefinitely under British control.
This is ruled out however by the lack of skilled labour in North Borneo, the cost of
such a move, and the time it would take. In any case by the time the move had been
made it might no longer be possible politically to remain in North Borneo. Under any
arrangements for Grand Design we should need therefore to keep our bases in
Singapore.
24. The Tunku has said in the past that he could not contemplate asking his
Parliament to agree to another Defence Agreement. He appears to envisage that the
existing Malayan Defence Agreement should merely be extended to cover Singapore.
The difficulty about this Agreement is that the United Kingdom Government cannot
make major alteration to the character or deployment of their forces based in the
Federation without prior consultation with the Federation Government. At the
present time the arrangement is that these forces can only be used for SEATO
purposes if they are first brought to Singapore. On present indications the Tunku is
unlikely to agree to any amendment to the Agreement as regards Singapore, and we
should therefore need to reach some prior understanding with him which would
enable us to continue to use our forces for SEATO purposes. Any reduction in our
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capacity to fulfil our SEATO obligations would adversely affect our relations with our
SEATO allies. But in any event it is unlikely that we should be able to use our bases in
pursuit of policies greatly out of line with the policies of the Federation Government.
25. There are obvious political difficulties about retaining bases in independent
countries and, in the last resort, no base can be used for any length of time if the
local population are hostile. The Singapore bases in particular are heavily dependent
on local civilian labour, both skilled and unskilled, and on such services as water
supplies. In this case, however, there are a number of factors in our favour. The
Tunku would not wish to take over Singapore without the bases because they are
important to the defence of Malaya and also because they bring considerable
economic and employment benefits to Singapore.
The next steps
26. The Tunku’s Memorandum will probably include a proposal for a conference
to be held in the fairly near future, one of the objects of which might be to draw up
terms of reference for a Constitutional Commission of eminent Commonwealth
persons, on the lines of the Reid Commission for Malaya. Both the Tunku and Lee
Kuan Yew are hoping that Mr. Macmillan’s visit in September will lead to significant
progress being made.
27. The first essential is for the United Kingdom Government to decide its policy.
I remain convinced that the right aim of our policy is Grand Design and that
advantage should be taken of the opportunity which the Tunku has now given us to
lend encouragement to the scheme. But there are admittedly serious problems to be
faced.
28. The two critical questions to be considered are the extent to which we would
be prepared to go in meeting the Federation Government’s views on (a) the Borneo
territories, bearing in mind the need to take into account the wishes of the people,
and (b) defence and our strategic requirements. Having formed our conclusions on
these matters the next stage, before there could be any question of a conference,
would seem to be a round of confidential discussions, mainly with the Tunku, to
ascertain whether there was sufficient common ground to enable us to go ahead. I
would hope that it might be possible to complete this process before Mr. Macmillan’s
visit in September,6 so that some forthcoming statement about the United
Kingdom’s attitude could then be made. This statement might be to the effect that
H.M.G. welcomed the Tunku’s proposal provided it led to the establishment of a
stable political unit in accordance with the wishes of the people concerned and
provided it enabled us to fulfil what we still regarded as our essential defence
obligations. The statement could go on to express agreement with the Tunku’s
suggestion that it would be desirable to hold a conference at which representatives of
the territories could express their views.
29. It would be desirable to consult closely with the Australian and New Zealand
Governments at all stages.
30. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, the Minister of Defence;
6 CO officials added manuscript comments in the margins of this despatch; here one wrote, ‘the heat is
now off on this point’ for the proposed visit was cancelled.
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the Governors of North Borneo and Sarawak, the High Commissioner for Brunei, the
United Kingdom High Commissioners in Canberra, Wellington and Kuala Lumpur
and Her Majesty’s Ambassador in Djakarta. I am also sending a copy to the Private
Secretary to the Prime Minister.
48 PREM 11/3418 27 June 1961
[The ‘Grand Design’]: letter from Lord Selkirk to Mr Macmillan,
reinforcing the points made in his despatch to Mr Macleod
I am sending to the Colonial Secretary a despatch about the proposal for a closer
association of Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories, ‘Grand Design’,1 but I
thought I ought to put the issues at stake clearly to you personally because:—
(a) they are big and bristle with very real difficulties;
(b) they affect four separate departments—the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office,
the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Ministry of Defence;
(c) the Federation hope that you will play an important role in the development of
this proposal during your visit next September.
2. The proposals likely to be put to us by the Malayans are as follows:—
(a) The Federation would take over from us the defence, foreign policy and
internal security of Singapore. Singapore would remain responsible for the other
functions of Government as now.
(b) The Federation would take over responsibility for the administration of the
three Borneo territories—North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei—either united or
separately.
(c) The existing defence treaty with the Federation would be extended to Singapore
and the Borneo territories with its limitations on the free use of our troops.
3. The difficulties this poses are:—
Firstly, that the Borneo territories are evolving quietly and peacefully. North
Borneo and Sarawak are, by and large, well satisfied with the British
administrations which hold the ring between the indigenous peoples and the
Chinese and Malays. There are virtually no European settlers. Although North
Borneo and Sarawak have, on the whole, reacted favourably to the scheme in
principle, I would expect them to show very strong opposition if it was rushed
too quickly or if it appears that the stabilising force of British rule is likely to be
impaired. Memories of what happened in 1946 are still green. Lack of confidence
in the administration might well be followed by a reversion to the traditional
practice of head hunting. The Sultan of Brunei, with a majority of Malays in the
state has, however, long been anxious for closer ties with the Federation of
Malaya, although he will have some difficulty in carrying local opinion with him.
Secondly, our defence position would be weakened overtly and, we would not
have freedom to deploy our troops from Singapore. This would have far
1 See 47.
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reaching effects both in our position in SEATO and in our relations with
Australia and New Zealand and would mean something of a shift in the
balance of power. There is a risk that this change would be regarded as giving
an opportunity for the Communists to pursue a more militant course with
better chance of success.
Thirdly, while the continued presence of our forces here would serve to deter
any Indonesian designs on the greater Malaysia area covered by this proposal,
the additional limitation on their use might lead the Indonesians to conclude
that they had less to fear if they embarked on military activity elsewhere.
Fourthly, the new arrangements would isolate Hong Kong a little more and it
might not be easy to maintain stability there.
4. It is not, however, advisable to delay consideration of this matter indefinitely.
Singapore is due for constitutional talks in 1963 and there is a growing movement
here for immediate independence with full Commonwealth status. Bargaining on the
wide questions posed by these proposals can be most advantageously conducted
while the present realistic Singapore Government is in power.
5. Furthermore, the advantages we should gain are considerable. We should be
relieved of internal security responsibilities in Singapore and the Federation would
take over Singapore’s foreign relations before an extreme left wing movement,
possibly Communist, can get in.
6. We have been in various parts of the Borneo territories from 70 to 120 years.
We can truthfully say that we have virtually abolished piracy, slavery and head
hunting and that both colonies, as well as Brunei, are making steady progress. But it
is very hard to say that North Borneo and Sarawak on their own would be able to
achieve a viable balance of effective government for many years to come. By their
association with the Federation, we should largely be freed from the anti-Colonial
pressures of the United Nations and might well maintain our influence on a sounder
long term basis. The parallel position of the Dutch in West Irian comes readily to
mind. Moreover, in the economic field, the preservation of the Malayan dollar as the
common currency will be ensured.
7. Greater Malaysia would be an independent member of the Commonwealth, as
such strictly speaking responsible for its own defence and, in this sense, there would
be no direct United Kingdom defence interest.
8. We should, however, wish to maintain a defence capacity to enable us to
continue to play our part in the containment of the overall Communist threat and in
promoting stability in the area. Indonesian ambitions, which they do not conceal to
local Asian opinion, also have to be kept in check. In addition, we must support our
important economic stake in Malaya and Singapore with its significant contribution
to the sterling area. We would be remaining in the area militarily at the invitation of
the Federation, and with the full support of Australia and New Zealand, in what
would come to be regarded as a Commonwealth defence base. It is in any case
necessary for us under present arrangements to keep our defence policy in line
generally with the outlook on foreign policy of the Federation Government and such
new arrangements as might be made are unlikely to be so very far from the present
position if we reach agreement soon. We may well, however, be in for some hard
negotiation with the Federation in order to obtain a greater freedom in the use of our
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troops in the greater Malaysia area than the Tunku allows under the existing defence
treaty in the Federation. The basis of our position in South East Asia would be
changed but we would be moving in line with current ideas in a manner which would
be more acceptable and understandable to most of the Asian nations. In any case, our
commitments today are probably greater than our present resources can meet.
9. Considerable risks are involved which can compare with those taken in 1947
in India, although the number of people involved is, of course much less. Perhaps the
biggest risk is to the morale of our own personnel, service and civilian, and of those
Asians who are most closely associated with the policies which we support.
10. These issues will have to be very carefully balanced and we may encounter
considerable difficulties over North Borneo and Sarawak, and in the sphere of defence.
Negotiating gambits are, however, not all on the side of the Federation. I believe
therefore that we would be wise in the long run to try to go forward with this policy:—
Firstly, because it prevents the Communists and others hostile to us
shielding their activities behind anti-colonialism.
Secondly, because it is the only way to secure the independent future of the
countries concerned with a reasonable prospect of survival as members of the
free world.
Thirdly, because I believe our position would be healthier and our influence
in the future stronger if it is clearly seen that we are here with the consent
and agreement of the Governments concerned.
11. Finally, I need hardly say how important it is that these questions are fully
and frankly discussed with the Australians and New Zealanders.
49 CO 1030/1149, no 127E 18 July 1961
[The Eden hall tea-party]: note (dated 31 July) by the office of the UK
Commissioner-General of a meeting held at Eden Hall at 4.30pm on
18 July of Lord Selkirk and P B C Moore with J Puthucheary, Lim
Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan and S Woodhull
[At the Anson by-election on 15 July, Lim Chin Siong and seven other left-wing PAP
assemblymen withheld support from the government’s candidate and instead backed
David Marshall (former chief minister and currently chairman of the Workers’ Party) who
stood for immediate independence. Lim Chin Siong’s group also protested against Lee
Kuan Yew’s promotion of merger with Malaya and called for the release of all political
detainees. To Lee’s embarrassment, David Marshall won. Lee and Goh Keng Swee
became, in the words of Selkirk, ‘pretty broken men, extremely jumpy and uncertain of
their political future’. Selkirk was disappointed that, instead of pressing for merger in the
face of communist opposition, Lee proposed to release detainees in order to embarrass
the British (Selkirk to Macleod, 17 July, tel nos 263 and 264, DO 169/18, nos 41 and 42).
Irritated by Lee’s moves to appease the communists and his attempt to blame the British
and Malayans for Singapore’s unrest, Tunku Abdul Rahman threatened to withdraw the
Federation’s representative on the Internal Security Council. Meanwhile, Lim Chin Siong
and three other dissident members of the PAP—James Puthucheary, Fong Swee Suan
and Sidney Woodhull—requested a meeting with Selkirk at his residence, Eden Hall.
Their aim was to discover whether he would suspend the constitution and resort to direct
rule in the event of Lee being voted out of office and the pro-communists coming to
power by constitutional means. The so-called ‘Eden Hall tea-party’ has acquired notoriety
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in the eyes of opposing conspiracy theorists: whereas the PAP dissidents suspected Lee of
colluding with the British, Lee accused Selkirk of plotting with his opponents. The ‘gang
of four’ tested Selkirk’s commitment to constitutionalism. Selkirk appears to have played
it straight, informing his guests that his responsibility was to uphold the constitution and
that he would intervene only to prevent direct action. Notwithstanding the fact that after
the meeting Selkirk informed Lee Kuan Yew what had happened via Special Branch, the
prime minister of Singapore publicly condemned the ‘Eden Hall tea party’ as a plot
hatched by the British with the intention either of placing the onus on him to smash the
left or of destabilising his government to allow the resumption of direct rule by Britain.
Lee tabled a motion of confidence in his government on 20 July which he won at 3.40 in
the morning of 21 July by a majority of one (26 votes out of 51) but it precipitated the
secession of the rebels. On 29 July they announced the formation of the Barisan Sosialis
(Socialist Front) with Dr Lee Siew Choh as chairman and Lim Chin Siong as secretary-
general. Document 49, dated 31 July, is an account written in the knowledge of events
culminating in the inauguration of the Barisan; document 50 is a telegram composed
shortly after the vote of confidence.]
1. James Puthucheary telephoned Lord Selkirk at Phoenix Park1 at about noon that
day to ask whether he could come to see Lord Selkirk accompanied by two of his friends.
He did not state who the friends would be. Lord Selkirk suggested he should come to
lunch on Thursday, 20th July, but Puthucheary obviously wanted an earlier meeting
and Lord Selkirk therefore suggested 4 p.m. that afternoon. Puthucheary agreed.
2. Puthucheary explained that his motive in coming to see Lord Selkirk was to
seek a re-assurance that in the event of the fall of Lee Kuan Yew’s Government, the
British would not take over in Singapore. He said the view had been widely put about
that the British would never allow the Communists to take over and that if the
dissidents in the P.A.P. split the party, the British would take over rather than let
anyone else be Prime Minister. Lord Selkirk replied, as he had done on a number of
previous occasions to similar questions, that his duty as United Kingdom
Commissioner was to see the Constitution of Singapore observed. Provided there was
no infringement of the Constitution or resort to direct action and violence, it would
be quite improper for him to interfere in the political life of Singapore. Lord Selkirk
stressed, however, that if anybody broke the Constitution or incited people in
Singapore to industrial unrest and violence, he would not hesitate to take whatever
action he considered necessary.
3. Lord Selkirk emphasised that if Singapore were to survive, she had to solve
her economic problems and this could only be achieved if stability were maintained.
He asked Lim Chin Siong and Fong Swee Suan whether they were Communists.
They seemed to be embarrassed by this question and failed to give a clear reply. Mr.
Woodhull, on the other hand, stated categorically that he was not a Communist.
Lord Selkirk then asked Lim and Fong whether they were looking to Communist
China to dominate Malaya and Singapore and whether they were good Malayans.
They all said they were good Malayans. Lord Selkirk then asked whether they
intended to resort to industrial unrest in order to achieve their aims. To these
questions they gave a clear negative. Lord Selkirk then said that he was certain the
future of Singapore lay in becoming part of Malaya and he asked Lim and Fong
whether they were in favour of merger. All four said they were in favour of merger
but were not prepared to give Lee Kuan Yew a blank cheque. Merger, as previously
1 Phoenix Park was the office of the UK commissioner for Singapore and commissioner-general for SE
Asia; Eden Hall was his residence.
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understood, meant the straight acceptance of Singapore into the Federation as a
further state. It seemed unlikely that the Tengku would agree to this. Lord Selkirk
then explained the Ulster model and they said that they would be quite prepared to
accept merger on these terms, even if it were with the Tengku’s right-wing
government. It emerged, however, that they were obviously concerned about what
their own position would be if the Federation took over internal security.
4. Puthucheary explained that one of the reasons he was out of sympathy with the
P.A.P. Government was that he felt extremely strongly about the position of the
detainees. Lord Selkirk said he was not prepared to discuss this question. Puthucheary
also emphasised that the main reason for the split in the P.A.P. was the arrogance of
Lee Kuan Yew and his refusal to allow proper consultation within the Party.
5. Woodhull asked whether the British Government would be prepared to agree
to the abolition of the Internal Security Council and full internal self-government. He
said that under the Six’s programme the British would still have the right of
intervention in Singapore if their defence position were threatened by the internal
security situation.2 He stressed that the Six were anxious and willing for the British to
maintain their bases in Singapore. Mr. Moore said that new constitutional talks were
not due until 1963 and that it was premature at this stage to consider amendments to
a constitution which had only run for two years (and very successfully,
notwithstanding the trumped up campaign against the Internal Security Council). The
Tengku’s Greater Malaysia proposal was much wider in scope and more important than
the programme put forward by the Six and discussion should be concentrated on this.
6. Lord Selkirk also said a few words on our concept of multi-racial
commonwealth, in which they seemed to show a taciturn interest.
In accordance with his usual practice of informing Lee Kuan Yew about visits made to
him by political leaders in Singapore, Lord Selkirk directed Mr. Hughes to inform
Singapore Special Branch that the meeting had taken place and of its content. Mr. Hughes
gave Mr. Linsell, Director Special Branch, an account of the meeting the following
morning. This was the first D.S.B. or Lee Kuan Yew had heard of the meeting. In fact it
is doubtful whether they would ever otherwise have known that it had taken place.
2 ‘The Six’ were six trade union leaders. Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan, Sidney Woodhull, Jamit Singh,
S T Bani and Dominic Puthucheary (brother of James) had issued a statement on 2 June calling for full
internal self-government and the abolition of the ISC, and had supported Marshall at Anson.
50 DO 169/18, no 59 21 July 1961
[Singapore’s Legislative Assembly: vote of confidence in the PAP
government]: inward telegram no 278 from Lord Selkirk to Mr
Macleod, commenting on Lee Kuan Yew’s allegations during the debate
Lee Kuan Yew gave us no warning that he was going to produce this ridiculous fairy
tale.1 The only point on which I would comment in detail is the visit of Messrs. Lim
1 In his previous telegram to the CO Selkirk reported that, in his speech to the Legislative Assembly, Lee
had accused the British of both colluding with the communists (at the Eden Hall tea-party) and of plotting
to engineer a collision between the PAP and the communists (DO 169/18, no 58).
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Chin Siong, Woodhull and Fong Swee Suan to Eden Hall on 18th July. The facts are
that James Puthucheary asked if he could come to see me with one or two of his
friends. I agreed to see him and he turned up accompanied by the other three. He
explained that his motive in coming was to seek reassurance that in the event of the
fall of Lee Kuan Yew’s Government, the British would not take over in Singapore. I
replied, as I have done on a number of previous occasions to similar questions that
my duty was to see the constitution of Singapore observed, and provided there was
no infringement of the constitution or resort to direct action, it would be quite
improper for me to interfere in the political life of Singapore. A full report of the
conversation follows by bag.
2. Lee’s motive is clearly that proposition he put to me on the detainees was
designed first to allay suspicions in the party that he had not in fact been pressing for
the release of the detainees and secondly to produce a public clash with the British
which would present him in an anti-Colonial light. When I rejected his proposition
on the detainees, he must have decided that it was necessary to concoct some other
form of public clash with the British in order to throw a smoke screen over the grave
dissensions within the party. In a telephone conversation this morning he made it
clear that he hopes we will publicly answer his allegations so that ‘The maximum
amount of public antagonism can be created between the Government and the
British’.
3. David Marshall and Lim Yew Hock ridiculed the story which they dismissed as
a fairy tale and there will be few if any responsible observers in Singapore who will
give it any credence. We have to decide however whether I should make any public
comment. In making this decision, we have to consider where this is leading us. Lee
has telephoned us twice this morning. He still hopes we will help him to make
immediate progress with the Tengku with a view to a quick decision in favour of
merger. In the first conversation, however, he envisaged that within a matter of
months he would be forced to resign and that the only chance of state government
for Singapore would be for British to take over. Later he suggested that if he could
obtain merger, he would see the matter through and accept the full consequences.
He appears to be in a state of vacillation and I can no longer put any trust in his word.
4. Lee’s speeches in the Assembly, which deliberately eschewed a strong anti-
communist line, together with the publication of the I.S.C. paper on the detainees
and the announcement of the decision to order the release of the detainees in
batches, may well seriously prejudice the prospects of merger. If this proves correct,
we must do all we can to avoid Lee manoeuvring us into a position in which we shall
be forced to take over the Government of Singapore. I am certain that even if the
next Government is much further to the Left or even communist manipulated, we
must allow the full democratic processes to work under the Constitution, provided
there is no threat to the internal security situation which requires our intervention.
It is too early to say what sort of government is likely to emerge from general
elections in the event of the fall of Lee Kuan Yew and for the present the best course
is to keep down the political temperature. This leads me to the conclusion that we
should, if possible, avoid being drawn into making any public comment. Any reply to
Press enquiries (corrupt group) saying ‘No comment’. I realise, however, that Lee’s
allegations may attract attention in the U.K. and we may in the next few days be
forced to comment. In that event I suggest that our line should be as follows:—The
U.K. Commissioner for Singapore wishes to state there is no truth whatsoever in the
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allegations made by the Prime Minister of Singapore in the Legislative Assembly on
21st July about a British plot to engineer a collision between the pro-Communists
and the P.A.P. Government. The U.K. Commissioner made it clear that his function
in Singapore is to carry out his duties under the Singapore Constitution and that he
will never attempt in any way to interefere in party politics. Questioned specifically
about the visit of Lim and Co. to Eden Hall we should simply confirm that this visit
took place at their request.
5. I should be grateful for your comments and information on any publicity this
may receive in the U.K.
51 PREM 11/3418 3 Aug 1961
[Proposal to hold talks in London]: letter from Mr Macmillan to
Tunku Abdul Rahman, replying to document 46
[Apart from a temporising message from Sandys, the Tunku’s letter of 26 June went
unanswered for seven weeks. There were two principal reasons for the delay: the first was
the need for exploratory discussions in London, with Selkirk and Tory and with the
governments of Australia and New Zealand; the second was the deterioration in relations
between the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew prompted by the instability of Singapore’s politics.
A draft letter (agreed between the CRO, CO, FO and Ministry of Defence) was not ready
until the end of July and Sandys advised the prime minister: ‘The sooner you can send it,
therefore, the better.’ He also recommended that Macmillan should restrain the Tunku
from ‘any further over-exuberant activities’ regarding Borneo since his recent visits to
Brunei and Sarawak had ‘caused some alarm’ in all three territories (Sandys to
Macmillan, 31 July 1961, PREM 11/3418, f 97; such ‘over-exuberant activities’ were
reported by White in his review of 1961, see 91). Macmillan’s reply carefully side-stepped
the issues of prior merger of the Borneo territories with Malaya and the future of the
Singapore base and, instead, invited the Tunku to talks in London.]
Thank you for your letter of June 26 about the proposed association of Singapore and
the Borneo Territories with the Federation of Malaya.
As I said in Parliament on June 20, I had observed with interest the constructive
suggestion you made in the course of your speech in Singapore on May 27. The ideas
which I know have been developing in your mind for some time, and which you have
now put forward, could have an encouraging effect for the political stability of South
East Asia; and I warmly welcome the stimulus they have already given to discussion.
I was particularly glad to receive from you the secret memorandum enclosed with
your letter, setting out your ideas about the form of such an association and the ways
in which it might be brought about. I have arranged for the ideas in your
memorandum to be examined with all possible expedition. We have already had an
opportunity of discussing it with Lord Selkirk and Sir Geofroy Tory while they were
over here.
As you know these very important proposals require consideration from a number
of different aspects. You will therefore understand that I cannot at this stage commit
the British Government on the possibility of a wider association. In particular, there
are some points, on defence and on the Borneo Territories, on which they will need
to be reassured.
On defence, the question of the continued use of our important bases and facilities
in Malaya and the other countries concerned raises very large issues. Certainly the
present difficult state of affairs in South East Asia, and the need in all our interests to
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maintain confidence there, makes it very important that nothing should be said
which might cast doubt on the maintenance of British defence capabilities in the
area. Our mutual friends in Australia and New Zealand are of course also directly
concerned, and we shall wish to consult with them.
As regards the Borneo Territories, I hear that you have just been visiting Brunei
and Sarawak yourself. You will thus have been able to form some preliminary
impressions about the situation there, and the state of opinion on a wider association
of the kind you have in mind. Our impression is that the idea of finding their
eventual political future in some kind of link with Malaya is seen to have attractions.
This suggests that, if the ground were carefully prepared, and the advantages of any
wider association became generally recognised, the Borneo Territories would be
ready to come in as free and willing members. I am sure you will agree that it is most
important at this initial stage, and in view of the doubts and hesitations which have
been expressed publicly in the territories over what close political association would
involve for the various races there, that we do not give the impression that we are
deciding on their future without regard for their own wishes.
I had been greatly looking forward to discussions about this project with yourself
and Mr. Lee Kuan Yew in September. I am most disappointed that I had to postpone
my visit to you. I think it is important that we should meet soon to talk these matters
over, and since you have been good enough to suggest that you would be prepared to
come to London, I am wondering whether you could in fact visit us instead. Several
of my colleagues are of course closely involved and our various engagements here
would not permit us to meet as early as September. As you know, the international
calendar in September and October is at the moment rather uncertain and I may not
yet be able to propose a definite date on which we might have talks. I would very
much hope, however, that it would be possible to hold these in late October or early
November. If this period would be suitable for you in principle perhaps you would let
me write again in late September in order to propose a definite date. I believe it
would be useful if Mr. Lee could come to London at about the same time so that we
could bring him into our discussions. This would I think be a necessary preliminary
to any formal conference which might seem appropriate later on, in which of course
we should have to include the Borneo Territories.
Would you be good enough to let me know whether my suggestion for a visit
appeals to you and whether the sort of dates I have suggested would suit you so that
we can sound out Mr. Lee? In the meantime, for this and for a number of other
reasons, I should greatly prefer that nothing be said publicly about a possible visit.
52 DO 169/27, no 91 5 Aug 1961
[Proposal to hold talks in London]: letter from Sir G Tory to N
Pritchard,1 reporting Tunku Abdul Rahman’s reactions to Mr
Macmillan’s letter
[On the same day that he wrote this letter, Tory sent a telegram to the CRO recounting
the Tunku’s response to document 51: ‘When I gave Tunku advance copy of Prime
1 N (later Sir Neil) Pritchard, acting deputy under-secretary of state, CRO, 1961; high commissioner in
Tanganyika, 1961–1963; deputy under-secretary of state, Commonwealth Office, 1963–1967.
09-Malaysia-30-56-cpp  21/9/04  9:06 AM  Page 150
[52] AUG 1961 151
Minister’s letter yesterday he begged me to impress on U.K. Government that it would be
politically impossible for him to accept any kind of link with Singapore even in a limited
field such as that of internal security except on broad lines of greater Malaysia plan. His
Malays would never forgive him if he were by connection with Singapore alone to create
at any time a Chinese majority in the two territories.’ (DO 169/27, no 89, tel no 576) In
his reply to Macmillan of 11 August, the Tunku stressed the importance of effecting a
merger with Borneo in advance of Singapore because of the communist threat in the
latter (see 53). CO officials reckoned that the Tunku was only going through the motions
of supporting Lee, since he appeared reconciled to Lee’s likely fall and convinced the
British would never let the communists gain control of Singapore. They also felt that his
determination to merge with the Borneo territories first was alienating their inhabitants
and would prove counter-productive (CO 1030/982, nos 486 and E/498A, and minutes by
H Nield, 31 Aug and I Wallace, 1 Sept 1961). A week earlier Tory had passed on the views
of the US ambassador in Kuala Lumpur who favoured the Grand Design but stressed that
timing was crucial so as not to dilute British defence capability in the region. ‘It is
gratifying’, commented Tory, ‘to find my American colleague takes this intelligent view of
the situation.’ (Tory to Pritchard, 28 July 1961, CO 1030/990, no 57).]
As you will have seen from my telegram No. 570, the Tunku was pleased with the
Prime Minister’s letter of the 3rd August about Greater Malaysia,2 when I gave him
an advance copy of it yesterday. As you will also have seen from one of my two letters
of the 28th July, I had prepared the Tunku for the delay and also for our reference to
the Borneo Territories and defence as points on which the U.K. Government would
need reassurance. He was, therefore, not upset or puzzled at the inclusion of these
references in the Prime Minister’s letter. He seems to be very keen on going to
London in November and is already in his mind planning a sea voyage for most of the
way so as to arrive in London at that time.
As regards Lee Kuan Yew, the Tunku was anxious that he should be associated
with the talks in London and said he thought he would like to arrange for Lee and
himself to travel in the same ship together, so that they could have a good deal of
informal contact about Greater Malaysia.3 The Tunku thought he might fly the last
part of the journey so as to be in London a little bit before Lee Kuan Yew. He seems
to feel as we did that it might be a good thing if he had an opportunity at some stage
of talking to us without Lee Kuan Yew present.
On the Borneo Territories, the Tunku’s only comment was in relation to Brunei.
He said that the Sultan was standing on the strict constitutional position that it was
up to the U.K. Government to make the first move with regard to Brunei’s future
relationship with Malaya. I said I thought we should shortly be asking the Sultan for
his view and the Tunku welcomed this. He said he was convinced that the bulk of
the Brunei Malays were well disposed towards Malaya and would gladly follow the
Sultan’s lead if he were to decide in favour of association with the Federation. The
Party Ra’ayat in Brunei, the Tunku said, was very small and completely
unrepresentative. Much too much attention was being paid to Azahari, who really
should not be allowed to influence Brunei’s future. He very much doubted whether
Party Ra’ayat were strong enough to start any significant trouble in Brunei. He was
sure there was no need to woo the Brunei Malays. I think it possible that he will say
2 See 51.
3 The parallel is clear (and explicitly drawn in document 63, para 7) between this proposal and the travel
arrangements for the independence talks in London (Jan-Feb 1956). Then the Malayan delegation had
settled their differences in advance of the conference on board MV Asia between Singapore and Karachi
after which they had completed the journey by air (BDEE: Malaya, document 392). In the end Lee Kuan
Yew decided not to attend the London talks in November.
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something about this in the reply which he at present intends to send to the Prime
Minister’s letter.
The Tunku did say that he thought the Sultan of Brunei had been partly
responsible for the unpopularity of the seconded Malay civil servants in that he had
always shown almost a contempt for his own Brunei Malays.4 The Tunku had told
him that some of the latter could easily be trained up to take over responsibilities in
the Administration but the Sultan would have none of it. He had thus created in the
minds of the Brunei Malays close to him the impression that he had a very ill opinion
of them and did not trust them. This naturally created a bad atmosphere for the
Federation Malays. As regards the recent incident and the wish of the Federation
Malays to be repatriated, the Sultan had pointed out that coming back to Malaya in
present circumstances would be like running away and would cause more loss of face
to the Federation Malays than sticking it out where they were. The Tunku thought
there might be something in this. He was in any event now going to replace the
Federation Malays in Brunei with another batch of civil servants who would as far as
possible be more senior and have more experience behind them. He was sending
Dato’ Abdul Aziz, the Permanent Secretary of his Ministry,5 to Brunei shortly to go
into all this.
On the question of defence the Tunku once again said that we could always station
troops in Malaya for Commonwealth purposes. If there were a war, and
Commonwealth countries in the area were involved, Malaya would also be dragged in
whether she liked it or not. Was this not enough for us? I said it was not enough
because, as I had explained on earlier occasions, we had obligations towards SEATO
which we might have to discharge in circumstances short of actual war. I sketched
out some examples and again referred to the Kuwait operation as an example of the
kind of thing we might have to do to stop a war from breaking out.6 For this purpose,
I said, we should need a base and a base we could continue to use. At the present time
we were dependent on Singapore. Here was a practical problem to which we must
find an answer.
The Tunku then surprised me by saying he wondered whether it would not after all
be possible for Malaya, after assuming responsibility for Singapore’s defence and
4 The secondment of Malay officers from the Malayan government service was an arrangement made at the
time of Brunei’s constitution, but their presence became a focus of resentment when the Tunku proposed
Malaysia. On 12 June 1961 the state forestry officer seconded from the Federation, Mohd Yakim bin Haji
Long, was assaulted by some Bruneians. Immediately ten Malayan officers resigned and some forty school
teachers requested repatriation. On 24 June the PRB distributed a pamphlet accusing the Tunku of
colonial intent. The Tunku and the Agong paid a goodwill visit to Brunei and Sarawak in early July, but
this tour did not dispel mistrust. In fact, the public was antagonised by the Tunku’s statement that there
was no need for the merger and independence of the Borneo territories in advance of their assimilation
within Greater Malaysia. A hastily convened United Front of Ong Kee Hui (SUPP), Azahari (PRB) and
Donald Stephens (whose UNKO would be inaugurated in Aug) promptly rejected this approach. The
Tunku then attempted to mollify his critics by assuring them that Malaya did not wish to colonise Borneo,
but the damage had been done. See 91 for White’s report on political developments in Brunei in 1961.
5 Dato Abdul Aziz bin Haji Abdul Majid had been permanent secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, since
1957. He is not to be confused with Dato Abdul Aziz bin Haji Mahomed Zain, also from the Federation,
who would replace Wan Ahmed as attorney-general after the crisis in Brunei’s administration of June-July
1961.
6 In June 1961 General Abdul Karim Kassem of Iraq laid claim to Kuwait. Bound by treaty to protect
Kuwait, British troops arrived from 1 July and by the end of the month the Iraqi threat dissolved.
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external relations, to allow us to go on using it as a base for SEATO purposes on the
grounds that it was now available to us for that purpose and that its continued
availability for SEATO was a condition of transfer of our sovereignty over Singapore
in all other respects. This was something, he said, which he would like to leave to the
Singapore Government to negotiate direct with the U.K. Government. It would be up
to Singapore to decide whether such an arrangement would be possible from their
point of view. Anyway, this was something which he was quite prepared to talk about.
From a conversation I had with Ghazali last night, he seems to be thinking on the
same lines as the Tunku about the Singapore base. He says that our genuine need to
have a base for SEATO is beginning to be understood by the Tunku. The Malayans
could not for political reasons join SEATO,7 but at any rate some of them realised
that, if SEATO did not exist, it would have to be created for the defence of countries
like Malaya. I have a feeling that Razak may try to move the Tunku and Ghazali away
from this reasonable approach and that we ought not to be too optimistic about the
Singapore base in the meantime. It is obvious, however, that the Tunku’s mind is not
shut on this subject and that he is personally ready to go to considerable limits in
trying to satisfy our defence requirements. Whether Lee Kuan Yew would feel able to
accept an arrangement of this kind is another matter. His opponents would be only
too ready to say that continued use of the Singapore base for SEATO purposes was an
obvious derogation from true independence. I should think he would argue that this
would play into the hands of the Communists but that is something on which Selkirk
is in a better position to comment than I.
I should record here that, as reported more briefly in my telegram No. 576, the
Tunku has begged me to impress upon the U.K. Government that it would be
politically impossible for him to accept any kind of link with Singapore, even in a
limited field, except in accordance with the broad lines of the Greater Malaysia plan.
He would, he said, be very much happier without Singapore at all but he had been
persuaded now that unless he accepted responsibility for Singapore it would
degenerate into Communism and would become a bridgehead of the Communist
powers on the Federation’s doorstep. His Malays would never forgive him, however, if
he were, by connection with Singapore alone, to create at any time a Chinese
majority in the two Territories. To press him to agree to some bilateral arrangement
with Singapore in the short-term was to invite him to commit political suicide. The
Tunku obviously sincerely believes this and I think it would not be productive for us
to press him on the subject.
You will have seen, however, from Singapore telegram No. 308 to the Colonial
Office that Goh Keng Swee believes that Razak and Ghazali are now convinced that
the Federation cannot afford to let Singapore wait for the three Borneo territories
and are therefore working for a face-saving compromise under which the Federation
would accept control of Singapore on condition that Brunei would be immediately
transferred and on the understanding that ‘Consultative Committees’ would be
promised for the other two Borneo Territories. I do not yet know how true this is;
Lee and Goh have deceived themselves before about true Malay feelings on crucial
matters. At any rate we know, and the Tunku knows, that Lee Kuan Yew will be
7 Sovereign but still closely aligned with Britain, the Malayan government refused to join SEATO in order
to avoid further antagonising critics at home and abroad (notably China and Indonesia).
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tackling the Tunku himself in the near future on these lines and we shall see what
impression he makes. The Tunku is prepared to do a great deal of listening to Lee and
he fully understands the delicacy of Lee’s political position and his pressing reasons
for trying to get some tangible link with Malaya in the very near future. The Tunku is
however inclined to think that Lee is exaggerating his difficulties and that he could
hold out for quite a long time if he simply went on quietly and firmly, without
getting hysterical and without double-crossing his well-wishers. In any event, I know
that the Tunku’s present intention is to tell Lee plainly that the Federation will have
none of Singapore by itself and that it is all of Greater Malaysia or nothing.
I am sending copies of this letter to Selkirk in Singapore and also to the Governors
of North Borneo and Sarawak and the High Commissioner in Brunei.
P.S. Since writing the above I have learnt in strictest confidence from an entirely
reliable source that both Razak and Ismail are dismayed at the attitude of the Tunku
and Ghazali on the subject of Singapore and SEATO and are doing their best to persuade
the Tunku that any compromise on this issue would be politically fatal for the Tunku.
53 PREM 11 11/3418 11 Aug 1961
[Proposal to hold talks in London]: letter from Tunku Abdul Rahman
to Mr Macmillan
I was very pleased to receive your letter of 3rd August1 giving your present views
about the proposed association of Singapore and the Borneo territories with the
Federation of Malaya. Your generous and constructive attitude in this matter is a
source of much encouragement to me.
As you know, the question of the integration of Singapore and the Federation is
not a new one; indeed since Independence, the idea of ‘merger’, to give its popular
name, has been constantly mooted, but I have stood out against it because of my fear
that the communal politics of Singapore based on Chinese chauvinism would upset
the balance of political thinking in the Federation, and destroy our hopes for the
peace and well-being and harmony of our peoples. The politics of this region,
however, would not allow for isolation and the idea of greater co-operation and
association between the Borneo territories, Singapore and the Federation has been
exercising my mind for some considerable time.
While I agree that the pace for such a development should not be forced, I am at the
same time most concerned about the Communist threat in Singapore which becomes
more menacing as time goes on, and I feel very strongly that before long the question
of the future of Singapore will have to be settled. I am convinced that an independent
Singapore will be drawn towards China; unless that is forestalled, it is needless for me
to say the Federation, as well as the region, will be exposed to grave dangers.
If we are to take in Singapore, it would be necessary first to strengthen our own
position, and we can only do that if the three territories of Borneo join us. This would
provide a measure of confidence in our people and would correct the imbalance in
the population. The Malays and the Dayaks are of the same racial origin while the
1 See 51.
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Chinese in those territories have not as yet been seriously penetrated by Chinese
Communist politics. Without the Borneo territories I would find it impossible to
contemplate the integration of Singapore and the Federation and to persuade my
political colleagues and the country to accept it.
You were right, of course, in emphasizing that the Borneo territories should be
associated under the proposed arrangements only as free and willing partners. I have
no doubt that once they are persuaded that such a merger would be in their interest,
they would be only too happy to join us. The difficulties to which you have referred
are no more serious than those which existed in the Federation before independence.
They are purely parochial and create no insuperable barrier. These susceptibilities
and demands can be met and provided for under the Federation Constitution, and
assurances to that effect will, I think, satisfy the territories concerned.
As regards defence, I fully appreciate the points you have raised. Let me hasten to
assure you that I am equally concerned that the defence arrangements for this region
should not be jeopardized under the proposed arrangements. However, I foresee no
difficulty in arriving at some suitable arrangement within the framework of the
existing Mutual Defence Agreement between our two countries whereby the various
defence requirements may be satisfied. This would, at the same time, remove any
possible fears that we are drawn unwittingly into SEATO.
These, however, are matters for more detailed discussions, and I, therefore,
warmly welcome your suggestion that we might meet in London, and I propose that
early in the New Year would be most suitable for me. I agree with you that it would
be useful to bring Mr. Lee Kuan Yew into these discussions. 
54 PREM 11/3737 14 Aug 1961
[‘Greater Malaysia’ and Britain’s role in SE Asia]: letter from Lord
Selkirk to Mr Macmillan
[An argument which Selkirk regularly put forward in favour of ‘Greater Malaysia’ was that
it would enable Britain to reduce military commitments and to adopt a new role assisting
nation-states in the containment of communism. An argument which he used in support
of speed was Singapore’s political fragility. The relevance and costs of Britain’s traditional
obligations in the region had also been central to the report of the Committee on Future
Developments in SE Asia (see 28 and 29). Selkirk returned to this theme on 12 Sept 1961
when he advocated early talks on ‘Greater Malaysia’ as a way towards, not only economies,
but also more realistic regional policies (PREM 11/3418, ff 42–44). Macmillan did not reply
until 17 Oct when he commented that SEATO had been originally intended as a temporary
expedient to protect the Geneva settlement of 1954 until the region had been stabilised.
But, he pointed out, ‘the continuation of tension over Laos, with its global repercussions,
makes it impossible to lower our guard with safety and re-align our defence objectives’ so
as to encourage self-reliance on the part of SE Asian governments and reduce British
military expenditure. Nevertheless, the prospect of a settlement over Laos and progress
towards achieving ‘Greater Malaysia’ might, he thought, allow a reduction of British
commitments, although it would be vital ‘to carry the Australians and New Zealanders with
us’ in any such retrenchment (PREM 11/3737; cf CO 1030/1120)]
I would like to recapitulate the general line of thought which I expressed when you
were good enough to let me come and see you in your room in the House of
Commons about a month ago.1
1 They had met on 27 July, see 47, note.
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2. It seems to me that in this area we are still finding it extremely difficult to get
away from the traditions of our past and in particular from what other people expect
of us.
3. From Trafalgar to the Entente Cordiale we were able to maintain peace in
almost all parts of the world. Since then we have continued this policy, though with
much less success, first in co-operation with the French and more recently in co-
operation with the U.S.A. We have done this partly from a sense of duty and partly
because of the inherent dependence of our economic position on world trade. But the
means at our disposal have become less and less adequate to meet the commitments
which we still retain. The result of this is that we are stretched to a point where our
strength might snap under the strain, and indeed our present position would be
highly perilous were it not for our basic dependence on the U.S.A. This fact does not
seem to me to be adequately recognised. It is the more regrettable that we have not
been able to achieve the close understanding and pooling of ideas with the Americans
over China and the Pacific which we have in a fair measure succeeded in attaining
across the Atlantic.
4. It is, I think, because of a failure to appreciate the gradual changes which have
taken place that we are burdened with a number of misconceptions about the role
which we can and should play in this part of the world today. We seem still to assume
that we are in a position to mount an expedition from Singapore and Malaya as it
were from a secure base. This is no longer true. First our lines of communication,
both to Europe and Australia, have been rendered very tenuous. Secondly, our ability
to act depends far more than was formerly the case on the consent or at least the
acquiescence of the peoples of the area. Whether we like it or not we have to
recognise that China, both militarily and ideologically, is becoming increasingly the
dominant force throughout South East Asia. The only long-term effective answer to
Communist China is nationalism, coupled with a recognition by each State that it
has an obligation to defend its own territory. I was glad to note recently that this idea
seems to be more readily recognised in Washington than it was. We must clearly do
everything we can to promote nationalism as a counter to communism and avoid
policies (especially those with an imperialistic flavour) which may lead nationalists
and communists to join forces against us. In these circumstances to pursue a defence
policy for purposes which cannot be identified with the interests of the area and may
even be contrary to the wishes of its inhabitants is both militarily hazardous and
politically unwise. Our object must rather be to identify our presence in South East
Asia with the national aspirations of the area, and at the same time play down and
eventually obliterate the concept either that the United Kingdom has a distinctive
interest apart from those of the countries in the area or that the United Kingdom
proposes to continue to maintain the defence of the countries and stability of the
area regardless of the individual policies of the countries concerned.
5. Such a position might not be too difficult to achieve if the countries with
which we are concerned were members of SEATO. Malaya has however refused to
join SEATO and there seems little present likelihood of her changing her mind. She
cannot therefore associate herself overtly in advance with policies for the support of
SEATO. The result is an inevitable conflict between the demands placed on us by our
SEATO obligations and the limitations to which we are subject by reason of our
position in Singapore and Malaya.
6. If our contribution to SEATO could be made otherwise than through these
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bases, of course, there would be no problem. But excluding this possibility and that
of Malaya joining the alliance, the solution which seems to me the only possible one
is a gradual redefinition of our position in SEATO which, while identifying us more
closely with the defence of Malaya, would make fewer demands on us for other forms
of support. This would, of course, involve a considerable re-orientation of our policy,
which it would necessarily take some time to carry through. Superficially it could no
doubt be taken as a weakening in our contribution to SEATO but the gain in terms
both of stability in the Malayan area and of our ability to act effectively even in
support of SEATO in given circumstances would, I feel sure, be a solid and lasting
benefit. I doubt indeed whether SEATO will be able to continue for long unless it can
be identified more closely with specific South East Asian interests and the countries
of the area are themselves able to take up a larger proportion of the strain. The
change would also have the further advantage of making our policy more acceptable
to countries like India.
7. Such a solution would of course also involve a change in our attitude towards
Malaya. If they pressed us to help them to maintain their own defence, we would be
willing to assist them to do so and would eventually only be there at their request.
The effect would be not only to dispel the notion that we were still engaged in some
imperialist plan of our own, but also to give a much greater sense of responsibility to
Malay foreign policy. This I believe in the long run would be greatly in the interests
of that country itself.
8. A solution on these lines would, as I say, have to be approached gradually.
There would be no question of our abdicating our responsibilities in this area or of
any immediate reduction in our defence establishment. Any impression that this was
contemplated would indeed be most damaging and should be studiously avoided.
Nevertheless, in the long run we could reasonably expect some relaxation of the
strain on United Kingdom resources. I do not suggest that this would come soon, but
some relief to our forces should be possible in course of time without giving undue
encouragement to the Communists. It was no doubt proper that we should carry a
disproportionate burden of defence during the early periods of evolution of members
of the Commonwealth, but today they continue quite openly to lean on us in a
manner which has relatively little relation to the resources which are available in
Commonwealth countries outside the United Kingdom. But it does not stop here.
For instance, Thailand and the Philippines, whose combined population is about the
same as that of the United Kingdom, are repeatedly complaining that we show
reluctance to mount an expedition into the jungle of Laos at a distance of some 7,000
miles from the United Kingdom, whilst they themselves are only prepared to declare
negligible forces for the same purpose. It seems to me that even if we had the
strength to do more, it must still remain our main task to contribute to the
objectives of SEATO by maintaining stability in the areas with which we are most
closely associated, namely Malaya, Singapore, the Borneo territories and Hong Kong,
and to do this by helping the countries in the area to maintain their own defence
rather than starting from the premise that we will deal with all defence issues
regardless of their wishes. I was interested to see from a recent report from Tory that
the American Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur had supported this proposition.2
2 See 52, note. Charles F Baldwin was US ambassador in Kuala Lumpur, 1961–1964.
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9. The course I am suggesting will need a good deal of explanation to the United
States of America but I believe the present Administration3 will understand this very
much better than its predecessors, and it would, I think, remove something of the
false note which exists in our relationship with the United States in this area.
10. We would also have to be careful to avoid giving any sense of alarm to the
Australians. On the other hand, they have been suspecting our motives for so long
that I believe it would clarify their minds and in the long run would give less rise to
suspicion.
11. I write this very much in the context of the proposals for a ‘Greater Malaysia’
which are currently being examined. But one of the reasons which makes the above
line of policy attractive to me is that it would fall very much more naturally into any
new defence arrangement that would become necessary if the ‘Greater Malaysia’
scheme should eventuate, as I hope it will and I think should be encouraged to do.
12. May I recapitulate shortly:—
(1) Our strongest card here against the expansion of communism is nationalism.
(2) To give nationalism the best chance of holding communism in check we
should avoid weakening local nationalist governments by pursuing an
independent policy not directly related to their countries’ interests.
(3) We should rather strengthen them by identifying our aims with theirs and by
encouraging them to assume charge of their own defence.
(4) By removing any grounds for the suspicion that we were pursuing
imperialistic ends, we should prevent the communists from hiding behind an anti-
colonial shield and thus attracting support from many who otherwise would not
listen to their doctrines.
(5) Our continued military presence here, even if our freedom of action is
restricted, will remain an important element in maintaining stability.
3 J F Kennedy, 35th president of the USA, Jan 1961-Nov 1963, appointed the veteran diplomat, Averell
Harriman, as assistant secretary for Far East affairs.
55 CO 1030/982, no 498C 24 Aug 1961
[Crash programme for ‘Greater Malaysia’]: letter from Lord Selkirk to
Mr Macleod, urging ‘a crash programme’ on merger to ensure survival
of Lee Kuan Yew’s government
[From this point onwards the question of timing bulked increasingly large. While the CO
and CRO were still reluctant to force the pace, Selkirk argued in favour of seizing the
opportunity provided by the joint approach of the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew to merger.
Delay might result in Malaya and Singapore once more drawing apart, the collapse of the
PAP government and the Borneo territories remaining a British responsibility for the
next decade or so. See also 58.]
I think the time has come when it is necessary to consider how far a crash
programme for the ‘Greater Malaysia’ scheme is desirable and practicable.1 As I see it,
the situation is as follows.
1 The phrase ‘crash programme’ alarmed officials in the Colonial Office and Borneo territories. In his reply
Macleod urged caution as regards Borneo (tel no 360, 8 Sept 1961, CO 1030/982, nos 541–544).
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2. Lee Kuan Yew has not been successful in riding the Communist tiger and was
in danger of being gobbled up. He has however now broken with the Communists
and, if he can obtain merger on reasonable terms, is apparently prepared to take a
firm stand.2 The original Communist concept was to accept merger as a long-term
aim in the belief that, on the one hand, it would give them a broader base from which
to work for the Communisation of the whole peninsula, and, on the other, that it was
unlikely to be achieved in the near future. Meanwhile they would continue in
Singapore to undermine the P.A.P. with a view to ultimately taking it over. In these
calculations they may not have fully grasped the implications for them of giving the
Tunku control of Singapore. At all events it appears that they have now realised that
if the Tunku takes over internal security in Singapore, they will be much more
directly threatened than they were by the present Internal Security Council.
3. Lee is now mad keen to achieve merger and indeed sees in it the only possible
salvation for his own political future and his party, the P.A.P. If he fails to get merger
by the end of the year, he will probably have to face a general election where he
would lose to the new left-wing ‘Barisan Socialis’ manipulated by the Communists.
Alternatively, he may try to force us to suspend the Constitution and take over. We
have to decide whether it is worth trying to save him. On balance, I think it is,
though this opinion might have to be revised in the light of Singapore developments.
Certainly, no other Singapore political leader (except Lim Yew Hock) would be likely
to fight for merger. The successor to Lee will almost certainly present us with
demands for a further measure of independence, if not more. The problem is,
however, whether there is any hope of getting the Tunku to move in time.
4. Tunku Abdul Rahman is quite keen to take over Singapore since he now
realises the political danger. But he believes it is politically impossible for him to do
this unless he can explain to his Malay electors that he has some counter weight to
the large chunk of Chinese who constitute the bulk of the population of Singapore.
This means the Borneo territories.
5. All three Borneo territories are quite unfitted as yet to enter an association of
this sort on the basis of popular representation. But they will continue to be so
unfitted for many years to come. I should give Sarawak about ten years and North
Borneo at least twenty years before a clear-cut electoral opinion could be given on
this subject. This means bluntly that if we proceed by normal constitutional
methods, and assuming the Tunku will not compromise, merger between the
Federation and Singapore is virtually out.
6. But I believe it may be possible to give the Tunku enough association with the
Borneo territories to justify his closer association with Singapore in the eyes of his
Malay population. In the sort of picture I have in mind, which is one which I have
only tentatively formulated and which I am bound to admit contains many
difficulties, Singapore would become a self-governing state of the Federation with
much more extensive powers than the other States; something on the lines of Ulster.
The Kuala Lumpur Government would, however, be responsible for defence, foreign
policy and internal security. The powers of internal security would necessarily
require to be fairly extensive to be acceptable to the Federation. The great advantage
2 Selkirk is referring to the vote of confidence which Lee narrowly won on 20–21 July and the subsequent
secession from the PAP of rebels to form the Barisan Sosialis on 30 July (see 49, note).
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of the Tunku taking over foreign policy is that it would effectively prevent Chinese or
Russian missions being set up in Singapore. The Borneo territories would be
substantially in the same position, subject to certain safeguards. That is to say, they
would send to Kuala Lumpur the same number of representatives as Singapore. If
the Singapore representatives were increased, the Borneo territories should be
increased. That should reasonably safeguard the parliamentary position. The Borneo
representatives would of course have to be nominated, which Tun Razak quite
specifically told me he would be perfectly satisfied to accept.
7. I can see at first sight that such an arrangement might not greatly appeal to
the Governors,3 particularly in so far as it meant their being subordinated in some
way to the Kuala Lumpur Government in respect of internal security. It is of course
not the ideal for them, but failing some such solution the future of their territories
will present an increasing problem to which it is hard to see the ultimate answer. I
think in fact that their requirements could be met in fair measure by forming a
Borneo Defence Council in Kuala Lumpur on which the U.K. High Commissioner
would necessarily sit and which would be specially charged with the problems of
defence and internal security of the Borneo territories.
8. Such a plan does, of course, involve a number of considerable risks. The
Borneo territories might very well react violently against it. They have, however, had
in Singapore recently a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association conference which
has been open to the press.4 The representatives of the Borneo territories have come
a very long way in saying that they support Greater Malaysia in principle, and there
have latterly been several further indications that, if handled properly, the local
peoples will be prepared to go along with the idea.
9. It would of course be essential that British staff should remain for some
considerable time and should be assured of doing so. I have no doubt that the
existing peace and quiet which runs throughout the Borneo territories is entirely
due to the quality and manner in which the British staff carry out their duties. The
Federation Government appear to be quite willing to give the fullest undertaking in
regard to this matter and could be kept up to it through the Borneo Defence Council
or some similar organisation in Kuala Lumpur. There would have to be, I do not
doubt, a provision enabling any of the territories to opt out within a period of say five
years if they should wish to do so. I should have thought something of this sort
would be essential to satisfy local sentiment as well as to meet backbench criticism in
the House of Commons. In any case I think it is a desirable safeguard.
10. This leaves the question of defence. On this subject there has been a great
deal of discussion and I will not go into details here. But I believe that basically, if we
can get the political organisation right, we can fit in defence requirements with the
broad agreement of the people concerned. I think it is important that we do so and in
3 ie, of North Borneo and Sarawak.
4 At its conference in Singapore on 23 July the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association announced the
formation of the Greater Malaysia Solidarity Committee (known as the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative
Committee). Consisting of representatives from each of the five territories (though Brunei sent observers
only) and chaired by Donald Stephens, the MSCC set out to collect views on Malaysia, disseminate
information on Malaysia, encourage discussion of Malaysia and foster activities promoting the realisation
of Malaysia. It met in Jesselton on 24 Aug, Kuching on 18–20 Dec 1961, Kuala Lumpur on 6–8 Jan and
Singapore on 1–3 Feb 1962 when it agreed a memorandum which was submitted to the Cobbold
Commission and printed as appendix F of the enquiry (cf CO 1030/1000, 1001, and 1002).
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any case, unless the defence arrangements are broadly accepted by the people, they
will not be of long duration.
11. Of course all this is putting tremendous confidence in Tunku Abdul Rahman.
We cannot foresee precisely his political life but he seems to be very reasonably
established and we have to take a chance on the irresponsible remarks which he makes
from time to time.5 There will be considerable difficulties and the scheme may seem
so loose that it hardly constitutes a political unity. These are all risks which I think
have got to be run. But I have come to the conclusion that, unless we are prepared to
take a chance, we may miss the psychological moment in the tide of the affairs of men
which would enable the foundations to be laid for the only stable evolution of these
territories which seems to me and most of our advisers to be sound.
12. There is one further possibility, which has been suggested by Lee Kuan Yew,
i.e. that if Brunei by itself were to join the Federation now, the Tunku might agree to
early merger for Singapore if offered some prospect of North Borneo and Sarawak
being brought in at a later stage and an assurance of our intention to work to this
end. A union of Brunei with Malaya would not of course present the same
constitutional, social or economic difficulties as exist in the case of the other two
territories. It is by no means certain that the Tunku would be prepared to
contemplate such a proposal or indeed that it would be acceptable on the Brunei
side. But the possibility may be worth exploring.
13. Some of the above points have been touched upon in Melville’s letter FED
59/4/01 of August 11 to the Governors and White, of which I have just seen a copy.6 It
is encouraging to know that the problem is under active study in London. I am not
sure however whether Melville’s main suggestion of a declaration of intent will go far
enough to satisfy the Tunku. It may therefore be worthwhile to consider the
admittedly more drastic and far-reaching solution which I have outlined above.
14. I am sending copies of this letter to Tory, Goode, Waddell and White.
5 See, for example, 52, n 4.
6 Melville’s letter is not printed here but see document 56 for Waddell’s reply to it.
56 CO 1030/982, no 506A 26 Aug 1961
‘Grand Design’: letter from Sir A Waddell to E Melville
[Waddell agreed with Selkirk that the British government should give a lead in planning
territorial mergers, but, alarmed by the increasing pace advocated by the commissioner-
general and more especially by the Tunku’s insensitivity to the Borneo peoples, he argued
that premature merger could lead to ‘racial conflict and outright rebellion’ in Sarawak.]
Your letter FED 59/4/01 of 11th August has just reached me. As I am off at the
weekend for a visit to the Fourth Division1 with Selkirk I had better try to give some
assessment of the position now, although as the Grand Design is at the moment in a
state of flux, not to say confusion, the present is not ideal for making assessments.
I think that quite frankly we have lost a good deal of the ability we once could have
had to guide the Greater Malaysia movement. You will recall that after the I.T.C. last
1 Sarawak was divided into five administrative divisions; Fourth Division, with its headquarters at Miri,
shared a border with Brunei.
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year and again this year Selkirk advocated taking a definite line on the Grand Design 2
while we in Borneo have consistently asked for a positive lead with regard to the Borneo
territories including a commitment by H.M.G. to give all practical (and financial)
assistance towards closer association.3 In the absence of a positive lead Sarawak has
been beset by doubts as to British intentions and this has led to internal differences
which are as wide as the gulf you mention and perhaps more difficult to bridge. Even
our main plank for bridging the gulf, that is, unanimity on the idea of Borneo
association, has seemingly disintegrated—first there was the defection of the Datu
Bandar during the Tunku’s visit and more recently Donald Stephens’s reported
statement that unification of the Borneo territories is not necessary and that merger
with Malaya is possible by 1963. It seems, however, that he has not been fully reported
and the most recent news is that Borneo unification would be facilitated within the
context of the Grand Design. What this precisely means I am not at present sure but
we will know more after the Consultative Committee meeting this week.4
In any event the line-up in Sarawak is, S.U.P.P. opposed to the Tunku’s plan of
integration as states but generally in favour of Greater Malaysia as an ultimate
objective after independence has been achieved here. S.U.P.P. is linked with Azahari
and the Party Rakyat in this policy and previously with Stephens in the so-called
United Front.5 The Front, however, may not be as united as it seems as they have all
reached this policy by different motives. S.U.P.P. believe that they will come out on
top in an independent Sarawak and the Chinese element in general and the
communist Chinese element in particular feel that this is a much better bet than
coming under the Tunku who is known to keep a very firm hand on the Chinese.
Moreover their links with Singapore and recently with Boestamam6 and the Party
Rakyat in the Federation which has taken shape in the proposal to call a socialist
summit meeting makes it obvious enough that their idea of Greater Malaysia is quite
different from the Tunku’s. It will be an association of the left and extreme left
designed to overthrow the Tunku. It therefore does not matter to them, indeed it is
an advantage, if Singapore fails to obtain merger and goes further, if that is possible,
to the left. At the same time the Tunku’s political position and prestige if he fails in
his plan will be undermined and he is known to have staked his political future on
the Grand Design. Brunei’s Party Rakyat line up with S.U.P.P. was, as I see it, initially
fortuitous—they were the only political parties then in the field, both striving for
independence and Brunei being rather small to accommodate Azahari’s political
ambitions. Opposition to the Sultan who has for long desired to join Malaya led quite
naturally to opposition to the Tunku and therefore to closer alliance with the left.
Hence the Tunku’s illogical charge that all who opposed his scheme are communists.
All communists certainly oppose it and will no doubt make the most of being in the
same camp as the moderates and indeed of the right wing. For the right wing (except
some of the Sarawak Malays perhaps) also oppose the Tunku’s plan through fear of
historical subjugation by Malays but mostly because they feel unprepared
2 See 30, 32, 36, 47 and 55. 3 See 31, 40 and 44.
4 For the Consultative Committee, see 55, n 4. 5 See 52, n 4.
6 Ahmad Boestamam (Abdullah Sani bin Raja Keehil) was a founder-member of the radical Malay
Nationalist Party in 1945; leader of the militant youth movement, API, 1946–1947; detained 1948–1955;
first president of the Parti Rakyat Malaya, 1955; federal MP, 1959–1964; detained as part of Operation Cold
Store in Feb 1963 and until 1967.
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educationally, politically and economically to take their rightful part—there is also
an understandable feeling of national pride and some sheer parochialism. By the
right wing I of course mean the Ibans, Land Dayaks, Kayans, Kenyahs and other
indigenous peoples. So we find some strange bedfellows in the anti-Tunku bed.
In the other bed are some of the Sarawak Malays (and now possibly Stephens and
his following in North Borneo) who originally shared the indigenous view above but
switched very suddenly. In quick merger the Malays see the only hope of regaining
their pristine position of influence and of keeping the Chinese in their place. I may be
overrating the influence of the Datu Bandar 7 whose leadership has never been
accepted by more than a portion of the Malays but nevertheless the only Malay
newspaper has taken up his line and may influence a wider circle. The volte-face by
the Datu Bandar has undoubtedly been caused by promises of preferential treatment
and the blandishments of the Tunku and Ghazali have been quite open and
unashamed. The Tunku clearly hopes to win over the Ibans and others by the same
methods and we are being bombarded by invitations to send parties to Malaya to
receive ‘the treatment’ which, one must admit, seems to be temporarily effective
even if one cannot admire it. I expect that Tory is doing what is possible to counter
the quite outrageous claims that more has been done in the last three years since
independence than in the previous century under British rule. I suppose I should
welcome the greater interest in the Grand Design but I deplore the methods and
motives which have debased a fine concept into a somewhat squalid political
intrigue. No doubt it will be elevated in due course but that is how it appears to me
now. And it is of course pregnant with racial trouble.
My own view on how things should go remains unchanged—Borneo association
first accelerated by considerable practical and financial assistance by H.M.G. to make
it a reality (and I warmly welcome the decision to appoint a Co-ordinator 8).
Eventually in the long term political association with Malaya in a confederation with
a high degree of self-governing power remaining in Borneo. Meantime, and working
to that end, the forging of closer links through joint institutions and joint planning
for which, as you say, the economic field affords the most obvious opportunities.
The development of consultative machinery would be natural and desirable. We are
told by the Tunku that it is is impracticable but I do not see that with trust on both
sides it need be. I do not see in what other way it is possible to fulfil our obligations,
particularly to the indigenous people, as set out in our constitution (the Nine
Principles 9) and the assurances given in the past (c.f. the Baram petition forwarded
under cover of my Saving No. 34 of 14th January 1960, to which your Saving No. 52
of 11th February 1960 was the reply) that our aim is to lead the people of all races to
take their full and proportionate part in the conduct of public affairs. This is a
subject which is repeatedly brought up as I travel the country and the trust imposed
7 See 43, n 4. 8 For the decision to appoint H P Hall as co-ordinator, see 36, note.
9 When the British government annexed Sarawak on 1 July 1946 it assumed the obligation to uphold the
Nine Cardinal Principles set out in the preamble to the Rajah’s Constitution of Sarawak of 1941. These
principles emphasised the rights and interests of the people of Sarawak and were included as appendix C of
the report of the Cobbold Commission (Cmnd 1794, Aug 1962). Concerned that the colonial government
was deviating from them in its pursuit of Malaysia, the former Rajah and Bertram Brooke also drew
Macmillan’s attention to these obligations (C V Brooke to Macmillan, 16 July 1962, and B Brooke to
Macmillan, 20 Aug and 13 Sep 1963, PREM 11/4345).
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in us must be maintained. The constitutional proposals I have put forward are aimed
at the same objective as are our educational and development schemes. The pace
may well quicken (and the constitutional proposals are a bit ahead of public
demand) but that will not matter as long as the proper people are making the
running. It may be too that the Tunku’s efforts to win over the indigenous people
will bear more and better fruit than I suppose, but I doubt it. Behind the attitude of
the indigenous people is the feeling that while they themselves (the elders) have not
had the chance or the experience or education to compete with the others inside the
country (far less with those outside) their sons now in the upper readers [reaches] of
the schools will be ready in ten to fifteen years time. With this feeling I have every
sympathy. With complete frankness the Ibans have said ‘We will not permit the
Chinese or Malays to kick the British out, we ourselves will ask them to go when we
feel the time has come.’
In consequence of all this I have reached the same conclusion that I have reached
many times over recent months that no formula can be produced to cover the
positions of Malaya and Sarawak. Unless the Tunku can be persuaded to concede the
long term approach I very much fear that the deal is off. If it is off we face more
tempestuous winds of change and increased subversive activity. On the other hand if
merger is forced by 1963 or at all prematurely there is a real prospect of racial
conflict and outright rebellion. If one has to make the choice then I must take the
first where the responsibility remains ours.
I fully agree with what Bill Goode says in his letter of the 24th August about the
initiative having been left long enough, indeed too long, with the Tunku. It is a most
awkward position for a Governor to have all this going on round him, pompous
Consultative Committees disposing of all and sundry, without being in a position to
do more than utter the authorised platitudes about ‘the wishes of the people’. I meet
my parishioners daily and they ask point blank what the British Government and I
think about Greater Malaysia. This is not now an academic question for back
rooms—not here at any rate. I would urge that H.M.G. should give a lead in the
following sense, that while Greater Malaysia is a constructive idea no decision has
been or will be taken without H.M.G. having fully consulted the peoples of the
territories and obtained their agreement on the basis of clear-cut proposals. This is
bound to take a considerable time and the present period of informal discussion is
helpful in determining some of the difficulties and appreciating some of the
advantages. H.M.G.’s responsibilities towards the Borneo territories are not
diminished. H.M.G. does not regard the trend towards closer association between
Sarawak and North Borneo as in any way prejudicial to some future association with
Malaya and is prepared to give all practical assistance to the furtherance of a Bornean
association in accordance with the general and particular wishes of these territories
for such an association. (And here I repeat my previous plea for increased financial
support for joint projects such as are already under consideration and such as the
Co-ordinator may be able to develop.)
I regret that I cannot be more helpful at this stage. However, yesterday’s report
that the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew have agreed in principle to merger,10 without
mentioning the accession of the Borneo territories as a pre-requisite, gives me some
hope that the long term Borneo approach may in the end be accepted.
10 See 59, note.
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57 PREM 11/3418 4 Sept 1961
[Proposal for talks in London]: letter from Tunku Abdul Rahman to
Mr Macmillan
[In response to the Tunku’s request for a statement of British policy and an early
meeting, Macmillan authorised Sandys to set up an ad hoc committee of officials, under
CRO chairmanship, to examine policy on closer association (see 60).]
Since my last letter to you of 11th August1 about the proposed association of the Borneo
territories, Singapore and the Federation of Malaya, events have been moving very
swiftly and I think, therefore, that I should keep you informed of these developments.
As you probably know, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew and I had a meeting recently at which we
agreed in principle on the question of the integration of Singapore and the
Federation.2 We were also agreed that the question of Defence, External Affairs and
Security should be the responsibility of the Federal Government while the State of
Singapore would retain Education and Labour. As a result we decided on the
appointment of a Working Party to go into the various implications arising out of the
proposed arrangements.
I am fully convinced that this subject must now be pursued with the utmost
vigour and urgency and I am hoping, therefore, that the Working Party will be able
to meet in the very near future. As you are no doubt aware there are elements in
Singapore owing allegience beyond these shores who are now working very actively
to arouse chauvinist and anti-merger sentiment as they realised that the real object
of the merger was to combat Communism in this region. For my part I am equally
determined to keep ahead of their moves and my recent meeting with Mr. Lee was
partly designed to keep the issue alive. A respite will only work to their advantage.
In these circumstances, I would like to revise my earlier proposal in response to your
invitation that we might meet early next year. It appears to me to be in the interest of
us all that we should arrange to meet as soon as possible. However, before we meet it
may perhaps be best to settle beforehand the basis for our talks. It is extremely important
that we should do all we can in advance to ensure the success of our discussions as
their failure will be a serious setback of which the Communists will make full use, and
to their advantage. I wonder, therefore, if at this stage, you could say whether the
British Government would agree to relinquishing its sovereignty over the Borneo
territories and Singapore in the immediate future to enable them to become member
States of Malaysia and, if so, the means by which this could be effected. At the same
time, I think it would be important to know whether the British Government would
contemplate the use of the Singapore base within the framework of our Mutual Defence
Agreement including the fulfilment of Commonwealth obligations.
It might perhaps be possible to carry on with the discussion here with
representatives of our three Governments and find agreed basis for the talks in
London. This would save much time as it would help to remove any obstacle there
might be in the way of bringing about a successful merger of these territories with
the Federation. I suggest that only after careful planning and preparation have been
made here should we go to London. If the intention is to meet earlier then we might
meet soon.
1 See 53. 2 See 59, note.
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58 CO 1030/983, no 615 16 Sept 1961
[Crash programme for ‘Greater Malaysia’]: letter from Lord Selkirk to
Mr Macleod, amplifying the case put in document 55
In my telegram No. 41 I have given a short answer to the point about relinquishment
of sovereignty in your telegram No. 360 on Greater Malaysia. I am now writing to
give you my further comments.
2. In my letter of August 24,1 I said that I thought the time had come when it was
necessary to consider a crash programme for ‘Greater Malaysia’. I should like first to
recapitulate the various reasons why I consider that such a programme is
necessary:—
(i) We must look at the whole scheme against the background of our overall
policy in the area. In my earlier letters and despatches on the subject I have made
it plain that I believe that ‘Greater Malaysia’ would be an important factor for
stability in the area and that it would satisfy long-term British and Commonwealth
interests.
(ii) Owing to the speed and manner in which the situation is now developing
there is a serious risk that unless Greater Malaysia can be achieved in the near
future, the opportunity may be lost for good. This is due to a combination of
circumstances in the various territories involved, i.e., notably:—
(a) For the first time we have governments in both the Federation and in
Singapore that are actively in favour of Greater Malaysia; this may never
recur.
(b) The present Singapore Government will almost certainly fall in the next few
months if rapid progress cannot be made. If this happens there will be no
prospect of merger as long as the Tunku remains in power in Kuala Lumpur.
(c) If we do not bring the Borneo territories in now (i.e. by 1963–64) so that the
Greater Malaysia plan fails, the long-term alternatives for them would be
independence or absorption by Indonesia or China. The first of these
alternatives is not likely to be maintained and would probably lead to the
second. Moreover it is certain that if we do not take the opportunity presented
by the Tunku’s present initiative, we cannot expect to remain in the Borneo
territories for another ten or twenty years. The Tunku’s proposals have already
made their impact on political consciousness there and, whatever happens, we
must expect demands for political change to come forward with much greater
urgency than they have hitherto.
(d) The Tunku has, to a considerable extent, staked his political future and
reputation on the success of his ‘Greater Malaysia’ proposals. If they fail, it will
be a set-back for him which could be damaging to his position at home.
Moreover failure will be blamed on us, and this would mean a serious blow to
our present good relations with the Tunku. We should be faced with an angry
and resentful Tunku over Singapore and over other problems.
(e) This may be our last chance to prevent Chinese preponderance in the area
which must inevitably involve a serious risk of ultimate Communist domination.
1 See 55.
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3. Before I set out my further comments on how the Borneo territories might fit
into the Greater Malaysia concept I should like to say this about our own policy
there. We must of course continue our efforts to train the peoples of those territories
for self-government and to bequeath to them respect for the rule of law. But we have
at the same time to face up to the fact that ‘one man, one vote’ has not been a wild
success in South East Asia. In my view therefore our greatest contribution to the
future stability of the Borneo territories has been and will be made in the fields of
administration and of education and in such economic spheres as communications,
land utilization and agriculture.
4. I said in my telegram No. 41 that I thought we could surrender sovereignty in
the Borneo territories provided that satisfactory arrangements were made for us to
continue making this contribution until such time as the local people are ready to
run their own affairs at the State level. We want the Tunku to assume sovereignty
over Singapore and it would certainly be logical for him to want the Borneo
territories to join a Greater Malaysia on essentially the same basis. Moreover, I doubt
if it would be wise to share sovereignty with the Federation even in the unlikely event
of our being able to induce the Tunku to do so, lest we lend countenance to the
allegation that Greater Malaysia is a plot for the preservation of British imperialism.
5. The basic problem is how to ensure that the constitutional provisions for the
Borneo territories are properly worked out, put to the territories for their consent
and then enacted in such a way that the people in the territories can be assured that
they will in due course be brought into full operation, while at the same time making
progress as rapidly as the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew require. I suggest that the best
way of doing this would be to negotiate now State constitutions for the Borneo
territories with whatever State powers, financial provisions and so-forth that are
desirable. These constitutions would include provision for representative institutions
and for the Governors ultimately to be in similar positions to the Governors of
Penang and Malacca.2 The constitutions would, however, come into force in stages
and, in this way, the pace of constitutional advance could be suited to the territory.
At the same time the important requirement of an assured ultimate constitutional
position would be achieved by enacting these constitutions by means of appropriate
legislative action in both the United Kingdom and the Federation. This legislation in
the Federation would provide that these constitutions would be capable of
amendment only in the same way as the Federal constitution itself, thereby
entrenching them to the same extent.
6. If the suggestion I have outlined is constitutionally feasible it remains to
determine to whom the Governors would be responsible for the administration of the
Borneo territories at the State level until they are ready to administer themselves and
the full provisions of their State constitutions have been brought into operation. In
addition, there must be some means of deciding when each suspended section of the
State constitution should become effective. Broadly speaking, there seems to be
three possible alternatives.
7. The first of these is to trust the Tunku absolutely. By this I mean that we make
the Governors finally responsible to Kuala Lumpur and leave it to the Tunku to
2 For the appointment of governors of Penang and Malacca at the time of Malayan independence see
BDEE: Malaya, lxxvii and 448 (12), 449, 453, 459, 460.
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decide when the State constitution can become fully operative. The difficulty here is
that the Tunku does not want to take over colonies and the Borneo territories do not
want to become colonies of the Federation (the Ibans for example are not Moslems
and do not relish being administered by Moslems). The other obvious disadvantage of
this course is that it would probably undermine the morale of the expatriates in the
Borneo territories with the result that our further contribution to their future
stability would be much reduced.
8. The second alternative is that the Governors should continue to be
responsible to London. In other words, although sovereignty was transferred to the
Federation they would agree to derogate from it to the extent of leaving direction of
State administration to H.M.G. for a transitional period. This would presumably re-
assure the local people and the administrators, but it would hardly appeal to the
Tunku. Moreover, I should have thought that H.M.G., on the analogy of the Central
African Federation, might not like it either.
9. Both these alternatives could, of course, be modified by various measures of
joint responsibility and consultation. But if this is to be the case, it seems to me
worthwhile to think in terms of formal machinery. This might be done by setting up
by agreement with the Federation Government a Joint Trust Council for the Borneo
territories. There are obviously various possibilities for the membership of this
council which I will not go into at this stage, but I think it might well be necessary to
give the Federation the chairmanship, at any rate on a rotating basis. The powers of
the council would include the ability to give the Governors, who would, I hope, be
prepared to continue in office in these circumstances, general guidence on State
matters, the future selection and appointment of new Governors and the power to
decide on the introduction of successive stages in the State constitutions. The
Council would not however meet too frequently and the Governors should be able to
conduct day to day affairs without interference from it. As a concomitant of this
arrangement it would be essential to include in the constitutional arrangements
provision for the establishment immediately of a Public Service Commission with
powers to make recommendations only to the Governor and to have it agreed that
the Governor would act solely in his discretion in matters affecting the Public
Service. I would hope in this way to postpone for some time the need to introduce a
scheme of compensation for expatriate officers, though I realise that in due course
this would have to come as the pressure increases, as it surely will, for increased
Borneonisation.
10. So far, I have been primarily concerned with the interests of the peoples of
the Borneo territories. From H.M.G.’s point of view there is also the need for a
satisfactory arrangement on Defence. This I envisage would take the form of an
extension of the Malayan Defence Agreement to cover the Borneo territories, as well
as Singapore. It must however be on a basis that would make it clear to the
Federation Government that they were responsible for their own defence and that we
were merely helping them to achieve their objective, probably through some form of
Defence Council in Kuala Lumpur. It would also have to be understood that they
would be prepared to undertake to co-operate in assuring the Defence and Internal
Security of remaining British territories in this area. Such arrangements would
necessarily presuppose goodwill and continuous consultation between the two
Governments. Such goodwill is fundamental to the whole concept of Greater
Malaysia and at this stage we must assume it.
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11. I realise that it will not be easy to persuade the Tunku to accept the
arrangements I have proposed above even though we are prepared to cede
sovereignty over the Borneo territories. The opting out clause for the Borneo
territories which I advocated in my letter of August 24 would obviously make the
scheme very much easier to put across there, but I am seriously wondering whether,
in the light of Tory’s telegram No. 651 of September 7 to the Commonwealth
Relations Office, there is any chance of getting the Tunku to agree to it. That being
so, and since some way must be found of consulting the peoples of the Borneo
territories before they are irrevocably committed to Greater Malaysia, the only
alternative is some form of consultation within the next year or two. At first sight
this may sound impracticable, but we should not forget the speed with which other
former colonies at least as underdeveloped as North Borneo and Sarawak have been
asked to decide their future. While still without any substantial experience of
managing their own affairs, Singapore may hold a referendum towards the end of
this year. Obviously, we could not move as quickly as that but popular consultation
in the Borneo territories in, say, late 1962 would be a very different proposition. This
would mean that the Tunku would have to accept that the inclusion of the Borneo
territories was subject to the will of the people there as expressed in 1962, but there
would be no provision for opting out once Greater Malaysia had been chosen. Of
course the risk of an adverse vote would have to be incurred but if we believe, as I
think we do, that the people must be consulted at some stage, this would have to be
faced sooner or later. The Tunku may not much like this, but since, as Tory has said
in his telegram No. 652 of September 7 to the Commonwealth Relations Office he
believes that we could swing public opinion in the Borneo territories in favour of
Greater Malaysia, he might be prepared to agree if it comes to the point. There would
still be the problem that the Tunku would presumably not finally accept Singapore
until the outcome of the Borneo Consultation was known but this also need not be
an insuperable difficulty.
12. If we had a crash programme on the lines I have described with such
consultations as the Governors think fair in the Borneo territories in about twelve
months’ time we should clearly have to try to ensure that the result was the one that
we and the Tunku wanted. I am quite sure that the influence of the administrations
in the Borneo territories is very considerable and that whatever is said about Greater
Malaysia by Her Majesty’s Government, by the Governors and by their District
Officers will carry very great weight with the local people. Conversely silence would
be taken as disapproval of the scheme. I recall the criticism in the case of the Central
African Federation that there had at the time of its introduction been no firm
instructions to District Officers in the protectorate to take a positive line in support
of it. I believe this point was commented on in the Monckton Report.3 It is therefore
essential for its success that any Greater Malaysia scheme should have the full
support of the local administrations on whom would fall the task of explaining its
implications and of setting its practical advantages against the immense problems
that would otherwise face the peoples of the Borneo territories when they became
3 Lord Monckton chaired the Advisory Commission on Central Africa whose report was published on 18
Oct 1960, see Hyam and Louis eds, BDEE: The Conservative Government and the End of Empire, liv-lv
and 495, n 1.
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independent. I believe that the Greater Malaysia scheme would be in the long term
interests of the Borneo peoples and that we can tell them this in all sincerity.
13. I realise that there are many other important aspects to be considered that I
have not dealt with in this letter. A joint Working Party will clearly have to be set up
to produce a detailed plan once the broad heads of agreement have been reached at
the top level discussions. I think a scheme on these lines could be worked out and the
prospective results merit the risks involved. The Tunku is very keen on this concept
and would, I believe, co-operate in the organisational change.
14. I am copying this to Goode in Jesselton, Waddell in Kuching, White in
Brunei, Tory in Kuala Lumpur, Oliver in Canberra and Cumming-Bruce in
Wellington.
P.S. I m sending copies to Alec and Duncan.4
4 ie, Lord Home and Mr Sandys.
59 PREM 11/3418 18 Sept 1961
‘Greater Malaysia’: inward telegram no 387 from P B C Moore to Mr
Macleod, reporting agreement between Tunku Abdul Rahman and Lee
Kuan Yew
[On 24 Aug the Tunku and Lee had reached preliminary agreement on the principle of
merger as well as the degree of autonomy to be retained by Singapore. They took this
further in Sept and set up a working party to examine details. By the middle of Nov Heads
of Agreement were drawn up and presented to the Singapore Legislative Assembly which
accepted them on 6 Dec (see 87 note 1). On 20 Sept the Tunku repeated his request for
‘some clear indication’ of British policy (CAB 134/1949, GM(61)2, annex). Others, too,
such as Selkirk and Sandys felt that London could not be seen to dither on the question of
closer association. Sandys was anxious to allay the Tunku’s misgivings and hold talks
sooner rather than later. Thus, although a meeting in late Oct had previously been ruled
out by other pressures on the prime minister’s diary, Macmillan’s private office advised
him to accept Sandys’ suggestion for a meeting with the Tunku on 23 Oct. This was the
date Macmillan offered the Tunku in a message of 23 Sept, attempting at one and the
same time to avoid giving a clear indication of British policy on either the Borneo
territories or the use of the Singapore base and to steer clear of antagonising the Malayan
government. It was now essential for ministers to be briefed on policy options, and the
inter-departmental Greater Malaysia (Official) Committee met for the first time on 27
Sept (see 62). Lee had already decided not to accompany the Tunku to the London talks
and, for his own domestic reasons, the Tunku now wished to avoid being too obviously
associated with the Chinese leader of Singapore. Lee remained in Singapore to prepare for
a referendum on merger. As part of his campaign, between 13 Sept and 9 Oct he gave
twelve broadcasts, each in three languages, against communism and in favour of merger.
These talks were published as The Battle for Merger (Government Printing Office,
Singapore, 1961).]
Greater Malaysia.
Following is text of communiqué issued in Kuala Lumpur following meeting of
the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew:—
‘The Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, Tengku Abdul Rahman
Putra Al-Haj, and the Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, had
talks for three days at the Residency in Kuala Lumpur.
Present at the talks were the Federation Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul
Razak bin Dato Hussein, and the Singapore Minister of Culture, Mr. S.
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Rajaratnam. Permanent Secretary for External Affairs, Inche Muhammad
Ghazali bin Shafie, was also present.
The Prime Ministers of the Federation and Singapore have agreed that the
working party should be instructed to work out the details of merger, with a
view to bringing about the integration of the two territories and its peoples in
or before June 1963.
On the basis of the agreement reached on 23rd August the two Prime
Ministers discussed important constitutional and economic problems arising
out of merger and broad agreement was reached.
The two Prime Ministers are satisfied that all legitimate local and special
interests of the people in the two territories can, and will, be safeguarded,
with the merger of Singapore as a State within the Federation.
Much progress has been made as a result of the discussions between the
two Prime Ministers. It is decided that the two Prime Ministers will meet
from time to time to review the working and decide on the recommendations
of the working party.’
2. Following are main points made by Lee Kuan Yew on arrival in Singapore.
3. All the main problems of merger had been ironed out and it only remained to
settle the details. Singapore was merging with the Federation as a very special State.
The Federation recognised its very special position, which was like that of Penang
although Singapore was bigger than Penang and was a free port and a big city. If
Singapore did not reserve to itself powers on Education and Labour there would be a
great deal of misunderstanding and unhappiness amongst Singapore people.
4. Although every State in the Federation came under the 9th Schedule of the
Constitution and customs, excise and income tax powers belonged to the central
Government, Singapore would have administrative duties like education, labour, health
and social services and would be getting a considerable amount of taxes to discharge those
duties. There would therefore have to be an equitable adjustment of representation in the
federal Parliament otherwise Singapore would be represented twice over. Representation
would be in proportion with the amount of reserve taxes that would be kept for Singapore.
5. Singapore’s status as the twelfth State in the Federation would affect the
position of the British in Singapore. The British were at present in Singapore as of
right. With merger they could not remain as of right; sovereignty would no longer be
with them. This is a matter to be settled between the Tunku, Singapore and the U.K.
Government. It would create a considerable amount of difficulty if the British tried to
get rights of the nature they had in Cyprus where they were in complete control of
certain sections of the island.1 Singapore was not as large as Cyprus and large parts of
the island could not be cut off for the Naval base and the airfields but these problems
were not insuperable.
6. Greater Malaysia could come at the same time or shortly after merger between
Singapore and the Federation.
7. On merger Singapore citizens and federal citizens would become federal
nationals. The question of citizenship and other matters would in due course be
published in a command paper for public information.
1 When Cyprus became independent in Aug 1960, Britain retained sovereignty over ninety-nine square
miles of base-enclaves.
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8. There would have to be constitutional talks with the British Government by
1963. After all the details of merger had been settled he and the Tunku would jointly
present the plan to the British Government.
9. The ideal must be complete integration between Singapore and the
Federation. That was not possible now; there was a lot of misunderstanding and
unhappiness about Chinese education. If at any time in the future all the difficulties
were ironed out and the people agreed to education going to the central
Government, then it could be done, but at present the people of Singapore did not
want it. The Federation was quite prepared to take charge of all subjects, but he was
going to safeguard what he thought were the legitimate rights of Singapore. The
P.A.P.’s duty for 1963 was to bring about merger on fair and just conditions. After
merger the position could be regularly reviewed and if both the State Government
and the central Government agreed to more powers going to the centre there was
nothing to prevent it.
60 CAB 134/1949, GM(61)2 25 Sept 1961
‘Summary of Malayan proposals and issues to be considered by the
British Government’: CRO memorandum for the Greater Malaysia
(Official) Committee
[This memorandum was discussed at the first meeting of the Greater Malaysia (Official)
Committee on 27 Sept. Set up by Macmillan ‘[t]o examine the proposals by the Prime
Minister of the Federation of Malaya for the creation of a “Greater Malaysia”
incorporating the Federation of Malaya, Brunei, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore,
and to make recommendations to Ministers’, the committee was chaired first by Sir
Alexander Clutterbuck and later by Sir Saville Garner, and included representatives of the
CO (either E Melville or Sir J Martin), the FO (generally E Peck), the Ministry of Defence
and Treasury. It was dissolved on 22 Oct 1963, five weeks after the inauguration of
Malaysia. Its papers are at CAB 134/1949–1951. One of the points raised during the
discussion of this paper was the likely reaction of the Americans since ‘for political
reasons they wanted us to maintain a military presence of significant proportions’ (see 62
and also CAB 21/5350).]
The Tunku’s proposals and attitude have been described in his messages to the Prime
Minister of 26th June, 11th August and 20th September. Copies of these are attached,
together with the memorandum enclosed with the message of the 26th June.1
2. The Tunku’s original proposals for the status of Singapore after merger have
been slightly modified following his discussions with Mr. Lee Kuan Yew.2
Malayan proposals
3. These are now as follows:—
(1) As a first step Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak should be brought into the
Malayan Federation as constituent units on the same basis as the existing states
(though he has informed Bornese [sic] leaders that he would be ready to give the
Borneo territories a large measure of self-government). He appears to be
1 See 46 for the Tunku’s message and memorandum of 26 June and 53 for his message of 11 Aug. His
message of 20 Sept is not printed here.
2 See 59.
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convinced that if the British Government gave a firm lead, the Borneo peoples
would be happy to come in at a very early date.
(2) Once (1) was secured, Singapore would join the Federation on a special basis
retaining powers to administer its own affairs in the fields of education and labour.
Singapore would then have proportionately smaller representation in the central
Parliament than they could claim on a population basis if they came in on the
same footing as the Borneo territories. Internal security would be a federal subject.
(3) The British bases in Singapore would cease to be at the disposal of SEATO but
could be maintained as bases for Commonwealth defence.
(4) There would be no administrative changes, but Singapore would maintain its
own Civil Service.
(5) After initial talks with the Prime Minister, there should be a more formal
discussion in which representatives of all the territories concerned and the United
Kingdom would participate. That meeting should decide on the appointment of an
independent constitutional commission on the lines of the Reid Commission
which drafted the present Constitution of the Federation of Malaya, to work out
the Constitution of the new union.
4. In Malaya the attitude of the opposition parties to these matters is not clear.
The initiative remains firmly in the Tunku’s hands.
5. In Singapore Mr. Lee Kuan Yew’s fundamental aim is to secure a viable
independence for Singapore in a democratic framework. He is fully committed to
Singapore achieving ‘independence through merger’ and his political future depends
on securing early progress. The left-wing opposition in Singapore are powerful and
anxious to create maximum difficulties for Lee and the Tunku. They are likely to
come out in favour of either a programme of complete merger with Malaya or one
which left internal security with the Singapore Government. Either, they reason,
would frustrate the Tunku’s designs against the Chinese. If full merger were
completed they would hope to be able to establish a Chinese-dominated government
at the centre, while if they retained internal security they could be sure of continued
freedom of action in Singapore. They would doubtless prefer a policy of complete
independence to the Tunku’s proposals.
Issues for examination
6. To assist the work of the Committee an attempt has been made in the
following paragraphs to indicate the issues on which Ministers will require
recommendations. As a first step, the Committee may wish to examine these
paragraphs with a view to agreeing on a list of the issues to be covered in the
Committee’s work.
7. Previous consideration of the idea of Greater Malaysia, at both Ministerial and
official level, has indicated general agreement that a closer association between
Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo Territories should be accepted as the ultimate
aim. In general Ministers will need to reach a conclusion on (a) the importance to
British policies and interests of achieving Greater Malaysia and (b) how far the
British Government can go at the London meeting to contribute to this end.
8. The question of timing has now become of critical importance. The Tunku
and Lee appear to have made considerable progress in defining what kind of
relationship between Singapore and the proposed central Government would be
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acceptable to both of them. The left-wing opposition in Singapore would no doubt
insist on terms unacceptable to the Tunku, and it is in any case highly improbable
that the Tunku would be prepared to negotiate with them. Retention of power by Lee
in Singapore appears therefore to be essential if the whole idea of a Greater Malaysia
is not to founder. If it fails now, the opportunity may be permanently lost.
9. Lee’s position in Singapore is weak. Some immediate and concrete evidence of
progress is essential to him to enable him to retain power. He and the Tunku have
made it clear that the central issue for the London meeting is whether the British
and Malayan Governments can reach a sufficient measure of agreement to provide
Lee with the public material necessary to enable him to sustain his position in the
Singapore Parliament which meets again on the 30th October. Our representatives
on the spot agree with this. It is necessary to define how far the British Government
can go at this stage in a statement of intentions.
10. The Tunku’s position is that he is not prepared to go any further over a
merger between Malaya and Singapore until he can be assured that the Borneo
territories will be brought into a federal scheme at least as early as Singapore. In his
view this is a fundamental requirement for him in order to enable him to deal with
the Chinese and left-wing elements in Singapore. His latest message envisages a
‘firm undertaking’ on this point by the British Government to be announced at the
London meeting. The British Government’s position has been that they will not
commit the Borneo territories without consultation with their peoples. There will
therefore be difficulties in finding a formula which the Tunku will regard as
adequate.
11. It is assumed that we shall wish to maintain defence facilities in Singapore
and Malaya under conditions which will enable us to use our forces to carry out our
SEATO and other defence obligations. Greater Malaysia would involve the loss of our
sovereign rights in Singapore and we should have to negotiate an agreement
covering our defence facilities and their use. The extension to Singapore of our
existing Defence Agreement with Malaya would not be satisfactory unless there could
be an agreed modification of the conditions which the Malayan Government have
hitherto imposed on the use of our forces for SEATO purposes. The Tunku has made
it clear that he could not accept any formal public link between SEATO and our
defence facilities. He has however indicated that, subject to this, he wishes to be as
helpful as possible over our defence requirements.
12. These defence matters will require detailed, and no doubt lengthy,
negotiation. At the London meeting we should presumably at least aim to bring the
Tunku to accept that an agreement covering the effective strategic use of our forces
is essential to is [sic], and to agree with him the lines on which further examination
of the details should proceed. Any announcement following the London meeting
would, from our point of view, need to include some reassuring reference to defence
matters.
13. Consideration of our general Defence Review has been on the basis that, if
Greater Malaysia is achieved, the British Government would no longer have any
responsibility for internal security in the territories concerned and that this would
lead to a substantial reduction in our forces. It would seem desirable to confirm with
the Tunku that he also envisages that in a Greater Malaysia the British Government
would have no internal security responsibilities, direct or indirect.
14. The Tunku will wish to discuss the internal situation in Singapore—in
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particular what the attitude of the British Government would be if the Socialist
Front were to overthrow Lee, and what we, and the Tunku, might do to help sustain
Lee (over and above any general commitments about Greater Malaysia). This ties in
with the problem of the Tunku’s present attitude to the political detainees in
Singapore and the Internal Security Council.
15. We have told the Australian and New Zealand Governments that we will give
them considered Ministerial views before the London meeting. They will expect to be
given time to comment.
61 PREM 11/3422 26 Sept 1961
‘Greater Malaysia’: inward telegram no 705 from Sir G Tory to Mr
Sandys, reporting the Tunku’s reaction to Mr Macmillan’s latest
message.
Greater Malaysia
Prime Minister’s message1 was delivered to Tunku yesterday and I saw him today
about it. He made it clear at the outset that he was hardening still further on
question of need to obtain some clear assurance about our relinquishing sovereignty
over Borneo territories before going to London. Strange as it may seem he evidently
sincerely believed when writing his last two letters to Prime Minister (my telegrams
No. 654 and No. 688) that Her Majesty’s Government could if they wished commit
themselves without reservation at London meeting to transfer of sovereignty over
Borneo territories. It was explained in my telegram No. 687 that when Lee Kuan Yew
came to inform Singapore Legislative Assembly at end of October, that scheme for
Federation/Singapore merger had been agreed, Tunku or his spokesman wished to be
able to say for benefit of Malays that all was well because Her Majesty’s Government
had undertaken to hand over Borneo territories whose populations would balance
net addition of Chinese from Singapore. Tunku noted from Prime Minister’s message
of 23rd September that we could give no early assurance of kind he wished and that
we should need more time to study implications. In answer to his question I felt
bound to tell him that Her Majesty’s Government were unlikely to be able by 23rd
October to be in a position to give definite and unqualified undertaking to transfer
sovereignty. Tunku said that if that were true, there was no point in his going to
London at this stage. For him to go to London and come back empty handed would
be undignified and damaging to his position. It was better that Her Majesty’s
Government should first satisfy themselves by consulting the populations of Borneo
territories that they wanted Greater Malaysia so that we should be able if we wished
to give undertaking about transfer of sovereignty when Tunku eventually paid his
visit. It had never been his intention to go to London to try and persuade us to
surrender sovereignty. His object had always been to discuss not the principle but
the practical implications of the transfer of power.
2. I begged Tunku to think again about this reminding him of serious
implications of Greater Malaysia for us, of our obligations towards Borneo territories
1 For Macmillan’s message of 23 Sept, see document 59, note.
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and political impossibility of handing them over without assuring ourselves and
Parliament that their wishes had been properly consulted, of our pre-occupation over
defence and our need to retain unrestricted facilities in order to discharge our
SEATO obligations and so on. Discussion between Prime Ministers would help to
clarify these matters. Only by frank discussion at highest level could effective
decisions be secured on what were more important questions of Government policy.
Tunku remained unmoved.
3. I got him to see once again that it was necessary for us to consult wishes of
Borneo territories before committing them to Greater Malaysia but he professed to
believe that this could easily be done at once and the desired answer obtained. I told
him that the Governors and all their officers in Borneo and Sarawak had warned us
that although opinion was coming round towards Greater Malaysia it was not yet
ready to accept it in its present form and to force the pace would be to set up adverse
and probably dangerous reactions. Tunku brushed this aside saying that he did not
believe there was any significant feeling against Greater Malaysia and that the
peoples of the territories if left to make up their own minds and not told what was
good for them by the British administration would now opt for Greater Malaysia. The
Tunku claimed that in the case of Malaya itself the Colonial administration had
proved wrong in their assessment of the will of the people as regards independence.
He was speaking as an expert in these matters. Tunku was in his most stubborn
mood and I found it impossible to reason with him.
4. It happens that this morning I was told in confidence by a very senior British
officer still in Malayan Government service that he was aware of growing disquiet on
the part of the Tunku’s Malays about the way in which the Tunku appeared to be
committing the Federation to Singapore without adequate safeguards. Ismail in
particular the Minister of the Interior and Internal Security was becoming very
anxious about the effect of these policies on political support for the Tunku in his
own party and I suspect that he and perhaps Razak, too, have at (?last) penetrated the
screen which the Tunku and Ghazali have built round themselves lately over Greater
Malaysia and have (4 corrupt groups) some of their apprehension.
5. Tunku recalled an earlier conversation in which he had told me he was not at
all anxious to take Singapore or Borneo territories for that matter and that he had
only been induced against his better judgment to accept principle of Greater Malaysia
because he feared that Communism would otherwise get foothold in Singapore and
in Borneo territories too. He said we ought to see matters in same light. It was up to
us to decide whether we wanted to stop Communism from engulfing these territories
or whether we did not care. In the former event we ought to see that Greater
Malaysia offered the only chance of stemming this Communist advance and that
there was only very little time.
6. I said I thought that if Tunku decided not to go to London in October that
would be a grave setback for Lee Kuan Yew. Tunku said that was not necessarily so in
his view. He was at that moment consulting his friends in the Singapore Alliance on
this point.
7. Tunku expressed regret that it had not proved possible for Prime Minister to
come here as originally planned and he suggested that visit by Prime Minister to
Federation, Singapore and the Borneo Territories when world situation had
quietened down a little would still be most welcome so far as he was concerned and
would probably be more fruitful than anything else in advancing Greater Malaysia.
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8. Tunku appears also to have suffered further reaction on question of defence.
He is again harping on theme that we could have Singapore for ‘Commonwealth
defence purposes’. I am afraid that here too we shall have to inform Tunku of our
minimum defence requirements and shall have to argue these matters with him in
advance of any visit by him to London.
9. I now expect to receive from Tunku for transmission by telegraph a further
message to Prime Minister saying he sees no purpose in coming to London unless we
can meantime give assurance on transfer of sovereignty over Borneo territories.
10. I have never known the Tunku so difficult as he was this morning. I hope to
talk things over with Ghazali tomorrow and shall report further then.
62 CAB 134/1949, GM(61) 1st meeting 27 Sept 1961
‘Summary of the proposals and of the issues involved’: minutes of the
Greater Malaysia (Official) Committee relating to document 60
[This meeting marked the first time that Whitehall formally engaged with the proposal to
create Malaysia. The following were present: Sir A Clutterbuck (CRO, chair), E H Peck
(FO), E Melville (CO), P S Milner-Barry (Treasury), C J Hayes (Treasury), N Pritchard
(CRO), R C Omerod (CRO), D G R Bentliff (CRO), C E F Gough (Ministry of Defence) and
F A Bishop (Cabinet Office). For the committee’s final report, see 73.]
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Commonwealth Relations
Office (G.M. (61) 2) summarising the Malayan proposals and the issues to which they
give rise for the British Government,1 together with Kuala Lumpur telegram no. 705
dated 26th September, 1961,2 and a note by the Commonwealth Relations Office
containing the framework of a report to Ministers in preparation for their
prospective discussions with the Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman.
The Chairman said that it appeared from Kuala Lumpur telegram no. 705 that the
Tunku would be sending a further message to the Prime Minister on the lines
indicated by Sir Geofroy Tory. This need not prevent the Prime Minister from
insisting that the Tunku should visit London for a first round of general discussion
about Greater Malaysia before we could contemplate any commitment going beyond
a general welcome for the project. We should be able to prepare a reply to the Tunku
in terms which would make it very difficult for him to refuse to come to London
without prior commitment on our part. No doubt, because of the weakness of the
present position of the Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, we could not
afford much delay in coming to grips with the material issues involved in the project
but the urgency was not such as to justify the Tunku’s demands that we should
prejudge any of the vitally important questions to be discussed.
Mr. Melville said that it would be wrong to assume that the question whether Mr.
Lee stood or fell depended upon our reaching firm decisions of substance in talks
with the Tunku before the end of October. We should aim in those talks at reaching
sufficient agreement for it to be worth while for the Tunku to continue his
negotiations with Mr. Lee and to enable the latter to argue in public with
demonstrable justification that he was making progress towards satisfactory terms of
1 See 60. 2 See 61.
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merger with the Federation of Malaya. But if Mr. Lee did fall a merger might still not
be finally lost. His opponents might still decide to play their hand constitutionally
(e.g., by avoiding action likely to force the British Government to intervene directly
in Singapore); and even if a new Singapore Government made demands which the
Tunku could not accept—such as a number of seats in the Federal Legislature in full
proportions to population—it was conceivable that they might later resile from such
a position so as to allow the possibility of a merger to be reopened. It had, of course,
to be recognised that any such developments might turn the Tunku finally away
from the idea of bringing Singapore into the Federation, and the crux remained how
far we could go towards committing the Borneo Territories. We could not simply
commit them unilaterally but if we could satisfy the Tunku about our support for
Greater Malaysia in principle and about the extent to which we were prepared to give
a lead in that direction to the Borneo Territories, we should have a reasonable chance
of keeping the project alive despite any inevitable delays and some deterioration in
the situation in Singapore.
In discussion it was agreed that the problem of timing was extremely difficult. It
was obviously most desirable to move fast in order to meet the wishes of the Tunku
and to anticipate any further weakening of Mr. Lee’s position in Singapore.
Moreover, we must avoid laying ourselves open to a charge of responsibility through
default for preventing the Greater Malaysia project from getting off the ground at all.
On the other hand, we badly needed time to try and carry the Borneo Territories
along with us without appearing to dragoon them into a Greater Malaysia; we could
not afford to take precipitate decisions about our defence interests; and we must be
able to engage in adequate consultation with Australia and New Zealand on the
project as a whole, and with them and other allies on its defence aspects in
particular. Our best course would be to get the Tunku to London for the proposed
talks and in them to explore with him in a general way, and against a background of
warm welcome for a Greater Malaysia in principle, the various different courses
along which we might seek solutions to the problems which it involved. This would
no doubt be a task of considerable delicacy but there was no alternative if we were on
the one hand to keep the project alive and on the other to avoid committing
ourselves too soon on issues of the first magnitude.
Throughout the discussion it was recognised that questions relating to our
defence interests in South East Asia and the Far East were crucial to our approach to
the Tunku about Greater Malaysia, and these questions were currently under radical
examination and that decisions upon them were most unlikely before the end of
October.
Mr. Gough said that hitherto the political Departments had quite rightly based
their thinking on the assumption that we must insist on maintaining our present
defence facilities and rights in Malaya and Singapore more or less unchanged. But
this, together with other fundamental assumptions of our defence policy, was today
very much under review. On grounds of finance, and because of the pressing need to
find additional man-power to fill the serious gaps in our forces in Germany without
recourse to some form of National Service, it was imperative and urgent to seek
reductions in our commitments and establishments outside Germany, and we must
therefore take a new look at our position in South East Asia and the Far East.
There were three major points to consider. First, we could assume that the creation
of a Greater Malaysia would relieve us of our responsibilities for internal security in
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Singapore and the Borneo Territories. This was of great importance since it would
release at least eight major units at present tied down for that purpose. Second, we at
present had responsibilities for the external defence of those territories, and of Malaya
under our bilateral defence agreement with her. No doubt the Tunku would want us
to stand by that agreement but we had to ask ourselves whether we could not and
should not find means of extricating ourselves from all these external defence
responsibilities. Third, we had up till now assumed that the manner in which we
fulfilled our obligations to the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) would
continue unchanged. If so, then we should certainly still need to keep substantial forces
in Malaya and Singapore, but if we decided that we could and should make radical
changes in the way of meeting our obligations to SEATO we were at once faced with a
totally different situation. It might be possible for us to take with SEATO the line that,
on the one hand, we regarded the creation of a Greater Malaysia not only as desirable
in itself but also as likely to reinforce the general security of South East Asia but that,
on the other hand, it would not be possible for us to retain in a Greater Malaysia the
bases necessary for the fulfilment of our SEATO obligations in accordance with existing
plans. The other Governments concerned with Greater Malaysia would not agree that
we should do so; we could not contemplate continuing our present arrangements for
the support of SEATO against the will of those Governments; and it was therefore
necessary for us to make other arrangements for meeting our SEATO obligations—
e.g. by relying upon long-range air striking power based upon Australia, without
substantial ground forces in South East Asia itself. It was difficult to see how we could
enter into serious negotiations with the Tunku before such questions were answered,
since so to do would inevitably limit the freedom of Ministers in seeking the best
answers: but it simply was not possible to have the questions adequately considered in
time for talks with the Tunku before the end of October, especially as the British forces
which at present relied upon bases in Malaya and Singapore were by no means all
United Kingdom forces but contained substantial Australian and New Zealand
elements, so that the United Kingdom could not enter unilaterally into firm
agreements with the Tunku about the future of the bases and must carry Australia and
New Zealand with it in full consultation.
The validity and importance of these considerations were fully recognised in the
discussion and the following were the other main points made:—
(a) The present Australian line was that we must make sure in our dealings with
the Tunku about Greater Malaysia that its creation would in no way require us to
give up the defence facilities which we needed for the proper fulfilment of our
existing obligations of all kinds.
(b) The internal security situation in Singapore might gravely deteriorate if Mr.
Lee’s position was destroyed and we were unable to make any progress on Greater
Malaysia. In that case we might be deprived for a considerable time to come of any
hope of obtaining the release of the forces committed to internal security duties in
Singapore.
(c) We should have to be very careful about the manner and timing of any
reduction in the strength of our forces in Singapore since precipitate change
would create grave problems of employment and other kinds.
(d) We must not overlook the likely reaction of the Americans to all these matters.
For political reasons they wanted us to maintain a military presence of significant
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proportions. On the other hand it was argued that we might have to get it across to
the Americans that, whereas our military presence in South East Asia had hitherto
been characterised chiefly by the possession of bases and nuclear power, our
liberal approach to the political problems of the area required us to change the
form and method of our military contribution to its security and that, while we
should continue to make an effective contribution as a nuclear power, we must do
so from outside the South East Asian land area.
The Committee:—
(1) Invited the Ministry of Defence to prepare a statement of the defence
problem for inclusion in a draft report to Ministers.
(2) Invited the Colonial Office to elaborate Part II of the Commonwealth
Relations Office draft note, in particular to spell out the broad situation from
which arose the urgency of the whole matter and the differences of view between
the Tunku and ourselves with regard to the Borneo Territories.
(3) Invited the Commonwealth Relations Office to set out more fully the
premises of our approach to the Great [sic] Malaysia project.
(4) Invited the Commonwealth Relations Office to co-ordinate the production
of a draft report for consideration at a further meeting of 4th October.
63 PREM 11/3422 28 Sept 1961
‘Greater Malaysia’: inward telegram no 715 from Sir G Tory to Mr
Sandys, reporting further on the Tunku’s reaction to Mr Macmillan’s
latest message
Greater Malaysia
My immediately following telegram1 contains message for Prime Minister from
Tunku handed to me this morning under covering letter from Ghazali dated today.
2. In long discussion with Ghazali yesterday it merged that one of main troubles
is the Tunku’s persistent suspicion that we still hope that he will be compelled by
deteriorating political situation in Singapore to accept responsibility for Singapore
before we are able to hand over Borneo Territories and that he will thus be left
‘holding the baby’. This suspicion has been reinforced in his mind by Razak. This was
confirmed to me today by Thompson 2 (here on his way to Vietnam) who was present
yesterday when Razak was trying to curdle Tunku’s blood on subject of Singapore.
Ismail’s contribution lately has been to argue that addition of Borneo Territories is
not in fact going to help Tunku in the slightest with additional Chinese problem
which he will acquire with Singapore.
3. Moral of this seems to Ghazali and me to be that a considerable advance would
be made by us with Tunku if we were able to assure him that sovereignty over Borneo
Territories would only be transferred to Federation simultaneously with that over
Singapore.
4. Tunku still has difficulty in understanding why we insist so much on
consulting ‘people’ of Borneo Territories on question of Greater Malaysia. He recalls
1 See 64. 2 For Robert Thompson, see 32, n 3.
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a number of instances in our recent history when control of Territories has been
transferred without waiting for them to reach the stage of full democratic self-
Government. Given urgency of need to preserve these Territories from an uncertain
and probably unsatisfactory fate why were we not content to consult the
Governments they now had. With his ambivalent approach to questions of self-
determination Tunku is inclined to attribute our wish to consult these people to our
intention to stall rather than to our sense of trusteeship. On this point he is still
more inclined to respect our need to satisfy our own Parliament than our obligation
to do justice to Borneo peoples.
5. I have no doubt that if Tunku’s visit to London is put off for long Greater
Malaysia scheme will suffer serious setback apart altogether from unfortunate effect
on Lee’s political position. People here who have sincere misgivings about Greater
Malaysia will be given time and encouragement to develop their arguments. Ghazali
and I think it might be possible still to persuade Tunku to go to London fairly soon if
not next month if we could give him assurance on following lines which I have told
Ghazali represents absolute limit which could be expected from us at this stage.
Begins.
(a) H.M.G. accept principle of Greater Malaysia.
(b) They will wholeheartedly commend scheme to peoples of Borneo Territories in
hope that Greater Malaysia might be implemented with the consent of these
Territories by 1963.
(c) Subject to assurance that Borneo Territories were willing to enter proposed
association with Federation of Malaya, H.M.G. undertake that they would transfer
sovereignty over Borneo Territories to Federation of Matala [sic] at the same time
as or before they transfer sovereignty over Singapore. Ends.
6. Question of defence facilities in Singapore remains. My latest information
confirms that Razak has infected Tunku with some of his apprehension about your
[sic] retaining unrestricted facilities in Singapore but according to Ghazali, Tunku
still thinks it should be possible to devise some formula which would satisfy both
him and us. As you will see Tunku says in his message that question of Singapore
base is one which will have to be sorted out once position is clear on future of
Territories but this problem is not insurmountable. I do not know what decision has
been taken in London on this question but I imagine you will wish to consider
whether any assurance to Tunku on above lines should include also some reservation
on following lines which would not of course be for publication. Begins.
It would of course also be necessary for H.M.G. to work out with Federation
Government some practical means whereby they could continue to discharge their
international defence obligations after the transfer of sovereignty over Singapore.
Ends.
7. I am satisfied that in adopting his latest attitude Tunku is genuinely anxious
about his ability to sell Greater Malaysia to his Malays. They would never accept any
arrangement under which Federation acquired Singapore in isolation. To enable Lee
Kuan Yew to play his hand the way he wants it in Singapore, Tunku has gone to the
absolute limit in allowing Lee to project idea of Federation/Singapore merger as
something separate from transfer of Borneo Territories. Tunku decided recently that
for him to go hand in hand with Lee to London to get approval for Federation/
Singapore blueprint would deepen suspicion on part of Malays that he was going to
10-Malaysia-57-78-cpp  21/9/04  9:06 AM  Page 181
182 PRINCIPLES FOR A FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA [64]
take over Singapore whatever happened. This was why he decided to go alone.
Knowing that his Malays are already taking him a great deal on trust over Greater
Malaysia and have deep misgiving about it, Tunku has also concluded now that he
should not go to London unless he is sure of coming back with some evidence of
success. When we first invited Tunku to go to London he saw this visit as the second
stage of Merdeka and planned his journey to coincide exactly with original journey to
London from which he returned with assurance of independence even to extent of
sailing in the very same ship and of breaking his journey at the same point.3 This may
not be an important factor but it helps to illustrate Tunku’s attitude to this second
‘historic’ journey and his wish to be sure of having something significant to bring
back.
8. I very much hope we can give Tunku quickly some such assurance as I have
suggested and that we can persuade him to go to London in the near future as we had
planned. You will see from my telegram No. 713 that Tunku has told Thompson he
proposes to visit Saigon on 19th October for about a week ostensibly as President of
Malayan Football Association but really in order to have talks with President Diem4
about situation in Vietnam. I have no doubt that if we were able to give Tunku quick
and satisfactory assurance, London visit would take priority over this especially if in
meantime Lee Kuan Yew impressed Tunku with desirability from his standpoint of
Tunku adhering to October date. On other hand you may now need a little more
time.
3 See 52, n 3.
4 Ngo Dinh Diem, president of the Republic of (South) Vietnam from its proclamation on 26 Oct 1955 until
his assassination on 2 Nov 1963.
64 PREM 11/3422 28 Sept 1961
‘Greater Malaysia’: inward telegram no 716 from Sir G Tory to Mr
Sandys, forwarding a message from Tunku Abdul Rahman to Mr
Macmillan
[The Tunku had not yet succumbed to Macmillan’s blandishments. On the contrary,
determined to get an early decision on the sovereignty of the Borneo territories, he
recommended postponing talks until Macmillan had had a chance to come out to SE Asia
and gather first-hand information. On seeing the Tunku’s message, Sandys was reported
to have said that ‘we could not allow the susceptibilities of headhunters to wreck this
project (or words to that effect)’ (Wallace to West, 29 Sept 1961, CO 1030/983). There was
no doubt, Tory informed Selkirk, that the Tunku was in a ‘dangerous frame of mind’.
While he hoped to induce Lee Kuan Yew to dissuade the Tunku from ‘any waspish public
statement’, Tory also urged the CRO to reassure him on the lines set out in document 63
(see Tory to Selkirk, tel no 718, 29 Sept 1961, PREM 11/3422).]
Greater Malaysia
Following is text of Tunku’s message to Prime Minister. Begins:
My dear Prime Minister,
Thank you for your message of 23rd September, in which you conveyed the wish that
we might meet on 23rd October 1961. I observed from your message that you would
need time to study the implications of the Malaysia plan before you could give a
decision on the matter. I would like to say once again that our concept of Malaysia
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implies the integration of the three Borneo territories on the same basis as the other
existing states of the Federation of Malaya while Singapore may be merged with
certain powers reserved for the state in matters of education and labour. The
integration of the Borneo territories with the Federation should be agreed now and
take effect before or at least simultaneously with Singapore. The main issue and in
fact the only issue therefore is whether the British Government (? would) be ready to
relinquish their sovereignty over the Borneo territories before or at least
simultaneously with Singapore in favour of Malaysia. Any preliminary discussion
between us would serve no useful purpose unless this issue is first settled. From my
conversation with Sir Geofroy Tory I had obtained the impression that the British
Government would not be able to decide until they are certain that they can get a
wholehearted support from Parliament and the people of Borneo territories. I hope it
is appreciated that as far as my Government is concerned the main reason for the
merger of the Borneo territories is to prevent Singapore from falling into the hands
of the Communists, which we are sure would happen if she were to be given
independence. With the exception of the Communist elements and their proxies all
Singapore politicians realise that in such an event disaster would follow which will
affect the rest of South East Asia. I have emphasised that my Government would not
be able to carry the idea of merger of Singapore unless the Borneo territories are
merged with the Federation as well. Frankly, if we are prone to think in terms of
balances, even the Borneo territories would not be an adequate compensation for our
trouble in the event of a merger with Singapore. Perhaps I should venture to propose
that it would be best if you have a little time after some of the more serious of the
world crises had blown over to visit those territories and this part in order that you
may gather a first-hand information. If it is not possible for you to come here, then I
would suggest that Mr. Lee Kuan Yew and the present leaders or representatives of
the Borneo territories be invited to London for a discussion with you. Your visit to
this (? area) or a meeting in London with the leaders of Singapore and Borneo
territories I think would materially assist you in arriving at your decision. Our
meeting should take place only after you are in a position to give a firm commitment
of the British Government in favour of Malaysia. The question of the Singapore base
within the framework of the mutual Defence Agreement, constitutional procedures
and administration arrangements are matters which will naturally have to be sorted
out once the position is clear regarding the future of these territories but these, as I
have said before, are not insurmountable.
My [sic] Lee Kuan Yew is worried about his position and the future of Singapore
but I am afraid I cannot help him much until I have received a firm answer from
you about the transfer of the sovereignty over the Borneo territories to the
Federation.
65 CAB 134/1929, ff 87–99 29 Sept 1961
‘Our foreign and defence policy for the future’: memorandum by Mr
Macmillan for the Cabinet Committee on Future Policy. [Extract]
[This comprehensive review provided the context for the high-level thinking on the
future of the Singapore base and Britain’s role in SE Asia and suggested that ‘the concept
of Greater Malaysia seems to offer the best hope for the future’. It was discussed on 6 Oct
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1961 (see 68). The following extracts have been printed: the prime minister’s
introductory note; section I paragraphs 1–6 (general issues) and 16–19 (SE Asia); section
II paragraphs 23–29. Material on the Mediterranean, Middle East, Africa, Hong Kong, and
Europe has been omitted from this volume, as has the annex showing a forecast of local
defence expenditure abroad. Since the document is a copy, the original having been
retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958, there may be other
omissions.]
At least two important studies are being made by officials about our future policy.
One group (the Future Policy Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Norman
Brook) is reviewing our commitments in theatres outside Europe to see what
changes of policy might be possible.1 The military advisers, at the direction of the
Minister of Defence, have been examining, for the longer term, the practicability of
meeting our overseas commitments by a strategy based on greater air and sea
mobility; and, for the shorter term, in what way, consistent with their long-term
thinking, the reductions which we need to make in our oversea military expenditure
could be obtained. It is naturally proving difficult to relate all this work together—it
is not easy to devise the means until we are sure of the ends, and to some extent the
ends depend on the means available. Meanwhile, we are under pressure to deal with
two separate problems, both of them of great urgency:—
(i) The need to reduce our expenditure overseas, including our military
expenditure, to fulfil the declared aims of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
(ii) The need to decide how to secure the man-power target which we have
accepted for our armed forces.
2. I do not think that we shall resolve these problems in time, and keep control
over our economic, foreign and defence policies unless we can find some way of
reaching agreement quickly on:—
(a) what commitments oversea we must maintain for the next ten years or so;
(b) what principles we should adopt for our defence policy, in order to meet those
commitments.
3. If we could reach agreement under both these headings, then the Minister of
Defence would be in a position to give the Chiefs of Staff and the military planners a
politico-military directive in broad terms, on the basis of which they could
recommend an organisation, strategy and deployment of our defence forces for the
next decade.
4. In the attached paper. I have accordingly made an attempt to indicate the
answers to two questions:—
I. What are the commitments oversea, involving defence forces, which we must
maintain during, say, the next decade, having regard to likely political
developments affecting our defence agreements, bases, lines of communication,
and so on, and having regard also to the undoubted need for economy, both
budgetary and in oversea expenditure, which will persist and even increase?
II. How can the limited resources which we can afford for defence purposes best
be used to support our oversea commitments in the next decade, bearing in mind
the requirement that these resources must also serve the other aims of our
1 cf, the studies of future policy done in 1960, 28 and 29 above.
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defence policy e.g., the support of N.A.T.O., and under present policy the strategic
nuclear deterrent?
5. I propose that a small group of Ministers most closely concerned should first
discuss Part I. When we see how we get on, we might discuss Part II on a later occasion.
I.
‘What are the commitments oversea, involving defence forces, which we must
maintain during, say, the next decade, having regard to likely political
developments affecting our defence agreements, bases, lines of communication,
and so on, and having regard also to the undoubted need for economy, both
budgetary and in oversea expenditure, which will persist and even increase?’
General objectives
1. (i) The general aim of our foreign policy is to prevent further areas of the
world from falling under the influence or domination of the Sino-Soviet bloc.
(ii) We have also a direct responsibility for maintaining the internal security
and effective protection of the remaining colonial territories.
(iii) Our foreign policy must also be directed to protecting our economic
interests oversea, notably our oil interests in the Persian Gulf.
2. To serve primarily the purpose of (i) above, it is a particular aim to support the
regional alliances, N.A.T.O., CENTO and SEATO. The Commonwealth connection,
though it is much less of a military and more of a political connection than these
regional alliances, is also of value for the same purpose.
Political developments
3. None of these alliances or links is static; all will inevitably suffer adjustment as
time passes. It is important to bear this in mind in deciding how far we should rely
on military, and how far on political or economic means to secure our aims. The
number of allies on whom we can completely rely, in using military means, may well
dwindle—the United States, Australia and New Zealand, Canada and (let us hope)
most of our N.A.T.O. allies will be almost the only ones.
4. We are likely to lose, too, the full use of some of our present bases and our
overflying rights, partly because other colonial territories will achieve independence,
partly because neutral nations will be under increasing pressure not to assist our
military operations. We must moreover realise that world opinion will more and
more criticise the use of military means. We have nearly reached a position in which
we can only exercise our rights under a defence agreement with another country in
order to take military action (even if it is only precautionary) if the government (and
perhaps the people) of that country are in full support of our action.
5. The moral is not that we must despair of ever using military means, but that
we must plan for their use only on a basis on which we can rely for the next decade
(see Part II). In considering what our oversea commitments should be, we must have
in mind the need to be realistic in this respect.
Areas of substantial military expenditure
6. The areas oversea in which we incur substantial military expenditure are set
out in the following paragraphs, with some points to suggest what our future
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commitments in those areas in the next decade should be. The current annual rate of
oversea expenditure for defence in these areas is indicated in each case and forecasts
of expenditure up to and including 1966/7, by areas, showing works services and
other expenditure separately, on the basis of present plans, are contained at Annex.
But of course, important though foreign exchange is, the real issue is the burden
which the commitments in each area, and the totality or the burdens in all areas,
place on our national resources. A reduction in our commitments, with a consequent
saving in man-power and accordingly in weapons and equipment, means a reduction
in the total defence budget. . . .
16. South East Asia (£45.5 millions)
Our present commitments arise mainly from a mixture of our interest in preventing
the expansion of Sino–Soviet influence, particularly in South East Asia, and our
responsibility for the internal security and defence of our colonial territories; but,
mingled with these aims, there has also been our wish to help in the protection of
Australia and New Zealand, and our hope to maintain our standing in this area in the
eyes of the United States. We are all conscious that the potential changes in South
East Asia may come about very quickly. So any review of our commitments here
should be radical and imaginative.
17. Although study of the problem has not been completed, by common consent
the concept of a Greater Malaysia seems to offer the best hope for the future. Of
course we cannot hope, even so, to keep all our existing facilities or freedom of
action; but, correspondingly, we may be able to dispose of some of our obligations,
without undue risk.
18. If Greater Malaysia came about, we would presumably give up our
responsibility for internal security in Singapore. The present burden of this
responsibility is in any case partly due to our need to use the Singapore base for our
part in SEATO operations. In a Greater Malaysia, though we might hope that the
Tunku would be sympathetic, we could not rely on the use of Singapore. This raises
the question—how can we play our part (or rather, an acceptable part) in SEATO—
and in ANZAM, from the point of view of Australia, New Zealand and the United
States—without relying on Singapore? The developing situation (it seems to me) will
drive our allies to realise that our role in South East Asia must be reassessed. We
should take advantage of that, and try to adjust our agreed role in the way that suits
us best, politically as well as financially.
19. Such a reassessment is a major undertaking. Need we provide a land
contribution at all to SEATO operations? If so, need it be at a forward base, or could it
not be in reserve (in Australia)? In either case, can we dispense with permanent
large-scale forward bases? Do we need any nuclear capability for our forces in this
area, either to impress the Australians or to influence (and perhaps restrain) the
United States? Might the deployment of some such capability from Australian bases
make it easier for our allies to accept a further reduction in our land forces? These
questions are perhaps directed more towards means than ends. Politically, our main
objective (except for the very short term) should be to play a role in the alliances in
the area, which would be acceptable to our partners, particularly the Australians and
the United States, and considerably less onerous in military terms than our present
commitments. . . .
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II.
‘How can the limited resources which we can afford for defence purposes best
be used to support our oversea commitments in the next decade, bearing in
mind the requirement that these resources must also serve the other aims of
our defence policy e.g., the support of N.A.T.O., and under present policy the
strategic nuclear deterrent?’
23. Let us assume that, as a result of discussion of Part I, we have succeeded in
defining our future (longer-term) commitments in the various main areas in the
world. The military advisers will then need some further guidance, if they are to be in
a position to make recommendations about the organisation, strategy and
disposition of our defence forces, about a number of important issues. I set these
issues out in the following paragraphs, with some provisional comments.
24. Should we continue our independent contribution to the strategic nuclear
deterrent, and if so on what sort of scale and by what sort of means?
I have indicated in Part I, paragraph 22, the military arguments for maintaining an
independent contribution under our national control in the last resort, and there is
the political argument—valid by past experience—that our measure of
independence in this field enables us to influence United States policy.
(Independence in this sense would not be inconsistent with sharing political control
for some worthwhile purpose e.g. to help to discourage the emergence of other
independent nuclear powers, or as part of an advantageous political bargain.)
Although with technical advances our strategic nuclear forces may in the longer-
term be a dwindling asset, they are at present of very great significance, and re-
equipped with SKYBOLT would remain so for most of this decade. There would be
no sense in throwing this asset away. But, for the longer-term, do we need, or could
we afford, to replace it, at the end of its useful life, with an entirely new form of
strategic nuclear deterrent—such as V.C.10’s with SKYBOLT, or POLARIS
submarines?
25. What man-power should be available for the Services? Will national service, in
some form, be reintroduced if necessary to provide a minimum?
Whether or not national service is to be introduced in the short-term, either in
connection with Berlin, or to meet a temporary shortage, is irrelevant to the longer-
term issue. For economic reasons, we cannot in any case afford to assign more than
(say) 380,000 men to the Services. But if we take a realistic view about the
commitments we should accept in the long-term, we may well not need defence
forces of this size. In any case, the most efficient and economic use of this manpower
can be made if the Services are on an all-Regular basis.
26. What facilities under the control of other governments (bases, overflying
rights, etc.) can it be assumed will be available for the next decade?
Should we plan on the basis that we can only rely on facilities in territories where we
retain sovereignty and on those provided by a small range of reliable allies, e.g., the
United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and perhaps South Africa. Some
facilities, e.g. overflying rights, can in practice be enforced in an emergency, e.g. by
aircraft flying too high to be intercepted, even against the wish of the country
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concerned; but presumably it would be unsound to base our strategy on this fact.
Should our strategy therefore be primarily based on freedom of movement in, on or
over the high seas?
27. How far will technological developments in weapons etc. be freely available,
having regard to their expense?
Technological advances will clearly provide our forces with greater power and
mobility—if we can foot the bill. This is a very difficult problem of selection and
balance. We shall clearly have to rely on the principle of interdependence to keep our
expenditure on research and development within reasonable bounds. Even so, the
production cost of all equipment is continually rising and we must ensure that the
‘forward look’ estimates are realistic in this respect.
28. What will be the future level of expenditure which can be afforded for defence?
Can the military planners be given a ceiling?
This raises serious difficulties. From one point of view, anything necessary for the
national defence must be afforded. But if the national economy is to survive, some
limit is essential. It is for this reason that we must reduce our objectives and
commitments to those that are vital. For purposes of planning defence expenditure,
is not the best guide that contained in the repot [sic] by the Treasury on public
expenditure and resources 1961/2 to 1965/6?
29. How can the present organisation for defence be improved in order to secure
the most efficient and economic use of the resources available for defence?
It is quite clear that we shall need to make the fullest use of whatever resources we
can afford for defence if we are to realise our objectives and fulfil our commitments
over the next years. We cannot afford any slack or waste. In any case, with the
prospective loss of some of our oversea bases, a drastic re-casting of defence strategy
will be necessary.
These needs are likely to require a re-examination of the functions of the three
Services, and they certainly will call for greater flexibility in the use of the various
forces in each Service and in inter-Service co-operation. It may be desirable to
examine means of facilitating the transfer of man-power between the Services, and
the possibilities of integrating common services, in the interests both of efficiency
and economy.
It will be desirable to improve the co-ordination of forward planning for defence,
including research and development. It may also be desirable to clarify the
functions of the Ministry of Defence and the other Departments concerned with
defence.
There is also the question of improving the unified control of operational and
major administrative policies. This means developing still further the inter-Service
character of the machine which the Minister of Defence needs to carry out his wide
responsibilities for the central organisation for defence (the 1958 White Paper). In
short, far-reaching changes may be necessary, especially in the habit of mind of our
defence organisation, and I believe that the staff concerned are ready to help to bring
this about.
10-Malaysia-57-78-cpp  21/9/04  9:06 AM  Page 188
[67] OCT 1961 189
66 PREM 11/3422, PM(61)75 3 Oct 1961
[Rescuing the London talks]: minute from Mr Macleod to Mr
Macmillan
[Following Macleod’s advice, a message was drafted for Macmillan to send to the Tunku.
Rather than prevaricate further and in order to maintain the momentum of planning, he
approved ‘Greater Malaysia’ in principle (despite the fact that the Cabinet had not yet
approved it in principle) and renewed his invitation to talks in London which the Malayan
prime minister accepted (see 67 and 69). The first time the proposal for ‘Greater Malaysia’
went to Cabinet was on 10 Oct when ministers recognised that defence interests might be
better served by promoting ‘Greater Malaysia’ than by allowing Singapore to claim
independence as a separate unit and when they approved the invitation for the Tunku to
come to London for talks ‘in the near future’ (CAB 128/35, CC 55(61)5 and CO 1030/984,
nos 665 and 680).]
The Official Committee have considered the Tunku’s message to you of the 28th
September.1 The Committee have concluded that, if there is not to be grave danger of
the whole operation foundering, every effort should be made to persuade the Tunku
to accept your proposal for a meeting in London.
It is clear however that the Tunku is in a difficult and dangerous mood, and we
shall not succeed with him unless we can very quickly reassure him that we accept in
principle the concept of a Greater Malaysia and that, without committing ourselves
on form or timing, we will commend it to the Borneo territories.
We have not yet discussed the matter in detail in Cabinet, but I agree with the
Committee that we can and should go as far as this. Lord Selkirk and the Governors
of the Borneo territories concur. The important thing is to get the Tunku to face up
realistically to the very difficult problems involved in achieving what he wants. We
shall only be able to do this if we can discuss them with him face to face.
In the absence of the Commonwealth Secretary, who is also very anxious that the
proposed meeting should take place, I send you a draft which the Committee
accordingly suggest for your reply to the Tunku.2 I am sure this is the right line.
I also send you the draft of a message for you to send to Mr. Menzies and Mr.
Holyoake.3
I am sending copies of this to the Chancellor, the Foreign Secretary, the Minister
of Defence and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the Commonwealth Relations
Office.
1 See 64. 2 Not printed, but see 67.
3 Not printed, but see 67, note
67 PREM 11/3422 3 Oct 1961
[Rescuing the London talks]: outward telegram no 1478 from Mr
Sandys to Sir G Tory, forwarding a message from Mr Macmillan to
Tunku Abdul Rahman
[Macmillan also had this message copied to Menzies and Holyoake (prime ministers of
Australia and New Zealand) with the following minute: ‘It is clear from his latest message
to me that the Tunku has worked himself up into rather a difficult frame of mind. We are
all agreed that the idea of Greater Malaysia offers the best prospects for the future and
that it is in all our interests to give it a fair wind. But the Tunku’s inclination towards
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crash tactics may wreck the whole concept. It is all the more important therefore to get
him here as soon as possible for frank and personal discussion. I am sending you a copy of
my latest message to him in which I have gone as far as possible at this stage to reassure
him and have pressed him to agree to an early meeting’ (PREM 11/3422, T 560/61)]
Please pass following message from the Prime Minister to the Tunku. Begins:
My dear Prime Minister,
I was most disturbed when I read in your message of 28th September that you might
prefer to postpone our proposed meeting in London.1
2. I have as you know taken a close personal interest from the start in your plan
for a Greater Malaysia and I was particularly disappointed that I had to cancel my
plans for a visit to Malaya in September. I very much wish to have an early
opportunity of visiting you, but I fear that this will not be possible for a little time.
3. Meanwhile the immediate question is how best we can make progress on this
very important matter. There is, I believe, already a very wide measure of agreement
between us on our aims. Indeed I would not have suggested that you come to London
for a meeting unless I had felt confident that we should be able to make useful
progress together.
4. I should make it clear at once that the British Government welcome and
accept the concept of a Greater Malaysia which would incorporate Malaya, Singapore
and the three Borneo territories.
5. I fully understand that it is of basic importance to you that the Borneo
territories should be included in the plan. Their inclusion is our aim too. Greater
Malaysia must be brought about by a concerted operation covering both Singapore
and the Borneo territories.
6. So far as we are concerned, we believe that the best future for the Borneo
territories lies in close political association with the Federation and Singapore, and
my purpose in suggesting early talks in London was to see how we could best work
together with you in attaining this end. There is already a considerable body of
opinion in the Borneo territories which accepts Malaysia as the ultimate aim, but
there are anxieties, which we cannot ignore, about the form of the association and
about timing. We must therefore bend our efforts, in close consultation with you, to
bring the peoples of the Borneo territories freely to join with you.
7. I agree with you that there would be great dangers to stability in the area as a
whole and in Singapore in particular if the present opportunity is let slip. It is
therefore urgent that you and we should consider jointly what means are best
calculated to achieve our objectives as quickly as may be possible.
8. We have much to plan together. We shall wish to discuss with you what might
be the constitutional position of the Borneo territories within a Greater Malaysia and
the best means of preparing the ground in them and presenting our ideas to their
peoples. Other matters are the economic development of the Borneo territories and
administrative arrangements, including the staffing of the public services. It will, as
you appreciate, be necessary to ensure that future defence arrangements are on the
right lines; the Australian and New Zealand Governments are of course closely
concerned in this.
1 See 64.
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9. Imaginative plans of this kind are, I am sure, best examined in the first
instance by personal discussion in the tradition of Commonwealth consultation. In
this way we can insure against the misunderstandings which are liable to arise from
long range correspondence.
10. I very much hope therefore that, in the light of what I have said as to our
attitude and approach to these matters, you will feel assured that a meeting between
us will be fruitful. I understand, and agree with, your sense of urgency about the
project.
11. There are real problems to be surmounted in bringing it about, and I am sure
that much the best way of making early progress would be for us to meet as soon as
possible and talk over together how best to handle them. My colleagues and I are
therefore holding ourselves in readiness for a meeting in the week beginning the
23rd October.
12. If you agree we ought to issue a public statement as soon as possible and I
attach a copy of what we would propose to say.2 As to this I am convinced that it
would hinder the attainment of what you and I wish to see come about if any public
statements were made prematurely which might lead the Borneo peoples to think
that decisions about their future had been taken by others without any consultation
with them. The terms of the statement have therefore been most carefully chosen so
as to avoid this danger.
Yours very sincerely,
Harold Macmillan Ends.
My immediately following telegram contains text of Draft Announcement.
2 Not printed.
68 CAB 134/1929, FP(61) 1st meeting 6 Oct 1961
‘Future foreign and defence policy’: Cabinet Future Policy Committee
minutes, agreeing to Greater Malaysia in principle
[Extract]
[Chaired by Macmillan, the meeting was attended by the following ministers: Butler
(Home Office), Selwyn Lloyd (Treasury), Home (FO), Sandys (CRO), Macleod (CO),
Watkinson (Defence). Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, permanent under-secretary at the FO,
was also present. Macleod would be replaced as secretary of state for the colonies by
Maudling a few days later, on 9 Oct. The committee adjourned to 10 Oct when it resumed
discussion of document 65. The extracts printed here relate to those extracts selected for
document 65.]
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Prime Minister discussing
the probable nature of our oversea commitments for the next decade and the means
by which it might be possible to meet them.
The Prime Minister said that it would, as a beginning, be convenient to make two
separate approaches to this problem. The first would be to divide our overseas bases
into two broad classes; Class I would contain those on which we could rely for
unrestricted use for any purpose within our own discretion and Class II those where
our freedom of action was likely to be hampered by local susceptibilities. Within
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Class II there might of course be wide variations in the extent of the restraints to
which we were exposed. In most cases, however, we should be able to use bases in
this class for total war, when we should be justified in ignoring local susceptibilities,
and in many cases we might use them for a once for all limited war operation. The
second approach would be to review our probable oversea commitments and
objectives overseas during the next decade. The two approaches would provide
assessments of the means and the ends of overseas policy; the two were of course to a
large extent interdependent and in some theatres we might be compelled, in the face
of local political developments, to choose whether we should modify our current
policies or whether we should seek new ways of supporting them.
In discussion of the extent to which we could rely on overseas bases for the next
decade the following points were made:—
. . .
The Far East
(e) Singapore had so far been regarded as a base of the Class I type, but when it
attained independence, either as part of a Greater Malaysia or in isolation, it would
certainly be relegated to Class II. Indeed, the Commissioner-General for South
East Asia had recently expressed fears that even now an attempt to use troops
based on Singapore for certain purposes might be opposed by the local population.
For planning purposes, therefore, Singapore should, like Malaya, be placed in
Class II. It was unlikely that we could rely on any base within the area of Greater
Malaysia, for example, in Borneo, remaining in Class I.
Future policy in the Far East
The Committee then discussed our future commitments and objectives in South
East Asia and Hong Kong. The following points were made:—
(f) The most urgent task was to determine our attitude to the proposal for a Greater
Malaysia. It was clear that if a Greater Malaysia were established our freedom to use
the Singapore base would be restricted; indeed the Tunku had stated publicly that in
that event the Singapore Defence Agreement would have to be renegotiated. It also
seemed likely that, with the increased proportion of Chinese in the new state, the
Tunku might be increasingly compelled to oppose any projects in support of SEATO.
Nevertheless, a completely independent Singapore would be more disadvantageous
to our interests than a Greater Malaysia. Further, unless the present Prime Minister
of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, could demonstrate that his policy for merger with
Malaya was proceeding successfully, he might well lose control in the very near future;
in that case his Government would almost certainly be replaced by one of the extreme
left wing. It was therefore in our general interest to support the project for a Greater
Malaysia. The difficulty was that we were not in a position to commit the political
future of our Borneo territories without regard to the wishes of their populations,
whereas the Tunku would not risk a merger with Singapore alone. Although the
territories appeared to favour the concept of Greater Malaysia in principle, they
required time in which to attain a higher standard of political development before
joining. If decisions in principle were taken now, it might be possible to achieve a
Greater Malaysia by 1963. We should therefore support the project, but without
prejudicing the ultimate freedom of choice of the Borneo territories.
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(g) As part of the new arrangements, we should transfer our responsibility for the
internal security of Singapore and the Borneo territories to the new state. We
should also seek to negotiate a continuance of our present freedom to use
Singapore. We should, however, recognise that in practice it would be extremely
difficult to use Singapore as a base if the population was actively hostile. It might
be possible to operate from our Naval and air bases which were reasonably self-
contained. It would, however, become increasingly difficult to use Singapore as an
Army base; it was normally the presence of troops, rather than ships or aircraft
which tended to rouse local resentment. It would therefore become progressively
more difficult to rely on using for operations in support of SEATO the
Commonwealth Brigade Group, which relied on transit facilities in Singapore. It
would, however, be imprudent as yet to seek to withdraw it; it provided the first
example of a joint Commonwealth force in peace time and its withdrawal would
not be welcome to Australia and New Zealand, whom it should be our policy to
encourage to bear their full share of responsibility for the defence of the area. We
should, however, recognise that in the longer term (certainly not before Greater
Malaysia had been established) it might be necessary to withdraw the
Commonwealth Brigade Group, possibly to a base in Australia. . . .
69 PREM 11/3422 7 Oct 1961
‘Greater Malaysia’: inward telegram no 746 from Sir G Tory to Mr
Sandys, forwarding a personal message from Tunku Abdul Rahman to
Mr Macmillan in reply to document 67
Following is text of personal message from Tunku. Begins. 
My dear Prime Minister,
Thank you for your personal message of 3rd October.
The constitutional position of the North Borneo Territories in Malaysia outlined in
that message would be on the same basis as the other existing States of the
Federation of Malaya. It is of course envisaged that there will be transitional and
other provisions to meet local requirements. The essential point is the transfer of
British sovereignty over North Borneo Territories to Malaya for the Federation of
Malaysia and this should be done before or at least simultaneously with the merger
of Singapore.
I am deeply appreciative of the personal interest you have taken in what may be
regarded as a matter for common endeavour. There are difficulties which we must
resolve arising out of anxieties of people of these Territories. However, this is
nothing new as we had to go through all these difficulties ourselves before
independence. Much of these fears can be removed if the advantages rather than the
disadvantages could be emphasised and the British Government would unreservedly
commend the proposal of Malaysia to the Borneo Territories. Of course, the ideal way
would be to seek the opinions and views of responsible people there but as you have
already acknowledged we do not have this much time at our disposal. I am sure you
agree that we have to resort to the process of telescoping time by some crash
programme. But such bold steps will I am certain prove advantageous.
10-Malaysia-57-78-cpp  21/9/04  9:06 AM  Page 193
194 PRINCIPLES FOR A FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA [70]
As you are already aware we have to reckon with the fact that the status of
Singapore would be the subject of review in 1963. It cannot be ruled out that Mr. Lee
Kuan Yew’s Government might not last that time and a general election might
perhaps return a Government not so well disposed towards the merger of Singapore
with the Federation or vice versa. This therefore makes me feel that we cannot wait
for 1963 but that Malaysia should be brought into being as early as reasonably
convenient to both our Governments. Hence my anxiety that there should be a firm
commitment on the part of the British Government now in the belief that a delay
might defeat our common objective. I have committed myself to visiting President
Ngo Din [sic] Diem in Saigon from 20th to 26th October and until I can persuade
President Ngo Din Diem to a postponement I cannot say if I can come to London on
the date proposed. The situation in Vietnam is serious and getting more so every day
and the President is most anxious to get my views on certain matters about which he
considered I could be of help. I hope you will agree to an alternative date, perhaps
during the first week of November in case I am unable to have my visit to Vietnam
postponed.
I am bringing a motion on the subject of Malaysia and Singapore merger in
Parliament to seek support at the coming session beginning on 16th October. You
may already be aware that the Colombo Plan conference will be held in Kuala
Lumpur from 30th October to 18th November and I am hoping that I should have an
opportunity to entertain the delegates while they are here.
I agree to the release of the text of your draft announcement subject of course to
the (? possibility) of the date of the actual visit being altered as suggested above.
However, I would like to see a couple of amendments to the text. With reference to
the third sentence of the draft text I would like to suggest the following be
substituted: ‘Her Majesty’s Government have welcomed Tunku Abdul Rahman’s
constructive proposals which would bring the Federation of Malaya, Singapore,
Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak into close political and economic association.’
This would remove any ambiguity and thereby avoid misunderstanding and
confusion in the public mind on how the matter stands between us. Furthermore I
would like to suggest that while I agree that the wishes of the local people should not
be ignored the inclusion of your last sentence in the draft statement will over-
emphasise the need for consultation with the people of the Borneo Territories who
are at this moment not sufficiently advanced in their political outlook to give an
unbiased opinion of their own as they are very much under the influence of the
British Colonial administrators.
Yours very sincerely,
Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra. Ends.
70 CAB 134/1929, FP(61) 2nd meeting 10 Oct 1961
‘Future foreign and defence policy’: Cabinet Future Policy 
Committee minutes, regarding Greater Malaysia and regional 
security [Extract]
[Present: Macmillan, Butler, Home, Sandys, Watkinson, Perth, and Thorneycroft
(Aviation).]
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The Committee resumed its discussion of a memorandum by the Prime Minister
discussing our oversea defence policy for the next decade.1
The Prime Minister recalled that at their previous meeting the Committee had
divided overseas bases into two classes: Class I, those of which we might expect to
have unrestricted use and Class II, those where our freedom of action might be
hampered by local suceptibilities (except in the case of total war or possibly for a
once-for-all limited operation).
In discussion of South East Asia, there had been general agreement to four proposals:—
(i) That we should try to take advantage of the Great [sic] Malaysia concept so as
to retain Naval and air facilities in Singapore, which would be freely available to us
in normal times and might conceivably be used as a forward operating base in war.
(ii) That we should continue to contribute to the Commonwealth Brigade Group,
stationed for the time being in Malaya, and forming a contribution to SEATO.
(iii) That for the longer term we should have to reassess, with Australia, New
Zealand and the United States, the nature of our role in SEATO.
(iv) That while Hong Kong had no value as a base, we should seek to maintain our
position by providing for its internal security and by making its occupation by
Communist China impossible without an operation of war.
It was now necessary to consider our policy and commitments in other theatres.
In discussion the following points were made:—
. . .
The Far East
(g) In the forthcoming discussions with the Tunku it should be made clear that
we intended, on the establishment of a Greater Malaysia, to hand over our internal
security responsibilities, but to seek to retain our defence facilities. Although the
Tunku would be unwilling to commit himself publicly to allowing facilities in
Greater Malaysia to be used for operations in support of SEATO, it was quite
possible that, in a situation which threatened a closer Communist threat to
Malaya, he might be willing to acquiesce in operations from his territory, except
the direct use of airfields for bombing. Nevertheless, it would be wise to consider,
in consultation with Australia and New Zealand, alternative methods of fulfilling
our SEATO commitments after Greater Malaysia were established. It should be our
general aim to reduce our forces to the Commonwealth Brigade Group stationed
near Malacca, and the Naval and air facilities on Singapore Island. . . .
Summing up The Prime Minister said that in the light of the discussion he would
prepare a directive for a review of our oversea defence policy in the longer term.
Meanwhile, it would be advisable for the Minister of Defence to bring to the Defence
Committee, after consultation with other Ministers as necessary, any proposals for
more immediate savings which might result from the decisions which had been
reached. These proposals should include consideration of the possible effects of
reductions in troops, for instance demands for compensation from Malta and Cyprus.
It was however undesirable to station troops in a country primarily for the purpose of
1 See 65 and 68.
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giving it economic assistance; moreover, it could be expected that grants in aid, or
other forms of economic assistance, would progressively diminish, whereas the cost
of overseas garrisons tended to rise.
In South East Asia we must accept that the best prospect lay in support for the
concept of Greater Malaysia, even though this might mean some diminution in our
freedom of action in the theatre. In discussions with the Tunku we should seek to
retain our present facilities if possible, but for the longer term we would have to be
prepared to regard facilities in Greater Malaysia as no more than forward operating
bases on the use of which we could not rely in all circumstances. It would be
advisable now for him to write to Mr. Menzies and Mr. Holyoake informing them of
the lines on which our policy was likely to develop.
It would be necessary at a later stage, as part of the general review of future policy,
to consider the future of the deterrent. A suitable time would be early in 1962, when
the future of SKYBOLT should be more precisely known.2
The Committee:—
(1) Took note that the Prime Minister would issue a directive for a review of
defence policy in the longer term.
(2) Took note that the Prime Minister would invite the Minister of Defence to
bring to the Defence Committee his proposals for savings in oversea defence
expenditure in the short term.
(3) Invited the Commonwealth Secretary, in consultation with the Foreign
Secretary and the Minister of Defence, to prepare letters from the Prime Minister
to Mr. Menzies and Mr. Holyoake informing them of the probable course of
development of our policy in South East Asia.
2 Although Britain possessed independent nuclear weapons, it depended on the USA for the means of their
delivery. One possible method was the Skybolt rocket, but, when this was cancelled, Macmillan negotiated
with Kennedy at Nassau in Dec 1962 an agreement whereby America would supply Britain with the
Polaris-submarine missile-launching system which could be loaded with British weapons, cf 166, note.
71 CO 1030/984, no 786B 12 Oct 1961
[Malayan background to Greater Malaysia]: despatch no 7 from M J
Moynihan1 to Mr Sandys
[This despatch (which was printed for confidential circulation) briefed Whitehall on the
Tunku’s approach to the forthcoming London talks. The Malayan premier was, Moynihan
pointed out, taking a big risk, in going ahead with Greater Malaysia. His attitude was
determined, not by greed, but by hostility to communism, Malayan communalism and
mistrust of Singapore. Two days later Selkirk wrote to Maudling (the new secretary of
state for the colonies) with respect to tactics to be adopted at the London talks in order to
restore the Tunku’s confidence in British intentions, while the governors of North
Borneo and Sarawak sent assessments from the Borneo perspective (CO 1030/984 nos 792
and E/811, CO 1030/985 no 886).]
Tunku Abdul Rahman is shortly coming to London to discuss Greater Malaysia. It
may be useful to you to have the following analysis of the political background to this
plan so far as Malaya and the Tunku are concerned.
1 M J Moynihan, deputy high commissioner, Kuala Lumpur, 1961–1963.
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2. Out of approximately seven million inhabitants in Malaya nearly half are
Malays and there are almost as many Chinese. This racial balance constitutes
Malaya’s main political problem and its solution is essential if Malaya is to remain
stable and free from Communist influences. A successful resolution of these racial
forces is the Tunku’s principal objective and his pursuit of this objective was
exemplified in his formation of the alliance, the Government coalition of the three
principal racial parties.2
3. The attempt to turn Malays and Chinese alike into good Malayans involves
some sacrifice on the part of each. To understand the reactions which this sacrifice
produces it is necessary to remind oneself that the Chinese in general are more
skilful, more industrious and better educated than the Malays and that the Malays are
permanently conscious of this comparative disability of theirs in free competition
with the Chinese. Hitherto the balance has been redressed by artificial means such as
the various reservations built into the Constitution in favour of the Malays and a
number of other devices which go some small way to hold the Chinese back.
4. Amongst those Malays who do not understand the longer term issues involved
there is a widespread feeling that the Chinese in Malaya are interlopers who have no
right to a stake in the control of the country’s destinies. To the extent, therefore, that
the Tunku in pursuit of his main objective of creating a Malayan nation gives the
Chinese a reasonable share in the country’s affairs, in rough proportion to the
contribution which they make to the economy and to the population, he is causing
deep disquiet to a substantial number of the people upon whom he principally relies
for his political support. Correspondingly, in his efforts to turn Chinese into
Malayans, he is naturally trying to make them in some respects less Chinese.
5. The Chinese have never been easy to assimilate. It is a matter of piety with
them to maintain intact connexions reaching back into their ancient history and
every respectable Chinese, including even Ministers in the present Cabinet, spends a
part of his day doing reverence to the spirits of his ancestors. The most ignorant
Chinese in Kuala Lumpur is for ever trying to appease his ancestors in one way or
another or at least taking care not to upset them. It is deeply foreign, therefore, to
the Chinese nature deliberately to sever or allow to be weakened any of the links
between himself and his ancestry in Mother China.
6. The acid test of the Tunku’s attempt to Malayanise the Chinese is now being made
in the imposition upon the Chinese secondary schools of the Government’s new
education policy, that is, a policy denying Government financial assistance to those
Chinese secondary schools which continue in effect to teach in Chinese. To this policy
there is still considerable opposition on the part of the Chinese and this is being led
amongst others by Mr. Lim Lian Geok, a Chinese schoolmaster, whom the Tunku is at
present trying to deprive of his citizenship, with a view to his banishment from Malaya,
on the grounds that he is promoting ill will between the races and that this is a grave
potential threat to the internal security of Malaya. By our standards these measures are
harsh but seen against the Malayan background they appear perfectly logical.
7. The Tunku has always admitted that the Malays are the only people he trusts
in Malaya and that if his attempt to Malayanise the Chinese should fail or should
2 For the Alliance of the United Malays National Organisation, Malayan Chinese Association and Malayan
Indian Congress see BDEE: Malaya, part III.
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result in a serious drain of Malay support from his Government he would not hesitate
to fall back upon his Malays, even to the extent of making common cause with his
Malay nationalist opponents. In the 1959 general election the two purely Malay
States, Kelantan and Trengganu, deserted the Tunku. This desertion was partly
attributed to the sense of neglect which the rural Malay felt on the east coast and to
the lack of those facilities and amenities which had been promised as one of the
dividends of independence. By the Tunku, however, it was also attributed to fears felt
by these backwoodsmen of the east coast regarding the extent to which he, the
Tunku, was giving power to the Chinese. There, on the east coast, in those two States
where hardly a Chinaman is to be seen from one day’s end to the next, it was hard for
a Malay to understand why the Chinese should have very nearly as much say in the
running of Malaya as the Malays. This desertion of Malays to the opposition came as a
shock to the Tunku and, since then, despite the fact that the general election gave
him more than a two-thirds majority in Parliament, he has been determined not to
alienate any more of his Malay support and has been at pains to win back support
which he has lost.
8. In the domestic sphere this determination has shown itself in the prosecution
of the Rural Development Plan, a plan directed not only to meet Malaya’s urgent
need of development in order to absorb the tremendous increase in the working
population during the next five years, but also to bring to the rural Malays the
concrete benefits which they have hitherto been denied. It is not publicly
acknowledged, but simple mathematical analysis will show, that this development
plan will, at best, only succeed in holding the overall standard of living where it now
is. This, however, will be done by raising the standard of living of the rural Malay and
by allowing the standard of living of the Chinese to fall back. It can be argued that the
Tunku is also restoring the situation, that is to say, restoring the trust and
confidence of his Malays, by taking, at last, the drastic step of implementing, as
described above, the Government’s long-awaited education policy at the expense of
Chinese secondary education: this is an indication to the Malays that the Tunku is
prepared to be tough with the Chinese.
9. The position in Parliament is, as I have said, that the Government enjoy
slightly more than a two-thirds majority.3 The Opposition are divided between Malay
nationalists, mostly from Kelantan and Trengganu, and a number of more or less
Socialist parties. The key influence in all these Socialist parties is Chinese. The
Malayan Communist Party is also virtually completely Chinese. Having lost the open
3 In the 1959 state elections the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party won 17 of the 24 seats in the Trengganu
Legislative Assembly and 28 of 30 in Kelantan. This setback for the Alliance caused the Tunku temporarily
to resign as prime minister in order to concentrate on the campaign for the federal elections later in the
year, see 7 and 8. The federal elections in August 1959 differed significantly from those in 1955 that had
shaped the route to independence. The Merdeka (independence) constitution was fully implemented in
1959, doubling the electorate and increasing the number of Chinese voters sevenfold: Malays were now
only 57 per cent of the electorate compared with 80 per cent in 1955. The result was that, while the
Alliance was victorious, its share of the vote fell from 81.7 per cent in 1955 to 51.5 per cent and its
majority dropped from 51 of the 52 electable seats in 1955 to 74 out of 104 places in the now fully elected
lower house, although it retained the two-thirds majority necessary to amend the constitution. The PMIP,
having won the single opposition seat in 1955, accounted for 13 of the opposition members in the federal
parliament of 1959. The others were: the Socialist Front 8 (led by Boestamam, president of Party Rakyat),
People’s Progressive Party 4, Party Negara 1 and the Malayan Party 1. There were 3 independent members.
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battle, the Malayan Communists are now fighting their war underground. They have
succeeded to some extent in penetrating the Socialist parties as well as the trade
unions, apart from the influence which they already or rather still exercise in the
Chinese secondary schools. As a result of the ‘united front’ policy now being pursued
by the Communists, the platform of the Malayan Communist Party’s so-called
manifesto is virtually the same as the political platform of the Socialist parties. These
are important points for an understanding of the Tunku’s attitude towards the
Chinese. However, the Tunku is not so much worried about this political opposition
as he is about maintaining the solidarity of his own Malay support. Something like a
third of the Malay population of Malaya is of fairly recent Indonesian origin. The
Tunku has often remarked that about the same proportion tend to adopt what might
be called Afro–Asian attitudes on important international issues, and it is these same
Malays who feel genuine misgivings about the Tunku’s policy of defence
commitment to Britain and about his firm declaration of identity with the West
when it comes to a show-down with the Communists. The support of these Malays is
essential to the Tunku if he is to be able to carry out his policy of creating a Malayan
nation or, in other words, if he is to preserve Malaya for the free world. It is not too
much to say this, because failure of his policy and the emergence of one race as
master of the others would inevitably advance the cause of Communism. In
particular, alienation of the Chinese would result in their making common cause
with their Chinese Socialist friends in Singapore and would strengthen the
movement which already exists among many Chinese in favour of a Chinese Socialist
take-over throughout the whole Malayan Peninsula.
10. It is with these considerations in mind that the Tunku from time to time
feels bound to adopt attitudes on world issues which diverge from our own and
which appear to favour the neutralists. Malay emotions are easily roused. ‘Amok’ is a
Malay word and running amok is a Malay habit. When Algerian rebels come here they
receive an enthusiastic welcome from the Malays and the Tunku must place himself
at the head of the welcoming party if he is not to damage his domestic political
position.
11. Since the day when Singapore received its Constitution and the Peoples
Action Party Government with Communist support came into power under Lee
Kuan Yew the Tunku has regarded Singapore as a power-house of Communist
subversion from which Malaya had to insulate herself. The Tunku consented to take
part in the Internal Security Council of Singapore by appointing a Minister to attend
its meetings but Malayan participation became increasingly unwilling and the
Malayan representative more and more took the line that Singapore was a British
responsibility, that we should take any of the unpleasant measures necessary to
preserve our interests in Singapore and that we should not expect the Malayans to
pick our chestnuts out of the fire for us. From the outset the Malayans wanted no
responsibility for Singapore and no part in it.
12. Thus every time Lee Kuan Yew mentioned merger as a possibility, or as a
desirable objective, the Tunku was quick to deny that merger was possible in the
foreseeable future, and to affirm that Malaya had first to settle her own racial
policies. He knew that hopes of merger encouraged the Chinese Socialists in Malaya
to dream of their pan Malayan Socialist State, and he knew also that the prospect of
merger struck terror into the hearts of his Malays. For these reasons the Tunku shut
his ears for a long time to all suggestions about merger or even about a wider
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association with Singapore and the Borneo Territories known at an earlier stage as
The Grand Design. The idea of this wider association with the Borneo Territories is
by no means a new one; it has been current for at least seven years. At one time the
Tunku himself was in favour of it. Immediately before independence, he took part in
a broadcast on the B.B.C. in London, and said specifically, in answer to questions,
that he was favourable to the idea of extending the Malayan Federation to the Borneo
Territories if these Territories wanted this. When he visited the Philippines on a State
occasion, he thought the Malays there might raise the question of Philippine claims
upon North Borneo and he wished, if so, to deal with these by saying that the long-
term future of the Borneo Territories obviously lay with Malaya. At that time,
however, we poured cold water on these ideas of the Tunku’s because we feared they
might distract attention from the objective of that closer association of the Borneo
Territories amongst themselves which was then our immediate objective in that
area. With the coming of the P.A.P. Government into power, a Government whose
Ministers the Tunku regarded at first as little better than Communists, the Tunku at
once turned cold towards the idea of association with Singapore at any cost. The
people of Singapore would, he said, never be the friends of Malaya or become true
Malayans in a thousand years.
13. With the deterioration in Lee Kuan Yew’s political position and with growing
fears of the eventual loss of Singapore to Communism, merger between the
Federation and Singapore, whether by itself or as part of a wider federation
embracing the Borneo Territories, began to seem to us to offer the only hope of
saving Singapore and of halting a process which if not checked could undermine the
freedom and stability of the whole of South-East Asia. The Tunku continued to resist
strongly all suggestions that Malayan interests lay in their assuming control over
Singapore. Even efforts on the part of Singapore to induce Malaya to develop a
limited common market foundered on the Tunku’s determination to maintain the
virtual insulation of Malaya from Singapore. Singapore was a British responsibility
and if necessary the British should stay there for ever and should certainly maintain
a position of strength so that they could deal firmly with any nonsense on the part of
the Chinese in Singapore. It was argued with the Tunku that it would be unrealistic
to imagine that the British could retain control of Singapore for ever; once we had to
withdraw Singapore would go Communist, the Communist Powers would move in
and Malaya would find a Cuba on her doorstep. Surely it made sense for Malaya to
take charge of Singapore before it was too late. To this line of argument the Tunku
always replied that it was our fault that Singapore had been separated from Malaya in
the first place and since we had let it deteriorate to its present deplorable condition it
was up to us to clean it up, or to go on keeping it in order ourselves. As to the risk
that the Communist Powers might establish bridgeheads there, the Tunku was
confident that any such move would be countered effectively by ourselves or, failing
this, by the Americans.
14. As time went on, however, the Tunku gradually came to the conclusion not
only that the British could not be relied on to hold the fort in Singapore indefinitely
or to take effective counter-measures if the Communists tried to establish a
bridgehead there, but also that the British either would not or could not even keep
Singapore Communism in check when it came within the scope of the Internal
Security Council. In this way the Tunku came finally to see that if Singapore were to
be saved from Communism he and nobody else would have to do it.
10-Malaysia-57-78-cpp  21/9/04  9:06 AM  Page 200
[71] OCT 1961 201
15. Merger between the Federation and Singapore by itself was obviously not to
be thought of. This would result in a net addition of approximately a million Chinese
of doubtful loyalty to the Chinese population of Malaya, i.e., nearly half of the
existing total in the Federation, which already represented a serious headache to the
Tunku. His Malays would regard a Federation–Singapore merger as the final
surrender of Malay rights to the Chinese. The Tunku appreciated, however, that he
would be able to secure support from his Malays for merger with Singapore provided
that at the same time he could achieve a balance by taking in the three Borneo
Territories, which would contribute a substantial if not an equal number of people at
least non-Chinese if not anti-Chinese. In any event if the Borneo States came in, as
he intended, as individual States there would be three new non-Chinese States as
against one Chinese State. One to three against the Chinese has come to be accepted
by the Malays as a minimum safeguard if the Chinese are to be effectively kept down.
In order that the Tunku should be able to carry his Malays with him, it was therefore
essential not only that the Borneo States should come in as well but also that they
should be acquired simultaneously with, if not before, Singapore, so that the racial
balance should at no time be thrown into jeopardy. The Tunku made it clear at the
outset that this was his basic requirement.
16. The Tunku also stressed that there was very little time, and that we should be
prepared to transfer sovereignty immediately. If we believed, as he did, that
association with Malaya was in the best interests of the Borneo Territories in the long
term and that failure to bring about this association very quickly would allow time
and opportunity for a Communist United Front Government to take over in
Singapore we ought surely not to be too delicate about treading on a few toes or
about short-circuiting normal processes of consultation. Here was an opportunity
not only to save Singapore but also to halt a Communist process which would be
bound in the end to spread to Indonesia and the Borneo Territories themselves and
to undermine the cause of freedom in all those countries which still remained free
south of Communist China. If we were to let this opportunity slip, by insistence on
maintaining the slow and measured pace of Whitehall, history would condemn us.
17. Nevertheless, the Tunku was unreasonable in expecting Her Majesty’s
Government to sign immediately on the dotted line, having regard to their
responsibilities not only to the Borneo Territories but also in the sphere of defence. It
has taken some time to bring home to the Tunku that not only would it be fatal to
the Greater Malaysia Federation if the Borneo Territories were dragooned into this
association without first being convinced that it was genuinely in their interests, but
also that this would lay us open to damaging attack in the United Nations, by the
Afro–Asian countries, for example, prompted by the Socialists in Malaya and the
Borneo Territories themselves. We should also have troubles in our own Parliament,
alerted as it already was to the finer points of our colonial policy in relation to Africa.
18. On defence too it was some time before the Tunku was brought to realise
that we had responsibilities which might well have to be discharged in circumstances
short of actual warfare. The Tunku’s line has always been that when war broke out in
this part of the world, Malaya would be with us, provided that he was still in charge,
and this meant that we must not expect him to incur politically dangerous liabilities
in peacetime. He now realises, however, that even in so-called peacetime there are
jobs we may have to do, that for us to be seen to be willingly sacrificing our ability to
do these jobs at the present disturbed time in South-East Asia would be damaging to
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the cause of peace, and that here is a problem to which we must both try to find a
practical solution. It is clear however that, whatever solution is found, it must be one
which permits him to continue to put his hand on his heart, if necessary, and say
that there is no link between Malaya and SEATO.
19. This brings us to the situation as it is to-day. The Tunku has agreed to go to
London, having received confirmation from us that we accept the concept of Greater
Malaysia and, in particular, that we regard the inclusion of the Borneo Territories in
a wider association with Malaya as an integral part of the whole arrangement. We
have therefore satisfied the Tunku that he need no longer fear that we have the
sinister design of delaying the transfer of the Borneo Territories in the hope that the
situation in Singapore will deteriorate in the meantime to such an extent that he will
be compelled, despite all his scruples, to take control of it by itself.
20. The Tunku is a man of enthusiasm and vision. Tun Razak his trusted
lieutenant and his eventual successor is a more hard-headed, calculating and, let us
face it, more intelligent man. The Tunku relies, and has successfully relied so far, on
his flair, his personal charm and his prestige. Tun Razak works it all out with his
slide rule. The two of them are thus complementary. Experience has shown that
success is only assured in any Malayan project if both are agreed upon it. The two of
them are now in line.
21. In dealing with the Tunku in London it, would be natural for us to feel that
we were the ones who were being asked to give most away, so to speak, and that he
should not come and dictate to us. Here, however, it must be remembered that the
Tunku thinks that he is the one who is being called upon to make the real sacrifice.
He would prefer to have nothing to do with Singapore and is not particularly
interested in acquiring the Borneo Territories with all the trouble they represent for
him, in terms of development and education and entirely new racial problems. He is
only being driven to this by the deep and passionate need which he feels to fight
Communism in this part of the world. Malaya has had 12 years of open warfare with
Communists on its own soil and is now continuing the fight against Communism
underground. The balance of internal security is still delicate. Anything to do with
the Chinese is thought of here in terms of its possible effect upon that balance. In
taking on Singapore, the Tunku is taking a very big and a nicely calculated risk.
Some of his colleagues have told him that the Borneo Territories will not
compensate him for the added problems of Singapore and he already half believes
this. Muddled or not, he is therefore actuated by a very strong sense of duty and it
would I submit be fatal if we, by our attitude to him, suggested that we thought he
was being tiresome or greedy, or that he was some kind of neo-imperialist. Tactically,
I suggest, the most effective attitude for us to adopt would be that here are practical
problems to which we must both find a practical solution. The Tunku is a man who
combines aristocratic standards of conduct with a remarkable political flair. On the
subject of the Singapore base he is therefore, I think, less likely to be impressed by
arguments on the merits of SEATO than by our showing him that for us to give up
our facilities in Singapore would be tantamount to going back on solemn treaty
undertakings. As regards the Borneo Territories, the Tunku would not, I fear, be
moved by appeals to the rights of man or to the principle of self-determination
whereas he would I think show understanding of the need to satisfy Parliament that
Her Majesty’s Government were not transferring sovereignty over these dependent
peoples without due regard to their wishes.
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22. I am sending copies of this despatch to the British Commissioner-General for
South-East Asia and Commissioner in Singapore, to the Governors of North Borneo
and Sarawak and the High Commissioner for Brunei, to the British High
Commissioners in Canberra and Wellington, to Her Majesty’s Ambassadors in
Bangkok and Djakarta and also to Her Majesty’s Ambassador in Washington. 
72 CO 1030/986, no 959 18 Oct 1961
‘Singapore and merger’: letter from P B C Moore to W I J Wallace,
assessing the PAP’s attitude to ‘Greater Malaysia’ and the prospect of
the Barisan overthrowing Lee’s government
Attention has been focussed in recent weeks on the Borneo and Defence aspects of
‘Greater Malaysia’, especially the need to give the Tunku enough expectation on the
Borneo Territories to persuade him to go to London for talks with Mr. Macmillan.
The Tunku has now been sufficiently reassured to enable the talks to take place, and
in this short breathing space before London, it would perhaps be as well to consider
another possible obstacle—will Singapore be a willing party to ‘Greater Malaysia’?
2. Lee Kuan Yew has always been most anxious to achieve merger with the
Federation, because he saw quite clearly that in the long term this was his only hope
of containing the Chinese chauvinists and Communists in Singapore. For a long
time the Tunku was adamant that Merger could not take place, but the logic of the
situation was so inescapable to Lee Kuan Yew and us that we never entirely
despaired. Martin Moynihan’s despatch of 12th October, 19611 describes how the
Tunku finally came round. There was never, of course, any question of our not being
prepared to deal with the problem of the Communists in Singapore in the short
term, but we had to persuade the Tunku that he alone, in the present climate of
international opinion, could deal with Singapore in the long term. This was not an
easy task, since it inevitably involved giving the Tunku the impression that we, his
allies, might not be as decisive as he was prepared to be in dealing with Communist
penetration. Nevertheless, it was essential to disabuse him of his illusion that
Singapore could safely be left to the British on an indefinite basis. When, therefore, it
appeared at the end of July that the Barisan Socialis might be going to unseat Lee
Kuan Yew, we had to explain to the Federation that, provided the Barisan Socialis
behaved in a constitutional manner, there was no question of our preserving Lee
Kuan Yew simply by putting the Barisan Socialis leaders in gaol or suspending the
Singapore Constitution. This led to some harsh feelings from the Federation, but
Ghazali, in particular, was very realistic, and I hope they have gradually come to see
some force in our argument, although they probably still feel in their hearts that we
have been pusillanimous in our approach to Singapore.
3. The outcome is that the Tunku appears to be completely convinced that he
must take Singapore into the Federation. Unfortunately, he became convinced about
a year too late, and the irony of the situation is that whereas a year ago Lee Kuan Yew
held 43 seats out of 51 in the Singapore Assembly and could probably have put
1 See 71.
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through Merger fairly comfortably, he has now been very nearly out-flanked by the
Chinese chauvinists and Communists with whom he tried to maintain a united front.
Lee was within an ace of falling on 20th July, and indeed he only survived by a
handful of votes.2 Since then, however, with the Tunku’s assistance, he has regained
a lot of lost ground. Few people ever believed that Lee could bring off merger
between Singapore and the Federation, even though this had always formed the main
plank of the P.A.P.’s political platform, and he has undoubtedly won a considerable
measure of respect by the success so far of his negotiations with the Tunku. The
Chinese are great respecters of power, and Lee has succeeded in giving the
impression that Merger is going to come about with the active support and
encouragement of the Tunku and the agreement of the British. At the same time, Lee
has come right out into the open about the Communists, and in a series of twelve
broadcasts3 has explained that the Communists fear Merger because this will involve
internal security passing into the hands of the Tunku in Kuala Lumpur. Opinions are
divided about the effectiveness of this move. It has probably had a useful effect with
the English-speaking Chinese. There has, however, been a fair amount of cynicism
from those who have asked why he accepted the Communists as bed-fellows for so
long if they were so dangerous, and also why he has not taken any action against
them now. Also, he is giving the impression to many people, particularly among the
Chinese-speaking, that he is merely labelling as a Communist anybody who is his
political opponent. So much for the background.
4. The Barisan Socialis’ aim is to force Lee Kuan Yew to resign and hold a
General Election, since it is commonly thought in Singapore that the P.A.P. would
be defeated at a General Election, and that the Barisan Socialis would emerge as the
majority party. The P.A.P. have only 26 seats out of 51 seats and on the face of it their
position in the Assembly is weak. Three months, however, have passed since the
defection of the 13 P.A.P. members, and although there have been rumours of more
waverers, no further defections have taken place and the 26 remaining P.A.P.
members have publicly re-affirmed their loyalty. It seems, therefore, that while Lee
can maintain progress with merger, he will be able to deter any further waverers. In
addition, he is reasonably assured that the 7 Alliance members will either abstain or
vote with him on merger. The same can probably be said of the one Independent.
This leaves 17 members, comprising 13 Barisan Socialis, Ong Eng Guan and his two
supporters and David Marshall. Lee’s programme is for the Assembly to re-convene
on 31st October, and for the debate on Merger to start on 8th November. Toh Chin
Chye told me the other day that this would probably last a week. Although there can
be no certainty until we see the stand taken by the 51 members after the lapse of over
three months, I believe Lee Kuan Yew will emerge from the Assembly debate with a
vote of confidence on his plan for merger. Probably only a breakdown in the
negotiations between the Tunku and H.M.G. could seriously prejudice this.
5. Unfortunately, however, a successful vote in the Assembly will not be
sufficient. The P.A.P. have already committed themselves to referring the issue of
Merger to the people in a Referendum. I am not sure whether this was a wise move,
2 For this debate, see 49, note and 50.
3 Given between 13 Sept and 9 Oct, the twelve broadcasts were published as The Battle for Merger
(Government Printing Office, Singapore, 1961).
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in view of the known unpopularity of the P.A.P., and it might have been better tactics
to depend on Lim Yew Hock’s 7 votes to obtain a majority of 33 out of the 51 seats in
the Assembly and leave it at that. Merger was in the P.A.P’s platform at the General
Election in 1959, and they might have claimed that a two-thirds majority of the
Assembly was sufficient for the implementation of Merger. On the other hand, the
loss of two by-elections,4 and the defection of a further 13 P.A.P. members was a
staggering reverse, and there would no doubt have been considerable criticism in
Singapore if Lee had sought to implement Merger solely on the basis of a favourable
vote in the Assembly. Be that as it may, the Government are committed to a
Referendum, and the question is whether they can win it. Here we come right up
against the problem of the P.A.P’s general unpopularity in Singapore, which was a
considerable factor in their defeats at Hong Lim and Anson. The danger of any appeal
to the people at this stage is that votes in a Referendum will be cast not on the merits
of Merger, but simply for or against the P.A.P. At long last, I think Lee and his
Ministers have realised the extent of their unpopularity in the State, and Lee is
therefore anxious not to have to put the Referendum question in the form of, ‘Are
you in favour of merger with the Federation on the terms agreed by me with the
Tunku—yes or no?’. Lee has also been disturbed by the recent Referendum vote in
Jamaica, and considers there is too much at stake in a question as important as this
to put it to the vote of the people in a straight yes or no form.5
6. Lee has, therefore, been considering whether he can hold a Referendum in
which there could be no final defeat for him whichever way the vote goes, on the
following lines. All political parties in Singapore have currently stated they want
Merger, and therefore there is no need to ask the people of Singapore whether they
are in favour of Merger. Everybody wants Merger, and it is just a question of how
Merger is to be achieved. He therefore has in mind that the Referendum should ask
the people of Singapore whether they want:—
(a) Merger on the terms agreed by the P.A.P. with the Tunku, or
(b) Complete Merger.
Both the Tunku and Lee have already pointed to the drawbacks in complete Merger
for Singapore. Not all the 628,000 present Singapore electors will qualify for Federal
citizenship and voting rights; labour relations will be in the hands of the Federation
and therefore the Trade Unions can expect a much stricter Governmental control
than exists in Singapore today; and Singapore may have to accept the full
implications of the Federal Government’s Chinese education policy. In this way, Lee
hopes that Singapore will be persuaded to vote for alternative (a). But a vote in favour
of (b) will still be a vote in favour of Merger and in that event Lee would undertake to
go back to the Tunku and try to negotiate Merger in a form more acceptable to the
people of Singapore. There would be no question of his having suffered an adverse
vote demanding resignation of the P.A.P. Government.
4 For the by-elections at Hong Lim and Anson, see 38 and 49, note.
5 The referendum bill was debated in the Singapore Legislative Assembly from 27 June to 11 July 1962 and
the referendum was held on 1 Sept 1962 (see 131). The Jamaican referendum on 19 Sept 1961 returned a
‘yes’ vote for secession and led to the break-up of the Federation of the West Indies, see Ashton and
Killingray, eds, BDEE: The West Indies, lxxiii, 158 and 163.
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7. The obvious obstacle to Lee’s plan is that the Tunku may feel obliged to say in
advance that the Federation could not agree to full Merger. Thompson has already
reported that Razak is against Lee’s plan, although apparently the Tunku sees the
merit in Lee’s tactic. Lee has told me that he is doing his utmost to persuade the
Tunku to agree to the Referendum being put in this form and that he has already
made some progress with Ghazali. I am hoping to go to Kuala Lumpur this week to
ask Sir Geofroy Tory whether it might be possible for him to lend some support to
Lee’s plea. I know the Tunku realises how important it is that Lee should not be
toppled, and I think we should, in all fairness, warn him that there might be
considerable risk for Lee Kuan Yew putting the Ulster type of merger in a
Referendum in the form of a straight, ‘Yes or No’.
8. The Barisan Socialis can counter Lee’s plan by advocating voters to tear up the
ballot paper. This is not a very satisfactory policy for a political party to adopt at a
Referendum, and in the absence of a more constructive attitude from the Opposition,
Lee might get a favourable vote for (a). Alternatively, the Barisan Socialis may ask
their supporters to vote for (b), but on their interpretation of full Merger, which
would give all existing Singapore electors Federal citizenship and voting rights. But
whichever way the Barisan Socialis play it, we hope that if Lee does not take up too
rigid an attitude, it may yet be open to him to continue in power even if the people in
Singapore reject his form of Merger and vote for ‘full Merger’. I would hope also that
if Singapore indicate clearly that they want a form of full Merger, the Tunku might
be prepared to consider this, although it is rather worrying that both the P.P.P. and
the Socialist Front have advocated full Merger in the current debate in the House of
Representatives in Kuala Lumpur.
9. So far, I have examined the possibility of the Barisan Socialis bringing down
the P.A.P. by constitutional means. If, however, they fail to force the P.A.P. to a
General Election, are they likely to resort to direct action? No doubt there will be
large-scale demonstrations, and possibly a number of strikes to demonstrate the
power of the Barisan Socialis on the industrial front. But on the whole we think it
unlikely that they will resort to riots and a general strike, thus giving Lee Kuan Yew
the opportunity to arrest them. Once Lim Chin Siong becomes convinced that the
people of Singapore are going to support Merger, then I suspect he may well revert to
the original long term policy of the M.C.P.—a Socialist Government throughout
Malaya. The opportunity of over-throwing Lee Kuan Yew and achieving a
Communist-manipulated Government in Singapore seemed, in July, to be so golden
that Lim Chin Siong could not resist it. If, however, he comes to the conclusion that
this cannot be achieved, I believe he may quite realistically revert to the original
plan. He will accept that this may mean gaol for him and his associates at the hands
of the Tunku, but he is probably prepared to take a long term view. Even Merger on
the terms agreed by Lee with the Tunku will give Singapore 14 seats in the Kuala
Lumpur House of Representatives, and one day there will have to be not only a
General Election in Singapore for a new State Assembly but also elections to fill the
14 Singapore seats in Kuala Lumpur. Victories in these elections will, in Lim’s
opinion, bring much closer the ultimate day of ‘Socialist Victory’ in Malaya. I would
not wish to be too dogmatic on this, and it is quite possible that the pressure of
events will force the Barisan Socialis to take violent action against Merger. On
balance, however, I believe they will, if possible, stick to constitutional means.
10. Our assessment at this point, therefore, is that the Barisan Socialis will
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employ every available means to depose Lee Kuan Yew constitutionally but may well
stop short of violent direct action; and that Lee Kuan Yew will win a vote of
confidence for his Merger policy from the Assembly but will face a much harder task
in winning a Referendum on Merger.
11. I am sending copies of this letter to Sir Denis Allen, Moynihan in Kuala
Lumpur, Jakeway in Kuching, Turner in Jesselton and White in Brunei.
73 CAB 134/1949, GM(61)11(Final) 20 Oct 1961
‘Greater Malaysia: report by the chairman of the Official Committee’:
report for ministers by Sir A Clutterbuck. Appendices B and C
[Set up to brief ministers for talks with the Tunku, the Official Committee on Greater
Malaysia met for the first time on 27 Sep (see 62), and on 19 Oct the committee agreed
their report which was submitted to ministers the following day. It substantiates the case
for proceeding with ‘Greater Malaysia’ and outlines tactics for forthcoming discussions
with the Tunku. It starts by identifying the reasons for, and the problems of, bringing
about territorial merger. In so doing it assesses the range of local opinion and discusses
the dilemma of timing: whereas circumstances in Malaya and Singapore demanded
immediate action, those in the Borneo territories called for a gradual approach. Turning
to defence, the report points out that ‘Greater Malaysia’ should relieve Britain of costly
commitments although it could curtail its rights to the use of military bases (an issue
about which Julian Amery, secretary of state for air, expressed misgivings in a paper
considered alongside this report at the Cabinet Defence Committee on 25 Oct). The
report therefore advises negotiators to work towards an arrangement whereby
Commonwealth forces stationed in ‘Greater Malaysia’ could fulfil their SEATO
obligations while the new state assumed responsibilities for its own internal security. It
was the defence aspects of the report (which was presented to the Cabinet Defence
Committee with an introductory note by the Cabinet secretary and numbered D(61)62))
that held the attention of ministers at their meeting on 25 Oct (see 74). Following the
discussion in the Defence Committee, Macmillan felt that ministers should give further
thought to the officials’ report, particularly those matters not relating to defence; hence
the establishment of the ministerial Greater Malaysia Committee which was first
convened on 9 Nov (see 77). On 10 Nov a twelve-page, 43-paragraph summary of the
officials’ report was despatched to high commissioners in Commonwealth capitals (CAB
134/1949, GM(61) 5th meeting; CAB 131/25, D14(61)3; DO 169/213, no 3; PREM
11/3422).] 
Introduction
The Committee was established with the following terms of reference:—
‘To examine the proposals by the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya
for the creation of a “Greater Malaysia” incorporating the Federation of
Malaya, Brunei, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore, and to make
recommendations to Ministers.’
2. The genesis of these proposals is as follows. The possibility of a political
association between Malaya, Singapore and the three British Borneo territories has
been under general discussion for many years and the United Kingdom Government
have throughout regarded it with favour in principle. It was discussed earlier this
year at a meeting of the Commissioner General for the United Kingdom in South
East Asia and other United Kingdom representatives in the area and they strongly
recommended that the United Kingdom should accept the development of such an
association as an ultimate goal of Government policy.
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3. In the past a major obstacle has been the attitude of the Malayan Government,
who were not prepared to run the risk that the Chinese majority in Singapore might
join with the Chinese minority in Malaya to the detriment of the interests of the
Malays. Recently, however, there has been a complete change of front on the part of
the Malayan Government. The Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in a speech on
27th May spoke favourably about the possibility of an association including all five
territories. He has followed this up with great vigour and on 26th June sent the
Prime Minister a memorandum setting out in some detail his proposals for a Greater
Malaysia (Appendix A to this report).1 The population figures in Annex A to the
Tunku’s memorandum are in a number of respects inaccurate: the most accurate
figures available are given in Appendix B to this report.
4. The Tunku now regards this matter as one of great urgency because the
position of the present Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, and his party
has of late rapidly deteriorated; and while the Tunku finds it possible to co-operate
with Mr. Lee, he sees no prospect of doing so with any other likely Prime Minister of
Singapore should Mr. Lee and his Government fall.
5. In Singapore Mr. Lee is committed to a policy of achieving independence
through a political merger with Malaya. He and the Tunku have met on several
occasions to discuss the Malayan proposals. Mr. Lee has made it clear that these
proposals have his full backing and he has agreed with the Tunku on the general
arrangements under which Singapore could enter the Federation on special terms.
These arrangements would be generally acceptable to us. Mr. Lee believes that his
only hope of achieving his aim of ‘independence through merger’ lies in rapid
progress on these proposals. The only major problem which such a merger poses for
us—and it is a very serious problem indeed—is the future of our rights in the
Singapore bases.
6. On the other hand, it is essential to the Tunku’s proposals that the three
Borneo territories should be brought into the association in order that their
predominantly non-Chinese populations may provide a counter-balance to the
Chinese majority in Singapore, and the Tunku is not prepared to contemplate a
merger of Malaya and Singapore without the inclusion of the Borneo territories. This
faces us with a serious dilemma since the Borneo territories are in almost every way
quite unready for effective participation in the proposed union.
7. The succeeding paragraphs of this report deal with the problems presented to
the United Kingdom Government by this situation under the following heads:—
Malaya (paragraphs 8–11)
Singapore (paragraphs 12–15)
Borneo (paragraphs 16–23)
Defence (paragraphs 24–32)
Finance (paragraphs 33–40)
Thereafter the report sets out the general conclusions of the Committee (paragraphs
41 and 42) and deals with tactics for the discussions with the Tunku which are due to
take place early in November (paragraphs 43–53). Finally, there is a summary of our
conclusions and recommendations (paragraphs 54–60).
1 See 46.
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Malaya
8. The future of Singapore is of direct and deep concern to Malaya. Economically
its separation from the Federation makes nonsense. But the Malay majority in the
Federation are deeply concerned at the likely results of a direct merger, since the
Chinese population in the combined territories would then be greater than the Malay
population, and moreover the Singapore Chinese contain a high proportion of
Communist sympathisers. After defeating their own Communists in the long
Emergency the last thing that the Malayans want to risk is Communist domination
from Singapore.
9. For a long time the Tunku’s view had been that he must keep the Singapore
Chinese out. He relied on us to control the situation there and said that in the event
of trouble his policy was to seal off Singapore by closing the Johore causeway. It has,
however, become apparent to him that the situation in Singapore is changing, and
he is aware that a constitutional review is due in Singapore during 1963. As a result,
he has now come round to the view that an independent Singapore would be a source
of continuous danger and embarrassment to Malaya and that the only alternative is
some form of merger between Malaya and Singapore.
10. But it is vital to Malaya that the terms of the merger with Singapore should
contain provisions which will safeguard the Federation as a whole against Chinese
domination. To achieve this the Tunku has laid down two essential conditions:—
(a) before being committed to a merger with Singapore he must be absolutely
certain that the three Borneo territories with their prodominantly non-Chinese
population will be brought into the wider Federation; and
(b) Singapore should have a smaller representation in the central Parliament than
they would be entitled to on a population basis: in return for this Singapore would
retain much wider powers than the other member states—but not responsibility
for internal security.
11. The Tunku’s specific proposals as they now stand are as follows:—
(1) As a first step Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak should be brought into the
Malayan Federation as constituent units on the same basis as the existing States
(although he has informed certain Borneo leaders that he would be ready to give
the Borneo territories a large measure of self-government). He appears to be
convinced that if the British Government gave a firm lead the Borneo peoples
would be happy to come in at a very early date.
(2) Once (1) was secured, Singapore would join the Federation on special terms,
retaining powers (much beyond those of existing States in the Federation—e.g. in
the field of education and labour) to administer its own affairs. Singapore would
then have proportionately smaller representation in the central Parliament than it
could claim on a population basis if it came in on the same footing as the existing
States. Internal security would be a Federal subject.
(3) The British bases in Singapore would cease to be at the disposal of SEATO but
could be maintained as bases for Commonwealth defence.
(4) There would be no administrative change in Singapore and it would maintain
its own civil service.
(5) After initial talks with United Kingdom Ministers, there should be a formal
discussion in which representatives of all the territories concerned and the United
10-Malaysia-57-78-cpp  21/9/04  9:06 AM  Page 209
210 PRINCIPLES FOR A FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA [73]
Kingdom would participate. That meeting should decide on the appointment of an
independent constitutional commission on the lines of the Reid Commission
which drafted the constitution of the Federation of Malaya.
Singapore
12. All the urgency and one of the two major elements of the problem lie in
Singapore, where the present constitutional position is full internal self-government
subject to certain controls over internal security, with the United Kingdom
responsible for defence and external affairs and enjoying full rights of occupation,
control and use of the bases. Singapore is under mounting economic pressures,
particularly as a result of an explosive rate of increase in population. Politically, there
is a powerful and growing demand for early independence in one form or another. In
the absence of any clear design for the future, Singapore’s economic and political
circumstances alike play directly into the hands of the Communists, whose influence
is strong and pervasive. Mr. Lee’s relatively moderate Government have recently lost
much ground to the extreme left and their hold on power is now tenuous.
13. We have always had in mind that Singapore and Malaya should one day
merge (and have on more than one occasion blessed the idea in public), partly
because only in that direction have we been able to see any real hope for Singapore’s
economy and partly because the political alternative has more and more seemed to
be Communist domination of Singapore. Since the proposal before us is that on
joining Malaya Singapore should surrender to the Federal Government all
responsibility for internal security and external defence, merger with a prosperous
Malaya ruled by a resolutely anti-Communist Government should greatly improve
the prospects of Singapore’s economic and political stability. If we can now agree
upon the creation of a Greater Malaysia, Mr. Lee and his Government may survive to
see it through. There is, of course, no guarantee that he will win the referendum on
the subject which he has undertaken to hold in November, but he will have a far
better chance if he can present his electorate with a firm promise of merger with
Malaya should the voters so choose. Finally, if a merger of Singapore with Malaya can
be achieved we shall not only succeed in extricating ourselves from an increasingly
menacing situation in the former, but do so in the one way likely to reinforce rather
than undermine the security of South East Asia in general and our own interests in
particular.
14. If, however, the Greater Malaysia project fails, Mr. Lee and his Government
will almost certainly fall and be succeeded by another much further to the left and
unwilling to contemplate merger with Malaya on terms acceptable to the Tunku.
Either of two unpleasant situations could then develop. First, under the new
Government the situation in Singapore might so deteriorate that our right under
certain conditions to suspend the constitution could and had to be exercised. This
would mean assuming direct administration of the island against the background of
a hostile population, a public service now containing virtually no British officials,
and a brittle economy at least badly shaken. We should then be left for an indefinite
period with sole responsibility for a Singapore gone thoroughly bad and requiring
(on our present reckoning) considerable reinforcement of the eight major army units
at present stationed there to safeguard internal security. In such circumstances the
value to us of the Singapore bases would, to say the least, be highly problematical:
even as things are it is arguable whether we could operate effectively from the bases
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if the Singapore Government set out to frustrate us. Second, the new Government
might so conduct themselves as to give us no proper grounds for suspending the
constitution, however sure we might feel that a Communist take-over was being
prepared behind the scenes. In either situation, any previous default on our part in
support of Greater Malaysia would have turned the Tunku almost as antagonistic to
ourselves as to Singapore.
15. We are committed to review the existing Singapore constitution in 1963. If
Singapore is not by then at least firmly set on the road to independence through
merger with Malaya (and assuming that the constitution had not meanwhile been
suspended) we shall be faced with a choice no less painful than that set out in the
previous paragraph. There will certainly be a demand for separate independence.
Should we refuse it we shall be faced by a hostile Singapore, whether or not we have
to suspend the constitution: should we accede, we shall establish in the heart of
South East Asia a new sovereign state likely to be increasingly influenced by Peking.
On the second of these hypotheses it seems inconceivable that the Singapore bases
would in any way continue to be available to us, and even on the first they would be
of very limited use.
Borneo
16. We have seen that there is no time to lose if we want to bring about a merger
of Singapore with Malaya; and we have also seen that that is unacceptable to the
Tunku unless the Borneo territories are included. Herein, if we leave aside our
defence problem, is our chief dilemma since we are under obligation to the peoples of
the Borneo territories to advance them socially, economically and politically until
they are able to assume responsibility for their own future—and in the ordinary way
that point would take many years to reach as their political, social and economic
institutions are still at a relatively early stage of evolution.
17. We have no doubt that inclusion in a Greater Malaysia offers the Borneo
territories their best hope for the future in the long term. Individually they are all
highly vulnerable on account of their small size and population, their racial
composition and their geographical position; and even a union of the three states
would by itself be relatively weak. Moreover China, Indonesia and the Philippines
have, or could readily work up, interests of one kind or another in them: in
particular, Indonesian irredentism is likely to prove an increasingly grave threat to
which there may well be no answer except Greater Malaysia. In the light of these
circumstances, of Colonial experience elsewhere and of general trends in South East
Asia, it seems unlikely that we can foster the political development of the Borneo
territories at a pace allowing time to secure their capacity to survive and prosper in
independence by themselves: if they are left on their own we shall almost certainly be
driven by external pressures to grant independence long before they are ready for it,
with all the dangers in which that will involve them. On this analysis our choice lies
between guiding them now into a Greater Malaysia which we are satisfied is their
most desirable destination, despite the fact that their peoples are not yet themselves
really capable of exercising considered judgement on the matter and are not yet
ready to stand on their own feet in this wider association, or waiting until they have
become so capable and ready, when the opportunity of Greater Malaysia may well
have been lost and the alternative prospect of separate independence will be parlous
and brief.
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18. The issue is further complicated by the Tunku’s apparent conviction that
most of the people of the Borneo territories would gladly join with Malaya at an early
date and that any reluctance on our part to commit them thereto without delay must
be due either to failure to read the situation aright or to a desire to saddle him with
Singapore alone. Indeed, any show of reluctance in the Borneo territories to accept
the Greater Malaysia project at once will almost certainly be attributed by the Tunku
to the influence of British officials. As we see it, however, the state of public opinion
(such as it is) in the Borneo territories, although not unfavourable, is generally
cautious. Doubts relate rather to the form of association and to timing than to
principle: few people like the idea of joining a Greater Malaysia as States on a par
with the existing States of the Federation of Malaya (as the Tunku proposes) or feel
that they are anything like yet ready to join. Opinion in the individual territories is as
follows:—
(a) In Sarawak the leading Malays (whose community forms less than a quarter of
the whole population) and some of their followers favour early merger with Malaya
without closer association of the Borneo territories first. The leftwing Chinese,
while not openly opposed to Greater Malaysia as an ultimate aim, want
independence in Sarawak first. There are signs that the leaders of the indigenous
peoples (Ibans, Land Dayaks, Kayans, Kenyas, etc.) are favourably disposed towards
the idea of a Greater Malaysia and have some awareness of a common interest with
Malaya in combating Communism. But they do not want to be rushed and would
prefer a union with North Borneo first. They do not yet feel ready educationally,
economically or politically for a merger and want us to stay and help them until
they are stronger. They fear Malay discrimination and have unhappy memories of
their relations with the Malays in the past. They are a tough people and would
resist, very possibly to the extent of armed insurrection, a premature transfer of
sovereignty to which they have not agreed. As the Governor puts it, ‘they are
interested in the pig, but do not want to buy it in the present poke’.
(b) In North Borneo the Malays are a small minority and here, too, are for
historical reasons unpopular among the non-Muslim majority (Dusuns, Muruts,
etc.). The Chinese generally want to go slow on Greater Malaysia and to work first
for self-government for North Borneo and federation with Sarawak (and possibly
Brunei). One or two native leaders are in favour of early merger with Malaya. For
the rest, opinion seems to be in favour of closer association of the Borneo
territories first, although there is some native opinion against any union with
Sarawak in view of Communist activity there. The Governor’s latest advice is that
merger with Malaya cannot be rushed: it must follow a federation of the Borneo
territories and then allow for a larger measure of self-government in Borneo. He
thinks that the Borneo territories would be well advised to wait and see the sort of
Governments in power in Malaya and Singapore in 1964.
(c) In Brunei, which is predominantly Malay, the Sultan has for some time been
in favour of his State becoming a State of the Federation of Malaya. He has,
however, refused to express to our High Commissioner in Brunei even preliminary
views on the Tunku’s proposals and now seems rather nervous about them, no
doubt because of the reactions in his State, where the only political party has come
out for elections first and a federation of the Borneo territories before merger with
Malaya. It is not certain how far this party could stage an effective revolt against a
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move by the Sultan for an early merger with Malaya, but the latest advice from the
High Commissioner and Lord Selkirk is that they are probably strong enough to
prevent it.
19. There is thus nothing in the material circumstances or in the general state of
opinion of the Borneo territories which need inhibit us in wholeheartedly
commending the principle of Greater Malaysia to their peoples: indeed, all Her
Majesty’s representatives there agree that we should do so. On the other hand, we
assume that the United Kingdom Government would not commit themselves to hand
over sovereignty in Sarawak and North Borneo (we have no sovereignty in Brunei)
until they were satisfied that this was substantially in line with local wishes. Any
outward indication that we contemplated including the Borneo territories in a
Greater Malaysia without local agreement would not only do us damage in the
territories and in the eyes of the world but also prejudice the success of the project
(an argument which should carry weight with the Tunku). This raises the question to
what extent it is in fact possible for us now, or will be in the near future, reasonably
to satisfy ourselves—and opinion both within and without the Borneo territories—
about local wishes.
20. In Sarawak the United Kingdom Government are particularly committed by
the eighth of the ‘Nine Cardinal Principles of the Rule of the English Rajahs’ 2,
repeated in the constitution of 1946 when the Crown took over from the Brooke
Rajahs, and reaffirmed last year in reply to a petition to The Queen which said that
the United Kingdom Government would not surrender final responsibility for the
development of Sarawak until they were satisfied that the people as a whole were able
to play their full part in the government of the country, and that in pursuing this
goal sight would not be lost of the best interests and desires of the indigenous
communities. It cannot be claimed that, even as a result of a sharply accelerated
programme of administrative, political and social development, these conditions
could be satisfied within the next few years and the people of Sarawak be able to
assume the responsibilities of government as a constituent state in a Greater
Malaysia. At present there are still few indigenous civil servants and none of them
hold senior positions. British officials might not be willing to stay on in numbers for
long if Sarawak entered a Greater Malaysia. In accordance with practice, when the
Secretary of State’s responsibility for protecting British officials ceases, there would
have to be a compensation scheme under which they would have the right to retire.
This could be framed so as to put no premium on retirement. Nevertheless, the
atmosphere might change so markedly that many might decide to retire. Malays
from Malaya (if available, which is doubtful) would be unpopular, as has recently
been seen even in Malay Brunei. Sarawak’s premature entry into a Greater Malaysia
might therefore lead to a breakdown in the administration. On the other hand, the
Supreme Council (Executive Council) and the Council Negri (Legislative Council)
both have majorities of unofficial members, and these in turn contain majorities of
(indirectly) elected members. It thus might not be altogether unreasonable to claim
that we could even today ascertain through the two Councils the wishes of the
peoples of Sarawak. Further, proposals for constitutional advance in 1963 have been
2 See 56, n 9.
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approved in principle and are to be presented to the Council Negri in December. It
may be desirable to accelerate some features of these. But in any case it will be the
British officials who will have to put across the idea of an early Greater Malaysia to
the non-Malay peoples and they will not be able to do this successfully unless they
believe that it involves a fair deal for those peoples.
21. North Borneo is still more backward, both politically and in the share taken
by local people in the public service, and even less ready than Sarawak to assume the
responsibilities of government. Although the Legislative Council has a majority of
unofficial members, there are as yet no elected members; and on the Executive
Council official and unofficial members are equal in numbers. It would thus be
difficult to argue either that North Borneo is ready for full participation in a Greater
Malaysia or that its people are in a position to decide for themselves whether or not
to join. In particular, if we wanted at an early date to make an attempt to ascertain
the wishes of the peoples of North Borneo in relation to Greater Malaysia, we could
hardly claim that the Executive and Legislative Councils were adequate to speak for
the whole country and we should have to consider whether the task could be carried
out by other means.
22. Brunei presents less difficulty since it is a Protected State in which the direct
internal responsibilities of the United Kingdom Government are limited; the Sultan is
believed to favour joining Malaya and the majority of the population is Malay and
Muslim. Moreover, although in most ways backward, Brunei enjoys great (although
diminishing) oil wealth. Unfortunately, owing to the Sultan’s failure to hold promised
elections and to clumsy tactics by him and the Tunku on a recent visit by the latter,
substantial opposition to merger with Malaya has grown up in Brunei: but the High
Commissioner advises that, if the Sultan and the Tunku were to moderate their
autocratic attitudes, there would be a good chance that the opposition party could be
brought round. There is a petition before the United Kingdom Government from the
opposition party complaining of the failure to hold elections and, in the context of this,
we could advise the Sultan that his promise to hold elections should be carried out as
soon as possible and that the issue of merger should at once be placed before the new
legislature, at the same time telling him that we regard merger as desirable in the
interests of Brunei. We could tell the Tunku that this seemed to us the best course.
23. Provided, then, that the Tunku and the Sultan can agree upon mutually
satisfactory arrangements for the immediate incorporation of Brunei, we need raise
no objection. In Sarawak and North Borneo the Governors believe that, given a firm
lead from the United Kingdom Government, they could work out proposals for
accession to a Greater Malaysia which would be acceptable in their territories. They
think that these would have to include the following:—
(a) Existing British staff must be retained.
(b) Sarawak and North Borneo must have a large measure of internal self-
government, including in particular control over:—
immigration,
education including language,
citizenship,
land development.
(c) Sarawak and North Borneo must retain their revenues, every cent of which is
needed for their own development.
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(d) There must be freedom to pursue closer association of Sarawak and North
Borneo.
(e) The United Kingdom Government must somehow guarantee these provisions
for a period at end of which Sarawak and North Borneo would have opportunity to
opt out.
To what extent such proposals would be negotiable with the Tunku is very doubtful.
(a) is referred to in paragraphs 20 and 21 above and paragraph 49 below. (b) and (c)
are in different degrees out of accord with the Tunku’s present insistence that the
constitutional position of Sarawak and North Borneo in a Greater Malaysia must be
that of States in the Federation of Malaya on the same basis as the present States, but
it is not clear how far he may be prepared to make concessions on points of this kind.
(d) might not be so difficult. There is already a movement towards closer association
between Sarawak and North Borneo (for example, a joint Free Trade Area has been
agreed on and is likely to be introduced early next year), we have encouraged it and
local support is growing. It is a good thing in itself, particularly if Greater Malaysia
were not to come off; and, provided that it is pursued without prejudice to the idea of
Greater Malaysia, we should continue to encourage it. The Tunku might not like this,
regarding it as a pretext for putting off the entry of Sarawak and North Borneo into
Greater Malaysia, but it would be incomprehensible to the peoples of the territories
why on any consideration of their interests we should not continue to support this
salutary movement, and their suspicions would be aroused. (e) looks entirely
unacceptable to the Tunku.
Defence
24. Ministers have already decided (F.P. (61) 2nd Meeting)3 that in our
forthcoming discussions with the Tunku we should make it clear that we intend, on
the establishment of a Greater Malaysia, to hand over our internal security
responsibilities in Singapore and the Borneo territories, but to seek to retain our
defence facilities in Malaya and Singapore. Our general aim should be to reduce our
forces to the Commonwealth Brigade Group stationed near Malacca and our existing
naval and air facilities in Malaya and Singapore. Ministers thought that, although the
Tunku would be unwilling to commit himself to allow facilities in Greater Malaysia
to be used for operations in support of SEATO, it was quite possible that in a
situation which involved a closer Communist threat to Malaya, he might be willing
to acquiesce in operations from his territory except for the direct use of airfields for
bombing. They accepted that we should support the concept of Greater Malaysia even
though it might mean some diminution in our freedom of action in the theatre so far
as defence goes. In the longer term we should have to be prepared to regard facilities
in a Greater Malaysia as no more than forward operating bases on the use of which
we could not rely in all circumstances; and we should consider, in consultation with
Australia and New Zealand, alternative methods of fulfilling our SEATO
commitments after the establishment of a Greater Malaysia.
25. The background to these decisions is that under our existing constitutional
relationships with Singapore and the Borneo territories we have an absolute right to
establish and maintain any defence facilities that we require in those territories and
3 See 70.
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to use our forces stationed there for any purposes. In Malaya, however, our rights to
maintain defence facilities and to use our forces stationed there depend on the terms
of our defence agreement with Malaya and on the extent to which the Malayan
Government, on local political grounds, feel able to allow our forces free entry and
exit (Appendix C to this report). We maintain bases and forces in the area for three
main purposes—internal security in Singapore, the Borneo territories, Hong Kong
and our Pacific territories; the external defence of these British possessions and of
Malaya (under the terms of our defence agreement); and the discharge of
international (i.e. SEATO) and Commonwealth obligations.
26. Eight of our major army units in Malaya and Singapore are on present plans
required for internal security in Singapore itself and in our other possessions in the
Far East and the Pacific. If Greater Malaysia is not achieved we must expect our
commitment to remain indefinitely at no less than at its present level (unless
Singapore is granted separate independence). We are anxious, however, on financial
and man-power grounds, to reduce our forces in South East Asia as much as we can.
It is implied in the Tunku’s proposals that we should be relieved of all responsibility
for internal security in Singapore and the Borneo territories. We do not know
whether the Tunku is really alive to the implications of this. We have no evidence
that he has yet considered what arrangements a Greater Malaysia would have to
make to ensure that its responsibility for internal security could be effectively carried
out from its own resources. We shall have to bring home to him the importance of
this issue and the need for him to make concrete plans to meet it. The point may
arise early in relation to Brunei if it decides to join in advance of the other territories
(see paragraphs 46 and 56).
27. If Greater Malaysia is not achieved we shall remain indefinitely responsible
for the external defence of the Borneo territories, Singapore (unless separate
independence is granted to it) and Malaya (under the terms of the Malayan Defence
Agreement unless we decided to denounce it). If Greater Malaysia does come about
we shall in any case still be responsible for the defence of Hong Kong and the Pacific
territories and we shall have to renegotiate the Malayan Defence Agreement to fit the
new situation. What commitments we undertake in the process will depend largely
on the decisions which we take about the future scale and character of our
contributions to SEATO. If we decided that in the long term we should aim to meet
our SEATO obligations without maintaining substantial forces on the mainland of
South East Asia, we should naturally want to reduce to a minimum any commitment
to the defence of Greater Malaysia. On the other hand, the Tunku may well count
upon British forces remaining in the area, believing that by their mere presence they
will contribute to stability. In any case, as Australia has pointed out, we want the
Malayan Government to remain anti-Communist and to be strong enough to control
Singapore. It might therefore suit us for the time being to retain certain forces in
Malaya and Singapore, whose role would include the external defence of Greater
Malaysia.
28. The essential elements of the defence problem may therefore be summarised
as follows:—
(a) In planning our long-term policy and strategy in the Far East we recognise
that we shall not be able to rely indefinitely upon the ability to use defence bases
freely for all purposes. This is true whether or not Greater Malaysia comes about.
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Indeed, it may be that the political realities in Singapore would even now impose
great difficulties on our using the bases for SEATO operations in Laos.
(b) In the long term the most that we shall need in Greater Malaysia may be
forward operating facilities; but final decisions on this must await the completion
of our strategic studies and consultation with Australia, New Zealand and the
United States.
(c) Meanwhile we should seek to negotiate terms which would enable us to use
our facilities in the area as freely as possible for strategic purposes after Greater
Malaysia has been brought about.
(d) The defence aspects of the Greater Malaysia project are of critical concern to
Australia and New Zealand. Both Australia and New Zealand have forces in the
Malayan area, and they have contributed and are still contributing large sums for
the construction of defence facilities there. The Australian Government have
emphasised to us the need to secure the best possible terms for the continued
presence in the Malayan area of the Commonwealth strategic forces in their
primary role of deterring Communist aggression. Both Governments have been
informed of the considerations which we shall have in mind in the discussions
with the Tunku; and they have been promised full and close consultation
throughout.
(e) We expect to achieve a substantial reduction in our land forces there once
Greater Malaysia is established, since the new State would take over responsibility
for internal security.
(f ) The Tunku clearly envisages that our defence facilities in Malaya and
Singapore would be retained in a Greater Malaysia. But he seeks to impose
conditions on their free use. In his memorandum at Appendix A he states that the
bases ‘will no longer be at the disposal of SEATO but could be maintained as bases
for the defence of the Commonwealth.’
29. It seems likely that the Tunku is in fact hoping to get the best of both worlds.
On the one hand he hopes to be relieved of the very acute political problem of having
bases on his territory overtly available for SEATO purposes. On the other hand he
appears to be counting on the continued presence of substantial British
Commonwealth forces in Greater Malaysia. The following considerations lead us to
suppose that he will in fact wish these forces to be retained:—
(a) We would expect him to feel that the presence of British Commonwealth
forces was a major contribution to the stability of the area; and this consideration
may be particularly important during the early stages of the establishment of
Greater Malaysia.
(b) The assumption by Greater Malaysia of responsibility for internal security in
Singapore and Borneo will in itself impose a very heavy new burden on its own
defence resources.
(c) Mr. Lee has recently emphasised in public how essential are our defence
facilities in Singapore for the economy of the island, and has indicated that their
removal would be most unwelcome from the economic point of view.
30. We must recognise that politically it would be extremely difficult for the
Tunku to agree to any public formula or agreement which linked our bases in Malaya
and Singapore with SEATO by name. But the Tunku for his part must recognise that
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we have obligations to SEATO which we cannot abandon. These are in fact in a very
real sense ‘Commonwealth’ obligations because we share them with Australia, New
Zealand and Pakistan. Moreover, there can be no doubt that SEATO has contributed
to the stability of the area and has played an important part in preventing
Communist aggression. Finally, a situation in which there were in a Greater Malaysia
substantial British Commonwealth forces which were prevented from playing an
effective part in the defence of South East Asia outside Greater Malaysia would be
strategic nonsense.
31. The Tunku appears to contemplate extension to Greater Malaysia of the
existing Malayan Defence Agreement. This would not in itself meet the strategic
requirements of ourselves, Australia and New Zealand. But the Tunku has indicated
that he is concerned that the defence arrangements for the region should not be
jeopardised; and he thinks that some suitable arrangement within the framework of
the Defence Agreement could be arrived at whereby the various defence
requirements may be satisfied. It is on that basis that we want to explore with him
the possibility of some arrangement which would not cause unacceptable political
difficulties for him but which would meet our essential strategic requirements.
32. It has been suggested that to avoid relying on Singapore we should negotiate
a retention of sovereignty over the island of Labuan off the coast of North Borneo, of
which constitutionally it forms part. The success of such negotiations is, however,
doubtful and the arrangement, besides involving considerable expense, would
probably not prove durable.
Finance
33. It is not possible at the present stage of our thinking to assess all the
financial implications in the defence field of the attainment of a Greater Malaysia.
We may reasonably expect to achieve substantial economies in overseas
expenditure in the Far East by reduction of those forces stationed in Malaya and
Singapore for purposes of internal security. But no substantial budgetary saving
would be achieved unless the total strength of the armed forces was reduced by an
amount substantially equivalent to the strength of the forces withdrawn; and if
there were no such reduction, additional expenditure on the reprovision of
accommodation in the United Kingdom or elsewhere might for some years even
exceed the savings in running costs which might reasonably be expected from
withdrawal.
34. If in the longer term efforts were made to replace our existing defence
facilities, or part of them in Labuan (paragraph 32 above) or in Australia, or through
improved facilities for seaborne support, very substantial new expenditure over a
period of years would be entailed.
35. In any case, even if we did not have to agree to a request from the Tunku to
keep certain forces in Malaya solely to fill the gap while Malaysian forces were being
built up to replace them, we might nevertheless find it difficult to resist pressure to
give the Tunku fresh help in money, material or training in expanding his own
forces, over and above the substantial assistance (now nearly finished) which he has
had from us since independence.
36. As for financial implications outside the defence field, the United Kingdom
Government’s present assistance under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts
towards development in Sarawak and North Borneo is of the order of about
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£1 million a year. If they remain dependent such aid will no doubt continue. If
Greater Malaysia came about it would presumably cease but we should no doubt be
expected to give assistance in some other form; we should also look to the Federation
of Malaya to give substantial help.
37. If Sarawak and North Borneo are to be equipped to take their places as part
of a Greater Malaysia there will have to be an accelerated programme of training of
local public servants; in so far as this is done before Greater Malaysia comes about
the United Kingdom Government will be expected to meet most of the cost. Plans
for this are now being considered but it is not yet possible to estimate the likely
cost.
38. The cost of compensating members of the Overseas Civil Service in Sarawak
and North Borneo for loss of career and commutation of their pensions has been
calculated at about £3.2 millions. Of this about £1.3 millions will be payable by the
United Kingdom Government under the Overseas Service Aid Scheme. They might
also have to assist the two Governments with their share.
39. No financial implications for the United Kingdom Government would arise
from Brunei’s entry into a Greater Malaysia.
40. Questions of accelerated aid for training or of compensation do not arise in
Singapore. We are committed to an Exchequer loan in aid of Singapore’s
development of up to £5 millions in the period to the end of 1962 (although there is a
good prospect that this will not be drawn down). We have also stated our intention to
make a further contribution after an examination of the need at the beginning of
1963. Thus, even if Greater Malaysia supervenes in 1963, we are likely to be asked to
honour this intention.
Conclusions
41. The foregoing study of the problem leads us to the general conclusion that
the earliest possible achievement of Greater Malaysia should be regarded as an aim of
British Government policy because:—
(a) It offers the only satisfactory prospect of settling the political problem of
Singapore.
(b) It would thereby contribute to the general security of the area and avoid the
new threat of a Singapore either contained by British arms or independent under
Chinese Communist influence.
(c) It offers the best long term prospect for the Borneo territories.
(d) It would relieve us of a heavy and costly military burden in the field of internal
security in the Far East.
(e) It would probably reduce, and certainly could not increase, our commitments
to the external defence of the territories concerned.
(f) It is unlikely to increase the difficulties which will in any case confront us in
the discharge of our international defence obligations (i.e. SEATO).
42. At the same time, it is clear from what has already been said that there are
wide divergencies, at any rate in the short term, between our aims and interests and
those of the Tunku in relation to defence and the Borneo territories. The following
paragraphs outline the tacties which we recommend for the forthcoming discussions
with the Tunku over the whole field of the Greater Malaysia project and in particular
with regard to defence and the Borneo territories.
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Tactics for discussions with the Tunku
General
43. It will be important to win the Tunku’s confidence in the United Kingdom
Government’s aims and intentions. At the moment there is a critical lack of
confidence on his part. In the last few weeks, despite the re-assurances in the Prime
Minister’s messages to him, he seems to have become deeply and unreasonably
suspicious of us. He appears to believe that we are deliberately magnifying, if not
actually creating, difficulties over the Borneo territories and that it is our object to
manoeuvre him into a position where Singapore and all its problems are left for him
to deal with on his own. His reference in a speech on 16th October to the
unavailability of Singapore as a SEATO base may have been intended by him as a
reminder to us that we cannot take him for granted.
44. If we are to create an atmosphere favourable to realistic and frank
discussions it will be necessary to convince the Tunku of our wholehearted support
for the Greater Malaysia project in principle, of our desire to see it achieved as soon
as possible and of our willingness to give a warm public lead in its favour. But we
must also make it clear to him that we cannot at this stage commit ourselves to
definite dates for the accession of Sarawak and North Borneo; and also that
arrangements will be necessary to enable our forces to continue to carry out their
essential strategic role of deterring Communist aggression.
Singapore
45. No difficulty arises here. The terms on which the Tunku and Mr. Lee are
planning the merger of Singapore and Malaya are acceptable to us and we can so
inform the Tunku.
Brunei
46. We should approach the Tunku on the basis that Brunei is a Malaya [sic] and
Muslim Protected State and that, so far as the United Kingdom Government are
concerned, there is no objection at all to its joining the Federation of Malaya now.
We should remind him that there is, however, strong (Malay) opposition to this in
Brunei and tell him that our advice to the Sultan would be as suggested in paragraph
22 above, to carry out his promise to hold elections as soon as possible, and to put
the issue of merger before the Legislature. We should be prepared to tell the Sultan
that we regard merger as being in the interests of Brunei. We should invite the
Tunku to give the Sultan similar advice. The Tunku may well say to this that we
ought not to bother about the opposition or about elections, but ought just to advise
the Sultan to announce that he is going to take his State into Malaya and be prepared
to treat the opposition rough if they object. The Tunku makes light of the strength of
this opposition. Our information both from our High Commissioner and the Shell
Company is that it cannot be ignored. There are therefore three very good reasons
why we should not agree if the Tunku takes the above line:—
(a) So long as our present Treaty with Brunei stands, we are ultimately
responsible for security there and liable to be involved if disorder broke out. If it
were serious we might even have to bring over troops from Singapore; and if that
happened both parties would put the blame on us—indeed, the Sultan’s cagey
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attitude over merger with Malaya is almost certainly calculated to make it possible
for him to blame the United Kingdom Government for anything that might go
wrong.
(b) Disorder might threaten the Shell oil installations in Brunei, which might
make the need to introduce troops more cogent.
(c) The example of Brunei Malays (and this argument should appeal to the Tunku)
resisting a merger with Malaya would be damning to the Tunku in Sarawak and
North Borneo.
It must be made clear to the Tunku that it is for the Sultan and himself to sell the
idea of a Greater Malaysia to the Brunei Malays. We cannot do it for them and we will
not give the Sultan advice which we believe might lead to violence.
Sarawak and North Borneo
47. We should explain to the Tunku frankly what our difficulties are—the
dangers of breakdown in the administration; our pledges to Sarawak; the need which
we have to show publicly (not least in Parliament here) that we are not handing over
Colonial peoples without due regard to their own wishes; and the matters to which
we believe many of them will attach importance, including the continuation of the
movement towards closer association between Sarawak and North Borneo
(paragraph 23 above).
48. The best result would be if we could get the Tunku to accept the accession of
Singapore without insisting upon the simultaneous accession of Sarawak and North
Borneo, and instead to co-operate with us in planning for the accession of Sarawak
only after, say, three or four years, and of North Borneo some years later still. No
doubt any such plan would require us to undertake a very special effort to accelerate
development of all kinds, particularly the training of public servants, in Sarawak and
North Borneo—which would inevitably cost a good deal of money—but we might at
the same time be able without much delay to obtain provisional agreement from
Sarawak and North Borneo to enter a Greater Malaysia and we might expect that,
with careful handling, they would more and more look towards that as a settled goal.
We might also as an earnest of our intentions set up joint consultative councils, both
official and unofficial, on which the Federation and the Borneo territories would be
represented. And we could tell the Tunku that we propose (as we already have in
mind) to appoint a senior officer on the staff of the Commissioner General to help
further the plan. But we must face the fact that even in the first round of talks the
Tunku seems unlikely to be satisfied with anything less than a firm undertaking on
our part to get the Borneo territories into Greater Malaysia somehow and at some
stage.
49. We have considered various means whereby responsibility for the
administration of Sarawak and North Borneo might for a period of years be shared
between Malaya and the United Kingdom. However they are dressed up, all such
schemes, involving two sovereign countries, amount to a kind of condominium. A
condominium over these two territories is probably incompatible with their
incorporation in the Federation. Indeed, the incorporation of these two territories,
subject to such a condominium, might even be considered to have an adverse effect
on the international standing of the Federation. For example, the United Kingdom
Government have in the past taken the view that ‘dominion status’ or full
10-Malaysia-57-78-cpp  21/9/04  9:06 AM  Page 221
222 PRINCIPLES FOR A FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA [73]
membership of the Commonwealth is not possible for the Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland so long as the United Kingdom retains control of Northern Rhodesia
and Nyasaland. However this might be, the possibilities of friction would obviously
be immense and a condominium is in any case not likely to be acceptable to the
Tunku. He is, however, understood not to object to British staff staying on, Malay
Governors taking the place of British. Such a substitution of Governors would
destroy the confidence of the non-Malays. But it seems just conceivable that an
arrangement could be worked out whereby sovereignty was surrendered but the
United Kingdom Government continued for a time to provide the staff to run the
territories, including the Governors. The Governors would have to be appointed by,
and responsible to, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King) of Malaya, but it might be
possible to have an agreement that such appointments would be made on the advice
of the United Kingdom Government. It might, perhaps, also be possible to agree that
on non-Federal matters the Governors would have access to advice from this
country: but this might prove to be a very difficult concept if such advice were to
include ‘political’ advice as well as ‘technical’ advice. Such arrangements might,
however, be acceptable neither to the Tunku nor to the territories, and the
possibilities of friction in practice are nearly, although not quite, as great as in a
condominium. In any case, a solution on those lines would be so complicated and so
dependent for its successful adoption on agreement in the territories that it would be
best not to mention it to the Tunku at this stage.
50. The most hopeful line with the Tunku would seem to be to take up his own
suggestion of an independent Commission. As he put it forward, such a Commission
would result from a conference of representatives of the territories to be called in the
near future and would be charged with the task of working out the constitutional
details of a federation of the territories. Given the political immaturity of the
territories it might be better not to have a conference at this stage and instead to let
a Commission sound local opinion, consider what particular safeguards and other
special arrangements would be needed for Sarawak and North Borneo if they entered
a Greater Malaysia in their present state of unreadiness and propose constitutional
arrangements to meet these. A conference could then follow the Commission with
something practical to bite upon. (We are, however, in consultation with the
Governors on the Tunku’s suggestion and cannot give firm advice until their views
are available.) It would seem quite unnecessary for such a Commission to cover
Singapore, where a continuation of direct negotiation between the Tunku and Mr.
Lee seems all that is necessary (although the Commission would, of course, need to
know what the plans for Singapore were). Whether it should cover Brunei or not
would need discussion with the Tunku and the Sultan.
Defence
51. In accordance with the Ministerial decisions on the handling of defence
aspects of the discussions, we should say to the Tunku that, as he appreciates, the
formation of Greater Malaysia creates defence problems for us in the context of our
international obligations and our joint responsibilities with Australia and New
Zealand. We understand the Tunku’s political difficulties over any specific
commitment to SEATO. We want to explore with him ways and means whereby
defence requirements do not become an obstacle to the creation of a Greater
Malaysia. We should tell him that we should expect a Greater Malaysia to assume
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military responsibility for its own internal security and that consequently we should
make a substantial reduction in the land forces which we at present maintain in
Malaya and Singapore. We should tell him that we should want to continue to have
unfettered use of our defence facilities in Singapore and that, for as far as we can at
present see, we should like, together with Australia and New Zealand, to continue to
station the Commonwealth Strategic Brigade in Malaya on the understanding that
we could if necessary commit it to SEATO operations; we should also like to retain
the use of Butterworth airfield indefinitely. The Tunku on his side may say that he
would like us to consider maintaining land forces in a Greater Malaysia over and
above our contribution to the Commonwealth Strategic Brigade in order to assist the
new country in its external defence. Also, he may say that a Greater Malaysia could
not allow us either the use of facilities in Singapore and Malaya, or the stationing of
the Commonwealth Strategic Brigade in Malacca if these were to be used for SEATO
operations. If such a stage is reached in the negotiations we should take the line that
this exchange of views has served as a valuable confrontation of his and our aims and
difficulties and that we suggest that the next stage should be for both sides to do
some re-thinking but that we are confident that, given mutual goodwill, these
problems can be solved in such a way that, on the one hand, we can continue to fulfil
our defence obligations and, on the other hand, defence problems need not in
themselves constitute an obstacle to the formation of a Greater Malaysia.
52. It is our aim to reduce as much as possible the forces stationed in Malaya and
Singapore for internal security purposes. When we propose their reduction to the
Tunku he may react by saying that the Malaysian Government will need assistance to
build up its forces to replace those of ours which are leaving. The Federation of
Malaya has had considerable defence aid from us since independence but it is very
nearly finished and it is quite possible that the Tunku may press us for more. It
would not be necessary for Ministers to answer such a request at once. The right
tactics would probably be to remit the question for consideration by officials on the
same basis as the financial talks of 1959.
53. With regard to Labuan, referred to in paragraph 32 above, we should, at this
stage, make no mention to the Tunku of the possibility of our wishing to retain
sovereignty. We must, however, accept in consequence that if we get involved in a
campaign to persuade the Borneo territories to accept the rapid achievement of
Greater Malaysia before we have decided on our defence requirements, it may later
become difficult to mention for the first time our desire to negotiate the retention of
sovereignty over Labuan.
Summary of conclusions and recommendations
54. We should accept the earliest practicable creation of Greater Malaysia as an
aim of Government policy. We can tell the Tunku that we wholeheartedly welcome
the idea of Greater Malaysia in principle and that we are prepared to give a warm
public lead in its favour. We must make clear to him the importance of our working
out together satisfactory defence arrangements. But the most pressing problem is
one of timing, particularly in relation to the Borneo territories.
55. We fully understand the urgency of the situation in Singapore. We also fully
understand the strength of the Tunku’s desire that the incorporation of Singapore
and of the Borneo territories in a Greater Malaysia should be a concerted operation.
It is, however, essential, if the operation is to be carried through successfully, that
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Greater Malaysia should not be arbitrarily imposed on the inhabitants of the Borneo
territories. We fully agree that their incorporation in a Greater Malaysia is to their
best advantage in the long term; and we are anxious to press ahead as fast as possible.
But time will be needed to ensure that the population as a whole are demonstrably in
favour of this solution, and time will also be needed to develop the apparatus of
Government and administration so that the territories are competent to carry out
their functions as parts of a Greater Malaysia. We cannot, therefore, at this stage
commit ourselves to firm dates for the accession of Sarawak and North Borneo. But
we shall do everything that we can on the following lines to ensure that no time is
lost.
56. We are prepared to use our influence towards the early accession of Brunei to
Greater Malaysia on such terms as the Tunku and the Sultan can agree between
themselves and succeed in getting accepted in Brunei. But care will be needed in the
handling of the opposition in Brunei and much harm would be done if the issue were
to be so forced as to cause serious disorders.
57. As regards Sarawak and North Borneo, we welcome the Tunku’s suggestion
for a Commission with the two-fold task of assessing the state of opinion about
Greater Malaysia and of making recommendations on the manner in which the two
territories might be associated in a Greater Malaysia (including any necessary
safeguards for their special interests) and on the timing of their entry. We should be
glad to discuss the composition and terms of reference of the Commission with the
Tunku.
58. We can go on to assure the Tunku that we are already pressing ahead with
three different developments designed to expedite the participation of Sarawak and
North Borneo in a Greater Malaysia—the appointment on the staff of the
Commissioner-General of a senior officer to co-ordinate action in this context;4
measures to accelerate the training of local people for their own public services; and
advance in the constitutional and political field. As the Tunku knows, there is already
a movement towards closer association between the two territories and we think it
right to encourage this provided that it is proved without prejudice to the concept of
Greater Malaysia.
59. On defence we should do our best to make the Tunku realise the importance
to himself and Greater Malaysia as well as to us of our continued ability to discharge
our international, Commonwealth and other obligations, and consequently of our need
to retain unfettered use of our existing defence facilities in the area. If we fail to reach
agreement with him along that line, we should tell him that the exchange of views has
been a valuable preparation for the further thought which is clearly necessary, adding
that meanwhile we are sure that it would be right to assume that agreement can and
will be reached and that we therefore need not delay such action as can be taken in
other ways to promote the realisation of the Greater Malaysia concept.
60. As regards Singapore, apart from the defence aspect, the arrangements
which the Tunku has been discussing with Mr. Lee Kuan Yew do not raise any major
problems for us, though the detailed arrangements will require consultation at a
later stage.
4 In Feb 1962 H P Hall, who was seconded from the CO to the commissioner-general’s office, was posted to
the Jesselton as co-ordinator for North Borneo and Sarawak.
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Appendix B to 73: Population figures of the territories in the proposed Greater
Malaysia
(Figures based on 1957 census in Singapore and Malaya and 1960 census in Borneo with adjustments
estimated according to known rate of increase.)
Estimated population 1961
Malaya
Malays 3,500,000 49.3%
Chinese 2,675,000 37.6%
Indians 795,000 9.8%
Others 125,000 3.3%
7,095,000 100%
Singapore
Malays 227,500 13.3%
Chinese 1,289,600 75.7%
Indians 145,100 8.7%
Others 45,100 2.3%
1,707,300 100%
Combined Singapore/Malaya Population
Malays 3,727,500 42.3%
Chinese 3,964,600 45.0%
Indians 940,100 10.7%
Others 170,100 2.0%
8,802,300 100%
British North Borneo
Non-Muslim 233,081 49.9%
Indigenous  Muslim Brajaus 72,804 15.6%
Indigenous Bruneis
Chinese 116,016 24.8%
Others (Indians, Pakistanis,
Others Indonesians, etc.) 45,099 9.7%
467,000 100%
Sarawak
Non-Muslim 353,130 44.7%
Indigenous  Muslim (Melanus) 47,400 6.0%
Chinese 243,320 30.8%
Malays 137,460 17.4%
Others (Indians, Asians, etc) 8,690 1.1%
790,000 100%
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Brunei
Muslim (Kedayans) 14,450 17.0%
Indigenous  Non-Muslim (Dusuns,
Dyaks, etc.) 9,350 11.0%
Chinese 16,150 19.0%
Malays 41,650 49.0%
Indians and Others 3,400 4.0%
85,000 100%
Estimated Population of the Borneo Territories
(N. Borneo, Sarawak, and Brunei)
Indigenous Muslim 134,654 10.0% Non-Muslim 595,561 44.4%
Chinese 375,486 28.0%
Malays 179,110 13.3%
Others 57,189 4.3%
1,342,000 100%
Greater Malaysia (Population by territories)
Malaya 7,095,000 69.8%
Singapore 1,707,300 16.8%
N. Borneo 467,000 4.6%
Sarawak 790,000 7.1%
Brunei 85,000 1.7%
10,144,300 100%
Greater Malaysia (Population by races)
Malays 3,906,610 38.5%
Muslim (Borneo) 134,654 1.3%
Indigenous  Non Muslim (Borneo) 595,561 5.8%
Chinese 4,340,086 42.7%
Others (including Indians) 1,167,389 11.7%
10,144,300 100%
Appendix C to 73: The Malayan defence agreement 5
1. Our rights to maintain defence facilities in the Federation of Malaya and to use
our forces stationed there depend on the terms of our defence agreement with the
Malayan Government.
2. Under this Agreement:—
5 For the negotiation of this agreement see BDEE: Malaya, lxxvii–lxviii, lxxx and 402, 407, 408, 410, 414,
417, 431, 432, 441, 462; for the text of the agreement see Parliamentary Papers, Cmnd 264, Sept 1957 and
J de V Allen, A J Stockwell and L R Wright, A collection of treaties and other documents affecting the
states of Malaysia, 1763–1963 (London, 1981) vol II, 264–268.
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(a) The United Kingdom Government undertake to afford Malaya ‘such assistance
as the Government of Malaya may require for the external defence of its territory’.
(b) The Government of Malaya afford to us the right to maintain in the Federation
such naval, land and air forces as are agreed between the two Governments to be
necessary for the external defence of Malaya and for the fulfilment of
Commonwealth and international obligations. The Government of Malaya agree to
the United Kingdom Government maintaining and using bases and facilities for
these purposes. The United Kingdom Government undertake to consult the
Government of Malaya when major changes in the character or deployment of
their forces in the Federation are contemplated.
(c) In the event of an armed attack against Malaya or any British territories in the
Far East, the two Governments undertake to co-operate with each other and to
take such action as each considers necessary.
(d) In the event of a threat to peace or hostilities not covered by (c), the United
Kingdom Government are committed to obtaining the prior agreement of the
Malayan Government before committing their forces to active operations
involving the use of bases in Malaya; but this does not affect the right of the United
Kingdom Government to withdraw forces from the Federation.
3. The terms of the Malayan Defence Agreement have in practice placed
restrictions on the use for SEATO purposes of our forces (including Australian and
New Zealand forces). The Malayan position has been that our defence facilities in
Malaya must not be used directly for SEATO purposes. It was, however, agreed with
them that British forces stationed in Malaya could take part in SEATO exercises and
return to Malaya provided that they were staged through Singapore. When consulted
last March about the possibility of British forces in Malaya taking part in an operation
in Laos, the Tunku stated that he would not object to the despatch of British troops
from Malaya direct to the scene of hostilities provided that this country was not used
as a base for military operations—in other words, a once for all withdrawal.
74 CAB 131/25, D 14(61)6 25 Oct 1961
‘Greater Malaysia’: Cabinet Defence Committee minutes
[The Committee reached the provisional conclusion that in the first round of talks with
the Tunku, ‘Greater Malaysia’ should be welcomed in principle but the impression should
be avoided that the British government was prepared to implement it forthwith and at all
costs. Ministerial caution was expressed by Macmillan in his summing-up: ‘the matter
was one of great difficulty since it seemed likely that we should be faced with grave
problems whether or not Greater Malaysia were achieved’. This document is also printed
in Hyam and Louis, eds, BDEE: Conservative government 1957–1964, 1, 264.]
The Committee had before them notes by the Secretary of the Cabinet covering a
report by the Official Committee on Greater Malaysia (D. (61) 62)1 and a
memorandum on Greater Malaysia by the Secretary of State for Air (D. (61) 66).2
1 For the report of the Official Committee on Greater Malaysia, see 73.
2 As secretary of state for Air (1960–1963), Amery expressed misgivings over the Greater Malaysia project
which, he argued, would weaken Britain’s title to the Singapore base. His memorandum is printed in
Hyam and Louis, eds, BDEE: Conservative government 1957–1964, I, 263.
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They also had before them a directive from the Prime Minister to the Minister of
Defence on defence policy and strategy (D. (61) 65).3
The Commonwealth Secretary said that the present proposals by Tunku Abdul
Rahman, the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, for a Greater Malaysia
comprising Malaya, Singapore and the three British Borneo territories represented a
striking change of mind since he had in January of this year discussed with the
Tunku the possibility of a merger of Singapore with Malaya. The Tunku was then
utterly opposed to such a merger despite pressure for it from Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, the
Prime Minister of Singapore. In the meantime, however, the shift of political
strength in Singapore away from Mr. Lee towards the extreme Left had evidently
persuaded the Tunku that he must as a matter of urgency incorporate Singapore
while it still had a Government with which he could agree terms acceptable to
Malaya, the alternative being an increase in Singapore of Chinese Communist
influence which he did not trust the British to control. At the same time, the Tunku
was not prepared to take Singapore into the Federation of Malaya unless by then he
could also incorporate the three British Borneo territories, in order that their
predominantly non-Chinese populations should be available to counter-balance the
overwhelmingly Chinese population of Singapore. This presented the British
Government with a difficult problem of timing as the Borneo territories were far
from ready for such an association: in the last analysis we must do what we thought
right about that and not simply abide by local opinion in Borneo, but it would be
important to carry local opinion with us and the Tunku must be made to understand
the need to do so. At present he over-rated the strength of Malaya’s attraction in the
Borneo territories. More difficult still was the problem of our bases in Singapore. The
Tunku clearly aimed at getting all the military and economic advantages of a major
British military presence in Malaya and Singapore while subjecting to his veto our
operational use of our bases and other facilities.
We could agree to the creation of a Greater Malaysia subject to reasonable
arrangements for the Borneo territories and satisfaction of our defence
requirements, but we should exercise great caution in the conduct of our first round
of talks with the Tunku next month. He was now so bent upon achieving a Greater
Malaysia that we could afford to insist that our needs, particularly in the field of
defence, must be adequately met. These talks should be regarded as an exploratory
operation, and we should be ready to reserve our position for further consideration at
a later stage if the Tunku’s initial attitude proved intransigent and uncompromising.
The situation in Singapore certainly imparted an element of urgency to the matter
but was not itself immediately decisive.
The Secretary of State for Air said that the issue turned on whether we should be
prepared to maintain our military position in Singapore, and whether we could in
fact do so. In his view our whole position the Far East, and our ability to exert any
influence with our allies—especially the United States, Australia and New Zealand—
depended upon the retention of nothing less than our present rights in both Malaya
(where they were limited) and Singapore (where they were quite unfettered). It was
an illusion to think that, if we withdrew our forces from their internal security role
in Singapore, the Tunku could still safeguard internal security with his own forces.
3 ibid, document 66.
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In a Greater Malaysia the influence of the Chinese was bound to increase and in due
course to prevail. It was asking too much of the Tunku to leave this problem with
him; and if we did so we should find ourselves having to move back again in difficult
circumstances, such as those now facing the United States in South Vietnam. On the
other hand, if we made the pivot of our policy a determination to stand firm in
Singapore we could succeed in safeguarding our essential interests. The Tunku’s
confidence in us would be restored; non-Communist opinion everywhere would
support us; and in Singapore itself we could count on the advantages of the local
economic importance of our bases and the fact that the Singapore Chinese were an
isolated community surrounded by hostile neighbours in Malaya, Indonesia and
other countries.
In discussion the general feeling of the Committee supported the view of the
Commonwealth Secretary that in the first round of talks with the Tunku we should
adopt a favourable attitude towards the principle of Greater Malaysia but avoid giving
any impression that we were prepared to implement it forthwith at all costs. We
should bring out into the open all the very real difficulties for us attending the
project, notably the necessity for great care in dealing with the Borneo territories
(where too forceful an approach could not only wreck the whole enterprise but turn
local eyes dangerously in the direction of Indonesia) and the vital importance which
we attached to agreement upon defence arrangements fully adequate to our needs.
The other main points made in discussion were:—
(a) In the long-term we could not afford to go on defending Commonwealth
countries which did not co-operate with us to the full. As was pointed out in the
Prime Minister’s minute of 23rd October to the Minister of Defence,4 and as was
clear from the Tunku’s declaration that in a Greater Malaysia our Singapore bases
would not be available for SEATO purposes, we could not assume that our defence
facilities in Malaya and Singapore would indefinitely offer a balance of advantage to
us. We must therefore in any case reconsider our long-term position there but we
must also make every effort to ensure that our present position was not meanwhile
further weakened. In this connexion the Chief of the Defence Staff 5 said that the
island of Labuan had an airfield, a good anchorage, and only some 10,000
inhabitants; if necessary, Labuan might be to Singapore what Gan was to Ceylon.
The island had been a gift to Queen Victoria, and recently had been administered
by North Borneo purely as a matter of administrative convenience. The Official
Committee’s report had recommended that no mention be made at present of the
possibility of our wishing to retain sovereignty, although this might make it
difficult to mention it for the first time at a later stage. This seemed to be a
somewhat unrealistic approach.
(b) In the short term it was very desirable that we should be able to reduce our
heavy commitment to maintain internal security in Singapore; and we should
remember that, if that responsibility passed to the Tunku, he could be expected to
find it much easier than it would be for us to take and sustain repressive measures.
For that reason he could afford to rely upon smaller forces than we had to earmark
for internal security. We needed to obtain this reduction in Singapore for two
main reasons. One was the pressing requirement for the savings which it would
4 ibid. 5 Lord Mountbatten.
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represent in men and money. If we had indefinitely to keep forces in Singapore for
internal security purposes on the present scale the whole balance of our long-term
plans for the Services would be upset as regards both finance and man-power. The
other reason was the urgent demand in other theatres for the forces thus tied up
in Singapore. On these grounds the achievement of Greater Malaysia—if we
assumed that it would relieve us of responsibility for internal security—would be
most welcome. Moreover, if Greater Malaysia was not in sight before the review of
the Singapore Constitution due in 1963 we were likely to encounter trouble there
(as we could even earlier if Mr. Lee and his Government fell). In that case we
should probably have to suspend the Constitution, perhaps for an indefinite
period. Whether or not we suspended the Constitution we should be very ill-placed
in Singapore (or Malaya) if we had to maintain our position in circumstances of
local hostility. No doubt, as experience elsewhere had shown, we could hold the
bases for some time—perhaps quite a long time—against the will of the local
Governments and peoples, but this would inevitably make it extremely difficult to
operate effectively from the bases. We should be in a particular quandary in
Singapore since, although the Army could possibly be moved from the city into the
naval and air bases, the bases themselves were so placed that reorganisation into a
relatively compact and easily defensible pattern was impracticable. The idea of
retaining sovereign areas in Singapore had its attractions, but an arrangement of
that kind might not be of great help in practice.
(c) The paragraphs in the officials’ report dealing with finance were as fair a
statement of this issue as was possible at this stage, and there appeared to be no
decisive financial objection to the Greater Malaysia project.
Summing up the discussion the Prime Minister said that the matter was one of great
difficulty since it seemed likely that we should be faced with grave problems whether
or not Greater Malaysia were achieved. Further consideration by Ministers would be
necessary before the discussions with the Tunku took place.6
6 See 77 and 78.
75 CO 1030/985, no 828 30 Oct 1961
[Preparations for the London talks]: letter from Sir J Martin to Sir A
Waddell, responding to issues raised by governors of North Borneo
and Sarawak in connection with the proposal for ‘Greater Malaysia’
[Extract]
[In preparation for the London talks, Sir John Martin sent more or less identical letters to
Waddell and Goode, passing on points from the report of the Official Committee (see 73)
about the special position of the Borneo territories and inviting the governors’ views on
the tactics to be adopted during discussions with the Tunku. He noted, for example, the
need for a commission of enquiry to assess Borneo opinion, safeguards for Borneo
interests, retention of expatriate administrators during a transitional stage and the
training of local staff. As regards the last point, P Rogers of the CO commented: ‘we may
have to try to achieve in perhaps as little as two or three years what we ought to spend at
least twenty years in doing.’ (Rogers to Goode and Waddell, 1 Nov 1961, CO 1030/1005, no
4).]
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. . . 3. The dilemma facing us all is clear. Unless we can clinch a plan for Greater
Malaysia in the near future with the Tunku, the opportunity may pass for ever. The
Tunku wants an assurance that Sarawak and North Borneo will join at least not later
than Singapore. The Singapore situation sets 1963 as the deadline there. Yet, apart
from the difficulty of ascertaining the real wishes of the majority of a population
such as that of Sarawak and North Borneo, we know that, whatever steps we may
take to hasten political advance, the training of local public servents (we shall be
writing to you and Goode separately about this) and so on, the peoples cannot be
ready by so near a date to support by any reasonable standards governments of their
own within a Greater Malaysia.
4. In the Commissioner General’s telegram No. 46 of the 30th September, which
gave his, your and Goode’s agreed views, it was stated that you were agreed that Greater
Malaysia offers the best future for the territories and that our basic policy should be
to achieve it and that, if given a firm lead, you thought you could work out proposals
which would be acceptable in Borneo. Paragraph 6 of that telegram then listed what
you thought the Borneo requirements would be. These were as follows:—
(a) Retention of existing British staff.
(b) Borneo territories must have large measure of internal self-government,
including in particular control over:—
immigration,
education including language,
citizenship,
land development.
(c) Borneo territories retain their revenues every cent of which is needed for their
own development.
(d) Freedom to pursue closer association of Borneo territories.
(e) Somehow Her Majesty’s Government must guarantee these provisions for a
period at end of which Borneo territories would have opportunity to opt out.
There have been indications that (a) might not be entirely unacceptable to the
Tunku, though it raises great difficulties (I recur to this question below). From what
he has said to various Borneo visitors and from what he said in his speech on the
16th October in Parliament in Kuala Lumpur there seems to be room for negotiation
on the question of the division of powers between the Federal Government and the
‘State Governments’ in Sarawak and North Borneo ((b) and (c) above). (d) also might
be negotiable. But the requirement of a right to opt out at the end of a period seems
to us frankly on present form an insuperable difficulty.
5. Since local men to administer the territories cannot be trained in a year or
two, however drastically one accelerates training and the giving of responsibility, and
since Malays from the peninsula would be unlikely either to be available or
acceptable (witness recent events in Brunei), the need to retain British staff as long
as possible is clear. Apart from our obligations to the peoples, the absence of an
adequate administration would carry the risk, as you have warned us, of racial strife
and that in turn might lead to Indonesia fishing in troubled waters and a state of
instability the exact opposite of what we would hope to achieve by the bringing about
of Greater Malaysia.
6. We have therefore given much thought to various means of sharing for a
period of years responsibility for the administration of Sarawak and North Borneo
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between the United Kingdom and the Federation Governments. Lord Selkirk’s letters
to which I have referred have been most helpful in this connection. But the fact is
that, however such schemes are dressed up, all of them, involving two sovereign
states, amount to a kind of condominium. The legal view is that a condominium over
these two territories is probably incompatible with their incorporation in the
Federation. Indeed, the incorporation of these two territories, subject to such a
condominium, might even be considered to have an adverse effect on the
international standing of the Federation. For example, the United Kingdom
Government have in the past taken the view that ‘dominion status’ or full
membership of the Commonwealth is not possible for the Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland so long as the United Kingdom retains control of Northern Rhodesia
and Nyasaland. However this might be, the possibilities of friction would obviously
be immense and a condominium is in any case not likely to be acceptable to the
Tunku. He is, however, understood not to object to British staff staying on, Malay
Governors taking the place of British. Such a substitution of Governors would
destroy the confidence of the non-Malays. But it seems just conceivable that an
arrangement could be worked out whereby sovereignty was surrendered but the
United Kingdom Government continued for a time to provide the staff to run the
territories, including the Governors. The Governors would have to be appointed by,
and responsible to, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong of Malaya, but it might be possible to
have an agreement that such appointments would be made on the advice of the
United Kingdom Government. It might, perhaps, also be possible to agree that on
non-Federal matters the Governors would have access to advice from this country;
but this might prove to be a very difficult concept if such advice were to include
‘political’ advice as well as ‘technical’ advice. Such arrangements might, however, be
acceptable neither to the Tunku nor to the territories, and the possibilities of friction
in practice are nearly, although not quite, as great as in a condominium. (There
would of course have to be a compensation scheme for officers, under which they
would have the right to retire, this being framed, as in the more recent schemes
elsewhere, so as not to put a premium on retirement.) We should be glad to have
your comments on the above.
7. Our general conclusion here is that the right course is to try to convince the
Tunku that we—and you too—are with him in believing Greater Malaysia to be the
best answer for Sarawak and North Borneo and that, because we really do believe it to
be in the best interests of the territories, we do intend to do our best to persuade the
territories to this view. But we should then try to get him to see, in his own interest
and that of the Greater Malaysia plan, that, if this operation is to be carried through
successfully, it is essential that Greater Malaysia should not be arbitrarily imposed on
the inhabitants of the Borneo territories. We would tell him that we fully agree that
their incorporation in a Greater Malaysia is to their best advantage in the long term;
and that we are anxious to press ahead as fast as possible. But time will be needed to
ensure that the population as a whole are demonstrably in favour of this solution,
and time will also be needed to develop the apparatus of Government and
administration so that the territories are competent to carry out their functions as
parts of a Greater Malaysia. We cannot, therefore, we should have to make clear, at
this stage commit ourselves to firm dates for the accession of Sarawak and North
Borneo. We should, for preference, avoid discussion with the Tunku of the difficult
and complicated concepts of shared sovereignties or that referred to in paragraph 6
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above and should put forward the suggestion of an independent Commission of
Enquiry with the two-fold task of assessing the state of opinion about Greater
Malaysia and of making recommendations on the manner in which the two
territories might be associated in a Greater Malaysia (including any necessary
safeguards for their special interests) and on the timing of their entry. We have had
some exchanges of view with you as to whether a Conference should precede such a
Commission or not. The state of the game on this at the moment is that North
Borneo would on balance like a Conference first (North Borneo telegram No. 207).
Sarawak would on the whole now perhaps favour a Commission without a
Conference (Sarawak telegram No. C.219)—and this is still, I think, our own
preference—but nobody feels uncompromisingly on this point. It may be that we
should wait and see how the Tunku feels on it before making up our own minds. At
the same time as we proposed a Commission of Enquiry (with or without a
Conference) we would assure the Tunku that we are already pressing ahead with
three different developments designed to expedite the participation of Sarawak and
North Borneo in a Greater Malaysia—the appointment on the staff of the
Commissioner General of a senior officer to co-ordinate action in this context (if we
reach agreement with the Tunku this appointment will of course have to take on the
appearance and, indeed, the actuality of a Greater Malaysia co-ordinator rather than
simply a Sarawak/North Borneo co-ordinator; we have just received Treasury
agreement to such a post and shall soon be writing separately about this); measures
to accelerate the training of local people for their own public services (we are writing
separately about this also); and advance in the constitutional and political field (this
also is being pursued in separate correspondence). We would also say that, as the
Tunku knows, there is already a movement towards closer association between the
two territories and we think it right to encourage this provided that it is done
without prejudice to the concept of Greater Malaysia. We should have to see how he
took this. It might be difficult to press it if he came out strongly against it; on the
other hand it might be difficult to explain to the territories why in a consideration of
their interests H.M.G. no longer thought it a good idea.
8. I should welcome your early views on these suggestions. In addition, I should
like to know whether you endorse Goode’s suggestion in his telegram No. 202 that
the Tunku and his close advisers should be encouraged to visit the territories to
assess conditions and views for themselves.
9. I should be grateful if in these coming weeks you would keep us very closely in
touch with any local expressions of opinion on this issue (with your comments where
appropriate on the importance to be attached to these).
10. I am sending copies of this letter to Lord Selkirk, White and Tory. . . . 
76 CO 1030/985, no 892 8 Nov 1961
[Preparations for the London talks]: letter from P B C Moore to W I J
Wallace giving advice on how to counter Tunku Abdul Rahman’s
likely criticism of British policy towards Singapore
I mentioned in my telegram No. 466 that I would be commenting on two recent
remarks made to the Press by the Tunku. I think we should consider these both for
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the reason that the Tunku may revert to them in London and because one has a close
bearing upon the merger issue in Singapore. What the Tunku said was:—
(a) that the Singapore officials and trade union leaders have been given too much
rope; that the British have not been firm enough and have tried to please
everyone;
(b) that if Merger did not come about then in all probability the British would in
1963 give Singapore a constitution that made them independent and thus lead to a
communist threat on the doorstep of the Federation.
2. As to the first point, one might hope that the Tunku would not feel any useful
purpose would be served by going over with us the rights and wrongs as he sees them
of our handling of political and constitutional developments in Singapore during the
past two or three years. I suspect, however, that he may well do so, at any rate in
private conversation with Ministers, and I think we must be prepared to deal in a
general way with his charge of weakness.
3. If the question is whether we were right in giving Singapore its present
Constitution, the answer is surely that this was inevitable given our general Colonial
policy and the pace of progress in other territories. The Tunku himself must see that
having granted independence to the Federation in 1957, when merger with
Singapore was not a starter, H.M.G. were bound to go some way towards meeting the
wishes of the people of Singapore for a greater measure of self-government. The
Constitution was an attempt to do this while not divesting ourselves of the powers
needed to maintain internal security and to protect our military base facilities. The
Tunku may counter that even so there was no call for us when the Constitution came
into force to agree to the release of the leading political detainees, some of whom we
must have suspected to be communists. The answer is that we had to take this risk in
order to induce the P.A.P. leaders to undertake the responsibilities under the
Constitution. Only thus could we open the way for the development of a strong,
stable local government that might be prepared to stand up publicly and clearly for
the things in which it believed and to resist the efforts of a communist minority to
lead the people astray. The Tunku must know that we have missed no opportunity of
encouraging Lee Kuan Yew to take such a stand: the pity is that he has left it so late.
4. I think that we must also be prepared to deal with the further question
whether H.M.G. themselves, through the U.K. Commissioner and using his powers
under the Constitution, should not have taken firmer action themselves over the past
two years to deal with the communists in Singapore. It is not easy to deal with this
shortly: the fact is that having granted the Constitution we had to give it a fair trial
and there has been no obvious instance in which we failed to use our powers in the
I.S.C. or otherwise. Indeed, in the cases of Soviet economic aid and Gazov, we used
them to good effect.1 The Tunku may allude to the ‘Eden Hall tea party’ and question
the wisdom of our telling Lim Chin Siong & Co. that our task was to see that the
Constitution was worked properly.2 I need not go into all this again. The short answer
is that, having given Singapore its Constitution, we had to make it clear that we
would abide by it. The undermining of the P.A.P. was partly inevitable but largely the
fault of Lee Kuan Yew. We were not responsible.
1 For British concern about Singapore’s interest in Soviet aid, see 33, para 23. 2 See 49.
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5. This brings us to the second of the Tunku’s points—that H.M.G. will, failing
Merger, give Singapore independence in 1963. There are I think two questions
arising from his public statement to this effect; first, whether we should make any
public statement in reply and, second, what in any event we should say to the Tunku
if he raises in London the question of H.M.G’s policy for Singapore if Merger fails to
come about.
6. As regards a possible public statement, I have already reported in our telegram
No. 465 Lee Kuan Yew’s view that it is essential that H.M.G. should publicly
contradict the Tunku’s assertion and say that Singapore belongs to Malaya,
historically, politically, economically and geographically and is in effect a West Irian
to which the Tunku can lay an unassailable claim.3 At a later meeting he put forward
a somewhat different suggestion to the effect that H.M.G. should say that if there
were ever any question of relinquishing their sovereignty over Singapore it could, for
historical, economic and geographical reasons, only be relinquished—with the
consent of the people of Singapore—to the Federation of Malaya. In devising these
formulas Lee Kuan Yew has of course in mind the need to indicate to the people of
Singapore before the referendum that if they vote against Merger there is no
prospect of independence for the Island alone. As reported, I told Lee that it is very
unlikely that we would be prepared to say anything on the lines of his first formula,
although it might be that we should want to say something to dispel the idea put out
by the Tunku that complete independence would in all probability be given to
Singapore in 1963. The sort of statement I had in mind was on the lines that the
question of what H.M.G. might do as a result of constitutional review for Singapore
in 1963 is premature; that at the present juncture both H.M.G. and the people of
Singapore are considering the fundamental and more immediate question of
whether or not the State should merge with the Federation of Malaya; and that it is
quite impossible at this time for H.M.G. to commit themselves in any way on the
hypothetical question of what might be done in 1963 if Merger did not take place. I
imagine that we could fairly readily agree to make such a statement and it would go
some way towards meeting Lee Kuan Yew’s point by leaving quite open the question
of Singapore’s political future if they go it alone. However, I doubt whether Lee Kuan
Yew would be satisfied and we need to consider whether it would be possible for
H.M.G. to go further and make a statement on the lines of the second formula that he
has suggested.
7. That formula contains in effect three propositions:—
(i) that independence will not be granted to Singapore alone;
(ii) that independence will only be granted through merger with the Federation of
Malaya;
(iii) that merger with Malaya will not be effected except at the wish of the people
of Singapore.
So far as (iii) is concerned no difficulty arises. It was stated in 1956 (see last para. of
Appendix 5 to Report of Singapore Constitutional Conference—Cmd. 9777) that
Merger would not be forced. It was also stated in Parliament in 1958 by the then
3 That is to say, Singapore was to be regarded as much an extension of Malaya as Dutch West Irian was of
Indonesia.
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Secretary of State that a decision on Merger was for the peoples of the two countries
alone to take and I do not think we would hesitate to reaffirm this if necessary. The
other two points are, however, very much more difficult. I suppose it is not
impossible that H.M.G. should declare in effect that they do not have any intention of
transferring sovereignty over Singapore to any other country than the Federation of
Malaya. But there is no point in making such a statement except in conjunction with
the further proposition that we have no intention of relinquishing sovereignty to the
people of the Island itself. In other words, that Singapore cannot become
independent alone.
8. There is in fact quite a lot of material bearing on this question in the Report of
the 1956 Singapore Constitutional Conference mentioned above. The Singapore
delegation put forward a closely reasoned case for saying that Singapore could
become a fully independent state within the Commonwealth and arguments against
this on grounds of non-viability, risk of communist subversion and Commonwealth
strategic requirements were all dismissed. In equally closely reasoned rebuttal of the
proposition H.M.G. did not go so far as to make a flat statement that independence
for Singapore was ruled out. The general remarks at the end of Appendix 5 in Cmd.
9777 summed up the case against independence in the circumstances then
prevailing but indicated that the position of Singapore would have to be reviewed if it
became clear that the road to full independence through Merger, which H.M.G.
favoured, was closed. In the light of this and of the development in other Colonial
territories since 1956—Cyprus springs naturally to mind—I do not see how it would
be possible for H.M.G. to say categorically that they would never grant independence
to Singapore alone. The conclusion, I suggest, is therefore that we cannot make a
statement on the lines of either of the formulas suggested by Lee Kuan Yew and that
if a statement is to be made it will have to be of the kind I have suggested earlier.
9. There remains the related but separate question of what we should say to the
Tunku in confidential discussions if he asks how H.M.G. foresee events panning out
over the period up to 1963, and thereafter, if in fact Merger is rejected and Singapore
is left for us to deal with. So far as the short term is concerned, the question is one to
which we have given much thought in the Commission. Our judgement is that if Lee
Kuan Yew is defeated on the Merger issue his position will crumble rapidly. Unless
his fall is accompanied by disturbances in which we are forced to re-assume direct
responsibility for the government of Singapore, the ordinary processes of the
Constitution will operate and there will be a general election. The likelihood in that
event is that the Barisan Socialis will form the new government and the question
that the Tunku may well put to H.M.G. is whether they intend to let this happen or
whether they have any plan for preventing either the party or certain of its individual
leaders from assuming political office. The answer to this is not easy and there are
some who judge that H.M.G. would be well advised to take ‘firm action’ at the very
start and put a number of people in detention. I am satisfied however that, always
assuming that there is no resort to direct action and that the Barisan Socialis play
their cards strictly constitutionally, it would be impossible for H.M.G. to advocate the
taking of purely preventive action against the party or any of its leaders. Such action
would in any case be a confession of failure and would lead us down a blind alley from
which it would be difficult to extricate ourselves. We cannot know for certain how
the political forces within the party would work out over any period in which the
Barisan Socialis were in office and it must surely be our hope that, as with the P.A.P.
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so with the Barisan Socialis, the extremist leaders would not in the event prove so
extreme and a communist take-over in Singapore would be averted.
10. I doubt whether any forecast of events working out satisfactorily on this
course would convince the Tunku or prevent his asking the obvious question—‘What
if you discover after Barisan Socialis come to power, that there are no leaders of
consequence within the party other than the communist leaders, and that they are
following the classical communist procedure of subverting the organs and processes
of democratic government from within?’ This is of course the most difficult question
and one that cannot be answered in detail in advance. The point to be made to the
Tunku however is that H.M.G. are not blind to the risk, that they will certainly watch
very carefully the way things are going in Singapore and will be prepared to take
such action as they deem necessary to forestall communist subversion of democratic
government in the Island. The point can be put convincingly that we should not be
so foolish as to allow a communist take-over in the very place where we were basing
the forces charged with the task of resisting communist expansion in the rest of S.E.
Asia.
11. Finally we should perhaps consider what we would say if the Tunku asked
bluntly how long we thought we should continue to require substantial defence
facilities in Singapore and whether there was any risk of our abdicating our
responsibilities here once our strategic interest had disappeared. In the nature of
things these questions are unanswerable but presumably H.M.G. will in the general
defence discussions with the Tunku make it clear that in the short to medium run
they will need and intend to retain their defence bases in Singapore. I would only add
that one of the ways in which we have brought the Tunku to contemplate Merger is
by bringing home to him the possible long term threat of Singapore to the
Federation. We must not at this stage run any risk of persuading him that Merger is
not necessary after all!
12. To sum up, I suggest:—
(a) that if the Tunku should revert to his charge that the British have given the
politicians and Trade Union leaders here ‘too much rope’ we should, as far as
possible, forego detailed rebuttal and content ourselves by making the general
point that Britain has in Singapore, as in many other Colonial territories, had no
option but to take quite considerable risks in pursuing the broad policy of
advancing the Colonies as rapidly as possible towards self-government. The Tunku
must know as well as any other Commonwealth leader that in the second half of
the twentieth century, a bold policy of this sort is the only one open to us, and that
there is no need to equate it with weakness towards communism.
(b) that if H.M.G. felt obliged to make a public statement about the constitutional
prospects for Singapore in 1963 should Merger not come about, we should say that
it is premature to consider such a hypothetical question at this stage; Merger with
the Federation is the immediate and fundamental question on which we are
concentrating our attention.
(c) that, if pressed by the Tunku to say how we envisage dealing with the
immediate situation if the P.A.P. Government should fall, we should re-assure him
privately that even if the Barisan Socialis come to power we shall watch
developments closely and will take determined action as necessary if we see
communists in the party working successfully towards a gradual take-over of the
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democratic institutions in this Island; but that we should be careful not to re-
assure him too completely lest he should decide that Merger is, after all,
unnecessary.
13. I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Moynihan.
77 CAB 130/179, GEN 754/1st meeting 9 Nov 1961
[Preparations for the London talks]: minutes of the first meeting of
the Cabinet Greater Malaysia Committee
[Set up primarily to consider matters other than defence and chaired by the prime
minister, the Greater Malaysia Committee met three times: 9 Nov, 15 Nov 1961 (see 78)
and 21 March 1962 (see 98). The day before the first meeting, Brook briefed Macmillan on
the Tunku’s suspicion that ‘we want to unload Singapore upon Malaya while keeping the
Borneo territories in our own possession’. Sir Norman Brook stressed that it ‘is essential
for us to reassure him about this’ (Brook to Macmillan, 8 Nov 1961, PREM 11/3422). The
meeting on 9 Nov was attended by Macmillan, Butler (Home), Home (FO), Watkinson
(Defence), Maudling (CO), Carrington (first lord of the Admiralty) and the Duke of
Devonshire (joint parliamentary under-secretary of state, CRO). Sir A Clutterbuck, chair
of the official committee, was also present. Notwithstanding its object to consider ‘those
aspects of the problem which did not relate to defence’, the meeting reverted to defence
and the future of Singapore bases bulked large in Macmillan’s summing up.]
1. Visit by the first lord of the Admiralty to Canberra and Wellington
The Meeting considered a telegram from the United Kingdom High Commissioner in
Canberra to the Commonwealth Relations Office (No. 996 of 9th November) saying
that the Prime Minister of Australia would be replying personally to the Prime
Minister’s message but that he had reluctantly decided that, as the Australian
election campaign had already begun, it was not practicable for him or other
Australian Ministers to receive the First Lord properly in the time available.1 Mr.
Menzies also said that it could be embarrassing for him if the First Lord were to visit
New Zealand but not Australia.
In discussion the Meeting agreed that in these circumstances the proposed visit by
the First Lord to Canberra and Wellington should not now take place. This was
regrettable and it would be worth while to bear in mind the possibility of a meeting
of Ministers from Australia, Malaya, New Zealand and the United Kingdom after the
first round of talks with the Tunku if it had not resulted in agreement upon
arrangements for defence fully adequate to our needs.
The Meeting:—
Invited the Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Relations2 to arrange for a telegram to be sent to the United Kingdom High
Commissioner in Wellington telling him that the First Lord’s visit would not
1 Australia and New Zealand were partners with Britain in the defence of Malaya and Singapore, and on 20
Oct Macmillan warned their prime ministers (Sir Robert Menzies and Keith Holyoake) of the likelihood of
Britain losing its full freedom over the Singapore base. Lord Carrington, first lord of the Admiralty, was
then lined up for a goodwill mission to Canberra and Wellington, but the visit was called off because of the
Australian election campaign. Menzies’ Liberal-Country Party was returned to power on 9 Dec.
2 The Duke of Devonshire was the nephew of Macmillan’s wife and was promoted to minister of state, CRO,
in Sept 1962.
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now be taking place but that no further communication on the subject would
be sent to the Prime Minister of New Zealand until the Prime Minister had
had the promised telegram from the Prime Minister of Australia.
2. Greater Malaysia
The Prime Minister said that the object of the meeting was to consider primarily
those aspects of the problem which did not relate to defence. The Defence Committee
had considered the defence aspects of the officials’ report on Greater Malaysia (D.
(61) 62) on 25th October 3 and had reached the provisional conclusion that in the
first round of talks with the Tunku we should adopt a favourable attitude towards the
principle of Greater Malaysia, but avoid giving the impression that we were prepared
to give effect to it at once or at all costs. We should bring out with the Tunku the
difficulties with which the project presented us, notably the necessity for great care
in dealing with the Borneo territories and the vital importance which we attached to
agreement on defence arrangements fully adequate to our needs. The Chief Secretary
to the Treasury 4 had already expressed the view that there appeared to be no decisive
financial objection to Greater Malaysia, and we were thus left to consider its political
implications.
The Tunku was at present deeply suspicious of our attitude towards Greater
Malaysia, believing that we wanted to make Malaya assume our responsibilities for
Singapore while we retained possession of the Borneo territories. We must seek to
remove this suspicion without committing ourselves too hastily or deeply over the
Borneo territories. We need not greatly concern ourselves about arrangements for
Singapore (apart from the problem of the bases) or for Brunei: so long as the Tunku
could reach agreement with the Government of Singapore and the Sultan of Brunei
on arrangements for closer association acceptable in all three territories, those
arrangements would almost certainly be acceptable to us. But there were real
difficulties about North Borneo and Sarawak. The Tunku was wrongly convinced that
the non-Chinese majorities of their populations were Malays of a sort and that, left to
themselves, they would at once accept immediate incorporation in Greater Malaysia.
This was untrue: not only were these peoples not of Malay stock but, for historical
and other reasons, they regarded the Malays with some suspicion; and such public
opinion on the subject as existed in the two territories, although cautiously
favouring Greater Malaysia in principle, did not favour entry into it at an early date or
on a par with the present States of the Federation of Malaya. We were deeply pledged
(particularly in relation to Sarawak) to retain responsibility for both territories until
their peoples were themselves ready to take over from us. Since by ordinary
standards this would not come about for many years, a rigid interpretation of our
obligations would involve a lengthy postponement of the idea of a Greater Malaysia.
On the other hand, substantial delay was likely not only to lead to grave trouble in
Singapore but also to increase the difficulty of bringing the Borneo territories into
Greater Malaysia at all (and we were satisfied that membership of Greater Malaysia
offered them the best prospects in the long-term). In this dilemma we must seek to
persuade the Tunku that we sincerely desire to get the Borneo territories into
Greater Malaysia but that we must also make a genuine effort to establish the
3 See 74. 4 Henry Brooke.
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willingness of their peoples to come in, if only because any attempt to dragoon them
without at least proper consultation could stir up such trouble in the territories as
seriously to damage, and perhaps altogether to destroy, any prospect of success.
In discussion the following points were made:—
(a) The political situation in Singapore was precarious and gave rise to the question
whether, even supposing that Mr. Lee won his referendum, he and his party might
not, before Greater Malaysia could be brought into existence, be replaced by a
different government which would repudiate any agreement already reached with
the Tunku. The general feeling was that that risk has to be taken but that it imparted
additional importance to the awkward differences which had lately arisen between
Mr. Lee and the Tunku about the form of the Singapore referendum. The Tunku
wanted it to pose a single question relating to a form of merger which would associate
Singapore with the Federation in much the same way as Northern Ireland is
associated with Great Britain. Mr. Lee wanted to avoid the risk of outright defeat on
a single question by adding a second choice of full merger between the two territories,
but this was quite unacceptable to the Tunku. Every effort was being made locally
to resolve these differences and there was nothing that we could do about them. It
seemed reasonable to hope that Mr. Lee’s position would be stronger once he had
won his referendum and that he would not be forced into a general election before
one became due in the ordinary way in 1963. This would allow some time in which
to make progress in North Borneo and Sarawak.
(b) The United Kingdom representatives in those territories thought that we
could get them into Greater Malaysia if we avoided undue haste. The best way of
setting about the problem might be, as the Tunku had himself proposed, the
appointment of a Commission to examine the matter on the spot. But whereas the
Tunku wanted a Commission only to work out constitutional arrangements for
the incorporation of the Borneo territories in Greater Malaysia, it seemed essential
that it should also be given the task of assessing local opinion on the project. The
Commission might take any one of various forms. The Tunku’s idea appeared to be
an independent chairman together with two Malayan and two British
representatives. But it might be better to have a Commission which was wholly
independent in the sense that it contained no direct representatives of any of the
Governments concerned. Another possibility was a one-man Commission, and in
that case Mr. Malcolm MacDonald might be a suitable and generally acceptable
choice if his services could be obtained. The Meeting agreed that the only
practicable means, first of reassuring the Tunku about our willingness in principle
to bring North Borneo and Sarawak into Greater Malaysia, and second, of carrying
opinion both in the two territories and outside with us in any such attempt, was
the appointment of a suitable Commission of some kind, with terms of reference
and membership satisfactory to the four Governments concerned. Its tasks would
be to establish the general state of local opinion about Greater Malaysia and to
recommend the constitutional and other terms on which North Borneo and
Sarawak might enter the wider association, including any special arrangements
which might be necessary to safeguard their interests until they reached a stage of
development on a par with the existing status of the Federation of Malaya.
In further discussion the Meeting reverted to the defence aspects of the problem
and the following were the main points made:—
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(c) It was impossible in advance of the forthcoming talks with the Tunku to define
the defence problem more precisely than had been done in the officials’ report, or
to determine our approach to it more exactly than the general conclusion of the
Defence Committee on 25th October, 1961. We must probe the Tunku very hard
about it in order to discover to the greatest possible extent what he really had in
mind, but without giving any indication at this stage that we might be able to
accept any derogation from our present rights in the Singapore bases. It would be
very damaging if we made any substantial concession before engaging in thorough
consultation with our Australian, New Zealand and American allies, all of whom
wanted us to retain our existing rights and facilities in Singapore. It might be,
however, that we ought in any case to begin planning a radical change in our
military presence in the Far East, switching from a pattern of cantonments in
Malaya and Singapore to a main base in Western Australia (possibly with a forward
operating base in e.g. Labuan) and relying upon an air-borne and sea-borne
capacity to intervene in South East Asia. On that calculation, if the Tunku refused
to allow us freedom in the use of our facilities in Singapore within a Greater
Malaysia, our best course might be simply to live it out in Singapore for some
years while we made our new arrangements. During that time, despite all the local
difficulties which would beset us, we could probably count upon being able at least
to mount a ‘once for all’ operation from Singapore if necessary.
(d) The question was largely one of presentation. The Tunku’s attitude to our
difficulties over Laos had not been unreasonable and he might be willing to enter
into private agreements with us which would meet our material requirements. But
no private agreement would fully serve our ends, if our public position involved a
ban (or even a veto) by a Greater Malaysian Government on our use of the Singapore
bases for SEATO purposes. A possible compromise might be to develop the ANZAM
arrangement, bringing Greater Malaysia more fully into it and turning our defence
agreement with Malaya into a quadripartite treaty between Australia, New Zealand,
Greater Malaysia and the United Kingdom. This would accord with the Tunku’s
present willingness to allow us free use of the Malayan and Singapore bases for
Commonwealth defence, although not for SEATO; and the New Zealand Government
had in fact made such a suggestion. If it were adopted, the Tunku might be prepared
to agree publicly not only that we should have complete freedom of action for
Commonwealth defence, but also that we could use the bases operationally for other
(i.e. in fact, SEATO) purposes also, subject to consultation, at the same time
undertaking privately not to make difficulties for us in any such consultation.
(e) We had several useful cards to play in our talks with the Tunku—his own
enthusiasm for Greater Malaysia, enhanced the general value of the part which we
could and must play if it were to be achieved; we could offer him material co-
operation in getting the Borneo territories in, or at least committed; he almost
certainly wanted us to maintain a substantial military presence in South East Asia;
and it would be in his interest to ensure that the merger did not entail a reduction
in the massive employment which our forces provided in Singapore.
Summing up the Prime Minister said that we could support the Greater Malaysia
project in relation to Singapore (subject to satisfactory arrangements about the
bases) or Brunei, and that we could give it our blessing in principle in relation to
North Borneo and Sarawak, while insisting upon fair treatment for their peoples. But
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in the last analysis our attitude must be determined by our ability or inability to
obtain satisfaction of our defence requirements: any agreement with the Tunku
about them must be not only adequate in effect but also defensible in public.
The Meeting:—
(1) Took note of the Prime Minister’s summing up.
(2) Agreed to discuss the Greater Malaysia project further the following week.
78 CAB 130/179, GEN 754/2nd meeting 15 Nov 1961
[Preparations for the London talks]: minutes of the second meeting of
the Cabinet Greater Malaysia Committee
[The attendance at the second meeting of the committee differed from that on 9 Nov:
Macmillan, Kilmuir (lord chancellor), Home, Hailsham (lord president and minister of
science), Sandys, Watkinson, and Maudling.]
1. Discussions with the Tunku
The Prime Minister said that discussions with the Prime Minister of Malaya (Tunku
Abdul Rahman) about Greater Malaysia were due to start on 20th November. The
Malayan delegation would be small, consisting of four Ministers and two senior
officials, and it seemed desirable to avoid confronting them with too large a United
Kingdom team.1 The nature of the talks themselves, which would be largely
exploratory, also made it desirable to keep the meetings relatively intimate and
informal. Our aim should therefore be to limit regular attendance at the meetings to
the Ministers most directly concerned (the Commonwealth Secretary, the Colonial
Secretary and the Minister of Defence), each being accompanied by preferably not
more than one official adviser. It did not seem necessary to trouble the Chancellor of
the Exchequer or the Foreign Secretary to attend these meetings as a matter of
course, but it would be helpful if they could be available to attend a particular
meeting if that seemed desirable. In these circumstances it also seemed desirable to
dispense with any full, formal record of the proceedings for agreement between the
two sides. No doubt each side would want to take their own notes and we should
certainly keep an adequate record ourselves: for the rest, we should aim at the end of
the talks to agree with the Malayans upon a summary of the conclusions reached.
He suggested that he should preside at an opening meeting at 11 a.m. on Monday,
20th November, and a closing meeting at 4 p.m. on Thursday, 23rd November,
although it would be possible for him if necessary, to take the closing meeting at 11
a.m. on Friday, 24th November. These meetings would be held at Admiralty House.
The intervening meetings should be conducted by the Commonwealth Secretary at
the Commonwealth Relations Office.
He would open the first meeting by giving a general welcome to the idea of Greater
Malaysia and then ask the Tunku to give his own views at length on the subject. He
would then wind up by describing the United Kingdom’s general attitude to the
concept, including a statement of the main problems as we saw them—how to deal
with the Borneo territories; the future of the Singapore bases; and by what practical
means we might seek to make progress in bringing Greater Malaysia into being.
1 See 79, note, for the composition of the negotiating teams.
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The Meeting:—
(1) Took note of the Prime Minister’s statement.
(2) Instructed the Secretaries to arrange for the Official Committee on Greater
Malaysia to consider detailed preparations for the discussions in accordance with
that statement.
2. Proposal for a commission of enquiry
The Meeting considered a brief on this subject (GEN. 754/2, Annex A) prepared by
officials for use in the discussions with the Tunku.2
The Prime Minister said that the Tunku had suggested that a commission should
be appointed to work out the constitutional details of a Greater Malaysia on the
model of the commission under Lord Reid which had drafted the constitution of the
Federation of Malaya.3 But officials, while supporting the idea of a commission, had
recommended that its task should be rather different and two-fold—to ascertain the
views of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak on Greater Malaysia, and then, in
the light of those views, to make recommendations about the manner and timing
under which such an association might be achieved and the safeguards which might
be necessary for the two Borneo territories. Arrangements for the merger of
Singapore with Malaya were already far advanced separately and there seemed no
reason for the proposed commission to cover Singapore; and this was probably also
true of Brunei since it was in a different position from the other two Borneo
territories as a predominantly Malay and Muslim Protected State over which we had
no sovereignty. Ministers had already agreed that we could almost certainly accept
any arrangements which the Tunku might reach with the Government of Singapore
and the Sultan of Brunei for closer association acceptable to all three territories. We
had, however, to consider whether there should be separate commissions to assess
opinion in North Borneo and Sarawak about Greater Malaysia and to make
constitutional recommendations about their incorporation, or whether one
commission could undertake both tasks. We had also to consider whether there
should be conferences between the Governments concerned before or after any such
commission had done its work, or both. Officials recommended that we should aim
in our discussions with the Tunku to get agreement on a single commission with
terms of reference on the lines which he had mentioned, and that in the light of its
report there should be a conference representing all the territories of Greater
Malaysia and the United Kingdom at which formal decisions might be taken on the
creation of Greater Malaysia.
In discussion the following points were made:—
(a) There seemed advantage in having one commission and not two since it would
be difficult to examine the state of local opinion in Borneo about Greater Malaysia
without at the same time considering what might be the form of the Greater
Malaysia which was the subject of that opinion.
(b) Because the work of the commission would be focussed upon North Borneo
and Sarawak it was arguable that it should consist entirely of members appointed by
the United Kingdom Government. A suitable team might consist of Mr. Malcolm
MacDonald as chairman (he was known to be favourable to the concept of Great [sic]
2 Not printed. 3 See 46, n 5; for the selection of the commission’s chairman see 89, note.
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Malaysia, he enjoyed wide confidence in the Borneo territories and he was likely to be
acceptable to the Tunku), together with a suitable lawyer and a third member with
appropriate experience in colonial administration.4
(c) We had to recognise that, unless we could bring Greater Malaysia into being
fairly quickly, we might lose the opportunity for all time. If, therefore, as Ministers
had already agreed, we thought Greater Malaysia desirable in the interests of all the
territories concerned, we might have to press North Borneo and Sarawak into it
more urgently than we should ideally want. For this reason, it was important to
retain flexibility in our position with relation to the views of the local peoples, and
the proposed commission should not be unduly formal in its constitution.
(d) The best plan might be for any commission to report to a conference representing
the Governments of all the territories concerned, including the United Kingdom. If
that conference then decided that Greater Malaysia should be created, it could agree
how the necessary constitutional arrangements could be made. A further commission
could be appointed to carry out this task (like the Reid Commission in Malaya) but
there might be advantage in the work being done by direct negotiation between
Governments without recourse to ‘independent’ legal aid.
Summing up the Prime Minister said that the general feeling of the Meeting
seemed to favour a small United Kingdom commission which would both assess
opinion in North Borneo and Sarawak and make general recommendations about
arrangements for their incorporation in Greater Malaysia, including safeguards to
meet the needs of their special circumstances. It would be possible for the
commission also to consider the position of Singapore and Brunei in relation to
Greater Malaysia, but this might not be necessary. It would also be possible to
consider the appointment of a Malayan member to the commission: on the whole,
that perhaps would be better avoided but the point could be left for discussion with
the Tunku. It seemed unnecessary to have an inter-governmental conference before
the commission went to work—the right occasion for a conference would be to
consider the commission’s report and decide how to proceed from that point.
Although Ministers had now considered the Greater Malaysia problem on a
number of occasions it had not yet been raised in the Cabinet and it was desirable
that the Commonwealth Secretary should mention it in Cabinet on the following
day.5
The Meeting:—
(1) Took note of the Prime Minister’s summing up on the subject of the proposed
commission of enquiry.
(2) Invited the Commonwealth Secretary to make an oral report to the Cabinet on
the following day about the way in which the talks with the Tunku were to be
handled.
4 The Reid Commission, however, had not been entirely appointed by the British government; it had been
a commission of Commonwealth jurists and had reported to both the Crown and Their Highnesses the
Malay rulers. Ministers soon came round to the view that the Borneo enquiry should be conducted by a
joint Anglo–Malayan Commission, see 80.
5 In fact Cabinet had already agreed (10 Oct) that talks should go ahead with the Tunku about ‘Greater
Malaysia’ (CAB 128/35, CC 55(61)5, 10 Oct 1961 and document 66 N). On 16 Nov Sandys notified Cabinet
that ‘exploratory discussions’ were due to start on 20 Nov (CAB 128/35/2, CC 63(61)6) which is printed in
Hyam and Louis, eds, BDEE: Conservative government 1957–1964, I, 265).]
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79 CAB 134/1953, GMD(B)61/1st meeting 20 Nov 1961
[London talks]: minutes of the first meeting held at Admiralty House
at 11 am with Mr Macmillan in the chair
[The Anglo–Malayan talks of Nov 1961 were the first of four Greater Malaysia conferences
held in London; the others took place in July 1962, May 1963 and June–July 1963. The
talks of Nov 1961 consisted of six formal sessions (see 79–84). The first and last were
chaired by Macmillan at Admiralty House (the prime minister’s base during renovations
to 10 Downing Street from the summer of 1960 to the summer of 1963) and the other
three by Sandys at the CRO. The Malayan delegation was led by the Tunku (prime
minister and minister for external affairs), Abdul Razak (Defence) and Tan Siew Sin
(Finance). Federal officials in attendance included Ghazali Shafie (External Affairs), Abdul
Kadir bin Shamsudin (Defence) and the Malayan high commissioner in London. The
British ministerial team was Sandys, Maudling, Watkinson and Perth (for one meeting
only), and it was supported by Sir R Scott, Sir J Martin, Sir G Tory, P B C Moore, G P
Hampshire (assistant under-secretary, CRO) and E H Peck (assistant under-secretary,
FO). At the conclusion of the talks a brief, joint statement was published and Selkirk was
notified of the outcome by telegram. The next day, Sandys reported to Cabinet that it had
been agreed, firstly, to appoint a commission to ascertain the views of Borneo peoples
and, secondly, to extend the Anglo–Malayan Defence Agreement of 1957 to the other
territories. On 28 Nov Sandys informed the House of Commons and a joint Anglo-
Malayan statement was published at the same time. Particular care was taken with the
wording of the formula governing the use of Singapore bases so as neither to constrain
Britain’s fulfilment of regional defence obligations nor to impair Malayan/Malaysian
sovereignty. The published statement permitted the United Kingdom to use the facilities
of Singapore as it ‘may consider necessary for the purpose of assisting in the defence of
Malaysia, and for Commonwealth defence and for the preservation of peace in South East
Asia’. Each side sought to avoid embarrassment—the British with their allies, the
Malayans with their electorate—but it proved very difficult to reconcile differences in an
unequivocal, public statement. To the consternation of Sandys and Watkinson, the Tunku
and Razak were soon tempted to reassure their public that Britain’s continued use of the
bases would be subject to a Malaysian veto (see 85 and 86). See Federation of Malaysia.
Joint Statement by the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Federation of
Malaya (Cmnd 1563); H of C Debs, vol 650, cols 242–248, 28 Nov 1961; CAB 129/107/2,
C(61)190, 22 Nov 1961; CAB 128/35/2, CC 65(61)4; CAB 134/1953; DO 169/213; DO
169/307, nos 20A, 33A and 63A; PREM 11/3420.]
Greater Malaysia discussions: opening meeting
The Prime Minister, after extending a welcome to Tunku Abdul Rahman and the
members of his Delegation, expressed the British Government’s whole-hearted
acceptance of the concept of Greater Malaysia. Britain recognised that there were
compelling reasons for bringing about this association while the present opportunity
lasted. Time was not on our side in view of the precariousness of the situation in
Singapore. It was necessary, therefore, to examine urgently practical ways and means
of advancing towards the common objectives.
The best way of proceeding might be for the discussions to be continued by a small
and informal group, with the Commonwealth Secretary leading on the British side,
supported by the Colonial Secretary and the Minister of Defence, the Chancellor of
the Exchequer and the Foreign Secretary being available if required. It would be
convenient for the subsequent meetings to be held in the Commonwealth Secretary’s
room at the Commonwealth Relations Office. In order to preserve the informality
and flexibility in the discussions, there would be a minimum of officials on the
British side. For the same reason it might be desirable to have no formal agreed
minutes of the meetings although at their conclusion an agreed statement might be
desirable. He suggested that the first meeting should be at 3.00 p.m. on Monday
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afternoon and subsequent meetings at 10.30 a.m. and 3.00 p.m. on Tuesday. Later in
the week, perhaps on Thursday, discussion might be resumed at Admiralty House
under his own chairmanship.
Singapore
The Prime Minister went on to say that although the British Government had already
had a clear explanation from Tunku Abdul Rahman himself of his plan for Greater
Malaysia, that was some little time ago. There would now be more recent
developments to report. It would be helpful, for instance, if the Tunku could say
something about the understanding which he had recently arrived at with the Prime
Minister of Singapore.
Tunku Abdul Rahman said that for a long time he had hesitated to agree to the
proposals of the Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, for a merger
between the Federation and Singapore. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew had, however, succeeded
in convincing him of the danger to which the Federation would be exposed if
Singapore became separately independent and, as was probable in that event, came
under communist control. This, and the renewal of communist aggression in the
countries to the north of Malaya, had satisfied him that he ought to come to some
arrangement with Mr. Lee. As a result they had agreed upon the principle of a merger
between their two countries, and a working party had been set up to work out the
way in which this might be arranged. The conclusions of the working party, which
had been agreed to by both Mr. Lee and himself, were embodied in a White Paper
which had been published in Singapore within the last few days.1 Briefly, what was
proposed was as follows:—
(i) Singapore would be a State within the Federation but on special conditions
and with a larger measure of local automony than the other States forming the
Federation. Defence, external affairs and internal security would be Federal
subjects: education and labour would be State subjects.
(ii) The fundamental liberties and the special position of the Malays in Singapore
would be preserved.
(iii) The present Singapore Legislative Assembly would continue as a State
Legislature, with reduced powers.
(iv) The existing Singapore civil service would be retained as a State civil service.
(v) The present Singapore Judicial and Legal Services would become a separate
branch of the Federal Judicial and Legal Services. The ultimate control of the
Judiciary would rest with the Federal Chief Justice in Kuala Lumpur.
(vi) The present separate Singapore citizenship and voting rights would be
retained, but in other respects Singapore citizens would enjoy the same national
rights and have the same passport as Federal citizens.
(vii) If Singapore were to join the Federation on a par with the existing member
States it would be entitled to about twenty-five seats in the Federal Legislature by
virtue of the size of its electorate. In view, however, of the greater autonomy which
Singapore would enjoy in comparison with the existing States, it had been agreed
1 The Singapore White Paper, Memorandum Setting out the Heads of Agreement for a Merger Between
the Federation of Malaya and Singapore (Cmd 33), was the product of negotiations that had been going
on since Aug and was adopted by Singapore’s legislative assembly on 6 Dec 1961 (see 59, note and 87 n 1).
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that the number of Singapore representatives should in practice be limited to
fifteen.
It had also been agreed (though this was not stated in the White Paper) to consider
further a proposal that, as a territorial measure pending merger, the Singapore
Government should be invited to appoint fifteen representatives, on an all-party
basis, from the Singapore Legislative Assembly to join the Federation of Malaya
House of Representatives.
It had originally been Mr. Lee Kuan Yew’s intention, to hold a referendum in
Singapore on the subject of merger. Mr. Lee had come to feel, however, that there
was a real risk that the outcome of such a referendum might be unfavourable, and he
seemed now inclined to look upon a majority vote in the Singapore Legislature as a
sufficient indication of the country’s support for the proposed change.2
The Borneo territories
The Meeting then went on to give initial consideration to the position of the Borneo
territories in relation to Greater Malaysia.
The Prime Minister said that, as the Tunku was already aware and had publicly
acknowledged, before the British Government could transfer sovereignty over the
Borneo territories they would have to satisfy themselves, and the world at large, that
this change was being made with the consent of those territories. Some form of
consultation with them was therefore essential, and one of the important problems
which now had to be decided was how this could most expeditiously be carried out.
Tunku Abdul Rahman said that his Government fully understood the British
Government’s feelings about this aspect of the matter. On the other hand, preparation
of the Borneo territories for entry into Greater Malaysia was a matter of urgency. If it
were delayed, the opponents of Greater Malaysia would be given time to foster opposition
to the idea. He hoped that the position of the Borneo territories would not in fact be
found to cause any great difficulty. The efficiency of their administration after a hand-
over of sovereignty could be preserved if the present British civil servants there could
be retained as others were in the Federation of Malaya after the country became
independent. In general, the change of sovereignty need have little effect on the lives
of the peoples of the Borneo territories. They would enter the proposed new association
on the same basis as the existing States of the Federation with broadly the same limited
amount of local autonomy. He recognised, however, their fears that amalgamation with
Malaya might lead to an influx of Chinese immigrants, and that it might, therefore, be
necessary to make special provision for local control over immigration.
The Sultan of Brunei would have exactly the same position in Greater Malaysia as
the Rulers of the Malay States now have in the Federation of Malaya: this he fully
understood.
Defence and internal security
The Meeting then turned to the questions of defence and internal security and the
Prime Minister invited Tunku Abdul Rahman to give his views.
Tunku Abdul Rahman said that the main issue in relation to defence was the
South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). He fully recognised that the purpose
2 In fact Lee went ahead with the referendum which was held on 1 Sept 1962.
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of SEATO was to provide for the defence of South East Asia against communism—
but that, after all, was also the object of the Malayan Defence Agreement between
Britain and Malaya. SEATO was not popular in South East Asia, partly because only
two of the South East Asian countries were members. Because Malaya was not a
member of SEATO and SEATO was unpopular in Malaya, it was impossible for his
Government to agree that in Greater Malaysia the SEATO label should continue to be
attached to the British bases in Singapore. Nevertheless, if trouble with communism
came to a head and war broke out, Britain would, of course, be able to make full use
of all her facilities in Malaya as well as the Singapore bases: indeed, the Singapore
bases would be less useful than the others in war because their situation made them
more vulnerable. He therefore thought that they ought to be put on the same footing
as the bases in the Federation of Malaya, and he believed that it should be possible to
work out arrangements which would satisfy Britain’s real needs, including those
relating to SEATO. When preparations were being made for the last SEATO exercise
he had told the British to go ahead with those preparations which involved the use of
our bases in Malaya, but had asked us not to insist upon a formal, written agreement.
That should perhaps be the approach to the problem of the Singapore bases.
On internal security he said that the communist threat in South East Asia was
grave and widespread. Things were going badly in South Viet Nam and if the
communists succeeded in taking over that country they would undoubtedly step up
their activities in Singapore. He would have much preferred to leave Singapore well
alone as hitherto and concentrate on keeping Malaya free from communism, as at
present: but he could not help fearing that, when the Singapore constitution came
under review in 1963, Britain might feel obliged to grant separate independence.
This would inevitably lead to Singapore becoming a communist state and he had
decided that the only way of avoiding that danger was to accept the merger of
Singapore with the Federation of Malaya. He believed that he would be able to deal
successfully with the internal security situation in Singapore after merger, even
though that might mean increasing his armed forces and police. All these forces
would be under central control from Kuala Lumpur, and it was his intention to set
up an Inspectorate General of Police with responsibility for internal security
throughout the whole of Greater Malaysia.
The Prime Minister said that the problem of the Singapore bases was one of great
importance for us. He repeated that we fully shared the Tunku’s desire to bring
Greater Malaysia into being but it would be very difficult for us to accept defence
arrangements which imposed fresh restrictions upon our freedom to use our bases
and other facilities in Malaya and Singapore. We were under firm obligations to
SEATO and we could not contemplate going back on them: moreover, the vast effort
in men and money which we had put and were still putting into our bases would be
wasted if we did not continue to enjoy freedom of operation in time of need.
The Minister of Defence said that we would naturally very much welcome being
relieved of our present responsibilities for internal security in the Greater Malaysia
territories. As the Tunku had himself said, it would inevitably do harm both to the
local Governments and to ourselves if British troops had in fact to be used in support
of the civil power. On the other hand, the problem of the use of our bases for external
defence was much more difficult: they were of value to us only if we could say openly
that we should be in a position to carry out our obligations in full when occasion
arose. He asked whether it might help if the Malayan Defence Agreement were
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extended to become a Commonwealth agreement rather than a bilateral agreement
between Malaya and the United Kingdom (with which Australia and New Zealand
were associated). But the real issue for us was our need to enjoy unfettered use of our
bases and facilities in Singapore.
The Tunku said that he thought that talks on defence between all the Commonwealth
countries directly interested in South East Asia were desirable as a matter of urgency,
but that they should be pursued as a separate issue from the question of the merger
of Singapore and the Federation of Malaya. The aim of the present discussions should
be to work out a satisfactory agreement over the Singapore bases.
The Commonwealth Secretary said that the morning’s discussion had been most
helpful in clarifying the issues at stake. It was clear that far and away the two most
important questions were those of consultation with North Borneo and Sarawak and
the Singapore bases. As the Prime Minister had stressed, Britain sincerely wanted to
achieve Greater Malaysia in principle because she thought it the right answer to the
long-term problems of all the territories concerned: he shared the Tunku’s anxieties
about Singapore and agreed that independence there would mean Chinese
communist control; and he also agreed that the Borneo territories had little hope of a
decent future in separation from one another or from Malaya. But the questions of
consultation and timing were crucial since we must not only do what we thought
right, but also ensure that what we did could properly be represented as meeting the
broad wishes of the Borneo peoples. He had been very glad to hear the Tunku
recognise that the aims of SEATO—predominantly to combat communism in South
East Asia—were in fact helpful to Malaya. He had no doubt that if SEATO military
operations became necessary the Tunku would agree to the use of our bases for that
purpose, but the main object of SEATO was not so much to fight a war against
communism as to provide a deterrent which would make war unnecessary by
establishing general confidence that aggression would be resisted if it took place.
Because of this, secret agreements about the operational use of our bases were not
really enough: we must be able to demonstrate to our allies and the world that we
could use our bases and their facilities for SEATO purposes if necessary. It was clear
from the discussion that both the Malayans and ourselves recognised each other’s
difficulties in this connection and our joint aim must be to work out a practical
solution satisfactory to both sides.
The Meeting:—
Agreed to resume its business in the Commonwealth Secretary’s room in the
Commonwealth Relations Office at 3 p.m. that afternoon.
80 CAB 134/1953, GMD(B)61/2nd meeting 20 Nov 1961
[London talks]: minutes of the second meeting held at the
Commonwealth Relations Office at 3 pm with Mr Sandys in the chair
Greater Malaysia discussions
Singapore
The Commonwealth Secretary asked about the significance of the word ‘transitional’
which had been used in describing the proposed arrangements for merger between
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the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, as set out in the White Paper presented to
the Singapore Legislative Assembly.
In discussion it emerged that they were not intended to be temporary, although
they could be described as ‘provisional’ until they had been approved by the
authorities concerned. Once the Singapore Legislative Assembly had approved them
they would be submitted for approval by the British Government and by the
Parliament of the Federation as part of arrangements for Greater Malaysia as a whole.
Thereafter they would be subject to alteration only by agreement between the
Malaysian and Singapore Governments.
The Commonwealth Secretary also asked what would happen to the proposals for
merger between Singapore and the Federation if the present Government of
Singapore were to fall: there was some danger of this as they had a majority of only
one in the Legislative Assembly.
Tunku Abdul Rahman felt that, with the support of his own Alliance Party
representatives and of the Singapore Peoples Alliance, the present Singapore
Government might be able to hold on until the next general elections due in 1963.
But there was no certainty that they could do so, and it would be fatal to the
prospects of Greater Malaysia if they failed. It was therefore essential to press ahead
with Greater Malaysia as quickly as possible.
Problems of the Borneo Territories
The Commonwealth Secretary stressed that we believed Greater Malaysia to be in the
best interests of all the countries concerned; and that we recognised the inclusion of
the Borneo territories in Greater Malaysia to be an indispensible part of the
Federation’s plans. Before the Borneo territories could be included, however, certain
problems had to be settled: in mentioning these we did so in a constructive spirit and
with no desire to delay the achievement of Greater Malaysia.
The Colonial Secretary said that we were ready to advise the Sultan of Brunei to
join Greater Malaysia, although we should not want him to do so in any way that
might risk provoking opposition among his own people. If, as was possible, such
opposition resulted in civil disturbance, the effect would be not only to damage the
prospects of Brunei joining Greater Malaysia, but also to raise doubts among the
peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak about the wisdom of their joining.
Before decisions could be taken whether or not North Borneo and Sarawak should
join Greater Malaysia we must ascertain the views of their peoples in principle and
we must be certain of administrative arrangements ensuring that their own
Governments could fulfil the functions which would be required of them after
merger. To meet these requisites we suggested the appointment of a commission of
enquiry with two roles. The first would be to find out what were the views of the local
peoples, the second to recommend arrangements for merger, including any special
provisions necessitated by the particular circumstances of the two territories. A
constitutional conference of representatives of the British, Malayan and both Borneo
Governments would in due course be required, but that should be held after the
commission had done its work. The proposed commission might perhaps consist of a
British chairman together with four other members, two appointed by the British
and two by the Malayan Governments. The chairman should be a man of wide
general experience rather than a constitutional expert but one of the British
members would in all probability be a suitably qualified lawyer.
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The Meeting then considered the possible terms of reference set out in G.M.D.(61)
2:—
‘Taking into account the expressed agreement of the Governments of Britain
and the Federation of Malaya that a closer association between Singapore,
North Borneo, Brunei, Sarawak and the Federation of Malaya is a desirable
aim in the interests of the people of the territories concerned,
(a) to examine and ascertain the views of the peoples of North Borneo and
Sarawak on the possibility of a closer association of the five territories;
(b) in the light of their assessment of these views to make recommendations
regarding the conditions and timing under which association with the
Federation of Malaya might be achieved and the safeguards for North Borneo
and Sarawak which might be necessary.’
In discussion the Malayan representatives made the following points:—
(a) It was possible to be too cautious over consulting the Borneo territories. In
1957 Penang and Malacca had been included in an independent Federation of Malaya
without special consultation; and the Brookes had ceded Sarawak to Britain on their
own personal authority immediately after the war.
(b) The terms of reference of the proposed commission should leave no doubt
that full merger of the Borneo territories in Greater Malaysia was intended. The
present mention of ‘closer association’, coupled with a reference to Singapore in
the preamble, implied something less than full merger of the Borneo territories;
and the point was important presentationally in Malaya, where full merger of the
Borneo territories was regarded as essential if the Federation was to take in
Singapore.
(c) There need be no difficulty over Brunei as the Sultan was very keen on merger.
Although there was some local opposition to it from the only political party, that did
not amount to very much and the people would follow the lead given them by the
Sultan. There was no natural basis for the growth of party politics in Brunei as the
people shared in the general prosperity which the Sultan derived from his oil
revenues and were content with things as they were.
(d) Lord Ogmore1 would be a very suitable chairman for the commission.
On the British side the following points were made:—
(e) There were essential differences between Penang and Malacca joining the
Federation and the Borneo territories joining Greater Malaysia. Sarawak’s coming
under British administration had special features: in particular assurances had been
given by us in effect not to transfer sovereignty ourselves without consulting the
people of Sarawak. It was essential to show the British Parliament and the world
generally that we had done as much as was reasonably possible to consult local
opinion, and that would be one of the main functions of the proposed commission,
which would not only consult the Legislative Councils of North Borneo and Sarawak
but also sound opinion at large in both territories.
(f ) It was important to provide safeguards which would satisfy the two
1 Lord Ogmore (formerly David Rees-Williams) had Malayan experience and was a friend of the Tunku, see
46, n 6.
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territories that the terms on which they joined Greater Malays [sic] could not be
altered against their will. It would not, therefore, be enough to have those
safeguards protected by provision in the Federal constitution that they could not
be altered except by a two-thirds majority in the Federal Parliament: it would be
necessary to provide that any change required the agreement of the territorial
Legislatures.
(g) Full merger was the aim of the consultations which the commission would
have in the Borneo territories—we understood the importance of this
presentationally in Malaya. Nevertheless while the commission should put over the
case for Greater Malaysia to the peoples of the territories, they could not be expected
in their recommendations to insist on the territories necessarily joining on the
same terms as the existing States of the Federation of Malaya. There would have to
be room for meeting the special needs of the territories, particularly over
immigration: not to allow this might prejudice the chances of securing the
territories’ agreement.
Broad general agreement emerged as follows:—
(i) Consultation in the Borneo territories was necessary before they could be
committed to joining Greater Malaysia. The best approach to this would be a
commission composed of a British chairman with two members drawn from the
Federation of Malaya and two from Britain. The terms of reference proposed in
G.M.D.(61)2 were discussed and revised in order to include a note of urgency and to
give more of a lead in favour of Greater Malaysia, while avoiding the impression that
its achievement was regarded as a fait accompli. The Secretaries were instructed to
re-issue G.M.D.(61)2 thus revised and the Malayan representatives would give the
matter further thought with a view to discussing it again next day. In any case the
proposed commission should be set up as soon as possible and asked to complete its
work with all speed, preferably within three months.
(ii) When the commission had completed its work there should be a
constitutional conference to consider its recommendations and reach agreement for
arrangements to achieve Greater Malaysia.
(iii) There might be need to ensure that the terms on which the Borneo territories
entered Greater Malaysia could not subsequently be altered without their individual
agreement.
(iv) There would be no objection to Brunei’s being covered by the commission if
the Sultan so wished: indeed, that might be a safer course than submitting the issue
to a Brunei Legislature after elections had been held, since the only existing political
party at present professed opposition to Greater Malaysia. The British Government
would seek the Sultan’s views. While there was no objection to discussion between
Brunei and the Federation of Malaya about merger, agreement on the inclusion of
Brunei required careful timing: it was important that no final or public agreement
should be reached between Brunei and the Federation without prior consultation
with the British Government.
The Meeting:—
Agreed to resume its discussion at 10.30 a.m. on the following day.
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81 CAB 134/1953, GMD(B)61/3rd meeting 21 Nov 1961
[London talks]: minutes of the third meeting held at the
Commonwealth Relations Office at 10.30 am with Mr Sandys in the
chair
Greater Malaysia discussions
Defence
The Meeting discussed the extent to which the defence bases in Singapore would
continue to be available for use by Britain and her SEATO allies after the
achievement of Greater Malaysia.
The Commonwealth Secretary said that there did not seem to be any basic
disagreement on this matter between the Federation and British Governments. The
latter had been given reason to believe that, whatever interpretation was to be put on
the terms of the Malayan Defence Agreement, the Federation Government would not
in practice put any obstacles in the way of use of the existing bases in the Federation by
British forces and the forces of other SEATO countries if those forces became required
for defensive operations within the region. It was also their understanding (which Tunku
Abdul Rahman now confirmed) that the Federation Government were prepared to apply
the same understanding to the use of the Singapore bases after a Federation/Singapore
merger. The British Government recognised that the state of public opinion in the
Federation did not allow the Federation to accept any proposals which publicly
associated them with SEATO, or to pass through their Legislature any measures which
would have the effect of increasing the Federation’s present undertakings about the use
of Commonwealth forces stationed on Malayan territory. The British Government
certainly had no wish to try to involve the Federation Government in SEATO against
their wishes. On the other hand, the Federation Government must recognise that Britain
had to remain free, and be seen to remain free, to discharge the international obligations
which they had undertaken under the Manila Treaty.
The following points were made in discussion:—
(a) From the point of view of the Federation Government it would be sufficient if
an understanding between them and the British Government over the use of the
Singapore bases after the establishment of Greater Malaysia were recorded in a secret
agreement. This would not, however, meet the British Government’s needs. It was
essential to them that there should be a public indication which would satisfy the
British Parliament and Britain’s allies of their continued ability to honour their
SEATO obligations. Only in this way could the main function of SEATO as a
deterrent remain unimpaired. That this should be so was in the interest of the
Federation as well as of Britain and her SEATO allies.
(b) Agreed arrangements about the future use of the bases in Greater Malaysia
might be recorded in either of two ways: there could be a new Defence Agreement
altogether, or the existing Malayan Defence Agreement could be extended and
adapted to meet the changed circumstances. From the point of view of presentation
in both the Federation and Britain, the latter course was preferable. If necessary the
extension of the present Malayan Defence Agreement might be accompanied by a
public exchange of letters to indicate the interpretation which the two Governments
had agreed to put upon it.
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(c) It would meet the British Government’s requirement if the amended
Agreement, or the accompanying exchange of letters of interpretation, could show,
in substance, that the Government of the future Federation of Malaysia would permit
unrestricted use of the British bases within the Federation for the purposes of the
defence of Malaya and other Commonwealth territories; and that it was accepted in
this connection that the defence of Malaya was best achieved, and the interests of
Malaya best served, by the preservation of peace within the whole area of South East
Asia.
(d) The present Malayan Defence Agreement did not stipulate whether Britain
and her allies were entitled to deploy forces direct from the bases in the Federation
for use on SEATO exercises, and it had become the practice for forces embarking on
such exercises to be removed in the first place from the Federation to Singapore,
which then became the ‘jumping-off ’ point. It was necessary from the British
Government’s view-point that an amended Defence Agreement should not adversely
affect the use of the Singapore bases in this way.
(e) One solution of the problem of reconciling the British Government’s
requirements with the difficulties in which the Federation Government were placed
domestically might be for the Singapore bases in a Greater Malaysia to be leased to
Britain, whose responsibility it would then be to decide the uses to which they were
put.
(f) After a mutually acceptable arrangement had been arrived at between the
Federation and British Governments for the future use of the Singapore bases, care
would have to be taken on each side not to make any public statements which would
compromise the public position of the other.
The Meeting:—
(1) Agreed that although the British and Federation Governments had somewhat
conflicting requirements over the public presentation of matters affecting the
future use of the Singapore bases in Greater Malaysia, the Federation Government
would in practice not wish to impede the full use of the bases by British and allied
forces in the event of their being required for defence operations in the region.
(2) Agreed that the use to which those bases in a Greater Malaysia could be put
would best be defined by an agreed amendment of the existing Malayan Defence
Agreement, accompanied, if found necessary, by a public exchange of letters
between the two Governments.
The Borneo territories
The Meeting then considered the draft terms of reference for the proposed
commission of enquiry into the inclusion of North Borneo and Sarawak in Greater
Malaysia as revised in accordance with discussion at the meeting on the previous
afternoon (G.M.D. (61) 2 (Revise)).
In discussion the revised draft was agreed subject to a number of amendments,
and the following points were made:—
(g) There would be no mention of Brunei in the terms of reference unless and
until the Sultan, in response to an enquiry on our part, asked for the commission to
cover his State.
(h) The commission should begin its task as soon as possible and the earliest
practicable date would probably be January, 1962.
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(i) It would be of great assistance in carrying the Borneo territories with us over
merger to have representatives of their peoples associated at all stages with the
arrangements for the achievement of Greater Malaysia. However, it was impossible at
this stage to decide exactly who should participate in discussions on the commission’s
recommendations: a decision could be taken only when it was known what those
recommendations were. It was therefore agreed that the commission should submit
its recommendations to the Governments of Britain and the Federation, whose
responsibility it would then be to agree what further steps should be taken.
(j) The Malayan representatives agreed that there was no objection to
administrative measures, such as the forthcoming introduction of a free trade area
between the two territories, designed to promote closer association between Sarawak
and North Borneo: but it was also agreed that the Greater Malaysia project took
precedence over any proposals for closer political association between the two
territories.
The Singapore Internal Security Council
The Colonial Secretary raised the question of the Federation’s decision to withdraw
their representative from the Council. They had given notice of this last August and
their decision would take effect next February. The Federation’s withdrawal would be
a serious matter as the Council would then have only a consultative role and there
would be no possible check on the Government of Singapore in the field of internal
security except through the suspension of the constitution.
Tunku Abdul Rahman explained that his Government, after due consideration, had
felt it necessary to take the decision in order to show their displeasure at the Singapore
Government’s policy over releasing communist detainees. The Malayan decision had
proved effective in making the Singapore Government more careful over releasing
further detainees. The Singapore Government had agreed to give no publicity to the
Federation’s action because they realised that once publicity had been given there was
no chance of the Federation’s reconsidering their decision. It was possible that the
Federation might reconsider their decision in the light of the new atmosphere that
now existed between the Federation and the Singapore Governments. He would be
glad to discuss the problem separately with the Colonial Secretary.
The Meeting:—
(3) Agreed that a draft statement of understanding between the two Governments
on the interpretation of their mutual Defence Agreement in relation to Greater
Malaysia should be prepared for further discussion at 3 p.m. that afternoon.
82 CAB 134/1953, GMD(B)61/4th meeting 21 Nov 1961
[London talks]: minutes of the fourth meeting held at the
Commonwealth Relations Office at 3 pm with Mr Sandys in the chair
Greater Malaysia discussions
Defence
The Meeting had before them a draft statement of understanding between the British
and Federation Governments on the interpretion of the existing Defence Agreement
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between the two countries as extended to cover the proposed Federation of Malaysia
(G.M.D. (61) 3). Tunku Abdul Rahman indicated that the draft in its present form was
unacceptable politically to the Malayans because it could be interpreted in the
Federation as a commitment on the use of the Singapore bases for SEATO purposes.
The Commonwealth Secretary suggested that a possible solution might be a lease
to cover the use of the Singapore bases: it might be on the lines of leases for bases
elsewhere—for example, the United States’ bases in the West Indies—which were not
subject to unilateral revocation by either of the Government concerned.
In discussion the draft statement was amended to read as follows:—
‘The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the
Federation of Malaya have agreed, on the formation of the proposed
Federation of Malaysia, as follows:—
(a) The Agreement on External Defence and Mutual Assistance of 1957 and
its Annexes shall be extended to apply to all the territories of the Federation of
Malaysia, and any references in that Agreement to the Federation of Malaya
shall be deemed to apply to the Federation of Malaysia.
(b) The Agreement and Annexes shall, in respect of Singapore, be interpreted
to mean that the Government of the Federation of Malaysia will afford to the
Government of the United Kingdom the right to continue to maintain the
bases and other facilities at present occupied by their Service authorities
within the State of Singapore, and will permit the United Kingdom
Government to make such use of these bases and facilities as they consider
necessary for the protection of the territories of Malaysia and other
Commonwealth countries, and the preservation of peace in South East Asia.’
In arriving at this agreed text the following points were taken into consideration:—
(a) A statement of understanding was a better solution to the problem of
Singapore than a lease because a lease would involve complicated drafting, with the
need to spell out in considerable detail provisions to cover all possible eventualities:
it would in effect amount to a separate defence agreement for Singapore.
(b) In the special arrangement for Singapore set out in sub-paragraph (b)
reference to ‘unrestricted’ use of the bases and other facilities would have raised
serious political difficulties for the Federation Government because of the SEATO
implications. The words ‘exclusive right’ were also politically objectionable to the
Federation. These words had been employed so as to ensure that only Britain and no
other country would be given rights over the bases but it was agreed to omit
‘exclusive’ as the point was academic since the Federation of Malaysia would never in
fact want to give such rights to a third country. The description in the agreed text of
how the bases might be used would enable Britian to employ them for all likely
purposes, including that of meeting her SEATO obligations (both operationally and
for exercises) and the use of the bases by her allies. There was no reference in the
statement to the consent of the Federation Government being required for the use of
the Singapore bases as was necessary under a similar clause of the existing Defence
Agreement. On the use of the Singapore bases for purposes strictly outside South
East Asia it was felt that the reference to the protection of the territories of ‘other
Commonwealth countries’ provided adequate cover.
(c) The statement of understanding would extend the existing Defence
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Agreement to the Borneo territories. Precise arrangements for British defence
facilities there were not yet settled and we must reserve our position in that respect.
We might, for example, want to continue to use the territories for SEATO exercises;
and in any case they were valuable for training purposes. We were also interested in
the possible use of Labuan for defence purposes. We felt, however, that it should be
possible in the event to agree satisfactory arrangements for the Borneo territories
within the ambit of the Defence Agreement.
(d) In reply to a Malayan inquiry about the British attitude in the event of an
attack upon Australian territory in New Guinea it was made clear that we must be
free to use the Singapore bases to help the Australians.
Press communique
The Commonwealth Secretary suggested that some preliminary consideration
should be given to the terms of the communique which should be issued at the
conclusion of the present talks. It was also desirable to agree upon what should be
said publicly in reply to enquiries from the press and others about the extent to
which the use of the bases in Singapore would be affected by the creation of Greater
Malaysia. Since the statements about the terms of reference of the commission of
enquiry and about future defence arrangements which the meeting had considered
were to be published, the communique itself could incorporate them verbatim, and
its preparation should not therefore, present any difficulty. A draft would be prepared
for consideration at a later meeting. In the meantime the British Government would
inform the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand at once of the contents of
the two statements which had been proposed. In doing so, they would have in mind
that, although the meeting had agreed broadly on the terms of the statement about
future defence arrangements, the exact text was still subject to further consideration
by the Federation representatives.
Federation/Singapore merger arrangements
The Colonial Secretary invited the Malayan representatives to clarify the statement
which they had made on the previous day to the effect that the arrangements for a
Federation/Singapore merger described in the White Paper presented to the
Singapore Legislative Assembly were ‘transitional’.
Enche Ghazali explained that, although the term ‘transitional’ did not appear in
the White Paper itself, it was the one used by the Federation Government to describe
the means by which a merger of Singapore with the Federation could be achieved at
short notice without running into constitutional difficulties. Under the existing
Federal Constitution new States could join the Federation only on the same terms as
the existing member States. The Constitution would have to be amended in
considerable detail to provide for the entry of Singapore into the Federation on the
intended special terms. This could not be done at all quickly. In order, therefore, that
the merger might be effected at short notice, if necessary, it was the intention to
introduce a new provision into the Federal Constitution which would allow for a new
State to join the Federation on special terms in anticipation of the later full
amendment of the Constitution. There was no intention of changing the
‘transitional’ arrangements embodied in the White Paper before they were finally
enshrined in the Federal Constitution; and the agreement of the Government of
Singapore would be necessary before any such changes could be made.
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It was suggested by the British representatives that this arrangement was liable to
lead to misunderstandings and trouble in Singapore. It would be possible for ill-
disposed persons to argue that the published arrangements whereby Singapore
would join the Federation on special terms were not as permanent as they seemed.
The Federation Government, they felt, would do well to go ahead as quickly as
possible with preparations for the necessary fuller amendment of the Constitution
with a view to completing it, if at all possible, before the merger of Singapore with
the Federation took place.
The Minister of Defence informed the meeting that Tunku [sic] Abdul Razak and
he had arranged to meet on Monday, 27th November to discuss what help, if any, the
Federation Government would need from Britain in preparing to assume
responsibility for internal security in Singapore after merger was effected.
The Meeting:—
Agreed to resume their discussion at 10.00 a.m. on the following day.
83 CAB 134/1953, GMD(B)61/5th meeting 22 Nov 1961
[London talks]: minutes of the fifth meeting held at the
Commonwealth Relations Office at 10 am with Mr Sandys in the chair
Greater Malaysia discussions
Press communique
The Meeting considered a draft press communique (G.M.D.(61)4) announcing the
outcome of the discussions. Annexed to the communique were draft statements on
the terms of reference of the commission of enquiry for North Borneo and Sarawak,
and on the agreed arrangements on defence.
Defence arrangements
The Commonwealth Secretary observed that it was essential that any statement
about the future defence arrangements should leave no doubt that Britain would
continue to be able to despatch forces, and especially naval forces, from Singapore
for activities outside South East Asia without the prior consent of the Federation
Government, even though the Federation Government would in practice normally be
informed of such movements.
Tunku Abdul Rahman said that the Malayans for their part could not agree to any
arrangement which could be said to be inconsistent with the future sovereignty of
the Federation over Singapore. The sort of movements envisaged by the British
representatives could, however, be interpreted as ‘withdrawals’ of forces from Malaya
and so would be acceptable.
The Meeting:—
(1) Agreed that the draft statement of agreed arrangements on defence (Annex B)1
should be amended so as to make it clear that after the formation of Greater
Malaysia, Britain would remain free to make such use of the bases and facilities in
1 Not printed.
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Singapore as she might consider necessary for the purpose of assisting in the
defence of Malaysia, and for Commonwealth defence and for the preservation of
peace in South East Asia.
(2) Agreed that the main text of the draft communique should also be amended
accordingly.
Press enquiries
The Meeting went on to consider what should be said by the British and Federation
representatives in reply to press and other enquiries about the outcome of the
discussions.
The Meeting:—
(3) Agreed that the following guidance should be observed in answering enquiries
about defence arrangements:
‘(a) The bases at Singapore will be British bases and will not be transferred to
the control of SEATO or to any other nation or group of nations.
(b) The new arrangement does not prevent Britain carrying out her
international and Commonwealth obligations.
(c) Neither of our Governments shall make any public statement which
conflicts with the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) above.’
Constitution of the commission of enquiry
The Meeting:—
(4) Agreed that, as regards the proposed commission of enquiry no forecasts
should be made of how soon it would begin and finish its work. It would be
sufficient to say that the commission would be set up, and would report, as soon as
possible.
(5) Agreed that the choice of a chairman and other members for the commission
of enquiry should be discussed before the Federation representatives left London.
Historical documents
Tun Abdul Razak asked if it would be possible for the Federation Government to
obtain copies of certain past records which were no longer available in Malaya but, it
was hoped, could be found in London. The Commonwealth Secretary undertook that
they would be given every assistance in this.
General
The Commonwealth Secretary expressed appreciation of the frank and cordial
atmosphere in which the talks had taken place and of the contribution made by the
Federation Prime Minister and his colleagues to their successful and speedy
outcome.
Tunku Abdul Rahman expressed similar appreciation. The satisfactory result of
the talks was indicative of the common aims and outlook of the British and
Federation Governments.
The Meeting:—
(6) Agreed to conclude the discussions at an immediately following meeting
under the chairmanship of the British Prime Minister.
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84 CAB 134/1953, GMD(B)61/6th meeting 22 Nov 1961
[London talks]: minutes of the sixth meeting held at Admiralty House
at 12 noon with Mr Macmillan in the chair
Greater Malaysia discussions
The Meeting had before them a joint statement by the Governments of the United
Kingdom and the Federation of Malaya on the outcome of the talks about Greater
Malaysia.1
North Borneo and Sarawak
The Prime Minister said that he assumed that the report of the Commission of
Enquiry would be published. He was sure that this would in fact prove necessary and
he therefore thought that the Commission should be so informed before they started
work as the knowledge was bound to have some influence on the manner in which
their report was drawn up. He regarded it as important that the Commission should
complete their task with all reasonable speed. They should be able to make rapid
progress as there seemed no need for their report exhaustively to cover all possible
constitutional arrangements for the entry of the two territories into Greater
Malaysia. It would be very important to make the right choice of Chairman: he
understood that Tunku Abdul Rahman and the Colonial Secretary had already had
some discussion on the matter and that it would be considered further while the
Malayan representatives were still in London.
The Commission would have to take into account the special needs of the two
territories in recommending the terms on which they might join Greater
Malaysia. These terms might well be different from those on which the existing
States of Malaya were members of the Federation, although some at least of the
differences might be of a temporary nature. Land would no doubt have to be a
State subject (as, indeed, it was under the existing Constitution of the Federation
of Malaya); and it might be necessary, for example, that education should be a
State subject in North Borneo and Sarawak although it was a Federal subject in
Malaya.
Tunku Abdul Rahman said that he thought it important that, although the special
circumstances of Singapore justified leaving education as a State subject there, it
should be a Federal subject in North Borneo and Sarawak. This was desirable as his
most effective means of developing a sense of Malaysian nationhood and of binding
the peoples concerned into a practical, working unity. The task would be facilitated
by the fact that the Malay language and the languages of the non-Chinese peoples of
Borneo had a common basis.
He agreed that, in order to avoid a breakdown in the local administrations, it was
essential to retain the services of British officials until local people were ready to take
their places. This would require careful presentation but the problem had been
handled successfully in Malaya and he had no doubt that that could also be done in
the Borneo territories. Meanwhile, his Government could help by sending officials to
1 Published as Federation of Malaysia. Joint Statement by the Governments of the United Kingdom and of
the Federation of Malaya (Cmnd 1563).
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help in Borneo (although experience in Brunei had shewn the need for great care
over any such arrangement) and by taking local officials from Borneo to Malaya for
training.
The Colonial Secretary said that a British Act of Parliament would be necessary for
the transfer to Greater Malaysia of Sovereignty over North Borneo and Sarawak (and
Singapore), but not in relation to Brunei, where sovereignty was vested in the
Sultan. Whatever might be the timing of entry into Greater Malaysia by North
Borneo and Sarawak, he saw no reason why the British Government should object to
Brunei going in at once provided that the transition could be arranged on terms
acceptable to all concerned.
Defence
The Prime Minister said that it was gratifying to find that agreement had been
reached over defence arrangements, and in particular that a satisfactory formula had
been found to meet the presentational needs of the British and Federation
Governments in relation to the Singapore bases. His line with his own Parliament
would be that Singapore had never been, and would not be, a SEATO base: it had
always been, and would remain, a United Kingdom base, although it was available to
enable us to fulfil our international (including SEATO) obligations.
Singapore
The Prime Minister felt that the outcome of the present talks should encourage and
strengthen moderate opinion in Singapore.
Tunku Abdul Rahman added that the outcome would also be particularly welcome
to businessmen and especially to foreign business whose capital investment in
Singapore was so vital.
Communique
The Meeting:—
(1) Agreed that neither we nor the Malayan representatives should make any
separate statement to the press about the talks; the communique should be
allowed to speak for itself. It would be released in the Federation and in Britain in
time for the following day’s morning newspapers.
(2) Agreed that the Sultan of Brunei should be informed as soon as possible of the
agreement reached in the present talks: otherwise he might feel that decisions of
importance to Brunei were being taken over his head. It would be necessary at the
same time, or as soon after as was possible, to sound him on the question whether
or not the Commission should cover Brunei.
Concluding remarks
Both the Prime Minister and Tunku Abdul Rahman expressed their satisfaction at
the outcome of the talks, in which results that met the needs of both sides had been
quickly reached in the frank and cordial atmosphere appropriate to discussions
between Commonwealth countries.
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85 DO 169/307, no 63A 27 Nov 1961
[Anglo–Malayan differences over defence]: note by C Benwell1 of a
discussion between Mr Watkinson and Tun Abdul Razak
The Minister saw Tun Abdul Razak privately after the official meeting this morning.
The Secretary, Enche Abdul Kadir and myself were also present.
2. Tun Abdul Razak said that he had sought an opportunity of seeing the
Minister alone because he was worried about the questions that would be put to his
Government in connection with the joint statement on Defence issued on November
23rd. He felt that in public his Government would be bound to take up the position
that the Singapore base could only be used in support of SEATO with the permission
of the Federation. In practice, it would of course be sufficient if the Federation
Government were simply informed of what the United Kingdom intended to do, e.g.
by way of exercises or troop movements.
3. The Minister said that he must make plain that if it were publicly stated that
the use of the Singapore base by H.M.G. was subject to a Malayan veto, he would be
bound to deny it. If there were in fact a right of veto, the base would be of little
further use and H.M.G. would stop spending money on it. He pointed out to Tun
Abdul Razak that it was in the clear interest both of the Federation and of the United
Kingdom to encourage the United States to maintain a presence in S.E. Asia and this
they would not do if there were doubt about the United Kingdom’s capacity or will to
do likewise. He also drew attention to a possible Commonwealth solution to the
problem—namely an agreement drawing in India, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand,
the Federation and the United Kingdom.
4. Tun Abdul Razak appeared to agree with both the last two points.
5. In conclusion, both Ministers accepted that there was a genuine difficulty
about reconciling the different attitudes of the two Governments when it came to
public interpretation of the statement on defence; but that it was best not to try to
bridge the gap at this stage by any form of words. Though there would be difficulties
and embarrassment, the best line was for each Government to stand by the agreed
principles governing public statements, and refrain from interpretations
inconsistent with those made by the other.
1 C W R Benwell, private secretary to Mr Watkinson, minister of defence, 1959–1962.
86 DO 169/213, no 42: 2 Dec 1961
[Anglo-Malayan differences over defence]: outward telegram no 1719
from Mr Sandys to Sir G Tory, reporting his conversation with the
Tunku on 1 Dec
I saw the Tunku tonight and told him that I had heard that Razak on his return to
Malaya had said to the press that the Singapore base would not be used for S.E.A.T.O
purposes and that the British could not make use of it without consulting the
Malayans.
2. I warned the Tunku very firmly that the entire value of our recent agreement
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would be destroyed if he and his Ministers continued to put an interpretation upon it
which the text could not by any stretch of the imagination justify.
3. He assured me once again that he fully accepted that the base could be used for
S.E.A.T.O purposes without the agreement of the Government of Malaysia but that
he and Lee Kuan Yew had political difficulties in presenting this to their own peoples.
4. I said that we fully appreciated his position but that a private understanding was
not enough. It was quite impossible for us to go on speaking with two contradictory
voices on a vital aspect of the agreement. This was bound to lead to a
misunderstanding which would become acute when the time came to embody the
agreement in a formal treaty. I added that unless he could clear up the doubts which
he and his Ministers had created we would have to consider carefully whether it was
right to proceed with the Commission of Enquiry.
5. He said that he was very worried about the reactions to the agreement
particularly in Singapore and that he was afraid that Lee Kuan Yew might lose his
slender majority and be replaced by a near Communist Government. He would not
know how serious the situation was until he got back on Monday but he would
consult his Cabinet and Lee Kuan Yew at once and communicate with us.
6. In the circumstances he thought his Cabinet might decide that they would
prefer the Commission to be composed wholly of British Government
representatives.
7. I told him that if he had originally made this proposal we could probably have
accepted it without difficulty but that having announced that the Commission would
be a joint one the withdrawal of the Malayan representatives would certainly be
interpreted as implying disagreement between us.
8. I got the general impression that the Tunku was thoroughly rattled. He felt that
he had agreed in London to more than he could carry with his own people and with
the people of Singapore. He seemed genuinely afraid that the pressure of public
opinion might force him to withdraw from the agreement and renounce the idea of
Greater Malaysia.
9. If he returns to Malaya in this depressed and despairing mood I’m afraid he may
not put up much fight and may be disposed to throw in his hand.1
10. In the light of the above please telegraph urgently your assessment of the state
of opinion in Kuala Lumpur/Singapore and if possible obtain the views of Razak/Lee
Kuan Yew.
11. I should like to receive your reply in time for me to talk further with the Tunku
on Saturday evening before his departure on Sunday morning.
1 This is the first indication of Sandys’ impatience with the Tunku which reached a crescendo in Aug–Sept
1963. The British official who saw him off at the airport gained a very different impression of the Malayan
premier and reassured Sandys on 4 Dec that he was ‘certainly not in a “depressed mood” then; he seemed
relaxed and cheerful and spoke kindly of you’. Indeed, he seemed to be optimistic about the Greater
Malaysia project and he arrived back in Malaya to a rousing welcome.
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87 PREM 11/3866 2 Dec 1961
[Role of commissioner-general in Anglo–Malayan defence
arrangements]: letter from Lord Selkirk to Mr Macmillan, proposing
formal machinery for Anglo–Malayan defence co-operation and the
extension of his term as commissioner-general
The speed with which the discussions with Tunku Abdul Rahman were completed
have made a considerable impression here although curiously enough, there has
been absolutely no comment here from any of the political figures in Singapore.1 I
was glad to see from the recent telegram from the Ministry of Defence (COSSEA 41)
that they fully appreciate the importance of avoiding any wordy discussion between
Kuala Lumpur and Whitehall. Indeed, it must be, I think, quite obvious that when
the Federation has sole charge of internal security in Malaya and Singapore, it will be
fully within their power to prevent us from doing things which they do not want us
to do. I have, therefore, no doubt that the effect of the agreement is that we can do
anything we like provided the Tunku agrees. But, if the Tunku is prepared to oppose
us, our sphere of activity will be severely curtailed.
In these circumstances, I consider it of first class importance to establish proper
joint machinery in Kuala Lumpur for the purpose of carrying out the three common
objectives promoted under the defence agreement: that is, the defence of Malaya, the
defence of Commonwealth interests and the maintenance of peace in South East
Asia. Such arrangements would not only serve to educate the Malays but would also
give them reasonable assurance and confidence that they know what we are doing.
They would also provide a formal link between the Malayan armed forces and the
Commonwealth armed forces in Malayan territory. Their exact form would need
careful examination and eventually discussion with the Malayan Government but I
have no doubt that something of this character is necessary.
The second point I want to make concerns timing. It is already clear that the
interim period before Greater Malaysia is achieved should not be prolonged a day
longer than is absolutely necessary. All decisions on policy, investment and
appointments are already tending to be deferred. Lee is just holding his own in
Singapore, but with some difficulty, and could well be destroyed at any time by
further defections in his party. As the Tunku said yesterday, if the present
Government fell, the whole idea of merger would collapse. I believe, therefore, we
should not only be ready to bring Malaysia into being next year but we should bend
all our efforts to achieve that objective. I believe the earliest date this might be
possible is August which conveniently coincides with Merdeka Day in the Federation.
This overriding aim will, I hope, be clearly before the Borneo Commission when it
proceeds with its work. It will, I hope, also be in our minds when considering the
setting up of new organisation both in Singapore and in Kuala Lumpur to operate
the new arrangement. By the same criterion, I also think it would be unwise for me
to leave as at present suggested in April as this will mean the establishment of an
1 On 5 Dec, however, the Sultan of Brunei publicly expressed approval of the outcome of the London talks
and on 6 Dec Singapore’s Legislative Assembly voted 33 to 0 (with 18 Barisan supporters absenting
themselves) in favour of the Heads of Agreement on merger with Malaya, cf 59, note and 79, n 1.
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interim organisation at precisely the time when these matters are being brought to
fruition. My replacement by a ‘U.K. Commissioner for Singapore’ will leave no one
with an oversight covering the whole area. It will seem as if we are withdrawing
before the job is properly completed.
I realise this new suggestion may run counter to our short term financial policy
but what we are trying to do is to achieve a sounder evolution of this area. In the long
run this will mean not only a reduced British liability generally but peaceful progress
in a manner which would serve not only our interests but also the best interests of
South East Asia as a whole. I must, therefore, suggest to you that my removal from
this position be deferred until, say, August to see whether it is not possible to get
these arrangements through by that date. By then, even if it was not completed, we
should be able to have a clearer picture of the manner in which it can be completed. I
have no doubt that though we have surmounted a big hurdle, one or two quite
difficult fences lie ahead of us.
88 PREM 11/3866 19 Dec 1961
[Role of commissioner-general in Anglo–Malayan defence
arrangements]: letter from Mr Macmillan to Lord Selkirk
[In his reply, Macmillan took into account the views of the foreign secretary and argued
‘that it would be a mistake to create formal consultative machinery too soon’ while the
need for economies warranted immediate retrenchment in the commissioner-general’s
office. He concluded, therefore, that ‘we should stick to our present plans’ rather than
prolong Selkirk’s term to the inauguration of Malaysia, although he was later persuaded
to extend (see 90). On the same day, the chiefs of staff discussed British strategy in the
1960s and noted that projected defence expenditure still did not come within budget
(COS 85(61)3, DEFE 4/141; see also CAB 21/4626 and D1(62)1, 12 Jan 1962, CAB
131/27).]
Thank you for your letter of December 21 about some of the problems arising from
the Greater Malaysia project. The two particular suggestions which you have made—
on consultation with the Malayans about defence and on the timing of changes in the
United Kingdom organisation in Singapore—raise important questions and I am
grateful to you for writing to me about them.
Assuming that Greater Malaysia comes into being, I agree that in practice our
ability to use our bases in Malaya and Singapore as we want will largely depend upon
good relations with the Malaysian Government, and that we should therefore without
delay do everything possible to develop with the present Malayan Government a habit
of close and frank consultation. Harold Watkinson had some discussion about this
with Abdul Razak and Kadir when the Malayans were over here recently,2 and all of us
concerned with the problem have since been giving it further careful thought, as a
result of which we find ourselves in accord with your views except on one point of
some importance.
We do not differ from you on objectives (particularly the necessity to educate the
Malayans in the problems relating to the defence of Malaya, the defence of
Commonwealth interests and the maintenance of peace in South-East Asia, and to
1 See 87. 2 See 85.
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give them reasonable confidence that they know what we are doing), and we also
agree, as I have already indicated, that the way to attain these objectives lies through
the development of regular and effective consultation. But we think that it would be
a mistake to create formal consultative machinery too soon. Instead I feel that we
should begin by encouraging informal and increasingly frequent exchanges of views
and information without the publicity and rigidity which would inevitably attend a
more formal approach.
There are several reasons for this. It seemed clear from the attitude of the Tunku
and Razak when they were here last month that they would prefer both Governments
to approach defence problems flexibly and pragmatically without too constant an eye
to the exact interpretation of written agreements. Again, we are already, under the
Malayan Defence Agreement, virtually committed in principle to discuss problems
relating to the defence of Malaya and of the Commonwealth; and formal machinery
for discussing the maintenance of peace in South East Asia might embarrass both
sides, ourselves because it could lead to arguments about our freedom of action
which we could otherwise avoid, and the Malayans because it might involve them in
matters which they would prefer quietly to leave to us alone. Moreover, experience in
ANZAM suggests that we might find difficulty in providing enough material for
worthwhile discussion at regular meetings of a formal character; and if the agenda
tended to be on the thin side we might well arouse in the Malayan mind a suspicion
that we were not serious about consultation and were deliberately withholding our
confidence from them.
On the other hand, as I have said, we are fully aware of the desirability of bringing
the Malayans, both in the Services and in Government, to a better understanding of
the relevance to Malaya of the general defence problems of South East Asia, and of
the particular issues to which they give rise for the United Kingdom. One of the
difficulties hitherto has been that because the broader aspects of defence have been
handled by British officers, seconded to Malayan service, there has been little
opportunity for Malay officers to extend their horizons. The Chiefs of Staff are
considering this problem now and will be consulting the Commanders-in-Chief in
Singapore about the best means of dealing with it. Our present view is that we should
begin by increasing the regular supply of general information, especially in the field
of intelligence, and move on to a more liberal exchange of planning information
when the educational process is well established and showing good results. That
would seem to be the stage at which we might hope to instill in the Malayans a better
appreciation of the nature and value of SEATO. At the same time, we also think that
we should develop more extensive and frequent contacts with Ministers and senior
officials of the Malayan Government—again, informally to start with. The
Commonwealth Relations Office will be getting in touch with Tory about this. We
think that at first exchanges of both kinds should be bilateral, but we are anxious to
draw Australia and New Zealand into this pattern of informal consultation and shall
be consulting their Governments about the best means and timing for doing so. We
feel sure that they will want such an association and we have no doubt that it would
be in our interests. It may well prove in due course that informal consultation could
with advantage be replaced by more formal arrangements but, for the reasons which
I have given, we think it desirable that that should happen, if at all, as a result of
general agreement arising from experience.
Your second suggestion related to the timing of the Greater Malaysia project. I
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agree that we want to achieve it as quickly as possible, but we have to recognise just
what the possibilities are. It seems to me that it might well be fatal to the whole
project if we appeared to be rushing our fences, particularly in relation to the Borneo
territories. You will have seen that Goode and Waddell believe that, if the
Commission of Enquiry is to do a satisfactory job, time must first be allowed for the
peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak to gain at any rate some general
understanding of what is proposed, and that even then the Commission will require
something like three months on the ground. That may be asking too much but by
any standard it seems unlikely that the Commission can submit its report before the
end of April at the earliest. Time will than be required for the report to be considered
separately by the Governments concerned before the proposed inter-governmental
conference is held; and we know from our experience of Malaya itself and other
territories that months of hard detailed preparatory work are likely to be required
between agreement on principles and the actual establishment of a Greater Malaysia.
We therefore think it unrealistic to hope that we could achieve a Great [sic]
Malaysian ‘Merdeka Day’ by August 1962, and that it would be dangerous to let any
such impression gain currency. That being so, although I share your sense of
urgency and see the attractions of deferring changes in your organisation—above all,
your own departure—at any rate until August, 1962. I believe that we should stick to
our present plans. Things may go smoothly but I think that we should be unwise to
entertain too lively expectations on that score. One element in the situation which
we cannot overlook is our very real need to obtain as soon as possible the substantial
economies which we can achieve by the proposed changes in your organisation and I
have come to the conclusion that, taking everything into account, we must adhere to
our existing programme.
89 CAB 21/4626 29 Dec 1961
‘Malaysia commission’: outward telegram no 1829 from Mr Sandys to
Sir G Tory, forwarding a personal message from Mr Macmillan to
Tunku Abdul Rahman about the selection of the chairman
[The commission of enquiry was set up to ascertain the views of the peoples of North
Borneo and Sarawak on the proposed Federation of Malaysia and to make
recommendations. Its remit included neither Brunei (because it was not a colony) nor
Singapore (since it was internally self-governing with institutions and machinery for
assessing public opinion). The British and Malayan governments each nominated two
members while the chairman was appointed by the British prime minister with the
concurrence of the Malayan prime minister. It was not until 16 Jan 1962 that the
commissioners were announced and not until 3 February that Lord Cobbold received his
formal instructions from Macmillan. From the outset the British favoured Malcolm
MacDonald as chairman on the grounds of, firstly, his reputation as a skilled arbitrator,
secondly his earlier advocacy of ‘Greater Malaysia’ and, thirdly, his knowledge of British
Borneo and sympathy with its peoples. It was probably on account of the last factor, as
well as unspecified ‘personal difficulties’, that the Tunku rejected his nomination. Ghazali
Shafie has recalled advising the Tunku against ‘my old and dear friend Malcolm
MacDonald’ as chairman principally because ‘all the credit would go to MacDonald and
that it would be easy for the opponents of [the] Malaysia plan to brand it as a British
design’. In any case, MacDonald was ruled out on account of his duties as co-chairman of
the International Conference on Laos, 1961–1963. The Tunku pressed for Lord Ogmore
(formerly David Rees-Williams), a friend who had been a useful ally in London during the
negotiations for Malayan independence. The Colonial Office, however, felt that Ogmore’s
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role in the cession of Sarawak to the Crown in 1946 would make him unacceptable to
many Sarawakians. There followed a succession of vain suggestions: Lord Boyd (A Lennox
Boyd)—too political; Sir J Robertson, Sir J Macpherson and Lord Shawcross—
unavailable; Sir S Caine—not interested; Lord Radcliffe; Lord Tweedsmuir; and so on. Sir
H Poynton remarked on 8 Jan 1962: ‘The situation keeps changing almost from hour to
hour & we can’t keep pace with it on a sheet of paper.’ He wryly suggested that Proteus
(the old man of Greek legend who had the power to assume different shapes at will) might
make a good chairman. On 12 Jan Macmillan put forward Lord Cobbold, Lord
Tweedsmuir and Field Marshal Sir Francis Festig, from whom the Tunku chose Cobbold,
a former governor of the Bank of England. The British accepted the Tunku’s suggestion
that Sir David Watherston (formerly chief secretary of Malaya) should serve on the
commission, and, in order to ensure that the commission was not too ‘Malayan’, they
selected Sir Anthony Abell as the other British commissioner. The Malayan
representatives were Ghazali Shafie, permanent secretary of the Ministry of External
Affairs, and Dato Wong Pow Nee, chief minister of Penang. I H Harris, a principal in the
CO, was seconded as the commission’s secretary. The commission toured Sarawak and
North Borneo between mid-February and mid-April and reassembled in Britain to write
up the report in May and June. The report was then scrutinised by Whitehall’s inter-
departmental Greater Malaysia (Official) Committee. For the appointment of the
commission see CAB 21/4626, CO 1030/1009 and 1010 and Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie,
Ghazali Shafie’s memoir on the formation of Malaysia, Bangi, Malaysia, 1998, p 171. The
tour is covered in CO 1030/1011–1014 and files on the commission’s hearings,
deliberations and recommendations are at CO 947. CO 947 consists of 61 pieces, as
follows: 1 chairman’s papers; 2 briefing papers for British members; 3 minutes and
hearings (including notes of meetings in England during May–June); 4 policy and report
(April–May); 5 legal advice; 6 political parties; 7 draft approved report; 8–12 Malaysia
Solidarity Consultative Committee; 13–31 North Borneo papers; 32–61 Sarawak papers.
The report was published in Aug 1962 as Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North
Borneo and Sarawak, 1962 (Cmnd 1794).]
Please see Tunku yourself as soon as possible after his return to Malaya and deliver
following personal message from Mr. Macmillan. Begins.
‘My dear Tunku,
Since I received your letter of 7th December about the Commission for the Borneo
territories, we have been doing our utmost to find a suitable chairman in whom both
of us would have full confidence. I am sure it is of the utmost importance that the
Federal Government should be represented on the Commission. Moreover, a failure
to agree on this matter would create a most unfortunate impression.
We have tried hard to persuade Alan Boyd to take it on. He was obviously attracted
and I think would have done it well. But he felt that more time would be required to do
it properly than he himself would be able to give, so we have had to look around again.
As we see it, there are two all-important qualifications for this job. First, the man
concerned must be fully convinced that the objective of a Greater Malaysia is right.
Secondly, he should be someone who is trusted by the people of the Borneo
territories, so that they will listen to his advice.
For this reason, I venture to ask whether you would not reconsider your earlier
doubts about Malcolm MacDonald. He certainly shares our belief that a Greater
Malaysia is right; and nobody is better qualified to sell the idea to the peoples of
Borneo. I understand your misgivings about his personal difficulties, but I still feel
that he is much the best man for this job. I hope therefore that you will give this
further consideration.
Of other names that have occurred to us, those of Sir Donald MacGillivray1 and
1 The last British high commissioner of Malaya, 1954–1957; he retired to Kenya and served as vice-
chairman of the Monckton Commission on the Central African Federation, 1960.
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Lord McCorquodale 2 seem possible. We have not, however, put the idea to either of
them, and we think it doubtful whether MacGillivray would be willing to leave Kenya
where he is now settled. McCorquodale is one of a number of people we have
considered; but he has no detailed local knowledge. If therefore we appointed him,
one would think it desirable to include in the team someone like Tony Abell, who is
familiar with the area.
I have thought a great deal about Ogmore. I am, however, convinced that this
would not be a wise appointment. It might indeed do great harm to our cause.
His part in the recent history of Sarawak has left the people there with a
prejudice against him, and, however baseless this may be, it is bound to operate
against the efforts of the Commission to secure the trust and confidence of the
population.
Perhaps you would let me know your thoughts on all this as soon as you can. If
there are any further names which you may wish to suggest, I shall naturally be most
happy to consider them.
Best wishes for 1962.
Yours ever,
Harold Macmillan’. Ends.
2 A former Conservative MP and businessman, including the chairmanship of McCorquodale & Co Ltd and
other printing companies.
90 PREM 11/3866 30 Dec 1961
[Role of the commissioner-general in Anglo–Malayan defence
arrangements]: letter from Lord Selkirk to Mr Macmillan
[In this document Selkirk reiterates his request to remain commissioner-general in order
to see Malaysia through to inauguration. Having conferred with the foreign secretary and
others. Macmillan replied to Selkirk on 5 Jan agreeing to extend his term of office until
Aug 1962 ‘by which time I would hope that we should see our way clearer on Greater
Malaysia’. At the same time he urged Selkirk to continue the reorganisation of his
headquarters at Phoenix Park ‘in the interests of economy’. There was, therefore, no need
for Selkirk to return to London for consultations in advance of his Eden Hall Conference
in January on which he reported to the prime minister and from which Macmillan drew
the conclusion: ‘Our limited resources and our growing commitments elsewhere make it
essential that we should gradually reduce our military and colonial responsibilities in
South East Asia. This will clearly be a long and difficult process and will have to be
conducted with great care, if we are to avoid the creation of a partial power vacuum in the
area.’ See Macmillan to Selkirk, 5 Jan 1962, PREM 11/3866; Selkirk to Macmillan, 24 Jan
1962, and Macmillan to Selkirk, 12 Mar 1962, CO1030/1084; and also CAB 21/4626.]
I have your letter of December 191 which you signed just before you left for the talks
in Bermuda.2
2. You were good enough to say that the points I raised in my letter of December
2 are important. I must regard them as fundamental.
3. During my two years here it has become apparent to me that we would have to
lighten the load of our commitments in this area. To this end I have sought to reach
a posture when this would gradually become possible. We now, however, seem to be
1 See 88. 2 Macmillan met Kennedy at Bermuda just before Christmas for talks about nuclear tests.
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pursuing two separate policies: first to maintain freedom of military action in the
area generally and in Singapore in particular without consulting the Government of
Malaya, and secondly substantially to reduce our forces in this area.
4. These two policies cannot be reconciled and we will have to decide which we
consider to be the more important. In practice I have little doubt that reasons of
economy will compel us to accept the latter. Indeed, the Ministry of Defence are
already considering ways and means to transfer responsibility for internal security to
the Malayans, thereby reducing our obligation to maintain a substantial number of
British troops in this area. With this aim in view, what you suggest in your letter
does not seem to me to go far enough. I accept that the habit of close and frank
consultation with the Malayan Government must be developed gradually. But this
must be based on some machinery from the outset which would reassure the
Malayans that we really are prepared to discuss common problems. In any case they
are now tentatively asking for some sort of joint committee. If we have to pour cold
water on such a suggestion, their natural sense of suspicion will be incurred.
5. At the present time there is no formal contact between the British Services in
this area and the Malayan Government. No joint planning of any kind has taken place
and indeed our personnel have not hitherto been authorised to hold any discussions
except on a purely personal and inevitably restricted basis. They can of course
communicate through the High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur on specific points
but I do not think this is enough. The Malayans want us to stay, they want to talk to
us and it is essential that we should be forthcoming if we are to regain their
confidence on which alone our continued presence in this area depends. The steady
process of consultations can, I believe, bring them a long way towards an
understanding of our approach to the problems of this area.
6. I must leave you in no doubt that I do not think without the concurrence of
the Malayans that we are free to mount operations from Singapore except in the
most circumscribed manner. To do so would be to run the risk of our being forced to
leave this area completely at a much earlier date. It may be necessary to take such
steps but we should do so with our eyes wide open.
7. As regards the second point in your letter, it appears to me that, unlike some
other places in this area, we have for some time been ahead of public opinion in
proposing a constructive solution to the problem of the remaining British territories
in South East Asia. We have already made some progress leading this opinion along
right paths and it is important that we should continue to keep up the momentum if
we are to thwart communist aspirations.
8. I am of course fully aware of the dangers of rushing the Borneo Territories and
it may well be that August next year will prove too soon. But I do not think we should
exclude it as a possibility. It is really not correct to say that the people are not
apprised of what it is all about. There has been an unceasing flow of information on
the radio, in the press, in speeches and in meetings held in Singapore, Kuching,
Jesselton and elsewhere, almost without a break over the last six months. If it goes
on too long doubts and suspicions will increase and a sense of disenchantment
prevail. Parties are forming fairly rapidly in the Borneo Territories and those with
communist affiliations are striving to strengthen and consolidate their positions for
the purpose of blocking Malaysia.
9. I do not suggest that we should disclose that we are prepared to consider
reaching an agreement by August nor allow it to become clear that we are ahead of
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public opinion. Our object should be to maintain the momentum by means of
objective comments and explanations. This would of course be done substantially
under the direction of the Governors of Sarawak and North Borneo. A recent
telegram to Kuching has now initiated this approach. Even so, it is not practical to
expect that we will ever get unanimous support for Malaysia from the Borneo
Territories; but I believe it is possible to achieve in the next twelve months a wide
measure of support which would permit us to overrule opposition. The opposition
however is likely to gain rather than lose in strength unless we can keep our plans
moving steadily forward.
10. Nor should we exclude the possibility, remote as it may be, that the Tunku
would be willing to take on Singapore before the Borneo Territories are in fact ready
to transfer sovereignty. This will, however, only be likely if he is satisfied that real
progress has been made and that we are fully supporting his plans.
11. You are asking me to come away from here with these developments little
more than half finished. There are many ways of course in which they could go
wrong and I am anxious that these points should be kept at least to a minimum. The
manifold problems which are before you to-day are all too apparent and it would be
wrong for this one to be added if it can be avoided. I would therefore like to come and
see you if you would be good enough to give me a date, if possible before the Eden
Hall Conference which is being held from January 17 to 20.
91 CO 1030/1447, no 101 15 Jan 1962
[Brunei: political developments during 1961]: despatch from Sir D
White to Mr Maudling
[On 22 Nov the Sultan of Brunei had written to Maudling welcoming the prospect of
‘Greater Malaysia’ and expressing his willingness to take part in negotiations with the
Federation and Britain and he had made a further statement of support after the
conclusion of the London talks (CO1030/1012, nos E48 and 49). This despondent report
by the British high commissioner, however, revealed British anxiety about the sultan’s
apparent capriciousness towards the project. White’s assessment was shared by two senior
CO officials (Sir John Martin and Ian Wallace) who at this time were touring the region in
advance of the Cobbold commission. Following a discussion with His Highness and his
ministers at the Istana (palace) on 15 Jan, Wallace noted: ‘Brunei is not going to be a
push-over for Malaysia’ (Wallace to Eastwod, 17 Jan 1962, CO 1030/1012, no 67). It was in
order to stiffen the Sultan’s resolve that Maudling spelled out the advantages of Malaysia
for Brunei in a letter of 9 Mar 1962 (see 95).]
I have the honour to submit a report on political developments in the State during
the second full year of what is virtually internal self-government, under the new
constitution.
2. The political situation in 1961 was dominated by three main issues, the
breakdown of the administration, the Sultan’s attitude on closer association with
Malaya, and the question of elections.
3. The breakdown of the administration was largely due to the Sultan’s
interference in its every aspect. The Mentri Besar 1, as ex-Private Secretary to the
Sultan, was not tough enough mentally or physically to cope with the Sultan and he
1 For the appointment of Brunei’s first mentri besar (chief minister) under the 1959 constitution see 9, n 6.
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was further handicapped, in his new capacity, by the increasingly obvious
incompetence of several of the Malayan officers seconded to Brunei. As the public
concern at the delays in handling Government business increased, so the Mentri
Besar’s acceptability to the Sultan decreased, and it became obvious that his days
were numbered.
4. The Malayan officers admittedly faced a difficult situation. The fact that they
were Malays, sharing a language and a religion, replacing British officials at the
Sultan’s request, was not sufficient to guarantee them a welcome from the
suspicious Brunei Malays. In common with every other foreigner, acceptance by
the Bruneis has to be won. The Malayans took it for granted and when it was
withheld, retired into an expatriate clique and ignored the locals. This was also
resented and they became increasingly unpopular. Senior Brunei officials in the
Public Service, especially those nominated to the Councils as unofficial members,
missed no opportunity of thwarting them and, although they were in Brunei at the
Sultan’s request, neither he nor the Mentri Besar gave them adequate backing;
frustrated officially and ostracised socially, they were determined to get back to
Malaya by hook or by crook. The opportunity came when the State Forest Officer was
assaulted. This relatively trivial but unpleasant incident provided an opportunity of
which they took the maximum advantage.2
5. This assault took place shortly before the State Visit of His Majesty the Yang
di-Pertuan Agong, and a well-meaning but misguided attempt to settle the incident
quietly out of court was, perhaps deliberately, misconstrued by the Malayan Prime
Minister. Without any adequate inquiry into the facts, the Tungku flew to the
support of his officers; criticised the Brunei Government, particularly the Senior
Police Officers, publicly attacked the Party Rakyat, who were only concerned to the
extent that Azahari, their President, was the brother of the attacker, and delivered an
ultimatum to the Sultan which was deeply resented.
6. The Tungku probably hoped that the threat to withdraw his officers would
force the Sultan’s hand over Malaysia; instead, the Sultan went cold on the project.
7. The Party Rakyat had already declared their stand on Malaysia—reunification
of the Borneo Territories as a first step, after elections, and then independence and
perhaps Malaysia later. The Tungku’s public utterances in Brunei, and elsewhere,
were calamitous. Apart from gravely embarrassing the Sultan and infuriating the
Party Rakyat, they underlined what was already widely suspected, that the Bruneis
were regarded as a backward people, who should be honoured to accept an invitation
to join Malaya.
8. Apart from stimulating opposition to the Malaysia plan, the Tungku’s remarks
also gave rise to strong suspicion, not without justification, that he was advising
against elections for Brunei. The failure to hold the elections by the agreed date was
certainly to some small extent due to the dilatory way in which the Attorney General
performed his duties, but the Sultan himself was obviously concerned at the prospect
of elections with only the Party Rakyat in the field, and indulged in attempts to form
a new party and intrigue against the Party Rakyat.
9. The result was that by the end of July the situation was extremely tense; the
Party Rakyat were more active and more threatening than ever before—they had
2 See 52, n 4.
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gained both support from and control over the labour organisation and were ready to
use any cudgel, including ‘sit-in’ strikes, to force the Government to get on with the
elections, get rid of the Malayan officers, and reorganise, even, if necessary, by
recruiting more British officers.
10. The Sultan was, for the first time, genuinely alarmed. He seemed to realise at
last the dangers of becoming too closely involved in the administration. Personally,
he probably favoured steam-roller tactics, putting the Malaysia scheme through the
Executive Council and having a show-down with the Party Rakyat and, if necessary,
arresting the leaders. Wiser councils prevailed; the Mentri Besar retired more or less
permanently to hospital, the Attorney General and the State Secretary left for Malaya,
the latter without authorisation, and the Sultan left for a dental operation in Malaya,
after formally announcing that the elections would have to be postponed to a date
not later than October, 1962.
11. The attitude of the Brunei Malays is often unpredictable—so it was again.
The undignified retreat of the Attorney General and the State Secretary to the safety
of Kuala Lumpur was welcomed. The Sultan’s announcement of the postponement of
the elections, and a reasoned explanation of why this was necessary, occasioned
strong protest, but it was obvious to all that postponement was now inevitable and
there was little point in striking to enforce a date that was no longer within reach.
Furthermore, the Sultan appointed Marsal bin Maun as Deputy Mentri Besar, acting
as Mentri Besar while the substantive holder was permitted to take all leave due to
him. Pengiran Yussof was appointed Deputy State Secretary, acting as State
Secretary, after the departure of the substantive holder. The Party Rakyat became
increasingly anxious to avoid the clash with Government which a sit-in strike would
have precipitated and chose the demonstration and petition to the Secretary of State
as a way out.
12. At any time up to a few months ago, it would have been impossible to view
the appointments of Marsal and Pengiran Yussof with anything but the gravest
apprehension. They, together with Pengiran Ali, now head of the Religious Affairs
Department, were the three members of the Brunei Malay Teachers Association who
had been specially selected by the Sultan in 1956 as the spearhead of the attack on
the British Resident’s entrenched position.3 Ardent nationalists, they all had close
contact with the Party Rakyat.
13. From the beginning, the Sultan made it clear that he intended to allow the
new Mentri Besar to lead the Government and he continues to refer to ‘his
Government’ on all occasions to eliminate as far as possible the criticism that was
mounting against him personally. Marsal and Yussof started, with exemplary
diligence, to clear up the enormous back-log of business, including some 600 files in
the State Secretary’s office awaiting attention. The speed with which they achieved
this, in spite of Marsal’s complete lack of English, was commendable. A new Attorney
General arrived from Malaya, a vast improvement on his predecessor. Tactfully he
gained the confidence of his local colleagues and the Sultan, and Council meetings
proceeded with efficiency and dispatch, instead of wrangling and interminable
loquacity.
3 One way of reducing British control in his kingdom had been for the Sultan to embark on constitutional
reform which he did in the mid-1950s with the support of the PRB.
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14. The rigidity of Marsal’s attitude to administration leads to some inequity,
but, after the impartiality 4 and lack of sense of responsibility by the Malayan officers,
discipline in the service was at a low ebb and a firm hand was needed. Once he has
established his authority and, if, as seems likely, he is confirmed in office, he should
be able to adopt a more reasonable approach. It is only fair to say that he and Yussof
have done extraordinarily well so far.
15. The Party Rakyat, in the meantime, have remained quiet, ostensibly awaiting
the reply to their petition. Azahari has been ill and away in Malaya and Indonesia and
several of the leading members of the Committee have also been to Indonesia. It
seems likely that they were apprehensive of the attitude Marshal would adopt. They
are not anxious for martyrdom and are known to have had ideas on seeking political
asylum if a clash had occurred.
16. On the advice of the new Attorney General, Dato’ Abdul Aziz, supported by
Marsal, Pengiran Yussof and Pengiran Ali, the Sultan has welcomed Malaysia in his
speech from the throne at the budget meeting of Council, but has undertaken to
consult the people first. A firm assurance was also given on the holding of elections
and, indeed, much of the enabling legislation and regulations made thereunder were
tabled at the meeting, after some hard work by the Attorney General to get them
ready. Furthermore, attempts have been made to conciliate the Party Rakyat, as well
as attempts to split its unity. One of the more violent members has been made State
Welfare Officer! Azahari has been invited to serve under Marsal on an all races
Committee to study the Malaysia idea and he probably had some sympathetic
treatment in his business difficulties. He now owes some $120,000 to Government.
17. It remains to be seen whether the Sultan and Marsal can swing public
opinion over to Malaysia. If they fail, the onus will lie on Tunku Abdul Rahman.
Much of the opposition to the scheme stems from dislike and distrust of him. He
must bear the responsibility for seconding officers to Brunei without adequate
experience and without briefing on the role of expatriate officers in a foreign State.
The notoriety attached to the lamentable performance of some of the seconded
officers has spread to Sarawak and North Borneo, who clearly share now Brunei’s
reluctance to have Malayans in high office. There seems little likelihood that Brunei
will now hurry into Malaysia; if they go at all, it will be on their own terms and not
the Tunku’s and the terms will be a large degree of local autonomy.
18. Recent events have to some extent relieved the pressure on the High
Commission. The Sultan has made it clear that the High Commissioner is
responsible for External Affairs and Defence and that his Government is responsible
for internal affairs. Marsal has made it clear that the High Commissioner is an
adviser to the Sultan only and not to him and, while courteous and socially friendly,
avoids official contact except by correspondence. This reduces the danger of Her
Majesty’s Government becoming entangled, as seemed likely at one time, in a
struggle between the Sultan and the Party Rakyat, though it is a rather liberal
interpretation of the Agreement and the Constitution.
19. I am copying this despatch to the Commissioner General for South East Asia
and the Governors of Sarawak and North Borneo. I also enclose copies for onward
transmission to the Commonwealth Relations Office, for High Commissioners in
Kuala Lumpur, Canberra and Wellington.
4 ‘Impartiality’ is a mistake; White clearly means ‘partiality’.
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92 CO 1030/1011, no E/280(iii) 16 Jan 1962
[Sir J Martin’s mission]: note of a meeting of British officials with Lee
Kuan Yew
[Martin and Wallace toured the region in advance of the Cobbold enquiry to assess the
prospects for, and administrative requirements of, the proposed Federation. Telegraphing
Lord Perth from Jesselton, Martin reported that the ‘advice from those to whom we have
spoken of all races is unanimous that people in Sarawak and North Borneo feel they are
being rushed’. Urging that the commission heed the objections of the Borneo peoples and
work out safeguards to meet them, he reminded Lord Perth of ‘the unhappy history of the
MacMichael agreements in Malaya’ in 1945 and ‘the lesson of our failure to reconcile
people to federation in Central Africa at the outset’ (31 Jan 1962 Goode Papers, box 2, file
1, f 23). Having visited Sarawak and Brunei, they met Lee Kuan Yew and his minister of
culture, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam. Before they discussed the political problems of
Singapore and the dangers inherent in delaying merger, Martin reported his impressions
of opinion in Borneo but Lee was inclined to dismiss Bornean reservations about ‘Greater
Malaysia’. See also Lee, Memoirs, pp 415–416 and Michael Jackson (ed by Janet Jackson),
A Scottish Life: Sir John Martin, Churchill and Empire (London, 1999, pp 208–212).]
The Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, and Mr. Rajaratnam, Minister of Culture,
met Sir John Martin, Mr. Wallace, Mr. Moore and myself 1 at Sri Temasek at 9.30 p.m.
on Tuesday, 16th January, for a general discussion on Greater Malaysia.
2. Sir John Martin summarised the general state of opinion about Greater
Malaysia as he and Mr. Wallace had found it during their recent visit to Sarawak and
Brunei.2 Their general impression, contrary to that given by the statements made at
meetings of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee,3 was of hesitation on
almost all sides. The unsophisticated people up the rivers knew as yet very little of
the implications for them of Greater Malaysia and they would need time to think
about it. The Chinese too were hesitant knowing the policy of the Federal
Government of ensuring that the Chinese in Malaya were kept in their place. In
Brunei, Azahari, who had considerable support from the young Malays, was firmly
opposed to Brunei joining Greater Malaysia and thought that the aim should be an
independent federation of the three Borneo territories. Sir John Martin said that they
had had a long discussion with the Sultan of Brunei who had asked what were the
advantages of Greater Malaysia for his state. They had explained to him why HMG
considered this the best policy for the Borneo territories and in fact had put the case
just as the Tunku himself would have done. They had agreed however that it was
right for Brunei to seek special terms and told the Sultan that the Secretary of State
was sending a letter agreeing that he should enter into direct negotiations with the
Federal Government.
3. Sir John Martin said that although they could not yet speak for North Borneo
their visit to Sarawak and Brunei had given them the clear impression that more
time would be needed before the territories could be satisfied that it would be in their
interests to join Greater Malaysia. This was particularly surprising in Brunei which
they had thought would, as an Islamic Malay State, be naturally attracted to
partnership with the Federation.
1 This note is unsigned but is presumed to have been written by an official of the UK Commission,
Singapore.
2 See 91, note.
3 On 4 Feb 1962 the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee produced a report broadly favourable to
merger, see 55, n 4.
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4. Sir John Martin said that he had been impressed too by the administrative
difficulties of moving quickly to Greater Malaysia. It would be necessary, as in all
other territories approaching independence, to give expatriate officers the option of
leaving the Service with compensation. The latest form of compansation scheme was
designed to encourage officers to stay on but in the nature of things a considerable
number of officers would decide to go. It would be some years before local officers
could be trained to take over nor could the Federal Government spare qualified
Malayan officers. In any case, the last thing the local people wanted was to see the
jobs handed over to Malays; there was also the difficulty that the first people available
locally would be the Chinese and not the indigenous people whose education was
very backward. Clearly this was a long term problem but a pause of two to three years
would enable something to be done to ease the administrative strain at handover.
5. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew said that the doubts and hesitations that people had
confided in Sir John Martin and Mr. Wallace should not be taken too seriously. The
leaders and spokesmen in the Borneo territories were people who respected authority
and who believed in getting themselves as close as they could to its ultimate source.
They saw that with Greater Malaysia the Tunku would be that ultimate source and
they were beginning to accommodate themselves to this fact. Nevertheless, it was
natural for them to hanker for the alternative of separate independence, with the
prospect of their playing a larger part on the smaller stage, and this would explain
the difference between the views given to senior officials of the British Government
and those expressed at the Consultative Committee meetings. The important thing
with people such as these was to give a strong lead and let them understand that
HMG’s support for Greater Malaysia was a settled matter.
6. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew said that he had no doubt that the Sultan of Brunei realised
the advantages for him of close association with like-minded Muslim rulers in the
other States within a strong Federation. Although he would want special terms for
Brunei he would come in all right. Possibly Azahari’s opposition to Greater Malaysia
was genuine but he must know that he could not resist it if the Sultan agreed and he
would settle on the best terms he could get. As for the Chinese, they were realists,
mostly engaged in commerce and they would decide on the basis of what was best for
business. They had wide contacts with other countries in this part of the world, and
knew about conditions facing Chinese in Indonesia and elsewhere. They realised that
although in Malaya Chinese did not have full political rights the conditions were on
the whole better than elsewhere and they would acquiesce in Greater Malaysia. There
remained the indigenous tribes who were simple people and understood little of the
issues involved. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew said that he knew that there could be serious
trouble if these people opposed Greater Malaysia and he stressed the importance of
the Commission of Enquiry including someone whom they knew and trusted who
would tell them it was a good plan. This was why he had suggested Sir Anthony Abell
as a man who was remembered in Sarawak with affection and whose advice the
people would accept.
7. The discussion then turned to the particular problems in Singapore. Mr. Lee
Kuan Yew explained, as he had on previous occasions, the difficulty of keeping up the
momentum and maintaining his position in Singapore during the period that would
elapse before Greater Malaysia could be effected. He said that the Tunku believed it
could all be accomplished by August, 1962; Jakeway in Sarawak thought they could
be ready by September; on the other hand, Sir William Goode had mentioned June,
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1963 as the more probable date. Meanwhile in Singapore the Barisan Socialis would
continue harrying the Government in the hope of finding some issue on which it
could be brought down. On the merger issue itself, they had not taken the line of
bold opposition but had made the tactical blunder of declaring themselves in favour
of complete merger and opposed only to various features of the White Paper
proposals. This was a difficult line to sustain and it had not prevented the loss of all
Malay support for the Barisan Socialis. (This was shown at their recent rally on West
Irian which was attended mostly by Chinese and by only a few hundred Malays). In
these circumstances, since no one opposed merger in principle, it was legitimate and
logical for Government in the referendum to ask a series of questions directed at the
particular objections to their White Paper. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew said that the Barisan
Socialis would then see that they could not win and they would decide that the
balance of advantage lay in staging wide-spread disorders rather than in accepting
quietly the implementation of merger and their removal from the scene. They would
argue that it would be better to go down fighting and so, as a result of police and
military action, create bitterness on which they could build again. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew
explained again why he could not take responsibility for the use of British troops to
deal with such disorders and why in consequence interim arrangements must be
made for the Tunku to take over responsibility for law and order before trouble came.
8. Sir John Martin said he understood Mr. Lee Kuan Yew’s difficulties in
Singapore though he did not altogether see the need to hold a referendum now that
the Assembly had endorsed the merger plan.4 The major point was that however fast
we might move in the Borneo territories the Tunku did not seem willing to consider
taking Singapore into the Federation before the others. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew agreed
that this was so and said that the Tunku’s attitude had hardened because he had
come to believe that HMG were trying to foist Singapore upon him without
committing themselves about the Borneo territories. This was why the Tunku had
lost confidence in the good faith of HMG and the first essential was to win back that
confidence. If that could be done it was possible that the Tunku might be prepared to
move a little from his firm position. Sir John Martin suggested the possibility that if
all went well in the Borneo territories and the Commission of Enquiry recommended
a plan that was endorsed at a conference of all the territories, the Tunku might then
agree to take in Singapore at once on the basis of a firm commitment by HMG that
sovereignty over the Borneo territories would be transferred at some later date that
would leave time for the necessary administrative preparations to be made. Mr. Lee
Kuan Yew agreed that this was a possibility, but only if confidence had been restored
between the Tunku and HMG.
9. Sir John Martin thanked Mr. Lee Kuan Yew for the opportunity of a full and
frank discussion on Greater Malaysia. So far as the Borneo territories were
concerned, it was clear that the most important thing was for the people to be given
a firm lead by HMG and this was now happening. His impression was that the people
there would come to accept the plan provided the Tunku was wise enough to grant
the reasonable safeguards that they wanted. It did appear however that more time
would be wanted to make the necessary preparations and to ensure that the
administration did not collapse after sovereignty was transferred. On the other hand,
4 On 6 Dec 1961 the Legislative Assembly had voted in favour of merger. For British views on the
referendum, see 72 and 131.
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it was also clear from Singapore’s standpoint delay meant danger and the major
problem was to reconcile these different requirements. The discussion had been
useful in pointing the way to possible answers on this and the first task seemed to be
the re-establishment of complete confidence with the Tunku. The hope must be that
he would then be willing to accept some special arrangements that would enable the
position in Singapore to be secured.
93 CO 1030/1011, no 305 20 Feb 1962
[Attitude of Sultan of Brunei to Cobbold Commission]: letter from Sir
D White to C G Eastwood, reporting the Sultan’s dilemma
You will have seen my telegram of 18th February, reporting the Sultan’s inability to
receive Lord Cobbold on Sunday, 25th February, as proposed.1
I asked the Sultan if he could not possibly fit in even a brief call, but he said that he
would be praying and could not receive any more afternoon visitors while the fast
was on. He would be pleased to receive Lord Cobbold after the fast was over. It may
well be a genuine excuse; the fast is a trying time and the Sultan looks tired and
strained. There may, however, be a political ‘nuance’. The Sultan is obviously under
pressure from Kuala Lumpur to make up his mind on Malaysia and it is equally
obvious that the Tunku either cannot or will not believe the strength of the
opposition here. The Sultan may, therefore, feel that Lord Cobbold would, somewhat
naturally, wish to know how his mind is working; he may also wish to see how things
go in Sarawak and North Borneo before he talks to Lord Cobbold.
I discussed the position with the Mentri Besar and Dato’ Pengiran Ali and with the
Malayan State Secretary and Attorney General, all of whom dined with me on
Saturday night. The general opinion seems to be that the whole Commission should
call later on, after Hari Raya.2 I will meet the Commission at the airport en route to
Jesselton on the 25th February and see what they think.
Meanwhile, I sense an increase in tension. There is strong criticism from the Party
Rakyat over the signing of the Consultative Committee Memorandum by the Brunei
overservers3 and over their public utterances. Pengiran Ali, the leader, has had
threatening letters. The Malayan Attorney General, whose mission it is to achieve
merger, is talking of proscribing Party Rakyat; their reported application to join the
Afro–Asian Solidarity Group is a breach of the Societies Enactment, I admit, and
some of the speeches by Party members have come close to treason. Nevertheless, I
can see no valid case for proscription and the suppression of a political party at this
juncture would be construed as an obvious move to facilitate merger. I have made it
clear to the Attorney General that I should be bound to oppose any action to suppress
the Party which could not be clearly justified in open open court, and I pointed out
that the Police might well prove unreliable if called upon to deal with trouble
1 The sultan later relented and in March agreed to a courtesy call from Cobbold. He continued to take a
keen interest in the commission and its report but quoted to British officials the Malay proverb: ‘Travel
slowly, and arrive safely’ (White to Wallace, 12 June 1962, PREM 11/3867).
2 The holiday that follows the fasting month of Ramadan.
3 ‘Overservers’ in this sentence is probably a misprint for ‘observers’. For the MSCC’s memorandum, see
55, n 4.
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emanating from such an action. H.M. Government would find it gravely
embarrassing to be called upon to restore order, if the trouble was caused by
unjustifiable repression. Furthermore, it is more than possible that the Police Forces
of Sarawak and North Borneo would not be available to assist the Brunei Force whilst
Malaysia is a ‘hot’ issue in the territories.
I have a great deal of sympathy with the Sultan in his dilemma. I do not think that
I should be guilty of over-emphasis if I stated that the situation posed a threat to the
dynasty. Her Majesty’s Government have not only welcomed the Malaysia concept,
they have advised the Sultan to merge on conditions to be negotiated. It would not,
therefore, be appropriate for us to bring any further pressure to bear on the Sultan,
though it is for further consideration whether anything more can be done to ease the
pressure on him, either in London or in Kuala Lumpur.
I still believe that a gesture by the Tunku to the Party Rakyat would have a value,
but I understand that the Brunei Attorney General has also failed to persuade the
Tunku to accept this view, hence his new approach, which I believe to be ill-advised. I
am well aware that the Tunku is convinced that the Party Rakyat is Communist
impregnated; I do not share his view and, indeed, there is no evidence whatsoever of
it, but I do think that the Party is swinging further left, partly as a result of the
Tunku’s attitude, and I hope that this can be brought to his attention.
If I were the Tunku, I should now write a sympathetic letter to the Sultan,
expressing regret at the dilemma in which he is placed and adding that it seems clear
that there must be many misunderstandings to be cleared up, as the Brunei Malays,
i.e. Party Rakyat, seem the only Malay organisation in the Borneo territories who
have not welcomed Malaysia, and that it seems incomprehensible that they should
seem prepared to throw in their lot with the Chinese Communist Barisan Socialis of
Singapore and the predominantly Chinese left-wing S.U.P.P. of Sarawak. I should
then suggest a goodwill delegation from Malaya to go round amongst the Brunei
Malays and talk to them. This should not be a political delegation, but should consist
of someone like Dato’ Osman,4 who is a personal friend of the Sultan and liked here, I
think, and is now Chairman of the Central Electricity Board, with a well-known
religious leader (dangerous, I know, to mix religion with politics but the situation is
already dangerous), and perhaps someone from the U.M.N.O. Youth Movement. They
should be briefed not to attack the Party Rakyat, but to talk to them and reason with
them. They should know how far the Tunku is prepared to go in the way of
concessions.
It is already becoming obvious that the Attorney General has compromised his
official position by his advocacy of Malaysia, and his usefulness will rapidly become
limited in this sphere.5
Of course, it would be inappropriate for me to make the suggestion from here, nor
should it be traceable back to me, but, if there is any merit in the idea, it might be
possible to ask Sir Geofroy Tory to throw out the idea on some suitable occasion. Will
4 Dato Osman bin Talib, entered the MAS in 1926, transferred to the MCS in 1929, was appointed state
secretary of Perlis in 1948, state secretary of Perak in 1949, deputy mentri besar of Perak in 1953, and
chief minister of Malacca in 1957.
5 For changes in administrative personnel made in 1961 and the role of Dato Abdul Aziz, the attorney-
general, see 9, n 6.
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you give this your urgent consideration, and also let me know if you think I am
taking the right line on the possible proscription of the Party Rakyat.
I am copying this to Lord Selkirk, Sir William Goode, Sir Alexander Waddell and
Sir Geofroy Tory.
94 CO 1030/987, no E/1128 6 Mar 1962
[Progress report on Cobbold Commission]: letter from Lord Cobbold
to Mr Maudling. Enclosure: note by Lord Cobbold
[Cobbold wrote this letter while staying at the British high commissioner’s residence in
Kuala Lumpur on the eve of the Hari Raya public holiday (at the end of the Ramadan
fasting month) and at a point when the commissioners had made preliminary visits to a
few, principal centres in Borneo. In spite of his request to keep it out of official files,
Cobbold’s paper was considered formally by Macmillan and his ministers after the
Tunku’s allegations regarding British attitudes to Borneo threatened the completion of
the enquiry (see 97 and 98).]
I enclose a private note for yourself and other Ministers who may be interested (I
should be grateful if you would keep the Prime Minister informed). Please regard it
as personal and ‘thinking on paper’ and not for any official files—we have only just
started and I may change my views completely as we go along.
I have seen a good deal of Selkirk, Goode, Waddell and Tory who have all been
most helpful and co-operative.
I have also had pleasant private talks with the Prime Minister of Singapore in
Selkirk’s house, and, as I say in the note, with the Tunku and Razak.
We are all well so far, but the pace is hot. Interest in the Commission throughout
the area is enormous and somewhat alarming. I have kept no copy of this note.
Enclosure to 94
My present thoughts, quite preliminary since we have a long way to go, are on the
following lines.
1. The whole position is even more difficult, and certainly more dangerous, than
it appeared in London.
2. Whatever decision emerges there will be a period, certainly of months and
perhaps of years, when strong and tactful handling will be necessary if serious racial
trouble and possibly bloodshed are to be avoided.
3. There are possibilities of a sensible and constructive solution on Malaysia
lines, but only if the Malayan Government are prepared to move quite a long way
from their present detailed thinking.
4. I see five main essentials if a success is to be made of the Malaysia idea:—
(a) The first step should be taken quickly and decisively as soon as possible after
our report is published. A long period of uncertainty at that stage would be
dangerous in the extreme. You would be wise to envisage a Governmental
conference not more than two months after our report, which I hope to get out
before the end of May.
(b) The first step must however be a very limited one, leaving the present local
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Governments very much in their present shape, with no weakening either in
appearance or reality of their authority on all matters of administration of the
territories—i.e. the immediate change should not go beyond e.g. sovereignty,
external affairs, defence and some combination of federal and local authority on
internal security.
(c) There must be a considerable interval before more complete integration can be
effected. It would be silly and dangerous to force the pace on this until local
politicians have grown up and local support and co-operation can be assured. At
present the main attitude, except for the Sarawak Malays and some others who
think they would do better under Malaysia, varies from a dislike of change and fear
of the unknown to positive hostility and dislike of the Malays. It just is not true
that these people feel themselves blood-brothers to the Malays—the marriage
would have to be one of convenience, and, if it is to survive, of mutual
convenience.
(d) The Civil Service must be kept going by British officers for a number of years.
This will mean encouragement and financial inducement from H.M.G. and also
adequate assurance that a competent and uncorrupt Government can be
maintained in the territories.
(e) A carrot will have to be provided both by the Malayan Government and for
some years by H.M.G., e.g. by contribution to a Development Fund, to persuade
the territories that they are better with Malaysia than without it.
5. I had a long and friendly talk with the Tunku and Razak yesterday, in which I
gave him some idea of these feelings (in more general terms). He will doubtless be
difficult to shift from his ideas of a fairly rapid integration into something very like
the existing Federation, though he did not seem wholly unwilling to contemplate a
2-stage operation.
6. In spite of all the difficulties I believe that Malaysia could with wisdom and
moderation be the right solution for the territories. Although they are at present
happy with their existing Government, the forces of nationalism and communist
influence are on the march in Sarawak and imminent in North Borneo—even
without external pressures I would not judge that happy Colonial Government would
have a life of many years. Whether Malaysia can be achieved will depend, in my
present judgment, on whether the Tunku is keen enough on it—or can be pushed
hard enough at the later stages by H.M.G.—to accept the facts of life far enough to
make the plan workable and acceptable to the territories.
7. The Commission get on well together personally and work together as well as
could be expected. I would think, however, that the prospects of unanimous
recommendations on the controversial points are extremely dim. The most I would
hope for is some meeting of minds and some appreciation of the facts of life, leaving
some thorny fundamental issues to be argued out between Governments.
Constitution-drafting is a long way away. We have provisionally agreed to meet in
England early in May to consider and write our report—I have invited the Malays to
stay at Knebworth. We feel no need for legal advice until we get to the drafting stage.
8. I repeat, and emphasise, that the position is difficult and dangerous. Quite
apart from Singapore, on which Ministers will be as well or better informed than I
am, things could blow up very quickly in several different ways. All I can ask at the
moment is that Ministers should be warned that difficult situations may have to be
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faced urgently and should be ready to take early and decisive action as soon as we are
able to produce a report. If the decision of Governments goes in favour of Malaysia
the plan will at that stage have to be sold, and sold hard, to the territories on the
basis that it will give them material benefits and not only on the basis of protection
against communism or aggression.
95 CAB 21/4849 9 Mar 1962
[Brunei’s future within Malaysia]: letter from Mr Maudling to the
Sultan of Brunei, setting out the advantages of merger
I have received a report from Sir John Martin of the interesting discussion about the
Malaysia proposal that he had with Your Highness recently in Brunei.1 I readily
confirm that, after most careful consideration, Her Majesty’s Government think it
right to advise Your Highness to accede to Tunku Abdul Rahman’s proposal that
Brunei should enter Malaysia, upon such terms and under such conditions as Your
Highness might, after having consulted public opinion, agree with the Tunku. With
this end in view, I wrote to Your Highness on the 8th January suggesting that
informal discussions might well take place between the two Governments, if Your
Highness so wished.
As Your Highness knows, it is the policy of Her Majesty’s Government to work for
the independence of the territories either directly or indirectly under Her Majesty’s
control, within, it is always hoped, the Commonwealth. Her Majesty’s Government
therefore welcomed the great constitutional advance which Brunei achieved as a
result of the 1959 talks in London. I know that my predecessor greatly appreciated
the friendly and co-operative spirit in which the talks took place, and which indeed
further underlined the long and happy relationship which has existed between
Brunei and Great Britain.
During these talks, Your Highness indicated a desire that Malayan officers should
be considered for appointment to Brunei. Lord Boyd 2 unhesitatingly agreed to Your
Highness’s proposal, well knowing the long-standing bonds of friendship between
Malaya and Brunei, and fully understanding and appreciating the advantages of
employing officers sharing a religion, language and culture with Your Highness and
Your Highness’s people.
It was, therefore, with a full understanding of Your Highness’s policy in this
respect that Mr. Macmillan agreed with Tunku Abdul Rahman in welcoming the
Malaysia concept and in seeking Your Highness’s views. Indeed, as Your Highness
may know, the Tunku specifically asked whether Her Majesty’s Government would
raise any objection to Brunei’s joining Malaysia at an early date, if that was Your
Highness’s wish. Naturally, the Prime Minister replied that, if Your Highness decided
on merger, Her Majesty’s Government would agree to any date acceptable to Brunei
and Malaya.
1 See 91, note. Maudling’s letter arose from the concern expressed by White and Martin and was based on a
draft by White which was revised after consultation with Selkirk, Tory, Waddell and officials in the CRO
and FO.
2 As Mr Lennox-Boyd, secretary of state for the colonies, 1954–1959.
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Apart from our understanding of the close ties between Brunei and Malaya, there
are other important factors which persuaded Her Majesty’s Government that the
Malaysia plan would be of benefit to Brunei.
Malaya, with massive Commonwealth aid, was the first country to defeat armed
Communist insurrection. The Communist effort in Malaya has continued
underground in the form of subversion, but this too has been brought and kept
under control thanks to the dynamic and decisive policies of Malayan leaders. In
looking to the future, apart from the internal threat of Communist subversion, we
have also had to take into consideration the possible threat of hostile action in Asia,
particularly against small countries. Communist pressure is increasing in a number
of places in South East Asia and there is a continuing risk of war which might
involve the whole Peninsula and constitute a direct threat to the integrity
ultimately of Brunei. Again, besides possible threats from Communism, both
internal and external, there is always the possibility that a small but wealthy
country like Brunei may appear a tempting prey to a more powerful neighbour. If
Brunei were a part of Malaysia her position would be strengthened. She would
enjoy the protection of the forces of Malaysia, together with those of the United
Kingdom based there by agreement. We recognise the right of Brunei to
independence, whenever the difficulties can be resolved to Your Highness’s
satisfaction, but we believe in all sincerity that the best hope of long-term peace
and security for the State is to be sought within the framework of some wider
association with neighbours of goodwill with, preferably, cultural, religious and
language ties.
On the economic side, we have heard of Your Highness’s wise decision to draw up
a plan of economic development for Brunei. We understand that this includes
industrial development with the aim of providing full employment for Your
Highness’s people, but we believe that this can only logically take place in an
atmosphere of stability and with guaranteed markets such as we hope Malaysia would
afford.
We fully recognise, furthermore, the importance of the throne to the people of
Brunei and their desire for the security of the dynasty. In the changing world in
which we live, it had occurred to us here that there would be greater security for the
Brunei dynasty within the Federal Constitution, which contains effective safeguards
for the position of the Rulers.
There is, as Your Highness knows, heavy pressure on what are called ‘Colonial
Powers’ to disengage from their colonial responsibilities. We regard not with sorrow
but with pride our achievements in this field, a pride that, with independence,
friendship remains. We wish, therefore, independence to come to the territories
under our protection, peacefully and without bitterness. We wish it to bring
permanent prosperity and peace. The prospects of an independent Brunei standing
alone must be uncertain; the future of a Brunei forming part of a greater Malaysia
will be much better assured. Malaysia will not sever the link between Brunei and
Britain—it will perpetuate that link in a different but more enduring form as
members of our great family of Commonwealth countries.
I apologise for writing to Your Highness at such length. We are, of course,
awaiting Your Highness’s views on this important matter and will be ready at all
times to enter into any discussions or negotiations which Your Highness might
wish.
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96 CO 1030/987, no 1108 12 Mar 1962
[Crisis over the Cobbold Commission]: inward telegram no 160 from
Sir G Tory to Mr Sandys reporting the Tunku’s public allegation that
British officials in the Borneo territories were obstructing Malaysia
[The Tunku’s accusations that British colonial servants in Borneo were hampering
preparations for Malaysia, were printed in the Straits Times and reached the British press
too. In a follow-up telegram on the same day, Tory informed the CRO that the Tunku was
‘unrepentant’ while Wong Pow Nee and Ghazali (the Malayan members of the Cobbold
Commission) were complaining of ‘rude treatment in North Borneo’. In asking the
secretary of state for an explanation, Macmillan wondered whether the attack was ‘really a
manoeuvre by the Tunku to forestall Communist criticism’ (Macmillan to Maudling, 12
Mar 1962, CO 1030/987, no 1112). Drawing upon material written at the time, Ghazali
Shafie has described warm receptions in Sarawak and North Borneo and attributed such
‘rudeness’ there was on the part of local people to their coaching by die-hard British
expatriates, see Memoir, pp 197–229.]
Today’s Straits Times publishes following front page report of interview with Tunku
11th March under banner headlines ‘British Civil Servants in Borneo territories
hampering Malaysia’ ‘Tengku accuses’ ‘Resident snubs Ghazali, Wong’.
Begins
Tengku Abdul Rahman today accused British civil servants in Borneo territories of
hampering Malaysia. Tenku said ‘British civil servants in Borneo territories can do a lot
to influence people, especially natives, because of their high position. ‘However, they
are very antagonistic towards Malaysia. They have now been persuaded not to take an
active part in opposing Malaysia. Instead, they have adopted an apathetic attitude’ he
stressed that ‘opinion’ of British civil servants in Borneo territories did not count as far
as he was concerned as he had already obtained agreement of the British Government
to Malaysia concept ‘I do realise necessity that they (British civil servants) should not
be allowed to influence natives, like Malays and Dyaks.’ ‘The British civil servants in
their position can do a lot of harm,’ he said. Tengku said that a British resident in North
Borneo had snubbed Malayan members of Cobbold Commission at a cocktail party ‘in
full view of everybody’. He said ‘So bitter was the British civil servants opposition to
Malaysia that when Wong Pow Nee and Ghazali were leaving the party, the British
resident involved did not have courtesy or politeness, as one would expect from a British
official in high position, to stand up and bid guests farewell’. Tengku added ‘When matter
was reported to me personally by Dato Wong and Inche Ghazali on their return to Kuala
Lumpur last week, I was really very annoyed at this complete lack of courtesy, politeness
and good manners on part of the host’. He would bring this to notice of Governor. Tunku
said that, beside British civil servants, people in Borneo territories opposing Malaysia
were Chinese people and businessmen, and British merchants.
He recalled that various Chinese millionaires were opposed to Merdeka1 fearing
chaos and disaster but no single Chinese in Malaya did not agree with Malayan
independence now. Look at their wealth.
Regarding British businessmen in Borneo territories opposing Malaysia, Tengku
said he could not understand their attitude ‘these people merely want to cling to
their possessions without due regard for changing situation’. North Borneo had not
1 Independence.
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been an easy place to push forward concept of Malaysia but it had dedicated people
like Donald Stephens2 and Dato Mustapha3 who believed in Malaysia. Danger facing
Borneo territories was ‘clear enough for everyone to see’.
‘I don’t have to repeat it time and again. We can all see threat of Communists. If I
did not see this danger I would not be bothered with other territories like Singapore,
Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo.
‘Why should I really bother with these territories, if I did not see the danger ahead
for us and for them. I am happy to have Malaya which is rich, prosperous and
enjoying peace and security.’
Dealing with Singapore, which might require ‘some special attention’ he said he
was certain that Singapore could not become an independent country. ‘Singapore
finds it a bit hard to accept merger terms because it has always regarded itself as a
little China’ he said. Ends
2 Founder-president of UNKO, 1961; chairman of the MSCC, 1961–1962; first chief minister of Sabah, 1963.
3 Founder of USNO, 1961; leader of Sabah’s delegation to the MSCC, 1961–1962; first head of state of
Sabah, 1963.
97 CO 1030/987, no 1128 19 Mar 1962
[Crisis over the Cobbold commission]: minute (PM(62)22) from Mr
Maudling to Mr Macmillan, rejecting the Tunku’s allegations
contained in document 96
[CO officials drafted for the secretary of state a long rejection of the Tunku’s allegations
which was eventually submitted to the prime minister in an abbreviated form. They argued
that the Tunku’s conduct was dangerously unacceptable and, in his brief for ministerial
discussions of this, Maudling’s private secretary pointed out: ‘we cannot bounce Borneo on
the basis of the Tunku’s present thinking; these are not just a bunch of head-hunters who
have no ideas at all, or whose views can be ignored; we are all in favour of Greater Malaysia
but it will have to be handled with more finesse than the Tunku is showing’ (CO 1030/987,
no 1146) While CO officials pressed for a strong ministerial riposte, however, the CRO was
inclined to let the matter drop, and following discussion in the Cabinet Greater Malaysia
Committee on 21 Mar, it was decided to take the matter no further with the Tunku (see 98).]
I promised you my comments on the Tunku’s attack on Borneo civil servants and
also to send you Cobbold’s note of his preliminary impressions of the prospects for
Malaysia. I enclose a copy of his note.1
2. The Tunku’s accusation that British officials in North Borneo are sabotaging
our plans for Malaysia and are at most apathetic is quite unjustified. We have this
from the Governor,2 there has been the statement by the President of the North
1 See 94.
2 In a telegram to the CO on 14 Mar, Goode strenuously denied ‘foot-dragging’ and stated: ‘We have done
our best to give warnings of problems which the Tunku has preferred to ignore’ (CO 1030/987, no 1114)
On the same day Goode wrote to Tory: ‘A Dusun Native Chief on the West Coast has told one of my officers
that he expressed very strong views to the Commission on Malay supremacy. In that conversation he
described Ghazalie as “kulit hitam” [black skin], and he may well have used this phrase in the hearing. The
story has reached Sandakan [North Borneo’s second principal town] that Ghazalie was referred to as a
“black man” by a local native. As I reported many months ago, there are many people in North Borneo who
dislike and distrust Malays, probably a relic of the old repression by Malays from Brunei. Ghazalie has
probably sensed this ill-feeling in some of the witnesses appearing before the Commission’ (ibid, no 1131)
For Ghazali Shafie’s own account based on material compiled at the time, see his Memoir, pp. 197–229.]
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Borneo Civil Servants’ Association of which I attach a copy,3 and I have personal
confirmation of what they say from Sir John Martin, who spent most of January in
Borneo and made it his particular business to talk to as many British officials as he
could meet.4 All this is now confirmed in unequivocal terms by Cobbold in his two
telegrams C.67 and C.68,5 the background to which is in his note.
3. The administrations in Borneo are not being paternalistic but realistic. They
are entirely with us in wanting to see Malaysia brought about. But, as Cobbold says,
the people do not feel themselves blood brothers to the Malays and, if there is to be a
marriage, and it is to survive, it will have to be one of mutual convenience. That
means that the terms will have to be acceptable to the peoples in Borneo.
4. There is in fact no hope of an early and successful Greater Malaysia without
British Officials. That is a particular reason why the Tunku’s outburst is so
unfortunate. The officers will stay on when the territories cease to be British colonies
only if they want to stay. Some will go anyway—this always happens—but the urge
to go will be greatly increased if it is made clear by this sort of public attack that they
are not trusted by their future Prime Minister.
5. We have got to get the points in the two preceding paragraphs across to the
Tunku if there is to be hope of Malaysia. My first thought is that this could best be
done in a message from you to the Tunku. A draft is being prepared which will be
available for our discussion on Wednesday.
6. I am not commenting here in any detail on Cobbold’s note—as he says he may
change his views completely. In general it contains no real surprises. A transitional
stage, as he suggests, with sovereignty handed over, but much responsibility
remaining with us, is a possibility we have thought of, but it would of course be very
difficult to work in practice. I see Cobbold does not feel the need for legal advice
yet—he will certainly need it on this sort of thing when the Commission come to
write their report.
7. The only other point I would comment on here is his suggestion that there
should be a Governmental conference not more than two months after his report,
which he hopes to get out before the end of May (that would mean the end of July or
August for the conference). I very much doubt if two months would be long enough
for printing, translation and dissemination in the territories and debates in their
legislatures and for our own and the Malayan Government’s consideration. I would
think September a more likely time.
8. I am sending copies of this minute and its enclosure to the Lord Chancellor,
the Foreign Secretary, the Commonwealth Secretary and Minister of Defence.
3 The president of the North Borneo Civil Servants’ Association was Roland Smith, assistant director of
agriculture since 1959. The statement, which was published in The Times on 14 Mar, is not printed in this
collection.
4 Martin minuted on 13 Mar: ‘I fear that Ghazali has prepared the Tunku for the possibility of an adverse
report by the majority of the Cobbold Commission & [sic] the Tunku, who seems to be a bit rattled, is in
turn preparing to blame the British and Chinese’ (CO 1030/987, no 1113).
5 In a telegram of 16 Mar, Cobbold suggested that the Tunku had reacted in ‘a fit of temper’ when told by
Ghazali of opposition in Borneo to his blue-print. Although the allegations were unjustified, Cobbold
accepted that they had amounted to a set-back for the commission (ibid, no 1126).
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98 CAB 130/179, GEN 754/3rd meeting 21 Mar 1962
[‘Commission of enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak’]: Cabinet
Greater Malaysia Committee minutes
[This meeting was chaired by Macmillan and attended by Sandys (CRO), Maudling (CO),
Peter Thomas (joint parliamentary under-secretary, FO) and Brook (Cabinet secretary).
The Tunku’s allegation brought home to ministers the dangerous tension between the
territories. It also revealed differences of approach between Whitehall departments and
between local officials rooting for one or another of the ‘Malaysian’ territories. Ministers
noted ominous similarities here with the Central African Federation. Immediately after
this committee meeting, Sandys asked Macmillan for sole charge of the Greater Malaysia
scheme and its implementation, instead of sharing it with the CO. Although Macmillan
was sympathetic to the proposal—accepting that ‘we must do all we can to avoid a
repetition of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland’—he felt that any reallocation of
responsibilities should follow, rather than precede, the Cobbold Report. He therefore
asked Sandys not to press him further for the time being. Yet even Macmillan’s patience
was wearing thin. Additional evidence of dysfunctional policy-making, provoked him to
protest: ‘This kind of telegram shows how impossible the present system is. It is Rhodesia
all over again. Can we really wait for Cobbold?’ But Brook reined him back: ‘The time to
make any change is when we have finally decided to put our money on a Greater
Malaysia.’ (Macmillan to Sandys, M86/62, 26 Mar; Macmillan to Brook, 5 Apr; Brook to
Macmillan, 10 Apr 1962, CAB 21/4626; see also BDEE: The Conservative government and
the end of empire, 266). On the other hand, those imbued with the Colonial Service
tradition were deeply suspicious of the CRO which, they felt, was ill-equipped for the task
of coping with the Borneo territories (see 104, para 8). The Cabinet reshuffle of 12–13
July 1962 (‘the night of the long knives’, see 130, note), as a result of which Sandys added
the CO to his portfolio, provided him with the opportunity to assume control over the
Malaysian project. Even so, however, diffusion and fragmentation of policy and its
implementation continued into 1963 (see 164).]
The Meeting had before them a letter from Lord Cobbold to the Colonial Secretary
dated 6th March, 1962 on the work and programme of the Commission of Enquiry;
and telegrams from the Governor of North Borneo, the British High Commissioner
in Malaya, and Lord Cobbold, about the Malayan reaction to reports of hostility to the
Commission on the part of British officials in North Borneo.1
In discussion the following points were made:—
(a) It would probably be thought best, when the Commission’s report was received
about the end of May, to publish at least the substance of it, but it would be wrong to
enter into any commitment to publish it in any form until Ministers had had an
opportunity of discussing its contents.
(b) The difficulties and dangers to which Lord Cobbold referred in his letter were
chiefly evident in the case of Singapore. The most important feature of the project of
Greater Malaysia, from the point of view of this country, was that it seemed to offer
the only reasonable prospect of maintaining the integrity of Singapore and
preserving the British position there.
(c) In the event of Greater Malaysia being generally accepted, it would still be
necessary to make provision for the continuance of the services of British officials for
a considerable time thereafter, especially in the less-developed territories.
Summing up this part of the discussion The Prime Minister said that if we were
successful in achieving Greater Malaysia this would relieve the British Government
1 See 94, 96 and 97.
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of its most invidious and burdensome responsibilities in the area. If we failed, the
problem of Singapore would be the most urgent: at the next elections a situation
might arise in which most of the British forces in the Island would be required to
defend their own bases. In regard to North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei, there was
also the special factor of a possible irredentist threat from Indonesia.
In further discussion of the unfortunate Malayan reaction to reports of
discourtesy towards the Malayan members of the Commission in North Borneo, it
was pointed out that the British High Commissioner had talked this matter over
with the Tunku, who appeared to recognise that he had been ill-advised. It might
now be better to regard the incident as closed, in the expectation that no more
would be heard of it.
Nevertheless, the episode pointed to the possibility of a serious danger, namely
that the Tunku’s advisers in Kuala Lumpur and the British Colonial Service officials
in North Borneo might be suspicious of each other’s aims and motives, to the point
of generating an atmosphere of mistrust, such as had developed in the Central
African Federation. If the Government, having considered the report of the
Commission of Enquiry, should conclude that Greater Malaysia would be in the best
interests of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak, it might be necessary to take
special steps to ensure that the British Colonial Service officials in the territories
fully appreciated the convictions underlying the Government’s policy and could
conscientiously devote themselves to its fulfilment.
The Meeting:—
(1) Took note of the points made in discussion.
(2) Invited the Colonial Secretary to arrange for a reply to be sent to Lord
Cobbold, informing him of Sir Geofroy Tory’s discussion with the Tunku and
explaining that no further action would be taken about the latter’s complaint.
99 PREM 11/3866 31 Mar 1962
[Sarawakian suspicions of ‘Greater Malaysia’]: letter from Lord
Cobbold to Mr Maudling
Thank you for your telegram in reply to mine about the Tunku’s outburst. I sincerely
hope he will keep quiet about these territories, though his recent threats to
Singapore all strengthen the opposition to Malaysia here.
This is our last day in Sarawak and we have been glad of three days here to pause
and recoup. We have not had any formal hearings in Kuching this time but have been
doing some individual coffee-housing, and I have been talking with some of the
senior officials, Chief Justice, Bishops etc.1
Ghazali has gone to K.L. for the week-end, ostensibly to see his wife who is not
well—but he will doubtless be reporting to The Tunku at the same time.
1 Muslims accounted for only about 23 per cent of the population of Sarawak (and 38 per cent in North
Borneo) and Christian and other non-Muslim communities were insistent that there should be complete
religious freedom in the Borneo territories. Mission schools (Anglican, Roman Catholic, non-conformist,
Seventh-Day Adventist) played a major role in Sarawak’s education. The commissioners differed over
religious provisions, see 124, appendix B and 129, appendix A.
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I have little to add to what I said in my earlier letter. It is quite clear that, apart
from the Malays, who think Malaysia would make life easier for them, and the
younger nationalist and/or communist Chinese, who are shouting ‘independence in
1963’, the bulk of the population would prefer to see continuation of British rule.
I still think that something acceptable to the majority could be devised if they can
be satisfied (a) that Malaysia is a partnership in a joint enterprise and does not mean
Sarawak being handed over to rule by Malays. (b) that things will be taken gradually
and a lot of local autonomy left to the State Government so that there will not be
much change too quickly. (c) that they can get, in some early and practical form,
some advantages from Malaysia e.g. in education and development.
Unfortunately almost every utterance from Malaya tends to confirm suspicions
here that the Malayan Government intends to gobble up Sarawak quickly and on
their own terms, and that H.M.G. have agreed, or are about to agree, to this process.
I remain convinced that if the Malayan Government persist in this sort of attitude
and are not prepared to be accommodating in the matters of safeguards, timing and
local autonomy (and generous in the matter of carrots), Malaysia will not be
acceptable to these territories. I am afraid that the project may well founder on these
sort of rocks. But I may be (I trust I am) underrating the Tunku’s wisdom when it
comes to the point. His handling of these territories has certainly been inept so far.
I confirm what I said earlier about the risks of serious disorder if the period of
uncertainty goes on for long after we report. Indeed, whatever the outcome of the
Malaysia proposals, I fear that there is bound to be a period of great trouble, and I
still rate the maintenance of a strong and stable local Government here as a prime
necessity in any circumstances—K.L. seems almost as far away from here as London.
None of this changes my belief that Malaysia is the best solution if only the Tunku
will be sensible enough to make it possible.
Please treat this on the same basis as my previous note (no copy kept).2
2 In spite of his request to the contrary, Cobbold’s letter was placed on file (as was that of 6 Mar, see 94).
100 CO 1030/1016, no 23 19 Apr 1962
[Transitional arrangements for Borneo territories]: letter from Sir W
Goode to W I J Wallace on the preparation of the Cobbold Report
[In this letter (whose importance Macmillan acknowledged) Goode pointed to a
fundamental dilemma facing the planners of the new federation: the effective merger of
North Borneo within Malaysia required lengthy preparation, yet it was unrealistic to
expect the Tunku to wait several years for its completion. He stressed the need for both a
firm acceptance of ‘the principles of Malaysia’ and safeguards for North Borneo, and he
urged the adoption of a transitional period during which the special interests of North
Borneo would be protected. Accepting that a transitional period during which British
officials exercised power raised problems of sovereignty, he argued that a compromise
between the Malayan and Bornean viewpoints should be worked out by experts in London
while the commissioners were writing their report. To allow the commissioners to
submit conflicting recommendations and to leave the resolution of differences until after
the publication of the report would be, ‘if not disastrous, extremely dangerous’. Waddell
agreed with Goode’s approach to the enquiry (Waddell to Wallace, 3 May, PREM 11/3866).
In his correspondence with the CO, Goode became more and more explicit about the need
to retain British staff and to counter the Tunku’s approach to the Borneo territories (see
104 and 105 and also CAB 21/4626 and PREM 11/3866.)]
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Under cover of a separate letter I have sent you copies of the memoranda which we
put in to the Cobbold Commission while they were here. You will see from the
memorandum on the machinery of government and process to self-government
within Malaysia that in my view North Borneo cannot become a self-governing
member State of a Federation of Malaysia for several years. To be successful, Malaysia
must give a large measure of local self-government to North Borneo. This means that
North Borneo must have a State Government capable of handling the State
responsibilities before Malaysia can be achieved, and I cannot see how we can
produce such a Government today. It must take us several years to produce a local
Government in which we can have reasonable confidence that it will be able to
undertake its responsibilities. We have two essential steps to take: introduction of
elections, and the emergence of Ministers of minimum competence recognised as
elected by the people and responsible to them. I cannot see how we can achieve this
position before 1967 at the earliest. Meanwhile it is not possible to hand over to the
local people full responsibility for State affairs.
2. But I think it is unrealistic to expect the Tunku to wait the several years which
North Borneo needs. We must therefore try to work out a plan which will give the
Tunku a form of Malaysia at the latest next year and yet can be made to work in
North Borneo.
3. We must go for some arrangement whereby:—
(a) the British Government accepts today the principles of Malaysia;
(b) we reach quick agreement with the Malayans on the division of powers
between the State and Federal Governments;
(c) some important powers, such as external relations, defence, internal security,
judiciary and others are transferred within a few months to the new Federal
Government of Malaysia; and
(d) North Borneo gets the safeguards it needs and retains a large measure of self-
government.
4. I think such a solution would be generally acceptable in North Borneo. It
would have the advantage of securing Malaysia now while the opportunity offers. The
division of State and Federal powers could, given the co-operation of the Malayan
Government, be so agreed as to remove most of the objections raised here to
Malaysia. Inevitably serving British officers would have to be given the option of
retiring with compensation and some will go. My own assessment is that the greater
the measure of self-government given to North Borneo, the fewer will leave. This is
the solution I hope the Commission will recommend.
5. But the crucial difficulty in this solution is to devise some way in which, while
giving the Tunku his side of Malaysia, we can retain our ability to help and in effect
control the North Borneo State Government until such time as it is capable of
discharging its responsibilities and holding its appropriate place in Malaysia in
relation to the other Governments thereof. This raises the bogey of sovereignty.
Malaysia requires that sovereignty over North Borneo now vested in the British
Government (pace the Filipinos) shall pass partly to the Federal Government of
Malaysia in respect of the Federal subjects, and partly to the North Borneo
Government in respect of State subjects. But we cannot in conscience transfer their
measure of sovereignty to the North Borneo Government until they are reasonably
capable of undertaking the responsibility involved. The problem is to devise some
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form of constitutional arrangement or inter-governmental agreement which will
make it possible for British officials to retain sufficient power to look after North
Borneo until such time as it can look after itself.
6. I cannot myself devise a scheme to achieve this. I wish I could. To me this has
always been the key problem of Malaysia, and I can only hope that it is not beyond the
ingenuity of experts in London somehow to devise a solution to it. (Compare our
telegrams from Kuching last year, Nos. 46 of 30th September and No. 47 of 1st
October).
7. I get the impression from Lord Cobbold that he is not optimistic about solving
this constitutional problem, always assuming that Tunku Abdul Rahman will be
prepared to accept such a form of Malaysia. And on this too Lord Cobbold seemed
doubtful. Unless we can solve the constitutional problem, and the Tunku will accept
such a form of Malaysia, then it seems to me that Malaysia is off.
8. I hope that the report and recommendations of the Cobbold Commission will
both solve the constitutional problem and sell the resulting form of Malaysia to the
Tunku. But I am not optimistic that it will. The constitutional problem must be a
matter for the best brains we can find in London. The sooner they get at it the better,
for we have no time to lose before we shall have to take big decisions. Any
constitutional lawyer will probably say that it is not legally possible to solve the
problem. Personally I would not accept this answer: the problem is somehow to
achieve what the constitutional lawyer believes is legally impossible, and I cannot
believe that, with all our experience of peculiar constitutional arrangements which at
any given time would have been ruled out as legally impossible, it is beyond us to
devise a solution. If necessary we must make new constitutional precedents; we’ve
done this before.
9. The Tunku’s co-operation is essential. He must be persuaded to accept a
compromise solution; and if we can give him a fair measure of what he needs to
claim that he has achieved Malaysia, I think he could be persuaded. This is an issue
between London and Kuala Lumpur which may have to be finally settled between
Prime Ministers. But it is no good securing the Tunku’s agreement, unless we are
reasonably confident that we can solve the constitutional problem and deliver the
goods. Conversely, it will be a waste of time racking our brains over the
constitutional problem, if there is no prospect at all that the Tunku will accept such a
solution.
10. I do not know what the Cobbold Commission will recommend. Lord Cobbold
told me that he hoped to be able to present his report by the end of May. We shall
then be under immediate pressure to publish the report, and it will have to be
published. Any delay between publication and announcement of firm decisions on
the main issues will be, if not disastrous, extremely dangerous. Any indication of
indecision or of dissension between the British and Malayan Governments will be
exploited to the full by all factions, both pro- and anti-Malaysia. Unless Nick Waddell
and I are in a position to make clear, firm statements about the future, we could well
find ourselves faced with serious threats to public security and we shall probably lose
our ability to control events. It is vital, therefore, that we should know what we are
going to do and have taken our major decisions before we publish the Cobbold
report. I do not think we should sit back hoping that the Commission will solve the
problem of Malaysia for us. We should anticipate the issues that are likely to face us
in the report and tackle them now.
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11. If the Commission is able to produce unanimous recommendations for a
form of Malaysia which will give the Tunku the substance of what he needs and will
also give North Borneo a large measure of self-government, particularly in respect of
those matters on which there are strong feelings here, we shall have no great
difficulty over the Commission’s report. For I assume that:—
(i) Ghazalie will not agree to recommendations which will be unacceptable to the
Tunku; and Waddell and I will probably be able to accept what the British
members recommend as satisfactory for Sarawak and North Borneo; and
(ii) the Commission will have satisfied themselves that the form of Malaysia they
recommend is both practically workable having regard to conditions in Borneo,
and constitutionally sound.
12. There will no doubt be arguments over details and legal drafting to be settled
at a subsequent inter-governmental conference, but we should be able to accept the
main recommendations very soon after the report is received.
13. If, however, the Commission is unable to produce a unanimous report, we
shall have to make very difficult decisions, and make them quickly.
14. The simplest decision will be that Malaysia is not practical at present, because
the Commission’s report shows that there are difficulties which cannot be overcome.
15. A much more difficult, but more constructive course will be to make a last
determined effort on the basis of the report to find a compromise solution which will
produce Malaysia. We can assume that the division in the Commission will be
between the British members with one view and the Malayans with another. A
compromise solution will mean requiring Waddell and me to consider to what extent
we can go further than the British members of the Commission in meeting the
Malayan view without unacceptable risk; and seeking to persuade the Tunku to make
more concessions to Borneo needs in order to get Malaysia and avoid a deadlock.
16. I foresee the greatest difficulty in achieving any compromise solution after
the report has been put in; even greater once it has been published. Delay in
publication will be ascribed to deadlock of some sort, and publication of divergent
views of the British and Malayan members will cause acute controversy here and
might produce a situation where we can no longer control developments. Unless we
have been able to agree upon a solution to the problem before the report is
published, I believe we shall find that we cannot achieve Malaysia.
17. We must therefore make every effort to reach a solution acceptable to both
the British and the Malayan Governments before the report is published. We shall
have little time between presentation of the report and its publication. Moreover, if a
solution to the problem is possible, it should be put forward in the report. It will then
have the authority of the Commission behind it and so will have the best prospects of
popular acceptance; whereas it will be very difficult to recover from the effect of a
divided report which will provide authority for rejecting any compromise.
18. When he left Lord Cobbold was not optimistic about getting a unanimous
report. It will, therefore, be prudent to anticipate that the Commission will not be able
to produce an agreed plan. We have only a few weeks left in which to make a decisive
effort to achieve Malaysia. I urge that we must do all we can to assist the Commission
to reach agreement, working on the basis that unless they do, Malaysia is off.
19. The Commission will be in London. Lord Cobbold will be able to consult the
Colonial Office and Ministers. Waddell is also in England, and if necessary I will fly
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back for consultations. But my hunch is that the Tunku will be the key person. If
Ghazalie cannot be persuaded to bridge the gap, then it seems to me that Lord
Cobbold may have to return to Kuala Lumpur, since this will be less difficult than
getting the Tunku to London.
20. My main point is that if we do not solve the problem now while the report is
being written, I do not think we ever shall. It is no good waiting for the report,
hoping that we shall somehow find a solution after we have received the report.
21. Of course, if Lord Cobbold is able to reassure you that he will be able to
produce a workable solution backed unanimously by the Commission, then things
will be much easier. I shall be vastly relieved.
22. My worry is that:—
(a) the Tunku still does not appreciate how great is the gap between his idea of
Malaysia and what we can accept as right for the Borneo territories;
(b) the Commission will fail to work out a plan to bridge the gap between what the
Tunku wants and what will work in Borneo;
(c) the Commission will not do enough to persuade the Tunku to accept such a plan;
(d) if these things are not done before the Commission reports, it will be too late.
23. To sum up this far too long letter:—
(i) We have got to devise some way in which we can support the North Borneo
Government so that it can manage its State affairs in the type of Malaysia that
conditions in Borneo require.
(ii) We have got to persuade the Tunku to accept the resulting form of Malaysia.
(iii) If the Cobbold Commission does both these things, we shall have only minor
difficulties in following up the Cobbold Report.
(iv) But if the Commission fails to produce a unanimous report, I see little
prospect of achieving Malaysia in the near future. Delay in deciding what we are
going to do will be dangerous.
(v) The only way to achieve Malaysia is to find an acceptable solution of the
problem before the report is completed and get it incorporated in the report.
(vi) If we cannot get an acceptable solution into the report, then we should be
ready to announce when the report is published that Malaysia has proved
impracticable at present.
24. I am copying this letter to Jakeway, White, Tory and Lord Selkirk.
101 CO 1030/1016, no 20 19 Apr 1962
[Cobbold’s views on the prospects for Malaysia]: minute by C G
Eastwood to E M West1
[At the conclusion of their tour of North Borneo and Sarawak, the commissioners
dispersed. Watherston and Ghazali went to talk with the Tunku in Kuala Lumpur and
Cobbold returned to London. He was debriefed on the prospects for Greater Malaysia in a
series of Whitehall meetings before the commissioners reassembled in early May at
Knebworth House, Hertfordshire, Cobbold’s country home which he had acquired
through his wife, the elder daughter of the second Earl of Lytton. Throughout May and
1 E M West private secretary to secretary of state, CO, 1961; private secretary to minister of state, CO, 1962.
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much of June they drafted the report, mostly at Knebworth though also in London (CO
947/3, CO 947/4 and CO 947/7; see also Ghazali Shafie, Memoir, p 230 ff).]
The Secretary of State may like to know that Lord Cobbold arrived safely back this
morning. I met him at London Airport. He had a trying journey back with six hours
in the middle of the night at Calcutta airport.
He is confident that there can be a scheme for Greater Malaysia which is both
practicable and acceptable if the Governments are sensible. The ‘if ’ is of course a big
one as regards the Tunku. The general shape of his ideas has not altered much since
his last letter to the Secretary of State: they have still to work out their plan in detail.
Meanwhile he has sent Sir David Watherston to Kuala Lumpur with Ghazali to talk
to the Tunku: he thought it wiser not to go himself.
The Commission meet again at Knebworth about the 5th May to write the report.
They hope to complete it by about the end of the month.
Lord Cobbold would like to come and see the Secretary of State some time, probably
during the first week of May and will have a word with Sir John Martin probably on
Wednesday next.2 The point he principally wants to make is that the period immediately
after the publication of their report will be one of great tension in North Borneo and
Sarawak. He is anxious that Governments should make up their minds on the report
quickly; otherwise he fears there will be some slitting of throats. I said that we had had
somewhat unfortunate experience of rushing people into federations without giving
them time to make up their minds: our idea had been that there ought to be full
discussion of the report in all the legislatures followed probably by a conference. Lord
Cobbold did not at all disagree with this: what I really think he has in mind is that we,
and I suppose the Government of Malaya too, should give an early indication of the
way in which the band-wagon is likely to go in order that those who are hesitating may
be given an opportunity of jumping on it. In other words we should say something to
the effect that the plan in the report seems a reasonable one: H.M.G. in the U.K. will
not make up their minds about it until it has been fully discussed locally but it would
seem to them to provide a practicable solution to a difficult problem.
He said that the Tunku was fully prepared to come himself to London in June or
July. He did not want to wait until the Prime Ministers’ Conference in September.3
If the report is presented about the end of May it would, I suppose, be published
about the middle of June. He did not think that it would be necessary to have full
translations into any other language though I suppose the summary and the texts of
important parts would have to be translated locally into local languages.
2 See 102.
3 ie, the meeting of Commonwealth prime ministers where they would endorse Britain’s resumed
negotiations to enter the Common Market.
102 CO 1030/1016, no 22 25 Apr 1962
[Cobbold’s views on the prospects for Malaysia]: minute by Sir J
Martin to C G Eastwood
Lord Cobbold called this afternoon on his return from Borneo. He said that he was
quite satisfied that Greater Malaysia was the right policy for the Borneo territories,
provided however that it was on the right conditions and not in the form which the
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Tunku seems hitherto to have contemplated. Merger on the Tunku’s original terms
would be quite unacceptable for Borneo and its imposition would have the most
serious consequences. Lord Cobbold seems to have no hope of a unanimous report,
since he evidently does not expect the Malayan members to go along with his views.
He hopes however to avoid the appearance of majority and minority reports, so that
there would be a single report saying on points of difference some members thought
this and some thought that. He fears that the Tunku is still woefully ignorant of
conditions in the Borneo territories and is pessimistic about the chances of obtaining
his agreement to acceptable terms of merger. On the other hand it is of great
importance to the Tunku that Malaysia should come off: failure would mean great
loss of face for him and it is even more in his interests than in that of H.M.G. to
ensure that things go well in Singapore. Lord Cobbold therefore thinks there may be
a 50/50 chance of persuading him. Unfortunately Ghazali is not an independent
Commissioner and will do as the Tunku tells him.
2. Lord Cobbold says that he contemplates quite a short report, though it will
indicate clearly the terms on which merger is proposed. The descriptive part has
already been drafted by Sir David Watherston and, since he does not think that the
members could argue for more than about a fortnight about their conclusions, Lord
Cobbold hopes that the report may be completed by as early as the 20th May or at any
rate before the end of the month. Thereafter he urges that we should go into action
as quickly as possible and that the report should not be published without some
indication of H.M.G.’s views. This will rally all the many people who wait to climb on
the band waggon, while its absence would encourage the growth of opposition and
dissension. He assumes that before any such statement could be issued we would try
to come to some agreement with the Tunku and the Tunku had spoken of the
possibility of coming to London in the summer. Lord Cobbold agreed that there
should be some consultation with the B. territories (eg by debates in legislatures)
and possibly a Conference.
3. Lord Cobbold did not go into detail about the content of the recommendations
he envisages, beyond indicating that he believed in a two-stage approach. It was
essential that, if Malaysia was to come at all, it should be introduced very quickly, but
the transfer of many powers would not come till a few years later and he evidently
contemplates work for a number of commissions or working-parties in determining
the details of this transfer during the intermediate period. He seems to contemplate
immediate transfer of sovereignty accompanied by temporary delegation, but this is
no doubt the subject which he wishes to discuss with Mr. McPetrie,1 whom he is to
see on Friday at 10 a.m.
4. I raised the question of legal advice.2 Lord Cobbold indicated that he did not at
present envisage the need for a legal adviser attached to the Commission while
drafting their report, but that he had certain questions which he wished to put to the
Legal Adviser. I suggested that it might be found helpful to consult Professor
Kenneth Wheare.3 I said how important it was that the Commission should not
1 J C (later Sir James) McPetrie, legal adviser, CO, 1960; legal adviser for Commonwealth Office, 1966, and
FCO, 1968.
2 See Goode’s recommendation, 100, para 8.
3 Rector of Exeter College Oxford. The CO frequently consulted Wheare on constitutional issues, including
those of Malaya in the early 1950s.
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recommend anything which it was found afterwards did not stand up legally. Lord
Cobbold fully takes this point.
5. Lord Cobbold subsequently looked in on the Secretary of State for a few
minutes and also on the Minister of State. The Secretary of State has minuted about
this to the Prime Minister.
6. Lord Cobbold asked me to keep to myself what he had told me, but did not
object when I said that I would like to inform one or two others in the Office. This
minute (which I am afraid has had to be prepared rather hurriedly) should be
registered for record after Mr. Wallace has seen, but please do not circulate outside
the Office.
7. It is convenient to add here that Sir Anthony Abell, whom I also saw earlier in
the day, gave as his opinion that not more than about 50% of the expatriate Service
would remain after the introduction of Malaysia.
103 CO 1030/1016, nos 52–59 23 May 1962
[Transitional arrangements for Borneo territories]: letter from C G
Eastwood to Sir W Goode
I am writing further, in Ian Wallace’s absence on leave, about your most valuable
letter of the 19th April on Malaysia.1
2. At the moment, we think it not impossible that the Commission will be able to
agree on a general solution which would meet a good deal of what you say (in
paragraph 3) we must have (with which we agree). But they may not be unanimous
on some issues. In that case, we do not see any real hope of ensuring that the
differences are removed from the report before it is published. For one thing, Lord
Cobbold is not a person amenable to pressure from Government, nor would he, I
think, be prepared to fly to Kuala Lumpur again to talk to the Tunku (nor indeed
should we think it a wise thing for him to do). He has emphasised since his return
that he does not regard negotiation with the Tunku as his function. So, if the
Commission cannot agree among themselves, Governmental intervention would not
persuade them to do so.
3. A report containing some differences of opinion would be a pity but it might
not be disastrous, at any rate if—as it is possible to hope—any differences are over
‘subjects’ rather than constitutional fundamentals, since there might be room for
settlement of these points between Governments.
4. I gather that both you and Jakeway2 (whose letter to Ian of the 3rd May has
just been received) assume that, in the event of immediate transfer of sovereignty, a
compensation scheme would have to be introduced at once and that of course
involves the risk of an exodus of expatriate officers sufficient (in Jakeway’s words) ‘at
any rate to make the task of bringing the country to orderly and competent self-
government immensely more difficult’. In that connection you should know that we
understand that a possible solution has been under consideration which, although
unique in our constitutional experience, might be feasible, viz. for the United
1 See 100. 2 Chief secretary, Sarawak, 1959–1963.
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Kingdom to cede North Borneo and Sarawak at once to the new Federation of
Malaysia but to provide by an immediately effective agreement between the United
Kingdom and the new Federation that during a prescribed transitional period the
internal government of the two territories would remain the responsibility of the
British Government, who would have the power to make laws.
5. Under such a plan the Public Service would not immediately be entitled to
claim compensation, since during the transitional period it would still be the
responsibility of the Secretary of State. Compensation schemes have hitherto been
introduced when the Secretary of State’s responsibility has been handed over to an
executive Public Service Commission at the stage either of self-government or of
independence, i.e. when British sovereignty was relinquished. The compensation is
appropriate because from then on the Secretary of State is no longer in a position to
carry out his responsibilities to the Service, i.e. there is a change of master. So far, we
have not unnaturally been more or less assuming that transfer of sovereignty to
Malaysia would inevitably mean the end of the Secretary of State’s responsibility i.e.
that the two things would happen simultaneously. But, if a unique constitutional
solution was found on the above lines, the two events would not be simultaneous and
there would not be a case in logic, and certainly not in expediency, for a
compensation scheme with immediate effect. Of course, there would have to be
immediate agreement that a compensation scheme would start as soon as the
Secretary of State lost control and/or the transtitional arrangements came to an end;
and there might be room for flexibility in introducing compensation even before
then, say if the situation were seriously to deteriorate.
6. I should however emphasise that this is entirely hypothetical, since we do not
know if the Commission will in the end come up with a solution on these lines.
Obviously any solution of this kind would require very careful presentation to the
Service and we should have to be very careful to ensure that the Secretary of State’s
responsibility was effectively preserved; that officers were saved from interference in
performing their duties properly and that the agreement for compensation at the end
of the transitional period was fully satisfactory.
7. Although, as I say, all this is hypothetical, we should nevertheless be glad to
have your comments, particularly on the likely attitude of expatriate officers.
8. To come back, however, to the question of how to handle the Report, we
entirely agree with you (and so, we know, does Cobbold) that any delay between
publication and the announcement of pretty firm decisions of principle by the U.K.
and Malayan Governments would be most dangerous. If the Governments can give a
general blessing to the report, then waverers will know which is the band wagon on
to which they should jump. But of course the U.K. Government’s blessing must be
expressed in a way which leaves freedom to local opinion, and particularly the local
legislatures, in North Borneo and Sarawak to express their views. It would be fatal to
give the impression that we had pre-judged the issue completely before there had
been any opportunity for local opinion to express itself.
9. We think the best course will be to hold back publication while we try to iron
out a common line of policy with the Tunku. We think we ought to be able to delay
publication for this purpose for three or four weeks after we receive the report. As
you know, a telegram has already gone to the Tunku asking him to come here for
about a week some time after the middle of June when he has had time to study it. As
soon as they are available, we would propose to send copies to you, to Waddell here
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and to Jakeway, White, Allen3 and Moore for confidential discussions with senior
advisers but not with unofficials. We are grateful to you for your suggestion that you
might fly back here for discussions and we should like to take advantage of it. We
hope you could come here to join Waddell in discussions a little before the Tunku
arrives. We would then hope to be able to settle at least some of any differences with
the Tunku and to issue perhaps a joint statement simultaneously with publication of
the Report, giving a general blessing to it, subject to such provisos as may be agreed
and also subject of course to the result of discussions in local legislatures and
perhaps of a subsequent intergovernmental conference.
10. We can only hope that such a programme will not lead to the confusion and
opposition in Borneo referred to in para. 16 of your letter, although there can
obviously be no doubt that the less the Commission disagree, the easier acceptance
of Malaysia will be, and vice versa. Much will, of course, depend not only on what the
Commission recommend but also on what they may leave for subsequent agreement,
for which it may be necessary to appoint ad hoc inter-governmental committees or
working parties.
11. The next step would presumably be discussion of the Report locally ending
with a vote on it in the local legislatures. Following on that there may have to be an
intergovernmental Conference. If there has to be such a Conference it would
probably best be held in London, though we would not rule out somewhere in the
Far East altogether.
12. Singapore will of course be very much concerned with the Report. If it
recommends a more attractive position for the Borneo Territories than Singapore
will have under Lee Kuan Yew’s agreement with the Tunku, then the implications of
this for Singapore will be considerable. As at present advised Lord Selkirk considers
that the discussions in June should only be between the U.K. Government (with of
course your advice and that of Waddell) and the Tunku. But we shall no doubt have
to tell Lee what is in the Report as soon as we get copies of it and it might be
necessary to think again about this when we know what his reactions to it are.
Certainly if there is a subsequent inter-governmental conference, the Singapore
Government should be represented at it.
13. If there is such an intergovernmental conference we shall have to settle the
correct basis of representation at it. Normally, at our ‘independence’ conferences, we
insist on having all parties in the Legislative Assembly represented. The Tunku,
however, for obvious reasons does not want to involve his Opposition. He and his
colleagues could speak for and commit his Government, as could Lee Kuan Yew his.
Whether or not it would be desirable to exclude these Oppositions from the
opportunity of having their say, we are left in an apparent difficulty about the
representation of N. Borneo and Sarawak. Do you think you could represent N.
Borneo on your own (I imagine not) or with one or two members of your Executive
Council, or would you expect all the unofficial members of it to attend or even a
cross-section of your Legislative Council? This question would possibly present less
difficulties in North Borneo than in Sarawak, where the leader of the SUPP is a
member of Executive Council. (And who would represent Brunei?) It is premature to
form conclusions on this, but it would be useful to have your comments.
3 Deputy commissioner-general, SE Asia, 1959–1962.
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14. There would obviously be a rather uneasy period between publication of the
Report, even with a general blessing from the U.K. and Malayan Governments, and
final decisions on it and this ought to be as short as is consistent with giving time for
the proper consideration of so important a matter. It would clearly be necessary, if
we were all going for Greater Malaysia, to do all we could during that period to guide
public opinion along the right lines, to reassure the public against fears and
perplexities, and to keep up the morale of the Public Service.
15. In this connection there is just a possibility (I would put it no higher) that
the Secretary of State might be able to fit in a short visit to the two Borneo territories
in July. He would have liked to see them before now, but that has not been possible. I
do not know if he can manage it at all, and if he could, he would only be able to spend
three or four days at the most in N. Borneo and three or four in Sarawak. I imagine,
however, that even in that time much could be done to discuss with you local
reactions to the Report and to put over H.M.G.’s views to the British officials and
community leaders. The timing of such a visit would clearly be affected by the
content of the Report and by the outcome of the discussions with the Tunku and
Waddell and yourself in London. In principle, however, it seems to us that a visit
could be most useful and we assume you would welcome it similarly. We will let you
know as soon as there is anything more definite to report.4
16. Meanwhile we should be glad if you would confirm that you would be ready
to come here in June, once we have all had a chance to study the report and before it
is published. We should also, of course, be glad to have your comments on the other
points in this letter.
17. I am giving Lord Selkirk a copy of this letter. We are also giving the C.R.O. a
copy for Tory and I am sending copies to Waddell and to Jakeway, White, Allen and
Moore. We shall be grateful for any comments any of them like to make. I also
enclose an extra copy which perhaps, if you see no objection, you would kindly hand
on to Henry Hall.
4 The secretary of state did not go to Borneo in July. Agreement on the Cobbold Report was not reached
until 31 July by which time Sandys had succeeded Maudling at the CO while the idea of a visit by the
secretary of state had been overtaken by the proposal for an inter-governmental committee chaired by
Lansdowne (minister of state), see 141, note.
104 PREM 11/3866 4 June 1962
[Transitional arrangements for Borneo territories]: letter from Sir W
Goode to C G Eastwood, replying to document 103 on the need to
retain British officers
Your long letter of May 23rd was most welcome for the encouraging possibilities
suggested in paragraphs 4 and 5.
2. The solution you suggest is what I was asking for in paragraphs 5 to 6 of my
letter of April 19th to Wallace, with the addition of postponement of entitlement to
compensation.
3. This additional point is of paramount importance. You will recall that in
Selkirk’s telegram No. 46 of 30th September last year, drafted in Kuching, we put
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retention of the British staff as our first requirement; and in my telegram No. 224 of
15th November I recommended that the Secretary of State should retain
responsibility for overseas officers and thus avoid the necessity for a compensation
scheme, at least for some years.
4. In recent months, however, I formed the impression that the view in London
was quite inflexible about this: that a compensation scheme must be introduced
immediately Malaysia was accepted, and there could be no departure from this
principle, cost what it might in loss of serving officers. This is why I had come, albeit
most reluctantly, to assume, as you rightly state in paragraph 4 of your letter, that we
must accept an immediate compensation scheme as inevitable. I am immensely
relieved to learn now from your letter that consideration is being given to an
arrangement which will make it possible to postpone entitlement to compensation,
and so postpone also loss of British officers.
5. So my immediate comment on the possible solution in your paragraphs 4 and
5 is to welcome it with relief and full support.
6. The difficulties and risks involved in such a plan are formidable. But I urge
that we should not let them put us off it. In any solution to this problem of Malaysia
there will be difficulties and risks just as formidable, if not more so. The important
thing is to go for a solution which is sound. I would rather accept failure now than
agree to arrangements which have no prospect of enduring, and so will bring much
greater troubles in the future.
7. I see particular difficulty in drafting the agreement giving the British
Government responsibility during the transition period. It must be as explicit as
possible in order to provide a clear division of powers between the British and
Malaysian Governments, and yet avoid impugning the Tunku’s achievement of
Malaysia. And there will be all sorts of possibilities of friction between
Jesselton/Kuching and Kuala Lumpur in working the transition period. But given
mutual goodwill and co-operation I think the plan is practical.
8. I am sure that if the plan is to work, it should be the Colonial Office, not the
C.R.O., which retains responsibility for the two Borneo territories during the transition
period. The C.R.O. is not fitted for the work involved, and transfer from the Colonial
Office to the C.R.O. would undermine confidence in North Borneo in one of the two
main purposes of the plan, namely that we will continue to safeguard the interests of
North Borneo in those matters which are not transferred to the Federation of Malaysia.1
9. As regards the second main purpose, the retention of British officers,
postponement of entitlement to compensation would certainly postpone any exodus.
It is difficult to forecast the likely attitude of expatriate officers.
10. During his visit early this year John Martin, in talking to a delegation of
expatriate officers, was careful not to go beyond saying that it seemed probable that
the date for introducing a compensation scheme would be the date of transfer of
sovereignty (again the bogey of sovereignty), in qualification of his earlier remark
that it was H.M.G.’s accepted policy that there should be a compensation scheme in a
territory when the Civil Service passed outside the control and protection of the
1 As regards problems arising from the division of responsibilities between the CO and CRO, see 98, note.
Despite Goode’s criticism of the CRO in this paragraph, his despatch was given interdepartmental
circulation.
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Secretary of State. If in fact the Secretary of State, under the terms of the agreement,
retains responsibility for the Service, officers would have to accept that conditions
had not arisen which entitled them to compensation. They might, however, put up a
claim based on transfer of sovereignty.
11. I am advised, however, that a number of officers has probably assumed that if
Malaysia is effected, a compensation scheme will be introduced simultaneously. They
are likely to be disgruntled if they find that we have produced a device to secure
Malaysia without giving them a compensation scheme. The more convincingly the
Tunku is able to claim that he has achieved Malaysia, the stronger will be the feeling
that the expatriate officers have been denied their expected entitlement.
12. It will no doubt also be argued that the difficulties of working under elected
Ministers justify a compensation scheme. I do not regard this argument as
acceptable. It will be some time before we have elected Ministers, and in any case it is
the surrender of control over the public service by the Secretary of State which is the
operative change, not the preliminary progress towards self-government.
Nevertheless, as elections and political parties increasingly dominate the
administration of the country, conditions become disagreeable to some officers.
13. It will be necessary to safeguard those officers who are in departments which
are to become federal under Malaysia. Presumably the Secretary of State would
retain authority over them in Service matters. But as long as they serve in federal
departments, they will be under policy direction from the Ministers of the Federal
Government in Kuala Lumpur. Unfortunately the recent public outburst by the
Tunku, in which he unjustly accused expatriate officers here, has made a lasting
unfavourable impression on many officers, including some of the most senior. I
think they have been too sensitive, but unless the Tunku can regain their confidence
they will continue to regard service under Malayan Ministers as distasteful.
14. So there will be difficulties over postponing a compensation scheme. But I
hope they are not insurmountable. It would be essential that we get down immediately
to negotiating a compensation scheme to become operative in agreed circumstances.
These negotiations themselves should provide an outlet for disgruntled feelings, and
perhaps some fears could be met. As I have written before, a great deal will depend
upon the extent of self-government given to North Borneo under Malaysia.
15. We have a high proportion of older officers in the Service here. 10 out of 34
in the Administrative Service and 9 out of 20 in the Police are already over 45 years of
age and so can opt to retire. We also have many officers on contract who can give
notice at any time and will not be influenced by compensation prospects.
16. I agree generally with the points made in paragraphs 8 to 12 of your letter
and have no further comment at this stage.
17. If we have an inter-governmental conference later, and I think this will be
necessary, I could not represent North Borneo alone. I should have to bring with me
the Unofficial Members of my Executive Council who are also leaders of the four
main parties here:—
Datu Mustapha U.S.N.O.
Donald Stephens U.N.K.O.
Khoo Siak Chiew United Party
G.S. Sundang Pasok Momogun
I think I could keep the representation down to these four.
11-Malaysia-79-122-cpp  21/9/04  9:06 AM  Page 301
302 THE COBBOLD COMMISSION [105]
18. A visit by the Secretary of State, however brief, would be most welcome. He
would be able to establish personal contacts with the community leaders and with
British officials. I am sure that in this way he would be able to do a great deal to
restore confidence in British intentions and to win acceptance for whatever plan has
by then emerged for Malaysia. John Martin will be able to advise from his personal
experience this year how best to use whatever time the Secretary of State could give
to North Borneo. The longer this can be, the better.
19. To revert in conclusion to the beginning of your letter, I think it is a great
pity that Lord Cobbold was not willing to do more to try to get the Tunku and others
of us to accept whatever recommendations he thinks would best achieve Malaysia. I
fear that this will be much more difficult after the report has been presented, when
each of us will probably be able to find in it support for his particular view. We failed
to bring the problems home to the Tunku last year. I hoped the Commission would
get him thinking about the compromises needed to bridge the gap between his ideas
and what is practical. The prospect of success is much less now at this late stage.
However, we must do the best we can.
20. I am copying this letter to Jakeway, White, Allen, Moore and Tory, and send
you an extra copy for Waddell.
105 CO 1030/17, no 168 5 June 1962
[Transitional arrangements for Borneo territories]: letter from Sir W
Goode to C G Eastwood on the need for the Tunku to make
concessions
Geofroy Tory’s letter of May 29th to Hampshire is a cold douche to hopes raised by
your letter of May 23rd.
2. If the Tunku is not able to make a substantial contribution to solving the two
related problems of helping North Borneo to run its State Government and of
retaining British officers, until such time as North Borneo can look after its own
interests, then in my view we shall not get Malaysia.
3. The Tunku may be able to take a firm line with his Malays and the Malayan
Chinese—they elected him—, but I don’t think this will work with my Muruts and
Dusuns, strengthened by the Chinese, a thousand miles away from Kuala Lumpur,
who start with a dislike for Malays and Muslims. They have only been steam-rollered
once, by the Japanese, and they exacted a price of heads for that.
4. Nor do I see how we could in conscience hand these people over to be
disciplined by the Tunku.
5. I do not recall hearing before about the arrangement mentioned by Tory in his
third paragraph. Its acceptability here would depend on several points:—
(a) the extent of the powers to pass ultimately to the centre;
(b) the safeguards in the special agreement against subsequent alteration by
Kuala Lumpur, c.f. recent amendments of the Malayan constitution;
(c) the constitution of the ‘fully representative working party’: it would command
no confidence here if it were under the control of the Malays;
(d) whether or not the British Government would guarantee or somehow ensure
that the Borneo territories got a fair deal during the transition period.
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6. Nor do I see much hope that Tory’s suggestion in his fourth paragraph would
hold the British officers. If they are not to get immediate right to retire with
compensation, they will have to have something more formal and reliable than an
understanding that in practice the Federal Establishment Officer would agree to act
on the advice of the Colonial Secretary. State Services, of course, are nothing to do
with the Federal Establishment Officer. I see great difficulty in persuading British
officers that although we are bringing in Malaysia, and although the Federal
Establishment Officer will take over from me responsibility for their appointments
etc., the time has not yet come to give them the right to retire with compensation. I
fear this would arouse strong resentment.
7. If we grant the right to retire with compensation, too many will go too soon.
The Tunku must appreciate that unless enough British officers can be persuaded to
stay, Malaysia so far as North Borneo is concerned is impractical.
8. I hope that Tory will be able to get the Tunku to realise before he comes to
London that if he is to get Malaysia he is going to have to make substantial
concessions to meet our common problems, even though these concessions will
cause him political difficulty at home.
9. I am copying this to Tory, Jakeway, White and Allen.
P.S. Tory’s telegram No. 323 to the C.R.O. has now arrived. If the Tunku persists in
his refusal to compromise, Malaysia must be off.1
1 Commenting percipiently on this postscript, a CO official wrote in the margin of Goode’s letter: ‘Tunku
will withdraw Malayan members of Commission, etc.’ See 111, para 8.
106 PREM 11/3866 8 June 1962
[Commissioners’ differences over their report]: letter from Lord
Cobbold to Mr Sandys
[A start on drafting the report had been made by Watherston before the commissioners
reassembled at Knebworth in early May. Thereafter, however, they made heavy weather of
it. Ghazali arrived from Kuala Lumpur no better disposed than before to Bornean
feelings, and in early June the Tunku intervened at a distance, threatening to withdraw
the Malayan members. While the commissioners were in agreement on integration
through ‘Greater Malaysia’ and also on the need for the Borneo territories to pass through
a transition period, they differed over the nature of that transition. On the one hand, Abell
and Watherston (with Cobbold in support) argued for a continuing British role to ensure
effective administration and prepare for the ‘localisation’ of public services, although they
tried to avoid confrontation with the Malayans by proposing that the details be worked
out on a government-to-government basis after the publication of the report. On the
other hand, Ghazali and Wong Pow Nee were under pressure from the Tunku to ensure
that the report spelled out transitional arrangements and eliminated the retention of
British governors or anything else which would open him to the charge of being an
‘imperialist stooge’. Cobbold worked against the clock to avoid a break-down or the
presentation of alternative reports (CO 947/3, and CO 1030/1016 and 1017).]
I do not think I can properly send you copies of sections of the Report, which, though
provisionally agreed, are subject to final agreement and to the dangers of a general
explosion of which you know.
I think, however, that in the special circumstances I can properly send you, subject
to all reserve, drafts of a letter which I have it in mind to send to both Prime
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Ministers1 if the Report is signed more or less in its present shape, and of a private
letter which I have it in mind to send to Admiralty House.
The Malayans will press at every stage for a complete handover of powers at once.
They might come as far as ‘British Governors’ and delegating a number of Federal
powers to the State Government for a period—but in fact they see themselves as
running the whole thing from Kuala Lumpur right away. I do not think you should
give way to this.
On the long-term we have reached a lot of agreement except, as I warned you, in
the area of religion and language—you will have trouble with religion, where there
are strong emotional feelings all round, with both Catholic and Protestant churches
firmly entrenched.
There will be a strong unanimous recommendation that in the early years both
H.M. Government and the Federal Government should provide generous help, both
financial and technical, for development.
I enclose two copies of this letter and enclosures,2 for the P.M. and Reggie.3 But I
must please ask you to keep it very close indeed because the whole thing may blow
up or I may have to make changes.
1 The Cobbold enquiry was set up as an independent commission charged with reporting to the prime
ministers of Britain and Malaya.
2 Not printed. 3 Maudling.
107 PREM 11/3866 11 June 1962
[Commissioners’ differences over their final report]: minute from
Lord Cobbold to Mr Sandys
Two things have happened since I sent you privately some papers on Friday.1
I have had a redraft of the piece which the Malayan members are putting in, in
which they go strongly (and rather offensively) against the idea of British Governors
for a transitional period.
Secondly I have heard from all members of the Commission that they are prepared
to ‘go to Press’ on the present drafts.
I am holding a meeting of the Commission at 3 p.m. on Tuesday.2 I propose at that
meeting to attempt to get specific references to retention of British Governors for a
transitional period removed from both British and Malayan versions of the formal
Report and included instead in a confidential letter to Prime Ministers.
If I fail, as I probably shall, I will arrange for the report to be prepared for signature
in its present form, but should ask you to accept from me, and convey to the Tunku,
the following message:—
(1) Final drafts of the Report have now been agreed and copies are being produced
for signature later in the week.
(2) I would, however, ask Prime Ministers to consider one point.
(3) In accordance with strong representations from the Malayan side, British
1 See 106. 2 ie, 12 June, see 109.
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members and I myself have refrained from any recommendation in the Report in
favour of the retention of a measure of British sovereignty in the territories for a
transitional period.
(4) I am, however, as Chairman, worried by the inclusion in the present drafts of
strong conflicting views about possible retention of British Governors for a
transitional period. I believe that these specific references may make
Governmental negotiation more difficult.
(5) I should therefore be grateful if Prime Ministers would consider suggesting to
the members nominated by their respective Governments that these specific
references to British Governors should be deleted from the formal Report before
signature and included instead in confidential letters.
108 PREM 11/3866 12 June 1962
‘Greater Malaysia’: note and supplementary note by Sir S Garner for
ministers on commissioners’ differences
[When Clutterbuck retired as permanent under-secretary, CRO, he was succeeded by
Saville Garner who also took over the chairmanship of the Greater Malaysia (Official)
Committee. These notes briefed Macmillan, Sandys and Maudling for their meeting later
that day, by which time Garner expected to have heard the latest position from
Cobbold.]
The background is set out in the report of the Committee on Greater Malaysia.1
There have since been the following further developments:—
(1) Lord Cobbold hopes to complete his report this week. He has, in the
meantime, drafted letters which he has it in mind to address to the two Prime
Ministers, together with a private and personal letter to the British Prime
Minister.2
(2) The Tunku has now made a public announcement that he is planning to leave
Malaya for London on the 29th June to discuss the Malaysia plan with Mr.
Macmillan.
(3) The report is near completion and fortunately appears to reach unanimity on
the main aim of a Greater Malaysia. The sole major difficulty is the presentation of
proposals for the transitional arrangements, which both sides recognise will be
necessary before the plan can be implemented in full. At one time the Tunku
threatened to withdraw the Malayan members if other members insisted on
recommending a division of responsibility during this period. This point has now
been conceded by the British members of the Commission, though Lord Cobbold
intends to make it clear in his confidential letter to Prime Ministers that he,
himself, favoured a solution under which the territories would be ceded to the new
Federation subject to an agreement that a number of powers would, for some
years, continue to be exercised in the territories by the British Government. No
problem arises on this major issue now, and it is hoped that the report will
recommend that it should be left to the Governments to decide on the exact
solution.
1 See 73. 2 For the final versions, see 118–121.
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(4) The immediate problem centres on the question of the retention or otherwise
of ‘British Governors’ during the transitional period.
Lord Cobbold is seeking to leave all details, including the position of British
Governors for discussion between Governments and not to refer to them in the
report. The British members of the Commission were prepared to accept this. But
Ghazali has made it clear that he must insist on his own version and has apparently
forwarded some draft paragraphs to Lord Cobbold which are phrased in somewhat
offensive terms. If Ghazali insists on the inclusion of his paragraphs, the British
members will equally, and no doubt rightly, insist on the retention of their statement
that it is essential to retain the British Governors.
Lord Cobbold feels – and this seems right – that if extreme positions are taken up
in the report, and subsequently made public, it will be difficult for either side to
make any concessions, and particularly for the Malayans to draw back. He aims,
therefore, at the meeting of the Commission which will be held this afternoon, to
secure the omission of both paragraphs and will, if necessary, tell the members of the
Commission that he is proposing to refer this point to the two Prime Ministers. If he
is not successful this afternoon in his aim, he plans to invite the British Prime
Minister to receive a message from him and to pass it on to the Tunku (see his
minute to the Commonwealth Secretary of the 11th June).3
Lord Cobbold has undertaken to report the upshot of his meeting before the
Ministerial talk at 5 p.m. and the result will be reported orally.4
Supplementary Note to 108
Greater Malaysia
The following sets out what is believed to be the general view of Lord Cobbold:—
(1) The Greater Malaysia plan is right in principle and the Commission proposes
to say so unanimously in their report.
(2) The Government of the Federation of Malaya have therefore got what they
want and should be content. They are making a great mistake in cavilling over
details.
(3) In view of the backward state of the Borneo territories and the lack of
indigenous administration, there is a most serious threat to law and order and the
gravest risk of a breakdown in the administration and of anarchy if the British
personnel are withdrawn too soon. It is not in the interests of the Federation that
this should happen and they would be unable by themselves to hold the position.
(4) Nevertheless, Lord Cobbold and the British members of the Commission are
prepared to recommend that sovereignty should be ceded and that there should be
no division in responsibility. But they are not prepared to recommend that the
British Governors should be withdrawn for the following reasons:—
(a) It is vital that a British officer should be in control and should be seen to be
in control.
3 See 107.
4 The commissioners met at 3 pm and Cobbold telephoned the result to Garner in time for the ministerial
meeting at 5.15 pm, see 109 and 110.
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(b) It would not be understood locally if someone were placed over their heads as
a nominal Head of State and lived in Government House. Symbols are important.
(c) The retention of British Governors is also vital to the retention of British
expatriate officers generally, and might provide a way of getting over the
difficulty of offering compensation.
Lord Cobbold considers that the main reason why the Tunku is pressing this issue
is that he has already offered the top positions to his local supporters.
(5) Lord Cobbold also wishes to draw attention to the very awkward situation
that may arise over religion. Under the existing Constitution in the Federation, the
religion of the State is declared to be Moslem, but if this were to be applied to
Borneo and Sarawak, where the majority is not Moslem this would not only give
rise to intense local difficulties, but also, he considers, to violent protests from the
Church of England and the Church of Rome.
(6) Lord Cobbold is prepared to amend his draft letter to the two Prime Ministers
so as not to refer in it in detail to the compromise solution.
109 PREM 11/3866 12 June 1962
[Commissioners’ differences over their report]: note by Sir S Garner
of a telephone conversation with Lord Cobbold
Lord Cobbold has telephoned me to say that he had a rather difficult time at the
session of the Malaysia Commission this afternoon, and that the Malayan members
were particularly difficult. He was, however, as firm as he could be with them and
insisted on reaching agreement, as far as possible, on the existing drafts, and pressed
both sides to agree to the omission of any reference to British Governors in the
formal report. The British members said that they would agree to this, but the
Malayan members asked for three further days in order to consider this among
themselves.
Lord Cobbold felt bound to agree to this and will therefore not be able to report
further progress until Friday, but he secured confirmation that, subject to this point,
the report in its present form could be regarded as agreed by all the members.
In the circumstances, Lord Cobbold does not wish to send any messages to the
Prime Ministers at this stage; he will let us know the outcome of the meeting on
Friday.
110 PREM 11/3866 12 June 1962
[Commissioners’ differences over their report]: note by T J Bligh of a
ministerial meeting at Admiralty House
[This meeting attended by Macmillan, Sandys, Maudling, Garner and Bligh started at
5.15 pm and lasted fifteen minutes.]
Sir Saville Garner said that Lord Cobbold had had his meeting with the Malayan
members of his Commission earlier in the afternoon. He had put to them that they
should be prepared to agree to any passage about British Governors being left out of
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the Report. They had asked for three days to consider their position on this. For the
rest the Report was now broadly agreed.
The Prime Minister thought it would be entirely right that the Report should stick
to the main proposal, namely to set up Greater Malaysia and to leave it to a matter of
negotiation between the Governments concerned as to how any transitional
arrangements might be reached.
It was agreed that if the Malayan members should on Friday say that they wished
their paragraphs about British Governors to be included in the Report, we should in
our turn ask for a further three days and should then be prepared to put pressure on
the Tunku to admit [?omit]1 these paragraphs.
Ministers then looked at the draft letter which Lord Cobbold had prepared to send
to the two Prime Ministers. It was generally agreed that this was on the right lines.
The Commonwealth Secretary prepared a revised ante-penultimate paragraph which
the Prime Minister thought suitable.
The meeting adjourned at 5.30 p.m.
1 Ministers shared Cobbold’s strong preference to omit from the report any reference to British governors
rather than include commissioners’ conflicting views on the transitional period.
111 PREM 11/3867 13 June 1962
[Commissioners’ differences over their report]: inward telegram no
349 from Sir G Tory to Mr Sandys, reporting the reasons for the
Tunku’s decision to recall Ghazali for consultations
Tunku has ordered Ghazali back to Kuala Lumpur immediately for consultations
before he signs report. Tunku assures me Ghazali is not being withdrawn from
Commission and that he will return. This move has been prompted by Ghazali’s
report of latest position of British and Malayan teams, particularly on transitional
period. The basic differences seem now to be as follows:—
2. Malayan view:—
(a) With transfer of sovereignty there should be simultaneous transfer of
legislative and executive authority in all agreed Federal matters to the Central
Government. Because danger of administrative breakdown if drastic change were
made too quickly Federal functions should be delegated back by Central
Government to respective States for a transitional period (compare paragraph 3 of
my letter to Hampshire of 29th May). But the constitution would show the final
position from the outset.
(b) Existing State laws would continue in force subject to their becoming Federal
laws on Federal matters until repealed or amended by the Central Government
notwithstanding any conflict with the constitution.
(c) Joint working party for each of territories should be set up with equal
representation from the territory and the Central Government ‘to examine and
make recommendations on measure and timing of integration into Federal system
of laws and practices relating to subject in the Federal list’. Similar working
parties on finance and economic matters and also on education and legal and
judicial services.
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(d) British officials must be retained, but retention of British Government ‘was
not requested by British officers as a condition for their staying on was
overwhelmingly against wishes of the people and was contrary to the concept of
Malaysia’. First Head of State for each Borneo territory as an interim measure
should, however, be appointed by the Agong on the ‘joint nomination of His
Majesty and The Queen’.
3. British view:—
(a) For a transitional period of 5 years adjustable by 2 years either way there
should be following provisions:—
(i) External Affairs and anti-subversive aspects of internal security would pass
to the Central Government.
(ii) Some representation from Borneo to Central Legislature elected from
unofficial member of State Legislatures.
(iii) Governor with present executive powers to remain and ‘to be expatriate’.
(iv) Constitutional development in the Borneo territories leading to full
ministerial and electoral system.
(v) Appointment of joint working party of representatives of Central
Government and Borneo territories to recommend on timing and measure of
integration into the Federal system of the laws and practices and of those
departments due eventually to become Federal.
(vi) Basis of employment of expatriate officers to remain unchanged.
(b) To bring this about Britain would surrender sovereignty over Borneo
territories, Federal Government would assume responsibility for external affairs
and anti-subversion, by agreement all other powers relating to both Federal and
non-current matters would remain with the states and by agreement also States
would be administered by British Governor appointed jointly by Agong and Queen.
4. Tunku and his Cabinet are unalterably opposed to British proposals in two
respects:—
(a) They would leave the Borneo [territories] from 3 to 7 years in constitutional
possession of State powers comparable, if not superior, to those to be enjoyed by
Singapore under the Ulster arrangement. This the Tunku could, he says, never
justify to the existing States of the Federation or internationally. It would also
make it impossible to ‘get away with’ the special arrangements for Singapore. He
could only accept Singapore on a basis of restricted citizenship and representation
at the centre. These limitations were at present justified because Singapore
expected to enjoy a greater measure of State autonomy than the other States of
Malaysia. If under constitutional arrangements applying when Malaysia came into
being Borneo territories were to enjoy equal or even greater State powers than
Singapore, the Singapore arrangement already under very strong political attack
both in Singapore and Malaya, would become utterly indefensible.
(b) The retention of Governors exactly as at present would make it impossible for
the Tunku to refute the accusations of his enemies and even more serious of his
friends and neighbours (Indonesia in particular) that he was lending himself to the
continuation of the Imperialist regime under cover of a bogus transfer of
sovereignty.
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5. Goode in his letter of 5th June says Tunku must make some concessions to
meet common problems.1 Tunku thinks that he would be making a very great
concession indeed if he were to agree to delegate Federal functions back to the
States for a period to be determined by an impartial working party and this is surely
true.
6. Difficulty of denying British officers their right to retire with compensation
unless the British administration continues is understood, but this problem ought to
be capable of solution in some other way. If we are prepared to go to the
extraordinary length of accepting a condominium arrangement (Eastwood letter of
23rd May)2 we ought to be able to stretch a point when it comes to compensation
terms, in any event there has never been a transfer of power to a formerly dependent
territory without some loss of administrative efficiency.
7. As regards paragraph 5 of Goode’s letter, the extent of the powers to pass
ultimately to the centre has been already agreed between the British and Malayan
teams I understand, and the working party would contain equal numbers of Central
and State representatives. As to his paragraph 6 about safeguards for British officers,
I have no doubt there would be some Treaty guarantee of conditions of service of
expatriates like the Public Officers Agreement in the case of Malaya. For the rest we
shall have to trust the Tunku to play fair as he has done in Malaya. After all the whole
scheme is an act of faith.
8. At the end of his letter Goode says that if the Tunku persists in refusing to
compromise, Malaysia must be off. I feel certain Tunku will not compromise on basic
issues mentioned in paragraph 4 above and there is indeed a great danger that if we
do not yield on those Tunku himself will call Malaysia off. Several times lately he has
repeated his earlier remark to me that if we really believe people in Borneo territories
are so full of mistrust then we must retain sovereignty until we feel that this mistrust
has been removed. He still says, however, that he believes this will prove to be our
last chance of pulling off Malaysia and that political deterioration in Singapore will
make it impossible for Malaya again to contemplate taking this enormous calculated
risk. He is surrounded by Ministers who are already persuading [sic] that Malaysia
will be bad for Malaya. Razak and Ismail are openly saying they believe there is now
no hope of achieving Malaysia and their satisfaction is ill-concealed. The only man of
influence, apart from the Tunku, who has his own clear vision of Malaysia as being
Malaya’s best interests, is Ghazali and however tiresome the further delay may be I
think it will not be a bad thing on balance if Ghazali comes home now to clear the
Tunku’s mind.
9. I have re-emphasised to Tunku your assurances that we are determined to
proceed towards realisation of Malaysia in agreement with him and he is pinning
his hopes to this. He said earlier he would find it impossible even to discuss the
Cobbold Report if it contained completely unacceptable recommendations on vital
matters, but I got him to agree yesterday that inclusion of some impossible
recommendation in Report need not preclude discussion between us provided that
two Governments agreed to reject it and to take joint responsibility in public for
doing so.
1 See 105. 2 See 103.
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112 PREM 11/3867 13 June 1962
[Commissioner’s differences over their report]: outward telegram no
553 from Sir S Garner to Sir G Tory, reporting attempts to achieve
agreement
You should know that latest position is that Cobbold Report can now be regarded as
‘agreed’ by all members but is still unsigned for following reasons.
2. British members have agreed to Cobbold’s suggestion that Report should
include no recommendation about division of responsibility in transitional period
and should recommend that the precise arrangements to govern transitional period
should be discussed between Governments. However in forwarding Report to both
Prime Ministers Cobbold intends to state in confidential letter that he and British
members favoured solution under which Borneo Territories would be ceded to new
Federation subject to agreement that certain powers in Territories would be
exercised by H.M.G. for some years.
3. Remaining outstanding point is that Ghazali is pressing for inclusion of
paragraphs (said to be offensively phrased) stating Malayan views on question of
‘British Governors’ during transitional period; if he insists, British members will
equally insist on stating their views. Cobbold has urged that these conflicting views
should also be omitted from Report but suggests they could be embodied in
confidential letters. Malayan members have asked for three days to consider this and
Cobbold hopes to report further on Friday 15th. Failing agreement he intends to ask
Prime Minister to accept and pass on to Tunku message from him asking Prime
Ministers to suggest to members nominated by them that specific references to
‘British Governors’ should be deleted.
4. We strongly agree with Cobbold since statement of strong conflicting views in
Report would inevitably make subsequent Ministerial negotiation more difficult.
113 PREM 11/3867 15 June 1962
[Commissioners’ differences over their report]: inward telegram no
354 from Sir G Tory to Mr Sandys, reporting the Tunku’s
authorisation of Ghazali and Wong Pow Nee to sign the report
Tunku has cancelled Ghazali’s order to return on receipt of message summarised in
my immediately following telegram.1 In light of this message he has authorised
Ghazali and Wong Pow Nee to sign report subject to following conditions. Begins:
Since it is a main condition of Tunku’s Malaysia plan that external affairs, defence
and all matters affecting security should be wholly Federal, the Malayan members
should not agree to British proposal that only the anti-subversive aspect of security
should be Federal. In addition they should not, repeat not, commit Malaya to the
delegation to States of ‘matters essentially Federal particularly finance’. Subject to
this and if their conscience is clear they are authorised to sign. Ends.
1 See 114.
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I understand report is now likely to be signed early next week.2
2. Tunku is still determined not to leave Kuala Lumpur 3 until all important
questions have been settled between British and Federation Governments. It seems
now that with acceptance of Malayan view on appointment of Governors, main issue
outstanding is constitutional basis of transitional period. Tunku confirmed that his
Government are opposed to British recommendations on this for reasons explained
in paragraph 4(a) of my telegram No. 349 amongst others.4 But he did not want to
pursue question further with me until Ghazali’s return and he had studied report as
a whole. We cannot possibly therefore hope to get to grips here until end of next
week at earliest.
3. I hope you will let me have your observations in the meantime so that I shall
be ready for Ghazali when he gets back.
4. My second immediately following telegram5 relates to other matters outstanding
on which it would be helpful to have your views by the middle of next week.
2 On the same day, Cobbold telephoned Maudling with the news that he expected the commissioners to
sign ‘next Thursday’, 21 June, on which Macmillan commented: ‘Good news so far.’ In fact they did sign on
21 June.
3 ie in order to attend talks in London. 4 See 111. 5 See 115.
114 PREM 11/3867 15 June 1962
[Commissioners’ differences over their report]: inward telegram no
355 from Sir G Tory to Mr Sandys, summarising Ghazali’s
recommendation to the Tunku that the report be signed
[Ghazali Shafie has recalled how he persuaded the Tunku to accept a report containing
separate recommendations from the British and Malayan members rather than strive for
agreement at this stage: ‘I reminded the Tunku that we were dealing with hard core die-
hard colonialists who were living in the past. They had a special feeling for the natives as
we had had a few of them in Malaya who thought that it was the white man’s burden to
take care of the noble savages who should remain so for them to patronise and gloat’
(Memoir, p 242).]
Summary of Ghazali’s message to Tunku dated 13th June. Begins.
British have agreed to withdraw all reference to appointment of British Governor
and also agree to first Governor being appointed by Agong on joint nomination by
Agong and Queen. Disagreement over transitional arrangements is therefore now
limited to executive powers of first Governor.
2. Malayans propose Governor should be constitutional Head and should appoint
Chief Minister with confidence of legislature. State Government would have all
powers in accordance with State List and Chief Minister should have certain
additional functions (not powers) of the central authority delegated to him in order
not to cause sudden changes in administration. Joint working party should be
formed to work out integration of what have hitherto been state matters into Federal
system.
3. British side feel that Borneo territories are not yet ready for such an
arrangement and the Governor should be given full executive authority as he has to-
day, subject only to transfer of responsibility to the Agong. Governor should not only
have full powers in all the state matters but also should have delegated to him, for
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transitional period, powers and functions of Central Government except External
Affairs, Defence and anti-subversive aspects of security. British recommend
transitional period should be from 3 to 7 years.
4. British views are being presented not as condition for merger ‘in a pack it or
leave it attitude’ but as proposals for serious consideration. In circumstances Ghazali
thinks way is now open for negotiation between two Governments on constitutional
issue and that there is no longer any ground for not signing report. Ends.
115 PREM 11/3867 15 June 1962
[Commissioners’ differences over their report]: inward telegram no
356 from Sir G Tory to Mr Sandys, identifying outstanding issues
Other outstanding issues.
Ghazali has reported agreement with British team on following matters need for
early decision. ‘Constitutional basis for Malaysia’ (this presumably under Federal and
State Lists). Appointment of Agong. Name ‘Malaysia’. Immigration. No repeat no
right of secession. North Borneonisation of public services as soon as possible.
Encouragement of British officers to remain until replaced by qualified Borneo
people. Citizenship.
2. Two sides have disagreed on:—
(a) Religion. Chairman and British members recommend specific provision
regarding freedom of religion in state constitution and that present Malayan
provisions regarding Islam should not apply to Borneo and Sarawak. Malayans for
their part recommend Islam as national religion for Malaysia.
(b) National and official language. British members are opposed to Malay as
national language whereas Chairman and both Malayan members agree that Malay
should be national language. As regards official languages Chairman and British
members recommend Malay and English as official languages in Borneo territories
with no time limit, whereas Malayan members recommend English as official
language for ten years or until such time as Central Government in consultation
with State Government provide otherwise. Similarly with languages at present
used in legislatures.
116 PREM 11/3867 19 June 1962
[Borneo interests and the commissioners’ recommendations]: inward
telegram no 104 from Sir W Goode to Mr Maudling, commenting on
document 111
[Goode found the Tunku’s intransigence and the British preparedness to compromise ‘all
most disturbing’. In telegram number 99, despatched on 17 June, he had argued: ‘If we
suppress views of the British members on vital issues such as transitional period we shall
mislead ourselves and misinform the public on publication. This is the way to disaster . . .
Tunku seems to be outmanoeuvring us . . . I cannot agree to any watering-down of views
of British members until I have seen the whole report.’ H P Hall, co-ordinator of Borneo
territories in Jesselton, similarly lamented that Ghazali’s methods together with ‘the
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Tunku’s pressure, via the C.R.O., on the Cobbold Commission seems to be paying off ’.
Hall reported popular support in North Borneo for the British governors and he also
defended British officials against charges of obstructionism (Hall to Wallace, 19 June
1962, PREM 11/3867). Recalling the ministerial meeting on 12 June (see 110), Macmillan
felt that Goode’s telegram of 17 June ‘shows how right it is for Governments to reach a
decision in principle’, but he was dismayed by his telegram of 19 June (Macmillan to
Brook, 19 June, PREM 11/3867, and document 117).]
It is difficult to comment without knowing the terms of the Cobbold Report as Kuala
Lumpur telegram is based on information provided by Ghazali only.
2. I must repeat my view that if Tunku persists in refusing to compromise,
Malaysia must be off. All our information is that Malaysia will only be acceptable here
with safeguards written into the Constitution, and the suggestion that the only
guarantee should be trust of Tunku ties of good faith (paragraph 7) would be viewed
with cynicism by large section of the community, particularly in view of the recent
amendments to Malayan Constitution on citizenship.
3. I also view with dismay the suggestion in paragraph 9 that Governments may
agree to reject the Cobbold Report. I agree with the view expressed by the Tunku as
reported in paragraph 3 of Kuala Lumpur telegram No. 323 to C.R.O. that
Governments could not possibly override or disregard the Cobbold Commission
recommendations. I assume that H.M.G. still accept the principle of self-
determination. So far, the only self-determination emphasized has been that carried
out by the Cobbold Commission who were asked to ascertain the views of the Borneo
peoples about Malaysia. If views as expressed to the Commission are now disregarded,
how will H.M.G. decide that any alternative proposals are acceptable to Borneo
peoples? After all, although Singapore has an elected Legislature, the decision on
Malaysia is still to be subject to a referendum.
4. Cobbold Commission is already being subjected to Government pressure at
the instigation of the Tunku. Malaysia without a real measure of popular consent is
fraught with danger and the attitude of Razak and Ismail reported in paragraph 8 of
Kuala Lumpur telegram is also hardly reassuring that the idea is popular in Malaya
itself either. The Borneo peoples are not so backward that they do not know the lack
of success in attempting to establish federations in other parts of the world e.g. West
Indies, Central Africa and United Arab Republic. They hope to go into Malaysia on
some basis of partnership and will expect H.M.G. to support them on this. Singapore
Government negotiated on its own terms with Malaya, and Borneo Territories had no
say in those negotiations. Similarly Borneo Territories should be allowed to go in on
terms which are acceptable to Borneo peoples and not forced to accept conditions
agreed in Singapore/Malaya negotiations to which they were not a party. If this was
H.M.G.’s intention, then this should have been part of the terms of reference of the
Cobbold Commission and the views of the people here ascertained on that plan.
117 PREM 11/3867, M161/62 21 June 1962
[Colonial attitudes to the Cobbold commission]: minute from Mr
Macmillan to Sir N Brook, commenting on document 116
[A copy of the prime minister’s minute was inadvertently sent to the secretary of state for
the colonies. ‘It made him—and the Colonial Office—angry’, J H Robertson of the
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Cabinet Office informed Brook. Indeed, Maudling immediately wrote a reply to Macmillan
rejecting the implication that governors made policy: ‘I have not yet made up my mind
what the Colonial Office point of view is to be on the matter. The Governor is fully aware
of the importance of Malaysia and I am sure his concern is to see it achieved without
serious troubles in Borneo.’ Tim Bligh of the prime minister’s Private Office pacified
Maudling and managed to secure his ‘willing agreement’ not to pass his paper to
Macmillan who remained oblivious of the consternation. A few days later, Brook
discussed with Macmillan the general point about ‘the attitude of colonial administrators
in the Borneo Territories towards the concept of Greater Malaysia’ and, ‘suggested that
certain organisational changes . . . would help to meet this difficulty’. He may have been
referring here to the plan for Duncan Sandys to add the Colonial Office to his ministerial
portfolio which took effect from 13 July. See CAB 21/4847.]
I am rather shocked by telegram No.104 from North Borneo and the attitude it
reveals. Does he realise (a) our weakness in Singapore, and (b) our urgent need to
hand over the security problem there? The whole mood is based on a false
assessment of our power. If this is the Colonial Office point of view, we shall fail.
What are we to do?
118 CO 1030/1028, no 1 21 June 1962
[Submission of the Cobbold Report]: private and personal letter from
Lord Cobbold to Mr Macmillan, explaining the difficulties
encountered in writing the report
[All the commissioners having signed the report, on 21 June Cobbold submitted it to the
prime ministers of Britain and Malaya who agreed to keep it confidential until they had
decided a course of action. It was published in early Aug 1962 as Report of the
Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak, 1962 (Cmnd 1794). As regards the
first of their two tasks (ascertaining the views of Borneo peoples), the commissioners
noted that the opinions of the inhabitants of North Borneo and Sarawak varied, tending
to run on racial and communal lines, but that about one-third strongly favoured
Malaysia, another third favoured it provided that there were adequate safeguards, and the
remaining third was divided between those seeking independence in advance of the
inauguration of Malaysia and those resisting it outright (Report, chapter 3, paras
141–144). As regards recommendations (their second task), the commissioners were
unanimous on a number of major issues, for example: that a decision in principle should
be taken by governments as soon as possible; that the new state should be called Malaysia;
that the constitution of the Federation of Malaya should be adapted for Malaysia, instead
of drafting a completely new one; that there should be no right to secede from Malaysia
after merger; that Borneanisation of the public services should proceed as quickly as
possible and that, in the interim, every effort should be made to encourage British officers
to remain in the service; that (in contrast to the terms for Singapore already agreed with
Malaya) there should not be a separate citizenship for the Borneo territories carrying with
it the nationality of Malaysia but that citizens of North Borneo should become citizens of
Malaysia (Report, chapter 4, section A, paras 145–148). In general, they concluded that ‘a
Federation of Malaysia is an attractive and workable project and is in the best interests of
the Borneo territories’, a view that Cobbold strongly endorsed on the assumption that
Singapore would also join (Report, para 237). The commissioners differed, however, over
the constitutional provision for religion and language, and, most notably, over the
transitional arrangements. The views of Abell and Watherston were set out in section B of
chapter 4, those of Ghazali and Wong Pow Nee in section C, while Cobbold summarised
and commented on them in section D. Although Cobbold shared the approach of the
British members, he felt that the precise constitutional arrangements for the transition
and internal security should be referred for inter-governmental discussion (Report, para
238). Cobbold also sent Macmillan, the Tunku and Maudling a series of letters (including
a memorandum by Abell and Watherston) which amplified issues that were not
mentioned or only partially covered in the report, principally on account of disagreement
between the British and Malayan commissioners (see 118–122). Here he was more
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explicit in his views regarding transition. In his private and personal letter to Macmillan
(see 118), for example, Cobbold insisted that British governors would be ‘essential’ in
North Borneo and Sarawak ‘for the next few years’ because the government in Kuala
Lumpur was both ‘fully stretched’ and largely ignorant of conditions in Borneo. Since
they were all written on the same day, the letters are presented here in the order in which
they were filed by the CO and exceptionally their security classification (eg private and
personal, personal and confidential) has been included in the headings to assist in
distinguishing between them. The letters were later copied to the Cabinet Oversea Policy
Committee which considered the Cobbold Report on 4 July, see 126 (PREM 11/3867, CAB
21/4848, and OP(62)3, 2 July 1962, CAB 134/2370).]
Dear Prime Minister,
I write this letter on a private and personal basis and not as Chairman of the
Commission.
I am sorry about the inordinate length and repetitiveness of the Report. I have had
great difficulty with two quite different approaches. We have had to write almost
everything at least twice over, but I have tried, as far as I could, to bring it together at
the end.
The only essential reading is:—
Chapter III—Assessment
Chapter IV—A. Recommendations on Certain General Matters
Chapter IV—B. Recommendations by British Members
Chapter IV—C. Recommendations by Malayan Members (to glance through)
Chapter IV—D. My summary of B. and C. and comments, and also my two letters
and the memorandum by British members enclosed in a third letter.
The best solution for the transitional period would in my view be the creation of
Malaysia in two definite stages, leaving all powers other than External Affairs,
Defence and the ‘anti-subversive’ side of Internal Security with the British
Government for 3, 5 or 7 years.
I have no doubt that this is what would suit the Borneo territories best, what
would fulfil H.M. Government’s obligations best, and that would make the whole
thing work best if the Malayans would play. But they evidently would not—as you
know, the Tunku instructed the Malayan members to withdraw from the
Commission if this recommendation were made. To avoid a breakdown I have
reluctantly dropped this specific recommendation from the Report and have, instead,
dealt with this subject in a personal and confidential letter to yourself and the Tunku.
If H.M. Government conclude that, for the sake of getting Malaysia, they can
properly agree to the British Government as such stepping out of the picture (not an
easy conclusion in view of the very definite commitments, including the 1960 reply
to the Baram petition to the Queen),1 I would see a tolerable compromise on the
following lines.
I regard British Governors for the next few years (three years might suffice) as
1 Commitments were enshrined in the Nine Cardinal Principles of 1941 which had been reiterated on the
annexation of Sarawak in 1946, included in the first schedule of the Sarawak (Constitution) Order in
Council of 1956 and appended to the Cobbold Report. The Baram district was in Sarawak’s Fourth Division
and the lower Baram river formed the border with Brunei. The commissioners met one group of Baram
Ibans who, clearly mindful of rule by Brunei Malays in the past, ‘hotly opposed’ Malaysia and insisted that,
if the decision went against them, safeguards should be built into the scheme (see Report, paras 46 and 48,
and appendix C: also document 56, n 9).
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essential, and H.M. Government will have to make some arrangements which will
keep the great majority of British officers there and fill the gaps (already alarming)
by getting contract officers.
The British Governors could then be left to get on with it, with as much support as
they could get from local legislative assemblies. It might help a solution if British
officers were employed by the Secretary of State but seconded to the State
Government. I should not myself be happy to see any powers handed over at once to
the Federation other than External Affairs, Defence and the anti-subversive side of
Internal Security (the last to be administered by delegation to the Governor). All
other powers should, I suggest, remain with the State Governments during the
transitional period. I think Kuala Lumpur already has enough on its hands: they have
done well in Malaya, but they are fully stretched and few of their top people know
anything about Borneo or have ever been there. I think they might make a mess of
the Borneo territories in the early years. One has to remember three things: there is
a lot of personal ambition and empire-building in Kuala Lumpur; the Malayans have
promised top jobs to several quite unripe Borneo politicians in order to get their
support for Malaysia; and, last but not least, many of the local head-hunting tribes
are backward and fearless and would revert with pleasure to their former pastimes.
One other point. I have supported Malaysia in the Report ‘on the assumption that
Singapore also joins in’. I do not wish to say anything more specific on this subject
for publication, as I thought it might be damaging. But I should feel bound to advise
H.M. Government that, if Singapore were to drop out, a federation between Malaya
and the Borneo territories without Singapore would have few attractions.
If a solution emerges which in my view does not take sufficient account of all these
things, I must reserve the right to say so in the House of Lords.
I should be grateful if you would restrict circulation of this letter to a close circle
in Whitehall.
119 CO 1030/1028, no 3 21 June 1962
[Submission of the Cobbold Report]: personal and confidential letter
from Lord Cobbold to Mr Macmillan (also to Tunku Abdul Rahman),
giving his views on transitional arrangements
Dear Prime Minister,
I write with reference to the Report of the Commission of Enquiry on Malaysia in
order to put before yourself and Tunku Abdul Rahman certain personal views of my
own.
I am, as I have stated in the Report, a firm supporter of Malaysia, and I have
endeavoured, in Chapter IV, Section D, to bring the views of members of the
Commission as far as possible together and to stress the high degree of unanimity
which exists in the Commission’s thinking.1
In a reference in the Report (paragraph 238) to the problems of the years
1 Chapter 4, section D was the chairman’s summary of the differing views of British and Malayan members,
as set out in B and C respectively, see 118, note.
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immediately following Federation, I have suggested that the precise constitutional
and other arrangements to govern a transitional period are matters for discussion
between Governments.
In the same paragraph I have used the words:—
‘I urge most strongly that any arrangements made for the early years after
Federation should provide for continuity of administration in the Borneo
territories and should not result in any weakening, either real or apparent, of
authority in Kuching and Jesselton.’
The points which I have in mind, stated in more specific terms, are these. The
present stage of political development in the territories is some way behind that of
other parts of the proposed Federation, and qualified local candidates to take the
place of British officers are not available in sufficient numbers. Nor would it be wise,
or generally acceptable in the territories, to fill vacancies by the appointment of
officers from Malaya or Singapore, even if they were available. I therefore judge it
necessary that for the next few years the highest posts (those of Governor and Chief
Secretary or their equivalents) should be held by expatriate officers, that these
officers should retain their present authority over domestic affairs (excepting only
that, in the anti-subversive aspects of Internal Security, they should be subject to the
overriding authority of the Federal Government), and that a high proportion of
expatriate officers should remain in the service. Whilst the precise arrangements to
cover Internal Security would have to be worked out by experts, I feel strongly that,
in this first period, the police should be under the control of the Governor and Chief
Secretary (or their equivalents) who should exercise their authority in matters
relating to subversion by delegation from the Federal Government and under the
Federal Government’s responsibility. I regard these as essential requirements for the
proper administration of the territories and for the maintenance of law and order. I
feel moreover that, considering the novelty of this project for the Borneo territories,
their political immaturity as compared with Malaya, and their distance from the
Federal centre, arrangements on these lines would be a positive benefit both to the
Borneo territories and to the new Federation.
I have myself favoured a solution under which the territories would be ceded to
the new Federation subject to an agreement that powers, other than those over
External Affairs, Defence, and the anti-subversive aspects of Internal Security, would
for some years continue to be exercised in the territories by the British Government.
I have felt that, from the practical point of view, this is the solution which would suit
the Borneo territories best and would give the best start to the new Federation of
Malaysia. But in order to meet strong representations made to me by the Malayan
members, I have omitted from the Report, as have the British members, any
recommendation to this effect, and I have instead, set out my views on these subjects
in this confidential letter.
I wish to add my personal opinion on one other question, which is a matter of
individual judgement and on which members of the Commission hold divergent
views. On my own assessment, if any offer of compensation were to be introduced at
an early stage, but otherwise the Public Services were to enjoy conditions of service
similar to those now in force with a British Governor at their head, between 30% and
50% of expatriate officers would be likely to leave the service in the next year or two:
if a compensation offer were made and the services of British Governors were
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dispensed with, I should expect to see the percentage of resignation go materially
above 50%. Loss of between a third and a half of the expatriate officers would put an
almost intolerable strain on the administration. Loss of more than half could easily
lead to a breakdown of the administration and be a serious prejudice to law and
order. I do not feel that in the interests of the territories themselves or in the
interests of the British Government or the Government of the Federation of Malaya
these risks could properly be run.
I trust that the Report, and the suggestions made in this letter, may be of some
assistance to you in laying the foundations for the new Federation, to which I have
devoted much time and thought, and in the future of which I profoundly believe.
I have written in the same terms to Tunku Abdul Rahman. 
120 CO 1030/1028, no 4 21 June 1962
[Submission of the Cobbold Report]: memorandum1 to Lord Cobbold
on transitional arrangements by Sir A Abell and Sir D Watherston
As the British members of the Malaysia Commission we would wish to place on record
certain factors which emerged during the later stages of the Commission’s deliberations
and which have materially affected our recommendations in Chapter IV (Section B) of
the Report, on the arrangements to be made during the transitional period.
When it became apparent that there was a serious divergence of view between the
Malayan and British members of the Commission over these arrangements, it was
agreed that each side should prepare its own recommendations. Our firm conviction
was—and still is—that it is essential that a British Governor should remain in
effective control of the administration both in Sarawak and North Borneo during this
difficult period. With this in mind the first recommendation that we drafted was to
the effect that Sovereignty over the two territories should be transferred to the new
Federation, but that this should be subject to an Agreement under which the
Federation Government would, for a period of three to seven years, be responsible
only for External Affairs, Defence, and the anti-subversive aspects of internal
security; and the British Government would be responsible for the government of the
two territories in all its other aspects. This responsibility would be exercised through
a Governor appointed by the Queen. By this arrangement ultimate control of the staff
would continue to lie with the Secretary of State for the Colonies and there would be
no change in the basis of their employment and no question of retirement and the
payment of compensation. Thus the continuity and stability which we regard as
essential would be provided during the ‘running in’ period of the new Federation.
When this proposal became known to our Malayan colleagues (and was, we
understand, reported by them to their Government) we were informed that no form
of dual sovereignty would be acceptable to Malaya and that if we persisted in this
recommendation the Malayan members of the Commission would be withdrawn.
We accordingly amended our recommendation to provide for complete
sovereignty to pass to the new Federation at once, but we reiterated our view that the
first Head of State in both territories should be a British Governor appointed jointly
1 Enclosed in Lord Cobbold’s confidential letter to the prime minister, 21 June 1962.
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by H.M. The Queen and H.M. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong. As you are aware,2 this led
to the inclusion in the section of Chapter IV of the Report which was being drafted by
our Malayan colleagues, of passages setting out their views as to why there should
not be a British Governor, even in the initial stages. You pointed out that these two
opposing views would clearly increase the difficulties of the subsequent negotiations
between the Governments and might even make agreement on Malaysia impossible.
Both we and our Malayan colleagues therefore agreed to your request that the
passages in question should be omitted.
We have recorded those events because the final form of our recommendations in the
Commission’s report may not sufficiently clearly convey the strong conviction that we
feel that it is quite vital that there should be a period of firm and experienced leadership
during the first few years of difficult adjustments, not only for the Governments but for
the peoples of Sarawak and North Borneo. This is of the first importance if the Federal
Government is to allay the fears of many of the people and to win their good-will.
We understand that our Malayan colleagues hold the view that the retention of the
Chief Secretaries of each of the present Governments in Borneo as State Secretaries
under the new regime will ensure continuity and stability of administration. We do
not agree with this view. The officers concerned would in our opinion be placed in an
intolerable position of great responsibility but without any real authority, under a
new and inexperienced Chief Minister and a native Head of State also without any
knowledge of the snares which would inevitably beset his path.
We appreciate the difficulties of our Malayan colleagues and we recognise too the
dangers of including recommendations in the Report which might adversely affect
the future negotiations which must take place between the British and Malayan
Governments. Nevertheless the fact remains that we have yielded a number of points
of the first importance under pressure. We were greatly concerned by the reluctance
of our Malayan colleagues, apparently supported by their Government, to make any
concessions in favour of non-Muslim susceptibilities and national pride. We believe
therefore that it is imperative that it should be brought home to the Prime Minister
of Malaya that if he wants to see a happy and united Malaysia in the next few years, he
must show that he will pay sympathetic attention to the strong feelings held by the
majority of people in the Borneo territories on such matters as the eligibility of their
Heads of State to become Head of the Federation, national religion, and language.
2 ie, Lord Cobbold.
121 CO 1030/1028, no 5 21 June 1962
[Submission of the Cobbold Report]: confidential letter from Lord
Cobbold to Mr Macmillan (also to Tunku Abdul Rahman), mentioning
certain points (notably racial tension in Sarawak) not suitable for
inclusion in the report
Dear Prime Minister,
I write on behalf of the Commission of Enquiry on Malaysia to mention certain
points which we desire to bring to your notice but do not regard as suitable for
inclusion in a Report destined for publication.
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We wish first to lay stress on the dangerous position which we believe exists in
Sarawak and which might easily spread to North Borneo. The happy relationship
between different races which was until recently a notable feature of both territories
has largely disappeared in recent months in Sarawak, and is under strain in North
Borneo, mainly because of strong feelings about the Malaysia proposals. Sarawak has
become divided on racial lines, and communal feelings are being whipped up by well-
organised Communist cells. Feelings were running high in Sarawak at the time of
our visit, and, but for the obvious presence of strong police and field force
detachments, there might well have been incidents at several places.
We believe that there will, in any event, be a period of tension and difficulty which
will need firm and careful handling if law and order are to be maintained. If the issue
of Malaysia should remain long in doubt, we should regard the outlook with foreboding.
This leads us to suggest that the British and Malayan Governments should take a
decision of principle as early as possible after they receive our Report, certainly not
later than early July, and that this decision should be made known at the same time
as, or very shortly after, the Report is published. Active steps should then be taken to
disseminate the Report and Governmental decisions of principle throughout the
territories, with a view to debate in the local legislative assemblies in the early
autumn, and (if thought desirable) an inter-governmental conference with official
and unofficial representatives of the two territories shortly thereafter.
There are obvious arguments for delaying a concrete step until after the Sarawak
elections, which are timed for next June but could, we understand, be advanced by
some months. But, in our judgement, these arguments are overridden by the risks
that, if action were delayed until a new legislature had been elected and had settled
down, the communal situation would have greatly deteriorated.
Next I should wish to mention a question relating to citizenship and immigration.
The recommendations of the Commission on these matters are based on the
assumption that present practice will generally be followed by the Governments of
North Borneo and Sarawak between now and the creation of Malaysia.
I am writing in the same terms to Tunku Abdul Rahman.
122 CO 1030/1028, no 6 21 June 1962
[Submission of the Cobbold Report]: letter from Lord Cobbold to Mr
Maudling, mentioning certain points on the public services not
suitable for inclusion in the report
[The Oversea Civil Service was established in May 1956 although this was followed by
further protracted planning, see D Goldsworthy, ed, BDEE: The Conservative government
and the end of empire 1951–1957, part II, 219–242 and Hyam and Louis, eds, BDEE: The
conservative government and the end of empire 1957–1964, part I, 82–87. For the
localisation of the public service of Malaya and provision for expatriate officers to apply
for positions in it, see BDEE: Malaya part III, 394 (17–20), 416, 418–420. See also A H M
Kirk-Greene, Britain’s imperial administrators, 1858–1966 (Basingstoke, 2000) pp
263–267 and On crown service: a history of HM colonial and overseas civil services
1837–1997 (London, 1999) pp 62–91.]
I am asked by the Commission of Enquiry on Malaysia to bring to your notice certain
points about the Public Services which, for various reasons, they did not think it
appropriate to mention in a Report destined for publication.
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We refer in many places in the Report to the high regard in which British officers
are held and to the necessity that they should be encouraged to stay on. We refer
specifically to the need to maintain the Service at full strength and fill existing
vacancies: we urge that H.M. Government should give immediate attention to this
point.
The other matters to which the Commission wish to draw your attention are as
follows:—
1. Both in Sarawak and North Borneo the Commission were able to meet
delegations from the Associations and Unions which represent the majority of
officers in the senior and junior branches of Government service. We also had
opportunities of discussing with senior officials the problems of staffing and
organisation which might arise if Malaysia came into being in the near future.
2. The senior staff associations in both territories (almost entirely composed of
expatriate officers) represented about 70% of the Grade I and Grade II officers in
the Government service. They told the Commission that they expected
compensation to be payable to their members when a change of sovereignty took
place. They also expected to be given the option either of resigning from their
present employment with compensation and pension and with the opportunity of
taking up a contract appointment in the country, or of continuing on permanent
and pensionable terms for the remainder of their service. Both associations
considered that the Malayan scheme for lump sum compensation was more likely
to retain officers than an instalment scheme as approved for Tanganyika. The
North Borneo delegation said that their members would be less likely to remain in
the country if they were made liable for service outside North Borneo.
3. The junior branches of the Civil Service (composed of locally recruited officers)
were represented by the North Borneo Civil Service Union and the Sarawak
Government Asian Officers Union. They were chiefly concerned with the
acceleration of the training programme and more rapid promotion in the service.
Neither delegation considered there would be many, if any, resignations in the
junior branches of the service on account of a change in sovereignty, provided the
terms and conditions of service were not changed for the worse. Some anxiety was
expressed lest many of the Federal posts in the Borneo territories would be filled
by persons from Malaya. They also expressed the hope that European officers
would remain until local personnel were qualified to fill their places.
4. Both at Jesselton and Labuan the Commission saw representatives of a number
of officers of the North Borneo Government who had been recruited onto the
permanent establishment from Burma, Ceylon and Hong Kong. These people were
worried that their future in the service and their promotion prospects might be
adversely affected by a change of sovereignty and the rapid Borneanisation of the
service. The Commission, while unable to give any assurance on this matter,
expressed the view that the shortage of trained and experienced officers and the
expansion of services appeared to offer good prospects of future employment and
security.
5. We were much impressed and encouraged by the responsible and reasonable
attitude of these delegations. Although they were primarily interested in the
prospects and treatment of the Government staff, this did not conceal their real
concern for the future welfare of the people of the Borneo territories.
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123 DO 169/214, no 95 28 June 1962
‘The Tunku and Malaysia’: memorandum by Sir G Tory, enlarging on
the implications of Malaysia for the Tunku’s political position
[Tory sent this ‘hurriedly dictated note’ to Garner on 28 June, ‘in case you need some
ammunition’. He had reported on Malayan politics in a more measured way two weeks
earlier, in a despatch which was later printed by the CRO for confidential circulation
(Tory to Sandys, 18 June, CO 1030/989, no 1260).]
The Tunku is very nervous about the effect of Malaysia on his political position. He
knows that he will have to deal with many new and difficult problems in the field
both of politics and of internal security and he would be glad to be able to avoid this
responsibility if he could do this without hurt to his conscience. He is driven on
purely and simply by his belief that Singapore left to us, or to itself, will deteriorate
into Communism very rapidly and that the contamination will spread both to the
Malayan peninsula and through Indonesia to the Borneo Territories themselves. This
is the premise on which his whole approach to Malaysia is based and his attitude
must be judged against this background.
The basis of the Tunku’s assumption is that Lee Kuan Yew’s Government cannot
survive more than a few months more and that it will be replaced by the Barisan
Sosialis, a United Front dominated and manipulated by expert and devoted
Communists with the object of taking over Singapore for Communism. Lee Kuan
Yew himself has told me that he cannot hold the political position in Singapore for
more than four months or so, that is, until he has to go to the Legislative Assembly
for more money, unless merger has in the meantime been assured. His whole
survival is now based, and deliberately based, on the inevitability of Malaysia and if
any setback occurs he believes his position will collapse.
If the Tunku could rely on Britain to remain in charge in Singapore for as long as
the Communist threat remained he would never have agreed to merger even within
the context of Greater Malaysia. He believes in fact that H.M.G. will not be able, or
willing, to resist for long Singapore’s demand for independence. Nor does he think us
likely to render the leading Communists harmless before we leave Singapore to its
own devices. His object, therefore, is to take over Singapore before Lee Kuan Yew’s
Government falls, in the hope that in the meantime we shall join with the Tunku and
Lee Kuan Yew (under cover of the anonymity which the I.S.C. provides) in
immobilising the Communist leaders, but in the certainty that in the last resort he
will himself undertake the job.
The Tunku states categorically that he will not accept merger with Singapore once
the Barisan Sosialis, with its present Communist leadership, has come to power
there. This is because he knows that with Malaysia the Communists who are the hard
core of the Barisan Sosialis would become leaders of an important section of the
political Opposition in the new Federal Parliament and that it would then be
impossible for him to proceed against them in the absence of obviously illegal
activity on their part without arousing dangerous communal emotions throughout
Malaysia, and without drawing trouble down on his head in the United Nations. At
that stage, according to the Tunku’s estimate, any repressive measures would be
regarded as anti-Chinese rather than anti-Communist. The movement for Greater
Malaysia has already sharpened communal feeling to a considerable extent and the
Tunku fears Malaysia will fail if this situation is aggravated.
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There are important persons on the British side who do not share the Tunku’s
view that all would be lost if Lee Kuan Yew’s Government were displaced by a
Communist-dominated Barisan Sosialis either before or after the implementation of
Malaysia. The Communists in the Barisan Sosialis must, they argue, be left to make
their mistakes, to commit illegal acts and so to allow themselves to be eliminated by
legal methods consistent with the principles of democracy; otherwise we play into
their hands. The Tunku, however, is certain that the Barisan Sosialis represents a
significant stage, what Mao Tse-Tung calls the ‘minimum programme’, of a
deliberate Communist conspiracy to take over Singapore and that the longer these
Communist leaders are left to build up their support the more likely they are to
succeed. The whole basis of the United Front technique, as the Tunku well knows, is
that it employs legal methods for illegal ends and that it remains invulnerable to
normal police action until it switches to the ‘maximum programme’ and takes over
openly for Communism.1 The people on our side who do not share the Tunku’s view
argue that Lee Kuan Yew’s Government was also a United Front and yet this is, so to
speak, the Tunku’s instrument. (In fact, of course, he has no choice.) The Tunku
would say to this that in Lee Kuan Yew’s Government the Communists, the very
same who now strongly influence the Barisan Sosialis, were in a subordinate position
and Lee Kuan Yew always realised, and reckoned with, the fact that one day he would
have to have a show-down with them. With the Barisan Sosialis it is a very different
matter since the Communists already dominate it.
The Tunku’s decision to go ahead with Malaysia was taken despite the serious
doubts of his ministerial colleagues and the disquiet of his Malay supporters. These
saw, as the Tunku does also, that Malaysia would greatly increase the strength of the
Chinese component in the Federation and the consequent risk of inter-communal
trouble and successful Communist subversion. The Tunku accordingly believes it is
essential that with Malaysia power in both the political and internal security fields
should be concentrated, and should be seen to be concentrated, in Kuala Lumpur.
Now that the people of the Borneo Territories have become suddenly aware of
politics, they have become vulnerable to subversion by the Communists, who are
already noticeably active in Sarawak, presumably with the object of frustrating
Malaysia. The Tunku argues therefore that the longer we delay the visible transfer of
power to the centre the more time the Communists will have to do their mischief.
(This point was made on a number of occasions to the Cobbold Commission by
people in the Borneo Territories who were generally in favour of Malaysia.)
The Tunku has also to reckon with criticism from his Asian friends to the effect
that he is lending himself to a British Imperialist manoeuvre designed to perpetuate
British political, military and economic influence in this area despite Britain’s
involuntary retreat before the forces of anti-colonialism. An alternative charge which
he fears is that he is a ‘neo-colonialist’ seeking to build up a colonial empire of his
own. For these reasons he considers it to be politically impossible for him to allow
the present British Governors to stay once Malaysia is established, or to allow the
control of Administration in the Borneo Territories to continue exactly along
1 A major example of the Tunku’s experience of this communist strategy is the attempt by Chin Peng of the
MCP to gain political recognition at the Baling talks in Dec 1955, see BDEE: Malaya part III, 350–353,
378–382, 391.
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colonial lines. If he is to be able to meet criticism from the Afro–Asian bloc, for
example, in the United Nations, criticism which the Communist-penetrated
Socialists in Malaya and the Borneo Territories are only too ready to stimulate, he
must also be able to say that there is an element of ‘liberation’ in the creation of
Malaysia, that Malaysia will bring some constitutional advance, as well as
independence from Britain.
For these reasons the Tunku insists that the British Governors should be replaced
and that with their replacement there should be some form of responsible
government, however rudimentary. The Government must henceforward be seen to
be a constitutional government and the functions of government must be vested in a
Chief Minister responsible to a Legislature.
The Governors argue that a sudden transition of this kind will lead to the
breakdown of government and public order. The Tunku cannot believe that this is so.
He says that there never was a Colonial Governor who did not sincerely fear such a
breakdown of administration at the actual moment of transfer of power, who did not
argue that independence was coming too soon. He says this is what people said in
1956 and 1957 with regard to Penang and Malacca; these two dependencies even sent
missions to London to appeal against the ‘premature’ transfer of power,2 but
circumstances showed that good government continued in Penang and Malacca
despite the fact that Governors entirely new to governing were introduced and Chief
Ministers appointed with no experience other than that which they had gained in
their political parties. The Tunku would probably admit that people in Penang and
Malacca were more advanced politically and educationally than those in the Borneo
Territories but he would argue that this was only a matter of degree, that there were
in fact a number of potential leaders in the Borneo Territories. He is confident that at
least two competent persons can be found to undertake the constitutional role of
Governor and he is not convinced that two others cannot be found in the two
Territories concerned who are competent to undertake the role of Chief Minister. He
says that with the retention of the existing Chief Secretaries and also of the bulk of
the British officers in the subordinate ranks of the Administration, good government
and public order can in fact be maintained. He speaks (optimistically) of being able to
lay his hands on a number of British officers, either recently retired or about to retire
from the Federation, who might well accept a contract posting in the Borneo
Territories, but he would not in fact deny that the majority of the existing British
officers would have to stay on if there were not to be a dangerous slowing down of
Administration.
This is the essence of the Tunku’s case. He is at present quite unshakable and it is
doubtful whether his Ministers will even try to shake him. He considers that he will
have conceded as much as he dare if he agrees to the suggestion of the Malayan
members of the Cobbold Commission that most of the State functions should be
delegated to the new Chief Ministers until a joint Working Party decides they may be
permanently transferred to the Centre. He may give way on some of the other minor
points at issue but on the constitutional basis of the transitional administration in
the Borneo Territories under Malaysia he is adamant.
Mr. Lee Kuan Yew has told me that he recently suggested to the Tunku that he
2 See BDEE: Malaya part III, 451 and 452.
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might at least be prepared to accept a compromise under which the present
Governor-type administration would continue for a short period, say a year or 18
months, but Lee says the Tunku would have none of this. The Tunku has himself told
me that if H.M.G. are really persuaded by the Governors that there will be a
dangerous breakdown in administration and public order if Malaysia on his terms is
accepted at once, then there is no alternative to our retaining sovereignty over the
Territories until we have brought them to a point at which we are prepared to hand
them over on the Tunku’s terms.3 When asked what would happen if Lee Kuan Yew’s
Government failed in the meantime and the Barisan Sosialis got in, the Tunku says
he would not, in these circumstances, contemplate merger with Singapore on any
terms. The implication is always that if we wanted the Tunku to take on Singapore
with the Borneo Territories at some later stage, it would be up to us meanwhile
either to see that the Barisan Sosialis did not get into power or to render its
Communist leaders harmless. There is no doubt that in his heart the Tunku would
regard Malaysia as dead if the transfer of sovereignty were in fact put off for more
than a very short time and if the Barisan Sosialis were during this time to displace
the P.A.P.
It will be seen from the foregoing paragraphs that the Tunku regards the
neutralisation of the Communist leadership in Singapore as an essential condition of
merger. He will be taking with him to London Dato’ Dr. Ismail, the Minister of
Internal Security, and also the Commissioner or Police, Dato’ Fenner 4, to support
him in this part of his mission. On this question of internal security in Singapore and
the extent of the danger from the Communists (Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan,
etc.) now in the Barisan Sosialis, there is a considerable difference between the
current view of the British Commission in Singapore and the view of the Malayans.
On the British side it is said that the evidence that these men are Communists is now
very stale and that there has been no recent proof of Communist activity or
allegiance on their part. The Tunku and his advisers for their part, and also Lee Kuan
Yew and the British police officers serving him, believe that Lim Chin Siong and his
friends are committed to a deliberate Communist conspiracy, the nature of which
has required them to sever their active links with the Communist movement. The
Malayans’ analysis of their activities in recent years shows that they were active
Communists at an earlier date (there is no argument about this question of fact),
that they cut themselves off from their Communist contacts at the time when they
became engaged in Trade Union and political work, but that in these latter years
their activities have fitted exactly into the pattern laid down for Communist United
Front programmes by Mao Tse-Tung in his own elaboration of Lenin’s doctrines. The
Malayans maintain that skilful exposure of this conspiracy would be enough to justify
police action against the identified Communists, and it is likely that this will be the
main argument put forward by the Malayans in the forthcoming London talks when
3 This was what the Tunku proposed when he formally rejected the Cobbold recommendations a few days
later, see 125.
4 Dato Claude Fenner (later Tan Sri Sir Claude) entered the FMS police in 1936; senior assistant
commissioner of police, Federation of Malaya, 1954; deputy secretary (security and intelligence), Prime
Minister’s Department, Malaya, 1958; director of police affairs, Malaya, 1962; inspector-general of police,
Malaysia, 1963–1966.
12-Malaysia-123-148-cpp  21/9/04  9:07 AM  Page 326
[124] JULY 1962 327
they press us to share responsibility with them and Singapore in the I.S.C. for
repressive action against the Communists.5
There is also a radical disagreement about the probable effect of repressive action
on relatively uncommitted Chinese opinion in Singapore and it is on a correct
assessment of this effect and on the implications for Malaysia that justification of police
action must depend. The Communists themselves believe that repressive action
against them at the ‘minimum programme’ stage, when they are using legal methods,
will consolidate nationalist opinion behind them. This is also the argument of the
British Commissioner in Singapore and his Security officers. The Malayans for their
part believe, on the basis of their own long experience in dealing with the Chinese and
with Communist subversion in this peninsula, that once the existence of a Communist
conspiracy has been effectively revealed, firm and determined action against the
Communists will bring the uncommitted Chinese into line with the Government
rather than to the support of the Communists who are the object of police action. This
was conclusively demonstrated during the Emergency. The Malayans affirm that the
Chinese in this part of the world are for the most part concerned only with their
material advancement and will accommodate themselves with whichever party has
shown itself to be able to provide firm and effective government. If the show-down
were merely between Lee Kuan Yew and Lim Chin Siong, the support would go to Lim
Chin Siong. But the show-down is really now between Lim Chin Siong on the one hand
and on the other Lee Kuan Yew, with the Tunku standing over him, and it is the
Tunku/Lee Kuan Yew combination which is clearly going to win.
5 See 129, appendix C for Singapore’s internal security and 132–140 for the London talks in July; the issue
of mass arrests came to a head in Dec and again in Jan-Feb 1963, see 144, 147, 148, 156, and 158.
124 CAB 134/1951, GM(62)15 2 July 1962
‘The Cobbold Commission Report. Interim Report by the Committee
on Greater Malaysia’. Annex A: ‘Main points of agreement between
British and Malayan sides of the Cobbold commission’; Annex B:
‘Main points of difference between British and Malayan sides of the
Cobbold commission’
[The interdepartmental Committee (Official) on Greater Malaysia, prepared this analysis
of the Cobbold Report, identifying the problems of transitional arrangements and
suggesting tactics that might be adopted in the next round of Anglo–Malayan
negotiations which were due to resume in London during the week beginning 16 July.
Before the Cabinet Oversea Policy Committee met to discuss this paper on 4 July (see
126), the Tunku announced his rejection of the Cobbold Report (see 125). The references
to numbered paragraphs are precisely those in the Report of the Commission of Enquiry
as later published (see also 118, note).]
Introductory
The Greater Malaysia project is of vital concern to British policy, since, if successfully
established, it offers the promise of a new stabilising factor in South East Asia, of an
arrangement for Singapore which would ensure the maintenance of our defence
position there, and of being able to forestall claims on the Borneo Territories which
might be made if they retain colonial status.
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2. It is therefore very satisfactory that the Cobbold Commission is unanimously
in favour of the project and also considers it as being in the interests of the Borneo
Territories.
3. Nevertheless, while the Report is unanimous on this main issue and on many
other matters, it has left one big and difficult problem to be settled in negotiation between
the British and Malayan Governments. This is the problem of what should be the nature
of the arrangements for governing and administering the Territories during the
transitional phase which must precede their full integration into the new Federation.
Main points of agreement within commission
4. These are listed in Annex A. It is very satisfactory that there is apparently full
agreement on the following:—
(a) Degree of support for Malaysia in territories.
(b) Malaysia a workable attractive project which would be in best interests of
territories.
(c) Early decision in principle should be taken and announced by Governments.
This and Report should be published in territories and debated in territorial
legislatures. Subject to results, Malaysia should be set up within twelve months
from the date of the decision in principle.
(d) On the creation of Malaysia sovereignty over the two territories should be
surrendered to the new Federation.
(e) Malaysian Constitution to be modelled on existing Malayan Federal
Constitution i.e. strong Central Government with States enjoying a measure of
autonomy; but in view of special circumstances of Borneo Territories certain
additional special safeguards should apply to them and be unalterable except with
positive concurrence of State Government.
N.B. No important differences are recorded about the nature of these safeguards
and in particular there seems to be full agreement on immigration.
(f ) No right of secession of States.
(g) Some form of transitional period during which it is essential to retain the
services of the present British staff and to institute no change in administrative
arrangements so far as they affect the ‘ordinary lives of the people’.
(h) Citizenship proposals. N.B. These raise a difficulty, since they allow Federation
citizenship to classes of persons who would not get it under the proposals already
agreed for Singapore. There is however also a recommendation of the Malayan
members (paragraph 190(g)) that persons normally resident in either of the
Borneo Territories should not be allowed to vote or stand for election outside their
own territory. If this were applied mutatis mutandis to Singapore it might enable
the Federation to agree to the wider citizenship proposals for Singapore. Mr. Lee
Kuan Yew is going to take this up with the Tunku.
(i) Method of appointing first Head of State in each territory.
In brief, there is virtually no disagreement on the ultimate position. Greater
precision on the division of powers is however necessary before a final decision could
be taken on the actual setting up of Malaysia.
The only really important points of disagreement, all inter-related, are over the
transitional period.
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Main points of disagreement
5. These are listed in Annex B. Briefly, the Malayan members think it possible, on
Malaysia Day, to anticipate by several years the constitutional evolution that would
be normal in such backward territories by giving immediately a large measure of
local political control to elected Bornean Ministers under a constitutional Head of
State. The British members think this quite unrealistic and propose a clearly marked
transitional period of three to seven years at the beginning of which, though
sovereignty would have been transferred to Malaysia at the outset, the administration
would be carried on exactly as now i.e. a British Governor with full executive powers;
this system to evolve as speedily as possible towards a full ministerial set-up during
the transitional phase. As shown in the separate letters,1 the British members would
prefer Her Majesty’s Government to continue, by delegation from the Federation, to
have full authority for all aspects of administration other than external affairs,
defence and anti-subversive measures during this phase.
The position of the Malayan members of the commission
6.
(i) The arrangements must be defensible by the Tunku against charges from the
Afro-Asians, the Communists and his own public opinion of ‘neo-colonialism’ and
‘imperialist stooge’.
(ii) The arrangements must not be such as to exacerbate dissatisfaction in
Singapore with the terms of the provisional agreement on merger concluded
between Malaya and Singapore.
(iii) Integration of the Territories in the new Federation as soon as possible is
necessary to prevent racial strife, to forestall Communist mischief-making and to
enable an energetic start to be made with essential development plans.
(iv) As an independent country, the Federation could not accept that it should
share jurisdiction with Britain in a part of its territory.
The position of the British members of the commission
7.
(a) It is essential to retain effective administration during the transitional phase.
Otherwise there will be a break-down of law and order, and civil strife.
(b) It will be some time before the Territories can produce a trained personnel to
man an effective administration of their own. Meanwhile administration must
depend on ex-patriate officers.
(c) It is not fair or reasonable to expect ex-patriate officers to stay on unless in
some way British control of the Executive is maintained—in fact it would amount
simply to transferring these officers to the service of a foreign government if
British control was not maintained.
(d) Moreover if there is no British control of the Executive ex-patriate officers
would regard themselves under the normal rules as having a legitimate claim to
retire with compensation; and if this had to be granted at least half of them would
go.
1 See 118–122.
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Difficulties for Her Majesty’s Government of Malayan proposals
8. Briefly these are:—
(a) Our belief that they would be contrary to the wishes and interests of the
Bornean peoples (they would almost certainly be regarded as a breach of our
formal assurances in Sarawak).
(b) They might not ensure reasonable and stable Government and might even lead
to a breakdown of administration.
(c) They would involve transferring to another Government the services of the
HMOCS officers,2 whom all agree should stay at their posts and on whose retention
most Borneans are insistent. To do this compulsorily would cause very great
difficulties with the staff and might not even succeed in retaining them. On the
other hand if the right to retire with compensation is offered, (according to
precedent elsewhere) it is virtually certain that so many would prefer to go that
administration might break-down completely possibly with serious disorders and
bloodshed.
Negotiations with the Tunku
9. The crux of the negotiations with the Tunku will, therefore be to secure his
agreement to a form of administration for the transitional period which will ensure
stability and enable us to retain willing British administrators in Borneo until
effective Bornean replacements can be trained. (N.B. Malays even if they were
available would not be acceptable to the Borneans while Chinese, who form at
present the great majority of potential local senior civil servants, would not be
acceptable to the Malay Government either.)
10. Our tactics with the Tunku should no doubt be to start negotiating from the
most favourable position from our point of view. But we must recognise that final
success depends on the Tunku accepting and working whatever arrangements can be
agreed upon and some concessions to meet him will not doubt have to be made.
11. We are preparing a paper which looks at all the possible alternatives, and we
shall be having talks with the Governors and with the British High Commissioner in
the next few days, after which we shall be in a position to make concrete proposals for
the handling of the negotiations with the Tunku.
12. Summary of Conclusions
(1) It is very satisfactory that there should be such a wide area of agreement in the
Commission’s Report. It seems likely that we and the Malayans should be able to
endorse without difficulty most of the agreed recommendations.
(2) The main difference of view thrown up by the Report is over the transitional
arrangements. This will be the main subject of the forthcoming negotiations with
the Tunku. We may expect the initial Malayan negotiating position to be at least
the recommendations made by the Malayan members of the Commission for the
transitional period.
(3) We must seek a negotiable compromise between these Malayan
recommendations and the recommendations of the British members of the
Commission which would protect our own main desiderata while at the same time
2 122, note.
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avoiding the difficulties the Tunku would foresee in accepting the
recommendations of the British members.
(4) Urgent and detailed study is being given to what precise shape such a
compromise might take and a further report on this will be submitted to Ministers
as soon as possible.
Annex A to 124
Subject View of Commission Paragraph Reference
1. Feeling in Approximately a third unreservedly in 144
territories favour; another third in favour subject 
to conditions and safeguards; 
remaining third against—hard-core 
of opposition perhaps 20 per cent.
2. Interests of A Federation of Malaysia is in the best 237
territories interests of both territories.
3. Next steps Decision in principle should be taken 151 
as soon as possible by British and Lord Cobbold’s letter 
Malayan Governments. Report and of 21st June on behalf 
these decisions of principle then to be of Commission to 
disseminated throughout the both Prime Ministers
territories with a view to debate in 
local legislative assemblies.
4. Sovereignty On the creation of Malaysia, sovereignty 153
over the two territories should be 188
surrendered to the new Federation
5. Form of Existing Constitution of Federation of 148(b)
Constitution Malaya should be taken as basis of 
Constitution of the new Federation, 
subject to amendments and safeguards. 
Present Federation of Malaya would 
then cease to exist and Sarawak and 
North Borneo would join new 
Federation as States. No amendments in 
any special safeguard should be made by 
Central Government without positive 
concurrence of Government of State. 
Power of amending Constitution of each 
State to belong exclusively to the 
peoples of each State.
6. Name ‘Malaysia’ all right, but should have, a 148(d)
Malay translation which does not mean 
‘Great Malaya’.
7. Head of Cannot see any way of meeting local 148(c)
Federation wish that Head of State should be 
eligible for appointment as Head of 
Federation
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Subject View of Commission Paragraph Reference
8. Legislative Lists Federal, State and Concurrent Lists 236(b)(iv)
should broadly follow lines of existing 
Federal Constitution
9. Representation Should take account of size as well as 236(a)(i)
in Federal population
Parliament
10. Special position Native races in territories should be placed 236(a)(ii)
of indigenous in position analogous to that of Malays in 
races Federation of Malaya Constitution
11. Secession Right of secession not recommended 148(h)
12. State Should be on lines of those of Penang and 153
Constitution Malacca
13. Head of State In first instance appointment by Yang 236(b)(ii)
di-Pertuan Agong on joint 
recommendation of The Queen and the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong
14. Electoral system Present electoral college system should be 194
retained in Sarawak and introduced in 
North Borneo
15. Development Urgent attention should be given to this in 170
fields of rural improvement, education, 220–228
medical and other social services, and 236(a)(iii)
training for administrative and technical 
posts
16. Public Service Essential that expatriates should remain 151(d) 
until locals can take their place. (Malayan 231–233
members ‘reluctant to advocate 
secondment from Malaya or Singapore 
unless there is a very definite request from 
Borneo territories.’)
17. Immigration Entry into Sarawak and North Borneo, 148(g)
even from other parts of Malaysia, should 
require approval of State Government
18. Citizenship Agreed proposals (of some complexity) put 148(k)
forward
19. Transitional There is wide difference of view about this 236(a)(v)
period (see Annex B), but there is agreement that 
‘at least in the early years there should be 
no change in administrative arrangements 
in so far as they affect the ordinary lives of 
the people’.
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Annex B to 124
Subject Malayan View British View*
1. Transitional Period
(a) General Both sides envisage a 
comparatively early transfer of 
sovereignty—the Malayans say 
‘within the next twelve months’ 
(paragraph 188)—and both say 
that there should be a transitional 
period thereafter, but their 
respective concepts of this 
transitional period are basically 
different. The Malayans want 
over-all power to pass at once to 
the Federation; they say this is 
essential if they are to produce 
rapid advance in economic and 
social development. The British think that the best
guarantee of success and
avoidance of racial conflict and
disorder would be for Her
Majesty’s Government to remain
in effective control in the
territories for a period of three-
seven years. Both sides, much
more particularly the British,
have watered down their views 
in the Report so as to avoid open
contradiction on these matters.
The British views are therefore 
to be obtained from Lord
Cobbold’s letter of the 21st June
to both Prime Ministers and 
from the Memorandum of the
two British members of the
Commission of the same date
which Lord Cobbold submitted 
to our Prime Minister. This
fundamental difference of
approach comes out, but only in
7a suppressed form, in Chapter 
VI of the Report. It comes out
much more clearly in the
accompanying letters.
(b) Governor and The Governor should be a The Governor should be British 
Administration constitutional ruler and there is and be an executive Head with 
no need for him to be British. He the same powers as now. A full 
would appoint a Chief Minister Ministerial system should develop 
* Except where otherwise specified ‘British View’ includes Lord Cobbold’s own view.
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Subject Malayan View British View
(b) Governor and who had the confidence of the but would take some years.
Administration Legislature and act on his advice, 
contd i.e. a full Ministerial system could 
be set up straight away in each 
State.
(c) State and Essential that not only defence The real British view is that, after 
Federal Powers and external affairs but all aspects the transfer of sovereignty, there 
of internal security (not just would be an agreement between 
anti-subversion) be Federal the new Federation and Her 
subjects from the start. All Majesty’s Government that 
subjects that are eventually to be powers other than those over 
Federal should also be handed External Affairs, Defence and the 
over to the new Federation at anti-subversive aspects of 
once although the Federation Internal Security would for some 
would delegate to the Chief years continue to be exercised in 
Ministers of the respective States the territories by the British 
the exercise of as many functions Government (Lord Cobbold’s 
as may be necessary for the letter of 21st June on behalf of 
maintenance of good Commission to both Prime 
administration. Malayans do not Ministers.) This is watered down 
want to delegate back Finance but in the Report. Since the Report 
seem to regard this point as leaves out the idea that these 
negotiable. powers should be exercised by 
Her Majesty’s Government, it 
appears that the proposal would 
be for them to be exercised by the 
Governor as the Head of State 
Government. The State 
Government would have policy 
control and legislative powers, 
not merely ‘executive functions’. 
(Paragraph 153)
(d) Expatriate Staff Malayans agree that British staff Governor to be as at (b) above, 
should be retained but offer no with Secretary of State for 
solution to problem of avoiding Colonies still exercising ultimate 
an offer of early retirement with control over staff; basis of their 
compensation. employment would be unchanged 
and thus no question of 
immediate retirement would 
arise.
2. Ultimate Position
(a) Religion Islam should be the National Specific provisions about freedom
(para.148(e)) Religion of Malaysia as in the of religion should be written into 
present Federation. (Article 3(1) ‘State Constitution.’ Present 
of the Federal Constitution says provision in the Malayan 
‘Islam is the religion of the Constitution about Islam should 
Federation: but other religions not apply to North Borneo and 
may be practised in peace and Sarawak. (NOTE: These make the 
harmony in any part of the Ruler of a State, other than 
Federation.’). They note that Malacca and Penang, the Head of 
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Subject Malayan View British View
(a) Religion under present federal constitution the Muslim religion in his State. 
contd certain public expenditure may be In Malacca and Penang the State 
incurred for Islamic purposes and Constitutions are required to 
that this may be considered provide that the Agong is Head of 
objectionable in Borneo, but they the Muslim religion in those 
make no recommendation about States.)
this.
(b) Language Lord Cobbold and Malayan British members of Commission 
(para. 148(f)) members of the Commission think that question whether 
think Malay should be the national Malay should be the national 
language. (NOTE: Presumably as language should be decided by 
in present Federal Constitution.) Borneo peoples themselves when 
Malay members think English fully elected representative bodies 
should remain official language have been constituted. Lord 
for ten years or until Central Cobbold and they consider Malay 
Government decides otherwise ‘in and English should be official 
consultation with’ State languages without time limit, 
Government until and unless State 
Government decides otherwise.
Possible differences that might be inferred from correspondence about completing the
Cobbold Commission’s Report
(a) Ultimate The Malayans want the ultimate There is nothing to show that the 
Constitutional position of North Borneo and British members or Lord Cobbold 
Position Sarawak in Malaysia to be made disagree with this but they have 
clear from the start. not specifically agreed.
(b) Length of Malayans have not specifically British members and Lord 
Transitional disagreed with this but may in the Cobbold have proposed the period 
Period event differ with us over the should be, three, five or seven 
length of the period (they have years.
apparently not agreed to any 
length but prefer this should be 
left to joint working parties of 
Central and State Governments.)
125 PREM 11/3867 4 July 1962
[The Tunku’s rejection of the Cobbold Report]: letter from Tunku
Yaacob to Mr Macmillan, forwarding a message from Tunku Abdul
Rahman rejecting the Cobbold Report
[A committee of the Malayan Cabinet considered the report at Fraser’s Hill, a hill station
north of Kuala Lumpur, and rejected the proposal to retain British governors and British
expatriate officers until they were replaced by Borneans to the exclusion of Malayans.
Although it was not immediately clear to the British from his message whether the
Tunku was proposing the postponement of Malaysia until the British government could
certify that the Borneo territories were ready for merger, by calling off his visit to London
he put ‘the whole subject . . . back in the melting pot’ (de Zulueta to Macmillan, 4 July
1962, PREM 11/3867; see also CO 1030/1024).]
12-Malaysia-123-148-cpp  21/9/04  9:07 AM  Page 335
336 THE COBBOLD COMMISSION [126]
I am forwarding herewith a message which I have received from the Prime Minister
of the Federation of Malaya for submission to you.
‘My colleagues and I have studied the Report of the Cobbold Commission and
we have come to the conclusion that we cannot accept the recommendations
of the Chairman and the British Members. In particular we feel it is
impossible for us to agree:—
(a) that on transfer of sovereignty, only External Affairs, Defence and anti-
subversive aspects of internal security are to be transferred to the Central
Government;
(b) to a situation whereby British Governors and Chief Secretaries (or their
equivalents) are not only retained but will continue to exercise full
authority over other domestic matters; and
(c) to a situation whereby all expatriate officers are not only retained but
until they are replaced by Borneo officers to exclusion of officers from
Malaya but are to be replaced by other expatriate officers should they leave
before Borneo officers are ready to take their places.
It will be apparent from above recommendations that it is not intended to
have any merger of these territories with the Federation. Although Report
recommends immediate transfer of sovereignty to the Federation, power will
still rest with Britain and the British officials during transitional period. It
will clearly be impossible for me to accept such a situation without losing face
with our own people. I would accordingly suggest that during transitional
period as recommended in the Report, Britain retains her sovereignty over
these territories and implements recommendations of the Commission. At
the end of this period, when U.K. Government has decided that these
territories are ready for merger, I would be happy to discuss creation of
Malaysia with you.
Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra.’
This message was received early this morning.
126 CAB 134/2370, OP(62)2nd meeting 4 July 1962
‘Malaysia: report of the Cobbold Commission’: Cabinet Oversea Policy
Committee minutes
[The Oversea Policy Committee was set up at the end of June. Its membership was: prime
minister (chair), lord chancellor, foreign secretary, chief secretary to the Treasury and
paymaster general, commonwealth secretary, minister of defence, and colonial secretary.
It succeeded the Colonial Policy Committee and its terms of reference were to consider
questions of oversea policy (other than defence policy and external economic policy)
which concerned more than one department. Its second meeting was attended by
Macmillan, Henry Brooke (chief secretary), Sandys, Watkinson, Maudling and the Earl of
Dundee (minister of state, FO). Norman Brook and Saville Garner were also present. The
entire meeting was devoted to the Cobbold Report and the officials’ analysis (see 124) was
put in a different light by the Tunku’s bombshell (see 125). The committee agreed that
the prime minister should send a conciliatory message to the Tunku (see 127 and 128)
and noted his intention to inform the full Cabinet of developments the following day. CO
officials, however, took a dim view of appeasing the Tunku. Thus, on 11 July, John Martin
wrote to Maudling: ‘In recent official discussions on Malaysia (and I think also in some of
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the Ministerial consideration of the subject) there have been signs of a tendency to believe
that Malaysia is so desirable that we must be prepared to pay any price which the Tunku
demands. This, I believe, is a dangerous thought . . .’ (CO 967/407).]
The Committee had before them a note by the Secretaries (O.P.(62)4) covering an
interim report by the Committee on Greater Malaysia,1 and a note by the Secretaries
(O.P.(62)6) circulating a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from the Prime
Minister of the Federation of Malaya (Tunku Abdul Rahman).2
The Prime Minister said that the Tunku’s message appeared to be based on a
misunderstanding. It suggested that since it would be impossible for Malayan
Ministers to accept the view of Lord Cobbold that British Governors and Chief
Secretaries should continue to exercise authority in the Borneo territories during
the transitional period, no point would be served in coming to London for
negotiations. The Tunku had clearly made the mistake of assuming that the views of
Lord Cobbold and of the British members of his Commission were in fact the views of
the British Government. This was not of course the case; the main disadvantage
of independent commissions was that they were independent. It would be necessary
to send an immediate reply to the Tunku, pointing out that the British Government
did not wish to retain authority in the Borneo territories during the transitional
period, that they were not in any way committed to the views of Lord Cobbold, and
that they would be prepared, on the Tunku’s arrival in London, to discuss with him
with a completely open mind any proposals which he might wish to put forward.
In discussion the following points were made:—
(a) There had been a very substantial measure of agreement between the
Malayan and British members of the Cobbold Commission. They were both agreed
that Malaysia would be in the interest of the Borneo territories, that it would be
necessary to retain British expatriate officers during the transitional period and that
on the creation of Malaysia, sovereignty over the territories should be surrendered to
the new Federation. The points of disagreement centred on the transitional period.
(b) Malaysia offered the best and possibly the only hope for longer term stability
in Singapore. If it was to be achieved it would have to be achieved quickly in view of
the deteriorating position of Mr. Lee Kuan Yew’s Government. A further defection
from his party had just been reported. The Tunku’s suggestion that discussions on
the Federation should be deferred until the end of the transitional period, in fact
amounted to an abandonment of Malaysia and he must have known this himself.
(c) A further reason for setting up Malaysia as soon as possible was that the
Philippine claim to North Borneo3 might be taken to the United Nations and might
attract considerable support, even though it had no merit. There was also the
possibility of a similar claim from Indonesia.
1 See 124. 2 See 125.
3 Following a resolution adopted by the Philippines House of Representatives in April 1962, on 22 June
Diasdado Macapagal (president of the Philippines 1961–1965) made a formal claim to North Borneo. The
claim was based on the status of the concession of land made by the Sultan of Sulu (later part of the
Philippines) to the precursors of the North Borneo Company whose rights had passed to the Crown in
1946. The British government had long been aware of these claims and the CO had prepared a paper on
them in Feb 1962, ‘Sovereignty over North Borneo’ (CAB 21/4626). Meeting Dean Rusk on 25 June, Lord
Home had assured the US secretary of state that ‘the Filipino claim was without foundation’ although he
accepted that Indonesia might turn its attention to North Borneo once the question of New Guinea had
been resolved (D1071/83 in PREM 11/3867; see also document 129, appendix B).
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(d) The balance of advantage lay in arranging for the full and complete transfer
of responsibility for the Borneo territories to the Federal Government when the
Federation itself was established. Great difficulties would be created if the British
Government were to retain some responsibility for the Borneo territories and to be
answerable to them in Parliament at a time when a large measure of overall
responsibility had passed to the Federal Government. This was the kind of situation
which had caused so much difficulty with the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland. Since both sides accepted the need to retain the administrative services
of British expatriate officers, the problem resolved itself into devising suitable terms
of service.
(e) The right to retire with compensation had hitherto been offered to British
expatriate officers when the Colonial Secretary’s control over them was withdrawn;
experience showed that many did in fact retire. One way of retaining the British
officials under satisfactory conditions might be for them to be taken into the direct
employ of the British Government and lent back to the local government; such an
arrangement would have some similarity to the secondment of service officers to
assist ex-colonial territories.
The Prime Minister summing up said that he proposed to bring the question
before the Cabinet on the following day and to seek their agreement to the transfer of
full responsibility for the Borneo territories to the Federal Government when the
Federation itself was established. It should on this basis be possible to reach early
agreement with the Tunku on principles. Further study would be needed of the
terms under which British officers would continue to serve in the transitional period.
The Committee:—
Took note that the Prime Minister would bring the question of Malaysia before the
Cabinet on the lines indicated in his summing up.4
4 On 5 July Cabinet considered a note from Macmillan enclosing the officials’ interim report. It endorsed
his proposal that negotiations should be pursued with the Tunku to bring about Malaysia as soon as
possible (while safeguarding the interests of the Borneo territories) and noted that he would press the
Tunku to visit London as planned (CAB 129/110, C(62)106 and CAB 128/36/2, CC 44(62)7).
127 PREM 11/3867, T335/62 4 July 1962
[Resumption of talks with the Tunku]: outward telegram no 641 from
Mr Sandys to Sir G Tory
My immediately following telegram contains Prime Minister’s reply to Tunku’s
message received this morning via Malayan High Commissioner in London.
2. In handing the Prime Minister’s reply to the Tunku you should emphasise
that the Prime Minister is very anxious that the Tunku should come here and
discuss everything perfectly freely. You may be able to impress discreetly upon the
Tunku that once we have appointed Commissioners we are powerless to influence
them, and therefore the views of the British members of the Commission are
entirely their own, and not in any way inspired by the British Government. If you
like to make a jocular reference, you could say that we have had a very tiresome
example in a matter of great domestic interest with regard to broadcasting, where,
once having let the Commission loose, it has made a report entirely unsatisfactory
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to the Government.1 This is what happens with respectable men once you appoint
them to an independent Commission.
1 The Committee on Broadcasting (chaired by Sir Harry Pilkington) was appointed in July 1960 and
reported two years later. On the whole it praised the output of the BBC but criticised ‘trivialisation’ of
programmes on independent TV, thus rekindling the political controversy over the relative merits of
public service and commercial broadcasting. Report of the Committee on Broadcasting, Cmnd 1753
(1962).
128 PREM 11/3867 4 July 1962
[Resumption of talks with the Tunku]: outward telegram no 642 from
Mr Sandys to Sir G Tory, enclosing Mr Macmillan’s reply to the
Tunku’s message (document 125)
Please deliver following reply to Tunku from Mr. Macmillan. Begins.
I have just received your message and I feel that there is some misunderstanding.
We both agreed that it would be a good thing to have an independent Commission to
ascertain the views of the Borneo territories and make recommendations.
2. There are always dangers in these independent Commissions for the very
reason that they are independent and I can assure you that I have had many examples
of this. I regard the situation to be as follows: both of us are anxious to get Greater
Malaysia created as soon as possible and agree that there should be a transfer of
Sovereignty to the new Federal State. There will be of course, as in every Federation,
problems as to the respective rights and duties of the central Government and of the
local governments. But these are matters for settlement between us.
3. The British Government has not the slightest desire to maintain its authority
during the transitional period over the Borneo territories. We are not of course in
any way bound by the recommendations of the Commission or of any of its members.
I hope, therefore, that you will come to London this month as planned in the full
knowledge that we will be completely open for free discussion on all the points and
any proposals which you may wish to make with a view to an early settlement which
I believe to be equally in the interests of your Government and ours. Ends.
129 CAB 134/2370, OP(62)7 10 July 1962
‘Discussions with the prime minister of the Federation of Malaya on
Greater Malaysia. Report by the chairman of the Official Committee’:
report from Sir S Garner for the Cabinet Oversea Policy Committee.
Appendices: A–E
[This paper offered answers to questions raised in the officials’ interim report of 2 July
(see 124). As regards the vexed issue of transitional arrangements, the officials suggested
five alternative models: 1) ‘Cobbold’s confidential letter’ (see 121); 2) ‘Sudan type’; 3)
‘special council scheme’; 4) ‘local head of state and British chief executive’; 5) ‘the
Malayan proposals’. In his brief for the prime minister, Brook ruled out the first on the
ground that the Tunku would reject it and that it would in any case give Britain ‘the worst
of both worlds’, ie responsibility for the internal administration of the Borneo territories
after they had joined the Federation. He also advised against the fourth model which was
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a compromise that would satisfy neither the Malayan government nor the people of
Borneo and would be unlikely to attract expatriate officers. Of the five alternatives, Brook
preferred the third (‘special council scheme’) which he saw as an improved variant of the
‘Sudan type’. In their report the officials themselves raised objections to the last option
(‘the Malayan proposals’), but Brook felt that one tactic in the negotiations might be to
start with these proposals with the intention of bringing them more closely into line with
British aims. Another ploy would be to build on the Tunku’s known acceptance of the
need to retain expatriate officers for the transitional period, by making their employment
more palatable both to Kuala Lumpur and to the expatriates themselves. The Oversea
Policy Committee, which considered the options on 12 July, felt that the order of
preference declined from the first to the fifth scheme and that the British side should
argue the case downwards from as high up the list as possible, though it accepted that it
was ‘unlikely that we should achieve anything better than Arrangement 3’ (see 130). In
his brief Brook also drew Macmillan’s attention to the importance of consulting the local
legislatures in order ‘to avoid giving any public impression that the United Kingdom and
Malayan Governments intend to force North Borneo and Sarawak into the new
Federation willy-nilly’ (Brook to Macmillan, 12 July 1962, PREM 11/3868).]
Introduction
1. The aim of the discussions is to reach agreement in principle on the creation
of a new Federation of Malaysia, including the territories of North Borneo and
Sarawak, with a view to a joint declaration by the British and Malayan Governments.
2. Thereafter, before the new Federation can be established, there will be much
consequential work to be done, including securing the agreement of the Legislatures
of North Borneo and Sarawak and working out detailed constitutional proposals in joint
working parties and inter-governmental conferences. Legislation will also be required
both here and in Malaya; and we estimate that, with the best will in the world, these
processes will require a year from now before the new Federation can come into being.
3. We start with the following advantages in seeking to reach agreement in
principle:—
(a) Both Governments are committed to the concept of Greater Malaysia and both
have strong reasons for wishing to bring it about.
(b) The Cobbold Commission have unanimously reported in its favour.
(c) On appropriate conditions there would be majority support for it in North
Borneo and Sarawak.
4. But the application of the principle is difficult:—
(a) On the one hand, the Tunku will insist that the United Kingdom must from
the outset not retain power in the two territories; otherwise he will lose face.
(b) On the other hand, we have a duty to see that the interests of the peoples of the
two territories are safeguarded; and we are convinced that this can be achieved
only if effective administrations are maintained in them, and that this requires the
retention during the first few years of a substantial body of British officers.
5. The major points to put to the Malayan Government are:—
(i) We are determined to make a success of Greater Malaysia.
(ii) We have no desire whatever to retain any authority on the part of the British
Government after the transfer of sovereignty.
(iii) But in both our interests, and to ensure future stability in the territories, it is
essential that the transfer takes place in an orderly fashion with the consent of the
people.
12-Malaysia-123-148-cpp  21/9/04  9:07 AM  Page 340
[129] JULY 1962 341
(iv) It is agreed on all sides that to achieve this expatriate officers must remain.
(v) We are anxious to play our part but must look to the Tunku to help create an
atmosphere and provide conditions under which expatriate officers will be willing
to remain.
(vi) In particular, we want to avoid having to offer expatriate officers an option to
retire with compensation, since past experience shows that this would lead to the
departure of a large number (possibly more than 50 per cent).
Transitional arrangements
6. The Cobbold Commission unanimously recommend early transfer of
sovereignty (i.e., within twelve months). This means that The Queen under Act of
Parliament would relinquish sovereignty over the two territories to the new
Federation of Malaysia, and they would accordingly cease to be part of Her Majesty’s
dominions.
7. As stated above, we need to preserve stable government in North Borneo and
Sarawak while quickly bringing on the inhabitants to a state of self-government in
accordance with previous assurances to the peoples; and to ensure this we need the
continued presence of the majority of the expatriate civil servants. What we seek is an
arrangement whereby, after sovereignty has been transferred and during the
transitional period, there is an administration which can exercise real control over
the internal government and of such a nature that expatriate civil servants can be
expected to serve without being given the right to retire immediately on
compensation. The problem is how to secure this in a way which the Prime Minister
of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, can be persuaded to accept and which will prevent
friction between the British Government and the Government of the new Federation.
8. We examine below a number of alternative constitutional arrangements. All of
them start from the assumption that sovereignty has been transferred and that the
new Federal Government will have full control of defence, external affairs and at least
the ‘anti-subversion’ aspects of internal security.
Arrangement 1 (Cobbold’s confidential letter)
9. Lord Cobbold’s proposal in his confidential letter to the two Prime Ministers is
that the territories should be ceded to the new Federation subject to agreement that
powers other than those for external affairs, defence and the anti-subversive aspects
of internal security continue for some years to be exercised in the territories by the
British Government.1 At the outset the Governors would exercise the same powers as
at present but changes leading up to full self-government in State matters would be
introduced as quickly as possible. There would also be a gradual transfer back to the
centre of Federal subjects by agreement.
Comment. This course would most effectively enable us to resist any claim from
the expatriate staff to retire with compensation, but it is ruled out because we know
that it would be unacceptable to the Malayan Government and would in any case be
inconsistent with the assurance which has been given to the Tunku that the British
Government have no desire to maintain their authority during the transitional
period.
1 See 119.
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Arrangement 2 (‘Sudan Type’) 2
10. This is broadly the scheme recommended by the British members of the
Cobbold Commission in the Report itself—although it is clear from the confidential
letters that they would prefer Arrangement 1. Under such a scheme the Heads of
State of the two territories would be appointed by the Agong (Federal Head of State).
By agreement they would be the present Governors and for the rest of the
transitional period any successor would be appointed on the nomination of the
British Government. The Federation would at the outset delegate to the States (not
to the British Government) Federal powers and functions other than for the three
subjects excluded under Arrangement 1. Changes leading up to full self-government
in State matters would be introduced as quickly as possible and there would be a
gradual transfer back to the centre of Federal subjects. Under this scheme the
Governors would be responsible neither to the Federal Government nor to the
British Government, except that in relation to conditions of service for expatriate
officers they would be under the ultimate authority of the British Government.
Comment. This course would leave the Governors in an exposed position but it
would still enable us to resist any claim from the expatriate officers to retire with
compensation. Nevertheless, it is unlikely to be acceptable to the Tunku because it
provides for the sharing of jurisdiction for the States between the Federal
Government and independent British Governors.
Arrangement 3 (Special Council Scheme)
11. It would be possible to mitigate the independence of the Governors’ position
in Arrangement 2 by the creation of a Special Council. The Federation would
delegate to the States at the outset Federal powers and functions as under
Arrangement 2. The Governors, as at present, would at the outset have full discretion
over the whole field though in practice they would increasingly act in accordance
with the advice of their Executive Councils. Changes leading up to full internal self-
government would be introduced as quickly as possible but up to that stage the
Governors would still have reserve powers. A special Council would, however, be set
up, to be presided over by the Governor and consisting of, say, four members—
perhaps two nominated by the Federation and two by the Governor himself (possibly,
one being the leading local politician and the other the Chief Secretary). If, while he
still had discretion over the whole field, the Governor wished to act against the
advice of his Executive Council, or in later stages wished to exercise his reserve
powers, he would be able to do so only if the Special Council agreed. The Public
Service would, however, remain his personal responsibility subject, as under
Arrangement 2, to the ultimate authority of the British Government. The Special
Council would drop out at the end of the transitional period.
Comment. The practical difficulties of such a complicated arrangement are
obvious but it might help to make the retention during the transitional period of the
British Governor and the delegation of Federal powers to the States slightly less
2 Sudan had been administered as an Anglo–Egyptian condominium from 1899 to the end of 1955. As
Sudan’s advance to self-government had accelerated in the early 1950s British officials attempted to
prevent the sacrifice of Sudanese interests for the appeasement of Egypt and also to provide the south with
constitutional safeguards against northern domination by allowing for the retention of British
administrative staff later than elsewhere in the Sudan. See Douglas H Johnson, ed, BDEE: Sudan.
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difficult for the Tunku. The advantage from our point of view is that it would still, we
think, be possible to avoid allowing retirement with compensation.
Arrangement 4 (Local Head of State and British Chief Executive)
12. Under this Arrangement there would be a local Head of State appointed by
the Agong with the agreement of the British Government, who would have the
functions of a Constitutional Monarch. The Federation would at the outset delegate
to the States Federal powers and functions as under Arrangement 2. The effective
head of the administration would be a Chief Executive who would be a British
officer appointed by the local Head of State on the nomination of the British
Government. The Public Service would be his personal responsibility, subject, as
under Arrangement 2, to the ultimate authority of the British Government. The
Head of State would act in accordance with the advice of the Executive Council
except where that advice differed from that of the Chief Executive, in which case he
would act in accordance with the advice of the latter. The Chief Executive would
preside in Executive Council. As and when a Ministerial system was introduced, the
Chief Executive’s power to advise the Head of State contrary to the views of the
Executive Council would be progressively restricted. A further variant would be to
introduce a Special Council as in Arrangement 3, to which the Chief Executive
would have to refer in the event of a difference of view between himself and his
Executive Council.
Comment. This proposal should dispose of some of the Malayan objections but it
would not be attractive politically in the States, where the embryo political leaders,
while willing enough to be guided by a Governor seen to be the top man, would not
relish a position of inferiority to a Chief Executive. Further, the Colonial Office, the
Department of Technical Co-operation and the Governors all feel strongly that the
change in the circumstances would be so great that expatriate officers would have to
be given the right to go with compensation.
Arrangement 5 (‘The Malayan Proposals’)
13. Under the Malayan proposals the Governor would be a constitutional ruler
and he would not be British (although this is not explicitly stated either in the
Cobbold Report or in the accompanying letters). He would appoint a local Chief
Minister who had the confidence of the Legislature, and would act on his advice. The
Central Government, having been legally and constitutionally vested with the
Federal powers simultaneously with the transfer of sovereignty, should immediately
delegate to the Chief Minister the exercise of as many executive functions as might
be necessary for the maintenance of good administration. What the Malayans have in
mind on this point is not fully clear. The administration would function under a
State Secretary subordinate to the Chief Minister, and this officer would be the
present British Chief Secretary.
Comment. This is the proposal which the Tunku is likely to press since it is the
minimum which clearly puts undivided jurisdiction in Malayan hands. On the other
hand the objections to this arrangement are:—
(i) The Territories are not yet ready for a Ministerial system of this kind.
(ii) The sudden transfer and retention of power in Kuala Lumpur would be
resented.
12-Malaysia-123-148-cpp  21/9/04  9:07 AM  Page 343
344 THE COBBOLD COMMISSION [129]
(iii) It would be a major change in policy for the British Government to refuse to
expatriate officers the right to go with compensation.
Public Service
14. The British Government are committed by Col. 3063 to the principle that
when the Secretary of State for the Colonies ceases to have responsibility for a Public
Service overseas, pensionable officers should be entitled to retire with compensation
for a broken career. With the transfer of sovereignty, the responsibility of the British
Government in any form would normally cease and the right to retire with
compensation would therefore follow.
15. But if this right is given, experience shows that, however carefully a
compensation scheme is framed to minimise the inducement to go, at least one-third
of the entitled officers will leave within a year; and in North Borneo and Sarawak we
are advised it might be as many as 50 per cent—and in the vital 35 to 40 age group,
possibly even higher. Many of them, particularly the administrative and police
officers, could not effectively be replaced.
16. It may be thought strange that, of a devoted Service, so large a proportion
should be ready to leave, but the drawbacks of staying are from the officers’ point of
view great. None but the oldest of them can see the prospect of completing their
careers in the territories; they probably have growing family responsibilities and feel
that they must be assured of an income for the rest of their working lives; and so they
wish to start off in a new career as soon as they can before it is too late. Moreover, if
they stay on they fear that they will be subjected to pressure to do things against
their conscience. The conclusion is inescapable that if officers have the right to retire
at the outset with compensation, the whole effectiveness of the administration will
be in danger.
17. How then, in order to meet the need to retain expatriate officers, can we
devise arrangements which will not necessitate giving them the right to immediate
retirement with compensation? It must be remembered that any scheme proposed
must be one which officers will accept and work: otherwise it will fail in its purpose.
Much will depend on whether they consider that the constitutional arrangements
proposed are fair to the people of the territories. We have explored three possible
lines of action which, singly or in combination, might meet the case:—
(i) A satisfactory constitutional arrangement.
(ii) An agreement with the new Federation or with the State Governments
guaranteeing their terms of service.
(iii) The British Government might take these officers into their service and
second them to the Federation or to the State Governments.
18. We have covered (i) in the paragraphs above on constitutional arrangements.
19. As regards (ii), the British Government are already committed to the
protection of conditions of service of all officers in Her Majesty’s Overseas Civil
Service at the time of self-government, by a Public Officers Agreement. Such an
Agreement in this case would not, therefore, be anything new. In the past the British
3 Col No 306, Reorganisation of the Colonial Service, 1954, provided for the creation of HMOCS (Her
Majesty’s Oversea Civil Service), cf 122, note.
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Government have held that such agreements are sufficient only if accompanied by
the right to retire with compensation, because, although terms of service are thereby
protected, officers are still exposed to the risk of being required to perform duties
which they cannot conscientiously carry out. These considerations apply with
particular force in the Borneo territories, where overseas officers fill almost all the
senior posts and bear the brunt of administration. Even if an agreement were
concluded with the new Federation in this case, the Colonial Office and the
Department of Technical Co-operation feel that it would still be essential to grant the
right to retire with compensation if the nature of the constitutional arrangements
were such as to involve the transfer of the officers to, in effect, another government.
Both Departments fear that if, contrary to past policy, the right to retire with
compensation were to be withheld in these circumstances, the confidence of the
Overseas Service generally in the British Government would be severely shaken and
morale in the Borneo territories would be broken.
20. (iii) above has the advantage, by bringing officers directly under the British
Government for the payment of salary and pensions and for other terms of service, of
appearing to give them additional protection. On the other hand, it leaves the officers
as exposed as under (ii) to being made the servants of another government whose
policies they might not be able conscientiously to carry out. Moreover, the question
whether officers taken directly into the service of the British Government in this way
should be granted compensation at any stage has still to be considered. There would
be strong objection in the Overseas Service to being brought under such a scheme
without the option of retirement with compensation. (iii) has the additional
disadvantage that the British Government would be blamed for any shortcomings in
the discharge of the officers’ duties. Any appeal by the officers would put the British
Government in the position of arbiter on local policy.
21. Our objective in the talks with the Tunku must be to secure constitutional
arrangements under which we are satisfied that there is no need to offer the right to
retire with compensation. (This would be possible under Arrangement 2 and,
perhaps, Arrangement 3: the Colonial Office and the Department of Technical Co-
operation do not think that it would be possible under Arrangement 4).
22. If arrangements were agreed under which the offer to retire with
compensation would have to be given there are a number of steps which could be
taken to encourage British officers to remain. Among these are:—
(i) Persuasion by the British Government—e.g., on the occasion of a Ministerial
visit.
(ii) Creation of a better atmosphere by the Tunku in addition to any
Governmental agreement.
(iii) Financial inducements.
(iv) The form of the compensation scheme.
23. The British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur believes that Arrangement
5 is the one which the Tunku is likely to press. The Tunku has said that it would be
politically impossible for him to accept any arrangements which placed effective
control in the hands of a British officer even for a limited period, or would be
different in kind from the standard pattern for the existing Malayan States. The
Tunku believes that more expatriate officers would stay than we appear to think; and
in any case he also believes that he could recruit enough volunteers from among 
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ex-officers of the Malayan Civil Service to fill any significant gaps in the
administration. His attitude is based upon his own assessment that anything short of
Arrangement 5 would weaken his political position to a point at which Malaya’s
interests would be better served without Malaysia. He is also certain (as is Mr. Lee),
that failing Malaysia, Singapore will in a few months’ time be lost to a Communist-
controlled government, with which the Tunku would not accept merger and which,
it is known, would not want merger on terms acceptable to him. The Causeway
would then be closed and Singapore sealed off.
Other matters
24. We think that, subject to agreement on satisfactory arrangements for the
transitional period, Ministers can generally accept those recommendations of the
Cobbold Commission which are unanimous, although a number of these will require
detailed study by working parties or other means before final agreement can be
reached upon the exact form of the new Federation. Meanwhile, we make the
following comments upon some of the more important of these matters:—
(a) Citizenship
The Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kwan Yew, is understood to be writing
to the Colonial Secretary seeking his support in representations to the Tunku, to
the effect that the arrangements for citizenship in relation to North Borneo and
Sarawak should not be more generous than those already worked out for
Singapore. But even the unanimous recommendations of the Cobbold
Commission will in any case come under criticism in North Borneo and Sarawak,
and we therefore recommend that, should it be decided to try and meet Mr. Lee’s
wishes in relation to citizenship, this should not be done by varying the
recommendations of the Cobbold Commission to the disadvantage of North
Borneo and Sarawak.
(b) Finance and development
We do not think that Ministers need engage in detailed discussion with the Tunku
on matters relating to finance and development but we suggest that he should be
told that fiscal and financial arrangements relating to North Borneo and Sarawak
will need a great deal of further elaboration by a working party or parties: some
independent examination may even be called for. He should in our view also be
told that it will be necessary for the British and Malayan Governments at an early
date to examine between themselves the joint planning and co-ordination of
development which will undoubtedly be required both before and after the
Federation of Malaysia is established.
(c) Courts
We suggest that Ministers should accept the two unanimous recommendations of
the Cobbold Commission together with one of the recommendations by the
Malayan members. These three recommendations are:—
(i) There should be a Federal Supreme Court having appellate jurisdiction
throughout the Federation.
(ii) There should be a separate High Court for the Borneo territories from
which appeals would lie to the Federal Supreme Court.
(iii) The Federal Supreme Court should have exclusive original jurisdiction in
cases between States or between a State and the Central Government.
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We further suggest that Ministers should inform the Tunku that they would like to
see effect given to these recommendations from the date of the establishment of
the Federation of Malaysia but that there are many other matters which will
require further examination by a working party before that date.
(d) Miscellaneous Public Service matters
Various matters in this category will require examination by a working party
before the Federation of Malaysia is established but we do not think that, beyond
making that point, Ministers need raise any of them in discussion with the
Tunku.
(e) Education
We recommend that Ministers should remind the Tunku that this subject closely
engages the concern of every parent in North Borneo and Sarawak and that there
will be strong pressure for a measure of local autonomy. Apart from this, we do not
think that Ministers need go into the matter with the Tunku, although he should
again be told that it requires examination by a working party before the Federation
of Malaysia comes into being.
(f) Language
The question of national and official language is an emotional matter in North
Borneo and Sarawak, and we recommend that Ministers should not enter into any
commitment with the Tunku before the peoples of the territories have had a
further opportunity of expressing themselves through their legislatures. Subject
to this important proviso, we believe that it should be possible to accept Malay as
the national language, provided that, as recommended by the Chairman and
British members of the Cobbold Commission, English remains one of the official
languages unless or until the State legislatures decide otherwise. The matter of an
official language has practical importance in relation to the language of laws and
other official documents, the language of debates in the legislatures and the
language of proceedings in the Courts. The retention of English as an official
language has a bearing on education, and the Chairman and British members of
the Cobbold Commission have stressed the importance of maintaining existing
policies regarding the use of English as a medium of instruction.
Religion
25. One important subject on which agreement was not reached by the Cobbold
Commission is religion. This is a highly emotional issue in North Borneo and
Sarawak and a note on the subject is at Appendix A to this Report. We recommend
that Ministers should urge the Tunku to accept the conclusions in paragraph 6 of
that note.
General Matters not covered by the Cobbold Report
26. We make the following comments upon a number of these matters:—
(a) Entry of Brunei and Singapore into the Federation of Malaysia
The terms of Singapore’s entry into the Federation of Malaysia have already been
agreed between the Governments of Singapore and the Federation of Malaya, but
negotiations for the entry of Brunei have not yet begun between the Sultan of
Brunei and the Malayan Government. We recommend that Ministers should tell
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the Tunku that it will be necessary at a later stage to ensure that North Borneo and
Sarawak enter the new Federation on terms generally not less favourable than
those agreed for Brunei.
(b) Indonesian and Philippine claims to part of North Borneo
We recommend that Ministers should raise these questions with the Tunku and in
so doing take the line indicated in paragraph 7 of the note on this subject at
Appendix B to this Report.
(c) Internal Security in Singapore before the state’s merger with Malaya
A note on this subject is at Appendix C to this Report. If the Tunku raises the
matter, we recommend that Ministers should take the line set out in paragraph 9
of that note.
(d) Defence aspects
We do not think that Ministers need raise any defence points during discussions
with the Tunku of the Cobbold Commission’s recommendations, but a note on
the defence aspects of the problem is at Appendix D to this Report and the
Minister of Defence will no doubt want to discuss with Malayan Ministers the
progress of the joint defence talks which have been going on in Kuala Lumpur.
In so doing he might in particular refer to the question of the level of British
forces to be retained in Malaysia (paragraphs 2 to 4 of the attached note) and to
the position regarding the use of British forces on active internal security
operations in Singapore after the formation of the Federation of Malaysia
(paragraphs 5 to 7 of the attached note).
(e) Situation in South East Asia
In case Ministers should have occasion to discuss this subject generally with the
Tunku a note upon it is attached at Appendix E to this Report.
Conclusions
27. The precise picture can emerge only in the course of negotiations, and
Ministers will wish to decide on the tactics to be employed.
28. The crux of the problem is the need to retain the expatriate officers and to
devise arrangements which will ensure this. The Tunku does not yet appreciate
either the need or the extent of the difficulties and he will need a good deal of
convincing.
29. Although Arrangement 2 would be inconsistent with everything that the
Tunku has so far said, there is something to be said at least for starting with this. It
is not necessary to contemplate this Arrangement lasting for the whole transitional
period. We could suggest that it should be limited to three years, two years or, in
the last resort, even one year from the establishment of the new Federation in
order to ensure smooth transition before passing over to one of the other
Arrangements.
30. It should be brought home to the Tunku, that if he insists on something
which goes beyond Arrangement 3, this at once raises the problem of the need for us
to offer expatriate officers the option of retirement with compensation. In that case
we must reckon with the possibility that half of them would go. This would be a
serious matter for all of us, which we must seek to avoid. If, therefore, we have to
offer the option of retiring with compensation, we must do all that we can to
encourage officers to stay, both by the terms of the compensation scheme and,
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perhaps, even more by constitutional arrangements which they will think fair to the
people. If the atmosphere is right, then there will be a much better chance of many
staying on. We are entitled to look to the Tunku to make some concessions in order
to reach a reasonable compromise which will ensure that the Greater Malaysia
project is successfully launched.
Appendix A to 129: Religion
Introduction
There was a difference of opinion in the Cobbold Commission on this subject. The
relevant paragraph of the Report is 148(e).
2. The Chairman and British members:—
(i) Recommend that the State constitution of each of the Borneo territories
should contain a provision to the effect that there shall be ‘complete religious
freedom as to worship, education and propagation’.
(ii) Consider that it is for the Borneo territories to decide for themselves, once
they have fully elected representative bodies, whether the provisions of the
existing Federal constitution that Islam is the national religion and that certain
public expenditure may be incurred for the maintenance of Muslim institutions or
instruction in the Muslim religion should extend to the Borneo territories.
(iii) Recommend that these provisions should not extend to the Borneo territories
in the meantime.
3. The Malayan members:—
(i) Recommend that Islam should be the national religion of the new Federation
(thereby implying that clause (1) of Article 3 of the existing Federal constitution
should extend to the Borneo territories as well as to the other parts of the
Federation).
(ii) Without making any recommendation, direct attention to the fact that under
the present Federal constitution certain public expenditure may be incurred for
Islamic purposes, and that this may be considered objectionable in certain
quarters so far as the Borneo territories are concerned.
4. The relevant Articles of the existing Federal constitution are 3, 11 and 12.
Article 3
5. The first part of clause (1) provides that Islam is the religion of the Federation.
Clause (2) relates to the States of Muslim Rulers and is therefore irrelevant to the
Borneo territories. Clause (3) requires the constitutions of the States of Malacca and
Penang to confer the position of Head of the Muslim Religion in each of those States
on the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.
6. It does not appear that clause (1)—or indeed the Article as a whole—has any
practical effect in constitutional terms except to set the background for the other
provisions of the constitution which do give certain practical advantages to the
Muslim religion. It also provides justification for the inclusion in the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong’s oath (Fourth Schedule to the constitution) of an undertaking to
protect the Muslim religion.
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7. The Malayan members would leave clause (1) unqualified so that it would
extend to the Borneo territories, and would presumably also wish to see clause (3)
expressly applied to those territories. The Chairman and British members consider
that whether Islam should be the national religion of the Borneo territories is a
matter for the territories themselves to decide when they have fully elected
institutions. They consequently recommend that clause (1) should not apply in
relation to the Borneo territories. It is not clear whether this recommendation also
extends to clause (3). It would be possible to provide that clause (1) shall not apply in
relation to the Borneo territories. This would, of course, look rather odd, for clause
(1) would then in effect provide that Islam shall be the religion of part of the
Federation—a rather untidy proposition which might be thought not to be entirely
consistent with the terms of the oath of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. Whether clause
(1) does or does not apply to the Borneo territories makes no practical difference in
constitutional terms to the inhabitants of the territories. If clause (1) were not
applied to the territories it would be difficult to justify the application to them of
Article 11(4) and, perhaps, the second half of Article 12(2), which are referred to
below, but they could be excepted from the application of these last two provisions
even though clause (1) of Article 3 did apply to them. Clause (3) of Article 3 could be
applied to the Borneo territories even if clause (1) were not, and the Muslims of
North Borneo and Sarawak might wish to see the Yang di-Pertuan Agong
constitutionally recognised as Head of the Muslim Religion in their States.
Article 11
8. Clause (1) contains a general guarantee of the right to profess, practise and
propagate one’s religion. This is qualified by clause (4), which provides that a State
law may control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among
Muslims, and clause (5), which stipulates that the Article does not authorise acts
contrary to any general law relating to public order, public health or morality.
9. The guarantee in clause (1) is in terms which are binding upon the authorities
of a State as well as the Federal authorities. Consequently, there is no need in law to
repeat this guarantee in the constitution of a State as the Chairman and the British
members recommend. It might, however, be politically desirable to include such a
guarantee in the State constitutions of the Borneo territories even though, as a
provision of a State constitution, it would not be binding upon the Federal
authorities.
10. Clause (4) of Article 11 could scarcely operate to the prejudice of non-
Muslims in States such as the Borneo territories, where Muslims did not command a
majority in the legislature. Nevertheless, the clause would in theory allow Muslims
to be treated as a special case under the law of the Borneo territories: this would give
offence locally and it would be quite easy to provide that the clause shall not apply in
relation to the Borneo territories.
Article 12
11. The general effect of this Article is to prohibit discrimination in the field of
education and religious instruction. The provision that is directly relevant to the
recommendation of the Commission is the second half of clause (2) which, as an
exception to the general proposition that there shall be no discrimination on ground
only of religion in any law relating to institutions for the education of children,
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permits Federal law to provide special financial aid for the establishment or
maintenance of Muslim institutions or instruction in the Muslim religion of persons
professing that religion. Such aid would have to come out of Federal funds since
Federal law could not make provision for the appropriation of State funds. There is
thus no question of the revenues of a State itself being used in a discriminatory way
under this provision. Nor, in view of Article 11(2), could the provision be invoked to
justify the application to non-Muslims of any special Federal tax designed to support
Muslim institutions or instruction in the Muslim religion. Nevertheless, the
provision would permit special allocations to be made for those purposes out of the
general revenues of the Federation; and since the Federal revenues of Malaysia would
in part be derived from the Borneo territories, its application in relation to the
Borneo territories might be considered objectionable, as the Malay members of the
Commission themselves recognise. The Chairman and British members recommend
that the provision should not apply in relation to the Borneo territories. There would
appear to be two ways of dealing with the point. Article 12(2) could be amended so
that the provision in question did not apply in relation to Muslim institutions
established in, or Muslim religious instruction given in, North Borneo and Sarawak.
If this were done, then Federal law could not provide special financial aid for Muslim
institutions or instruction in the Muslim religion in the two territories in excess of
anything which it provided for non-Muslim institutions or instruction in other
religions there. It would still, however, be open to the Federal Legislature to
appropriate Federal revenues, which had been derived from the Borneo territories, in
aid of Muslim institutions elsewhere in Malaysia. The alternative way of dealing with
the matter, which would obviate this objection, would be to amend Article 12(2) in
such a way as to remove from the Federal Legislature the power to give special
financial aid to Muslim institutions and instruction in the Muslim religion, whether
in the Borneo territories, or elsewhere, and to vest such a power in State
Legislatures.
Conclusions
12. The possible application to North Borneo and Sarawak of the provisions of
the Federal constitution relating to Islam is a highly emotional issue with non-
Muslims in those territories. It is suggested that the following recommendations
should be made to Ministers:—
(i) The provision of Article 3(1) of the Federal constitution that Islam is the
religion of the Federation should not extend to North Borneo and Sarawak.
(ii) References to North Borneo and Sarawak should be included in Article 3(3) of
the Federal constitution so that the constitutions of each of those States would be
required to confer on the Yang di-Pertuan Agong the position of Head of the
Muslim religion in the State.
(iii) Article 11(4) of the Federal constitution, which permits a State law to control
or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons
professing the Muslim religion, should not apply to State laws of North Borneo or
Sarawak.
(iv) The State constitutions of North Borneo and Sarawak should contain
guarantees of religious freedom.
(v) Article 12(2) of the Federal constitution should be amended by removing from
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the Federal Legislature the power to provide special financial aid for Muslim
institutions and instruction in the Muslim religion and transferring this power to
State Legislatures.
Appendix B to 129: Indonesian and Philippine claims to the Borneo Territories
In the long run the most likely alternative to Greater Malaysia is Greater Indonesia.
No Asian Government would consider that either independence or continued
Colonial rule could offer a lasting third choice for the Borneo territories in their
present form. If these are not absorbed by Malaysia, they are likely to be swallowed
up, sooner or later, by Indonesia or the Philippines or, just possibly, to be turned into
outposts of Communist China.
2. Indonesia, as the immediate neighbour of the Borneo territories, offers by far
the most serious potential challenge to Malaysia. Indonesia’s resources and her
population of 90 million greatly exceed those of the Philippines; and the Indonesians
have closer affinities (religious, racial, etc.) with the people of the Borneo territories.
So far, however, Indonesia has made no official claim, though one of the politicians
who, while out of office advocated the ‘liberation’ of the British Borneo territories, is
now a member of the Indonesian Government. Apart from tactical considerations
arising out of the Indonesian claim to New Guinea, the main reason for this
abstention is probably Indonesia’s own political disunity. The fundamental conflict
between the Javanese and non-Javanese races of Indonesia has produced a strong
Federalist movement in Indonesia which, in a crisis, might develop in the direction
of separatism. The Indonesian Government must accordingly realise that, in a head
on clash with Malaysia, parts at least of the outer islands might find Kuala Lumpur
quite as attractive as Djakarta. Although Indonesia’s leaders can not welcome the
creation of Malaysia, they are unlikely to interfere with the process or to advance
claims to the Borneo territories until they feel their own internal position to be a
good deal stronger than it is today. Indeed, they have denied any such intentions
publicly. On the other hand, if the Indonesians come to regard Malaysia as unlikely
to be achieved, they would find it difficult to leave the Philippines as the only
challenger to British rule and would probably put forward a claim themselves. As the
progress of the New Guinea dispute has shown, such a claim would be a serious
menace.
3. In itself the claim officially advanced by the Philippine Government in June,
1962, has little more than nuisance value. It has given rise to great resentment in
North Borneo itself, where there is no public support for the Philippine claim. It
concerns only that part of North Borneo originally under the sovereignty of the
Sultan of Sulu, and the Philippine Government have not specifically demanded more
than discussion on the status and sovereignty of North Borneo. Indeed, their
intention is probably limited to extracting substantial financial compensation instead
of the annual payments (5,300 Malayan dollars) made to the heirs of the Sultan of
Sulu in respect of the original cession (or, as the Filipinos contend, lease). The
Philippine Government may conceivably have the Indonesian danger at the back of
their minds, but their main reason, apart from considerations of internal politics, for
raising this issue now, is that they would find it much easier to bring pressure to bear
on the British Government as a ‘Colonialist’ power, than on a purely Asian Malaysian
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Government. Not only would the Philippine Government themselves be reluctant to
quarrel with the Malayans, but they would receive less sympathy from the Afro–Asian
bloc, the United Nations and international opinion than they would in a straight
forward (as they would represent it) anti-Colonialist issue. The Philippine
Government must accordingly be expected to apply pressure in support of their claim
during the coming months (perhaps even taking the issue to the United Nations or
the International Court of Justice) and to maintain this as long as the British
Government remain responsible for the Borneo territories. The longer it takes the
British Government to divest themselves of such responsibility, the greater the risks,
not only of damage to Anglo–Philippine relations, but also of arousing so much
emotion in the Philippines that the Philippine Government will be unable, even if
they so wished, to abandon their claim without obtaining satisfaction, even after the
establishment of Malaysia. Moreover, the harder the Philippine Government press
their claim, the more the Indonesian Government will be tempted to advance their
own.
4. Apart from an actual offer to buy them off (the only figure so far mentioned is
the £10 million demanded in 1958 by the Filipino lawyer who originally fomented
the present agitation) the only argument likely to influence the Philippine
Government would be that their claim would be seriously embarrassing to the
Government of Malaya, as potential inheritor of Her Majesty’s Government’s
responsibilities in North Borneo. Unfortunately, the attitude of the Malayan
Government, apart from an early and somewhat half-hearted attempt to dissuade the
Philippine Government from putting forward the claim, has been unhelpful. On 27th
June, for instance, the Tunku told the press that the Philippine claim was a matter
between the British and Philippine Governments, in which Malaya was in no way
involved. The claim would not, he said, affect the relationship between the A.S.A.
countries (Association of South East Asia, to which Malaya, the Philippines and
Thailand belong 4). But, if the British Government asked A.S.A. to help find a
solution, he would gladly consider this.
5. If the Tunku’s reference to assistance from A.S.A. implies mediation by that
organisation, this would not be welcome. It would virtually mean mediation by
Thailand (the only disinterested member) which would certainly favour the
Philippines at British expense, and any influence the Malayans might be able to exert
would not, for instance, prevent the Thais recommending some large British
payment to the Philippines. The outcome might thus be much more unsatisfactory
than that of direct bargaining with the Philippine Government.
6. On the other hand, the Tunku is most unlikely to reverse his attitude now and
to join us in whole-hearted opposition to the Philippine claim. Even if he did, the
Philippine Government have by now committed themselves too far to be much
influenced by such a belated conversion. The most we can expect from the Tunku is
that he might exert a moderating influence on the Philippine Government and try to
persuade them to proceed a little more discreetly. If the Philippine Government
4 The Association of South-East Asia (ASA) was an experiment in regional co-operation between Malaya,
the Philippines and Thailand. Established on 31 July 1961, ASA was intended to offer an alternative to
SEATO. It foundered on the Philippines’ claim to North Borneo and was superseded by the formation of
ASEAN (Association of SE Asian Nations) in 1967. On the Philippines’ claim, see 126, n 3.
12-Malaysia-123-148-cpp  21/9/04  9:07 AM  Page 353
354 THE COBBOLD COMMISSION [129]
made an outright demand for the annexation of North Borneo, the Tunku’s attitude
might change. The trouble is that the Tunku would probably like the dispute with
the Philippines to come to a head as soon as possible. He wants it to be settled to the
satisfaction of the Philippine Government before Greater Malaysia comes into being,
so that he inherits North Borneo with a clean title unencumbered by prior claims. He
may, therefore, at some stage, urge us to buy the Filipinos off.
Arguments for use with the Tunku
7. If a decision is reached with the Tunku to go ahead with Malaysia at the
forthcoming talks we are to have with him in London it is suggested Ministers take
the opportunity of raising with him the following points:—
(a) The Malayan Government are better placed than anyone else to exercise a
moderating influence on the Government of the Philippines over North Borneo.
(b) Without this, the Philippine Government are likely to work themselves and
their public opinion into an inconveniently emotional attitude.
(c) If this happens, it would disturb North Borneo and increase Malayan problems
after the establishment of Malaysia.
(d) It could also make it impossible for the Philippine Government to abandon the
claim even after the establishment of Malaysia.
(e) It could also provoke the Indonesians into putting forward a much more
dangerous claim of their own. For all these reasons it is as much in the interests of
the Malayan Government as of the British Government that the Tunku should do
what he can to induce the Philippine Government to adopt a more reasonable
attitude.
(f ) The British Government cannot possibly compromise their entire case (that
sovereignty over North Borneo is settled and not open to dispute) by agreeing to
open negotiations with the Philippines on this issue or accepting outside
mediation.
Appendix C to 129: Internal security in Singapore before the state’s merger with
Malaysia
Under the present constitution of Singapore the maintenance of internal security is a
matter for the Singapore Government; but the Internal Security Council, on which
Malaya, Singapore and Britain are all represented, has power to take decisions which
are then binding on the Singapore Government.
2. There has for some time been a difference of opinion as to whether anything
needs to be done to suppress the Communists and their sympathisers in Singapore,
who are opposed to the merger of Singapore with Malaya on the terms which have
been agreed between the Tunku and Mr. Lee. The focus of this opposition is the
Barisan Socialis party and, in particular, its Secretary-General, Mr. Lim Chin Siong.
3. The Malayan feeling is that the leaders of the Barisan Socialis party should be
arrested and detained in advance of merger. This could, in their view, be put over to
the Singapore public for what it is, action against Communists who are planning to
take over Singapore by constitutional means in accordance with classic Chinese
Communist doctrine. The Chinese of Singapore would then, they feel, climb on to
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the Lee/Tunku bandwagon and merger would go through peaceably. The Tunku is
reluctant to mark Malaysia’s birth by action against the Barisan Socialis after
merger. Lord Selkirk, on the other hand, as British Commissioner in Singapore,
advises us that such action might have the very opposite effect to that for which the
Malayans wish, by providing the opposition with opportunities to exploit the
situation—e.g., by giving them the chance to pose as martyrs. On this view the better
hope of achieving merger successfully probably lies in keeping down the local
political temperature.
4. Because of this disagreement, the Malayans have threatened to withdraw their
representative from the Internal Security Council (paragraph 1 above). The effect of
withdrawal would be to deprive the Council of its powers of decision; and the
Chairman (Lord Selkirk) is not for the time being calling any meetings.
5. An ad hoc committee of police and security officers was recently set up by the
Malayan and Singapore Governments to examine and make recommendations for a
phased plan of action against Communists and Communist sympathisers in
Singapore before merger. (The British Government were invited to participate in the
committee but declined on the grounds that its terms of reference prejudged the
issue.) The committee has now recommended the following course of action:—
Phase 1 (action to be taken immediately)—Control of selected organs of the
Press and restriction of political activity on the part of trade unions.
Phase 2 (action to be taken after the proposed referendum in Singapore* but
before merger)—Searches of suspect organisations, detention of a short list
of established Communists (in particular Mr. Lim Chin Siong) and
restrictions upon the movements and activities of others.
These proposals have been accepted by the Malayan and Singapore Governments. A
start has already been made with Phase 1 by way of pressure upon certain
publications and banning of some meetings and processions.
6. The proposed action lies within the Singapore Government’s own field of
responsibility, and in theory it might be possible for the British Government to allow
it to be taken without their having to declare their own attitude. The Malayan and
Singapore Governments, however, will probably try to associate the British
Government with the responsibility for at any rate Phase 2 of the plan, perhaps
through the medium of the Internal Security Council, and in practice it would be
difficult to avoid sharing this responsibility. Even if we were to oppose the plan in the
Internal Security Council, we should still be implicated in the public eye by reason of
our membership of the Council.
7. Although constitutionally the British Government’s power to intervene in this
matter is somewhat limited, we have the ultimate responsibility for Singapore up to
the time of merger, and it is British troops which will in the last resort be needed to
restore order if the situation gets out of hand. Also, it is to the British Government
that any international criticism (e.g. in the International Labour Organisation) of the
proposed action will be directed. Moreover, serious disturbances in Singapore might
affect the ability of the British Government to discharge their defence commitments
in South East Asia.
*The date of the referendum in Singapore is still undecided. It is expected to be during the next few
months and, according to the latest report, may be as early as August.
12-Malaysia-123-148-cpp  21/9/04  9:07 AM  Page 355
356 THE COBBOLD COMMISSION [129]
8. When Mr. Lee was in London in May 5 he was told by the Colonial Secretary, in
discussion of this question, that ‘we have broad backs and are not afraid to carry our
share of the burden. I must, however, be convinced that the action taken will make
things better and not worse’. After his return to Singapore, Mr. Lee, for reasons not
apparent, deliberately gave the Tunku reason to understand that he had secured from
Ministers here unqualified approval of the plan; but the record has since been put
straight with the Tunku through the British High Commissioner, who has told him
that it will be up to him in London to persuade British Ministers that, as both he and
Mr. Lee believe, these measures will on balance be good for Singapore and Malaysia.
9. The Tunku is expected to press the question while he is in London. If he does
so, it is suggested that Ministers might take the following line:—
(a) We cannot ignore the possibility that the proposed repressive measures might
exacerbate rather than improve the situation.
(b) We should accordingly still prefer to postpone a decision until nearer the time
when it is suggested that the main action will be needed, viz., following the
referendum in Singapore, when the situation may be clearer.
(c) Even then we should feel at liberty to disagree with the Tunku as long as we
have the ultimate responsibility and Malaya is not unavoidably committed to
taking over Singapore.
(d) Our hesitation is due to a genuine uncertainty as to whether what is proposed
is the best way of handling the situation in Singapore, and not to any reluctance to
share with the Malayan and Singapore Governments whatever unpopularity the
measures may evoke.
Appendix D to 129: Defence aspects
General position
1. The main defence aspects of the formation of Malaysia were covered at the
meetings with Malayan Ministers in November, 1961. It was then agreed that the
Malayan Defence Agreement and its annexes should be extended to all territories of
the Federation of Malaysia, subject to the proviso that Britain should have the right to
continue to maintain the Singapore bases and to make such use of these as Britain
might consider necessary for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Malaysia, for
Commonwealth defence and for the preservation of peace in South East Asia (Cmnd.
1563 Annex B).6 Subsequently the Minister of Defence agreed with the Malayan Minister
of Defence that a joint examination should be carried out in Malaya of the more detailed
defence questions that would arise from merger between Malaya and Singapore. The
report of the joint defence talks which have since taken place is now under examination
in London. The agreement reached last November represents a very satisfactory
arrangement and it is neither necessary nor desirable to reopen this question during
the forthcoming talks. A number of minor points arising from the application of the
Agreement to Singapore will have to be jointly examined shortly, but there are no
issues of principle in the defence field to be settled at the forthcoming talks.
5 He flew to London via meetings with Nehru (New Delhi), Nasser (Cairo) and Tito (Belgrade).
6 Cmnd 1563 was the joint Anglo–Malayan statement issued after the London talks in Nov 1961, see 79–84.
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Strength of British forces in Malaysia
2. By assuming responsibility for internal security in Singapore the new Federation
would in due course relieve Britain of a considerable responsibility, for which a number
of major units of the British army (including Gurkhas) are at present stationed in
Malaya and Singapore. To meet requirements other than internal security we plan to
keep certain forces in the area. As a result of the joint examination in Malaya, proposals
have been made for handing over internal security commitments in Singapore to the
Federation Government, and these are now being studied in London.
3. Following rumours in the local press about reductions in the Brigade of
Gurkhas, the Malayan Minister of Defence asked Her Majesty’s Government that no
decision to remove forces from Malaya and Singapore should be taken without
consultation with the Federation Government because of the needs of external
defence which had yet to be examined. Ministers agreed that the Malayan Minister of
Defence should be told that the subject might be discussed during the Malayan
Prime Minister’s visit. In the same reply it has also been confirmed that it is Her
Majesty’s Government’s intention to have the question jointly examined on the spot,
and that no reduction in the strength of British forces in the area would be made
without consultation. Attention was also drawn in the reply to the Secretary of State
for War’s statement of 30th May explaining that no decision on the future of the
Brigade of Gurkhas would be taken until next year.
4. The Malayan views on force levels for external defence have yet to be
considered through joint machinery for combined military planning. Proposals for
this machinery have been agreed at the joint defence talks and are now under
examination by both Governments. It will therefore be necessary at a suitable stage
in the forthcoming talks for the Minister of Defence to reassure the Malayan Prime
Minister that it is our intention to have external defence questions examined locally
as soon as the necessary machinery has been set up, and in the light of such
examination, to consult the Federation Government before withdrawing any forces
no longer required for internal security commitments in Singapore.
British Assistance to Malaysia for internal security
5. The agreed terms of reference for the joint defence talks referred to ‘a phased
plan for the assumption by the Federation Government of all internal security
commitments in Singapore and the Borneo territories’ taking into account the rate
of build-up of the Federation armed forces. Britain normally regards internal
security in an independent Commonwealth country as the responsibility of the
Government concerned, and units of British forces would not normally be employed
on internal security duties in a sovereign state. However, the report from the joint
defence talks suggests that Britain should have a continuing commitment to help
with internal security problems in Singapore until the end of 1964, by when the
Federation would have built up adequate forces for internal security.
6. We imagine that Malaysian Ministers would have to approve an actual request
to call in British help and British Ministers would similarly require to be consulted.
Until the report on the defence talks has been examined in detail by officials it will be
difficult to weigh up at all accurately the implications of allowing British troops to be
used after merger in active internal security operations. In order to meet
commitments, more detailed plans would have to be considered for the part which
British forces might have to play until Malaysian forces were able to assume all
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commitments, and these plans would have to take into account the legal position as
well as the possibility of not committing British forces, except in the last resort, to
the more active roles such as operations in the streets of Singapore.
7. The Malayan Government are alive to these considerations. The Malayan
Minister of Defence has already told our High Commissioner that his Government
would be most reluctant for their own political reasons to call on British forces for
active internal security operations, and would only do so in the direst emergency.
They would however consider it necessary to be assured that our forces would in fact
be available in those extreme circumstances. The Minister of Defence will no doubt
wish to discuss this matter with his Malayan colleague.
Appendix E to 129: Situation in South East Asia
Laos
The formation of the Coalition Government and the resumption of the Geneva
Conference 7 are very welcome, but they are only a beginning. It will be a long and
difficult job to build up a genuinely neutral, independent and stable Laos. We hope
the Tunku will do what he can to cultivate closer relations with the new Laotian
Government. They could do with some friendly advice from an Asian Government of
a more balanced and disinterested character than the immediate neighbours of
Laos.
Vietnam
2. The situation in South Vietnam remains very difficult. The Tunku has already
given valuable assistance over the despatch of the Thompson Mission to South
Vietnam and by supplying arms, advice and training facilities.8 We should welcome
any further suggestions which he likes to put to us. The immediate problem is to
help the Saigon Government to re-establish their authority themselves, and to defeat
the insurrection organised from Hanoi, without the need for assistance from foreign
combatant troops. Meanwhile, we do not think that international negotiations could
possibly help, since South Vietnam would be at such a disadvantage in them until the
military situation is restored. The success of the Geneva Conference on Laos offers
no precedent for a similar conference on Vietnam.
New Guinea
3. The British Government are seriously concerned by the attitude of the
Indonesian Government. Dutch acceptance of the Bunker formula9 (which had been
endorsed by the British Government and the United States Government, as well as by
U Thant) does not seem to have satisfied them. The Indonesian demand for further
7 On 23 July 1962 the Geneva Conference on Laos, which had convened in May the previous year, reached
international agreement on the political unity and neutralisation of the country.
8 This was the British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam, 1961–1965, under Robert Thompson.
9 Ellsworth Bunker was a US diplomat acting as a UN moderator in the West Irian dispute; the Bunker
formula called for the Netherlands to transfer West Irian to UN administration for a period of a maximum
of two years during which the UN and Indonesia would test indigenous opinion and Indonesia might
prepare for the assumption of control. It was on this basis that the dispute was resolved.
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clarification suggests that they really want additional concessions. It may even be
that President Sukarno does not really want a negotiated settlement, even on his own
terms, but is intent on humiliating the Dutch militarily, so that they have to come to
the conference table to sue for an armistice. This could create a very dangerous
situation.
Association of South East Asia (A.S.A.)
4. The British Government welcomed the Tunku’s initiative in founding this
association of Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand last year. They would be glad to
see it become the nucleus of a wider association of South East Asian states. The
British Government have, however, deliberately avoided giving any public
encouragements to such ideas. Overt Western sponsorship might, in their view, only
frighten off such neutralist states as Burma. The British Government would welcome
the Tunku’s own ideas on the subject. Has he any plans for expansion? In particular,
has he considered the idea of sounding out the new Burmese Government?10
10 It was led by General Ne Win who overthrew the government of U Nu in a military coup in Mar 1962.
130 CAB 134/2370, OP(62)3rd meeting 12 July 1962
‘Greater Malaysia’: Cabinet Oversea Policy Committee minutes
[This meeting was attended by Macmillan (chair), Kilmuir, Home, Sandys, Watkinson,
Maudling, and Anthony Barber (economic secretary, Treasury). The following senior civil
servants were present: Brook, Garner and Martin. It may be wondered how much
ministerial attention was paid to ‘Greater Malaysia’ at that afternoon’s meeting since a
major and clumsy Cabinet reshuffle was in the offing: the morning had seen what
Macmillan’s biographer has described as ‘a thoroughly unhappy Cabinet’ and by the next
day, after the so-called ‘night of the long knives’, Macmillan had sacked one third of his
Cabinet in ‘an act of carnage unprecedented in British political history’ (Alistair Horne,
Macmillan, vol II, pp 343–348). As regards overseas responsibilities, Butler (who became
deputy prime minister) was given charge of Central Africa, Thorneycroft succeeded
Watkinson as minister of defence, and, as anticipated a few months earlier (see 98, note),
Sandys took over the CO from Maudling (who replaced Selwyn Lloyd as chancellor of the
Exchequer). Sandys was now secretary of state at both the CO and CRO, although the two
departments remained separate until they combined as the Commonwealth Office in
1966.]
The Committee had before them a Note by the Secretaries (O.P. (62) 7) covering a
Report by the Chairman of the Official Committee on Greater Malaysia1 on the
conduct of the forthcoming discussions with the Prime Minister of the Federation of
Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, about the proposed new Federation of Malaysia.
The Prime Minister said that during the transitional period following the
establishment of the new Federation it would be necessary to preserve stable
government in North Borneo and Sarawak while at the same time bringing the
inhabitants to a stage at which they could themselves manage their own local affairs.
It was generally accepted that this required the retention for a number of years of the
bulk of the British expatriate officers now serving in the two territories; and the main
question was how to reach agreement with the Tunku on arrangements which would
1 See 129.
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secure this without appearing to derogate from the sovereignty of the new
Federation over North Borneo and Singapore.
Officials had examined five different possible arrangements. Arrangement 1, which
had been proposed by Lord Cobbold, was clearly ruled out since under it the United
Kingdom would retain direct authority in the Borneo territories: this, as he (the
Prime Minister) had assured the Tunku, they did not desire to do. Arrangement 2,
which had been proposed by the British members of the Cobbold Commission,
copied the Sudan model. Although under it the Governors would not be responsible
to the United Kingdom Government, the Tunku might not be willing to accept as
Governors British officers who would not be responsible to the new Federal
Government either. Arrangement 3 was a modification of Arrangement 2 whereby
the independence of the Governors would be to some extent qualified. Arrangement
4 provided for a local Head of State but the effective head of the administration would
remain a British officer, appointed on the nomination of the United Kingdom
Government, who would retain personal responsibility for the public service. This
would no doubt be more attractive to the Tunku in that the Head of State would be a
Malaysian. Arrangement 5 was that proposed by the Malayan members of the
Cobbold Commission and still further reduced the British element in the
administration. From our point of view the order of preference was reversed. The less
control we retained over his administration, the harder it would be to retain staff.
The Commonwealth Secretary said that the Prime Minister’s preliminary talk
with the Tunku would be of vital importance. In his view the aim of the talk should
be to reassure the Tunku that we had no wish to retain British authority in the
Territories, to seek broad agreement on the essential practical requirements of the
situation, but not to determine in any detail how those requirements might be met.
No concessions should be offered at this stage, and the main issue of the transitional
arrangements should not be brought to the crunch until later in the discussions,
when the outstanding points of lesser importance had been settled.
The Colonial Secretary said that it would be best to deal first with the long-term
issues such as education and religion: it should then be easier to agree the
transitional arrangements in the knowledge that Malaysia was attainable.
Transitional arrangements
In discussion of the five possible Arrangements for the transitional period which the
Prime Minister had outlined, the general feeling of the Committee was as follows. Our
order of preference declined from Arrangement 1 to Arrangement 5, and we should
argue the case downwards from as high up the list as possible. Arrangement 1 was
clearly ruled out. Arrangement 2 was very doubtful. It was in practice unlikely that we
should achieve anything better than Arrangement 3, and even that might be difficult
as it involved retention of British officers rather than the appointment of Malaysians
as Governors and Heads of State in the two territories. If the Tunku proved adamant
we might have to make our main stand on a determined effort to close for Arrangement
4: in that case, to have any hope at all (and it would in any case be slight) of avoiding
the grant to expatriate officers of a right to retire with compensation, it would be
essential to obtain firm agreement that the British Chief Executive would retain
effective responsibility for the public service. We might in the end have no option but
to negotiate on the basis of Arrangement 5. We could not accept it as it stood but it
was, perhaps, capable of amendment to an acceptable form: for example, we might
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insist—and there was precedent for it—that the first Chief Ministers should be British
officers and that the initial delegation of Federal powers should include, as under the
other proposed Arrangements, all powers other than those relating to external affairs,
defence and the anti-subversive aspects of internal security. Finally, it might be
possible to obtain agreement upon the division of the transitional period into an initial
phase under one Arrangement and a later phase under another.
In further discussion the following were the main points made:—
Internal security
(a) It might be possible to obtain some advantage from the Tunku’s recent request
that United Kingdom forces should in the last resort be available to help in an internal
security role in Singapore or the Borneo territories between the establishment of
Malaysia and the time (estimated at 1964) when his own local forces would have been
built up sufficiently to undertake that role unaided. He might recognise that our
agreement to this request would make it the more incumbent upon him to agree with
us upon suitable transitional arrangements for the Borneo territories, although it
would be unwise to link the two transitional periods directly together.
Public service
(b) On the vital questions of the need, and the means, to retain expatriate
officers, we had the advantage of knowing that the Tunku agreed with us on the
need; and it should therefore be possible to persuade him to be reasonable about the
means even though he was understood at present not to share our view of the likely
scale on which expatriate officers would leave should it be necessary to grant them a
right to retire with compensation, and to believe that he could in any case fill the
gaps from other sources. The best approach would be to impress upon him with all
possible force, first, the damaging consequences which we think would flow from a
major exodus of expatriate officers, and second, our conviction that such an exodus
would be difficult to avoid if a right to retire with compensation had to be granted. It
might thus be possible to bring him to see the wisdom of generosity to North Borneo
and Sarawak over such long-term matters as religion, education and language, both
of which would have a vital influence upon the attitude of expatriate officers towards
further service in the two territories.
(c) Of the 700 or so expatriate officers in the two territories, some 300 really
mattered, although the number holding key posts (mainly in the administrations and
the police) was, of course, a good deal smaller. Professional officers might find it
possible to stay on and could perhaps be replaced if they went: but the loss of
administrative and police officers would be much likely and more damaging, and
their replacement almost impossible. What weighed with them all was not merely
their material interests in terms of conditions of service or career-prospects, but the
nature of the work they would be called upon to undertake. They were afraid that
they might be called upon to execute policies laid down by Malayans who had
inadequate regard for the Borneo peoples and pursued courses of action inimical to
the interests of those peoples. They also feared that they might become the unwilling
instruments of nepotism and corruption.
(d) One solution would be for the United Kingdom Government to take these
expatriate officers into their employment and second them to the two Borneo
Governments: this would not cost more than a compensation scheme.
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(e) In seeking any solution to the problem of retaining expatriate officers a factor
of great importance would be consultation with their own Staff Associations: if we
could secure a reasonable accommodation with the Tunku it should be possible
through such consultations to ensure the retention of expatriate officers in
satisfactory numbers whether or not it proved necessary to grant a right to retire
with compensation—although it would, of course, be preferable by agreement to
avoid that. Alternatively, it might be possible to work out an acceptably modified
compensation scheme whereby, for example, a limited measure of compensation was
granted to those who chose to retire early but proportionately larger amounts at a
later date to any who agreed to serve on.
(f) One difficulty was that compensation on the scale which had been paid
elsewhere (it averaged £7,000) was a powerful inducement to retire; and if it were by
any method increased as an inducement to serve on, a dangerous precedent would be
set—in Kenya, for instance, where there would soon be an equally grave problem of
the same kind, 16,000 officers were involved.
Local consultation
(g) It would be necessary at a number of stages in the progress to the
establishment of Malaysia to consult the Legislatures in North Borneo and Sarawak.
This had an important bearing in two respects on the discussions with the Tunku.
First, we must persuade him of the need (which he had dangerously overlooked in
the past) to avoid making public statements suggesting that the United Kingdom and
Malayan Governments already regarded the Malaysia project as a settled affair in
relation to which only their views were significant; and second, we must make it
clear in the statement to be published at the close of the discussions that any
agreements which the two Governments might have reached about North Borneo
and Sarawak, were subject to consultation with the local Legislatures.
Outstanding long-term issues
(h) The recommendations of the Cobbold Commission on citizenship were
unanimous and acceptable but there were several other long-term issues to be settled
which to a greater or lesser degree aroused strong emotions in North Borneo and
Sarawak. The most important of these were religion, education and language
(especially in relation to education, since the Borneo territories set great store both
upon education and upon English as the medium of instruction). Religion was a highly
emotional issue as the majority of the Borneo peoples were not Muslims and disliked
the idea of Islam as their national religion. On language the Cobbold Commission had
made the useful suggestion that, if Malay were accepted as the national language,
provision should be made for North Borneo and Sarawak to retain English as an official
language for as long as they wanted. Generally, it was very desirable to persuade the
Tunku of the solid material advantages to be gained for Malaysia by understanding of
local feelings on all these matters in the two Borneo territories, and by corresponding
magnanimity in the practical arrangements to be made in relation to them. Failure in
these respects would be needlessly damaging to the prospects of Malaysia.
Summing up the Prime Minister said that in his first private talk with the Tunku
he would begin by repeating that the United Kingdom Government were just as
anxious as the Tunku to ensure that the proposed Federation of Malaysia came into
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being. He would then reiterate the assurance which he had already given to the
Tunku that the United Kingdom Government had no desire after the establishment
of the new Federation to retain over North Borneo and Sarawak either sovereignty or
any direct authority. He would emphasise that the other matters which remained to
be settled were practical questions to which the United Kingdom and Malayan
Governments, sharing the same essential concern for the successful future of
Malaysia, should be able in their forthcoming discussions to find answers acceptable
both to themselves and to the peoples of the two Borneo territories.
As the Tunku himself had recognised, the retention of the largest possible number
of the British expatriate officers—particularly administrative and police officers—now
serving in the two Borneo territories was crucial, and this required that, during the
transitional period, because the United Kingdom Government would no longer have
any direct authority in North Borneo and Sarawak, the United Kingdom and Malayan
Governments must agree upon arrangements calculated to encourage expatriate
officers to remain in their posts. This heightened the need to work out terms for the
entry of North Borneo and Sarawak into Malaysia which fully satisfied the special
requirements of their peoples, particularly in such matters as religion, education and
language, which were highly emotional issues in the two territories. Success in this
would be a powerful inducement for the expatriate officers to remain at their posts.
Generally, he would in this talk enter into no new commitment to the Tunku and
would not engage in argument about the precise arrangements for the transitional period.
He would conclude by seeking the Tunku’s agreement that the right order of
procedure would be to take, first, all those matters on which the recommendations of
the Cobbold Commission were unanimous; second, the long-term issues which had
not been agreed in the Cobbold Commission but must be settled; and finally, against
the background of agreement upon the long-term arrangements, the arrangements
to be made for the transitional period.
He would also take an opportunity at a suitable point in his talk with the Tunku to
emphasise the need both for adequate consultation with the Legislatures in North
Borneo and Sarawak and to avoid meanwhile giving any public impression that the
United Kingdom and Malayan Governments intended to dragoon the two territories
into Malaysia willy-nilly.
The Committee:—
(1) Took note of the Prime Minister’s summing-up.
(2) Invited the Commonwealth Secretary, in consultation with the Colonial
Secretary, to prepare, on the lines indicated by the Prime Minister, a draft
programme for the main discussions which the Prime Minister could agree with
the Tunku during their private talk.
131 CO 1030/1150, no 183 12 July 1962
[Political developments in Singapore since the Tunku’s speech of 27
May 1961]: despatch from P B C Moore to Mr Maudling on the
chances of Lee winning the battle for merger
[Moore was acting UK commissioner, Singapore, in place of Selkirk at this time. By the
time the despatch reached the CO, Sandys had replaced Maudling as secretary of state.
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This document was later printed for confidential circulation and was also considered by
the Cabinet (Official) Committee on Greater Malaysia (CO 1030/1150, no 187 and DO
169/19, no 173A; see also CAB 134/1951, GM(62)36, 17 July 1962).]
I have the honour to submit a brief review on political developments in Singapore
since May last year when the Tunku first responded to the promptings of the British
and Lee Kuan Yew and spoke out in favour of closer association of the Federation of
Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo Territories. The Tunku’s bold initiative set in train
events which will climax shortly in the discussions on the Cobbold Commission’s
Report in London and in the hotly debated referendum in Singapore.
2. Experience of three years of the Singapore Constitution suggests that we have
been fortunate in having Lee Kuan Yew as Prime Minister.1 It would have been only
too easy for the Singapore Prime Minister to have maintained widespread popular
support by pressing for a greater measure of independence for Singapore on her own
when it seemed that the Tunku was unalterably opposed to Merger between
Singapore and the Federation. Instead, Lee took the far harder course of telling the
Singapore Chinese that their independence could only come through merging with
the Malay dominated Federation. Lee’s tactics, however, have not always matched up
to the quality of his overall policy and the road he has trod to Merger has been even
more stony than it need have been.
3. The outlook for the P.A.P. following their defeat by Ong Eng Guan at the Hong
Lim bye-election [sic] in April 1961 was not good. After two years of office the Party
had lost considerable public support and was faced with another bye-election in the
Anson division. Lee had persisted in his attempt to keep the left wing extremists
within the Government and Party instead of looking for increased support from
moderate opinion. As a result the Party and the T.U.C. had been badly weakened by
the internal sapping of Lim Chin Siong and his colleagues. Progress along the Party’s
main policy line of Merger with the Federation seemed to be blocked indefinitely and
political momentum was taking Singapore towards what Lee believed was the
disastrous goal of an independent Chinese city state. Then came the Tunku’s speech
and the situation changed fundamentally.
4. Lee lost no time in welcoming the initiative towards Merger in his speech on
National Day 2 and open conflict in the P.A.P. at once ensued. The left wing of the
Party, led by Lim Chin Siong and supported by eight P.A.P. Assemblymen and a large
section of the trade union movement, reacted instinctively against the prospect of
control by the right wing Federation Government and made it a condition of their
support for the P.A.P. candidate in the Anson bye-election that the Party should work
for full internal self-government. Lee stood firm, the bye-election was lost to David
Marshall (Singapore’s first Chief Minister and new leader of the Workers’ Party) five
more P.A.P. Assemblymen defected and the struggle within the P.A.P. culminated in
a debate on a motion of confidence in the Assembly on 20th/21st July.3
5. The Government were left with a majority of only one in the Assembly, but
they reaffirmed their belief in Merger and survived. During the debate Lee launched a
1 See 13, 15 and 38 for previous assessments by the UK commissioner of political developments in
Singapore.
2 3 June 1961, the second anniversary of the inauguration of the constitution for self-governing Singapore;
later replaced by 9 Aug, commemorating Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in 1965.
3 See 50.
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sudden attack on the British in an attempt to cast a smoke screen over the disaster
which had befallen the Government as a result of allowing the extremists to
undermine them in the Party. He suggested that there had been a Machiavellian ploy
by the United Kingdom Commission (culminating in the so-called Eden Hall tea
party) to encourage the extremists into open conflict with the P.A.P. leadership and
thus to force the leadership to take repressive action against them.4 The truth was
that the extremists, faced with the threat of Merger, thought that their best course
was a swift attempt to overthrow the leadership and to assume control of the
Government; their visit to Eden Hall was that of prudent men who wanted to know
whether the British would allow them to take office in the ordinary constitutional
way. Their narrow failure to defeat the Government must have been a great
disappointment but they rapidly adjusted themselves to the role of militant
opposition. A new party—Barisan Sosialis—was formed, with Lim Chin Siong as the
Secretary General, thirteen members in the Assembly and the greater part of the
P.A.P. constituency apparatus under their control. A parallel development in
the trade union field led to the dissolution of the T.U.C. into two groups of unions,
the one that supported Barisan Sosialis having about forty members, including the
powerful Singapore General Employees Union and many smaller industrial unions.
6. From this point on, the story is essentially one of the P.A.P.’s ‘Battle for
Merger’ as Lee himself termed it in the published version of a series of twelve
broadcast talks that he gave in the Autumn.5 It was clear that the Government could
not face a general election and that their only course was to seize the initiative
offered by the Tunku. This Lee did with characteristic skill and determination and by
late August he had succeeded in hammering out with the Tunku a practical basis for
Merger whereby the Federation would control Defence, External Affairs and Internal
Security, while Singapore would keep control of Education and Labour. The scheme
was worked out in more detail over the next two months and by the middle of
November Lee was able to publish a White Paper containing a formal Exchange of
Letters between the two Prime Ministers and a memorandum setting out the agreed
proposals. The essence of the scheme, which we originally suggested to Lee and was
at first called the ‘Ulster Model’, was that the Federation should have complete
constitutional safeguards against any possibility of the Singapore Chinese upsetting
the political dominance of the Malays in the Kuala Lumpur House of
Representatives. To this end it was agreed that Singapore should only have 15 seats
in the House of Representatives instead of the 25 to which she was entitled by reason
of her population and that Singapore citizens should not become Federation citizens
on Merger although they would be given Malaysian nationality and passports.
7. During this time the Merger issue was widely debated in the Press and on the
radio, and opposition parties tried hard to persuade the Government to associate
them in the negotiations. At an early stage, Barisan Sosialis concluded (whether
wisely or not still remains to be seen) that they could not oppose Merger absolutely
even though in their hearts the last thing they wanted was for Internal Security of
Singapore to come under the control of the right wing Federation Government.
Accordingly, they adopted the tactic of declaring themselves in favour of full and
complete Merger, with proportionate representation for Singapore in the Federation
4 See 49, note. 5 See 59, note.
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Parliament and with automatic Federation citizenship for all its citizens; for good
measure, they also demanded general elections in Singapore before Merger and Pan-
Malayan general elections after it. All other opposition parties accepted the principle
of Merger too, but only the Alliance was ready to support the White Paper proposals
as the best way for the present of making progress towards full Merger. By the time of
the debate on the White Paper in the Assembly towards the end of November,
criticism of the Government’s Merger proposals was clearly centred on the twin
questions of representation in the Federation Parliament and citizenship. On the
first point, the debate on the whole went in favour of the Government who justified
less than proportionate representation for Singapore on the grounds that the State
was being given greater local powers. On the question of citizenship, the
Government argued that full Merger would mean the application of Federation rules
of citizenship to Singapore, and that under these rules those not born in Singapore
would have to re-register for citizenship. The Government estimated that this would
result in several hundred thousand citizens being disenfranchised, and on this
ground they justified the special provisions of the White Paper whereby Singapore
citizens retained their separate citizenship and automatically became ‘Federal
Nationals’. Barisan Sosialis firmly rejected this argument and maintained that a
reasonable and fair application of the Federation citizenship rules to Singapore
should mean that all existing Singapore citizens would automatically become
Federation citizens on Merger.
8. The debate in the Assembly concluded on the 6th December with a vote of
thirty-three to nil in favour of the White Paper, all opposition parties except the
Alliance having walked out before the division. In general, Lee was entitled at this
point to considerable satisfaction with the progress he had made since near disaster
in July. His series of broadcasts in which he argued the case for merger and exposed
the whole history of Communist united front tactics had perhaps not made the
impact he had hoped but he still held the initiative and the essential margin of
support in the Assembly. He himself was playing a constructive part in the meetings
of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee which was devoting itself to the
essential task of bringing the Borneo Territories around to Malaysia. There had been
a satisfactory outcome to the Defence talks with the Tunku in London and H.M.G.
had both expressed their general support for Malaysia and had taken note of the
Singapore White Paper. There remained one serious obstacle. The Tunku was not
willing to take Singapore unless he could have the Borneo territories at the same
time. Singapore was therefore faced with the prospect of a long wait, probably until
1963.
9. Faced with this delay, Lee Kuan Yew made a major mistake, which may yet be
his undoing, in pledging the Government to submit their Merger proposals for
endorsement by the people at a referendum. At the time this no doubt seemed a good
way of relieving pressure on the Government for general elections but it is now
proving a tremendous millstone around their necks. Given the P.A.P’s firm stand in
favour of Merger at the previous general election and the approval of their White
Paper proposals by almost two thirds of the members of the Assembly, it would have
been quite reasonable for the Government to proceed with Merger without more ado.
Certainly H.M.G. for their part would have seen no difficulty in transferring
sovereignty to the Federation on the strength of the vote in the Assembly. The risk in
any referendum, as the Government soon saw, was that their White Paper proposals
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would be rejected, not on their merits, but merely to show dissatisfaction with the
Government itself. Lee therefore decided to make the people choose between the
White Paper proposals and full Merger as urged by Barisan Sosialis and other
opposition parties, with the clear implication that full Merger would mean loss of
citizenship for many people in Singapore. The Opposition were soon aware of the
trap being laid for them and countered by threatening to frustrate the referendum by
telling their supporters to cast blank ballots. The Government were thus forced step
by step to tighten up the provisions of the Referendum Bill and it now provides for
blank ballots to be construed as support for the White Paper, and for the number of
such ballots to be declared only if the Government see fit. The result is that
Government have no hope of any sort of credit for holding a referendum and it is
generally regarded as a dishonest manoeuvre.
10. Meanwhile, behind the public debate on Merger during the last six months
there have been secret discussions on the question whether the left wing extremists
should be arrested before Singapore is handed over to the Federation.6 These
discussions were initiated by the Federal Government who feel strongly that firm
action should be taken against the extreme left wing while the British are still in
charge. At first Lee shared the British view that it would be dangerous to take such
action in the months leading up to Merger, and that the overriding need was for a
calm political position in Singapore. Subsequently, however, partly to appease the
Tunku but also no doubt to some extent to suit his own political needs, he changed
his stand and agreed to a programme of action that provides in its first phase for the
intensification of measures to harrass and provoke the extreme left wing, followed in
the second phase by the arrests of its leaders. How far Lee intends to go on his own
responsibility and whether the initial phase will succeed in its intention of provoking
unconstitutional action by the extremists remain to be seen.
11. Thus, on the eve of the discussions in London on the Cobbold Commission’s
Report which it is hoped will put the Borneo piece of the Malaysia jigsaw firmly into
position, Singapore remains the doubtful quantity. In the last weeks, the debate on
the Referendum Bill has reached a new pitch of intensity and, although the
Government can rely upon the support of the Alliance to force it through, the strain
on their own supporters is very great. Already, this has resulted in the defection of
one back-bencher and the outlook for the Government is uncertain.7 If it should fall,
this would mean the end of Malaysia for the time being and the opening of a period of
great difficulty for the British in Singapore. On balance, however, I should judge
6 For the detention of subversives, see references at 123, n 5.
7 Hoe Puay Choo defected from the PAP, thereby reducing the PAP to 25 out of the 51 seats. Nonetheless, it
carried the vote on the referendum by 29 to 17 with the support of Lim Yew Hock’s SPA and UMNO. Lee
regained his majority of one on 4 Aug. Lee now had the authority to run a referendum on merger. He
would do so on the following terms. Three alternatives would be presented: A (in support of the
government’s proposals); B (in favour of Singapore becoming a state within the federation); C (in favour of
merger on terms no less favourable than those offered to the Borneo territories). It was also laid down that
all blank or spoiled ballot papers would be counted as supporting ‘A’. Two days after losing the vote on the
referendum bill, the Barisan sent an appeal to the UN protesting against the terms of the referendum. Lee
also went to New York to rebut the charges. He then travelled to London for the Malaysia talks, arriving on
27 July and moving immediately into a round of meetings. The referendum on merger was held on 1 Sept
and the result was as follows: A 71.1 per cent; B 1.7 per cent; C 1.4 per cent; blank 25.8 per cent.
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that, with luck and the continuing determination of Lee Kuan Yew, the Government
may succeed in ‘winning’ the referendum and holding on until H.M.G. and the
Federation together can implement the whole Malaysia plan. But time is very short
and the transfer of sovereignty must take place at the earliest possible moment.
12. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Governors in Hong Kong,
Jesselton and Kuching on a personal basis; to the United Kingdom High
Commissioners in Canberra, Wellington, and Kuala Lumpur; to H.M. Ambassador in
Djakarta; and to the High Commissioner for Brunei.
132 CO 1030/1024, no E/90 20 July 1962
[Anglo–Malayan talks in London]: minute from Mr Sandys to Lord
Lansdowne recording his lunchtime conversation with the Tunku
about a staged transfer of power
[The Tunku arrived in London in mid-July and established his court at the Ritz Hotel.
‘The Tunku is like a Spanish grandee. That’s his world’, Macmillan once remarked to Lee
Kuan Yew. The Malayan delegation included Razak, Tan Siew Sin, Abdul Aziz bin Haji
Abdul Majid (permanent secretary, Prime Minister’s Department), Abdul Kadir bin
Shamsudin (Defence), Shariff bin Hassan, C M Sheridan (attorney-general) and C Fenner
(director, police affairs). At 12 noon on 17 July, after a brief meeting between prime
ministers, the talks got underway with a plenary session in Admiralty House which was
followed by meetings in the CRO between the Tunku and Sandys that afternoon and the
next morning. The detailed negotiations were left to a steering committee, where
Lansdowne took over from Sandys as leader of the British side. The plenary session
reconvened on 23 July, with Sandys in the chair, to consider a summary of the
committee’s proceedings (for the record of meetings see DO 169/273 and DO 189/221).
North Borneo and Sarawak were represented at the London talks by Goode and Waddell.
Agreement was reached on a number of points but after ten days the talks were in danger
of breaking down. The stumbling blocks were, firstly, the implications of extending the
existing federal constitution to North Borneo and Sarawak (particularly with respect to
religion, language and education) and, secondly and most significantly, the timing of
merger (see 134). On the one hand, further preparation of the Borneo territories
warranted a later date; on the other hand, instability in Singapore necessitated an earlier
date. The Tunku was anxious that Malaya’s merger with Singapore should synchronise
with, and certainly not precede, its merger with the Borneo territories. Lee Kuan Yew,
who reached London on 27 July after a mission to the UN to refute the Barisan’s charges
regarding Singapore’s prospective referendum, brought demands of his own; he wished
the British government to detain or restrict up to 150 subversives and opponents and the
Malayan government to make concessions on citizenship. Because he was afraid that he
might be left ‘holding the Singapore baby’ without the countervailing support of the
Borneo peoples, the Tunku threatened to pull out of the talks (see 133). Breakdown would
have been in nobody’s interest, least of all the Tunku’s, since to return to Kuala Lumpur
empty-handed would have damaged his political reputation. In order to get negotiations
back on track, Macmillan, who had in any case been intending to offer the Malayan
premier some hospitality for he sensed that he had been somewhat neglected socially,
invited the Tunku to lunch at Chequers on 28 July. Here a significant, secret formula was
proposed (see 135 and 136).]
1. The Prime Minister of Malaya lunched alone with me to-day and we discussed
the setting up of Malaysia.
2. I stressed the importance we attached to a smooth transfer of power in a way
which would not alarm the local population or lead to the premature withdrawal of
the British officials. I suggested that it would be desirable to retain the British
Governors for another two or three years, whilst indigenous Ministers were being
trained on to take over responsibility.
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3. The Tunku was vehemently opposed to the idea of British Governors in any
form within the new Federation. However, after some discussion he said he thought
there would be no objection to delaying the incorporation of North Borneo and
Sarawak into the new Federation for a year or two. I pointed out that the merger with
Singapore could obviously not be similarly delayed.
4. After examining various possible courses, we agreed to consider a solution on
the following lines:—
(a) At the end of the present talks, the British and Malayan Governments would
announce their decision (subject to working out detailed arrangements) to set up
the new Federation of Malaysia, comprising Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo,
Sarawak and Brunei.
(b) The actual transfer of sovereignty in respect of each territory would be left
over for determination by the two Governments, subject to a maximum time limit
of two or three years.
(c) The transfer of sovereignty in respect of Singapore and Brunei would be
effected as quickly as possible during the next few months.
(d) The transfer of sovereignty in respect of North Borneo and Sarawak would be
effected at such time as the British Government thought right, subject to the
maximum time limit of two or three years, at the end of which we would be
irrevocably committed to merge the territories in the new Federation.
(e) During the transitional period, the Federal Government could begin to initiate
development schemes in Sarawak and North Borneo with the consent and co-
operation of the British authorities.
133 PREM 11/3868 26 July 1962
[Anglo–Malayan talks in London]: letter from Tunku Abdul Rahman
to Mr Sandys, announcing his intention to break off the talks
I have given most careful thought to your proposal for the creation of Malaysia which
envisages the possibility of the admission of Singapore into the Federation prior to
the Borneo territories but found it unacceptable.
The mandates which I have obtained from Parliament, from the Alliance Party, and
from my own Party, have at all times been most emphatic that the merger with
Singapore must be done simultaneously with the Borneo territories. The reason is
obvious, for, the admission of Singapore into the Federation earlier than the Borneo
territories would tip the balance of population in favour of the non-Malay population
by 869,000.
There is a very real apprehension of the people of the Federation, in particular the
Malays, of the danger of the preponderance of Chinese population which would affect
the trend of our politics, for the majority of them are inclined to Chinese chauvinism
and communism. This is the problem of Singapore of which both our Governments
are most concerned.
I have been able to win the support of the people of the Federation to the Malaysia
proposal on the assurance that the balance of population would be made up by the
simultaneous admission of the other territories. You might say that these measures are
purely temporary in that the Borneo territories would merge in the next few months. That
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might be so, but the psychological effect in the minds of the Malay people would be one
of suspicion, and fear—suspicion in that I have gone back on my promise to them and
likely to do so again, and fear that I have been weak enough to allow myself to be used as
an instrument of British interest in order to perpetuate British Imperialism. If therefore
Malaysia is created in the way you envisage, I fear that I shall lose the trust which has been
reposed in me. For this reason, my colleagues and I suggested a package deal.
The question of having British governors in Malaysia after the transfer of
sovereignty for a period which you suggested would open myself to very severe attack
and criticism from my own people and would indeed provide the communists with
the best opportunity to create dissension in our ranks. With that, my standing in the
eyes of my people would suffer a severe set-back, and I would be of no further use
both to my country and to our friends in the Commonwealth.
In the circumstances, if we are not able to arrive at some agreement, my
colleagues and I feel that we would rather remain as we are, and should Malaya be
faced with the threat of Communist aggression I am sure with the help of God and
the determination of our people we should be able to resist it.
I have, therefore, decided to return home but before I do so I would very much like
to meet the Prime Minister to say goodbye as well as to explain to him my position
regarding these matters.
134 DO 169/273, no 11B 26 July 1962
‘Progress report on Anglo–Malayan talks’: CRO memorandum on
behalf of Mr Sandys and forwarded by W I McIndoe to P de Zulueta for
Mr Macmillan’s information
[The Anglo–Malayan talks went badly. Officials regretted that in their initial meeting on
17 July Macmillan had encouraged the Tunku to believe that the British government
would in the end be willing to achieve agreement at almost any price. In the view of A M R
Cary of the Cabinet Office, ‘unless there is some dramatic change in the situation it looks
as though a solution may emerge which will cause serious trouble in Borneo and by
repercussion, in this country’. The invitation to Chequers was intended to avert such a
crisis. De Zulueta requested this report from McIndoe (Sandys’ private secretary) in order
to brief the prime minister for his forthcoming lunch with the Tunku (see Cary to Brook,
27 July 1962, CAB 21/4847, and de Zulueta to Macmillan, 27 July 1962, PREM 11/3865).]
Long term arrangements
1. On a large number of points agreement has been reached, the most important
being that the ultimate constitutions for North Borneo and Sarawak in Malaysia
should be based on those for Penang and Malacca with additional safeguards, the
details of which have yet to be settled. On some points, e.g. religion, agreement has
still to be reached.1
1 The main issues outstanding as regards the Borneo territories were religion, language and compensation
for expatriate officers; for Singapore the principal matter was citizenship. The Tunku wanted Islam to be
the state religion for the whole federation to which the non-Muslim communities of Borneo objected. With
respect to language, Cobbold had recommended that English should remain the official language unless
local legislatures proposed otherwise, whereas the Tunku wished to control the date of change. In any case,
it was accepted that the practical details of these and other matters would have to be worked out on the spot,
hence the subsequent appointment of the Inter-Governmental Committee chaired by Lansdowne.
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The transition
2. The main questions which have still to be resolved are: when sovereignty
should be transferred and whether Singapore should enter Malaysia earlier than or at
the same time as the other territories.
3. For internal political reasons the Tunku wants all the territories to join the
Federation simultaneously. What we require is a little time to effect the transfer
smoothly and without losing the confidence of the inhabitants. The Tunku would be
quite prepared for the transfer of all territories to take place on any date that suits us,
i.e. in eighteen months or two years time. But the political situation in Singapore
makes a long delay impossible in practice. The present minority government may
easily collapse before the end of this year.
4. To meet this difficulty Mr. Sandys has proposed that the two Governments
should announce:—
(a) that the transfer of all territories should take place on 31st December, 1963,2
subject to the proviso that by agreement all or any of the territories may be
incorporated into the Federation at an earlier dates; and
(b) that the two Governments should secretly agree that if, in the interval, Lee
Kuan Yew’s Government appears at any time to be on the point of collapse,
Singapore and Brunei will be incorporated into the Federation in advance of
Sarawak and North Borneo.3
5. The Tunku, in a private talk with Mr. Sandys, accepted this arrangement. But
later after talking to Tun Razak, he changed his mind.
6. The position now is that the Malayans have been asked to consider the matter
further. It is important that they should not think that the British Government are
prepared to make further concessions beyond those already offered by Mr. Sandys,
which go a great deal further than Lord Cobbold recommended.
7. It would be politically most damaging for the Tunku to return to Malaya
empty-handed and without achieving agreement on the creation of Malaysia. There
is, therefore, reasonable hope that to avoid this he will be willing to make some move
in our direction. In the last resort it may be possible for us to make some small
further concession of a presentational nature to him. But Mr. Sandys does not wish
to play this remaining card just yet.
General
8. Assuming that agreement is reached in the next few days with the Malayans,
it is envisaged that a joint announcement would be made, the Cobbold Report
would be published, joint inter-governmental committees would then be set up to
meet in the Far East and Lord Landowne and a Malayan Minister would visit the
Borneo Territories quickly to expound and win approval for the arrangements
proposed.
2 The Tunku had proposed that sovereignty over the Borneo territories should be transferred on 8 Feb
1963, his birthday.
3 This became the nub of the Chequers’ formula (see 136) and was the reason why the agreement of 31 July
remained secret apart from the joint public statement (see 140).
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135 DO 169/273, no 12 28 July 1962
‘Record of a Meeting at Chequers at 12.15 pm on Saturday, July 28,
1962’: minutes by P F de Zulueta of a meeting attended by Mr
Macmillan, Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Razak
[The Chequers’ lunch-time meeting was orchestrated as follows: Sandys arrived first and
briefed Macmillan on a formula which he should suggest to the Tunku and which he later
sent him in writing (document 136). Sandys withdrew before the arrival of the Tunku and
Tun Razak who had a half-hour’s discussion with Macmillan. Sandys then joined the
meeting, appearing to have just arrived at Chequers. Finally, Home joined the party
which then went into lunch. Macmillan reported the Chequers’ meeting to Cabinet on 3
Aug (CAB 128/36/2, CC 53(62)2); see also CO 1030/1025, no E107A; PREM 11/3868).]
The Prime Minister began by expressing his regret that his other engagements had
prevented his taking a very active part in the discussions which had been going on.
The Tunku expressed his complete understanding. He said that he had just been
having a good discussion with Lee Kuan Yew which had turned largely on the date at
which Malaysia could be brought into effect. Lee Kuan Yew was not sure how long he
could hold on and February, 1963, seemed about the latest safe date. The
Commonwealth Secretary however had talked about December 31. The Government
of Malaya would not mind how long they waited for Malaysia, were it not for the
dangers in Singapore which seemed imminent.
The Prime Minister asked if Lee Kuan Yew and the Tunku had now agreed about
the Citizenship question. The Tunku agreed that there had been some
misunderstanding on this point but said that the legal advisers were now working on
the formula and he hoped that it would be acceptable to Lee Kuan Yew.
The Prime Minister said that he would like to speak very frankly to the Tunku.
Although most people in the United Kingdom were in favour of the idea of Greater
Malaysia the Bill giving effect to it would not have quite as easy a passage as had the
Bills, for example, for the Independence of Tanganyika.1 There would be a certain
amount of discussion, particularly from those on both sides of the House who were
particularly concerned with the traditional British tenderness for minority groups.
This would be true both in the House of Commons and in the House of Lords. It
would be a great help in the passage of any Bill if a clear declaration of intent had
been made to cover the interests of the inhabitants of the Borneo territories. He
quite understood the Federal Government did not in fact intend to change the way of
life of these people but detailed declarations of this intention could be very
important. It would also be helpful if the question of dangerous communists in
Singapore could be deferred until after the Parliamentary discussions. Granted these
points, the Prime Minister quite saw the difficulties of timing to which the Tunku
had referred. He assumed that in fact agreement could be reached about safeguards
for the Borneo peoples and about the defence arrangements. If all that could be
agreed then he wondered whether a formula might not be found which would allow
the formal date for Malaysia to be fixed as August 31, 1963. There could be a
declaration in principle now to that effect. Even this would be quite difficult because
the Cobbold Report had spoken of a much longer transitional period. The Prime
1 For the decolonisation of Tanganyika, which became independent in Dec 1961, see Hyam and Louis eds,
BDEE: The Conservative government, I, 140–156.
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Minister then spoke from a formula which he subsequently sent to the Tunku,
stating that this was a personal idea. He explained that in any Bill to establish Greater
Malaysia a formula must be used which would allow the Federation to be established
on August 31, 1963 or on such earlier date as might be laid down by Order of
Council. It would be privately agreed between the Governments of the United
Kingdom and of the Federation of Malaya that if an earlier date than August 31
proved necessary owing to the position in Singapore then the British Governors
would continue to exercise executive authority in the Borneo territories under the
Agong until the latter appointed new Governors on August 31, 1963. The Tunku said
that this was an interesting idea. He thought that the formula should provide that
the formal agreement between the Governments concerned should be reached by
February 8, 1963. The Prime Minister agreed that this might be possible and said
that he would send the Tunku a copy of his personal idea for him to study.
136 DO 169/273, no 12 28 July 1962
[The Chequers’ formula]: letter from Mr Macmillan to Tunku Abdul
Rahman. Enclosure: ‘Suggested plan for Malaysia’
My dear Prime Minister,
As I promised, I enclose a copy of the suggestion which I outlined to you today as a
possible plan for the establishment of Malaysia. I believe that something on these
lines might provide a solution.
It was a great pleasure to entertain you and the Deputy Prime Minister to
luncheon today.
Yours very sincerely,
HAROLD MACMILLAN
Enclosure to 136
1. At the end of the present talks, a public announcement would be made that
the British and Malayan Governments had decided in principle that the proposed
Federation of Malaysia should be brought into being on 31st August, 1963.
2. At the same time the two Governments would declare their intention (after
the referendum in Singapore and after consultation with the legislatures of North
Borneo and Sarawak but not later than January 1963) to conclude a formal
agreement which would provide for:—
(i) the transfer of sovereignty on 31st August, 1963;
(ii) safeguards for the special interests of North Borneo and Sarawak; and
(iii) defence arrangements on the lines already agreed.
3. In addition, the two Governments would, by an unpublished exchange of
letters, agree:—
(a) that, if the present Government of Singapore fell or appeared to be about to
fall, the new Federation of Malaysia should be brought into being as soon as
practicable; and
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(b) that, in that event, the British Governors of North Borneo and Sarawak, while
ceasing to be responsible to the British Government, would continue, as an
interim measure, to exercise their present executive powers until the appointment
of new Governors by the Agong on 31st August, 1963.1
1 The secret agreement of 31 July reproduced this formula more or less word for word, see 140.
137 PREM 11/3868 30 July 1962
[London talks on merger between Malaya and Singapore]: minute
from P F de Zulueta to Mr Macmillan, reporting discussions between
Mr Sandys, Tun Razak and Lee Kuan Yew on 29 July about citizenship
and internal security
[The Singapore and Malayan leaders used the London talks not only to conduct business
but also to improve their working relationship. Following the Chequers’ lunch, the
Tunku had tea with Lee Kuan Yew at the Ritz and the next morning (Sunday, 29 July)
they were joined by Razak and Goh Keng Swee for golf at Swindon. That afternoon Lee
and Razak discussed citizenship and internal security with Sandys at the CRO. As regards
citizenship, Lee pressed for Singapore’s citizens to be known as citizens, rather than
nationals, of Malaysia—nomenclature which he felt sure would meet his critics’
grievances. Razak conceded the point on Sunday and the Tunku endorsed it on Monday
morning (30 July) when they met at the Ritz. Lee immediately returned to his base at the
Hyde Park Hotel to commit to paper the new scheme (which would necessitate an
amendment to paragraph 14 of the Singapore white paper, Cmd 33 of 1961, agreed by the
Singapore Assembly on 6 Dec 1961). The prime ministers of Singapore and Malaya then
confirmed their agreement by an exchange of letters. For the final wording of these
arrangements see 140, appendix C. As regards Singapore’s internal security, both Lee and
the Tunku pressed for a round-up of subversives before merger and hoped to shift onto
the British the responsibility for such an operation. Sandys categorically refused to take
the initiative in, or sole responsibility for, the matter and argued that it would be a matter
for the Internal Security Council, which was composed of British, Singaporean and
Malayan representatives (see 138; cf CO 1030/1029 and Lee, Memoirs, pp 437–440).]
At the talks between the Commonwealth Secretary, Tun Razak and Lee Kwan Yew on
July 29 they discussed Singapore’s citizenship and security.
On citizenship Lee Kwan Yew said that he had now reached agreement with the
Tunku that Singapore’s citizens should be described as citizens of the Federation of
Malaysia. This meets his point. He was, however, rather vague about the rights which
Singapore citizens would have and agreed, at Mr. Sandy’s request, to send a
document setting out the position which would be agreed also with the Malayans.
Mr. Sandys pointed out that he would have to consider the position in relation to the
rights which would be enjoyed by the inhabitants of the Borneo territories.
As regards security in Singapore, Lee Kwan Yew argued strongly for an operation
against known Communists to take place after the referendum in Singapore but
before merger. He was supported by the Malayans. He apparently had in mind the
arrest of some 25 people and the restriction of another 150.
Lee Kwan Yew said that when this happened he could not express enthusiasm for political
reasons but would say that this action was a regrettable necessity. He suggested that the
Malayan Government should be known to have taken the initiative in pressing this action.
There was considerable discussion about this because neither we nor the Malayans could
understand why Lee Kwan Yew could not take this action on his own responsibility. Lee
Kwan Yew explained his political difficulties and Mr. Sandys undertook to consider an
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operation such as was suggested. He said, however, that before taking a decision he would
like to see some specific case histories of the people who would be detained.
On the main question of dates and the rights of the Borneo people, the
Commonwealth Secretary is working to get a draft announcement ready for issue on
the evening of July 31 when some of the Malayans will go home. This may or may not
spell everything out in detail. There is another meeting at 10.00 p.m. tonight and
presumably further meetings tomorrow.
138 DO 169/273, no 14 31 July 1962
[London talks on merger between Malaya and Singapore]: note by the
Far Eastern Department of the CO of certain points discussed at a
meeting between Mr Sandys, the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew 1
1. Singapore: citizenship
Mr. Lee Kuan Yew said that he did not wish the agreement which he had reached
with the Tunku on Citizenship to be published yet.
It was agreed, however, that in reply to questions Mr. Sandys should be at liberty to
say publicly that an agreement had been reached between the Governments of Malaya
and Singapore, that he was satisfied that its terms were reasonable, and that it was for
the Governments of Malaya and Singapore to decide the question of publication.2
2. Singapore: internal security
Mr. Sandys said that:—
(a) He could not allow himself to be put in a position where he could be said to
have agreed in advance, even in principle, to a series of arrests in Singapore
without having had an opportunity to consider the cases of the individuals
concerned. He categorically refused to give any such agreement.
(b) If the Internal Security Council decided on security grounds that arrests were
necessary, he would not seek to intervene or to resist such a decision on political
grounds. A reasonable case for the arrests must, however, be presented: each
individual case must be made out and examined on its merits. It was not for the
British Government to initiate action in this matter, nor was he (Mr. Sandys)
prepared to put anything in writing at this stage.
(c) If everyone else concerned showed that they were prepared take their share of
responsibility the British Government would not shirk theirs and would not let the
others down.3
1 This meeting took place in the CRO at 7 pm; they then moved to Admiralty House where they met with
Macmillan at 7.35 pm, see 139.
2 Having recovered his majority of one in the Singapore Assembly on 4 Aug, on 14 Aug Lee announced the
terms of the citizen provisions and that the long-promised referendum would be held on 1 Sept.
3 Ghazali Shafie, who attended the meeting as secretary to the Malayan delegation, has recalled: ‘The
Ministerial Meeting mostly dealt with the question whether the British authorities would take internal
security action in Singapore before the merger. Sandys refused to budge an inch and requested the Tunku
not to push too hard. He however conceded that if the situation demanded it, UK government would act.
The Tunku said Selkirk might not go along with that to which he replied that he would deal with the
situation in his own way. Turning to me Sandys said that I should not record his words but that we should
take his words in good faith. The Tunku acknowledged the assurance given’ (Memoir, p 260).
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139 CO 1030/1025, no 111A 31 July 1962
[Signing the joint agreement]: note of a meeting of Mr Macmillan and
Mr Sandys with Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tan Siew Sin and Lee Kuan
Yew
The Tunku accompanied by Mr. Tan Siew Sin, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, the High
Commissioner and others called to see the Prime Minister at 7.35 p.m. on Tuesday,
July 31. The Prime Minister was accompanied by the Commonwealth Secretary, and
I1 was present.
After an exchange of courtesies two copies of the joint agreement between the
United Kingdom and the Government of Malaya were signed by both sides.2 There
was some reference made to the draft joint statement3 and the Prime Minister
thought there might be some discussion in the House of Commons on this. It could
not, therefore, be regarded as a formality but the statement made it clear that the
interests of all concerned had been properly looked after. In particular paragraphs
five and six would help to counter any criticisms that the United Kingdom had too
rapidly abandoned its responsibilities. It was hoped that the announcement would
help to stabilise opinion in the Territories. The Tunku agreed and said it was
important to get the referendum completed during the dry season. Mr. Lee also
agreed.
There was some reference to the position of the Philippines. The Tunku said that
the jurisdiction lay in the hands of the United Kingdom and he would not, therefore,
of his own accord have discussions with the Philippine Government. The
Commonwealth Secretary said that no formal claim had been made to the United
Kingdom Government. The Tunku added that the Philippines were friendly with
Malaya and there would be no serious embarrassment with them. He thought the
Philippine Government were seeking a way back into a wholly oriental sphere but he
was sure they would listen to him and he would emphasise that Malaysia was based
on self-determination. The Prime Minister added that this made it all the more
important that local legislatures should be consulted.
It was agreed that it would be right to tell the Press that evening no more than
that the talks had come to an end, that agreement had been reached and that a joint
statement would be made in the House of Commons 4 and simultaneously in Kuala
Lumpur the following day. There was a further exchange of courtesies in which the
Tunku and Mr. Lee expressed their satisfaction at the way in which the talks had been
conducted, at the hospitality they had received in London and at the opportunity the
new arrangements gave them both to confront the common enemy who still pressed
from all sides.
The meeting adjourned at 8.10 p.m.
1 T J (Sir Timothy) Bligh, one of the prime minister’s private secretaries. 2 See 140.
3 ibid., appendix D. 4 In fact both Sandys and Lansdowne made parliamentary statements.
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140 DO 169/273, no 16A 31 July 1962
‘Agreement on the setting up of the Federation of Malaysia’:
agreement in principle signed at Admiralty House by Mr Macmillan
and Tunku Abdul Rahman. Annex and Appendices: A ‘Framework of
initial state constitutions of Sarawak and North Borneo’; B
‘Citizenship’; C ‘Singapore citizenship’; D ‘Joint public statement’
[This document, commented H G Turner of the CRO (formerly of the MCS), ‘seems likely
to become a basic historical document in the formation of the Federation of Malaysia’
(Turner to Sir Charles Dixon, 8 Aug 1962, DO 169/273). For this reason it was printed and
circulated, but on a highly restricted basis. Indeed, unlike the Cobbold Report which was
published on 1 Aug in its entirety, most of the provisions of the agreement, annex and
appendices remained secret. Three of the five clauses of the agreement itself were
reproduced from the Chequers’ formula with only minor variations (see 136). The only
part to be published on 1 Aug and announced in both Houses at Westminster as well as in
the Federal Parliament was the joint statement (appendix D). The reasons for secrecy
were twofold. The first sensitive issue was encapsulated in the provisions set out in
paragraph 3, and confirmed by an exchange of letters between the two governments, for
the inauguration of Malaysia before 31 Aug 1963 ‘if for any reason it appeared desirable’.
The justification for such action had been spelled out in the Chequers’ formula, namely ‘if
the present Government of Singapore fell or appeared to be about to fall’. The agreement
was kept secret, secondly, so as not to antagonise the peoples of Borneo; in the view of the
CRO, ‘the agreement records an acceptance (not achieved by the Malayan members
without hard bargaining) of the view of the Malayan members of the [Cobbold]
Commission’ (memorandum by the Far Eastern Department, CRO, 29 Oct 1962, DO
169/215).]
1. The British and Malayan Governments have decided in principle that the
proposed Federation of Malaysia shall be brought into being by 31st August, 1963.
2. The two Governments declare their intention to conclude, within the next six
months, a formal agreement, which among other things will provide for:—
(a) the transfer of sovereignty over Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak by 31st
August, 1963;
(b) detailed constitutional arrangements including safeguards for the special
interests of North Borneo and Sarawak, to be drawn up after consultation with the
legislatures of the two territories;
(c) defence arrangements, as set out in the joint statement by the Governments of
the United Kingdom and of the Federation of Malaya dated 22nd November, 1961
(Cmnd. 1563).
3. In addition, the two Governments will, by an unpublished exchange of letters,
agree:—
(a) that, if for any reason it appeared desirable, the new Federation of Malaysia
could, by agreement between the two Governments, be brought into being on a
date earlier than 31st August, 1963;
(b) that, in that event, the British Governors of North Borneo and Sarawak, while
ceasing to be responsible to the British Government, would be confirmed in their
positions by His Majesty The Yang di-Pertuan Agong and would continue, as an
interim measure, to exercise all their present powers by the authority of His
Majesty until the appointment of new Governors by His Majesty on 31st August,
1963.
12-Malaysia-123-148-cpp  21/9/04  9:07 AM  Page 377
378 THE COBBOLD COMMISSION [140]
4. The two Governments have agreed upon the matters contained in the attached
Annex. Except where otherwise expressly stated this relates to North Borneo and
Sarawak only.
5. Facilities will be offered to His Highness the Sultan of Brunei to arrange for
Brunei to enter the new Federation should His Highness so desire.
For the British Government
HAROLD MACMILLAN
For the Malayan Government
TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA.
LONDON, 31ST JULY, 1962
Annex
1. Title of Federation. ‘Malaysia’ will be the official title of the Federation.
2. Sovereignty. On the creation of Malaysia, sovereignty over Singapore, North
Borneo and Sarawak will be transferred simultaneously by Britain to the new
Federation of Malaysia.
3. Transitional period. In the early years after the merger as few changes as
possible will be made in the administrative arrangements of North Borneo and
Sarawak affecting the day-to-day lives of the people. During this period certain
Federal powers will be delegated to the State Governments. This will be a matter for
discussion by an Intergovernmental Committee.
4. Constitution
(a) The Constitution of the new Federation of Malaysia will be based on the
present Constitution of Malaya.
(b) There will be safeguards for the special interests of North Borneo and Sarawak
which will not be capable of amendment without the concurrence of the
Government of the territory concerned.
(c) The Constitutions of Sarawak and North Borneo will in the first instance be on
the lines indicated in Appendix A.
5. Amendment of Constitution
(a) The Constitutions of the two territories will be required to be brought into
conformity with the provisions of the Eighth Schedule of the existing Constitution
of Malaya within a maximum period of years to be recommended by an
Intergovernmental Committee. The Legislatures of each territory will be
empowered to effect this change at an earlier date, if they think fit.
(b) Subject to the above, the States will have the exclusive right to amend their
own Constitutions.
6. Head of State. The Heads of State in North Borneo and Sarawak will be
appointed by His Majesty The Yang di-Pertuan Agong acting in his discretion but
after consultation with the Chief Minister. However, in the case of the first
appointments the Malayan Government will consult the British Government before
tendering advice to His Majesty.
7. Secession. The States of the new Federation of Malaysia will not have any right
of secession.
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8. Representation in the Federal Parliament
(a) Representation in the Federal Parliament for the territories will be in
accordance with the principles laid down in the Thirteenth Schedule of the
Malayan Constitution with additional weightage to take account of the particular
circumstances of the territories.
(b) Representatives of North Borneo and Sarawak in the Federal House of
Representatives will, until the system of direct elections is introduced, be elected
by their respective legislatures.
(c) The independent Federal Election Commission, which is responsible for
delimiting constituencies throughout the Federation and which is now composed
of a Chairman and two Malayan members, will be enlarged by the addition of one
member from the Borneo territories.
9. Electoral system. The present electoral college system in Sarawak will be
retained and a similar electoral system will be introduced in North Borneo as soon as
practicable and without awaiting the establishment of Malaysia.
10. Legislative Lists. The Federal, State and Concurrent Lists in North Borneo
and Sarawak will follow the Constitution of the existing Federation of Malaya, except
where otherwise agreed between the Malayan and British Governments. An
Intergovernmental Committee will consider what exceptions should be made other
than those specified.
11. Judiciary
(a) There will be a Federal Supreme Court having appellate jurisdiction
throughout the Federation.
(b) There will be a High Court in the Borneo territories from which appeals would
lie to the Federal Supreme Court.
(c) The Federal Supreme Court will have exclusive original jurisdiction in cases
between States or between a State and the central Government.
(d) Other matters relating to the Judiciary will be studied by an
Intergovernmental Committee.
12. Citizenship. The provisions governing citizenship will be drafted by the legal
representatives of the two Governments on the lines set out in Appendix B and
approved by an Intergovernmental Committee.
13. Religion
(a) Complete freedom of religion will be guaranteed in accordance with the
Constitution.
(b) An Intergovernmental Committee will consider how best to reassure the
peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak on this matter, which is of primary
importance to the territories.
14. Language
(a) The national language will be Malay.
(b) For all purposes in North Borneo and Sarawak the use of indigenous
languages will continue as at present.
(c) So long as the State Government so desires, English will continue to be an
official language in North Borneo and Sarawak.
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15. Immigration into North Borneo and Sarawak from other parts of Malaysia
(a) There will be certain constitutional safeguards with regard to the entry of
persons into North Borneo and Sarawak from other parts of Malaysia.
(b) These safeguards will take the following form:—
(i) The existing Federal Constitution will be amended to enable the Federal
Parliament to legislate to empower the State Governments to control the
movement, otherwise than on the grounds specified in Article 9 (2), of persons
from other parts of Malaysia into North Borneo or Sarawak, and to provide that
any such legislation may not be repealed or amended without the concurrence
of the Government of the State concerned.
(ii) The Government of the Federation would give a solemn undertaking to
pass, simultaneously with the admission of the Borneo territories into
Malaysia, a law conferring upon each of the States of North Borneo and
Sarawak power to control the entry into the State of persons from other parts
of Malaysia, subject to provisions designed to secure that a person or class of
persons should be admitted or refused admission into the State if the Federal
Government considers that this is necessary or expedient in the interests of
defence, internal security, external affairs, or in order to enable the Federation
Government to carry out its other constitutional and administrative
responsibilities.
(iii) The detailed provisions of the law referred to in sub-paragraph (ii) above
will be worked out by an Intergovernmental Committee.
16. Immigration into North Borneo and Sarawak from outside Malaysia
(a) Whilst it is accepted that the control of immigration from outside Malaysia will
be a Federal matter, it is agreed that North Borneo and Sarawak will be given
under the Constitution a measure of control over the admission of persons into
those States from outside Malaysia.
(b) This will take the form of amending the existing Federal Constitution so as to
provide without prejudice to Article 9(1):—
(i) that the Government of North Borneo or Sarawak may request the Federal
Government to deny admission to the State to any particular person or class of
persons from outside Malaysia other than members or officers of the Federal
Government.
(ii) The Federal Government will comply with such a request unless in its
opinion the admission of that person or class of persons is necessary or
expedient in the interests of defence, internal security, or external affairs or in
order to enable the Federal Government to carry out its other constitutional and
administrative responsibilities.
17. Education. Education will be in the Federal List. An Intergovernmental
Committee will consider:—
(a) the form of assurances to be given regarding the continued use of English or
other languages of instruction in North Borneo and Sarawak;
(b) the question of the delegation by the Federal Government of functions in
regard to education to State or local education bodies.
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18. Tariffs
(a) Tariffs will be on the Federal List.
(b) The alignment of the present tariffs in North Borneo and Sarawak with those
of the rest of the Federation will be effected by stages.
(c) The detailed arrangements will be worked out by an Intergovernmental
Committee.
19. Indigenous Races. Members of indigenous races in North Borneo and
Sarawak (as defined in the Interpretation (Definition of Native) Ordinance, 1952, as
amended by the Interpretation (Definition of Native) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1958,
of North Borneo, and in the Interpretation Ordinance, 1953, of Sarawak) who are
citizens of Malaysia will enjoy a special position analogous to that at present enjoyed
by Malays in Malaya under the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya. This
provision, the details of which will be worked out by an Intergovernmental
Committee, will be embodied in the Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia.
20. Shipping and Navigation. Shipping and Navigation will be in the Federal List
but the extent to which jetties and small installations (coastal or riverine) should be
in the Concurrent List will be considered by an Intergovernmental Committee.
21. Fisheries. Fisheries will be in the Federal List, but an Intergovernmental
Committee will consider how exclusive rights should be defined and protected.
22. Labour and Social Security
(a) Labour and Social Security will be in the Federal List.
(b) Charities will be in the Concurrent List to the extent necessary to give the
States power to legislate for local charities.
23. Regionalisation of Federal Services. Such Federal Services in North Borneo
and Sarawak as may be agreed by an Intergovernmental Committee will be
administered on a regional basis.
24. British Officials
(a) The two Governments are agreed upon the importance of retaining as many as
possible of the British and other expatriate officials.
(b) An appropriate scheme for inducement and compensation will be worked out,
in consultation with the representatives of the officers concerned.
25. Report of Cobbold Commission. The Cobbold Report will be published
simultaneously with the announcement of the present decisions reached by the two
Governments.
26. Brunei. His Highness the Sultan of Brunei will be consulted regarding the
application where appropriate of the above decisions to Brunei.
27. Intergovernmental Committee
(a) The Intergovernmental Committee referred to in preceding paragraphs will
consist of representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, Malaya, North
Borneo and Sarawak, under a Chairman to be nominated by the British Government.
(b) The precise composition of the Committee will be decided by agreement
between the British and Malayan representatives.
(c) Representatives from Brunei may be invited to attend meetings of the
Committee if this is considered desirable.
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28. Singapore Citizenship. The arrangements for citizenship for the inhabitants
of Singapore will be in the form agreed between the Governments of Malaya and
Singapore as set out in paragraph 14 of Singapore White Paper Cmd. 33 of 1961, as
amended in regard to nomenclature and franchise in the terms of Appendix C.
29. Public Statement. A joint public statement in the terms of Appendix D will
be issued on Wednesday, August 1st, at about 14.30 hours G.M.T.
Appendix A: Framework of initial state constitutions of Sarawak and North Borneo
The Governor
1. There will be a Governor of each State with powers similar to those possessed
by the Governors of Malacca and Penang, i.e. he will be a constitutional Head of
State.
2. The Governor in each State will be appointed by H.M. The Yang di-Pertuan
Agong acting in his discretion but after consultation with the Chief Minister of the
State concerned. However, in the case of the first appointment, the Malayan
Government will consult the British Government before tendering advice to His
Majesty.
The Executive
3. The executive authority of the State will be formally vested in the Governor.
But he will normally be obliged to act on the advice of an Executive Council (see
below). Thus the general direction and control of the State Governments will be
exercised by the Executive Council. The Governor will, however, act in his discretion
in:—
(a) the appointment of a Chief Minister (see below) and
(b) the withholding of consent to a request for the dissolution of the Legislative
Assembly.
4. The Executive Council in each State will be appointed as follows:—
(a) The Governor will first appoint as Chief Minister to preside over the Executive
Council a member of the Legislative Assembly (see below) who in his view is likely
to command the confidence of a majority of the members of the Assembly.
(b) The Governor will then, on the Advice of the Chief Minister, appoint other
members from among the members of the Legislative Assembly. Until such time
as the Legislative Assembly is fully elected these will include the State Secretary,
the State Legal Adviser and the State Financial Officer (see below) as ex officio
members.
5. The Executive Council will be collectively responsible to the Legislative
Assembly.
The Legislature
6. The Legislature in each State will consist of the Governor and a Legislative
Assembly.
7. Initially, the existing State Legislatures will continue in being as the State
Legislative Assemblies. Until each Assembly is fully elected, a Speaker will be
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appointed by the Governor, and the State Secretary, the State Legal Adviser and the
State Financial Officer (see below) will be members ex officio, and the practice of
nominating members will also continue.
8. Fully elected membership for the Legislative Assemblies would be introduced
as soon as practicable. In the first instance election will be effected through the
electoral college system.
Administrative Structure
9. The principal officer in charge of administrative affairs in the State will be
styled State Secretary.
He will be the channel through whom instructions pass from the Executive
Council to the civil service.
10. Other principal officers will be the State Legal Adviser and the State
Financial Officer.
11. Below these, government will be effected through departments, each in the
charge of a Head of Department.
12. The Federal Government will establish a Department charged with general
responsibility for the administrative integration of the new States into the
Federation. The staff of the Department will include officers with specialized
knowledge and experience of the territories.
Appendix B: Citizenship
(a) A citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies born in Sarawak or North
Borneo or naturalized in either territory before the date on which Malaysia comes
into effect shall by operation of law become a citizen of the Federation of Malaysia.
Included in this category are persons who were born in either of the territories
before the dates on which they became British colonies. There is, however, one
qualification that needs to be made. Some persons in this category might have
severed all connexion with Borneo and the other territories that will form Malaysia.
There needs to be evidence of permanent residence and a person in this category
shall accordingly be deemed to be permanently resident in a territory if he has
resided in either territory (or partly in the one and partly in the other) for a
continuous period of five years immediately before the formation of Malaysia. It is
important that there should be the minimum of formality in establishing such
permanent residence. Periods of absence which are not inconsistent with essential
continuity of residence should not be regarded as a break in continuous residence.
(b) A person resident in Sarawak or North Borneo on the date on which Malaysia
comes into being should be eligible to apply for registration as a citizen of Malaysia at
any time during the first eight years after that date if:—
(i) he has resided before Malaysia in either territory (or partly the one and partly
the other) or after Malaysia in any of the territories of the Federation for periods
amounting to 8 out of 12 years preceding his application and which include the 12
months immediately preceding his application; and
(ii) he intends to reside permanently in the Federation; and
(iii) he is of good character.
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Again, as with the previous category, the formalities for obtaining citizenship should
be reduced to the minimum so that as few difficulties as possible are put in the way of
people who have made their homes in the Borneo territories and who wish to remain
in Malaysia as citizens. During the period of the application of these arrangements
the existing provision in Sarawak and North Borneo regarding a language test should
apply. There should also be a waiver of the language test where application for
registration is made within two years after the creation of Malaysia and the applicant
has attained the age of 45 years at the date of the application. Such an applicant
should take the citizenship oath in the form prescribed in the existing Constitution
of the Federation of Malaya.
If a person obtains a certificate of citizenship under this arrangement it should be
possible for him to apply, at the same time that he obtains his own certificate, for the
grant of a certificate of citizenship in respect of any of his minor children born before
that date and ordinarily resident with him in Malaysia.
(c) The citizenship provisions recommended above shall be subject to the special
guarantee that no amendment, modification or withdrawal shall be made by the
Federal Government without the positive concurrence of the Government of the
State concerned.
(d) Subject to the above points, after Malaysia is established, the existing
provisions of the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya relating to the acquisition
and termination of citizenship shall apply mutatis mutandis.
This will mean, inter alia, that all persons born in the Borneo territories after
Malaysia will be citizens of Malaysia by operation of law, provided that one of their
parents is a citizen, or is a permanent resident of the Federation. Adequate publicity
should be given to this point in order to dispel doubts about the position of non-
natives. The provisions of the Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia relating to
citizenship shall be not less favourable for the inhabitants of North Borneo and
Sarawak than the provisions governing the citizenship of the inhabitants of any part
of the Federation of Malaysia other than Singapore or (in the event of special
arrangements being made for citizenship in that territory) Brunei.
Appendix C: Singapore citizenship
Arrangements agreed between Governments of Malaya and Singapore
Singapore citizens will be citizens of Malaysia. As the Federation of Malaya will cease
to be a separate State it will not be possible to have a separate citizenship of the
Federation of Malaya. There will therefore be only two citizenships:—
(i) citizenship of Malaysia;
(ii) citizenship of Singapore.
The existing State nationalities of the Malay States will, of course, continue.
2. There will be reciprocal restrictions on franchise rights so that:—
(a) only citizens of Singapore will be allowed to vote or stand as candidates for
election in Singapore; and
(b) citizens of Singapore will not be allowed to vote or stand as candidates for
election in any part of Malaysia outside Singapore.
12-Malaysia-123-148-cpp  21/9/04  9:07 AM  Page 384
[140] JULY 1962 385
3. There will have to be constitutional machinery for this. This can be done, it is
suggested, by amending the Federal Constitution:—
(a) to prevent a citizen of Malaysia, who is also a citizen of Singapore, from voting
or standing for election in any part of the Federation outside Singapore; and
(b) to prevent a citizen of Malaysia, who is not a citizen of Singapore, from voting
or standing for election in Singapore.
4. In order not to disenfranchise a citizen of Singapore permanently in the
Federation outside Singapore, it will be necessary to provide machinery to enable a
citizen of Malaysia who is also a citizen of Singapore to exercise his franchise rights
in the Federation outside Singapore. This can be done by enabling a person who
satisfies the residence and other qualifications for citizenship under the Federal law
to qualify for a registration as a voter in the Federation outside Singapore. So long as
he is registered in the Federation, his name will be deleted from the electoral roll of
Singapore.
30TH JULY, 1962
Appendix D: Joint public statement
1. The British and Malayan Governments have received and studied the Report of
the Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Cobbold which visited North
Borneo and Sarawak earlier this year to ascertain the views of the inhabitants on the
proposal to create a Federation of Malaysia embracing Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak,
North Borneo and Brunei. The Report is being published today.
2. The two Governments are most grateful to the Commission for their valuable
Report and have accepted almost all the recommendations on which the Commission
were unanimous. The two Governments have noted in particular that the
Commission were unanimously agreed that a Federation of Malaysia is in the best
interests of North Borneo and Sarawak and that an early decision in principle should
be reached.
3. In the light of this Report and of the agreement reached between the
Government of Malaya and the Government of Singapore, the British and Malayan
Governments have now decided in principle that, subject to the necessary legislation,
the proposed Federation of Malaysia should be brought into being by 31st August,
1963.
4. To give effect to this decision, the two Governments intend to conclude,
within the next six months, a formal agreement which, among other things, will
provide for:—
(a) the transfer of sovereignty in North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore by 31st
August, 1963;
(b) provisions governing the relationship between Singapore and the new
Federation, as agreed between the Governments of Malaya and Singapore;
(c) defence arrangements as set out in the joint statement by the British and
Malayan Governments dated 22nd November, 1961; and
(d) detailed constitutional arrangements, including safeguards for the special
interests of North Borneo and Sarawak, to be drawn up after consultation with the
Legislatures of the two territories.
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5. These safeguards will cover such matters as religious freedom, education,
representation in the Federal Parliament, the position of the indigenous races,
control of immigration, citizenship and the State constitutions.
6. In order that the introduction of the new Federal system may be effected as
smoothly as possible and with the least disturbance to existing administrative
arrangements, there will be, after the transfer of sovereignty, a transition period,
during which a number of the Federal constitutional powers will be delegated
temporarily to the State Governments.
7. An Inter-Governmental Committee will be established as soon as possible, on
which the British, Malayan, North Borneo and Sarawak Governments will be
represented. Its task will be to work out the future constitutional arrangements and
the form of the necessary safeguards.
8. The Minister of State for the Colonies, Lord Lansdowne, who will be the
Chairman of this Committee, and the Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation of
Malaya, Tun Abdul Razak, will proceed shortly to Sarawak and North Borneo to
conduct discussions.
9. In order to maintain the efficiency of the administration, the British and
Malayan Governments are agreed on the importance of retaining the services of as
many of the expatriate officials as possible. The Minister of State will discuss with the
Governments of the territories and with the Staff Associations how this best can be
done.
10. The British and Malayan Governments have informed the Sultan of Brunei of
the agreement they have reached and have made it clear that they would welcome
the inclusion of the State of Brunei in the new Federation.
141 CAB 134/1951, GM(62)42 10 Sept 1962
‘Report on visit to North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei by the minister
of state for colonial affairs from 14 August to 30 August, 1962’: report
by Lord Lansdowne on preparations to implement Malaysia through
the Inter-Governmental Committee
[The agreement of 31 July 1962 (see 140), to bring about a Federation of Malaysia by 31
Aug 1963, required an Inter-Governmental Committee to work out the future
constitutional arrangements and necessary safeguards for North Borneo and Sarawak. As
Lansdowne reports here, however, the London announcement came ‘as a great shock’ to
North Borneo. On 13–14 Aug Donald Stephens convened a meeting of political leaders
who drew up a fourteen-point (later twenty-point) programme of minimum demands.
These Twenty Points gained weight by attracting support in Sarawak and went far beyond
what the Malayans had conceded at the London talks in July. Although North Borneo’s
Legislative Council and Sarawak’s Council Negri agreed to the principle of Malaysia (on
12 and 26 Sept respectively), they did so on condition that state rights were safeguarded.
The IGC was chaired by Lord Lansdowne, with Tun Razak as deputy chairman, and had
representatives from Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak. There were no members from
Singapore while Brunei sent observers. Lansdowne and Razak visited Borneo in Aug (as
reported in this document) and at a preparatory meeting of the IGC in Jesselton on 30
Aug five sub-committees were set up. The sub-committees (all chaired by Sir John
Martin) covered constitutional, fiscal, legal and judicial matters, public service, and
departmental organisation. H P Hall and T J O’Brien, who was seconded from the British
high commission in KL, serviced the IGC. The first sub-committee met on 8 Oct and
plenary sessions were held on 22–24 Oct, 23–26 Nov and 18–20 Dec after which
remaining points of detail were remitted to an ad hoc committee of specialists. Deadlock
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almost occurred over financial issues and development aid but these matters were
eventually resolved. As regards constitutional relations, although they failed to secure an
initial seven-year period during which legislative power should remain within the state
(rather than being delegated to it), North Borneo and Sarawak won a number of
safeguards which could not be changed by the federal government without the
concurrence of the state government. To prevent amendment of the federal constitution,
however, they would require a two-thirds majority in the federal house of representatives
which they could achieve only by voting together and also in concert with Singapore.
Lansdowne’s interim reports went to the Greater Malaysia (Official) Committee, see 146.
The final report was initialled on 22 Jan 1963 and published on 27 Feb as Malaysia:
Report of the Inter-Governmental Committee, 1962 (Cmnd 1954). The Council Negri of
Sarawak adopted its recommendations on 8 Mar and North Borneo’s Legislative Council
followed suit on 13 Mar (CO 1030/1032; CO 1030/1050; CO1030/1052, no 73; CO
1030/1053–1057, 1065–1067; GM(62)44 and GM(62)46, CAB 134/1951; DO 189/259; FO
371/169694, nos 10 and 11).]
On 1st August, it was announced in Parliament that the British and Malayan
Governments had decided in principle that the proposed Federation of Malaysia
should be brought into being by 31st August, 1963. It was also announced that
detailed constitutional arrangements, including safeguards for the special interests
of North Borneo and Sarawak, would be drawn up after consultation with the
legislatures of the two territories. An Intergovernmental Committee was to be
established as soon as possible on which the British, Malayan, North Borneo and
Sarawak Governments would be represented. The task of the Intergovernmental
Committee, of which I was to be Chairman, would be to work out the future
constitutional arrangements and the form of the necessary safeguards for the two
territories.
2. I arrived in Jesselton on 14th August and was joined at Kuching on 18th
August by Tun Abdul Razak, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya.
3. The primary purpose of our visit was to set up the Intergovernmental
Committee, but first it was necessary to promote acceptance of the early date for
Malaysia and also to attempt to allay the anxieties, both of the people and of the
British officers, over what appeared to many of them as a Malayan ‘take-over’. We
therefore travelled the territories extensively and with our Malayan colleagues met as
many of the leaders of the people as possible and talked also with the expatriate and
locally employed officers. At our meetings we explained the concept of Malaysia and
described how the Intergovernmental Committee would work. We listened to a great
number of opinions on special safeguards for the territories. We emphasized that we
were not a repeat order of the Cobbold Commission and explained that it was the
responsibility of the representatives of the four Governments in the
Intergovernmental Committee to work out the form of the necessary safeguards.
4. Mr. Philip Rogers1 in my party was specifically charged with the task of
discussing a compensation scheme with the British expatriate officers.
5. At the London talks, the territories were represented by the Governor of North
Borneo, Sir William Goode and the Governor of Sarawak, Sir Alexander Waddell.
Unfortunately, Sir Alexander Waddell had to remain in London owing to illness. Sir
William Goode returned to North Borneo on 3rd August and was able to do a lot to
take the edge off the consternation caused by the London decision. Nevertheless,
1 Philip Rogers, formerly of the CO, was under-secretary, Department of Technical Co-operation, 1961–1964.
For discussions about compensation for expatriate officers see, for example, 143, paras 3 and 4.
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when we arrived in Jesselton, it was still clear that the London announcement had
come as a great shock.
6. In our numerous meetings, all our conversations were directed towards
correcting the basic misconception that Her Majesty’s Government was about to
sanction a Malayan ‘take-over’ and that the progress and happiness of the peoples of
the territories were being sacrificed to world politics. Although much had been done
by British officers to popularize the concept of Malaysia, even amongst people who
were in favour of it there were grave misgivings about the speed with which it was
being brought about. As our tour proceeded, and with the help of good publicity,
there was a general improvement in attitude. Both the concept of Malaysia and its
early date gained more general acceptance. But this acceptance was conditional upon
the Intergovernmental Committee agreeing constitutional arrangements which
would meet the anxieties and aspirations of the territories.
7. The improvement in the political climate could not have been brought about
without the consistent help and tactful guidance of Sir William Goode and Mr.
Jakeway, the Officer Administering the Government of Sarawak. Equally our mission
could have achieved no success without the co-operation of Tun Razak and his
colleagues. Although this British–Malayan mission has helped to restore confidence,
it is my opinion that the negotiations in the Intergovernmental Committee will
require the most careful handling.
8. The main problems with which the Intergovernmental Committee will have to
deal are:—
(a) Freedom of religion.
(b) English as an official language and medium of instruction.
(c) Heads of the States and their eligibility for Headship of the Federation.
(d) Representation in Federal legislature.
(e) Division of financial control between Federal and State legislatures.
(f) Funds for development.
(g) Control of immigration.
(h) Citizenship.
(i) Degree of State autonomy within the Federation.
(j) Safeguards against future amendment to Federation and State constitutions.
Views were expressed both orally and in memoranda on all these subjects, and by the
end of our tour the North Borneo political parties had agreed a joint memorandum
outlining their views. It seems likely that the political parties in Sarawak will also
attempt to reach an agreed line. The only organized political opposition to the
concept of Malaysia is from the Communist controlled left-wing of the S.U.P.P. in
Sarawak.
9. I had a two hours private talk with the Sultan of Brunei in the middle of our
tour. The Sultan wished to know how the Intergovernmental Committee would work
and all his questions on Malaysia were directed towards ascertaining how we thought
he would fit into the picture. As I stonewalled, he asked whether I thought he should
put up proposals to the Malayan Government. I reminded him that Sir John Martin
had suggested this in March.2 (The Sultan had in fact already set up a Committee, of
2 Martin had visited the Sultan in Jan, and in Mar 1962 Maudling had set out the advantages of merger in a
letter, see 91 and 95.
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which the High Commissioner, Sir Denis White, is a member, to study the situation
and to formulate proposals. I understood that this Committee was to meet shortly
after our visit.)
I am convinced that the main attraction of Malaysia to the Sultan is in the hope of
protecting his own position by joining the Sultan’s [sic] Club. He also wishes to be
Agong of the Federation and has been offered this carrot by the Malayans.
He will certainly fight hard for the maximum control of State revenues. Whatever
he does will closely affect the Bornean discussions.
Tun Razak who visited the Sultan earlier last month had tentatively agreed to the
Sultan sending observers to the Intergovernmental Committee. As I thought this
might strengthen our position, I accepted Tun Razak’s suggestion and formally
invited the Sultan to send observers. This he agreed to do at the first plenary session
in October.
10. We held a preparatory meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee in Jesselton
on 30th August and agreed that the following Sub-Committees should be set up:—
Constitutional.
Fiscal.
Public Service.
Legal and Judicial.
Departmental Organization.
The first plenary meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee will be held at its
headquarters in Jesselton in the middle of October and will be attended by Tun Razak
and myself. Meanwhile, under the supervision of permanent representatives of the
four governments, the work of the Sub-Committee is proceeding. I have reserved the
right of Chairmanship of all committees to the British.
11. The joint submission of the North Borneo political parties goes well beyond
what the Malayans appeared to be prepared to concede in London. Throughout the
London talks, the Malayans consistently under-estimated the difficulties involved in
the accession of the territories to Malaysia. Thanks, however, to the frank and
forceful way in which the Borneans expressed their views throughout our tour, the
Malayans accepted the reality of the difficulties. Dato Aziz3 even went so far as to
acknowledge to Sir William Goode that whereas in London he had considered the
Governors’ attitude obstructive, he now realized that they had only been
representing the true views of the people. He repeated this admission in the presence
of a number of colleagues in Kuala Lumpur. I believe that our Malayan colleagues
now realize that British concern over the form of Malaysia is directed solely towards
the determination to create a federation which will stick.
12. Our tour enabled our Malayan colleagues to obtain a more realistic
appreciation of the situation in the territories. Much will depend, however, upon the
impression formed by the Tunku himself after his visit to the territories this month.
If agreed solutions are to be reached in the Intergovernmental Committee, the
Malayans will have to make concessions. There are as yet only very slight indications
that they may be prepared to do so.
13. It is impossible to forecast how many of the British officers will remain. The
chief factors upon which they will make their decision are:—
3 Dato Abdul Aziz bin Haji Abdul Majid, permanent secretary, Prime Minister’s Office.
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(1) The constitutional arrangements and safeguards agreed by the Intergovernmental
Committee.
(2) Terms of compensation and inducement.
(3) The length of service to which they may look forward.
(4) Personal considerations.
In my opinion it is most important that the British officers should know the terms
of compensation and inducement by the end of this year.
I have requested the Governments of the territories to work out as quickly as
possible the probable rate of Borneanization of the Service.
The form of Malaysia and the role which the British officers will be called upon to
play will be quite as important to them as any financial consideration.
14. It was suggested to us that the Malayans, in claiming that Malaysia would
bring about an accelerated rate of development in the territories, were offering a
‘false prospectus’. It was argued that if the price of rubber continued to fall and if
British Colonial and Development Welfare aid were no longer forthcoming, the rate
of Bornean development must inevitably be retarded.
The view was expressed both by Bornean and British speakers that the idea of
Malaysia was accepted because the British who were responsible for the territories
recommended it. If the territories suffered thereby, the British would be to blame.
Not only was the wish that the British officers should remain repeatedly expressed,
but also the fervent hope that British financial aid should not be withdrawn.
I am bound to say that in view of the fact that Her Majesty’s Government is giving
up its responsibility for the territories before they are ready to achieve independence
on their own, we have a continuing obligation to help them. I consider that we
cannot honourably discharge this obligation to the peoples of the territories whom
we are persuading to accept Malaysia, unless we maintain our assistance after
Federation at a level not lower than the existing Colonial Development and Welfare
grants. This should not include the cost of any compensation scheme.
If Malaysia is to fulfil the hopes we have for it, it must be demonstrably successful
and successful from the start and this will cost money.
15. I would like to record my gratitude to the first-class team which accompanied
me and with them to express our thanks to the Governors, the High Commissioner
and the officers throughout the territories for the invaluable assistance and co-
operation which they gave to us and our Malayan colleagues. Despite short notice, all
the arrangements made for our travel and meetings were admirably organized.
142 CO 1030/1031, no E32 11 Sept 1962
[Tunku Abdul Rahman and the Borneo territories]: record by Lord
Lansdowne of his conversations with Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun
Razak in Kuala Lumpur on 1 Sept 1962
Before calling on the Tunku, I had a few minutes conversation with Tun Razak. I
repeated to him the importance which I attached to his accompanying the Tunku on
his visit to the territories. Wallace and I both emphasised that his visit had created
confidence and we considered that by his accompanying the Tunku the Malayans
would be building on success.
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2. I told Tun Razak that I hoped Ghazalie would not accompany the Tunku as it
was my impression that he was on the wrong wavelength and gave the impression of
being supercilious. Tun Razak appeared to take the point (he did not bring Ghazalie
with him on the second leg of his visit to the territories). I told him that both Dato
Abdul Aziz and Dato Nik Daud in his party, had made a good impression.
3. Tun Razak said that as he had been asked to deputise for the Tunku at the
[Commonwealth] Prime Ministers’ Conference, he thought it would be difficult for
him to accompany the Tunku to the territories in September. Tun Razak told us that
the Tunku was due to visit India and Pakistan in October and he himself had to go to
Korea in early November. I then suggested that if the Tunku could visit the
territories during the last week of September, perhaps Tun Razak could be absent for
three days which would enable him to start the tour off on the right foot at Jesselton.
Tun Razak said that he thought that would be possible.
The Tunku had reserved from 11.0 a.m. onwards for a talk. I arranged with Tun
Razak to see him alone at first, explaining that I thought it would be less
embarrassing if I could privately point out the difficulties in which the Tunku had
put us by some of his utterances to the Press. Tun Razak agreed to this and I spent
about half an hour alone with the Tunku.
2. I told the Tunku that although H.M.G. was one hundred per cent behind him
in wishing to bring about Malaysia I felt it only fair to say that it was [of] vital importance
that the territories should be brought in in the right way, if Malaysia was to endure.
3. I showed him Press reports of his statement on March 12th, with banner
headlines ‘Tengku accuses’ British Civil Servants in the Borneo territories of
hampering Malaysia.1 I also drew his attention to an article in the Straits Times of
August 21st which quoted him as saying ‘we will be helping (the territories) to throw
off the British yoke and attain independence for themselves’. I then recalled a
paragraph from his speech in Parliament on the 15th August, in which he referred to
the importance of retaining the British Officers. I told him that I had not been aware
of this statement during our tour in the territories and much regretted that it had
not been given more publicity. I had of course reported at all our meetings what he
had said in London about the importance of retaining British Officers, but what had
been carried by the Press to which I had referred had made a deep impression.
4. The Tunku took all this in very good part. As to his statements in March he
said quite bluntly that it was then his opinion that the British officers were against
Malaysia and ‘I therefore had to attack them’. I told him that I was quite satisfied that
they were not against Malaysia and indeed were working actively for it. I did think
however that the early date was too much of a shock for some of the older members
of the Service and I suspected that they would probably leave. As to his remarks
about the British yoke, with a big twinkle in his eye, he reminded me that when he
was fighting for Merdeka in Malaya, he had used the same tactics to build up a
national spirit. Of course, he had always looked upon the British as his best friends
and he still did. I told him that I quite understood these tactics, but this sort of thing
did make it extremely difficult for us with the British officers on whom he had said
himself he very much relied.
1 See 96, 97 and 98.
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5. I reminded the Tunku that he had referred in London to a number of
expatriate officers who had volunteered to serve in the territories. I asked him if he
could remember how many had applied. He said that to the best of his recollection it
was about seventeen, all of whom were first class men and had served in Malaya. I
told him that when asked at our meetings by the Borneans what would happen if a
large number of British officers left and if, as they had been assured, replacements
were not available from Malaya, I had said it would be necessary to recruit from
outside. The Tunku said that it had been suggested to him that he might recruit
exclusively from the U.K. but he doubted the wisdom of this.
6. Tun Razak then joined us and we talked of the political consciousness of the
peoples in the territories. The Tunku expressed the view that no one other than the
Malays had any political views at all. I decided not to dispute this misconception as I
thought it better for the Tunku to learn by his experience on visiting the territories. I
did, however, say that it seemed to us that there was a danger of the Malays in
Sarawak thinking that they would automatically get all the best posts. The Tunku
said at once that I need not worry about that as there has been an exact parallel in the
Federation and he had seen to it that there was no preferential treatment. I did not
comment on this obvious inaccuracy.
7. The Tunku said that all his information was to the effect that the S.U.P.P. were
highly organised and had close links with Communist cells in Singapore. I told him
that my impression was that the S.U.P.P. was in considerable state of disarray and
with clever handling it might be possible to disengage the Chairman Mr. Ong Kee
Hui and thereby to create a separate group of moderates and expose the extremists in
their true colours. Tun Razak appeared to accept this possibility and agreed that Ong
Kee Hui was one of the most able politicians in the territory.
8. I referred to the anxiety which I believed to exist in the minds of many of the
people that they would be dominated by Malaya and that they remembered the
unhappy history of Brunei Malays in Sarawak. The Tunku laughed at this and said
that of course they couldn’t remember as all this took place before the Rajahs and
this phobia was something that had been generated by the British. He added that the
people from the territories had told him that the British had said that after Malaysia
they would be taken over by the Malays.
9. I asked Tun Razak whether he thought we ought to say something to the
Tunku about the religious problem. Rather reluctantly Tun Razak agreed that we
might, which made me think that he was hoping to handle this matter himself. I told
the Tunku that the people wanted more than just freedom of worship i.e. freedom of
religion which included freedom to propagate. Tun Razak muttered something about
the Tunku having agreed in principle so I decided to leave the subject. I have the
impression that we may be edging towards something acceptable.
10. I reminded the Tunku that when I saw him off from the London Airport2 I
had suggested that an early visit to the territories would be very valuable. I repeated
this suggestion and the Tunku at once agreed.3 I told him that I hoped it would be
possible for him to take Tun Razak with him and that he might go this month. He
said that he would like to meet the people informally. I suggested that he should
meet the British officers informally too and to this he readily agreed.
2 On 8 Aug after the Malaysia agreement had been signed on 31 July. 3 He went in November.
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11. He then went off on a rather rambling talk about the peoples of the
territories being good, honest but very unsophisticated people. The Dayaks were
suddenly becoming full of self-importance as they were being wooed on all sides and
if they were wooed too much they would ask for too much. They should be told what
to do. The trouble was that with the exception of Donald Stephens there were no
political leaders in the territories.
12. I asked the Tunku what ideas he had about the Head of each State. From
what I had heard there appeared to be no obvious candidates. He said that there
seemed to be odd ideas in the territories that a Yang di-Pertuan Negara could be
created, but this was ridiculous as there were no hereditary rulers in the territories. I
again asked what he had in mind. Without hesitation he replied Datu Bandar for
Head of State in Sarawak, though he knew his health was very poor, and a Dayak
District Officer as Chief Minister. In North Borneo Datu Mustapha for Head of State
and Donald Stephens as his Chief Minister. Tun Razak said that this would work very
well as Stephens and Mustapha were good friends and Mustapha was senior to him
on the Executive Council. He then spoke vaguely of appointing a Minister from the
territories to the Federal Government at an early date.4 To my surprise he added that
if necessary, the Governors could stay on for a few months.
13. I got the impression that the Tunku was still determined to minimize the
difficulties involved. ‘Let them come here and see how happy everybody is together.’ I
said that this would certainly be useful but it was equally important in my opinion
for Malays to visit the territories. He said that I could rest assured that he would
arrange this.
14. I told the Tunku that on a number of occasions Borneans who accepted
Malaysia in principle had suggested that they would prefer sovereignty to be
transferred to them in the first instance, even if only for a day. I also told him that I
had discussed this suggestion with Tun Razak and that we were both of the opinion
that provided this could be properly buttoned up beforehand it might well have
advantages. Apart from the political advantages which might accrue both to H.M.G.
and to the Government of the Federation of Malaya (voluntary merger rather than
transfer, merger rather than absorption) there might also be advantage over the
Filipino claim. U.N. interest in the Filipino claim might be reduced if North Borneo
could be shown to be an independent State before joining Malaysia. The Tunku
thought this idea was worth thinking about provided there were no risk of a slip
between independence and Malaysia. The Philippines being indirectly raised in this
context, I was able to ask the Tunku to keep his Government in close touch with
H.M.G. so as to avoid conflicting public statements over the Filipino claim. The
Tunku said that he had made it clear that his Government was not involved but he
had had to ‘play about’ with the Filipinos. I said that I hoped he would not play about
with them too much and that we could maintain close liaison.
15. I asked Tun Razak whether he had explained the position over the secret
London Agreement 5 insofar as negotiations in Borneo were concerned. As he said
4 The appointments of Datu Mustapha as head of state and Donald Stephens as chief minister were
uncontested, unlike the nominations for Sarawak. In addition a minister would be appointed from
Sarawak and another from Sabah (but none from Singapore) to sit in the federal Cabinet. See 210 and 224.
5 See 140.
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that he had not, I told the Tunku that in my opinion it was necessary in our
discussions with the Borneans to start from scratch. This did not, however, of course,
mean any retreat from the points already agreed. I told him that I had discussed this
with Tun Razak and explained it to Dato Aziz. Although the Tunku did not look
particularly pleased he evidently accepted that it was necessary.
143 CAB 134/1951, GM(62)43 28 Sept 1962
‘Financial questions’: note by the CRO for a meeting of the Greater
Malaysia (Official) Committee
A fairly long list of financial questions will need to be settled in connection with the
creation of Malaysia.1 It seems useful at the present stage for the Committee to take
stock of these questions, to consider what work needs to be done before answers to
them can be suggested, and in due course to submit proposals on certain of them to
Ministers. The Committee may also find it useful to examine the timetable for
consideration of these questions.
2. Broadly the financial questions fall into three categories:—
(a) The compensation-incentive scheme for expatriate personnel in North Borneo
and Sarawak;
(b) The scale of British assistance to the projected expansion of the Malaysian
armed forces;
(c) The question of a British contribution to development expenditure in Malaysia.
These three categories are considered in turn below.
3. The compensation-incentive scheme. Proposals have been submitted to the
Treasury by the Colonial Office for a compensation-inducement scheme for expatriate
officers in the Borneo Territories. The scheme would cost up to £31⁄2 m. over 5 years.2
Of this one-half, according to precedent, would be borne by Her Majesty’s Government
under the Overseas Services Aid Scheme and one half by the Territories.
4. This is the most urgent financial question from the British point of view. If we
are to have a smooth transfer of power, without serious danger of trouble and
perhaps bloodshed in the Territories, as many as possible of the expatriates must be
induced to stay on and a prerequisite of this is that they should know where they
1 Financial questions were considered by the committee on 2 Oct (GM(62)8th meeting, CAB 134/1950).
2 See correspondence between Sir H Poynton (permanent, under-secretary, CO) and Sir R Harris (third
secretary, Treasury) at CO 1030/1064. In his letter of 26 Oct, Harris accepted in principle the CO’s case
that inducements should be offered to expatriates to stay on: ‘the situation in [North] Borneo and Sarawak
is unique, not simply because in HMG’s view the local inhabitants are not fully ready for independence
(this could be the situation elsewhere and yet we might have had to move to independence for wider
reasons of policy) but in addition we are leaving the local inhabitants in a position in which their future
may be at risk if non-indigenous authorities get a grip on them before they can look after themselves. To
put it bluntly, if the expatriates were to go, we should be leaving the inhabitants at the mercy of the
Malayans; this may or may not be to their advantage; but we have a special and unique obligations [sic] to
hold the ring with expatriate officers for as long as we can while the inhabitants are being trained to take
over.’ That said, however, the Treasury refused to agree any financial commitment until the scheme had
been costed, see 145.
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stand on compensation (with its built in inducements to stay). It will be highly
desirable to be able to have a scheme agreed by all concerned by about the end of the
year. Before that the scheme has first to be approved in principle by the Treasury,
discussed with the Colonial Governments, cleared with the Malayans and put to the
officers concerned. Mr. Sandys and Lord Lansdowne attach the utmost importance to
rapid progress being made on this subject. This seems to be possible only if the
compensation-inducement scheme can be considered on its own straight away,
without being held up until some sort of finality can be reached on questions of
defence aid and development aid. But a complication will arise if the Territories
object to paying their half of compensation; normally we should only consider
assistance for this as part of a financial settlement.
5. Defence Aid. This is the question to which the Malayans attach most urgency.
Joint defence talks have taken place in Kuala Lumpur culminating in a report which
envisages a ten-year expansion of Malayan forces at a capital cost estimated by the
Malayans at over £50 m. and current costs reaching a peak of £20 m. in 1970. The
Malayan Minister of Finance in discussions with the Ministry of Defence in July and
with the Economic Secretary to the Treasury in September, has been pressing us to
state what contribution we can make towards the cost of this plan. He also hopes to
secure contributions from other friendly Governments, e.g. Australia, New Zealand,
India, Pakistan and the United States.
6. The Ministry of Defence are assessing the recommendations in the Kuala
Lumpur report from the point of view of the desirability of the plan, its cost and the
possible extent of British assistance. At the special request of the Malayans, the
Ministry of Defence have already given, without commitment, a provisional estimate
of the availability and cost of certain items in the plan which the Malayans regard as
urgent. These amount to just over £2 million. The Malayans are pressing us to give
some advance indication of our willingness to meet the cost of these items in order
to enable them to get on with their own planning.3
7. Economic Aid. The Malayans have asked us, as a minimum, to maintain and
if possible to increase our present level of assistance to North Borneo and Sarawak.
Mr. Tan Siew Sin pointed out the need to ensure that development in these territories
should continue to expand in the early years of Malaysia and specifically asked for
continuation of development assistance at present given as Colonial Development and
Welfare grants at a level of about £2 million a year and for a continuance of C.D.C.
investment in the Territories until 1968. He also asked about the prospect of Malaya
being able to float a £4–£5 million loan on the London Market.
8. There is already an I.B.R.D. Team working on a revision of the Malayan Development
Plan and the I.B.R.D. have agreed to send a further mission (under Professor Rueff 4) to
study the economic implications of Malaysia. A new Development Plan for
3 Defence talks, initiated by Watkinson (minister of defence) during a visit to Kuala Lumpur and Singapore
in late Mar 1962, resulted in a joint Anglo–Malayan report in June. Subsequently the Ministry of Defence
set up a working party, chaired by J A Drew, to examine the formation of the Malaysian armed forces.
4 Jacques Rueff, a distinguished French economist and financier who was judge of the Court of the
European Communities 1958–1962, was appointed in 1961 to lead the World Bank Mission to examine the
feasibility of closer economic co-operation between Malaya and Singapore. When it was decided in
principle to establish Malaysia by Aug 1963, the scope of the Rueff mission was extended to cover the
economic aspects of closer association of Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories.
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Malaya/Singapore is not however expected to be ready before 1st January, 1964. Tun Razak
has proposed to Lord Lansdowne the setting up of a Development Sub-Committee of the
Intergovernmental Committee. Before a full I.B.R.D. Report is available, it will be necessary
for us to have agreed with the Malayans what contributions we are to make to development
for the first few years of Malaysia; though we may have by the end of this year some idea
of what adjustment of plans over the next two years the I.B.R.D. think will be necessary.
The Borneo Territories in any case will shortly have to be told what resources they can
count on after the present C.D. and W. period (March 1964) if they are to enter into
commitments necessary to keep development moving. It will, therefore, be important that
at least an interim financial settlement should be reached at the same time as an agreement
on constitutional and other Intergovernmental Committee matters.
9. Procedure. If the view is accepted that we should aim first at settling the terms
of the compensation-inducement scheme, the main question then is what steps need
to be taken before we will be ready to make known our views to the Malayan
Government on defence aid and development aid.
10. Mr. Sandys does not wish any offers to be made on defence aid and development
aid for the time being, in the belief that it would be desirable to hold back any offers
we might be prepared to make until the Inter-Governmental Committee has made
some progress, so that we could, if necessary, offer some financial inducement at the
appropriate moment to overcome difficulties which might arise in that Committee.
11. In accordance with this line, a brief has been prepared (B.F. (62)44 of the 7th
September) for the British delegation to the IMF/IBRD meeting, containing the
recommendation that the delegation should listen and assure the Malayans that their
requests will be fully considered when the constitutional and financial position has
been investigated, when defence needs have been examined, and in the light of our
own position at the time.
12. Meanwhile, the Malayans are likely to continue to press for an indication of the
likely magnitude of our defence aid in particular. It would be helpful to know from the
Ministry of Defence by what date they expect to have completed their examination of
the Malayan defence question. If that examination is likely to be left until January, it might
be desirable for us to inform the Malayans now that we shall not be able to give them a
final answer before then (though we should perhaps avoid debarring ourselves from
making offers on particular items earlier if this would be useful in order to secure
concessions from the Malayans in the Intergovernmental Committee). The question also
needs consideration whether we should aim at dealing with development aid and defence
aid piece-meal with the Malayans or whether we should plan for a grand financial discussion
with them in the New Year aiming at settling all financial questions apart from the
compensation-inducement scheme which will, it is hoped, have been settled earlier.
144 CO 1030/1036, no 152 5 Oct 1962
[Arrest of opposition activists]: despatch from Lord Selkirk to Mr
Sandys, reporting an improvement in Lee Kuan Yew’s political
position and recommending non-compliance with the Tunku’s
demand for the arrest of members of Barisan Sosialis
[During the London talks in July, British, Malayan and Singaporean ministers had
considered the detention of opposition activists in the event of a deterioration of
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Singapore’s internal security. Sandys had refused to agree either in principle or in
advance to such a course, arguing that he would have to examine individual cases. He had
also made it clear that the British government could neither initiate nor take sole
responsibility for such arrests. Moreover, Sandys and Selkirk reckoned that the detention
of Lee Kuan Yew’s political opponents would be counter-productive, aggravating radical
opposition in Singapore and embarrassing Britain internationally. Nonetheless, as
Selkirk reported in this despatch, the Tunku and his ministers now regarded the
elimination of Barisan leaders to be an essential precondition of merger. In Selkirk’s view,
they wished not only to destroy the Barisan Sosialis but also to help the restoration of
Lim Yew Hock to power. The Brunei rising two months later reinforced the case for mass
arrests with the result that the British gave way; on 12 Dec Sandys approved Selkirk’s
recommendation for action to be taken through the Internal Security Council (see 138
and 147; also CO 1030/1150).]
I have the honour to address you on the subject of political and security policy in
Singapore. When in 1960 it became clear that the next constitutional step for
Singapore should, if possible, be a merger with the Federation of Malaya, the
problem was to convince the Federation Government that such a merger would not
enable the combined Chinese of the peninsula to obtain political control in Kuala
Lumpur. A scheme of merger was therefore devised under which the Malays would be
assured of lasting protection against Chinese political domination through two
safeguards. First, the number of Singapore seats in the Kuala Lumpur House of
Representatives would be restricted to 15 instead of the 25 which would be justified
by reason of population, and secondly Singapore citizens would not be allowed to
vote in the Federation. These safeguards were not, however, in themselves sufficient
for the Federation who proposed that at the same time Britain should transfer to
Malaya sovereignty over her territories in Borneo in the expectation that a majority
of the Borneo representatives would always support the Malays in the Kuala Lumpur
House of Representatives. From this it will be seen that the problem in Malay minds
was the threat to their political position, not the maintenance of internal security
which would in any case be safely in the hands of Kuala Lumpur under any scheme of
merger.
2. It also has to be remembered that at the time when the Tunku was
formulating his Malaysia proposal, Lee Kuan Yew held a commanding majority in the
Singapore Assembly and seemed to be in an unassailable political position. In the
first part of the Malaysia discussion, therefore, we heard nothing from the Federation
about internal security action in Singapore being a precondition of merger. A few
months later, however, in July 1961, Lee Kuan Yew’s Government suffered a
shattering upheaval from which he emerged with a majority of only one in the
Assembly. Furthermore, the defectors from the Government quickly formed
themselves into a new party, the Barisan Sosialis, with an effective organisation
throughout Singapore. This was a great shock to the Federation, who had expected
that Lee Kuan Yew would be able to guide Singapore comfortably into merger. They
were now faced with the prospect that he might not even survive until merger, and
that the Barisan Sosialis, who included in prominent positions such ex-detainees as
Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan, and Woodhull, might well win the next elections
in Singapore. Accordingly the Federation began to consider the possibility of
arresting the ex-detainees in the Barisan Sosialis with a view to hamstringing the
party as an effective political force. By this action they hoped to clear the way in
Singapore for a return to power by Lim Yew Hock as leader of a branch of their own
Alliance party. This idea seemed to formulate in their minds towards the end of 1961
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and by early 1962 they were strongly urging upon Lee Kuan Yew and HMG the need
to make arrests before merger. To show they were in earnest, they declined after
February, 1962 to take any part in Internal Security Council meetings unless HMG
previously agreed to seek the Council’s approval for the arrests. Meanwhile, although
Lee was supported temporarily in the Assembly by the Alliance party, his political
position remained very uncertain and he appeared to have taken a further
unwarrantable risk by pledging himself to hold a referendum on merger. This caused
the Federation to redouble their pressure on Lee Kuan Yew and in March, 1962 he
accepted in principle the Malay view that arrests would have to take place before
merger.
3. To what extent Lee really believes in this policy is not yet certain. He is
probably very much attracted by the idea of destroying his political opponents. It
should also be remembered that there is behind all this a very personal aspect. Lim
Chin Siong, Woodhull, Fong Swee Suan and James Puthucheary who were arrested
by Lim Yew Hock in 1956 following riots were members of Lee’s party. Five members
of the Executive Committee of the party were also among those arrested by Lim Yew
Hock in 1957 and this was always assumed publicly to have been done at Lee Kuan
Yew’s direct request. The leading detainees were let out by us in 1959 because Lee
made this a condition of his taking office and they all held positions in his
Government.1 Twelve months ago Lee was pretending that he also wanted to release
the remaining political detainees; now he claims he wishes to put back in detention
the very people who were released at his insistence—people who are intimate
acquaintances, who have served in his Government, and with whom there is a keen
sense of personal rivalry which transcends ideological differences.
4. In all this the Malay motives have remained primarily political. Singapore has
in fact been quiet during all this period and there is no immediate threat to internal
security. The police and military are probably better prepared today in Singapore
than they ever have been in the history of the Colonial empire. I have found in all my
conversations with Federation ministers and officials that while they stress the
conspiratorial and subversive aspects of the activities of Lim Chin Siong and his
colleagues, their real and understandable fear is that the Barisan Sosialis will gain
political control in Singapore which will then become a base for undermining the
Federation and eventually winning political control in Kuala Lumpur. For this
reason I have all along been urging the need for a proper assessment of the threat
before any action is decided and I was glad to have it agreed at the last I.S.C. Meeting
that the paper being prepared by the Federation and Singapore Special Branches
should try to do this.
5. I have been unwilling to agree to the Malay proposals for arrests in Singapore
for two reasons. First, satisfactory evidence has not yet been produced to show that
the persons concerned have been involved in any unlawful activity since they were
released from detention by HMG in 1959. A number of them are now leaders of one of
the main political parties in Singapore and their arrest without justification would,
1 As part of a campaign to counter subversion, in Sept 1956 Lim Yew Hock’s government outlawed a
number of communist-front organisations and ordered the police to clear Chinese schools of protesting
students. The disturbances, which caused thirteen deaths and more than one hundred other casualties,
were quelled only with the assistance of police and troops brought in from the Federation. The principal
figures amongst the detainees were released in June 1959, following the PAP’s electoral victory, see 13.
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in my opinion, have serious repercussions for all three Governments concerned and
also for Malaysia. It is one thing to try to control the trade unions and to keep
industrial action within reasonable proportions. I myself constantly urged this upon
Lee Kuan Yew. It is, however, another matter to arrest politicians who have kept
within constitutional limits and we should be hard put to it to defend such action in
the House of Commons and in the United Nations where the Barisan Sosialis have
already appeared. Secondly, I believe that repressive action against the leaders of a
party which draws its support very largely from the Chinese speaking people—who
are some 60% of the electorate—and which includes many who are in it simply
because they dislike Lee Kuan Yew personally, would tend to strengthen the United
Front rather than to divide it. In short, the Malay policy may well succeed in
consolidating under United Front leadership all those Chinese who have vague
socialist ideas and who feel the emotion of Chinese chauvinism in their blood.
6. The Malays remain unconvinced and are saying that these arrests are an
absolute precondition of merger taking place. They have now returned to the
Internal Security Council to pursue their case there. We recently held a valuable
meeting of the Council in which I again established to my satisfaction that the
Malays’ fears are almost wholly political. I have considerable sympathy for them.
They remember their own struggles with the Communists, in which twelve thousand
of their people were killed, and they are determined that the Communists should not
come to power in Singapore by constitutional United Front tactics, riding on the
backs of the Chinese. I am anxious, however, that they should not take repressive
action that may result in the very thing they fear happening. The successful outcome
of the referendum on merger has been a most important development, the full effects
of which still remain to be seen.2 It has been a resounding victory for Lee Kuan Yew.
By this I do not mean that the P.A.P. will necessarily win the 1964 elections in
Singapore. This is in any case too far ahead to forecast. I do think, however, that the
referendum has shown that Lee Kuan Yew and the P.A.P. are still a considerable
political force in Singapore and also that there is no other alternative party, likely to
obtain a significant number of seats in the 1964 elections, which could govern
Singapore better in the general interests of Malaysia. So far as I can judge, the Tunku
still thinks in terms of disrupting the Barisan Sosialis by arrests, discarding Lee
Kuan Yew and the P.A.P. as a spent political force and enabling the Alliance under
Lim Yew Hock’s leadership to emerge as the Government of Singapore. This is an
unrealistic policy likely to drive the Chinese speaking people into following anti-
Malaysia leaders, one of whom—Ong Eng Guan of the United People’s Party—we
know to be an irresponsible demagogue who is waiting quietly in the wings to step in
when the moment suits him. In the Federation the Tunku can rely on the support of
his Malays. In Singapore Lim Yew Hock has no such solid foundation on which to
build and he is generally regarded as discredited. Anyone who wishes to govern
Singapore must be able to make an appeal to the left centre and to the Chinese
speaking people, and be able to retain their confidence while weaning them gradually
from their Chinese chauvinism. So far, Lee Kuan Yew is the only political leader who
is prepared to work for Malaysia who has shown himself competent to do this.
2 Having recovered his majority of one in the Singapore Assembly on 4 Aug, on 14 Aug Lee announced that
the long-promised referendum would be held on 1 Sept. The government’s proposal won the support of
71.1 per cent of votes.
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7. The Tunku would therefore be much better advised to plan on the basis that
Lee Kuan Yew is at present his best instrument for governing Singapore. I know only
too well that there are serious differences of ideology and temperament between
these two men which at times create a yawning gulf. It is, however, in the interests of
us all that they should try to work together. I realise this will not be easy. Lee Kuan
Yew, in the glow of his referendum victory, is posturing as a neutralist Afro–Asian
leader in a way which is bound to anger the Tunku. His current visit to Moscow is
only one example.3 There is also the problem of Lim Yew Hock. We have a number of
times tried to persuade Lee Kuan Yew to form a political alliance with Lim Yew Hock
since this would ensure that one party commanded the support of centre and right-
wing opinion. I am sure such an alliance could win the Singapore elections.
Although, however, Lee Kuan Yew is only too glad to benefit from Lim Yew Hock’s
support in the Assembly, he has steadfastly refused to contemplate any political
alliance. One solution would be for Lim Yew Hock to bow out of politics but I do not
see this happening. Perhaps the most we can hope for is an electoral pact between
Lee Kuan Yew and Lim Yew Hock when the Singapore elections take place. Only with
the Tunku’s backing is this remotely possible.
8. I am very glad to see from the minute of your meeting with Razak and Lee
Kuan Yew on 17th September, 1962 that you have deferred any question of arrests.4 If
the Barisan Sosialis resort to direct action in Singapore, then the arrests will be
justified and must take place. If, however, the situation remains quiet, then I believe
this matter of arrests will become less important by comparison with the political
relationship between the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew. I recommend, therefore, that in
the months before Malaysia we must try to work for an effective alliance between the
two Prime Ministers. If this can be achieved, I believe many of the Tunku’s fears
about the political future of Singapore may prove unfounded.
9. I am sending copies of this despatch to the British High Commissioners in
Kuala Lumpur, Canberra and Wellington; to the Governors of North Borneo and
Sarawak; and to the High Commissioner for Brunei.
3 To the disapproval of the Tunku, Lee returned from the Commonwealth Conference in London via Moscow.
4 Sandys met Razak and Lee on 17 Sept while they were in London for the Commonwealth conference
which, much to Lee’s unease, endorsed Britain’s bid to join the European Economic Community.
145 CO 1030/994, no E/134 22 Nov 1962
[British financial assistance for Malaysia]: letter from A A Golds1 to
Sir G Tory, discussing Malayan expectations and Whitehall’s response
to them. Enclosure: ‘Notes on progress towards a Malaysian financial
assessment’
I think that we owe you some explanation, even though it can only be for your own
private information, of what we are trying to do here in Whitehall to meet the
Malayans’ expectations of British financial assistance for Malaysia; and of when we
are likely to be able to give them some kind of answer to their various requests.
1 A A Golds, counsellor in the CRO and FO, 1962–1965; head of the joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department,
1964–1965.
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2. What follows is a wholly private account of the story so far. It has not been
cleared with any other department in London. However if you should wish to send us
any comments on any of the issues with which the letter deals I should be very glad
to have them, especially as Crosthwait2 and I are members of a Working Party of the
Cabinet Official Oversea Co-ordinating Committee which, as mentioned below, is
now seized with the problem of a Malaysian ‘financial settlement’.3 (I should perhaps
at once add that my use of this term of art has no official authorisation but we are in
fact considering the question of British assistance for Malaysia as being in the nature
of a ‘financial settlement’.)
3. As you know the Malayans have already put in specific bids for defence aid and
development aid of a total magnitude greater than anything we are likely to be able
to wring out of the Treasury. So far, British Ministers and officials have carefully
avoided giving any commitment to the Malayans but have promised to consider their
requests against the whole background of Malaysia’s requirements and of our own
resources and commitments. This process of consideration has now at last got
properly under way. However it is still presenting departments in Whitehall with a
difficult ‘cart and horse’ or ‘wood and trees’ problem. No one has yet been able to
quote to the Treasury even a very approximate figure of the scale of assistance which
we should offer to Malaysia. Meanwhile the Treasury have made it clear that before
they will even admit that any aid at all must be given and certainly before they will
agree to talk of hard figures, they went to know inter alia the following:—
(a) Exactly how great a burden the Malayan economy will be assuming as a result
of taking over our existing responsibilities in Singapore and the Borneo territories.
(b) How far this will be off-set by the enhanced resources of the new Federation.
(c) What economies to H.M.G. will result from the transfer of our responsibilities.
(d) How much of the Malaysian defence expansion programme is both realistic
and essential and what the cost of this portion would be.
(e) What economic development in Borneo (or elsewhere in Malaysia) it is
necessary for us to support whether for economic or political reasons.
(f) What help for Malaysia can be expected from other sources than H.M.G. (e.g.
Americans, Australians, World Bank etc.).
The Treasury want the Colonial Office, Foreign Office, Department of Technical Co-
operation, Ministry of Defence, Service Departments and ourselves to furnish them
with all possible data on these points and also, on the basis of the answers to (c) (d)
and (f ) above (and our assessment of all relevant political and strategic factors) to
name the sum which the British tax payer should be called upon to pay as the
financial price of Malaysia.
4. To many of us this does not seem a very realistic sort of exercise and, as you
may imagine there are a number of ‘carts and horses’ mixed up in it. The Ministry of
2 T L Crosthwait, assistant secretary, CRO, 1961–1963.
3 Set up in July 1962 ‘to consider questions of oversea policy (other than defence policy) which concern
more than one of the oversea Departments’, this committee first discussed British financial aid for
Malaysia in Nov 1962 and in the light of other investigations, such as the Lintott mission to Kuala
Lumpur. It submitted a report to ministers in time for talks with a Malayan delegation in May. See 170,
173–176 and also CAB 134/2276–2278 and 2281.
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Defence for example maintain that they cannot answer (d) above in vacuo. They
argue that they must always have some idea of the total money likely to be available
before they can say whether any defence plan is sound (e.g. the one outlined in the
Steering Committee’s Report)4 or whether they should aim at something less.
Similarly it seems unlikely that we (C.R.O. or F.O.) shall be able to give any answer to
(f ) until the Malayans themselves make a move, which we assume they are unlikely
to do until we have given them a firm indication of the probable limits of our own
assistance.
5. The whole question has recently been submitted, after discussion in the
Greater Malaysia Committee under the P.U.S’s Chairmanship, to the Cabinet Official
Oversea Co-ordinating Committee whose function is to examine and make
recommendations on all questions involving financial assistance before they go to
Ministers. This Committee, on which we and the other departments concerned are
represented, has now undertaken to produce recommendations for Ministers early in
the New Year. The intention is that Ministers should be in a position to tell the
Malayans, by the time that the formal agreement on Malaysia is due to be negotiated,
how much financial aid they can confidently expect from us. So far we have been
expecting the formal agreement to be concluded in early February but I understand
that following Lord Lansdowne’s latest private discussions with Tun Razak, it seems
now most improbable that the Malayans themselves will be able to keep to this
timing. However, we certainly hope that we shall at any rate have been able to clear
our own minds about the financial limits of our assistance well before the last lap of
the negotiations for formal agreement begins. Meanwhile we hope, for tactical
reasons, not to have to enter into advance commitments.
6. The main ‘ingredients’ of any financial settlement as we see them will be:—
(a) The cost of the Compensation/Inducement Scheme for the expatriate officers
in Borneo.
(b) Our contributions to the Malaysian Defence expansion programme.
(c) Our contribution to Malaysian development on account of the Borneo
Territories.
(I enclose a wholly informal memorandum summarising the present position
reached under each of these heads, as seen in this Department.) As you know only
too well the Malayans have been pressing us for some time now to show something of
our hand on (b) while both the Malayans and the Borneans are pressing our
representatives in the Intergovernmental Committee on (c). It may be that we shall
have to give them further interim answers on both. So far as (c) is concerned you
may know that Lord Lansdowne himself is convinced that we should not offer less,
over the first five years of Malaysia, than the equivalent of what we are at present
giving the Borneo territories by way of C.D. and W. aid.5 This is also what Tan Siew
Sin asked for. However, present form is that the Treasury will certainly not agree to
make any commitments for economic aid until they know what our commitments
under (a) and (b) above are going to be. It was only with the greatest reluctance that
4 ie, the steering committee that dealt with the detailed matters identified during the Anglo–Malayan talks
in July 1962, see 132, note.
5 See 141, para 14 and repeated at 146, para 14.
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they agreed even to authorise Lord Lansdowne to promise at this month’s plenary
session of the Intergovernmental Committee, to make available the unexpired
portion of the C.D. and W. allocation which in any case comes to an end in March,
1964. On (b) we have been trying hard to get all the ‘internal security’ items on the
Malayans’ ‘priority list’ agreed in advance of the financial settlement and we hope to
be able very soon to let you know definitely about this. (a) has to be given priority,
although the question of the other 50% of its total cost (£31⁄2 m. over 5 years) will
probably be deferred until the eventual ‘financial settlement’. Everything else must
however still be regarded as in the melting pot though as I have said our present
hope is to have poured something out of it by early next year.
7. I apologise for the length of this letter, which for obvious reasons I am not
copying elsewhere.6
Enclosure to 145
The compensation-inducement scheme
The scheme, which has been cast in the light of experience gained in other territories
and after consultation with representatives of the men concerned, is estimated to
cost some £31⁄2 million over 5 years. According to precedent H.M.G. would pay half of
this and it would be up to the Territories (or ‘Malaysia’) to pay the remaining half.
The two Governors have, however, reacted strongly against putting this suggestion
to their Governments.
2. This is the most urgent financial question from the British point of view. If we
are to have a smooth transfer of power, without serious danger of trouble, as many as
possible of the expatriate officers must be induced to stay on and it is important that
they know by the end of the year, if possible, what effect the compensation scheme
will have (with its built-in inducements to stay). The various departments here are
agreed on the form of the scheme which is being sent now to the Borneo
Governments. Later it will go to the Malayan Government but the problem of who is
to pay for the cost normally borne locally still remains.
3. It is recognised that the question of the incidence of local cost is complicated
in the circumstances of Malaysia because the fiscal arrangements between the
Federal Government and the States are not yet determined and in due course there
has to be a general settlement of the financial matters arising out of the
establishment of Malaysia. Meanwhile, we have no intention of holding up the
application of the compensation scheme itself as it is important to induce as many
expatriate officers as possible to stay on.
Defence aid
4. Conclusion (n.n.) of the Malayan/British Steering Committee’s Report stated the
Malayan view of the form which financial aid should take was as follows:—
(a) Malayans to pay all seconded personnel at their own (lower) rates with the
expatriate element paid by supplying Government.
6 Despite this request, a copy passed out of the CRO to reach this CO file.
12-Malaysia-123-148-cpp  21/9/04  9:07 AM  Page 403
404 CONFLICT, DEADLOCK AND AGREEMENT [145]
(b) Training facilities at concessional rates.
(c) A lease/lend agreement in respect of ships and aircraft.
(d) Free transfer of accommodation and land.
(e) Direct financial assistance towards the increased annual recurrent charges in
the initial stages of the programme.
With regard to (a) above, a scheme has been drafted in Whitehall for the
subsidisation of the costs of seconded personnel in all Commonwealth countries that
might be concerned. This has not yet been approved by Ministers and we do not yet
know what particular method of subsidisation will be adopted. If the method of
subsidisation recommended in the scheme were adopted, the cost in respect of
Malaysia for 1963/4 would be approximately £1 million. This will, no doubt, be taken
into account when the general settlement is made.
5. Points (b) to (e) above will also be taken into account in the general financial
settlement but it is unlikely that help will be forthcoming towards annually
recurrent expenditure except in respect of specific projects like training or
secondment.
6. Even if it is accepted that in the light of the SEATO forces available the joint
Steering Committee’s plan provides a suitable basis for military planning it is by no
means clear that it has been accepted by the Malayans as a practicable plan for
Malaysia without outside financial assistance. Tan Siew Sin in his meeting with the
Minister of Defence in July said that his Government could not afford any money
towards the capital costs (£50m.) of the expansion programme and he admitted that
the Steering Committee had set ‘high targets’. In a letter dated 23rd July to the
Secretary of State, in commenting on the Committee’s recommendations, he used
the words ‘if implemented in full’ which suggests that he has doubts whether it will
be fully implemented. The Malayans, therefore, would presumably accept the
proposition that a plan is not realistic if it cannot be afforded even if there are sound
military reasons in favour of it. It seems likely that such financial aid as is
forthcoming from Britain will be limited to certain aspects of the plan particularly
those which are directly relevant to our continuing interests and commitments in
the area. This need not preclude defence aid from other sources, (e.g. U.S. and
Australia), but we have no information about the extent to which aid might be
forthcoming from such sources.
7. We have to consider Malayan requirements in the light of our obligations
under the Anglo–Malayan Defence Agreement—which it is proposed to extend to
Malaysia—to afford Malaya such assistance as she may require for her external
defence. These obligations will, of course, be much in the minds of the Malayans
during the Combined Planning discussions which have now started. We are hoping,
in the course of these talks, to persuade the Malayans that the forces which we were
in any case planning to retain in Malaya to meet our S.E.A.T.O. obligations will be
adequate to meet our obligation to assist in the external defence of Malaysia.
8. Apart from the general problem of Defence Aid there is the more immediate
problem of the priority shopping list which the Malayans have produced of barracks,
ships, aircraft, etc., which they want us to hand over to them right away as an
interim measure without prejudice to a final settlement on defence aid of all kinds.
These items have been costed and the total is approximately £3.4 million (this
includes the cost of two Heron aircraft. Kuala Lumpur telegram No.830 refers). It
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has proved difficult in practice to deal with the financing of these advance items
before the whole financial picture is clear. However, it is now proposed that certain
essential installations required by Malaysia to implement the internal security plan
by M-Day should be handed over without prejudice to the final financial
arrangements made in respect of them. An exception is also under consideration
with regard to the four helicopters required for internal security.
9. To sum up the question of Defence Aid this will be considered on a general
basis by the end of next January at the earliest and apart from the exceptions referred
to in paragraph 8 the Malayans can expect no firm decisions until then.
10. Development aid
The Malayans have asked that, in order to ensure expanding development in North
Borneo and Sarawak during the early years of Malaysia, we should undertake to
continue to provide assistance at about the present level of Colonial Development
and Welfare grants, which now amount to some £2 million a year. The view of
Ministers is that, since development aid is a principal card in the hands of British
negotiators if there should be difficulty in reaching agreement, no commitment in
relation to it should be given until the intergovernmental talks are well advanced.
However, Lord Lansdowne, has recently been authorised to give (if necessary) a
guarded indication of our intentions at the plenary meeting on 23rd November and
an assurance that an amount equivalent to any outstanding Colonial Development
and Welfare allocation for the present quinquennium (estimated at something less
than £1 million by 31st August, 1963) would be made available to the new Federal
Government for the development of North Borneo and Sarawak. Any further aid we
give for development will have to be considered with other forms of aid in the context
of the financial settlement for Malaysia as a whole.
11. The Malayans have also asked about the prospect of floating a £4 or £5
million loan on the London market. At present it seems likely that they will be told
that they could have access to the market but only to the extent of some £2 million.
146 CO 1030/1032, no 106 6 Dec 1962
‘Malaysia: progress report by the minister of state for colonial affairs’:
report by Lord Lansdowne on the Inter-Governmental Committee,
urging British financial assistance to the Borneo territories after the
formation of Malaysia
[This report was printed for confidential circulation. For the context of the IGC see
document 141, note.]
The Inter-Governmental Committee held four more Plenary sessions in Jesselton
between the 23rd–26th November, at which most of the outstanding major points of
principle were agreed. Provided some remaining financial questions can now be
answered, the Committee should finish its work by the end of the year.
2. North Borneo finally dropped their demand for fiscal autonomy under the
Constitution of Malaysia which at last removed the major obstacle to a satisfactory
division of legislative powers on the lines agreed in the London talks.
3. Citizenship, Education, Religion and Immigration (except for the important
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question of the State’s right to refuse entry for employment in industry for federal
purposes) were agreed. Concessions were made both by the Federation and by the
Borneo territories. At the outset of his visit to Borneo which immediately preceded
these Plenary sessions, the Tunku announced that he proposed that North Borneo
and Sarawak should have 40 seats in the Malaysia House of Representatives.
4. A summary of the main points of agreement reached in the Inter-
Governmental Committee is set out in Annex I. A list of outstanding points for
settlement by the Inter-Governmental Committee is set out in Annex II.1
5. I called for further meetings of Sub-Committees between 6th–8th December,
to deal with outstanding questions, and arranged to hold in Kuala Lumpur between
18th–20th what should be the final Plenary sessions. In so far as it can be prepared in
advance of final decisions, the first draft report of the Inter-Governmental
Committee will be considered at the Kuala Lumpur meetings. The aim will be to
complete the report by 31st December. How far this can be achieved will depend
largely on the progress of discussions on financial arrangements for Malaysia.
6. In my first report, dated 10th September, I said that we had a continuing
obligation to help the Borneo territories and that:—
‘If Malaysia is to fulfil the hopes we have for it, it must be demonstrably
successful and successful from the start and this will cost money.’
After three further months of negotiations, I am more than ever convinced of these
propositions.
7. Sarawak’s attitude to the negotiations has been constructive and helpful, but
it has been coupled with a determination to obtain guaranteed sums for its future
development.
8. We would have reached deadlock at the November meetings in Jesselton, if the
North Borneo delegation had not at last been persuaded to drop its demand for fiscal
autonomy. The undertaking which I was authorised to give—that Her Majesty’s
Government were prepared to make available to the Government of Malaysia an
amount equivalent to any outstanding C.D. and W. allocation for the present
quinquennium and to consider helping thereafter for the development of North
Borneo and Sarawak—was of some assistance in achieving this change of attitude.
But it was made abundantly clear that this ‘concession’ by North Borneo was subject
to the working out of the detailed financial arrangements and on the understanding
that development would continue at an increased rate.
9. Neither territory will be satisfied with general assurances. Each will require
guarantees of hard cash before they will finally commit themselves to Malaysia.
10. The Malayans made the mistake of overselling Malaysia to the territories with
promises of rapidly expanding development. The present expectations of the
territories are consequently pitched high. The Malayans are now saying that the
financial position of the Federation is not as comfortable as the statistics suggest and
that despite a heavy reduction in their own development expenditure they may be
faced by the end of 1965 with a large fall in reserves. The Federation is certainly
looking to the United Kingdom for continuing assistance in the development
programmes of North Borneo and Sarawak.
1 The annexes are not printed.
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11. I agreed that at the outset of these negotiations we should not show our hand
on finance and that our future development assistance for the territories should be
considered in relation to the extent of our financial arrangements for Malaysia as a
whole and that we should reserve our position for comprehensive discussions with
the Federation which would include defence and compensation for British officers.
In my November report, I agreed that we should still not yet show our full hand on
finance.
12. I consider that the time has now come for us to declare our position on
development. In our laborious negotiations we have so far through compromise and
concession been able to achieve satisfactory agreements over safeguards for North
Borneo and Sarawak. I believe this success will be worthless if we are now hesitant or
ungenerous on finance.
13. We have still to obtain North Borneo’s acceptance of detailed arrangements
for the handling of their finances and Sarawak’s agreement hinges on the guarantee
of a development fund. We have already achieved progress beyond what at times
seemed possible. I am confident that I can bring the work of the Inter-Governmental
Committee to a successful conclusion this month if I am authorised to say at the
Plenary meeting in December that subject to the financial arrangements for Malaysia
as a whole, Her Majesty’s Government will be prepared to provide the new Malaysian
Government for five years after Malaysia with aid at a rate not less than at present
provided for North Borneo and Sarawak for the continued development and welfare
of these two territories. Unless we do this, I see little chance of the North Borneo and
Sarawak delegations signing the report of the Inter-Governmental Committee and of
obtaining a successful vote on it in the two territorial legislatures in January.
14. In conclusion, I repeat my strongly held personal opinion that in view of the
fact that Her Majesty’s Government is giving up its responsibility for the territories
before they are ready to achieve independence on their own, we have a continuing
obligation to help them and we cannot honourably discharge this obligation to the
peoples of the territories whom we are persuading to accept Malaysia unless we
maintain our assistance after Malaysia at a level not lower than existing C.D. and W.
grants, not including the cost of any compensation scheme.
147 CO 1030/1160, no 46 12 Dec 1962
[Singapore arrests]: outward telegram no 546 from Mr Sandys to Lord
Selkirk, approving action
[In the aftermath of the Brunei revolt (see 149, note) and in the light of evidence of
communist penetration of the Barisan, Selkirk faced heavy pressure to drop his previous
resistance to the arrests of ‘subversive elements’ in Singapore. His inward telegram no
573 of 11 Dec has been retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958, but
the minute by C S Roberts of the CO reveals that in it Selkirk requested authorisation to
concur on behalf of the British government in the immediate arrest of leading
communists and communist sympathisers. Macmillan, who was on the distribution list
for communications of such significance, responded immediately: ‘I would like to have
Mr Sandys’ view. I must be consulted before [sic] reply.’ Having obtained prime
ministerial approval, Sandys despatched outward telegram no 546. The secretary of state
then left London for a tour of the West Indies to examine policy for Britain’s remaining
dependencies now that Jamaica and Trinidad had achieved independence. Lansdowne,
who was in SE Asia on the business of the Inter-Governmental Committee, kept Sandys
informed of developments in Singapore reassuring him that he had ‘taken great pains to
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avoid HMG being driven into the position of appearing to take the initiative over arrests’
(Lansdowne to Sandys, CROSOS no 155, 17 Dec 1962, Sandys Papers, 8/1.]
Personal from Colonial Secretary.
Your telegrams Nos.573 and 575.
As you know I have all along been reluctant to give blanket approval in advance for
arrests of subversive elements in Singapore. But if we are to avoid a dangerous
disagreement with the Malayan Government we shall have to take some action of this
kind before merger.
2. I am quite sure that the insurrection in Brunei provides the best possible
background against which to take this action. I consider therefore that we should
move at once, before the atmosphere of emergency evaporates, as it quickly will
when active fighting in Brunei ceases.
3. I have no doubt that the Police and the Army would like to have longer to
perfect their plans, but I am inclined to think that the advantages to be gained by
delay will be more than offset by:—
(a) the greater difficulty in explaining the need for this action to the world; and
(b) the risk of leakage of information resulting in the flight of some of the birds
you most want to catch.
4. My conclusions are, therefore, as follows:—
(a) Before merger, sooner or later, arrests will have to be made.
(b) This is the best moment to do it.
(c) The emergency justifies a substantial number of arrests of persons who in one
way or another constitute a danger to public safety.
(d) If the Internal Security Council so decide, I consider that the sooner the
arrests are carried out the better and I shall be content for you to give your
consent without detailed reference back to me.
5. We must of course identify ourselves with this decision. But the public
announcement must make it clear that the Malayan and Singapore Governments
share equally with us in the decision.
148 CO 1030/1160, no 56 14 Dec 1962
[Singapore arrests]: inward telegram no 582 from Lord Selkirk to Mr
Sandys, reporting the decision of the ISC on 13 Dec
[The ISC authorised sweeping arrests for which the British, Malayan and Singaporean
governments agreed to take joint responsibility. Action was scheduled for 16 Dec. The
operation was aborted, however, because the governments of Malaya and Singapore fell
out over the list of detainees. Lee Kuan Yew added political opponents to Special Branch’s
list. The Tunku strongly objected to this abuse of the operation, probably fearing also that
it would inflame his own opponents in the federation. This disagreement prompted Dr
Ismail bin Dato Haji Abdul Rahman (minister of internal security and interior) to
withdraw from the ISC and much mutual recrimination ensued. The operation was
revived in Feb, code-named ‘Coldstore’ (see 156 and 158).]
The Internal Security Council met in Singapore last night.
2. We first considered the joint security assessment by the Special Branches. This
was a much better paper than had previously been available and contained a great deal
12-Malaysia-123-148-cpp  21/9/04  9:07 AM  Page 408
[148] DEC 1962 409
of valuable information about communist activities in Singapore. The paper was only
produced yesterday and we did not have time to examine it thoroughly before the
meeting. However we recorded our agreement with the broad terms of the paper.
3. I then asked Ismail to state why the Federation had asked for an emergency
meeting. He said the Federation view had always been that strict security measures
should be taken in the Federation and Singapore while at the same time every attempt
was made to improve the standard of living of the people. The Federation Government
had been very concerned at the security situation in Singapore and would not be able
to proceed with Malaysia if the communists in Singapore were not arrested.
4. Lee Kuan Yew said he agreed with Ismail that action must now be taken. The
perfect opportunity had been presented by the Brunei revolt and this must not be missed.
5. I said I had recognised all along that a threat was presented by the
communists in Singapore. I had not however previously been convinced that a large
number of arrests was necessary to counter this threat. Recently, however, new
evidence had been produced about the extent of the communist control of the
Barisan Socialis and also there had been indications that the communists might
resort to violence if the opportunity occurred. Recent statements by the Barisan
Socialis and Party Rakyat supporting the revolt in Brunei confirmed this.
Accordingly H.M.G. were prepared to see action taken in Singapore provided:—
(a) it was made clear publicly that all three Governments accepted joint
responsibility and
(b) the action was taken very quickly.
6. Lee Kuan Yew said the Singapore Government agreed that there must be joint
responsibility for the action and his public line would be that action was most
regrettable but most necessary. I asked Lee to confirm that his Cabinet shared his
views. He said that for security reasons he had only been able to consult those who
were members of the Council but he thought the others would agree. He went on to
explain that previously he had thought that if the action had to be in a cold situation
it would be necessary for the British colonial power to accept the main responsibility.
In view however of the revolt in Brunei and the evidence of foreign participation, the
action could now be presented as taken by the Nationalist Governments of the
Federation and Singapore against anti-nationalists who had threatened the security
of Malaysia. It would however be essential for the Federation Government to take
the initiative publicly and to make it clear that they had pressed for the action. The
Singapore Government would support them and the British should remain in the
background as much as possible. At Lee’s suggestion Ismail agreed to the [omission?]
Federation and Singapore Governments would co-ordinate their public statements.
7. This was highly satisfactory from our point of view except perhaps that we would
not wish to place so much emphasis on the threat to Malaysia since this might suggest
that the action was political rather than security. In view however of the Federation
acceptance of Lee’s line, I decided it would be wrong to raise any objections.
8. The Council approved the terms of the public statement to be issued
immediately after the action is taken. This is contained in my immediately following
telegram.1 The statement was signed by Ismail, Lee Kuan Yew and myself. You will
1 This statement was not issued because the operation was aborted.
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see that the statement makes it clear that all members of the Council share jointly in
the responsibility for the action.
9. We then considered the extent of the action to be taken and the timing and
reached the following conclusions:—
(a) The operation should be sufficiently comprehensive to cripple the communist
effort in Singapore. A preliminary assessment by Singapore Special Branch
indicated that about 180 persons would be detained in the first instance.
(b) The list of names should if possible be finalised today by the two Special
Branches and the S.L.O. and agreed out of Council. The Council will then meet
secretly in Kuala Lumpur tomorrow Saturday 15th December at 22.15 hours to
record their formal approval of the list.
(c) The operation would commence at 02.00 hours Singapore time on Sunday
16th December.
(d) The Barisan Socialis Party should be banned but it was not decided whether
the Party Rakyat S.A.T.U. and the S.G.E.U. should also be banned.
(e) It was agreed that the list ought to include certain Barisan Socialis
assemblymen, but Lee thought it most desirable that the Federation should at the
same time arrest at least one of their Parliament known to be a communist or
communist sympathiser e.g. Lim Kean Siew or Boestamam.2 Ismail promised to
get a decision from the Tunku and we have now received his concurrence.
(f) All the communist publications including ‘Plebian’ and ‘Barisan’ should be
banned.
(g) It was noted that action had already been taken in Sarawak. Lee hoped there
would be more than the 31 arrests so far ordered in Sarawak but I pointed out that
this was a matter for the Governor. I also explained that the Governor would not
want to ban S.U.P.P. at this stage since there was a distinct possibility of S.U.P.P.
breaking up following Ong Kee Hui’s condemnation of the Brunei revolt. Today’s
papers report defections.
(h) At Lee’s suggestion the Federation agreed that they should simultaneously
mount an operation which would involve the arrest of a substantial number of
people in order to show that action was being taken on a Pan Malaysian basis.
(i) The Council statement would be released on Sunday following the completion
of the operation.
(j) The Federation Government would make a statement in Parliament on Monday
and this would be followed by a statement by Lee Kuan Yew on the Singapore radio.
(k) The U.K. Commission would make no comment in Singapore beyond the
statement by the Council, but I explained that you would no doubt have to make a
statement in the House of Commons.
10. Please let me know if there is any further background you require for the
House of Commons. I will try to let you have texts of the Federation and Singapore
statements before Monday afternoon your time. I suggest your broad line should be
to follow the terms of the Council’s statement as amplified by the Federation and
Singapore statements.
11. I will report further developments tomorrow.
2 Lim Kean Siew (Labour Party) and Ahmad Boestamam (Party Rakyat Malaya) were leaders of the Socialist
Front in the federal parliament of Malaya.
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149 CO 1030/1466, ff 103–105 15 Dec 1962
‘Political appreciation of the revolt’: memorandum on the Brunei
rising by Sir D White for Lord Selkirk and others attending a meeting
at Labuan on 17 Dec
[At 2 am on 8 Dec—coinciding exactly, although probably not intentionally, with the
time and date of the Japanese attack on Malaya in 1941—the Tentera Nasional
Kalimantan Utara (TNKU), or National Army of North Borneo launched co-ordinated
attacks on key centres. Their forces quickly overran the oilfields at Seria as well as much
of Brunei Town and the rest of the state. They moved into parts of the Fourth and Fifth
Divisions of Sarawak, including Limbang, that tongue of territory splitting the sultanate
into two parts which had been annexed by Sarawak in 1890 and remained a continuing
source of acrimony between Brunei and Sarawak. There were also disturbances across
the border in North Borneo. Acting under the Anglo–Brunei treaty of 1959, the British
sent in Gurkhas, Royal Marines and other military units. By midday on 11 Dec some
1,600 troops had arrived and most important centres had been recovered. Despite
widespread support amongst the people of Brunei, TNKU resistance swiftly collapsed. By
18 Dec all hostages had been released and by the end of the month 2,700 rebels
(estimated by the British as all but a handful of the TNKU) had been captured or had
surrendered. The last few dissidents had been rounded up in mid-May 1963 by which
time many original detainees had been released. Following the revolt the constitution
was suspended, the PRB was proscribed and a state of emergency was declared. The high
commissioner, Sir Dennis White, was in the UK at the time of the outbreak and Selkirk
took direct charge. White returned to Brunei on 10 Dec and his subsequent reports
breathe the guilt and embarrassment, the defensiveness and frustration of a man during
whose watch a crisis had occurred. In addition to streams of situation reports on
operations, the files are full of papers addressing the causes and likely consequences of
the rising, the aims of the leaders and the extent of their support and, finally, the future
course of British policy towards Brunei and the region more widely. Questions were
asked, firstly, about the causes and outbreak: Had there been a failure of British
intelligence? Had the local administration been complacent? Had British representatives
been caught napping? What were the objectives and role of Azahari who was in Manila at
the time of the revolt? What was the precise relationship between the PRB and the
TNKU? To what extent was the Sultan implicated in the rising? How far was the revolt an
attempt to democratise Brunei? Had the PRB been provoked into action by the
postponement of the new Legislative Council on which it had won control of all 16
electable seats in the elections of Aug 1962? Was the rebels’ primary objective to restore
Brunei to its former glory by uniting the Borneo territories in opposition to ‘Greater
Malaysia’? How widespread was local support for the rebels? Secondly, there were
questions about the revolt’s repercussions in the region: How much support had the
TNKU received from the Philippines and especially Indonesia? What links were there
between the TNKU and Sarawak’s Clandestine Communist Organisation? In what ways
might the revolt exacerbate Singapore’s problems of internal security? Thirdly, there
were questions concerning Britain’s future policy: Did the revolt provide the opportunity
for sweeping reform of Brunei’s government? Had Britain’s intervention and successful
suppression of the rising enhanced or diminished its relationship with the Sultan?
Should they adopt Azahari as a ‘progressive nationalist’ in preference to the Sultan and
his court? Might they persuade some PRB detainees to espouse the cause of ‘Greater
Malaysia’? What impact would the incident have on Britain’s international relations and
reputation? Would the rising improve or impair British attempts to persuade Brunei to
join Malaysia? For example, on 20 Dec both White in a despatch to Sandys (see 150) and
Selkirk in a letter to Macmillan (see 151) criticised the ineptitude of the Brunei
government, and White recommended that Britain should take advantage of the Sultan’s
weakness to insist on his immediate acceptance of Malaysia (see also 154 and 155). For
the course of the rising, see CO 1030/1068–1076; PREM 11/3869 and 4346. For the
aftermath of revolt and assessments of the prospects of Brunei joining Malaysia see CO
1030/1466–1470, 1489–1491, 1493; FO 371/169694 and 169702; PREM 11/4347. For the
views of Chiefs of Staff, see COS 78(62) and COS 83(62)1, DEFE 4/150; COS 3(63)1,
DEFE 4/151; COS 9(63)1, DEFE 4/152. See also the subsequent narrative prepared by the
FCO’s Research Department, ‘The origins and formation of Malaysia’, paras 204–218,
reproduced as an appendix to this volume.]
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Causes
The people of Brunei entertain a long-standing and deeply-felt dislike of the local
nobility and ruling clique, of whom the most prominent, the Mentri Besar, Deputy
Mentri Besar, and Deputy State Secretary, were at one time associated with Party
Rakyat.
Furthermore, the Sultan’s own personal interference in the administration of the
country, favouritism and out and out nepotism, have brought down upon himself some
of the discredit well earned by a dilatory, inept and not particularly honest
administration.
I feel that the main purpose of the revolt was to overthrow the present
Government, and that reunification of the Borneo Territories and anti-Malaysia were
added inducements, the former to attract persons with Brunei connections in
Sarawak and North Borneo, and the latter to attract dissident elements in the
component parts of the proposed Malaysia.
Outside connections
There is no direct evidence of outside connections. It is equally certain that the
rebels expected Indonesian assistance by air; hence the removal of obstructions from
the Anduki Airfield by the rebels and the incident at Berkenu when the rebels saluted
a British aircraft in mistake for an Indonesian one.
There seems little doubt that both S.U.P.P. and Barisan Socialis were fully in the
picture as to Azahari’s intentions, and may even have promised support.
Otherwise, the revolt is confined to Brunei Malays and Kedayans within the State,
or in Sarawak and North Borneo, and others, who may have joined in for the fun of
some Pengiran shooting, to settle some personal grievance, or through
intimidation.
The insurrection
I find it impossible to believe that the Sultan and his Government had not had prior
knowledge of the way the situation was developing. They share, with the people of
Brunei, the deeply felt desire to re-establish their former position as Rulers of a large
part of Sarawak and a part of North Borneo. I suspect that the Sultan, with his usual
dislike of committing himself, kept his own Government in ignorance of his real
views an Azahari’s plan for reunification of the territories; I have little doubt that he
discussed it with Azahari, and Azahari discussed it with the Tunku.
At the very last moment, the Sultan decided to ask for British help. A day or two
before that, the ruling clique started feeding scraps of information to the Police.
The rebels were clearly, in general, not anti-British. Lives and property were, in
Brunei, largely respected. There was a more vicious element in the oilfields, and in
Limbang.
The future
There is no doubt, in my mind, that if British Military presence were to be
withdrawn, or seriously weakened, the rebels would strike again, and this time the
Sultan, the nobility and the administration would be butchered.
The outlawing and defeat of the Party Rakyat have created a political vacuum. The
Civil Service, at no time a strong organisation, has been decimated by Party Rakyat
infiltration and many of its members are under arrest or on the run.
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There is no confidence in the Mentri Besar amongst the British, Malayan or other
senior Civil Servants, or amongst the population.
The loyalty of the people to the Sultan as Head of the State and Supreme Executive
Authority seems to have been virtually destroyed. His position as Religious Head
cannot, at present, be assessed.
There are two alternative for the Sultan; abdication in favour of the Crown Prince
with a Council of Regency, or an urgent announcement of his intention to become a
purely Constitutional Ruler, as soon as the situation permits.
The Mentri Besar should resign or be dismissed, and a figurehead Mentri Besar
appointed, possibly the previous man, with, preferably, a Malayan or a British
Adviser, in fact administering the territory, with a team of Malayan and British
administrators running the State.
The Police Force should be strengthened by at least 6 retired or other Police
Officers with a knowledge of Malay.
Special Branch should concentrate urgently on the preparation of a list of key men
in the rebellion who should be put on trial as soon as time permits.
The great majority of the prisoners should be released on parole, under restricted
residence conditions, as soon as Military operations permit, and employed on useful
work at living wages.
The doubtful prisoners should remain in custody at present.
An Economic Development Committee, with executive and financial power,
should start, as soon as possible, rural and other development programmes. The
United Nations Economic Adviser, an American, might preside; a local Committee
would achieve nothing.
Malaysia
Brunei either enters Malaysia now, or as soon as it can be established that the
rebellion is largely anti-Government.
Failing this, there seems little chance of achieving the aim, and Brunei remains
indefinitely a dangerous source of infection for Sarawak and North Borneo, and an
untidy, if not insupportable, defence commitment for Her Majesty’s Government.
150 CO 1030/1076, no 6 20 Dec 1962
[Brunei revolt]: despatch from Sir D White to Mr Sandys, providing
an account of the disturbances and a preliminary assessment of its
causes and political impact
I have the honour to inform you that I returned to Brunei on Monday, December
10th, and resumed duty forthwith.
2. Until interrogation of prisoners is complete, and there has been a thorough
investigation of captured documents, and the information so obtained collated, it is
not possible to formulate authoritative conclusions as to the causes and origin of the
revolt, and my views must remain tentative.
3. The position in November when I returned to the U.K. was that the Party
Rakyat, having successfully won all seats in the District Council elections, had been
13-Malaysia-149-174-cpp  21/9/04  9:08 AM  Page 413
414 CONFLICT, DEADLOCK AND AGREEMENT [150]
returned to all 16 elected members’ seats in Legislative Council.1 There had been no
business meeting of Council, merely a formal session to swear in the new Council
and to listen to an address from the throne.
4. The Sultan, on the advice of the Mentri Besar, nominated six of the elected
members of Legislative Council to Executive Council. Some trouble occurred about
this, as Party Rakyat wished to say who should be appointed, though the Constitution
reserves the right of the Sultan to nominate as he thinks fit. The Party eventually
withdrew their opposition; the Sultan’s nominees took their seats and their attitude
at subsequent meetings was not unduly aggressive.
5. The information available to me at this time indicated that the Party Rakyat
would endeavour to obtain recognition as the successful Political Party by
Constitutional means, if possible; there would be a resolution to amend the
Constitution, and to demand independence in 1963.
6. On the Malaysian front, the Sultan had reserved his position, in spite of the
unanimous advice of the Palace clique to reject the invitation to join, after the rebuff
to the Brunei delegation in Kuala Lumpur. This advice was undoubtedly known to
the Party Rakyat, whose leader Azahari and some of his colleagues had been in touch
with Tun Razak and the Malayans. Azahari had indicated that if he was recognised as
the leader of Brunei, he would ‘bend’ his Party to accept Malaysia.
The Malayans seemed to have accepted the inevitable and to have reconciled
themselves to the fact that Azahari was practically certain to be the next Mentri
Besar; indeed, they invited him to lead a delegation to visit Malaya and all
arrangements were made for the visit.
The delegates cancelled the visit or postponed it on the morning I left Brunei en
route for the U.K.
7. The Sultan, after many months of investigation and research, had decided to
make a formal request to Her Majesty’s Government for the return of the Limbang
District to his rule.2 I had discussed the matter with him, and had agreed to take a
letter to the Secretary of State from him and to explain his view. I was, myself, well
aware of the strength of the feeling in Brunei on the Limbang ‘corridor’. The feelings
of the Limbang people were thought by the Sarawak Government to be against the
proposal, in the case of the majority of the population, and that the agitation in
favour of return was confined to a number of Malays and Kedayans of Brunei origin,
egged on by Party Rakyat and S.U.P.P.
8. Brunei has, since time immemorial, been a hot bed of rumour, lies and
intrigue. Reports over the last few months have been received of parties of Brunei
youths proceeding through Sarawak to Indonesian territory for some form of
military training, but investigation failed to substantiate the rumours, either in
Sarawak or in Brunei.
1 The 1959 constitution provided for a two-tier electoral system. Direct elections were held to 55 seats on
the district councils which returned 16 representatives to the 33-member Legislative Council. The
majority of 17 on the Legislative Council were ex officio, official or nominated members. During July and
Aug 1962 the PRB, which was the only organised party, won 54 out of the 55 district council seats thereby
ensuring that its candidates would secure control of the electable seats on the Legislative Council and
could claim to represent popular feeling. The first meeting of the Legislative Council was postponed as a
result of the revolt, after which the councils and constitution were suspended and the PRB was banned.
2 The loss of Limbang to Sarawak was deeply resented in Brunei (see 9, n 5). Not surprisingly the TNKU
attempted to reclaim it for Brunei in the rising.
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Azahari, however, and his leading colleagues, were paying visits to Djakarta far too
frequently for our peace of mind, in view of Azahari’s long connection with the
successful Army of Liberation leaders in Indonesia, during the Japanese occupation,
and during the struggle against the Dutch.
It must also be remembered that Azahari had been imprisoned in 1955 for
unlawful assembly (I think) and while in prison had been involved in a scatterbrained
plot to overthrow the Government.
9. I was concerned at this time at the lack of Special Branch information coming
in, but it was ascribed to the lull in political activity. I was convinced that the real
battle ahead lay between the people of Brunei and the ruling clique, i.e. local nobility
and a few elevated commoners, and that the only safe course for the Sultan to pursue
was to become a genuinely Constitutional ruler, and grant power to the Party Rakyat,
even at the price of letting down the ruling clique. As I have already stated in para 6
above, I believed that Tun Razak had also accepted this view.
10. A few days before the revolt, arrests were made in the Lawas district of the
Vth Division3 of men with the Tenteraman Nacional [sic] Kalimantan Utara uniform
and insignia; one uniform was found in the Temburong enclave, which is part of the
State of Brunei. No arrests were made. Special Branch officers of the three territories
met in Limbang but their conclusions indicated that there was no immediate danger.
11. Two or three days before the revolt started, Dato Pengiran Ali, Deputy Mentri
Besar and the Sultan’s confidant, started to feed reports to the Police of the storing of
uniforms and arms in the villages. Police search failed to confirm this. It should be
noted here that before this the Malayan Attorney General in Brunei had reported the
serious state of events to the Tunku, and a verbal report was also made to the Tunku
by a Malayan member of the Staff of Radio Brunei.4 I have been informed that the
Attorney General did not pass the information to the Commissioner of Police or
Special Branch in Brunei, surprising as this may be.
12. On Friday at about mid-day, Mr. Parks, my A.D.C., was informed on the ‘safe’
telephone by Mr. Linton, the Shell Managing Director in Seria, that the Resident,
Miri,5 Mr. Fisher, had received what he regarded as reliable information that a revolt
was timed to start in the early hours of Saturday morning.
This information was conveyed to the Earl of Selkirk, who was in Brunei on a visit
of enquiry. The information was also conveyed to the Sultan and Mentri Besar, and
Police precautions were taken, resulting in a strong concentration of forces in the
Brunei Town Police Station.
13. About 2 a.m., a heavy attack was launched on the Brunei Police Station. The
personal gallantry and leadership of the Commissioner of Police, Mr. Alan Outram,
drove off the attack with some casualties to the rebels, and the situation eased
3 In Sarawak, abutting the eastern border of Brunei.
4 On 1 Dec the Tunku informed Tory that he had received clear evidence from Brunei’s attorney-general
(who had been seconded from the Federation) that an insurrection was imminent. Noting the warning,
Macmillan commented, ‘If this is true, it is serious’, but Sandys reassured the prime minister that the
‘reports received by the Tunku are greatly exaggerated and there is no reason at present to expect an
emergency’ (CO 1030/1068, nos 1, 4 and 5). After the outbreak of the rising, the Tunku criticised the
British for failing to act on information and he issued a questionnaire that provoked White to tender his
resignation, see 153. For Selkirk’s assessment of the role of the intelligence services, see 151, para 6.
5 Seria was the centre of Brunei’s oil industry; Miri was an oil town and the administrative headquarters of
Sarawak’s Fourth Division, south-west of Seria.
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temporarily. Later the attack was resumed and it was necessary to open fire again.
The Power Station had been taken and the power cut off.
14. A party of rebels went to my house at about 3.15 a.m. and arrested and tied
up Mr. Parks. They were not particularly aggressive, and appear to have been looking
for me, though it is difficult to understand why it was not known that I was out of the
country.
At about 9 a.m. Mr. Outram, with Mr. Glass, an officer of Her Majesty’s Overseas
Service, and a party of police came up to my house; the rebels surrendered and Mr.
Parks was released.
It is interesting to record that Miss Petrie, my confidential secretary, drove
unmolested through bands of rebels in uniform to the house, was allowed to talk to
Mr. Parks, who was tied up, and to go away again.
I must record here my appreciation of the courage and good sense of Mr. Parks
throughout a difficult and dangerous period.
15. Some rebels in the early morning went up to the Palace but withdrew after
an exchange of shots. It can hardly be considered more than a token attack. Two
Party Rakyat leaders on Saturday morning drove up to the Palace to see the Sultan;
they were refused admission and arrested.
The house of the Mentri Besar was also attacked by the rebels but, again, it does
not seem to have been a very determined assault.
16. No European or other houses were attacked or molested. There was no looting.
17. A message was received through the Mentri Besar saying that the Sultan
wished to invoke the protection of Her Majesty’s Forces, as provided for in the
Agreement; this message was got through to Lord Selkirk.
18. In the meantime, the attack on the oilfields had already taken place.
Shell personnel on early morning duty, who were unfortunate enough to
encounter rebel bands, were arrested and others who were still in their houses were
not molested and, in fact, remained in their quarters throughout the period during
which the area was in rebel hands.
The Police, under the leadership of the Malayan Police Officer on secondment,
seemed to have retired to the Panaga Police Station at Seria and the one at Kuala
Belait, both of which were held in strength. It is impossible to escape the conclusion
that more aggressive action could have probably dispersed the rebels.
There was little damage to installations in the oilfield, though there was some
looting in Kuala Belait.
The rebel attack on the main Police Station in Seria, at Panaga, was mounted
behind the shield of captured Shell employees. One was killed, several wounded,
some escaped and found their way back home. The remainder were incarcerated in
Seria Town Police Station which had been captured by the rebels without much, if
any, resistance.
19. Police stations elsewhere in the State surrendered to the rebels without
known opposition. A considerable quantity of arms and ammunition thus became
available to the rebels.
20. At mid-day on the Saturday, a detachment of North Borneo Police arrived, and
played an invaluable part in holding Brunei Airport which up till then had been guarded
by British and Malayan civil servants only. Unfortunately, the North Borneo
detachment ran into rebel opposition at the Power Station and suffered one fatality. I
would record here my deep appreciation of the speed with which His Excellency the
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Governor, Sir William Goode, despatched help and of the courage and discipline of the
detachment. The importance of holding Brunei Airport till help arrived is self-evident.
21. Limbang, headquarters of the Vth Division of Sarawak, was also attacked and,
after some police opposition, taken, and the Resident and his wife and other
Europeans captured and imprisoned.
22. The situation on Saturday evening, when the first British troops arrived, the
1/2 Gurkhas, was that with the exception of the Brunei Town Police Station and
adjacent areas, the Airport, the Panaga Police Station at Seria, and the Kuala Belait
Police Station (which eventually surrendered for no satisfactory reason after holding
out for three days), the whole of Brunei was in rebel hands, as well as Limbang. One
cannot overemphasise the value of the Gurkhas, and the part they played, with their
limited forces, in holding essential points till further reinforcements arrived. They
are splendid troops.
23. This is not the time to attempt a detailed account of the history of the military
intervention. The operation to relieve the situation was mounted with exemplary speed
and efficiency; the co-operation between the services was of the highest order, and the
military operations have from the outset been conducted with courage and humanity.
The Force Commander, Brigadier Glennie, deserves the gratitude of us all.
24. The rebel opposition appears to have become more determined and
aggressive after the arrival of reinforcements and the 1/2 Gurkhas suffered casualties
both in the town area of Brunei and on the road to the oilfields, at Tutong, where
heavy opposition made a return to Brunei inevitable.
As reinforcements arrived, immediate relief operations were mounted. All were
carried out with speed, courage and efficiency. I must here record our gratitude to
the Queen’s Own Highlanders whose recapture of the Seria Town Police Station and
release of the prisoners, held as hostages, was admirably conceived and executed.
25. The relief of Limbang was entrusted to the Marine Commandos almost
immediately on arrival and, in spite of some of the heaviest opposition encountered,
the town was quickly captured and the hostages released. I deeply regret the losses
suffered by the Marines, whose courage and efficiency were of a high order.
26. Reports were received of rebel forces operating near Sibuti in the IVth
Division of Sarawak and an immediate and successful operation was mounted by the
Greenjackets.
27. The situation at the date of this Despatch is that all urban or semi-urban
areas of Brunei are in our hands. Hard core rebels are still in bands of varying sizes
spread over the State of Brunei, and the Vth Division of Sarawak, and perhaps still in
the Sibuti area of the IVth Division. Many will, I think, get rid of guns and uniforms,
and attempt to infiltrate back into their villages. There then remains a mopping-up
commitment in the jungle areas, and a police-cum-military search of all villages and
towns in the State, with Special Branch screening of the population.
28. As I have already said, it is not yet possible to form definite conclusions as to
the motives behind the revolt. Indeed, they probably vary according to the areas and
races involved.
There is so far no direct evidence of Indonesian or other foreign involvement;
nevertheless, I am convinced that the rebels themselves were certain that Indonesian
assistance would be forthcoming. I find it hard to believe that the rebel leaders would
have attacked Limbang, with the certainty of British reprisals, if they had not felt
sure of outside aid.
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The manifesto, outlining the Party Rakyat policy, now in our hands, states that the
reunification of the three Territories was the main objective, under Brunei
leadership. Azahari was almost certainly to be the Prime Minister, and the Sultan of
Brunei was to be the first Head of State.
The manifesto is anti-Colonialist, but not anti-British or pro-Communist, and
states clearly that, if British forces did not intervene, there was to be no injury to
British personnel or damage to property. If British forces were to intervene, the
rebels were to resort to guerrilla warfare and sabotage.
29. It may be helpful to give you some preliminary thoughts of my own on the
events, and also my suspicions and guesses.
I find it difficult to acquit the Sultan and the ruling clique of some pre-knowledge
of what was going on. I think it possible that the coup d’etat was planned for later
this month, perhaps Christmas Day, and that the revolt may have been accelerated by
the progress of Special Branch investigations, and perhaps the visit of Lord Selkirk. I
suspect that the Indonesians encouraged and perhaps even promised assistance to
the rebels, as a means to wreck Malaysia. I suspect that the rebels in Brunei expected
little resistance other than that of the British led Police, because they had been told
that the Sultan himself was well-disposed to the plans and, indeed, would head the
new Federation. With the widespread Brunei irredentism in respect of their lost
territories, it is not beyond possibility that the Sultan himself and his ruling clique
have indeed entertained from time to time dreams of restoring Brunei’s sovereignty
over the lost areas. Was he tempted? Did he procrastinate and temporise to the last
moment, as he does on issues great and small? We know that Azahari had told the
Tunku of his plan to reunite the Borneo Territories under the Sultan and then take
them into Malaysia. I suspect, in fact I am almost sure, that Azahari discussed this
with the Sultan.
Whether or not the Sultan was attracted and had promised to consider the
proposal, but thought he had more time to procrastinate than he had, in fact, got, I
have little doubt that the rebels thought the Sultan was with them. The
comparatively civil attitude to the British, and the hardening of the rebel resistance
with the arrival of outside forces, is in accordance with the manifesto.
30. Had a coup d’etat taken place in Brunei with the Sultan’s secret concurrence,
without bloodshed and without interference with foreign lives and property, there
could hardly have been British intervention but, once the High Commission was
attacked, and Europeans used as a human shield, once Limbang (Sarawak territory)
was attacked, the Brunei rebels must have known that H.M.G. would be forced to
intervene.
The certainty of intervention appears to indicate the rebels’ confidence in outside
support, and the only likely sources are Indonesian or Communist.
31. It is interesting to note that the Kedayans, one time slaves of the Brunei
nobility, have played such an active part, both in the Limbang district, in Sibuti and
Berkenu, as well as in Brunei. I believe that their hostility was directed against the
nobility of Brunei, who have spent the whole period holed up in the Palace with their
wives and children.
With the Party Rakyat in control, they could hope for a happier future, freed for
ever from the rapacious nobility.
32. Though I myself am at present inclined to think that Brunei irredentism and
the hatred of the people for the local nobility were important internal causes, and the
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Indonesian dislike of Malaysia, and the Communist policy of aiding disaffection
important external causes, and however equivocal the conduct of the Sultan and his
closest advisers may have been, we have no choice but publicly to accept the Sultan’s
version of events, i.e. that the ringleaders have staged a revolt against his
Government and made an attempt on his life.
In supporting his version, we appear to be forced to restore, revitalise, and succour
a Government which has been so inept and dilatory that it has to some extent
brought about a rebellion which seems to have been supported by a large proportion
of the Sultan’s subjects. We clearly do not wish to highlight the anti-Malaysian factor
in the rebellion.
33. If I am right in my deductions or guesses, we are faced with the question of
whether the public are going to believe the Sultan’s story that the Party Rakyat
leaders have deliberately misled them into believing that the Sultan himself was to
lead the crusade for the ‘liberation’ of Brunei’s lost territories, that there would be
little or no serious opposition in Brunei, and that Indonesian aid would be
forthcoming, or whether they will believe Azahari, and decide against the Sultan.
There may be a token acceptance of the Sultan’s version while the military
presence is still here, but I have little doubt that the moment an opportunity
presents itself, they will rise again against him and his nobility, and blood will flow.
34. We have written his speeches for him, drafted his appeals to his people to lay
down their arms, persuaded him to adopt a policy of reconciliation, and the
maximum degree of clemency subject to security, in spite of his predilection for
oriental revenge, pressed for immediate relief of the dependants of the casualties on
the rebel side, and of the prisoners, pressed for rural development, land reform, and
as massive as possible a programme of relief work, and the immediate formation of
an Emergency Executive Committee, with myself or my representative included, and
in all this, I am much indebted to Lord Selkirk who pressed, with success, these
points, with the help of Sir Geofroy Tory. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that
the burden will fall on an inept and inexperienced Civil Service, badly shaken by
defection and panic, with our role limited to that of persuasion and cajolery.
35. The Sultan himself is still vaccilating [sic]. He may want to join Malaysia, but
harps on ‘benefits’ for his people from entry. He is clearly most concerned for his
own safety and security of tenure and is thinking in terms of independence with a
British garrison. He shows no sign of appreciating our own position in the area,
defensively or politically. The Mentri Besar, basically anti-British, and isolationist, as
his confidence revives, will be more difficult to persuade or cajole into decisive
action.
36. Three choices appear open to us:—
(1) to support, as we are doing, a discredited Government;
(2) to repudiate the Treaty, in spite of our Shell interest, in view of the
distastefulness of our present position; or
(3) to insist, in conjunction with the Government in Kuala Lumpur, on
immediate acceptance of Malaysia.
Of these, I favour the last.
37. I can only conclude this gloomy tale with an expression of gratitude to Her
Majesty’s Forces, the North Borneo Government, the Malayan Government, and the
Governments of Sarawak and Singapore for their assistance, co-operation and support.
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38. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Earl of Selkirk, the Commander
in Chief, Sir Geofroy Tory, Sir William Goode, and to Sir Alexander Waddell, with the
hope that if copies are required by other posts they will be supplied by your office.
151 T 225/2551 20 Dec 1962
[Brunei revolt]: letter from Lord Selkirk to Mr Macmillan, affirming
Indonesian support for the uprising, the near success of the revolt and
the decadence of the sultanate
[In the absence of White until 10 Dec, Selkirk took charge at the start of the crisis. On 7
Dec he visited Brunei where he found ‘a general air of complacency’ (CO 1030/1068, no
17). On Sunday 9 Dec, Sandys telephoned Selkirk both during and immediately after a
crisis meeting which the secretary of state had called in London and they agreed that
Selkirk should return to Brunei the next day (ibid, no 162). Macmillan insisted on being
kept informed of events by telegram while he was in the Bahamas tensely negotiating
with President Kennedy what came to be known as the Nassau Agreement on nuclear
weapons. The Treasury copy of Selkirk’s letter is preferred to the version in the Prime
Minister’s files, since paragraph 6 of the latter has been excised under 3(4) of the Public
Records Act 1958, see PREM 11/4346.]
Dear Prime Minister,
I have your letter of December 12 and the following is a note on the position to date
in Brunei.
2. I am writing on the morning following Soekarno’s announcement of support
for the Brunei revolt in which he says that ‘any Indonesian would be a traitor who did
not do so’. His words seem to me to echo some of the bouncing threats which we had
to listen to from Hitler in the latter thirties, and with the introduction of Russian
arms and military preparations for West Irian, he is now a formidable military power
who clearly shows signs of wanting to flex his muscles. The border between British
and Indonesian Borneo is some 1,000 miles in length. It is an open frontier and
would be impossible to guard or even to demarcate except in very limited places. The
rugged border area takes a long time to traverse but it could be crossed almost
anywhere by tough guerrillas. Frankly, if Soekarno wants to start guerrilla warfare in
the jungles of Borneo, I can see no end to it so long as he supports it. Moreover, we
do know he wants to kill Malaysia.
3. In Brunei the revolution came within an inch of being completely successful.
Some arrests were made in Sarawak and this probably precipitated the operation by
at least a fortnight or perhaps longer. Warning had come the day before the revolt
started which enabled police stations to be alerted; otherwise airfields would have
been taken, the Sultan captured and we would have had to fight our way ashore from
landing craft in an open coast in the north-east monsoon. Although association with
the revolt was widespread throughout the entire population, there was not much fire
and most rebels were ready to surrender as soon as the police appeared.
4. Whilst I have no proof, it is felt by many, including the High Commissioner,
that the plot was not completely unknown to the Sultan. It may have been that my
visit to him the day before the revolt just swung him against it.
5. The objects of the rebellion, like all these things, seem to be complex. The
incompetence and unpopularity of the ancient Brunei Sultanate was basically the
reason why Rajah Brooke was asked by the Sultan of Brunei to take over increasing
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portions of Sarawak in order to restore peace and this is what the Rajahs achieved.
This revolt was in some measure a continuation of the same process—a revolt
against the decadent remnants of a feudal society, even though the Sultan is the
representative of Allah on earth and is still held in regard by the people. But to this
motive, others were added such as the glory of a greater Brunei extending the whole
length of the three territories; a certain dislike of the Malays; a good many sheer
pecuniary rewards and a general disrespect for the organs of Government which had
certainly deteriorated since 1959 when we ceased to carry any direct responsibility. I
do not put anti-Malaysia very high among the most important motives because quite
clearly no decision had been made on the point and the Sultan remains rather
equivocal about it.
6. I have naturally examined whether we had been let down by our Intelligence
Services. In fact, there was a lot of stuff which had not been properly assessed and
also a certain supineness on the ground. There are three separate Special Branches
for the three territories and my staff maintain the division of M.I.5. and M.I.6., which
is a most serious handicap in an area such as this.1 Moreover, you will recall that the
staff here2 has been heavily cut both in Intelligence and on the Chancery side in the
last twelve months. I have also been inhibited from holding the normal Joint Defence
Advisory Council meetings of the three territories because of the pressure of
investigation and discussion going on about Malaysia. Nevertheless, if we had acted
strongly on such evidence as we had, it might well have led to the movement being
pushed underground with more serious long-term results instead of boiling over as
it has. We have also been unduly trustful in not keeping one single soldier in the
Borneo Territories.
7. My chief concern is to get some life and vigour into the Sultan’s Government.
Two days ago I preached him a sermon on radical reform, but it is his Government
and we must be very careful not to appear to be taking it over; at the moment he is
very willing to co-operate. I am therefore seeking to strengthen the High
Commissioner’s staff so that they are in a position to advise and help in getting the
Government going properly. This is the only way we can safely do it without too
obviously being accused of making the Sultan our pawn.
8. North Borneo has been wonderfully steady and indeed carried out local
elections only three days ago in which the people appear to have supported
overwhelmingly the parties who favour Malaysia. On the whole, Sarawak too has
been steady, although they have a potentially dangerous clandestine communist
organisation mostly run by Chinese.
9. My next concern now, however, is what Indonesia is going to do. I have been
pressing the Foreign Office to make the strongest protests before Soekarno starts
down the slippery path—it may well be that it is too late now. The Tunku in Kuala
Lumpur has been rather over-excited about Indonesian complicity and has made a
number of provocative remarks. Here we must draw the lesson that if he provokes
the Indonesians, it is we who are in the firing line. However, he has been extremely
helpful in sending police, interpreters and interrogation officers to Brunei. Even the
1 In a meeting with Macmillan on 25 Apr 1963, Selkirk drew attention to deficiencies in local intelligence
organisation as revealed by the Brunei revolt, a matter which the secretary to the Cabinet referred to ‘C’
and Roger Hollis (Trend to Garner, 29 Apr 1963, DO 169/226, no 67).
2 ie, commissioner-general’s headquarters.
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Singapore Government have secretly sent some interrogation officers to help deal
with the prisoners in Brunei. I am a little worried about the Singapore Government
for although all their feelings are antagonistic to Indonesia, which they regard with
contempt, and sympathetic towards the Malays, I can never be quite certain which
way they will jump if public opinion swings one way or the other.
10. I find it hard to believe we will not have to ask you to send military
reinforcements here; if our overflying rights in Indonesia are cut and anything goes
wrong with the Maldives,3 we are extremely isolated.
3 Britain’s joint strategy with the US in the Indian Ocean depended on island bases, notably Gan in the
Maldives, see 221, n 3.
152 CO 1030/1466, ff 106–109 29 Dec 1962
[Brunei revolt]: note on future policy by Sir D White for Lord Selkirk
and others attending a meeting in Jesselton on 1 Jan 1963
Assuming that there is no change in our policy of steering Brunei towards Malaysia,
it is imperative that decisions are taken both as to the methods to be employed and as
to timing.
2. The Tunku not only advocates, but is actively instigating, a ‘shotgun’ wedding;
H.M.G. has so far not issued any directive on this, but the consensus of opinion
seems in favour of a more cautious approach, with banns and orange blossom.
3. In my view, the shotgun wedding was only possible in the heat of battle; it is
no longer a feasible solution—it would be damaging both to H.M.G. and the Tunku,
and a risky provocation to Soekarno.
If this view is agreed, it is essential that the Tunku should be persuaded to accept
it.
4. Special Branch investigations confirm most of the preliminary views I had
formed and circulated in a note at our previous meeting.1 We are supporting a
Government without merit and without backing in the State, whose dilatory
methods, lack of integrity and inaccessibility were a contributory factor in the revolt.
If we continue much longer to give our support to the present Government, we
shall be committed irrevocably.
In seeking a decision on policy here, I must add that the present Mentri Besar and
his Deputy are co-operating with us fully, and both seem to have accepted the
principle of the Federation of Malaysia.
5. The Sultan is believed by the TNKU to have been privy to the rebellion and to
have accepted the idea of reunification of the three territories with himself as Ruler. I
suspect that, as is his custom, he equivocated; he shares the long-standing and
deeply-ingrained irredentism of the Brunei Malays and would have been attracted by
the idea of reunification. I imagine that Lord Selkirk’s talk with him awoke him to
the dangers of his position, and he called for British support. I doubt if he had given
his confidence to the Mentri Besar about his intrigue with the TNKU.
I consider it desirable that the Tunku should be informed of the result of Special
1 See 149. For an account of the meeting on 1 Jan, at which White’s second note (152) was tabled, see 155.
13-Malaysia-149-174-cpp  21/9/04  9:08 AM  Page 422
[152] DEC 1962 423
Branch interrogations on this matter. I doubt if he would withdraw his support of the
Sultan, but he might hear of the information through his Malayan officer who was
present at the interrogation of our informant.
I do not think that H.M.G. can withdraw their support from the Sultan in
consequence of our knowledge; nevertheless I have serious doubts as to whether I
should continue to represent H.M.G. in Brunei. My role in Brunei has been
conciliatory; my brief was to re-establish friendly relations with the Sultan and his
leading Government executives. I am inclined to feel that a tougher approach is
needed and that this is more important than proficiency in Malay and a reputation as
a sympathetic conciliator. This is for H.M.G.’s decision, and I shall make no
difficulties, but my resignation might have a salutary effect on the Sultan and his
advisers.2
6. Interrogations so far complete indicate that the Party Rakyat had a political
wing which does not appear to have been actively concerned with the revolt. The
revolutionary wing led locally by Yassin Affendy in Azahari’s calculated absence must
be destroyed, but there does seem a reasonable chance of using the ‘political’ wing,
led by Awang Hafidz (now under interrogation) to bring the non-TNKU element, i.e.
the majority of the native people of Brunei, to accept the idea of independence within
Malaysia.3
7. The following action proposals are tabled for discussion:—
(1) A statement by the Sultan that the revolution has in no way altered his
determination to press on with his plans to become a Constitutional Head of State
with a fully elected popular Government.
(2) That talks take place in the near future between H.M.G. and Brunei to
determine the future of the State in accord with H.M.G.’s expressed determination
to grant independence to all her Colonial and quasi-Colonial territories.
(3) In the light of the discussions with H.M.G., His Highness should appoint an
interim Executive Council, containing members of Party Rakyat (who had not
been members of TNKU), members of the Brunei Malay Teachers’ Association,
Kedayan representatives (if any can be absolved from participation in the revolt),
and representatives of other minority groups. The ruling clique should have the
minimum representation.
This Council should be invited to endorse the decisions reached in talks with
H.M.G. Offstage discussions would have to take place with selected members prior
to their appointment to ensure as far as possible their pre-acceptance of proposals.
(4) The Malayans should undertake a programme of religious and cultural
propaganda to overcome the antipathy of the Bruneis to them, an antipathy which
has been reported to have slackened as a result of the revolt.
(5) Initiation of a campaign of political education by British or Malayan lecturers,
or possibly by both.
N.B. (4) and (5) are the results of Mr. Bennett’s4 talks with Malayan and Brunei
Information staff.
2 See 153. 3 For attempts to ‘turn’ leaders of the PRB, see 153, note.
4 John Still Bennett (not to be confused with John Sloman Bennett of the CO) was regional information
officer, Singapore and Bangkok, 1959–1963. For the publicity drive from early 1963 onwards to present
Malaysia positively to SE Asia and the wider world, see FO 953/2128–2132.
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(6) Pressure should be brought on the Sultan to dispense with the services of at
least some of the holders of top posts in his Government, even if this has to be
achieved by the distribution of honours and financial compensation, and to
appoint more generally acceptable persons, including possibly one or two from
Party Rakyat political wing, on a temporary basis, pending Malaysia.
(7) Assurances will be needed from H.M.G., even if not given publicity, to the
Sultan, the nobility, the ruling clique, Shell and other British commercial
interests, as well as to remaining British Government officials, that British troops
will remain in Brunei until such time as it can be safely assumed that the threat to
internal security is removed. Shell might lose up to 50% of their staff if British
troops were prematurely withdrawn. The Tunku, no doubt, has views on this
point.
(8) LIMBANG: This is not, perhaps, an immediate problem, nor is it my business,
but as much advice has been tendered (and gratefully received) on what should be
done in Brunei, I may be excused from expressing the view that Party Rakyat
intrigues in the area found a such readier response and were on a far larger scale
than were estimated by the authorities.
I do not imagine that the people of Limbang would welcome transfer to Brunei
under its present Government in spite of financial and other attractions;
nevertheless, I imagine that the Tunku will wish this issue to be resolved before
Malaysia.
153 CO 1030/1466, f 112 31 Dec 1962
[Resignation of high commissioner of Brunei]: letter from Sir D
White to Mr Sandys
[In addition to the reasons given in this letter to Sandys, White informed Wallace, ‘I
consider that the Tunku’s questionnaire (which Lord Selkirk forwarded to you with my
notes) is about the most offensive document that a Commonwealth Prime Minister could
send to Her Majesty’s representative. Lord Selkirk told the Tunku of his views in no
uncertain terms, but no one else seems to think it necessary to protest’ (CO 1030/1466, f
102). The Tunku’s questionnaire, which was released in June 2003, accused the British of
gross neglect regarding security (CO 1030/1493, no 1/E). Although they recognised the
difficulties with which White had been contending since the inauguration of Brunei’s
constitution in 1959 and defended him against the Tunku’s charges, Selkirk and
Lansdowne were determined that he should be replaced (CO 1030/1493). So, too, was
Macmillan who had written to Sandys about this as early as 12 Dec (CO 967/419). Sandys
accepted White’s request to retire but did so on health grounds alone; his reply was a
generous tribute to White’s sense of duty and, in focusing exclusively on his medical
circumstances, the secretary of state sealed British ranks against charges of
mismanagement of the Brunei crisis (Sandys to White, personal, 10 Jan 1963, CO
1030/1493; cf Lansdowne to Selkirk, 21 Jan 1963, CO 967/417). White did not leave
immediately and in March 1963 was interviewing PRB detainees (notably Awang Hafidz
Laksamana, Awang Tengah and Pengiran Matusin) in an attempt to turn them into
organisers of a Brunei Alliance that would actively campaign to secure the people’s
acceptance of Brunei’s entry into Malaysia. Angus MacKintosh, who had been deputy
commissioner-general, SE Asia, from 1956 to 1960, served as high commissioner from
Apr to Dec 1963 when he was transferred to the Ministry of Defence and replaced by E O
Laird.]
Now that the more active phase of the Brunei rebellion seems to be under control, I
have the honour to address you upon my own problems as British High Commissioner.
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2. As you are aware, I accepted appointment with the proviso that I should be
permitted to retire after three years instead of the usual five years in office. I have
from time to time raised the question of my retirement with the permanent officials
of the Colonial Office and, indeed, in November, had expressed the opinion that a
change was desirable in view of the overwhelming success of the Party Rakyat at the
polls,1 and the obvious difficulty that I would face, not only in working with them,
but also in persuading the Sultan and the Palace party, with whom I had for so long
been closely associated, that recognition of the Party Rakyat was inevitable, though
distasteful to them. No suitable relief seemed available at the time.
3. I had also come to the conclusion that a tougher line was needed with the
Sultan, if we were to overcome his inability to make up his mind, and had discussed,
without solution, how to achieve this, though, here again, I had expressed doubts as
to my own suitability to implement a tougher policy.
4. It is obvious that I underestimated both the gravity and the imminence of the
threat to the security of the State, and had been inclined to accept Azahari’s
assurances that he intended to employ Constitutional methods to attain his ends.
5. A decision on the future of this unhappy little State is a matter of urgency, but
the political implications of any decision are now of international concern. Under
the circumstances, and after careful and anxious consideration, I have come to the
conclusion that I should offer you my resignation, and this I now do, with the
assurance that I shall accept loyally whatever decision you may care to make.
1 See 150, n 1.
154 CO 1030/1466, no E/7, GM(63)1, annex A nd [Jan] 1963
[Brunei’s political future]: draft telegram from Mr Sandys to Lord
Selkirk
[On 28 Dec Selkirk reported (inward telegram no 96) that the Sultan of Brunei had
decided to accept the principle of Malaysia and to negotiate terms with the Tunku. Selkirk
went on to suggest tactics for fostering the process. The draft reply, which was considered
by the Greater Malaysia (Official) Committee, was later cut on the instructions of the
prime minister. On 2 Jan the secretary of state despatched the abbreviated version. The
draft is printed here, however, since it provides a fuller account of London’s views on the
importance of bringing Brunei into Malaysia and on how to effect the merger.]
Your telegram No. 96.
Brunei
Your telegram has now been considered by Ministers who agree that the policy must
be to persuade, but not to force, the Sultan into Malaysia. Other alternatives, i.e.
independence outside Malaysia, or continuation of status quo, would be most
unsatisfactory both from our point of view and that of the future Government of
Malaysia, and, in the long term, for Brunei itself.
2. The problem is to convince the Sultan of this so that there will be no question
of his reopening negotiations with the Malayan Government under the impression
that, if he cannot get the terms he wants, he has nevertheless two satisfactory fall-
back positions. It would be very awkward if negotiations, once reopened, were not to
succeed.
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3. We suggest, therefore, that when you see the Tunku you should set out, as we
see them, the disadvantages of the alternatives to Malaysia, and discuss with him
whether there would be advantage in a preliminary softening up by us (as you had
suggested in your telegram No. 86). The arguments for and against the two
alternatives to Malaysia seem to be as follows:—
(a) Independence. Mr. Maudling in his letter of the 9th March, 1962 to the Sultan
(copies of which went to Allen, Goode and Tory) set out the objections to both
independence and the status quo, but nevertheless recognised the right of Brunei
to independence ‘whenever difficulties can be resolved to your Highness’s
satisfaction’.1 The Sultan may well feel that there are attractions in independence,
particularly if this were guaranteed either by the U.N., by Indonesia or the
Philippines, or both, or by a Defence Treaty with the U.K. or with Malaysia (which
would in fact exclude the U.K.). From our point of view, of course, the objection to
independence is that we should be unable to protect the oilfields except by
invitation. An independent Brunei would be a focus for subversive operations
against Malaysia in general, and its Borneo components in particular. From the
Sultan’s point of view no guarantees of external protection could help him against
subversive activity which the weakness and wealth of his State would invite.
(b) Status quo. It would not be legally possible for H.M.G. to terminate the 1959
Agreement unilaterally. We should therefore have to seek to persuade the Sultan
(as was done in Mr. Maudling’s letter) that continuation of the Agreement will
become increasingly inappropriate after the independence of the neighbouring
territories. H.M.G. would be prepared to put their reluctance to continue the 1959
Agreement after Malaysia in the strongest terms to the Sultan on the ground that
the advent of Malaysia had radically changed the situation, and that there was now
a much more satisfactory alternative for safeguarding the security of Brunei. We
could emphasise that it would of course be more difficult for the U.K. to assist in
the internal security of Brunei. But in the last resort the Sultan could hold us to
the Agreement and he no doubt realises that we could not afford to leave the
oilfields unprotected.
4. In your telegram No. 86 you suggest that the Secretary of State should have
discussions with the Sultan, but the Sultan’s decision to seek to reopen negotiations
with Malaya seems to have removed any immediate necessity for this. Nevertheless
some softening up may be desirable before negotiations start, and if you think it
would be helpful for you yourself to undertake this, I am sure that White would be
grateful for this supplement of the efforts he has already made (your telegram No. 85
and 86). It might be best if whoever saw the Sultan were to bear a letter from the
Secretary of State.
5. Despite our efforts, however, it may be difficult to persuade the Sultan that
there is no real alternative to Malaysia, and if he finds the terms unattractive he may
well reject it. It may assist in making the Tunku more amenable if you set out to him
also the position as we see it.
6. As regards terms for Brunei to enter Malaysia, we note from paragraph 3 of
your telegram No. 86 that you have already moved the Tunku to concede that some
1 See 95.
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special financial arrangement with Brunei would be justifiable. We certainly regard
some financial concessions as essential, and there may also be other concessions
which could be made which would not have the effect of causing Sarawak and North
Borneo to reopen the Agreements on the Inter Governmental Committee.
7. In our telegram Personal No. 211 to Brunei we asked White whether there was
any possibility of broadening the base of the Brunei Government. We are impressed
with Waddell’s and Goode’s views about the danger of negotiating with the
discredited and unpopular Palace party. While we appreciate the willingness of the
Tunku to negotiate with Marsal,2 this is bound to cause considerable criticism and,
unless the Sultan can come to terms with his people, (your telegram Brief No. 55),
any agreement reached might be difficult to carry through. We agree, however, that,
even if it is not immediately possible for the Sultan to appeal to popular support, the
importance of getting Brunei into Malaysia is such that negotiations with Marsal
should go ahead faute de mieux.
8. As regards any statement by the Sultan, we feel strongly that this should avoid
suggesting that there are any practicable alternatives to Malaysia.
2 Dato Marsal, the Sultan’s chief minister.
155 PREM 11/4346 4 Jan 1963
[Brunei’s political future]: letter from Lord Selkirk to W I J Wallace,
reporting a meeting held at Jesselton on 1 Jan1
I held a meeting on January 1 in Jesselton, at which the Governors of North Borneo
and Sarawak, the High Commissioner, Brunei, the Commander-in-Chief, Far East,
the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Land Forces, the Director of Military Operations,
the three Commissioners of Police and others were present. We discussed the
military and political situation and outlook in various aspects.
2. The discussion on the political future of Brunei took place against the
following background:—
(a) there is no immediate alternative to government by the Sultan through Dato
Marsal;
(b) there is no existing political organisation other than the Party Rakyat;
(c) Azahari cannot in present circumstances be brought back into the body politic;2
(d) unless Azahari has been finally and effectively discredited in Brunei eyes, the
Party Rakyat cannot safely be brought back into the body politic under secondary
leaders and another name;
1 The letter was signed by a member of Selkirk’s staff in his absence.
2 Azahari played no part in the revolt, but, being in the Philippines at the time, he took refuge in the
Indonesian embassy in Manila and later moved to Indonesia. There had been some talk in British circles of
grooming him for government office and, after the revolt, Sir Leslie Fry (British ambassador in Jakarta)
suggested overtures to Azahari. Although de Zulueta felt that ‘there might well be something to be said for
getting Azahari committed to joining Malaysia and then letting him overturn the Sultan who has evidently
not been conspicuously loyal’, he feared that ‘Azahari is too drugged with the idea of becoming an
independent Sultan to see the true dangers of his position if our protection was withdrawn’ (de Zulueta to
Macmillan, 27 Dec 1962, PREM 11/4346; see also, FO 371/169694, nos 3, 5 and 12.).
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(e) conditions do not yet exist in which an alternative political party could be
formed and flourish;
(f) the Tunku appears still anxious to have Brunei in Malaysia;
(g) Malaysia will be less stable without Brunei, whether Brunei is independent or
under British protection;
(h) Brunei would not be able to maintain an acceptable form of independence
outside Malaysia;
(i) effective British protection, even if politically acceptable, would be more
difficult after Malaysia.
3. Each of the above propositions is arguable, but I myself believe that they must
all be accepted.
4. There is no doubt that we must do all we can, in concert with the Tunku, to
get Brunei into Malaysia. The question is whether the operation is to be a ‘shotgun’
marriage, a long and seemly courtship, or something between the two.
5. A shotgun marriage—that is to say a decision by the Sultan, taken and
announced in the very near future, that he will join Malaysia—would certainly be
offensive to large sections of world opinion. It might also, though I am less sure of
this, increase tension or at least bitterness within Brunei. Further, I doubt whether
we could induce the Sultan to agree, even if we were prepared explicitly to threaten
abrogation of our agreement.
6. A long courtship is in my view impracticable. Insofar as the Sultan’s
administration improves, it will make him more confident in his ability to sit on the
fence. If it does not improve, the courtship will not prosper. Further, I do not believe
that the Tunku will be prepared to wait for very long; and the conditions for Brunei’s
accession will probably become stiffer and less acceptable as time goes by. Lastly, I
am frankly doubtful whether, in the foreseeable future, the Sultan will be able to so
popularise the idea of Malaysia in advance of the realisation as to be able to achieve a
convincing popular endorsement of it.
7. The solution, in my view, and I think also in that of most of those present at
the meeting, seems to be to concert with the Tunku and the Sultan a programme on
the following lines:—
(a) Tunku and Sultan to make contact and satisfy themselves and H.M.
Government—H.M. Government acting in an intermediary rôle if necessary—
that agreement can and will be reached on terms for Brunei’s accession to
Malaysia.
(b) Sultan to make (but not announce) irrevocable decision to carry negotiations
on accession through to a conclusion.
(c) Sultan to announce that he is entering into these negotiations.
(d) H.M. Government to welcome this announcement, while emphasising that the
final decision is for the Sultan and the Tunku.
(e) Sultan to institute a careful programme of propaganda and projection
covering the following points:—
(i) within Malaysia, inevitable return to representative Government;
(ii) pending Malaysia, amnesty or clemency, relief, rehabilitation, development,
administrative vigour;
(iii) outside Malaysia, inability of Brunei to survive alone indefinitely.
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In this connexion, Meadows3 has made a most impressive start in revivifying the
administration, and if the momentum which he is generating can be kept up, I do
not by any means exclude the possibility of a real reconciliation between the people
of Brunei and their Government.
8. I hope to discuss a programme on the foregoing lines with Tun Razak on
January 4. The Federation Government must at all costs accept that negotiations
must succeed; there can be no third attempt. Further, they must see that their
Malayans in Brunei do their very best to support the Sultan’s efforts to popularise
Malaysia. If you have any qualifications or comments to make, I hope that you will
make them very soon, before it is too late.
9. I am sending copies of this letter to the High Commissioner in Brunei, the
Governors of North Borneo and Sarawak, the High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur
and our Ambassadors in Djakarta and Manila.
3 P H Meadows joined the MCS in 1948 and served in Singapore from 1951. An expatriate officer in Lee
Kuan Yew’s government, he was on the point of resigning following victimisation by Ong Eng Guan when
Lee transferred him to the Prime Minister’s office as deputy permanent secretary (see 15, n 3). He later left
the public for the private sector in Singapore. Immediately after the Brunei revolt, Selkirk sought
experienced officers for special tasks in Brunei on a short-term basis and Meadows was appointed deputy
high commissioner. Working on a plan for administrative reform in consultation with the Sultan, he made
an immediate impact and, had his firm been willing to extend his secondment, he would have been
considered as a replacement for White. See CO 1030/1450; H P Hall to Selkirk, 24 Dec 1962, CO
1030/1466; Selkirk to Wallace, 8 Jan 1963, CO 1030/1489.
156 PREM 11/4346 5 Jan 1963
[Singapore arrests]: inward telegram no 13 from Lord Selkirk to 
Mr Sandys
[Several times after mid-Dec, Moore spoke with Lee about reviving the plan to arrest
suspected subversives. The British believed that this was the only way to induce the
Tunku to accept merger with Singapore, whereas Lee feared the Tunku would abandon
Malaysia once the threat of subversion had been eliminated. On 1 Feb the ISC decided to
go ahead with operation ‘Cold Store’, see 148 and 158.]
Moore saw Lee Kuan Yew again yesterday. Lee is still extremely worried lest, after the
arrests have been made in Singapore, the Tunku may eventually decide either not to
go through with Malaysia at all or to leave out Singapore. His reasons are as follows.
First, he argues that the Tunku may feel that, having eventually persuaded Lee Kuan
Yew and the British to take action against the Communists in Singapore, he need no
longer fear Singapore as a subversive threat to the Federation. In these
circumstances the Tunku might think it would be better after all to leave Singapore
to the British to handle. Secondly, Lee is concerned about the possibility of the
Tunku’s nerve failing altogether on Malaysia, especially if Indonesian intervention
and pressure persists and grows. He contrasts the Tunku’s initial strong reactions to
Indonesia with his more recent statements which seem to indicate weakness. He
quoted the following two passages from speeches by the Tunku reported in the
‘Straits Times’ on the 2nd and 4th January respectively:—
‘So far Indonesia has been attacking us with words’ he said ‘and so long as
words are used against us we will return the compliments in full measure.
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But if it comes to a hot war in which guns and bullets are used we are
helpless’.
‘We have neither war planes nor war ships and not even firearms to fight with
any country’.
Lee is beginning to wonder whether, in the light of these statements, he can have any
confidence that the Tunku would persist with Malaysia in the face of serious
Indonesian ‘volunteer’ intervention in Borneo.
2. Lee went on to say that, while he would like the arrests to take place, he would
much prefer to get beforehand a written assurance from the Tunku that, if the
arrests were made, Malaysia, including Singapore, would definitely come into being
on the 31st August 1963. Moore pointed out again, however, that it hardly seemed
practical politics to ask the Tunku for such a written assurance since we cannot seem
to bargain the arrests against Malaysia. If the arrests are justified, they should be
made irrespectively of Malaysia. Lee’s answer to this is that he has always said it is
not possible to arrest the Communists in Singapore except as part of the merger
arrangement under which Kuala Lumpur takes over responsibility for Singapore’s
internal security and that he could never make the arrests on his own. While it is
true that Lee has always been consistent on this point, I am sure we cannot hope to
extract such a written undertaking from the Tunku and that it would be bad tactics
to try. The Tunku has said he will accept Singapore into Malaysia provided two
conditions are met. First that the Borneo territories must enter at the same time
and, secondly, that the arrests should be made in Singapore. With this I think we
must be content. Lee appeared reluctantly to accept that a written undertaking was
not feasible but he may return to the idea.
3. Having explored this possibility, Lee then said that he would go through with
the arrests provided the British were prepared to assure him that there was no
likelihood of the Tunku going back on Malaysia. Moore reiterated what he said in the
previous conversation, namely, that he had no reason to suppose that the Tunku
would go back on Malaysia provided his two conditions in regard to the Borneo
territories and the arrests were met. He undertook, however, to report these views to
you and to give Lee an answer early next week.
4. After speaking to Razak yesterday, I do not share Lee’s apprehension about the
Tunku’s resolution. We are, however, advised by Tory, and I see no reason to
question his advice, that there is a real risk the Tunku will try to drop Singapore
from Malaysia if the arrests are not carried out. Furthermore, Lee is apparently
prepared to accept his share of the public responsibility if the arrests are made and it
would be a very considerable achievement with important long term implications to
have Lee publicly committed to the arrest of Communists and their sympathisers in
Singapore. I think, therefore, our policy must be to assume that the Tunku will go
through with Malaysia and to try to strengthen his resolve by dealing with the
security situation in Singapore in the way he has always wanted.
5. I should be grateful, however, if Tory could let you have his views on (a) the
likelihood of the Tunku dropping Singapore from Malaysia if the arrests are not
carried out fairly soon; and (b) the possibility of the Tunku dropping Malaysia
altogether in the face of Indonesian opposition and possible intervention.
6. Subject to any contrary views Tory may have, I would recommend that we tell
Lee at once that we have no reason to suppose that the Tunku will fail to go through
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with Malaysia, including Singapore, provided the arrests are made and Lee does not
thereafter try to shirk his responsibility. I hope Lee will be satisfied with this answer
and will be prepared to proceed. He mentioned that he was now in favour again of a
large-scale operation involving the arrest of some 180 people including members of
the Singapore Assembly and the banning of the Barisan Socialis. He realises that
there is no question of similar action in the Federation.
157 PREM 11/4346 17 Jan 1963
[Indonesian subversion of the Borneo territories and the future
defence of Malaysia]: letter from Lord Selkirk to Mr Macmillan
[A week after Selkirk’s letter to Macmillan, the foreign secretary informed Cabinet of
‘continuing indications of an attempt by Indonesia to subvert the Borneo Territories by
gradual infiltration’ and of British consultations with the US, Australia and New Zealand
about ‘the possibility of promoting joint measures to restrain the Indonesian
Government’. He added that it would be necessary ‘to seek to dissuade the Government of
the Philippines from supporting Indonesian policies in this area’. Accepting that ‘it might
well be necessary to take further measures’ to prevent the renewal of Indonesian
aggression, Cabinet approved the attempt to work out a joint policy with other
governments so that Indonesia should be left in no doubt that, ‘unless they abandoned
their intentions in relation to Borneo, they would be liable to meet concerted resistance’.
Cabinet returned to the subject a week later when the foreign secretary reported
continuing military activity by Indonesia that had resulted in some troops in the UK
being placed on 72-hour alert. He also mentioned the possibility of the Philippines
making common cause with Indonesia. On 7 Feb the foreign secretary reported, though
with little conviction, Indonesia’s denial of aggressive intent towards the Borneo
territories (CC 6(63)2, 24 Jan; CC 9(63)4, 31 Jan; CC 10(63)2, 7 Feb 1963, CAB 128/37).]
Since my letter of December 201 on the revolt in Brunei, later information has on the
whole served to underline what I said at that time. But it has become clear that,
although the revolt was not communist inspired, the communists are using, and will
continue to use, it and its aftermath to achieve their aim of preventing the formation
of Malaysia or of disrupting it when formed.
2. Recent events, however, have somewhat altered the image of Malaysia. Brunei,
who one would have thought would be the easiest candidate to bring into Malaysia
both from the historic and the ethnical associations, may now prove to be the most
difficult. Although Brunei does not represent more than about seven per cent of the
total population of the Borneo territories it constitutes a focal point on which
Indonesia can concentrate her designs to infiltrate with the resources amply
available to her for the purpose. To this must be added the deterioration of
Indonesian/Malayan relations which have never been good. We are thus presented
with bigger problems to face both in the formation of Malaysia and in the
maintenance of its security and stability when it comes into existence. Not that the
new image is altogether gloomy. Far from it. Indonesian interference in the Borneo
territories has swung opinion in North Borneo and Sarawak firmly in favour of
Malaysia and has convinced many of the Chinese in Singapore that while a merger
under the Malays may not be ideal, it is infinitely preferable to being absorbed by an
expansionist Indonesia. These developments serve, however, to underline the
1 See 151.
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importance of attaining Malaysia if we are to hope to maintain any stability in this
area where, to the north we have a desperate war in Vietnam and in the south there is
Indonesia, well armed and highly unstable.
3. The resultant position is a clear need to increase the defensive capacity of
Malaysia, to which I do not doubt we will have to make a greater contribution than we
had perhaps originally thought necessary. In other words, we will have to recognise
that our military assistance to Malaysia during the formative stage may have to be
larger and last longer than we had previously thought would be the case. This will be
further complicated by the inevitable overlap of two tasks, the maintenance of internal
security and of security against external aggression; it is now clear how very difficult
it will be to distinguish between these roles and to restrict our obligations. The military
aspect of these problems is now being examined by the Commander-in-Chief’s military
planners. This may mean an increase in our burden in this area; but I am sure our
Malaysia policy is right and has been amply justified by events.2
2 The document is incomplete: paragraph 4 has been deleted and retained under 3(4) of the Public Records
Act.
158 CO 1030/1577, no E/99 [1 Feb] 1963
‘The communist conspiracy’: paper authorised by the Internal
Security Council of Singapore, accounting for operation ‘Cold Store’
[Meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 1 Feb, the ISC decided to proceed in the early hours of the
next day with what was code-named operation ‘Cold Store’. They authorised 169 arrests of
which about 120 were made, including those of Ahmad Boestamam, James Puthucheary,
Sidney Woodhull and Lim Chin Siong. Boestamam was detained on account of his links
with Indonesia and alleged involvement in the Brunei rising. Lim Chin Siong went into
captivity having refused Lee Kuan Yew’s offer of a safe passage out of Singapore. At the
same time the ISC approved a public statement to which was annexed an explanatory
paper, ‘The communist conspiracy’, which security and intelligence officers had drafted at
Lee Kuan Yew’s request. ‘Cold Store’ provoked protests in Singapore and internationally.
A team of British Labour MPs visited Singapore in May to find 35 persons still in solitary
detention and Amnesty International campaigned on their behalf.]
The Communist Party of Malaya is a pan-Malayan Party and has claimed that it never
recognised the ‘false’ separation of the two Malayan territories. The aim of the
Communist Party of Malaya is to establish in the Federation and Singapore a
Communist State of Malaya.
2. In 1951 the Party foiled in its attempt to establish such a state by armed
revolution in Malaya, switched its tactics to the familiar Communist methods of the
‘United Front’ and the ‘peaceful constitutional struggle’. Significantly, however, the
Party did not disband the defeated remnant of its terriorist force, but kept it in being
both as a symbol of resistance and as a potential nucleus for a revival of the ‘armed
struggle’ at any time when conditions appear favourable.
3. Deriving its inspiration from the revolutionary experience of the Chinese
Communist Party, the Communist Party of Malaya is at present in the stage of
development described by the CCP as the ‘minimum programme’. ‘Anti-imperialism’
is the keynote of this stage. The United Front, described by the Malayan Communists
themselves as ‘not an organisation but a sort of struggle strategy’, is the principal
instrument of the minimum programme.
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4. The ‘United Front’ is an auxiliary unit of the C.P.M. terriorist force. It
comprises all those organisations which are either controlled or penetrated by
members of the Communist Party of Malaya and, pretending to be independent,
endeavour to attract non-Communists to them so as to appear ‘respectable’. Its
purpose is to advance the cause of Communism in Malaya and Singapore and its
main tasks are:—
(i) To recruit adherents to Communism and once recruited to train them into
cadres and open front workers.
(ii) To join whenever expedient with non-Communist organisations in pursuing a
common objective which is to the ultimate advantage of the Communist Party.
(iii) To provide cover for secret Communists.
5. The Communists in Singapore began to implement this new United Front
policy in 1955. Their leaders, trained as underground CPM cadres in numerous cells
in the trade unions, schools and rural organisations, first attempted to gain power
through winning key positions in the socialist and non-Communist Peoples Action
Party. They hoped to use the P.A.P. as the main instrument by which the United
Front would capture political power in Singapore. During the years 1955 to 1959,
making use of the organisation, skill and experience they had accumulated over a
period of more than 30 years, the Communists heavily infiltrated the P.A.P. but never
succeeded in exploiting it as a subservient and effective instrument of the United
Front. As part of their United Front tactics they began penetrating the trade union
movement and by 1956 had made considerable progress in gaining control of it.
6. In 1955/56 the Communists, at the same time as attempting to achieve a
dominant influence in the PAP, made considerable progress in gaining control of the
bulk of the trade union movement. The militant policy of the Communist-led unions
provoked a series of strikes and industrial disputes designed to inflame the workers
against the ‘foreign capitalists’. The CPM drew upon the extensive student
organisations which it had recruited during the previous five years to provide
militant support for the strikers. The unrest culminated in the widespread rioting
and mass arrests of 1956 and 1957.
7. The Communists acknowledged the tactical mistakes of 1956/57 which caused
the loss of many valuable party cadres and the disruption of United Front work. The
CPM circulated a pamphlet of self-criticism entitled ‘Summary of Experiences of the
Anti-Persecution Struggle’ for the training of Communist cadres in United Front
work in future. Attributing the setbacks of 1956/57 to incorrect tactical guidance
arising from the ‘left-wing adventurist policy’ of the open leaders of the United Front,
the document called for a fundamental policy in future to ‘conceal the best cadres
and conserve our strength’. To implement this policy the CPM in Singapore
tightened its security measures, withdrawing valuable cadres to safe areas and
disbanding its subsidiary organisation, the Anti-British League.
8. The period 1959 to 1961 marked the final attempt by the Communists to
dominate the P.A.P. after the P.A.P. took office following the 1959 elections. Lim
Ching Siong, Fong Swee Suan and other experienced Communist cadres released
from detention established themselves and their followers in key posts in the trade
union movement. They quickly dominated the already Communist dominated
Singapore General Employees’ Union and used it as a base from which to extend
their penetration to other unions. They established a similar grip on organisations of
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rural dwellers, and thereby hoped to secure their ‘mass base’, in accordance with
Communist doctrine, in the ‘workers-peasant alliance’. By drawing individual unions
together into federations under their control and establishing a similar grip on
organisations of rural dwellers, they hoped to secure their ‘mass base’, in accordance
with Communist doctrine, in the ‘workers-peasants alliance’.
9. The open break with the P.A.P. came with the announcement of joint support
for the Malaysia Plan by the Prime Ministers of the Federation of Malaya and
Singapore. The achievement of Malaysia should have accorded with the Communists’
own proclaimed aims of national unity and independence, but their calculations had
in fact been based on the premise of an isolated Singapore where they could make a
bid for political control at the next elections and secure self-government with the
Internal Security Council abolished. With merger and Malaysia internal security
would be in the hands of a central government which could not be captured from
Singapore alone. Moreover, a central government of an independent nation could
deal more effectively with Communist subversion. The Communists would not then
be able to raise a successful counter-attack to rally people on the basis that action
against them was colonialist oppression in a non-independent Singapore for the
benefit of British military and economic interests. Therefore although committed to
the principle of merger, the Communists were obliged to oppose its achievement by
every possible means and thereby to expose the fact that the only Malaysia they
wanted was one under Communist domination. After a final unsuccessful bid in July
1961 to capture the Government they established their own front party, the Barisan
Sosialis, which has since become the principal vehicle of their United Front strategy.
10. Entrenched in the key positions in the C.E.C., particularly those of
Secretary-General and Organising Secretary, the Communists have absolute control
of the Barisan Sosialis. The United Front has now become identifiable and exposed by
the dominant influence which these same Communists in the Barisan Sosialis have
established over their own mass organisations in the trade union, rural organisation
and educational fields. Communist leaders of the Barisan Sosialis are at the same
time advisers to important trade unions, members of the Executive Council of the
‘Singapore Association of Trade Unions’ and organisers behind the scenes of
Communist activity by their puppet rural organisations and student action
committees.
11. The past year-and-a-half since the formation of the Barisan Sosialis have
provided a series of examples of the Communists’ mobilization and engagement of
the United Front to exploit any issue to foment bitterness, frustration and hatred
amongst the people so that Barisan Sosialis can increase their following and the
Communists increase their influence amongst the masses. In each case the
technique was the same. Students were invited to oppose the Government and go
against their parents on the pretext of defending Chinese education. Rural dwellers
were incited to obstruct and damage Government’s rural development projects
designed to improve conditions on the grounds that the compensation they received
for resettlement was inadequate. Workers were told that merger with the Federation
of Malaya would lead to their suppression and the de-registration of their unions. In
each case the Communists took an issue on which a section of the public could be
made dissatisfied and by irresponsible propaganda exploited it to prevent the
government from resolving the issue. They used the various newspapers and
publications of the United Front to distort the facts and whip up public feeling. In
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addition various components of the United Front were brought out in support by the
issuing of public statements, resolutions, memoranda, circulars, pamphlets, etc., to
convey to the public an impression of massive support for their issue. And all the
time the Communist manipulators sheltered behind the cover of lawfully registered
organisations.
12. The outstanding example of this mobilization of the various components of
the United Front occurred in the National Referendum campaign. A ‘Referendum
Working Committee’ was set up under the chairmanship of Fong Swee Suan. Under
its direction Barisan Sosialis branches appointed their own working committees to
conduct the anti-Referendum campaign in the various constituencies. All the main
components gave the public an impression of mass support for the issue. And all the
time the Communists sheltered behind the cover of the legally constituted
organisation.
13. These local working committees comprised representations of all component
organisations of the United Front in that constituency, which had a significant
following in the locality concerned. Thus in a rural constituency the leading part in
the local working committees was played by the local officials of the Communist-
controlled S.R.R.A. and S.C.P.A. assisted by the local branch officials of the B.S.S. and
members of the Communist-dominated O.B.A. or one or more trade unions. In the
urban districts the strongest S.A.T.U. controlled trade unions in the constituency
concerned was represented on the local working committees, again together with the
local Barisan branch officials and members of teachers and O.B.A.
14. The working committees established in the way were responsible, in
accordance with central direction from the Communist leaders on the National
Referendum Working Committee, for the massive propaganda campaign all over the
island for blank votes in the Referendum involving local mass rallies, banners and
posters, house-to-house canvassers, and other demonstrations of ‘the peoples’
hostility to the phoney Merger’. The National Working Committee also involved
another component of the United Front, the N.U.S.U., in their campaign and at its
instigation the students organised so-called gallup polls in two constituencies on the
following pretext of it being ‘for academic research’.
15. In the left-wing trade union field, the United Front tactics were most clearly
demonstrated when the Communists, having failed to capture the Singapore Trade
Union Congress, set up in June 1962, a ‘Singapore Trade Unions Working
Committee’. The Committee served as a central body for the direction of Communist
activity within left-wing trade unions and for the co-ordination of the United Front
activity with its other components. Hussein Jahidin was Chairman with S. Ghouse,
Secretary of the Naval Base Labour Union as Secretary-General, Tan Teck Wah,
President of the Singapore General Employees’ Union, and Dominic Puthucheary,
Vice President of the S.G.E.U. and member of Barisan Sosialis Executive Committee.
This Committee invited representatives from over 100 civil organisations to two
meetings at the Singapore Motor Workshop Employees’ Union premises to oppose
the Referendum Bill. Both meetings were banned by the Government.
16. The similarity of this Committee to the 1956 Civil Rights Convention
Committee whose meetings led to the riots of October 1956 was quite obvious. The
Civil Rights Convention Committee of 1956 was sponsored and organised by the so-
called ‘95 Trade Union Working Committee’. The activities of the 1962 Singapore
Trade Unions Working Committee were specifically designed to mobilize mass
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support for a Communist-inspired political issue and were of the same pattern as in
1956. They were in no way connected with legitimate industrial grievances. If these
activities had been allowed to continue they would have led to a similar situation as
in the 1956, resulting in bloodshed and rioting.
17. As a result of the exposure the Communist directors of the S.T.U.W.C.
allowed this organisation to lapse and revived the activities of SATU as a cover for
their political objectives. Fong Swee Suan has taken direct charge of SATU and its
organisation has been strengthened to provide firmer control by its leaders over its
40 affiliated unions.
18. The Communists have used their domination of the Singapore Rural
Residents and Country Peoples Associations and the Hawkers’ Union to incite the
rural population to oppose government development projects to improve their living
conditions. Many of the leading officials of these organisations, headed by Fong Beng
Boo and Lim Woon Chye, Paid Secretaries of the S.R.R.A., have had considerable
experience of United Front activity in former banned Communist-controlled
organisations such as the Singapore Chinese Middle School Students’ Union and the
Singapore Farmers’ Association. Under their leadership the S.R.R.A., S.C.P.A. and
Hawkers’ Union participated in the B.S. Referendum and anti-Merger campaigns.
They also instigated local dwellers to obstruct government development work such
as the canal construction in the Kampong Ang Teng area in October 1962. When
these tactics were exposed by the Government, the S.R.R.A. leaders taking their
direction from Lim Ching Siong, called off their obstruction campaign. Now their
new tactics are to attempt to claim credit amongst the people for forcing
Government to carry out improvements on their behalf.
19. The same United Front has been mobilized for the campaign to create an
issue over Chinese education. A Chinese Middle School Students’ Action Committee
was set up to boycott the Government Secondary IV Examinations in November 1961
and its agitation amongst the students was given extensive and seditious publicity in
the United Front publications. The agitation was resumed in November 1962.
However they failed to win sufficient support and the United Front leadership not
daring to risk failure in conducting a further boycott campaign abandoned its plans.
Communists and their sympathisers in influential positions in the Nanyang Guild of
Graduates, the 33 Chinese School Old Boys’ Associations and the Nanyang University
Students’ Union have concerted to mount a politically-inspired campaign to create
an issue over Chinese education. They are currently engaged in attempting to
organise a ‘torch campaign’ for this purpose. This also is receiving United Front and
Barisan Sosialis support.
20. What has been described so far is the way the Communists have used
organisations under their control for United Front activity. In contrast to this is the
way the Communists have formed temporary alliances with non-Communist and
even anti-Communists elements to exploit an issue and to extend their influence
over the masses. A particular example was the participation of the Barisan Sosialis in
the Council of Joint Action formed, organised by the Liberal Socialist Party and
supported by the Singapore Workers’ Party to oppose the Merger proposals and the
National Referendum. However, people generally recognised that the Communists
were only using these persons and organisations for their own ends and that their
propaganda concerning ‘second class citizenship’ was false. The electorate firmly
endorsed the merger proposals. But although unsuccessful in using the Council of
13-Malaysia-149-174-cpp  21/9/04  9:08 AM  Page 436
[158] FEB 1963 437
Joint Action to mobilise public support for their stand against Merger at the
Referendum, they nevertheless succeeded in isolating the Chairman of the Singapore
Workers’ Party as a prelude to his eventual ousting from that party and its capture by
the pro-Communist faction.
21. Lim Ching Siong’s admission of the Referendum result as a ‘minor and
temporary setback’ indicated Communist recognition of the defeat of their campaign
against Merger. A new phase of the struggle opened, its basis to be broadened to
include all the racial communities of the future Malaysia. For this purpose the
Communists had already established an instrument under their own control in the
form of a ‘Liaison Secretariat’ of the ‘Malaysian Socialist Conference’ at Barisan
Sosialis Headquarters in Singapore with Dr. Poh Soo Kai, the Assistant Secretary-
General of the Barisan Sosialis as its Executive Secretary. Lim Ching Siong told his
followers that they must take heed of any favourable conditions offered to the
Malayan ‘socialist’ forces in future, extend their activities outside Singapore and
make the best use of all methods available, seeking co-operation from the left-wing
and anti-colonial forces in Malaya and the Borneo territories.
22. After the Referendum results, the Communists re-appraised the situation
and on 12.9.62 Lim Ching Siong announced the policy along which the United Front
was to operate for the immediate future. Lim Ching Siong’s admission of the
Referendum result as a ‘minor and temporary setback’ indicated Communist
recognition of the defeat of their campaign against Merger. Lim laid down three
principles for the future struggle:—
(i) To persist in the exploitation of ‘constitutional struggle’ so long as the
administration allowed the conditions for it;
(ii) To strengthen national unity by facing the problems of plural communities
throughout Malaysia, and thereby broadening the basis of the struggle; and, in
particular to include the Malays;
(iii) On the mass foundation of the workers and peasants to work for a united
majority by drawing in the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie.
Lim Ching Siong finally told his followers that they must take heed of any
favourable conditions offered to them in future, extend their activities outside
Singapore and make the best use of all methods available, seeking co-operation from
the left-wing and anti-colonial forces in Malaya and the Borneo territories.
23. The Communists have evidently been in some doubt as to the best methods
for implementing this policy. The ‘peaceful constitutional struggle’ was shown by the
Referendum results not to be paying all the dividends they had hoped. The
experience of Communist parties elsewhere showed that the armed struggle was also
necessary to achieve the complete revolution. The Communists were reminded by
Lim Ching Siong in his veiled New Year message on 1.1.63 to appreciate the teaching
of Lenin, as quoted in the Statement of 81 Parties adopted at the Moscow Conference
in 1960, that ‘the ruling classes never relinquished power voluntarily’. For this
reason the founders of Communism laid down that the armed struggle would always
have to be co-ordinated with the constitutional method and that the success of the
revolution would depend on how well prepared the Communist parties were for any
swift and sudden replacement of one form of struggle by another.
24. These problems and the implementation in Singapore of Communist theory
were discussed at a series of cadre training meetings held by the Barisan Sosialis
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SGEU and other components of the United Front in the months after the
Referendum. In all cases the policy and tactics advocated by Lim Ching Siong on
12th September, 1962, in his re-appraisal of the situation after the Referendum
setback, were accepted as the fixed party line for the future. His speech on that
occasion, his Annual Report as Secretary-General of the Barisan Sosialis and Fong
Swee Suan’s Annual Report of SATU were circulated for study and purposes of
‘political education’ to the various component organisations of the United Front in
the trade unions, rural associations, cultural associations and student clubs.
25. The outbreak of the revolt in Brunei on 8.12.62 provided the Communists in
the United Front with the type of situation which Lim Ching Siong had described in
his policy speech. On the night of 9.12.62 the Barisan Sosialis issued a statement
supporting the revolt. They organised a mass rally on 23.12.62 and instigated
Singapore Partai Rakyat leaders to come out in open support of the Brunei revolt.
The leaders of the Barisan Sosialis were also instrumental in causing the Communist
controlled SATU and SGEU to bring out all pro-Communist trade unions in
Singapore in support of the revolt.
26. It has also been known that long before the Brunei revolt, Lim Ching Siong
had been in regular secret contact with A.M. Azahari, the leader of the revolt. Their
meetings had been arranged by Said Zahari,1 a close associate of Lim Ching Siong
and other Communist United Front leaders. On all the visits of A.M. Azahari to
Singapore during the past year, Said Zahari, was his closest associate and confidant
in Singapore. On two occasions they held clandestine meetings arranged on both
occasions by Said Zahari. One took place at 2315 hours on 4.3.62 at No.118
Tembeling Road. On the occasion of his last visit to Singapore between 29.11.62 and
7.12.62, Said Zahari arranged a meeting between A.M. Azahari and Lim Ching Siong
at the Tiong Hwa Restaurant in Prinsep Street at 1240 hours on 3.12.62. Three days
later he fled to Manila.
27. It will be seen therefore that whilst the Communist conspiracy in Singapore
is still a ‘peaceful’ and an open one it contains within itself the seeds of violence. The
United Front must always be regarded as one of the two prongs of the Communist
revolution. The other is militant terrorism. There can be no doubt that the hard core
organisers and their collaborators of the Communist conspiracy in Singapore believe
that the armed struggle remains a weapon to be employed when even [ever?] the
opportunity arises. In the meantime the instrument to be used to further the
Communist cause is a ‘constitutional socialist party’ leading the United Front by
controlling registered ‘legal’ organisations of workers, peasants and students and
allied with carefully placed cadres in other political parties. By means of this ‘United
Front’, the Communists are conspiring to win power in Singapore and ultimately
throughout Malaysia. The Communists in the United Front, which has now
consolidated its strength, are trying their utmost to prevent the State of Singapore
from attaining complete independence through Merger with the Federation of
Malaya. The Merger proposals have been endorsed by an overwhelming majority of
the people of Singapore at the National Referendum. It is evident that their intention
1 Said Zahari, editor of Utusan Melayu until that newspaper was brought under UMNO control and he was
exiled to Singapore in Aug 1961, has recorded his arrest at dawn on 2 Feb 1963 and the subsequent 17
years of detention in Dark clouds at dawn: a political memoir (Kuala Lumpur, 2001).
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is to set up a Communist controlled Singapore to use it as a base, to capture the
Governments of the other territories of Malaysia. The Communist pose a serious
security threat to the future peace, prosperity and independence of Singapore and
the other territories of Malaysia.
159 FO 371/169695, no 35 7 Feb 1963
[Malaysia and the UN]: letter from Sir P Dean1 to A D Wilson2
[Writing to the FO from New York as head of the UK Mission to the UN, Dean noted the
increased interest now taken in Malaysia as a result of lobbying by parties from Singapore
and Sarawak as well as the Philippine claim to North Borneo. Conscious that the success
of British policy would hinge on support from America (as well as Australia and New
Zealand), he noted growing US concern about the implications of Malaysia for
international relations in the region. As the subsequent quadripartite talks revealed,
Britain’s allies were reluctant to participate in concerted action to prevent Indonesian
interference in the Borneo territories, see 160–162. Replying on behalf of the FO on 18
Feb, Peck asked Dean to assess the likelihood of UN support for a plebiscite in the Borneo
territories, since, despite their objections to it, the British might have to resort to that
option as a way of fending off the Philippine claim to North Borneo.]
Adlai Stevenson3 has recently expressed some concern to me about the Malaysia
project, and this, I am sure, reflects a general unease amongst the Americans on the
possibility of having to take sides once more in a colonial dispute. Stevenson’s chief
point was that time is of the essence, and that the sooner Malaysia can become a fait
accompli the better for all concerned.
2. I have explained to him the position as I understand it, which is that a
conference will shortly be held, probably in March, between the British and Malayan
governments, at which a formal agreement will be signed providing for the transfer
of sovereignty in North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore by August 31, 1963.
However, I was unable to tell Stevenson exactly when the conference would be held,
what other steps (apart from an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament) would have
to take place thereafter and what the prospects were of Malaysia coming into effect
before August 31, 1963. Another point raised by Stevenson, and which I could not
answer, was whether the three territories would in fact have a brief moment of
independence (a few days or even a few hours) before union with Malaya takes place
(as happened with British Somaliland and Somalia).4
3. We were much heartened by the decision to bring forward the date of the Aden
Federation from March 1 to mid-January, as I think this will put us in a stronger
position when the Committee of Twentyfour 5 begins, and if the establishment of
Malaysia could similarly be brought forward to (say) mid-June, this (as indeed any
advancement) would be welcomed by the Americans and our other friends here and
make our task considerably easier. If the advancement of the date could be kept
1 The letter was signed by Alan Campbell in Dean’s absence.
2 A D Wilson, assistant under-secretary, FO, 1960–1964.
3 Adlai Stevenson, US delegate to the UN, 1961–1965.
4 The FO firmly discounted this suggestion which had been considered and rejected some time before.
5 UN Committee of Twenty-Four (formerly Committee of Seventeen) was responsible for overseeing
colonialism and was generally critical of British colonial policy.
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secret so that our critics believe that August 31 remains the target date, so much the
better.
4. I realise that those concerned with this project are anxious to bring it into
being as soon as possible and that a great deal has already been accomplished in a
relatively short time to meet this end. However, there has been, as you know, a great
increase in interest here at the United Nations in Malaysia in the past weeks, and
pressures for some form of U.N. intervention may well build up in the coming
months. The Indonesians and the Filipinos look bent on stirring up trouble in one
form or another. I suggest, therefore, that our own interests in the United Nations
and the need to retain American confidence and support, are added reasons for
bringing Malaysia into being at the earliest possible date.
5. I hope that you will be able to let me have your comments on this question
before too long, as I have promised Stevenson that I will give him further
information as soon as possible. I am sending a copy of this letter to Greenhill6 in
Washington and am enclosing additional copies of this letter in case you wish to pass
them on to the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office.
6 Denis Greenhill (later Lord Greenhill) was minister at the British Embassy, Washington, 1962–1964.
160 FO 371/169695, no 21 11 Feb 1963
[Quadripartite talks in Washington]: inward telegram no 471 from Sir
D Ormsby-Gore to Lord Home, reporting the views on Malaysia of
Australia, New Zealand and the USA
[The support of the USA, Australia and New Zealand was regarded as essential for the
success of the Malaysia project. The British hoped to obtain diplomatic and possibly
military assistance in their growing confrontation with Indonesia. The quadripartite talks
took place while the Cabinet continued to engage with future defence policy. Two days
before the meeting in Washington, the Cabinet Defence Committee had addressed the
scope of British commitments in the Far East (see 166, note; also DO 169/234–236 and
FO 371/169888).]
First meeting between Ambassadors and Mr. Harriman1 this afternoon was restricted
to a general discussion on Malaysia. The following were the main points of interest. A
full record follows by bag.
2. There was general approval for the creation of Malaysia though the other
delegations pointed out that this was entirely a British responsibility.
3. Concern was expressed about the situation after August 31. I explained our
intentions and commitments under the extended defence agreement and spoke on
the lines of your telegram under reference. Mr. Harriman stated that the United
States Government might conceivably consider itself obliged to take action in the
event of overt aggression against Malaysia, particularly if Malaysia had become a
member of the United Nations. On the other hand they could not contemplate any
military commitment to deal with covert warfare arising from Indonesian
infiltration. This would be for the British. The Australians and New Zealanders took
1 Averell Harriman was a staunch Democrat and veteran diplomat whom Kennedy had brought back into
foreign relations as assistant secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, 1961–1965.
13-Malaysia-149-174-cpp  21/9/04  9:08 AM  Page 440
[161] FEB 1963 441
the line that their own participation in countering subversion would depend upon
the circumstances at the time. The Australian and New Zealand Governments would
have to take into account the action being taken by the British and would reach a
decision on the merits of the case. As a general proposition, Australian troops were
maintained in South East Asia for strategic purposes and were not normally available
to deal with the preservation of civil order or the countering of subversion.
Nevertheless they had considered the emergency in Malaya to have been akin to
external aggression and had taken part in the fighting. The New Zealanders also
pointed out that they had provided aircraft for the Brunei operation. The possibility,
therefore, of Australian and New Zealand participation was by no means excluded.
4. I suggested that the other Governments might wish to consider entering into
bilateral defence arrangements with the new Malaysia. Sir Arthur Tange2 said that
this would be a matter for consideration by his Government after the Washington
talks; at their Cabinet meeting last week the Australian Government had been aware
of this problem.
5. The other delegations were insistent that we should prepare for trouble in the
United Nations between now and the formation of Malaysia. In particular they were
anxious that we should be able to show some consultation of the popular will in
Brunei and asked whether we could consider action to improve the position. They
also asked us to prepare a paper setting out tactics in the United Nations and
explaining the steps already taken to consult public opinion in North Borneo and
Sarawak.
6. The Australians mentioned the need to try and improve relations with the
Indonesians and reassure them about Malaysia.
7. In general the other delegations were reasonably sympathetic and anxious to
hear our plans. I made it clear that the principal requirement was to show no
weakening of our intention to bring Malaysia into being.
8. Talks will be resumed tomorrow morning and it has been agreed that I should
then propose our specific measures for deterring the Indonesians or for offering
them some inducement to accept our plans.
2 Sir Arthur Tange, secretary, Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 1954–1965.
161 FO 371/169695, no 23 12 Feb 1963
[Quadripartite talks in Washington]: inward telegram no 482 from Sir
D Ormsby-Gore to Lord Home
At today’s discussions I put forward the various inducements which we might offer
the Indonesians to take a more understanding view of our policies. These included
the non-aggression pact, a proposal for a free trade area, common defence
arrangements, joint measures to deal with piracy and smuggling, frontier
demilitarization in Borneo, and political consultation with the Indonesians and
Filipinos. I also asked for the cooperation of other Governments in restraints such as
a joint warning to the Indonesians of the military consequences of intervention in
Borneo, a united front in face of the Indonesians so as to make it clear that the
British would not be subject to pressure to give way as were the Dutch in West New
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Guinea, and the possibility of concerted troop movements to frighten off the
Indonesians if the situation deteriorated.
2. During discussion both in the morning and afternoon, the following positions
were reached:—
(i) So long as Sukarno remained in control of Indonesia we must expect trouble.
In the next month or so this would almost certainly take the form of infiltration
into the Borneo territories.
(ii) In the event of infiltration the United States would not wish to give military
assistance. Their commitment to resist subversion in Viet Nam (and formerly in
Laos) was sufficient, and other Powers should take the load in Malaysia. Under
pressure from Sir Howard Beale1 and myself, Mr. Harriman admitted that a point
might be reached at which Indonesian infiltration would amount to open
aggression against Malaysia and that his Government might then reconsider its
attitude, but he would not be moved beyond this.
(iii) The Americans, Australians and New Zealanders, while admitting that the
Tunku’s recent outbursts had usually been provoked by the Indonesians, felt that
the Tunku must be asked to restrain his language during the present difficult
period. More than this, they would want him to make some statesmanlike gesture
such as resuming discussions with President Macapagal about a Philippine/
Malaysia federation or reopening contact with Sukarno so as to discuss with him
future Indonesian/Malaysia cooperation.
(iv) Of the measures which I had proposed (paragraph 1 above), the other
delegations were strongly opposed to any six-Power or other joint warning to the
Indonesians. They felt this would be received as imperialist ganging-up, and that
any warnings to be given to the Indonesians should be secret and individual. They
were also much opposed to the suggestion made by the Filipinos during their talks
with us in London for a six-Power conference.
(v) The other suggestions I had made were matters which the British Government
might wish to pursue in the first place bilaterally with the Indonesians. Should we
need the cooperation of our allies later on in any of these matters, we should ask
for it and they would do their best to help. They hoped that we should not delay an
approach to the Indonesians. I said that we must first await Dr. Subandrio’s reply
to your message sent to him before Christmas. When this had been received and
studied we might possibly be in a position to suggest a meeting with him or to put
forward explanations or proposals in writing.
(vi) Throughout, the Americans, Australians and New Zealanders stressed the
long-term need to preserve good relations with Indonesia, and to try and avoid any
final rupture in defence of our immediate objectives.
3. The general impression left by our two days’ discussions is that our allies are
fearful of impending trouble. The Australians and New Zealanders see themselves as
gradually being drawn in to any fighting necessary to keep the Indonesians out. They
would be less anxious about this if they were sure that the Americans would be
involved also, but the United States Government is determined to try and get the
Commonwealth countries to shoulder this burden alone while they themselves
concentrate on Viet Nam.
1 Sir Howard Beale, Australian ambassador to the US, 1958–1964.
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4. We accepted that there should be no formal agreed conclusions or
recommendations, but that our Governments would take up separately the action
required. I shall be reporting on the discussions by despatch and will include a list of
the various tasks which fall to us. I shall also be reporting in a separate telegram on
the question of informing the Tunku of our discussions.
162 FO 371/169908, no 18: 15 Feb 1963
[Quadripartite talks in Washington]: despatch from Sir D Ormsby-
Gore to Lord Home. Annex: ‘Quadripartite talks: lines of action which
it was agreed to pursue’
I was instructed by the Permanent Under Secretary1 in his letter of the 9th of January
to express to the United States Administration your serious concern about the
expansionist ambitions of President Sukarno and in particular the growing
indications that he was actively opposed to the formation of Malaysia. Similar
approaches were made to the Australian Government in Canberra. After some delay,
mainly caused by the Australian need for further preparation, quadripartite talks
were held here at Ambassadorial level on the 11th and 12th of February. The New
Zealand Government had meanwhile expressed a wish to participate. Mr. Averell
Harriman represented the United States Government.
2. Our main aims in these talks were first of all to make sure that there was no
weakening of American, Australian and New Zealand support for the formation of
Malaysia and that this should be made publicly known. From there we hoped to
concert measures to prevent the Indonesians from intervening in the British Borneo
territories, or alternatively to make sure, that if they did intervene, we received the
maximum support from the Americans, Australians and New Zealanders in trying to
expel them. In addition we agreed to discuss measures to be taken in regard to the
likelihood of an Indonesian attack on Portuguese Timor and in general the policy to
be pursued towards Indonesia.
3. Before the talks began, we had been able to agree at the official level an
assessment of the Indonesian threat. This was reported in my Saving telegram No. 65
of the 7th of February. While there were differences of degree in our assessments, it
was common ground that the power of Indonesia and the unpredictability of its ruler
constituted a serious problem for the West which must be concerned both with the
security of the region itself and its relation to the defence of the South East Asia
Treaty Organisation, while presenting a continuing opportunity for the Soviet Union,
which was actively exploiting the situation. The present focus of attention of the
Indonesian leaders was the forthcoming creation of Malaysia whose emergence they
saw as a challenge to their interests. We had in this to take into account the claim of
the Philippines Government to North Borneo which had now grown to be of primary
importance in Philippines politics. We had no difficulty in agreeing that Indonesia
certainly intended eventually to take over Portuguese Timor and that this too would
result in an embarrassing situation particularly for the United States and the United
Kingdom.
1 Sir Harold (later Baron) Caccia, permanent under-secretary of state, FO, 1962–1965.
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4. At the outset of the talks it was evident that both the Americans and
Australians had recently reviewed the whole situation in the South West Pacific,
regarding which they took a very serious view. Mr. Harriman affirmed that American
support for the conception of Malaysia remained staunch though he repeatedly said
that the concept was the responsibility of the United Kingdom in conjunction with
the Government of Malaya. My Australian colleague and Sir Arthur Tange, who flew
from Canberra for this exercise, showed that Australian thinking had come out
likewise in renewed support for the efforts of Her Majesty’s Government to bring
Malaysia into being. Nevertheless it was apparent that serious doubts existed about
the best way to proceed. Both the Americans and Australians expressed criticism of
the hasty statements by the Prime Minister of Malaya, even though they recognised
that in most cases these had been provoked by aggressive pronouncements by the
Indonesian leaders. The view was taken that if we were to resist political action in the
United Nations designed to postpone Malaysia Day beyond the 31st of August and to
disrupt the operation altogether, we and the Malayans would require to conduct a
considerable preparatory operation. There was more than a little concern about the
lack of evidence, for easy consumption by public opinion in the countries concerned
and by United Nations Delegations, of the extent to which the population of the
Borneo territories had been and would be consulted about their future. It was
recognised that the revolt in Brunei had shown that the elected representatives in
that territory were against Malaysia, and that this impression would stick unless we
could produce clear evidence to the contrary.
5. I had the feeling that both the Americans and the Australians, and to a lesser
extent the New Zealanders, thought that we were at fault in not having adequately
prepared the ground in their countries for the request for support which we were now
making. I am not in a position to comment as to how far this complaint is justified.
From the outset the Americans have, at all levels, kept on repeating that Malaysia is
primarily a British matter. They have therefore perhaps been less curious about the
details than they would have been if they had realised from the start the extent to
which their support would be required. However that may be, in their recent re-
assessment of the situation, they have become acutely aware of the possible conflict
between support for us and their accepted policy of keeping Indonesia neutral and
maintaining their alliance with the Philippines, upon which among other things their
use of the two bases in the Philippines depends.2 The Australians have apparently been
driven to a similar awareness of a possible conflict of aims, though in their case the
situation is further complicated by the proximity of Indonesia, by the precarious
political position of the Government and by their desire to undertake no commitments
appreciably ahead of those undertaken by the Americans.
6. In consequence I must conclude that we were not entirely successful in
obtaining assurances from our allies either on measures for preventing Indonesian
intervention in the Borneo territories prior to Malaysia Day, or in meeting the
somewhat different problems which will arise once Malaysia is established and we are
no longer directly responsible for those territories. As recorded in my telegram No.
481, Sir Howard Beale and Sir Arthur Tange reflected the decision of the Australian
cabinet last week to accept the creation of Malaysia as the best solution for the
countries concerned, and apparently for the action we had so far taken, but they were
2 The US occupied Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base until 1992.
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set against the prospect of the new Federation having to be supported indefinitely by
the Western powers not only against Communist China, but also against its non-
communist neighbours, Indonesia and the Philippines. They were under instructions
to make the stipulation, which they must have known to be an impossible one, that
the acquiescence of Indonesia and the Philippines be obtained and also that due
respect should be paid to the genuine fears of these nations. On the American side
Mr. Harriman emphasised that the main American leverage on the Indonesian
leaders would be reserved for the principal American aims of countering the strong
influence within Indonesia of the Indonesian communist party, and to prevent a
situation in which Indonesia became tied, hand and foot, to the Soviet Union.
7. This being so we were pressed hard to explain the extent of our commitment
to defend the Borneo territories, particularly after Malaysia Day. On the basis of the
instructions in your telegram No. 1665, I explained that if the Indonesians tried to
overthrow the Malayan regime in the Borneo territories, and Malayan forces were
unable to deal with the situation, we would regard this as a matter of external
defence under which Article I of our Defence Agreement with Malaya would become
operative; that sufficient British forces would in fact be kept in South East Asia to
deal with such commitments; and that combined planning with the Malayans, taking
into account the build-up of the Malaysian forces was at present being undertaken.
The suppression of the Brunei revolt had shown that forces stationed in the area
could be brought in within as little as twelve hours, and it was our intention to retain
training facilities in North Borneo which might allow the rotation of some forces
there and provide evidence to the Indonesians of a continuing British presence.
8. I had the uncomfortable feeling that although neither the Americans nor the
Australians said so in the meetings, there were considerable misgivings about the will
and capacity of Her Majesty’s Government to devote the financial and material
resources to maintain this commitment for any length of time, and in consequence
also apprehension that they themselves might be called upon to undertake counter-
guerilla activities against the Indonesians in addition to their existing commitments
in Indo–China and elsewhere in South East Asia. This apprehension came out more
clearly in private discussion than in the talks themselves. It is however an element
which I submit must be taken into account in our future assessments of the situation.
9. We had to review in some detail the possible inducements to the Indonesians
to, as the Australians put it, ‘acquiesce’ in Malaysia. These included proposals for a
Non-Aggression Pact, common defence arrangements, joint measures to deal with
piracy and smuggling, a proposal for a free trade area, provision for political
consultation and frontier demarcation. We had to conclude that none of these measures
would remove the probability that infiltration could begin perhaps as early as next
month, and that as long as Sukarno remained in control we must expect trouble. My
colleagues felt that the most urgent necessity was to prevail upon the Tunku to restrain
his language during the present difficult period, and even to encourage him to resume
his discussions with the President of the Philippines, and to re-open contact with the
President of Indonesia. They appreciated that we must await a reply from the Indonesian
Foreign Minister to your message sent before Christmas, before pursuing any further
top level direct approach to the Indonesians ourselves.
10. We also reviewed the possibilities of deterrent action. All were agreed that
any attempt to involve SEATO in the Indonesian situation would be fatal and that the
end result would be far worse than the situation we were trying to meet. They were
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equally opposed to any joint warning to the Indonesians and to the suggestion, made
by the Filipinos during their talks in London, for a Six Power Conference excluding
the Americans. The most that I could get from Mr. Harriman, who seemed to be
reflecting a prepared position of the United States administration, was that while
American support for Malaysia would continue to be reaffirmed in Djakarta and
elsewhere and their position in the event of an overt aggression, particularly after
Malaysia was properly constituted as an independent state within the United Nations,
would be unequivocal, no commitment could be entered into at this stage in regard
to Indonesian infiltration. Both my Australian colleague and I pressed him to define
his attitude more clearly on this, Sir Howard Beale pointing out that the Australians
had regarded their original commitments to Malaya as operative during the
emergency caused by Communist insurgency. Under pressure Mr. Harriman did
admit that a point might be reached at which Indonesian infiltration would amount
to open aggression and that his Government might then reconsider its attitude, but
he would not be budged beyond that point. Clearly the extension of existing defence
agreements to cover the whole of Malaysia is going to be given consideration in
Canberra and Wellington and the stage of commitment to cover the contingencies
now in prospect has not yet been reached.
11. Contingency planning for political action in the United Nations, both in
respect of the Borneo territories and Portuguese Timor, is something which we all
felt should be undertaken forthwith. This is something which will be pursued later
this week by Mr. Warner and Mr. Golds, the officials who came out from the Foreign
Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office to take part in these talks, while they
are in New York. In any case we agreed to set up a Standing Committee representing
our four countries in Washington to keep under continual review the position in
regard to Timor.
12. Among the deterrent measures which you asked me to consider was the
possibility of the threat of stopping American aid. Mr. Harriman would make no firm
commitment on this, because, as I have set out above, of the Administration’s main
goals of countering Soviet influence and keeping the Indonesian communists out of
power within the country. However the Americans have pointed out to the
Indonesians and will continue to do so, that their hopes of obtaining Congressional
approval of aid will depend largely on Indonesian good behaviour. In this respect Mr.
Harriman set out in some detail the types of aid which the United States expected to
be in a position to give, if his proposals find acceptance by Congress. It is highly
relevant to consideration of this situation that the State Department must present a
picture of Indonesia which does not show any strong probability of the country
falling completely into the communist camp or being over-run by the P.K.I. Unless
they can do this, there is no chance of getting any aid bill through Congress, and if
that fails they will have no leverage at all. I do not suggest that, for this reason, Mr.
Harriman regards the actual situation as any less serious than we have represented
it. Nevertheless, like all our Governments, the Americans are highly conscious of the
need to present the position suitably to their own public opinion.
13. Although we agreed that there should be no formal conclusions or
recommendations resulting from our talks I enclose a list of headings under which
we agreed to recommend future action by our Governments. These are all, in my
view, clear evidence of the seriousness and the sense of urgency which have now
been imparted and they provide the means for continuing close consultation.
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I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty’s representatives in Djakarta,
Kuala Lumpur, Canberra, Wellington, Manila, Bangkok and New York, and to the
Commissioner General for the United Kingdom in South East Asia in Singapore.
Annex to 162
Lines of action which it was agreed to pursue:—
(1) An approach to the Prime Minister of Malaya. Draft instructions to the United
Kingdom High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, for clearance in Washington,
Canberra and Wellington were put forward in my telegrams Nos. 494 and 495.
(2) Further consultation on the development of relations with Indonesia. United
Kingdom initiative on this will hinge upon Indonesian Foreign Minister’s reply to
Secretary of State’s message.
(3) Further consultation on relations with the Philippines, particularly any follow-up
of the London talks, e.g. the Parliamentary Under Secretary’s visit to Manila in March.
(4) Preparation of a paper by the United Kingdom Government, with co-operation
from Malaya, on the exercise of self-determination in the Borneo territories. It was
emphasised that such a document was essential for background use in the United
Nations and with public opinion elsewhere.
(5) Consideration by the United Kingdom of any possible further measures to
consult public opinion in the Borneo territories.
(6) Joint consultation in New York on the situation in the United Nations and the
possibilities open to Indonesia and the Philippines for political action there.
Consultations should include exploration of the ways in which the Secretary General
might exercise a beneficial influence.
(7) Study by the four governments concerned of the effect upon SEATO and their
respective defence commitments towards SEATO of developments in the Borneo
territories before and after Malaysia Day. This includes study of the effect upon
Singapore and the Borneo territories of these territories ceasing to be the territory of
a member state by reason of the formation of Malaysia, and the status of each of the
Commonwealth armed forces now in Malaysia after Malaysia Day.
(8) The active study, both in the United Nations context and otherwise of the threat
to Portuguese Timor and the setting up of a Standing Committee in Washington
representing the four countries to keep Timor under continual review.
163 FO 371/169695, no 32 16 Feb 1963
[Malaysia and the UN]: letter from F A Warner1 to E H Peck,2
reporting steps being taken to neutralise opposition at the UN
Although I shall be seeing you before you receive this letter I thought you might like
to have a record on paper of the various talks which we have had, both in Washington
and New York about the United Nations aspect of the Malayan problem.
1 This letter was written by Warner, on secondment to the UK Mission to the United Nations, and signed by
another official in his absence.
2 E H (later Sir Edward) Peck, assistant under-secretary, FO, 1960–1964.
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2. Everybody agrees that this matter will come up first in the Committee of
Twenty-four. The Committee has already received petitions addressed to it by
Azahari, by the North Borneo parties and by the S.U.P.P. in Sarawak. As you know,
the Committee meets at the end of this month and will be well into its business by
the beginning of March. Fortunately, there are other problems on its plate. For
instance, the Arabs want to discuss Aden whilst the Africans will be hot on Rhodesia.
Our item might therefore be pushed lower down on the agenda. Of course, the
Indonesians will want it taken as soon as possible and we gather that they have been
receiving some support in this from the Russians. But the experts on our own
Delegation and amongst the Americans, Australians and New Zealanders say that
they think it unlikely that Malaysia will go to the top of the list. It seems that there is
a slight danger that the Committee of Twenty-four might split up into sub-
committees so that Aden, Rhodesia, Malaysia etc. could all be taken simultaneously.
The Americans, however, who are members of the Committee, do not believe that
there is any great danger of this since it would be difficult to reach agreement
amongst the members of this dreadful and quarrelsome body as to who would sit on
which sub-committee.
3. This means that there is a reasonable chance that the Committee of Twenty-
four will not be able to tackle our problem until after the Inter-Governmental
Agreement has been finalised and discussed by the Borneo legislatures. The
Delegation feel that this is to our advantage and that we should resist any suggestion
that the item should come forward until a later stage, though our means of doing
this are obviously limited.
4. When the item arises, the Indonesians and their supporters are likely to argue
principally on the basis of self-determination. They will take the line that the
inhabitants of British Borneo territories were inadequately consulted as to their own
future. They might suggest that the British should be required to give these people
complete self-determination. They might ask that the formation of Malaysia be
delayed meanwhile. We know that their principal aim is to prevent Malaysia coming
into being on August 31; if they could get a postponement the whole matter could
then be brought up at the 18th Assembly in the autumn, by which time the
Indonesians would hope to have brought about widespread disturbances in the
Borneo territories. A Motion of the Committee of Twenty-four asking for
postponement might satisfy them or they might add to it a rider asking for
plebiscites in all three territories concerned. The latter would be more effective since
a demand for mere postponement would amount to a request for the continuation of
‘imperialist’ rule. If, on the other hand, the postponement were designed to lead up
to the exercise of self-determination through plebiscites many of the members of the
Committee of Twenty-four would be attracted towards it.
5. I should note that everyone here thought (with reference to Kuala Lumpur
telegram No. 246 to the C.R.O.) that it was now unrealistic to hope that debate in the
Committee could be confined to Brunei. I, also, do not believe for a moment that this
would be possible. You will have seen the Delegation’s comments in their telegram
No. 208 sent off yesterday afternoon.
6. When Malaysia is debated in the Committee of Twenty-four we can certainly
not expect a rousing victory. The general opinion seems to be that the best we could
hope for would be a general feeling that this is not a very good anti-colonialist case.
The Afro–Asian members might be put off by the fact that the quarrel is largely
13-Malaysia-149-174-cpp  21/9/04  9:08 AM  Page 448
[163] FEB 1963 449
between two members of their own group—Malaya and Indonesia. They might feel
that there was something to be said on the Malayan side, that there had been a barely
acceptable minimum of consultation of the populations concerned, that there were
much better anti-colonial issues waiting to be debated, and that therefore they really
could not be bothered to take this matter beyond expressing a general hope that it
would not break out into general hostilities and that principles of self-determination
would be observed. In other words a rather confused and unenthusiastic response
might perhaps be achieved. Our own Delegation are reasonably optimistic about this
without being too sure of the matter. The Americans, Australians and New
Zealanders on the other hand feel that we ought to try to do more to smooth the way.
They definitely do not think that the arguments in paragraph 4 of Foreign Office
telegram No. 690 are sufficient, particularly in respect of Brunei. In their heart of
hearts they would obviously like us to hold plebescites if we could get away with it,
and I see from Singapore telegram No. 81 that this is also the view of Lord Selkirk for
North Borneo. We have explained how difficult this would be and have blown very
cold upon the suggestion.
6. The next best thing to plebiscites would be to make the maximum fuss of
parliamentary procedures in North Borneo and Sarawak and to give them as much
publicity as possible. It will be even more important to have adequate presence at
United Nations debates of the political parties in North Borneo and Sarawak who are
favourable to Malaysia. I note that the C.R.O. and Colonial Office have this very much
in mind and will be looking for the right men. The real difficulty is Brunei, and we
have been constantly questioned about this. Perhaps we might leave this for
discussion in London with the other departments. There is perhaps a ray of hope in
the report that steps are being taken to form an Alliance Party in Brunei. Goodness
knows that political parties grow at a fantastic speed in those tropical climates, and
we might perhaps hope for some plausibly representative Brunei spokesmen to be
sent here to defend the Malaysian cause within a few weeks.
7. To sum up the whole position about the Committee of Twenty-four, we
ought to be considering the following propositions. The Committee is thoroughly
hostile to us. The Americans and Australians who are much more gloomy about the
outlook than we, will do the best they can for us as members, but they are in a
difficult position and want us to make their task as easy as possible. This means
polishing up all the representative side of our programme and producing good
spokesmen. It also means that the Malayans must take as much responsibility as
possible (though we must remember that they themselves are not members of the
Committee). If all this is done we might get a fairly harmless result. In the last
resort, we can disregard any resolution of the Committee; we have done so before
on many occasions.
8. The Committee might, of course, ask the Secretary-General to intervene. If he
had already taken action there would be nothing new or additionally dangerous
about this. The general feeling is that we ought to play along with the Secretary-
General, particularly since Narasimhan3 has shown himself well disposed. We might
be able to keep discussions with the Secretary-General going on for a long time until
we were well out of the danger area. I fancy that the Americans and Australians
3 Chakravarthi V Narasimhan, under-secretary, UN Secretary-General’s Office.
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might become difficult if they thought that we were unwilling to co-operate with the
Secretariat or were refusing them a chance to use their good offices.
9. Now we come to the less serious problem of a Special Assembly. It is just
possible, though rather unlikely, that the Committee of Twenty-four would
recommend a Special Assembly. The Indonesians might also ask for it if they could
create a really troublesome situation in our Borneo territories which would enable
them to argue that there was a definite threat to peace in the area. I am glad to say
that nobody here believes that such a move would be successful. An absolute
majority is required (56 votes) and it would apparently be very difficult to get this. An
alternative would be for the Indonesians to ask the Special Spring Session, which will
meet probably in early May, to add Malaysia to its Agenda, but under rules 16 to 19
this is even more difficult as it requires a two-thirds majority. The Assembly might
set aside these rules (a dirty trick which has been used on another previous occasion)
but even then a majority of those present and voting would be needed, and this would
probably not be forthcoming. We are not therefore expected to take too seriously this
possibility.
10. A third possibility is an appeal by Indonesia to the Security Council. We are
told that this is unlikely to appeal to the Indonesians because the membership of that
body is reasonably satisfactory from our point of view. There is little likelihood that
we should need to use our veto. On the other hand, we might be able to make use of
this body ourselves if the Indonesians press their military intervention too blatantly.
In any case we should keep the Security Council on our side. It was agreed here that
if we are obliged to make any major troop moves there would be advantage in letting
the Security Council know what we are doing by sending them a letter without
asking for a meeting. Apparently this is considered good United Nations manners and
would put us in a favourable tactical position. We should have to make it clear that
our troop movements were taken in face of a threat of interference from Indonesia,
since we do not admit the right of the United Nations to show any interest in troop
movements made to deal with purely internal matters.
11. In all these United Nations maneouvres we have one favourable factor. It
seems that many of the members here are rather fed up with the Indonesians and are
suspicious of their motives. But while we can take advantage of this we must
remember that anti-colonialism is so powerful an emotion that the factors which are
favourable to our case are only secondary.
12. Now we come to the dispositions of the various delegations. A key point is
whether we can count on Indian support. It is good to know that the Indians have
again decided that they are in favour of Malaysia. We hope that they will be prepared
to say so in New York. No-one has much faith in this because the Indians have let us
down on certain previous occasions, even when they were theoretically on our side.
But we surely stand a better chance now that the Indian attitudes have been so
deeply affected by events on the China border and that Krishna Menon has
disappeared from the scene.4 Even if the Indians won’t actively help to rally support,
we can get other delegations to go and consult them. We shall no doubt be discussing
with the C.R.O. whether anything further can be done to strengthen Indian
4 Krishna Menon, India’s minister of defence, 1957–1962, was dismissed as a result of India’s defeat in the
war with China.
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resolution, since it is bound to have a tremendous effect here. Tony Golds has also
suggested that we ought to have another look at the position of the Pakistanis.
13. The really important people are the Malayans. We must make this look like
an inter-Asian quarrel. It is the Malayans who must do most of the effective
lobbying.5 They have made a good start at this end. They are systematically going
round other Delegations here on a personal basis making the best of their case. They
have shown enterprise in producing an excellent paper which they are giving to each
Delegation as they canvass it. It has been suggested, however, that there are
additional measures which the Malayan Government could take. First (and the
Americans and Australians are most serious about this) the Tunku should be careful
about his public statements; although they are made in response to Indonesian
attacks they could be made to look aggressive if produced as evidence in debates
here. Secondly, he might make more use of the support for Malaysia expressed at the
last meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. It would be a good thing if the
Tunku would write to all the Commonwealth Prime Ministers reminding them of
this, asking for their support, and making sure that they follow up by writing to their
delegations in New York. Tony Golds has already suggested this to the Malayan
Delegation here and will ask the C.R.O. to tell Sir Geoffrey [sic] Tory so that he can
follow it up if necessary. The New Zealanders also suggested that the Malayans might
send a Delegation round to all the Commonwealth capitals to follow up the Tunku’s
letters—a good idea. Thirdly, we must make sure that the Malayan Delegation here is
properly staffed. There is a danger that Zakaria,6 the admirable First Secretary who is
doing most of the work at present may be withdrawn within the next week or two and
we should see if we can get this stopped. There might even be a case for
strengthening his team. Fourthly, we must do our best to make sure that the
Malayans take the lead in debate. Although they are not members of the Committee
of Twenty-four it is quite possible that both Indonesia and Malaya will be invited by
the Committee to attend for this item. Sir Patrick Dean says that at the moment they
are reluctant to do this and would like us to make the running. We must try to
reassure them that if they take the lead we will back them up and not leave them
isolated.7
14. This has been a very long letter. Let me sum up the many suggestions which
have been made:—
(i) We should have another look at the opportunities which have been given for
consultations of the Borneo populations on their future. We should see if there is
any wider form of consultation we can devise. If this is not possible we should give
all the publicity we can to those constitutional processes which have already taken
place or which may follow in the next few months.
5 The Malayan delegation at the UN was led by Dato Ong Yoke Lin. Ong, who had been appointed minister
of Labour and Social Welfare when Malaya achieved independence, was also ambassador in Washington.
6 Zakaria bin Haji Mohd Ali was a member of the Malaysian delegation to the UN in Sept 1964 when the
Security Council examined Malaysia’s charges against Indonesia under article 39 on the UN Charter. He
was permanent representative at the UN, 1970–1974.
7 Patrick Dean emphasised the points set out in this paragraph in his letter to Peck of 18 Feb, ie the need
for the Malayan delegation to make a concerted effort to lobby at the UN, in Commonwealth capitals and
in the capitals of those countries of the Committee of Twenty-Four; also at FO 371/169695, no 32.
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(ii) We should ensure the best possible representation of all three Borneo
territories at any United Nations debate in which their respective affairs may be
discussed. We should also think of getting Lee Kuan Yew here; he was terrifically
effective last summer.
(iii) Both we and the Tunku should try to appear as aggrieved and long-suffering
parties and should avoid any statements which might appear to prove the
Indonesian case that Malaysia will be hostile to Indonesia.
(iv) Whenever we are forced to take strong action, such as the movement of
troops, we should consider notifying the Security Council and friendly
Delegations.
(v) We should encourage the Malayans to continue their present excellent work of
lobbying and to extend it by personal letters from the Tunku to other
Commonwealth Prime Ministers, perhaps with the despatch of a Malayan
Delegation.
(vi) We should consider whether we or the Malayans should make a major effort at
lobbying in the capitals of all non-Communist members of the Committee of
Twenty-four and of the Security Council.
(vii) We should see that the Malayan Delegation here is not weakened by the
transfer of key personnel at this delicate stage and that it is reinforced if necessary.
15. I am writing you a separate letter about future Malaysian membership of the
United Nations. I have also excluded from this letter the questions of Timor and of
the Philippines claim to N. Borneo as they are not strictly relevant. I can discuss
these on my return.
16. I am sending copies of this letter to Fry in Djakarta, Pumphrey in Singapore,
Ledward in Washington, Fisher in Bangkok and Campbell in New York, and I enclose
ten extra copies for distribution in London as necessary.
164 PREM 11/4347 20 Feb 1963
[Co-ordinating policy]: minute from P F de Zulueta to Mr Macmillan,
proposing changes in Whitehall for the conduct of Malaysian policy
I find this a disquieting telegram1 and indeed the whole Malaysian situation looks to
me to be getting out of hand. I think that the Americans are now becoming luke
warm about Malaysia because they do not wish to be involved with the Indonesians.
The same applies to some extent to Australia and New Zealand. I do not believe that U
Thant 2 has been manifesting his interests in the area without some American
prompting.
1 This refers to a report in the Manila Bulletin that President Macapagal was thinking of an alternative to
Malaysia. His idea was a confederation incorporating the Philippines, Malaya and Indonesia and possibly
Thailand, with Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo to be jointly administered by the Philippines, Malaya
and Indonesia on behalf of the United Nations, until a referendum or plebiscite could ascertain the wishes
of their inhabitants. The US and Britain would be asked to guarantee the security of the territories during
the transitory period.
2 Burmese diplomat and UN secretary-general, 1961–1971.
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One of the troubles in Whitehall is that there are so many Departments involved—
C.R.O./C.O., Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence. There is already a Greater
Malaysia Committee consisting of a group of senior Ministers with yourself as
Chairman but this seldom meets and is in any case a deliberative and not an
executive body. Then of course there is an official body working under Lord
Lansdowne in the Colonial Office to deal with the details of the actual establishment
of Malaysia but this body does not deal with the wider issues, such as relations with
Indonesia and the Philippines, or rarely defence questions. I am not sure that the
time has not come for the establishment of an Executive Commitee under a powerful
and effective Minister to see that decisions are promptly taken and executed and that
the various aspects of policy are co-ordinated all the time. Much the best would be a
Committee under Mr. Heath’s chairmanship.3 Its object would be to use all possible
means to bring off the Malaysia project and to be sufficiently alert to recognise if this
project finally seems likely not to work and to develop alternative policies in time.
If you agree with this idea perhaps I might speak to Sir Burke Trend about it and
ask him to take some soundings.4
3 Edward Heath was lord privy seal with FO responsibilities, 1960–1963.
4 Sir Burke Trend, having been deputy Cabinet secretary in 1956–1959, took over from Sir Norman Brook
in Jan 1963. Trend’s view was that better co-ordination would be achieved by an executive committee of
officials since it would be difficult to put any minister in charge other than the Commonwealth secretary.
Macmillan approved and a body, known as the Executive Working Group, was set up under the
chairmanship of N J Abercrombie (under-secretary, Cabinet Office, 1962–1963, and a scholar of French
literature who later became secretary-general of the Arts Council of Great Britain). It consisted of
representatives from the overseas departments, the Ministry of Defence, and the Treasury. Its remit did
not include policy issues which remained the concern of the official and ministerial Greater Malaysia
Committees. Rather its purpose was to take prompt, day-to-day action. It met for the first time on 5 Mar
1963 and thereafter on an almost daily basis. Missions overseas were informed that all telegrams requiring
departmental action in London should carry the prefix OCULAR (CAB 21/4851).]
165 DO 189/222 6–8 Mar 1963
[Brunei: terms of entry into Malaysia]: minutes by Sir A Snelling and
A A Golds (CRO)
[In Feb 1963 the Tunku and Sultan conferred on the terms of Brunei’s entry into Malaysia
and drew up Heads of Agreement that included the favourable financial conditions for
Brunei which are discussed by Snelling and Golds below. Thereafter, however, the
Malayans whittled down Brunei’s privileges: in early Apr the Conference of Rulers
reduced the Sultan’s chances of becoming the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or King of Malaysia
by insisting that his precedence would be set at the date of Brunei’s entry into Malaysia
instead of his accession to the throne. The high commissioner in Brunei, who felt that the
Rulers’ decision was ‘shabby’, reported that the Sultan was ‘taking his rebuff calmly’
though his advisers were ‘furious’ (MacKintosh to Sandys, tel no 77, 5 Apr 1963, DO
189/222). Crisis point was reached in June when the Malayans rejected a number of the
Heads of Agreement, including the favourable financial terms, see 182 and 188.]
Mr. Golds
The attached paper1 which has just arrived from the Colonial Office, about the
financial and economic position of Brunei is the first statement I have seen showing
1 Not printed.
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just how rich Brunei is with foreign investments at the end of 1961 totalling nearly
£100 m.2
To my way of thinking this entirely alters the way in which we ought to approach
the problem of the extent to which we are to subsidise the defence of Malaysia. I have
talked to Mr. Mark3 in the Treasury and understand from him that the economist,
Ross,4 will soon be back and that this is one of the points he was asked to look into.
Mr. Mark also tells me that Sir Maurice Parsons5 of the Bank of England has recently
circulated a memorandum which deals in part with Malaysian finance and no doubt a
copy of it has gone to the economic side.
Please keep me in touch with any discussions with Mr. Ross upon his return. Broadly
my simple-minded thought is that, if Brunei does become part of Malaysia, this £100 m.
must become part of the external assets of Malaysia as a whole and vastly increases
Malaysia’s ability to buy defence equipment etc.6 It ought therefore to relieve greatly
the legitimate calls that can be made on us to subsidise the cost of Malaysian defence.
A.W.S.
6.3.63
Sir Arthur Snelling
Brunei
As requested, I will keep you in touch with the discussions which we expect to have,
probably in the Overseas Co-ordinating Committee, with Mr. Ross later this month.7
2. Meanwhile I thought I should comment that although Brunei is certainly a
rich state (per capita) it is by no means certain that the new Federation of Malaysia
will obtain the kind of benefits from Brunei’s accession which your minute suggests.
This is because:—
(a) In order to obtain Brunei’s accession, Malaya has had to offer special terms.
(b) Brunei is apparently to keep all her existing investments and the income from
them. Only future investments will be ‘subject to consultation’ with the
Federation authorities.
2 Golds corrected this figure to £87 m.
3 James Mark, Treasury 1948–1964, was appointed under-secretary, Ministry of Overseas Development, in 1965.
4 In response to a request from the Malayan government for an expert financial adviser, C R Ross visited
Kuala Lumpur between 21 Feb and 6 Mar 1963. Ross had until recently been a lecturer in economics at
Oxford University and was about to take up the chair in economics at the University of East Anglia. He had
some experience of working for the Treasury and had acted in a consultative capacity in Asia and Africa.
5 Sir Maurice Parsons entered the Bank of England in 1928 rising to deputy governor in 1966; in 1970 he
became chairman of the Bank of London and South America.
6 Amending the figure of £100 m to £87 m, Golds wrote in the margin against this sentence: ‘This seems
very doubtful. See minute below.’
7 Ross reported on 8 Mar and his paper was considered by the Oversea Co-ordinating Committee of officials
on 12 Mar. Wary that his invitation from the Malayan minister of finance to visit Kuala Lumpur might
have been a ploy to soften up the British government in advance of negotiations over the financial
settlement for Malaysia, Ross nonetheless concluded that, while Malaya currently enjoyed prosperity, the
prospects for future export earnings were less favourable. ‘The Malayans’, he wrote, ‘are seriously afraid
that they are being asked to take on more than they can manage, and they are afraid that the United
Kingdom may not appreciate the scale of their difficulties when it comes to a negotiation.’ The Oversea
Co-ordinating Committee agreed to recommend that a British negotiating team be sent to Kuala Lumpur
as soon as possible. This resulted in the mission led by Sir Henry Lintott, 6–14 Apr. (OC(O)(63)4, 8 Mar
and OC(O)(63)3rd meeting, 12 Mar, CAB 134/2277; DO 189/275; see also 170, note and 173).
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(c) Brunei will also keep her oil revenues and will be exempt from most federal
taxation.
(d) She will make a fixed annual payment to the Federation of $40 million (i.e.
about £5 million). However, out of this the Federation will obviously have to meet
the cost of the various federal services, including defence and internal security, for
which K.L. will be responsible in Brunei.
(e) Brunei already lends money to the Federation and contributes her quota
towards the currency backing. It is not clear that her accession on the terms
envisaged for her will bring about any striking increase in this respect.
(f) Brunei’s oil is, as appended figures show,8 a wasting asset. Production is
expected to decline pretty steeply after this year.9
(g) Brunei has an ambitious scheme of social welfare costing about £1 million a
year which it would scarcely be practical politics for her to abandon, but which it
will probably be difficult for her to finance in a few years’ time.
A.A.G.
7.3.63
Mr. Golds
Thank you for pointing out all these arguments that may be advanced for saying that
we must subsidise Malayan defence heavily even when Malaysia absorbs rich Brunei.
You will since have seen a note of some facts Mr. Peck of the Foreign Office gave me
about the contribution we obtained from Kuwait towards the cost of our defence of
her. This at least is some sort of precedent.10
The burden of the arguments you advance is that we have no influence on the
financial arrangements between the Tunku and the Sultan and that if the Tunku is
kind to the Sultan the Tunku will, therefore, remain poor and we must pay out a lot
of money to help defend Malaya. This is obviously not a position we can accept. One
possibility would be that in our financial negotiations with the Tunku we should
stipulate that we intend to take into account the accretion of wealth to Malaya as a
result of the absorption of rich Brunei and that the size of our aid must necessarily
depend upon proof of Malaysia’s need which can only be assessed after adding up the
assets of all component parts of the Federation.
A.W.S.
8.3.63
8 These figures are not printed.
9 Off-shore prospecting resulted in a dramatic improvement in forecasts in early June, see 190.
10 Referring to this sentence and alluding to the despatch of British troops to protect Kuwait in June-Aug
1961, Golds wrote in the margin: ‘It is a precedent for asking the Sultan to pay for the [current?] rescue
operation; but I doubt if it will help us when the Federation takes over responsibility for Defence.’
166 CAB 134/2277, OC(O)(63)7 19 Mar 1963
‘Defence in the Far East about 1970’: memorandum by Sir A Snelling
for the Official Oversea Co-ordinating Committee. Annexes A & B
[The Nassau Agreement of Dec 1962, whereby the Americans consented to provide Britain
with Polaris in place of Skybolt, established the strategic parameters of defence policy-
making. Meeting at Chequers on 9 Feb, the Cabinet Defence Committee reviewed the
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scope and costs of defence commitments in the context of Nassau as well as in the light of
financial constraints and economic difficulties. As regards the Far East, Singapore posed a
dilemma. Originally valued as an adjunct to India, it had acquired a role of its own, indeed
four roles: in Malaysia, in SEATO, in the containment of Indonesia, and in the
reinforcement of Hong Kong. ‘Our commitment in Singapore had originally derived, like
our commitment in the Middle East, from the need to safeguard our position in India.
But, now that the total cost of maintaining our forces east of Suez was rising towards
some £600 million a year, we should consider realistically the economic and political
consequences of withdrawal.’ It was accepted that economies could not be made without a
corresponding reduction of political commitments in the region. In addition, ministers
felt that the withdrawal of forces from the Far East ‘would be regarded as a major political
defeat and, quite apart from its serious effect on Australia, New Zealand and the United
States, would encourage the spread of Communism’. The question of how to carry out
effective retrenchment was referred to the Official Oversea Co-ordinating Committee to
which Sir Arthur Snelling, deputy under-secretary at the CRO, submitted this
memorandum. For the purposes of this collection the value of Snelling’s paper lies in its
comprehensive review of the many issues with which ministers and officials grappled
throughout the planning and implementation of the Malaysia project. In the first part,
Snelling identifies British objectives, commitments and deployment in the region.
Secondly, he examines the division of opinion over future policy brought about by the
discrepancy between the few economic advantages which Britain derived from SE Asia
and its heavy expenditure there, and he summarises the political and military arguments
(including the nuclear dimension) for and against withdrawal. Thirdly, he assesses the
extent to which non-military methods (for example, diplomacy and aid) and a more
effective redistribution of the load between allies might achieve British objectives or at
least secure relief of current burdens. He concludes, in the fourth part, that few of
Britain’s current objectives could be achieved by entirely non-military methods. At its
meeting on 22 Mar, the committee accepted that marginal adjustments would result in
savings and that this would be conveyed to the Group of Permanent Secretaries chaired
by the secretary to the Cabinet. Reporting the committee’s discussion to Sir Harold
Caccia, permanent under-secretary at the FO, E Peck emphasised that Britain could not
reduce its forces while Indonesia posed a threat and that a reduction of contributions
would jeopardise British influence with the US. He urged a ‘softening up’ of Australia and
New Zealand with a view to increasing their involvement in the defence of their ‘near
North’ and also suggested a streamlining of the military presence in Singapore. A robust
response to Snelling’s paper was completed by the FO on 9 Apr in a memorandum for the
Oversea Co-ordinating Committee, entitled ‘Future policy in the Far East’. The Cabinet
Defence Committee reviewed the question of Britain’s regional role in the wider context
of future defence policy on 19 June, see 180 (D(63)3rd meeting, 9 Feb 1963, CAB 131/28;
CAB 134/2277; OC(O)(63)18, CAB 134/2278; FO 371/173493, no 65.]
This paper is written in response to a request from the Official Oversea Co-ordinating
Committee for a study of the implications of the withdrawal of United Kingdom
Forces from the Far East. In accordance with the wishes of the Committee,
statements are included of Western interests, of United Kingdom commitments and
of the possibility of protecting these interests and of carrying out these commitments
by other arrangements than at present. The Committee directed that the
examination of the implications of changes in United Kingdom deployment should
be based on achieving some savings from 1964 onwards with substantial savings in
the years 1968–75. The views expressed in this paper are personal and not to be
taken as committing the C.R.O.
I. The present situation and planning
Objectives, commitments and deployment
2. Until the Second World War few people questioned the need for Britain to
maintain a large military presence in and around the Indian Ocean, Singapore and
the South-Western Pacific. Our developing commercial interests in the area from the
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sixteenth century onwards led us to assume larger political and military
responsibilities. For 200 years from the mid-eighteenth to mid-twentieth centuries
our interests in Eastern Asia centred upon the maintenance and defence of the
Indian Empire. During the last two or three decades of this period the main function
of Singapore was to prevent the incursion of Japan into the Indian Ocean.
3. But since 1945 the relative decline in the power and resources of Britain and
the growth of the Communist threat has forced us to re-define our objectives both
globally and regionally. Globally, we now need to identify our interests with those of
our Western allies. The Western objectives have been described in the Foreign Office
as:—
(i) the maintenance of as many countries as possible outside the Communist
camp, either as allies or uncommitted;
(ii) the preservation and development of Western deterrent power;
(iii) the avoidance of nuclear war;
(iv) the safeguarding of Western prosperity.
4. Regionally, our principal objectives in the Far East were defined by the Prime
Minister in 1961 as being:—
(i) to prevent Communist, particularly Chinese Communist, expansion
throughout the area by support of SEATO and Malaya and by other means;
(ii) to preserve our links with Australia and New Zealand and to contribute to
their forward defence.
Other secondary, but obviously important objectives of policy in the area may be
summarised as being:—
(iii) to protect Hong Kong and other British Colonies in the area;
(iv) to safeguard our income from exports and investments in the Far East, as in
other parts of the world.
5. In pursuit of these objectives we have entered into the following regional
commitments of a multilateral or bilateral character.
(a) In SEATO we, the United States, France, Australia and New Zealand have in
effect undertaken to co-operate with Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan in
defending their territories, and also (if requested) the territories of Cambodia, Laos
and Vietnam, against aggression or the threat of aggression. Detailed SEATO plans
exist and to enable them to be carried out forces have been ‘declared’.
(b) We have a Treaty obligation, for a period of undefined duration, to assist
Malaya with her external defence. In common with Australia and New Zealand, we
station forces in Malaya and Singapore for this purpose. We have undertaken to
support the creation of Malaysia, and when it comes into being our Treaty
obligation will be to help defend the whole of Malaysian territory. We have
explicitly restated this commitment to the U.S. in February 1963.
(c) Our commitment to contribute to the forward defence of Australia and New
Zealand is a moral and not a written one and is not defined with any precision. It
arises under ANZAM which is a consultative body of which the U.K., Australia and
New Zealand, but not Malaya, are members. The three Commonwealth countries
aim to contribute to the external defence of Malaya, Hong Kong and the South
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West Pacific. In practice the result of ANZAM has been the creation of the
Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. This consists of the Commonwealth Brigade
and the allocation to the command of C.-in-C. F.E. of Australian and New Zealand
naval and air forces.
(d) We share with fifteen other nations (including the U.S., Canada, Australia and
New Zealand) a continuing obligation to the U.N. (expressed in a U.N. resolution)
‘to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified independent and
democratic Korea under a representative form of Government.’ The present
situation is technically only an armistice. If war starts again in Korea we shall be
formally committed to pursue the aim expressed in the U.N. resolution.
6. In addition, to complete the list of purposes for which we deploy forces in the
Far East, there are certain unilateral obligations.
(e) Although not required to do so by treaty, we station troops in Malaya to
combat terrorism and thus to help her maintain internal security. Some time after
Singapore and the Borneo Territories become part of Malaysia, we hope that our
responsibility for their internal security will be taken over by Malaysia (whilst our
external responsibility remains in effect unchanged under (b) above).
(f) There will still remain our obligations to defend and maintain internal security
in Hong Kong, Fiji and our other Colonies in the Pacific.
(g) We make our traditional naval contribution to the maintenance of freedom of
the seas and the suppression of piracy.
7. The forces we now deploy in the Far East to achieve these objectives and fulfil
these commitments can be summarised as follows:—
Ground Forces. We have 20 major units in the area, at present divided roughly
equally between Malaya (including Singapore), Hong Kong and Borneo. This
represents about 15 per cent of the strength of the British Army.
Naval Forces. For Naval purposes the Far East and the Middle East must be
regarded as a single theatre, as most of the Naval forces East of Suez are based on
Singapore. About 50 per cent of the operational strength of the Royal Navy is East of
Suez.
Air Forces. There are 16 squadrons and 5 R.A.F. bases in the Far East, of which one
squadron and one base are in Hong Kong and the rest in Singapore and Malaya. This
represents about 10 per cent of the operational strength of the R.A.F.
The economics of Far Eastern defence
8. At Annex A is a collection of such estimates and statistics as are readily
available bearing on the economics of Far Eastern defence, including data on the cost
of our regional defence effort, our income from exports and investments, our aid to
Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo Territories, the probable external assets of
Malaysia etc.
9. Until recently the only figures relating to the cost of our forces overseas were
of the expenditure in foreign exchange to which their deployment gave rise. The
figure for the Far East most frequently quoted on this basis was £50m. a year. It is
still not possible to obtain completely accurate statistics of the total cost of our forces
in the Far East, but the Treasury estimate that defence in the whole area East of Suez
at present involves us in expenditure of nearly £500m. a year, inclusive of the
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necessary backing in Britain. This amounts to about one-third of our total defence
expenditure (excluding research and development). Very tentatively the Treasury
believe it would be reasonable to attribute one quarter of this £500m. to the Middle
East and three-quarters, or say £375m. a year to the Far East. The foreign exchange
element in the £500m. is some £120m. a year of which about £35m. is incurred in
the Middle East. Our annual defence expenditure at present in respect of the Far East
can thus be cautiously estimated at about £290m. in sterling plus £85m. in foreign
exchange, and amounts in all to about one-quarter of the cost of our total defence
effort.
10. The economic value of South East Asia to the West in general and to Britain
in particular is nothing like one-quarter of that of all allied and uncommitted
countries. The resources of the area, especially rubber, oil and tin, are considerable
but not indispensable. British trade with South East Asia is only about 3 per cent of
our total trade. The foreign exchange we earn from our investments in all countries
in Asia between West Pakistan and Japan is smaller than the foreign exchange we
disperse for defence purposes in the same area. The conclusion is inescapable that
our defence expenditure in the Far East is now out of all proportion to our economic
stake there.
11. Yet present plans provide not for a reduction but for an increase in the cost of
our defence effort East of Suez. The Chiefs of Staff paper on British Strategy in the
Sixties* envisages an expansion in both our naval and air deployment East of Suez. It
looks as though the total cost of defence East of Suez will rise in the next decade
something as follows:—
£ millions
1962/3 1972/3
Navy 216 290
Army 160 160
Air Force 110 155
486 605
These rough estimates assume constant prices; if the purchasing power of the pound
continues to decline at the rate of 21⁄2 per cent per annum, the actual cost of defence
East of Suez will be 1972/3 reach over £750m. The biggest increase on present plans
will be in naval expenditure. Already the Royal Navy is the costliest service East of
Suez. The prospect is that by the early seventies we shall be spending in respect of
that area almost as much money on the Royal Navy as on the British Army and the
Royal Air Force put together.
II. The division of opinion about future policy
The questioning attitude
12. Faced with this situation, the purpose, value and essentiality of maintaining
a military presence in the region is being called in question. At Annex B is a list of
some of the Whitehall reports and papers during the last three years bearing wholly
or partly on this issue and a collection of quotations from a few of them.
* COS (62)1
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13. In these memoranda strong doubts have been expressed by the Prime
Minister, Ministers and officials about the whole scale of our defence effort in the Far
East in relation to our resources, our obligations elsewhere, the size of our interests
in the region and the efforts of some of our Allies. The need has been questioned for
us to make any land contribution at all towards SEATO. Similar doubts have been
cast upon the necessity for us to maintain an independent nuclear capacity in the Far
East. Doubts have been expressed about the need to retain our base at Singapore and
the wisdom of assuming that we shall still be able to keep it in the 1970s.
Nevertheless military planning continues to proceed upon the assumptions that our
total expenditure on defence in the Far East can be allowed to go on rising during the
next decade; that we shall continue to provide a land contribution to SEATO; that we
shall retain and develop a nuclear capability in the Far East; that it is essential for us
to keep a multi-service base in Singapore; and that we shall still be able to use it in
the mid-1970s. In fact there is no identity of view in Whitehall at present upon the
need for us to contemplate a large and continued military presence in the Far East.
The political and military arguments are examined separately below.
The political argument
14. The political case in favour of a strong British deployment in the Far East rests
upon the following arguments:—
(i) The consequences of the loss of South East Asia to the Communists would be
that confidence in the West in other areas would be gravely weakened, that the less
staunch among the allies would slip into neutralism or satellite status, that China
would be encouraged to adopt aggressive policies more generally, that India and
Pakistan would be exposed to increased Chinese pressure and that the Russians
might be tempted to a dangerous course elsewhere in the belief that the West was
on the run. These results would follow to a greater or less degree whether the
Communists achieved their aims by military action or by subversion, and whether
the area collapsed quickly or by slow stages.
(ii) The political consequences would be almost as serious in the event of
Indonesian territorial aggrandisement at the expense of Malaysia. The threat from
Indonesia is new and is not yet fully taken into account in our long-term military
planning. There is no acceptable alternative to Malaysia, and if the Indonesians
broke it up the blow to the British position in the area would be particularly great.
(iii) As Britain is manifestly unable by herself to contain both China and
Indonesia, it is necessary to seek strength in alliances—e.g. SEATO and the
Malayan Defence Treaty. But if we hope to benefit from these alliances, we must
contribute to them on a scale sufficient to convince our allies that we are sincere
and pulling our weight.
(iv) Only by our contributions to SEATO and to the defence of Malaysia and by
maintaining our base in Singapore are we able to exert influence on U.S. policy in
the area. This is important to us in the nuclear field. And for domestic political
reasons the U.S. Government, in order to maintain their own military effort in the
region, must be able to show that we are sharing the load and honouring our
commitments.
(v) Military withdrawal from the Far East would mean the abandonment of Malaya
and of our contribution to the forward defence of Australia and New Zealand.
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Politically and eventually economically Australia and New Zealand would be forced
to leave the British and enter the American orbit. We have a major moral
obligation to Australia and New Zealand if only on account of the way they rallied
to our defence in two World Wars.
15. On the other hand there are political arguments against the retention of a
large British military presence in the Far East.
(i) Without questioning the consequences of the loss of all or large parts of South
East Asia to the Communists of Indonesia, it is possible to doubt whether the scale
of the military effort we can muster is big enough to exert a decisive political
influence. Certainly a retreat by the United States or a decline in her military effort
in the area would bring about dire political results. But would these follow if we
quit and the U.S. remained? Would the United States, in her own interest, leave a
power vacuum? Would Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam, Thailand, Malaya or the
Philippines really go neutralist or worse if only we and not the Americans
departed?
(ii) For us to be able to exert influence on U.S. policy in the Far East may be useful
without being vital. It is difficult to see what major British interest would suffer
from loss of that influence, which could never amount to a veto. In the nuclear
field, are the U.S. Government so irresponsible that if we cannot restrain them
they will be inclined to embark on rash and possibly escalatory adventures? Is the
influence we do exert on U.S. policy commensurate with the cost of our defence
effort in the Far East?
(iii) Our position and influence will not decline so much if we quit Singapore
voluntarily as if we wait till we are forced out. The political arguments in favour of
a voluntary and total withdrawal are that military bases present a challenge to
strident nationalism (e.g. among the young Chinese in Singapore); that they
attract the enmity of neighbours (?Indonesia); that military alliances expose
regional governments to criticism as neo-colonialist stooges (which is why the
Tunku refuses to allow Malaya to join SEATO or to take part in ANZAM planning);
and that we get involved in the support of governments which have no popular
support (South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Brunei). On the other hand there is
no more democratic ruler in South East Asia than the Tunku. The inference is
drawn that the interests of the West would be better served if we abandoned our
policy of military bases and alliances and instead supported local nationalist,
democratic movements.
(iv) The voluntary abandonment of Singapore would admittedly do drastic harm
to our relations with Australia and New Zealand. But these relations are not
healthy if they are dependent upon our contributing over 7 per cent of our Gross
National Product to defence whilst they contribute 3.1 per cent and 1.7 per cent
respectively of theirs. They can and should carry a bigger share of the load of Far
Eastern defence.
(v) Our politico-military thinking over Singapore in relation to Malaysia and
SEATO involves some circular reasoning and is creating unforeseen difficulties for
us. The circular reasoning arises in respect of every overseas base; we cannot
retain a base in an independent country without undertaking to defend that
country; one of the purposes of the base then becomes the defence of the country
in which it is located in order to permit the base to be retained. Thus we accepted
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our obligations in the defence treaty with Malaya partly to enable us to keep
Singapore, and we needed Singapore partly to be able to defend Malaya. Then we
decided that, given the attitude of the Tunku towards Singapore, the best prospect
of keeping our base was to support the creation of Malaysia. But unforeseen
Indonesian hostility to the Malaysia project is at present adding to the military
threat in the area and so obliging us to contemplate adding to our military
deployment based on Singapore. So a costly game of politico-military leap-frog
proceeds. Meanwhile, of course, our military presence in Singapore enables us also
to discharge our obligations under SEATO. But the only safe assumption to make
is that long before 1970 we shall be able to go on using Singapore for SEATO
purposes only to the extent that the Government of Malaysia agrees with those
purposes and is willing to let us use the base for them. And Malaya is not a member
of SEATO. For so long as the Tunku stays in power we shall probably be able to
retain our Singapore base, but when he goes our tenure of it may become
insecure.
The military argument
16. The military arguments for maintaining a large military presence in the Far
East are familiar and can therefore be listed briefly.
(i) Our current commitments in the area cannot be fulfilled with anything less
than the forces we now plan to deploy there. Indeed these forces are probably a
good deal too small for the job they are meant to be doing, and it is only by a
certain amount of sleight-of-hand (e.g. the ‘double-pledging’ of the same British
battalion to meet our obligations under SEATO and the Malayan Defence Treaty)
that we can get by.
(ii) Since the last military examination of our long-term plans for the Far East,*
the Indonesia threat has grown. It now faces us with the possibility of a
commitment either to engage in a long struggle in the Borneo jungles or deal with
Indonesia by some other military method e.g. by bombing Jakarta.
(iii) The retention of a base at Singapore is absolutely vital to the discharge of the
obligations listed in paragraph 5 and 6 above. The only partially satisfactory
alternative would be the establishment, virtually from scratch, of a multi-service
base or bases in Australia, which would be vastly more costly than the retention of
Singapore.
(iv) While the U.S. have sufficient military power, in depth, to deal adequately
with the South-East Asian portion of the Asian continent, they cannot easily get
round the corner to deal with Burma or the Indian sub-continent. There is in fact
a gap in the U.S. military presence from the Philippines to the Mediterranean and
the South Atlantic. Only we can fill it at present. Even if, under pressure, we found
that we needed to call upon American help, the U.S. forces would be handicapped if
they could not use British bases and staging facilities in Singapore and points to
the West. We must therefore retain those facilities unless we are prepared to see
the whole of the Indian Ocean area become a power vacuum.
17. The arguments which can be advanced against the need for the present
planned deployment in the Far East can only take the form of questioning some of
* COS (62)1
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the military assumptions. This can most conveniently be done by treating the
general military arguments first and the nuclear issues second.
(i) The land and air forces we could contribute in a war with the Communists on
the mainland of South-East Asia probably add little to the strength the U.S. could
muster. It is virtually impossible to envisage circumstances in which the Chinese,
when contemplating aggression, would be restrained by the British rather than
the American armed strength they would have to face. Our total contribution
looks marginal. Our Army contribution is not very significant on military as
distinct from political grounds. There is scope for Anglo–American discussion at
political and service (e.g. between Commanders-in-Chief) levels on the overlap of
military deployment in the Far East.
(ii) The Minister of Defence appears to doubt whether we could ever use all the
forces we now have in the Far East, including our biggest Naval concentration.
The Chiefs of Staff* have recognised that overlapping between the three Services
may exist and have envisaged the need for closer definition of their respective roles
and responsibilities. The Far East seems a particularly suitable theatre for an
examination of this kind.
(iii) A politico-military re-assessment might reveal that the need for stationing
forces in the Far East on the scale at present planned could be reduced if fresh
assumptions were made. E.g. upon the acceptability of a longer time for
reinforcement (which might permit greater dependence upon the Strategic
Reserve) and upon the conditions necessary before greater reliance could be placed
upon the West-about reinforcement route to avoid the Middle East air barrier (as
for instance by arrangements to use long-range U.S. transport aircraft when
needed).
(iv) The purpose of two battalions in Hong Kong and at least part of the land
forces which are in the Singapore/Borneo area is said to be to enable the
‘identification of aggression’ to take place. This ought not to be a job solely for our
troops even in a British Colony. For ten years a U.N. Observer Corps has been
watching both sides of the cease-fire line in Kashmir. Can we not press urgently
for this precedent to be followed elsewhere in Asia? The knowledge that a U.N.
presence would enable any aggression to be instantly identified might do more to
deter Indonesia than all the British troops in Borneo.
(v) It seems paradoxical that such a large and increasing proportion of the cost of
Far Eastern defence should be on naval account when the threat in the Pacific
from China, unlike the former threat from Japan, is mainly by land and air, and
when whatever naval force China could despatch would meet the U.S. Fleet long
before it reached Singapore.
(vi) Rejection of the suggestion that we should move our base in Singapore to
Australia rests on the assumption that any base or bases there would have to be
multi-service and would need to be built wholly or mainly at our expense.
Although the Chiefs of Staff have set out in broad terms our possible future
requirements for base facilities in Australia† on a multi-service basis, these have
not been costed. But need such facilities be multi-service? Can we ever hope to
* C.O.S. (62)1, paragraph 117 † COS (61)197.
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provide a significant land force contribution to the close defence of Australia
without re-imposing conscription? Would not any attack on the mainland of
Australia automatically involve global nuclear war? Could not our contribution to
the defence of Australia, and even of areas further north, be provided by nuclear
means alone? Luckily the Indonesian threat is now provoking Australia into the
realisation that she must spend a good deal more money on defence. We should try
to ensure that some of it is devoted to the provision of facilities which we could
use—in case we lose Singapore—to enable us to help defend Australia. The time is
becoming ripe for us to raise these questions with her. We have a card of entry in
the desultory exchanges of messages which have been taking place between the
Prime Minister and Sir R. Menzies and Mr. Holyoake since 1961 in which we have
been gradually getting them to face up to the consequence if we lost Singapore.
This correspondence at the moment leaves the ball in our court.
The nuclear issue
18. The Americans have a nuclear capability in the Far East. So have we. Is ours
necessary? The answer must be yes if, but only if, either the American capability is
inadequate or if we deem it essential to maintain our nuclear independence in that
area.
19. As to the adequacy of the U.S. capability, the only reasonable assumption to
make is that, in the Far East as elsewhere, it is big enough for all conceivable
purposes.
20. The need for British nuclear independence has not been examined with the
Americans in a specifically Far Eastern context. The Prime Minister insisted at
Nassau that we must retain our nuclear independence and that when the V bombers
are replaced by British Polaris missiles we must be free to withdraw the latter from
the multi-national force and use them independently when ‘supreme national
interests’ are at stake. But virtually all the discussion at Nassau centred around
NATO. Do we conceive it possible that our supreme national interests should be at
stake in the Far East to such an extent as to necessitate the unilateral usage of
nuclear weapons in that area?
21. If it is argued that we might wish to preserve an independent nuclear
capacity in the Far East for the close defence of Australia or New Zealand if for no
other purpose, the following answers might be given:—
(a) it is virtually inconceivable that we should have to act independently of the
United States in that situation:
(b) we can be confident that Australia will before long be willing to accept nuclear
weapons and to permit us to station nuclear forces of our own in her territory:
(c) it may therefore be unnecessary for us to maintain an independent nuclear
capacity ‘at large’ in the Far East.
22. Discussions with the United States would obviously be essential before we
abandoned our regional nuclear capability. However unwelcome the argument
would be to the Americans, it would be possible, in the light of the opposition
President Kennedy displayed at Nassau to British nuclear independence, for us to
represent the regional abandonment of that independence as a concession to their
viewpoint! The opportunity should also be taken to ascertain what U.S. policy is on
some fundamental nuclear questions in the region. Do the Americans think that
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nuclear weapons in fact deter the Chinese? Does the U.S. intend to use such weapons
in the event of Chinese aggression, or is she restrained by the thought of possible
Russian support of China? Is the U.S. prepared to contemplate using these weapons
against a Far Eastern enemy other than China, e.g. Indonesia?
23. If for any reason the view is taken that we must maintain an independent
nuclear capacity at large in the Far East, the following questions may still be asked
about the appropriate methods of ensuring that capacity.
(i) The decision that we need to undertake deployment both by sea and by air was
directed primarily to methods of moving our forces, rather than to methods of
delivering nuclear weapons.* Is it in fact necessary that in the Far East we should
provide for the delivery of nuclear weapons both by V bombers and carrier-borne
aircraft?
(ii) The discussion at Nassau was based on the assumption that the V bomber
would not provide a credible deterrent after 1970 against Russia. But must we
assume that in the first half of the 1970s the V bomber will no longer provide a
credible deterrent against China? Could we retain V bombers in the Far East after
we had ceased to employ them in the NATO area?
(iii) What is the future of the sea-borne nuclear weapon in the Far East? Do we
envisage the deployment of Polaris submarines East of Suez or will all four or five
of them be needed nearer home? If we are to have a Polaris capability in the Far
East, will there be any need for a carrier-borne nuclear capability in that area in
the 1970s?
The summing-up
24. If we accept the argument that the forces to be deployed under present plans in
the Far East are the absolute minimum necessary to enable us to discharge our
existing commitments, we must view our military presence there on an ‘all-or-
nothing’ basis; and economic circumstances may then force us to contemplate total
withdrawal. We ought if we conceivably can [?try] to avoid total withdrawal. At
present it would not be regarded as voluntary but as a retreat in the face of
Indonesian threats and a major defeat for the West in general and ourselves in
particular. Voluntary withdrawal would involve the abandonment of our moral
obligations to Australia, New Zealand and Malaya and would be disastrous to our
relations with them. It would also gravely impair our relations with the United
States, and impair our position in the Indian sub-continent.
25. But, as suggested at several points above, there does seem to be a prima facie
case for thinking that our deployment could be reduced without abandoning
Singapore and without serious damage to our objectives or relations with our allies.
Moreover in present circumstances there is a case for examining the feasibility of
leaving the U.S. to confront China whilst we concentrate upon confronting
Indonesia. We should of course also allow the U.S. to use our facilities, e.g. at
Singapore, for purposes connected with the containment of China. And our
continued presence in Singapore would permit us to discharge our obligations
towards Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand. This would not be an easy matter to
negotiate with the Americans, but if economic pressure compels us to envisage large
* COS (62)1: Appendix A
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economies in our defence expenditure in the Far East, it may be the least undesirable
way of proceeding. Alternatively if we are able to persuade the Americans that we are
over-committed in Europe, and so can achieve major defence economies there, we
might offer to maintain the contribution to Far Eastern defence which we should
otherwise be obliged to curtail.
III. Non-military methods of achieving our objectives
26. The question has been raised whether by diplomatic, economic or other non-
military methods we could achieve our major objectives in South East Asia. The
quick answer can only be that aggression cannot be deterred or combatted by non-
military means. But subversion can. The first question must therefore be whether
the Communists, the Indonesians and any other potential enemies in the Far East
are likely to have recourse mainly to military or to subversive means in order to gain
their ends.
27. The Chinese mood is uncertain and potentially dangerous. On the one hand
her recent dealings with countries on her southern border, other than India, have
been generally correct and in some cases conciliatory. On the other hand her
dealings with India since last October have shown a new and alarming willingness to
achieve political and limited territorial objectives by the use of open and large scale
military operations. The latter have hitherto been so limited as to stop far short of
anything that would involve a physical confrontation with the Western powers.
Avoidance of such a confrontation is likely to continue to be one of the dominant
considerations in Chinese external policy wherever both Chinese and Western forces
can be brought to bear directly. Though in consequence the threat of direct Chinese
military aggression may be extremely limited in territorial terms, nevertheless there
is ample evidence that Chinese intentions in terms of subversion and revolution are
very great. Prosecution of these intentiors with greater vigour would be consistent
with the line China has taken in her quarrel with Moscow, and also with the renewed
atmosphere of confidence and arrogance in Peking since the Chinese economy took a
turn for the better last year. The threat of Chinese-supported revolution and
subversion in South East Asia is greatly exacerbated by the existence of the overseas
Chinese communities in the area, and also by the fundamental insecurity of many of
the governments. The danger from subversion throughout the area is likely to
increase as the power and confidence of Communist China grow.
28. Similarly Indonesia, whose appetite has been whetted by her success in Dutch
New Guinea, is likely to become more aggressive. She too, by her appeals on racial lines
to her fellow Malays in other countries may be able to build up an effective fifth column.
29. What could we achieve by giving or receiving more aid? Neither China nor
Indonesia can be bought off by the receipt of Danegeld.1 The scope for useful aid—
whether civil or military—is therefore confined to the allied and uncommitted
countries. It is probably desirable for us on political grounds to give a little aid to
every undeveloped non-enemy tropical country; otherwise we tend to turn forgotten
children into juvenile delinquents. There are at present a multiplicity of aid schemes
for the countries in South East Asia, including United Nations schemes, Colombo
1 A tribute paid by the Saxon kings to the Vikings in eleventh-century England; appeasement by bribery.
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Plan, American, German and Italian aid schemes, etc. To the countries in and near
the front line especially Laos, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand, the
Americans have been the biggest benefactors. But the results of American aid have
not been impressive and their value had led to questioning in Washington. There
seems no reason why we should aim to give more than token aid to these countries.
To Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo Territories we have given a certain amount of
economic aid but in the near future our principal contribution seems likely to be the
provision of help to enable them to build up their own armed forces. Negotiations
about our military aid to Malaysia have yet to take place but the cost to us may be up
to £30m. in the next few years. It seems right that our aid to Malaysia should
principally take this form. One suggestion worth examining might be to accelerate
the build-up of Malayan armed forces by transferring to them some of the Gurkhas
we shall no longer need; the agreement of the Governments of Nepal and India would
be required before such arrangements could be made.
30. Our burdens in the area would of course be lightened if there could be some
more ‘inward aid’ from other countries in the area. The prospects have already been
examined (paragraph 17(vi)) of securing increased defence contributions to the area
from Australia. As regards Malaysia the fact stands out that she will be born with a
sterling silver spoon in her mouth to the value of over £600m. This is the total of the
external assets of the sum of the parts of Malaysia, but not all of it will be at the
disposal of the Government in Kuala Lumpur. Nevertheless it is difficult to believe
that Malaysia cannot afford to make a larger contribution to its own defence.
31. Political and diplomatic action to ease our defence burdens in the Far East
must be directed primarily towards increasing the share of them which is borne by
our Western allies. Suggestions have been made for ‘generalising’ these burdens, e.g.
by a concerted policy within NATO in regard to a mutual defence pact between the
countries of South East Asia, under-written by the peace-keeping machinery of the
United Nations. If successful such efforts would mean that our European allies would
foot part of the bill for containing Communism in the Far East; the French
contribution to SEATO has dropped away to virtually nothing and the West Germans
have never contributed significantly in that area. However there are arguments
against using the NATO forum for this purpose. To ex-Colonial territories NATO
often seems to be an organisation of former Colonial powers, and it might do more
harm than good to the cause of the West to put a NATO label upon any Western
defence activities in the Far East. Close consultation with our representatives in the
area would therefore seem desirable before launching any such initiative. Such
consultation might take place at the next Eden Hall Conference.
32. There is scope for securing some relief to our burdens through the greater
use of United Nations machinery. One particular suggestion to this end is made in
paragraph 17(iv) above.
IV. Conclusions
33.
(a) Our present defence responsibilities in the Far East are largely residual from
our imperial past.
(b) Our political objectives are now to help contain China and to contribute to the
forward defence of Malayasia [sic], Australia and New Zealand.
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(c) For this purpose we have entered into a series of specific commitments of which
the chief are to contribute to the defence of our SEATO allies and Malaya. Australia
and New Zealand are our partners and with them we have formed the Commonwealth
Strategic Reserve. We also still retain certain Colonial and naval responsibilities.
(d) We deploy about 15 per cent of the British Army and 10 per cent of the R.A.F.
in the Far East, and roughly 50 per cent of the Royal Navy in the Middle and Far
East together.
(e) The cost of this deployment in the Far East is about one quarter of our total
defence bill and is out of proportion to our economic stake in the area. But on
current plans the real cost will rise during the next decade, by the end of which
naval expenditure will be nearly half of total defence expenditure East of Suez.
(f) This state of affairs is attracting criticism. Strong arguments are advanced for
and against the need for such a British military presence on this scale.
(g) The general case for retaining it is:—
politically, that abandonment of any of our present commitments would have
disastrous effects upon the position of the West both locally and further afield,
upon our own prestige and interests, and upon our relations with our American
and Australasian allies;
militarily, that our deployment is the minimum necessary to fulfil our
commitments, that it is likely to increase because of the Indonesia threat, that a
Singapore base is vital, and that if we quit there will be a power vacuum, which
the U.S. will be unable to fill, from the Mediterranean to the Philippines.
(h) The general arguments on the other side are that politically and militarily the
value of our presence in the Far East is marginal compared with that of the U.S.;
that politically the influence we exert with the U.S. and the loss of prestige if we
quit can be over-estimated; that there are political disadvantages in having bases
and military alliances; and that our relations with Australia and New Zealand must
have regard to the fact that they are not pulling their weight over defence.
(i) An independent British nuclear capacity in the Far East looks unnecessary, but
if it must be preserved we may nevertheless be able to economise on the means of
delivery.
(j) Total British military withdrawal from the Far East would have disastrous
political and military effects, particularly in the face of Indonesian pressure.
(k) But we might be able to achieve a reduction in our regional military
commitment as a result of further examination of the possibilities of:—
reducing the overlap between our and U.S. forces (paragraph 17(i));
reducing the overlap between our own three Services (paragraph 17(ii));
re-examining the military assumptions about timing and routeing of
reinforcements (paragraph 17(iii));
working for the setting up of U.N. Observer Corps to identify aggression
(paragraph 17(iv));
re-examining the need for the naval deployment envisaged (paragraph 17(v));
abandoning an independent British nuclear capacity in the Far East (paragraphs
18–22);
or alternatively re-examining the need for retaining both land-based and sea-
borne methods of delivering nuclear weapons (paragraph 23).
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(l) The feasibility should be examined of dividing responsibilities in the Far East
between the Americans and ourselves on the basis that they will contain China
whilst we contain Indonesia.
(m) Alternatively, we might persuade the Americans that we shall be able to carry
our present load in the Far East only if our load in Europe is drastically reduced.
(n) Few of our present objectives in the Far East could be achieved by entirely
non-military methods, e.g. aid or diplomacy.
Annex A to 166: Some financial and economic statistics
Cost of British defence effort
The following are rough estimates produced in the Treasury of the cost of the British
defence effort east of Suez.
£ millions
Rough Estimate
1962/3(1) for 1972/3(2)
Navy 216 290
Army 160 160
Air Force 110 155
(3)486(3) (3)605(4)
Notes: (1) Includes elements for U.K. backing and apportionment of Strategic Reserve. Excludes any
element for research and development.
(2) Assumes constant prices.
(3) Of which roughly £120m. may be for the Middle East.
(4) Of which roughly £150m. may be for the Middle East.
British income
Exports from the U.K. in 1962
To:— £ millions
Federation of Malaya 40.7
Singapore 38.2
North Borneo 2.8
Sarawak 2.3
Brunei .4
84.4
Interest, Profits and Dividends according to U.K. Residents in 1961
From:— £ millions
Malaysia 22
Hong Kong 4
Indonesia 1
India 38
Pakistan 5
Ceylon 4
Japan 2
Other countries in the Far East –
76
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Notes: (1) Excludes income from oil.
(2) Includes income from direct as well as portfolio investment.
(3) U.S. income from the same area probably does not exceed £40 million; Australian income may
be up to £3 million; New Zealand income negligible.
(4) Source: Central Statistical Office.
Aid
Air to Malaysian territories
(expressed as an annual figure)
Federation of Malaya £ millions
1957 Great in Aid for Defence Expenditure (61–62) 2.9
‘Fringe benefits’ (for British seconded officers) .081
Singapore
C.D. & W. (ave.) .25
Defence (ave.) .51 .76
North Borneo
C.D. & W. (ave.) over
5 year plan .6
Sarawak
C.D. & W. (ave.) over
5 year plan .75
5.091
External Assets
External Reserves of Malaysian Territories
£ millions
Federation of Malaya (includes private reserves
and share of currency fund). 328
Singapore (excludes private reserves other
than banks). 140
Sarawak and North Borneo 58
Brunei 90
616
Annex B to 166: Source material
1. The following is a list, by no means exhaustive, of some of the major reports
and memoranda of the last three years concerned wholly or partly with politico-
military policy in the Far East.
F.P. (60) 1 of 24th February, 1960. Future Policy Study 1960–70. This is a report of
a committee of Permanent Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff presided over by Sir N.
Brook.
D.S.E. (60) 30(Final) of 3rd November, 1960. Future Developments in South East
Asia. A report by a committee of officials under the chairmanship of Sir R. Scott.2
2 cf 28 and 29.
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C.O.S. (61) 197 of 22nd June, 1961. Base Facilities in Australia. A short note by the
Chiefs of Staff.
Our Foreign and Defence Policy in the Future. Memorandum by the Prime
Minister dated 2nd October, 1961.3
Directives by the Prime Minister of 23rd October, 1961, on future defence policy
and the future cost of defence.
C.O.S. (61)1 of 9th January, 1962. British Strategy in the Sixties. A full study by
the Chiefs of Staff.
C.O.S. (62) 415 of 26th October, 1962. Comparative Assessment of Westabout and
Eastabout routes.
Defence in the Longer Term. Memorandum by the Minister of Defence dated 28th
November, 1962.
C.O.S. (62) 456 of 28th November, 1962. Directive to the C. in C. Far East.
C.O.S. 14/63 of 10th January, 1963. Strategy after 1970—Australia and New
Zealand.
Strategy East of Suez. Memorandum by Mr. Cary dated 23rd February, 1963.
Selected quotations 
The scale and cost of our defence effort East of Suez
2. In February 1960 Sir Norman Brook wrote:a ‘there is danger that in future the
effort involved in maintaining our position in Singapore may be out of proportion to
our interests in doing so, particularly if political developments in Singapore or
Malaya were to lead to serious restrictions on the full use of the base facilities. Before
the end of the decade we may have to abandon it as a base.’ Elsewhere in the same
reportb it is stated that ‘as regards our own resources there is a danger that by
spreading them too thickly and too widely, we may fail to preserve our most
important interests.’ The report recommended thatc ‘we should not plan on the
assumption that we may have to engage by ourselves in any military action (except
conceivably in Hong Kong) but should maintain no greater an effort than is
necessary to encourage our Allies, maintain the cohesion of the Commonwealth and
make the United States feel both that we are taking a fair share and that we have a
right to be consulted on policy in the area.’
3. In November 1960 Sir Robert Scott wroted that the main role of British
defence forces and facilities at present in the area was (a) internal security and
external defence of British dependent territories; (b) a contribution to the strategic
deterrent against China; (c) a contribution to operations on land (for example a
SEATO operation). He continued: ‘the United Kingdom cannot continue for another
decade to play all three roles on present scales and in present forms. . . . The U.K.
must continue to make a contribution to the nuclear deterrent against China. In
addition the U.K. cannot avoid her special obligations to her dependent territories,
a F.P. (60)1, part III, paragraph 85. b F.P. (60)1, part I, paragraph 45(d).
c F.P. (60)1, part III, paragraph 72. d D.S.E. (60)30, paragraph 17 et seq.
3 This would appear to be a reference to the prime minister’s memorandum ‘Our foreign and defence
policy for the future’, 29 Sept 1961, printed in this collection as document 65.
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notably Hong Kong. . . . It is only in the third defence role (a contribution to land
operations) that we could afford to risk some reduction’. Later in the same report he
wrote: ‘If we are to continue to meet these commitments [i.e. in Eastern Asia] as at
present, military expenditure must increase. Such an increase is hard to justify on
direct political or economic grounds or in relation to inecapable defence
commitments elsewhere.’
4. In 1961 the Prime Minister wrote:e ‘the developing situation (it seems to me)
will drive our Allies to realise that our role in South East Asia must be re-assessed.
We should take advantage of that and try to adjust our agreed role in the way that
suits us best, politically as well as financially.’
5. Questions have also been asked about the size of our defence effort in the Far
East in relation to that of our Allies. Thus the Brook Report contained the following
passage:f ‘Australia and New Zealand benefit more directly than we do from our
defence expenditure in the area and they should contribute more. Australia’s
interests in Asia are growing but she has not yet assumed commensurate
responsibilities. . . . But if we are to be realistic we must recognise that it would be
difficult to persuade the Australians or even the Americans to do more. . . . It seems
unlikely that we shall be able to make substantial economies in our own expenditure
without abandoning our major interests or undertaking a radical revision of the
means by which we protect them.’
The nature of our Far Eastern defence effort
6. The view of Sir R. Scottg was that ‘a reduction in the British military presence
in Eastern Asia is inevitable. No modification can be made without some adverse
effects, and it is only in our contribution to land operations in the area that we can
afford to risk a cut.’
7. In his memorandum of 2nd October, 1961 the Prime Minister asked the
following questions: ‘Need we provide a land contribution at all to SEATO
operations? If so, need it be at a forward base, or could it not be in reserve (in
Australia)? In either case, can we dispense with permanent large-scale forward
bases? Do we need any nuclear capability for our forces in this area, either to
impress the Australians or to influence (and perhaps restrain) the United States?
Might the deployment of some such capability from Australian bases make it easier
for our allies to accept a further reduction in our land forces? These questions are
perhaps directed more towards means than ends. Politically, our main objective
(except for the very short term) should be to play a role in the alliances in the area,
which would be acceptable to our partners, particularly the Australians and the
United States, and considerably less onerous in military terms than our present
commitments.’
8. Subsequently the Minister of Defenceh wrote: ‘these forces (i.e in Singapore
and Malaya) can operate at the request of Malaya in Malaya and perhaps in Greater
Malaysia and make a contribution to operations of a wider character in the area, e.g.
the sending of a Hunter squadron to Thailand. They cannot do much more’. The
e Memorandum of 2nd October, 1961. f F.P. (60)1, part III, paragraph 72.
g D.S.E. (60)30, paragraph 108. h Memorandum of 28th November, 1962, paragraph 9(iv).
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Minister of Defence in the same paper also questioned the assumption that we should
plan to take independent action in the Far East, and suggested that ‘we should
assume as at present that in the Far East we should not take part in any major
operation without partners or allies’.
The Singapore base
9. In many papers there has been a questioning attitude towards the wisdom of
assuming that we shall be able to stay in Singapore. Thus in the Brook Report there
is a passage reading:i ‘it is possible that the United Kingdom will be able to retain
bases there until 1970 but it would be unwise to base policy for the end of the period
(i.e. the 1960s) upon this assumption.’ Nevertheless military planning has continued
to proceed upon the assumption that we shall continue to be able to use Singapore in
the foreseeable future. Thus the Chiefs of Staff in their paper on British strategy in
the 1960s, arguedj that, although they had been told to assume that Singapore would
be available only until 1970, the lack of provision for alternative bases during the
1960s would mean that, if we had to abandon Singapore before the middle 1970s, the
results would be ‘particularly crippling’. The latest paper on strategy after 1970k
contains among its conclusion the statements that: ‘the continued basing of United
Kingdom forces in Malaysia would be the best military contribution we could make
to the maintenance after 1970 of the Western position in the Far East’ and that
‘unless there is a change in British policy in the Far East area we can foresee no
likelihood of any reduction in planned force levels of the United Kingdom
contribution to the defence of Australasia after 1970’.
i F.P. (60)1, part I, paragraph 34. j COS(62)1, paragraph 121.
k COS 14/63, paragraph 26.
167 CAB 131/28, D(63)10 25 Mar 1963
‘Use of British forces in active internal security roles in Singapore
after merger in the Federation of Malaysia’: memorandum by Mr
Thorneycroft for the Cabinet Defence Committee
[In briefing Macmillan on this subject preparatory to its discussion at the Defence
Committee, Trend produced a balanced argument. On the one hand, he cited the
following reasons for countenancing a British role in Singapore’s internal security:
Britain would respond only to the request of an independent government; it was vital
that Malaysia should succeed; the internal security of Singapore was crucial to the
British base and commerce; British assistance would not require additions to forces
already present in Singapore. On the other hand, he pointed out that British
involvement risked accusations of ‘neo-colonialism’, complex political and legal
difficulties and unknown financial implications. The Defence Committee considered
Thorneycroft’s paper on 1 Apr and agreed that: a) in principle British troops could be
used for the internal security of Singapore under Malaysia; b) the minister of defence and
secretary of state for war would, in consultation with the Malayan government, prepare a
scheme setting out the tasks and duties of British forces; c) steps should be taken to
indemnify British personnel against possible consequences of their actions when
employed on internal security duties on behalf of sovereign Malaysia (Trend to
Macmillan, 29 Mar 1963, PREM 11/4347; COS 22(63), 29 Mar 1963, DEFE 4/153; D
5(63)3, 1 Apr 1963, CAB 131/28; CO 968/761).]
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Introduction
This paper deals only with internal security requirements in Singapore after merger.
The possible requirement for British assistance in the Borneo territories after their
merger with Malaysia would arise more from external threats, and this matter has yet
to be examined with the Malayan authorities.
Malayan plans
2. The Federation of Malaysia will assume responsibility for its own internal
security on its formation (not later than 31st August, 1963). A local joint
examination has been made of certain of the defence arrangements that will then be
necessary, including the build-up of Malaysian forces required for internal security.
This has shown that Malaysian forces will not be entirely adequate to meet internal
security situations between the formation of Malaysia and January, 1965, at the
earliest. The Federation of Malaya have pointed out that the latter date depends on a
favourable decision by us on financial aid for the expansion of their forces.
3. The latest assessment of the likely requirement for British military assistance
in this interim period is as follows:—
Up to about December, 1963
(a) One company for use from the outset of trouble.
(b) Helicopter and light aircraft for reconnaissance and voice control from the
outset, and possibly later in a more active role.
(c) Administrative support, particularly transport and medical, and recovery facilities.
(d) One major unit for use only in the last resort, if trouble occurs simultaneously
in Malaya and Singapore.
Up to January, 1965 at earliest
(a) One major unit for use only in the last resort, if trouble occurs simultaneously
in Malaya and Singapore.
4. The Malayan authorities have also indicated that they may like to approach the
Commander-in-Chief, Far East, for volunteers from civilian personnel of the Service
Departments stationed in Singapore to assist the authorities there in the
maintenance of essential services during civil disturbances. There would seem to be
no reason why such assistance could not be given provided the Government of
Malaysia were prepared to meet all costs and to agree to idemnification and
compensation at the normal rates applying under the conditions of service of the
United Kingdom Departments concerned.
British interest
5. Following the inter-Governmental discussions on the proposal to form
Malaysia in November, 1961 my predecessor told the Malayan Minister of Defence
that we should wish to withdraw us soon as possible those of our forces which were
in the theatre primarily for internal security purposes.1 It was agreed that a phased
plan should be worked out for the taking over of internal security responsibilities by
1 Harold Watkinson, minister of defence 1959–1962, negotiated with Tun Razak at the London talks in
Nov 1961 and visited Kuala Lumpur in Mar 1962.
13-Malaysia-149-174-cpp  21/9/04  9:08 AM  Page 474
[167] MAR 1963 475
Malaysian forces, for the build-up of these forces, and for the run-down of our forces.
We are anxious to do everything possible to contribute to the smooth formation of
Malaysia and we must therefore give the Government of the new Federation all the
help we can in maintaining law and order in Singapore during the period while
Malaysian forces are building up. We also have to consider the security of our bases
and the safety of the large British community in Singapore. In the worst case of
serious trouble there we should almost inevitably become involved.
British forces
6. To meet the requirement set out in paragraph 3 above we would not need to station
in Singapore, or elsewhere in the area, more units than we now plan to do for other reasons.
As regards forces which could be used in an internal security role, our long-term plan is
to retain in Singapore and Malaya the equivalent of 7 major Army units, 2 Royal Marine
Commandos, and probably some Gurkhas. Forces for internal security duties in an
emergency could, if necessary, be found from these units. The rate of run-down to our
planned long-term strength would therefore not be affected by such a commitment.
Political and legal factors
7. Internal security in an independent Commonwealth country is of course the
responsibility of the Government concerned, and units of British forces would not
normally be employed on internal security duties in a sovereign state. Indeed, I am
not aware of a case where British units under British command have been used in
this way before. Operations against communist terrorists in Malaya were warlike in
nature. Some internal security tasks after merger, particularly those in the streets of
Singapore, may be unpalatable. British participation might incur international
criticism. We should also have to defend our action in Parliament. There are legal
problems in the use of British forces for such tasks. These are complex and may take
time to work out. As a first step we are assessing what the position would be under
present legislation in Singapore and Malaya and how this would apply under
Malaysia. Our aim would be to ensure adequate safeguards for our forces and we
should insist on these as part of any agreement to help the Malaysian forces.
8. My predecessor discussed the general question with the Malayan Minister of
Defence who made it clear that his Government would be embarrassed if they had to
call on British forces, and that the Malayan Government, for their part, are most
anxious not to do so if it can be avoided since this would be damaging politically to
the new Federation.
9. To a limited extent internal security plans for Singapore can be adjusted to
ensure that British forces are allocated to more passive roles such as the guarding of
checkpoints and the maintenance of essential services. However, in the event of a
complete breakdown in public order and assuming that the Malaysian forces cannot
deal with the situation it would be virtually impossible to avoid contact between
British forces and the Singapore population.
Finance
10. Since the use of British forces in this way in a sovereign state would be unique,
there are no financial precedents to guide us in considering what costs the Malaysian
Government should be asked to meet. The Treasury view is that there is no reason why
the Malaysian Government should not bear the full costs of the services they require
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including pay and upkeep of the forces concerned and an element for compensation
in case of injury to or death of personnel and damage on loss of equipment. My own
view is that it would be reasonable to expect the Malaysian Government to meet our
out of pocket expenses and the cost of compensation for personnel and equipment
where this was necessary. I am not convinced that it would be either practicable or in
our long term interest to press the Malayans to accept a commitment in advance to
pay for the normal upkeep of British forces so used, i.e. the full rather than the extra
cost. I should welcome the views of my colleagues on this point.
Conclusions
11. I consider that in the circumstances I have described we should accept in
principle the commitment to help Malaysian forces for an interim period in dealing
with serious trouble in Singapore. Agreement to do so should be conditional upon:—
(a) prior political approval being given by both sides in each case;
(b) the highest priority being given by the Malayan Government to the build-up of
Malaysian police and military forces for internal security roles;
(c) so far as it is possible, adjustment of internal security plans for Singapore in
order to allocate to British forces the most passive roles;
(d) satisfactory agreement on financial questions such as scales of payments for
compensation, disability etc., where these might arise from the use of British
forces and their civilian component in internal security operations;
(e) the enactment, if required, of legislation by Malaya and Singapore and
subsequently by Malaysia, or the signing of bi-lateral agreements, which will
confer on British forces and their U.K. civilian component sufficient protection
and indemnification.
For our part we should do all we can to help and encourage the build-up of Malaysian
forces and in particular by making available the accommodation for which they ask,
subject, of course, to agreement on financial arrangements. To accede to requests of
this kind may not always be convenient for us, but I consider the need to speed the
build-up of Malaysian forces for internal security tasks overrides the inconvenience.
12. I accordingly invite ny colleagues to agree that:—
(a) We should accept in principle the commitment to help the Malaysian
authorities for an interim period in maintaining law and order in Singapore (as
described in paragraph 3 and 4).
(b) The Malayan Government should be so informed and that discussions with
their representatives on the financial and legal aspects should be arranged.
168 FO 371/169734, no 13 3 Apr 1963
‘South East Asia’: minute (M 131/63) from Mr Macmillan to Lord
Home, expressing anxiety about regional defence after the formation
of Malaysia
I am rather uneasy about our position in this area of the world. We are committed to
bring Malaysia into existence not later than August 31; and there can, of course, be
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no question of our not honouring that undertaking. But I am not sure that we have
really sized up the subsequent problem of defending her (or helping her to defend
herself) against attack, whether overt or covert, by Indonesia and possibly the
Philippines. I do not get a great deal of comfort from the record of the recent
quadripartite talks in Washington;1 and I have a feeling that both the Americans and
the Australians, while not convinced that we can really protect this new child of ours,
are not at all anxious to help us to do so. And I believe that the real reason for their
hesitation is the fact that they are not sure that it really makes sense to think simply
in terms of defending Malaysia; and they suspect that we are not giving sufficient
consideration to the logically prior problem of keeping Indonesia and the Philippines
neutral. If they are right, we are indeed taking on a formidable liability, as becomes
clear if you look at the map and see how Malaysia will be more or less encircled by
Indonesia on the west and south, by the Philippines to the east and by the dubiously
neutral structure in Indo–China to the north. I doubt whether this is a situation
which, if it really got out of control, we could deal with single handed; nor do I see
why we should be expected to do so.
Selkirk will be here over Easter; and I think that we should take the opportunity to
review the position with him. But as a preliminary we might consider—perhaps at a
meeting of the O.P.C. next week—the nature and extent of the threat to Malaysia and
the means of coping with it. For this purpose it would be helpful if you would
circulate a memorandum on the political situation in that area of the world, as it is at
the moment and as you see it developing over the next year or so, and on the political
means at our disposal for neutralising Indonesia and the Philippines. Perhaps the
Minister of Defence and the Commonwealth Secretary, to whom I am sending copies
of this minute, would also circulate memoranda, dealing respectively with our
military capacity to deal with a significant threat to Malaysia, whether overt or
covert, and with the possibility of securing from Australia and New Zealand a greater
contribution to the defence of South East Asia, in political as well as military terms,
than they have been prepared to make hitherto.
I am also sending a copy of this minute to the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
1 See 160–162.
169 PREM 11/4347 16 Apr 1963
‘Future defence of Malaysia’: minute (PM/63/56) from Lord Home to
Mr Macmillan, replying to document 168. Enclosure: ‘The future
defence of Malaysia’
[Home argued that there was no alternative to Malaysia and that its defence against
Indonesia and the Philippines would require assistance from Australia and New Zealand.
It was clear from the record of Home’s meeting with Dean Rusk (US secretary of state,
1961–1969) on 7 Apr that the US expected Britain to handle the problem in co-operation
with Australia and New Zealand, ‘leaving the United States to take a back seat’. Home’s
memorandum was circulated to the Oversea Policy Committee for which Macmillan was
briefed by Trend who felt that it was ‘disappointingly negative’. It was ‘disappointingly
cautious’ particularly as regards, firstly, the value of an association of Malaysia with the
Philippines and Indonesia and, secondly, the possibility of sharing costs with Australia
and New Zealand. At the Oversea Policy Committee on 24 Apr ministers recognised that
there was little prospect of reducing the scale of military commitments to Malaysia in the
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short term but concluded: ‘It would be important not to enter into any commitment to
provide any specified level of military assistance to Malaysia in the longer term. Ministers
would shortly be undertaking a major review of our Far Eastern strategy and the scope of
that examination should not be limited in advance by the acceptance of fresh or more
definite commitments’ (OP(63)6 and OP 4(63)1, CAB 134/2371; FO 371/169734; PREM
11/4183)]
In your minute of April 3 about South East Asia (M 131/63) you asked for the views or
the Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office and the Ministry of Defence, on
the implications of our policy on Malaysia, for circulation to the Overseas Policy
Committee. I enclose a copy of a memorandum which has been prepared in
consultation with the other Departments. A separate memorandum on ‘Defence in the
Far East’ is also being prepared as part of our present review of defence commitments
and this will cover the long-term implications of Malaysia. The enclosed
memorandum therefore deals with certain immediate questions which you have
raised about the rightness of our Malaysia policy. You may care to use it as a brief for
your talk with Lord Selkirk on April 25 and I also propose to circulate it as an Overseas
Policy Committee paper.
2. I am copying this minute to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Minister of
Defence and the Commonwealth Secretary.
Enclosure to 169
Hitherto the Western Powers in South East Asia have been concerned chiefly with
the Communist threat. We have been trying to prevent the North Vietnamese
Communists from thrusting into South Vietnam and Laos. We have also, by our
membership of SEATO, tried to persuade our friends in the area that we are prepared
to help to defend them against any future menace from China. In the last two years,
however, we have been faced with a ‘second front’ from Indonesia. Warfare was only
narrowly avoided over West New Guinea; there is a continuous threat to Portuguese
Timor and the Indonesians now want to prevent the formation of Malaysia.
2. Indonesian opposition to Malaysia comes partly from their desire one day to
seize Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo for themselves. It also comes from envy and
dislike of a prosperous Malaya. Sukarno has had much difficulty in holding together
his island empire; he feels that Malaya is a rival attraction for the Sumatrans, and
that its economic and political stability show up his own failures. Therefore, to
prevent the creation of Malaysia, he has adopted a menacing attitude in an attempt to
frighten the Tunku out of going ahead with the plan. The result however has been to
stiffen the Tunku and there is little fear that he will be put off Malaysia.
3. A complication is the Philippines claim to North Borneo. This had led the
Filipinos and Indonesians into trying to make common cause and it could damage
the Philippines alignment with the Western Powers and threaten American bases.
There is, however, little likelihood of any military threat from the Philippines.
4. It is unlikely that major Indonesian operations against the Borneo territories
could be launched without a considerable and protracted build up, which we would
be bound to detect and of which there is no evidence at present. In practice, however,
the Indonesians are more likely to infiltrate numerous small parties, which they
could with little or no warning. The Chiefs of Staff consider that adequate British
forces are available in the theatre to meet such infiltration, but it would be necessary
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to send replacement forces to Singapore from the United Kingdom. A major overt
attack, however, would require further reinforcements, including V bombers from
the United Kingdom.
5. In February we discussed with the Americans, Australians and New Zealanders
in Washington what we should do in these circumstances. All four governments felt
that Malaysia was the only solution to the problems of Singapore and the future of the
Borneo Territories. All four governments agreed to make their position known publicly
in order to deter the Indonesians from adopting more dangerous methods. This has
been carried out and does seem to have had a sobering effect on the Indonesians. We
recognised in Washington, however, that at some stage the Indonesians might step up
their attacks and try to produce local rebellions in the Borneo Territories by infiltrating
agents and supporting armed insurgency. We explained our position in the case of
overt aggression: that the Anglo/Malayan Defence Agreement would extend to the
Borneo Territories after Malaysia. In response to a question from the Americans we
agreed:—
(a) that should the Indonesians endeavour to overthrow the Malaysian regime in
the Borneo territories by heavy infiltration, we should regard this as a case where
the Malaysians would be entitled to ask for assistance in the external defence of
their territory under the Anglo/Malayan Defence Agreement as extended to cover
Malaysia;
(b) that we should keep a sufficient capability in South East Asia to deal with this
commitment.
6. The United States Government said that in the event of overt aggression by
Indonesia against Malaysia they might feel obliged to take appropriate action.
Subversive activities were a different matter, however, and it would be primarily a
Commonwealth responsibility to deal with them. The Americans were too deeply
committed in Vietnam to wish to take on a second case of the same kind. They
agreed, however, that Indonesia’s subversive activities might be carried to the stage
where they more or less amounted to outside aggression and that in that case they
might have to reconsider their attitude. The Australians and New Zealanders also did
not commit themselves but they agreed that they would have to reach some decision
in the fairly near future once Malaysia exists and our own defence arrangements are
final.
7. On April 7, during the SEATO meeting in Paris, Mr. Rusk reverted to the
subject and said that he wanted to make the position of the United States
Government quite clear in regard to any threat to the territory from Indonesian
Borneo. So long as the threat remained one of subversion to be countered by police
action the United States Government hoped that Her Majesty’s Government together
with the other Commonwealth countries in the area would handle it by themselves
leaving the United States to take a back seat. They had enough problems of their own
in that part of the world anyhow and did not want one more. If, however, the problem
blew up into greater dimensions than that of police action that would be a new
situation and the United States attitude of reserve would no longer apply.
8. Malaysia will be entirely responsible for internal security in the Borneo
territories. But the Malaysian Government might ask for our help in meeting a threat
to internal security, which they considered to be beyond their own resources. It
would then be for Her Majesty’s Government to decide whether to agree. We are not
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formally committed in any way (as we are, for a time, at least, in Singapore).
Nevertheless, the Americans, at least, would expect H.M.G. to help the Malaysian
Government to deal with any subversive threat beyond the capacity of purely
Malaysian resources.
9. Meanwhile the Americans, Australians and New Zealanders are concerned that
nothing should be done to aggravate the situation. They recognise that Indonesia
and the Philippines cannot be brought to approve of the creation of Malaysia but
hope that the process can be handled so tactfully as to avoid clashes. The following
steps are being taken to meet these wishes.
(a) Malaya
We have on several occasions asked the Tunku to be statesmanlike in his reaction to
Indonesian attacks. We have had some success, but Malayan public opinion makes it
difficult for the Tunku to be as conciliatory as we would wish.
On the other hand he has agreed to tripartite discussions with the Indonesians and
Filipinos, provided they are not aimed at delaying Malaysia. His attitude is that the
formation of Malaysia is a domestic concern, but that he is quite prepared to discuss
Malaysia’s future external relations with her neighbours. Plans are also in hand for
building up Malaysian forces, including the Borneo battalions, with training and
other assistance from ourselves. These will gradually reduce the likelihood of the
Malaysian Government seeking our help in the preservation of public order, but will
not free us from the obligation to assist in the external defence of Malaysia.
(b) Indonesia
Nothing will make the present Indonesian Government accept the idea of Malaysia
sincerely. We can only deter them from interfering by resolute but unprovocative
support for Malaysia and hope for a more reasonable Indonesian attitude after
Sukarno disappears. To show that we can be conciliatory on anything not
incompatible with the essentials of our policy, the Foreign Secretary is maintaining a
correspondence with the Indonesian Foreign Minister and has offered to discuss
differences and to help in any way to smooth out Malay–Indonesian differences.
(c) Philippines
The Philippines have not finally made their choice between Malaysia and Indonesia.
Our policy towards the Philippine claim—unlimited polite discussion but no
negotiation—has prevented any open breach or any headway with the claim. The
Filipinos are now reluctant to press this in the International Court or the United
Nations, particularly as they are not receiving full support from the Indonesians, who
covet North Borneo for themselves. Meanwhile the Malayans are wooing the
Filipinos and having some success in keeping them out of Indonesian arms.
Continuation of these British and Malayan policies offers some prospect of eventual
Philippine acceptance of Malaysia.
(d) The United States
The Americans now seem more satisfied that everything possible is being done to
avoid offence to the Indonesians and the Filipinos. The Americans have given good
public support to the early creation of Malaysia. So long as their present heavy
commitments remain there is no chance of getting them to go beyond what they said
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in Washington. The President is having considerable difficulties in getting money for
his aid programme and Senator Mansfield’s1 Committee have strongly advised
against assuming new commitments in South East Asia.
(e) The Australians and New Zealanders
The Australian Government are now publicly committed to political support for not
only the Malaysia project but its timing. Sir Garfield Barwick2 has been taking a
robust line with the Indonesians and the Filipinos and has even made it clear to the
Indonesians that Australia recognises that her support for Malaysia may well have
military implications. All of this has had good effect. The Australian Government
have not decided on the form any military arrangements will take and with their
present slender majority they have to proceed very carefully before accepting new
defence commitments. New Zealand’s misgivings over Malaysia have never been so
acute as those of the Australians.
We certainly hope to secure from both Australia and New Zealand a larger
contribution to the Western military effort in South East Asia. However, the timing
of any pressure we shall exert to this end needs careful consideration. They have
fought down their recent hesitations about pursuing the Malaysian project in the
light of Indonesian opposition. But these could easily be revived if they got the
impression that we wished to reduce our own military contribution and were asking
them to take up commitments that we were going to lay down. In short it is probably
wiser to wait until after Malaysia Day before applying a great deal of extra pressure on
them.
(f) The United Nations
It is important that we satisfy the United Nations as far as possible. The Colonial
Office are doing what they can to ensure that the will of the people in the three
Borneo territories is not only consulted but is seen to be consulted, with good results
in North Borneo and Sarawak. Special information machinery has been set up. We
have accepted the help of the Secretary General through Mr. Narasimhan to iron out
differences between Malaya and the Philippines and Indonesia. United Nations debate
is unlikely to take place in the near future.
10. Conclusions
(i) There is no alternative to the formation of Malaysia.
(ii) We should not delay the original programme for its creation by August 31.
(iii) While it is impossible to predict the course of events, the chances of averting
any major showdown with the Indonesians or Filipinos before August 31 appear to
be improving.
(iv) But even if we get over this hurdle the future Malaysia will probably be exposed
to attempts by Indonesia to overthrow its authority in the Borneo Territories.
1 Mike Mansfield, Democrat majority leader in the Senate, led a Congressional group to Southeast Asia in
late 1962. Their report, which sparked fresh debate on US policy in Feb 1963, recommended a thorough
revision of military assistance programmes and looked towards the contraction, rather than expansion, of
American involvement especially in the Vietnam war, see Appendix to this volume, para 294.
2 Leader of the Australian delegation at the UN, 1962–1964.
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(v) We have a continuing military commitment to help the Malaysia Government
against external aggression, and might be asked for help against a serious internal
threat.
(vi) The Americans are not willing to commit themselves to dealing with anything
except overt aggression. We are unlikely to be able to change their view at this
time, though in the long run it is hard to see how they could escape some
involvement.
(vii) We must seek to ensure that the Australians and New Zealanders share with
us to the fullest possible extent responsibility for the defence of Malaysia. But a
successful approach can best be made later.
(viii) We must continue to treat the Indonesians and Filipinos both with firmness
and with great care and courtesy. We must maintain our efforts to get the Tunku
to do the same.
170 CAB 131/28, D(63)18, Annex C 20 Apr 1963
‘Federation of Malaya: financing the defence programme’: despatch
from Sir G Tory to Mr Sandys
[In Apr 1963 Sir Henry Lintott led a mission to Kuala Lumpur to examine what financial
assistance might be offered by Britain towards the Malayan defence programme on the
establishment of Malaysia. Lintott was deputy under-secretary at the CRO, 1956–1963,
and had previously served in Customs and Excise, the Board of Trade and as secretary-
general of the OEEC. In the CRO he had been involved in planning post-independence
financial aid for Ghana and Nigeria as well as discussions to mount a Colombo-type plan
for Africa (Hyam and Louis, eds, BDEE: The Conservative Government, 1957–1964, part
II, 327, 332 and 336, and Lynn, ed, BDEE: Nigeria, part II, 488). On 28 Mar, before the
Lintott delegation departed for Malaya, the Tunku wrote to Macmillan, referring to
Britain’s financial settlement for Malaya on independence in 1957 and pointing out that
the current situation was now ‘rather more serious’. This was the result of commitments
under the Five-Year Plan plus a sharp drop in the price of rubber, deterioration in the
balance of payments and the demands of defence and internal security. The Tunku
insisted that the financial settlement should be agreed before the final round of Malaysia
talks in London. Macmillan delayed replying to the Tunku until 27 Apr when he sent a
brief, generally sympathetic but non-committal letter: ‘We are anxious to do what we can,
within the limits of our capabilities, to help you with the kind of difficulties which you
foresee’. The report of the Lintott mission and Tory’s despatch on the subject were
considered by the Cabinet Defence Committee on 10 May (see 173; also Tunku to
Macmillan, 28 Mar and Macmillan to Tunku, 27 Apr 1963, PREM 11/4347).]
The mission, under the chairmanship of Sir Henry Lintott, which visited Kuala
Lumpur from 6th–14th April, 1963, to look into the requirements of finance for
Malaya’s expanded defence programme, have established to their satisfaction that the
Defence Plan is modest and that even so the Malayan Government have no hope of
meeting either its capital or recurrent cost, given their present financial
commitments. The clear implication is that, to the extent that we cannot help
financially to meet the bill, the Malayans must cut down either their Defence Plan or
their Development Plan or both. I have the honour to submit the following
observations on this situation.
2. Against the background of the Brunei revolt, the threat of subversion in
Sarawak and the continuing menace of Indonesian confrontation, the Malayan
Defence Plan is most unlikely to be cut. Indeed, it would scarcely be in our interests
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if it were. Our military staffs have agreed with the Malayans upon the level of forces
needed in Malaysia over the next few years and we shall be obliged, in the discharge
of our defence obligations and of our implicit undertaking to see Malaysia through
safely, to continue to provide forces to fill the gap between the agreed level and what
Malaysia can contribute. It is clearly to our advantage that Malaya should find, or be
given, means to implement her present Defence Plan.
3. The Defence Agreement we have with Malaya has, during the first five years of
independence, been justified politically by the argument that Malaya needs British
military assistance to hold the ring whilst permanently effective barriers to
Communism are built up in the form of a landed peasantry and a steady standard of
living at a fairly high level. The Tunku looks at the map of South-East Asia—at
Communist China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Indonesia—and rightly concludes
that the dyke builders must hasten before the flood runs in. He has always said that
the first 10 years would settle Malaya’s fate and this does not seem to me to be an
exaggeration.
4. The Malayan Government regard their Development Plan as a vital
contribution to Malayan security. Compared with other newly independent countries
Malaya was born in easy economic circumstances. Her standard of living is said to be
the highest in Asia and her reserves are the envy of much larger nations. But she is
running into difficulty. Natural rubber, at the mercy of world prices beyond Malaya’s
control, brings 60 per cent of her export earnings and provides 30 per cent of
employment. With growing competition from synthetic rubber there is a downward
trend in natural rubber prices and throughout the ’60s it will be a struggle for Malaya
to maintain her export earnings at their present level.
5. At the same time she is faced with a veritable population ‘explosion’. Her
natural increase of 3.3 per cent per annum is exceptionally high. An economy that
provides adequately for 6.9 million people in 1960 will be strained to the utmost to
feed 9.6 million in 1970. In these circumstances Malaya must run very fast in order
to stand still economically. To provide for this increasing population and to meet
the growing unemployment problem she has embarked upon a vigorous
development programme. This will only be enough to keep national income per
head at the present level and it brings its own problems in the form of increased
demand for imports and capital goods. With the import bill rising and export
earnings static Malaya’s reserves, though ample at the moment, will come under
very severe pressure, particularly as in Malaya foreign trade represents three times
as great a share in the national economy as it does in even such a trading nation as
Britain.
6. Britain’s own interests are very much identified with the continuance of
Malaya’s prosperity. So long as Malaya is well off and can still be led by a Conservative
Government which encourages foreign capital, our own substantial assets in Malaya
are safe. We estimate our private capital investment in Malaya as about £400 million.
This compares, for example, with £335 million for India and £108 million for
Pakistan. Our exports to Malaya are of the order of £60 million per annum. We have,
therefore, a very big financial stake in Malaya and a considerable vested interest in
the maintenance of a stable and prosperous Malayan economy. Knowing how closely
this condition is linked to development we ought not lightly to recommend that the
shortfall in defence finance should be made good by economies in development
expenditure.
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7. These are practical considerations. There are also strong moral arguments in
favour of generosity on our part. The Tunku is attracted by the prospect of building
up a bigger stable unit in this troubled region but he dreads the problems which
Malaysia will bring. He was only persuaded to take on Singapore because he
realised that we should have to contract out and to give Singapore its
independence. He foresaw an independent Singapore rapidly sinking into
Communism and Malaya falling a prey to Communist attack on two fronts. Taking
over Singapore is undoubtedly an act of self-preservation on Malaya’s part but it is
being undertaken with regret and misgiving because—in the Tunku’s estimation—
we are not tough enough to maintain our position there indefinitely. The Borneo
Territories are being taken in as a balance of non-Chinese population to the net
million or so Chinese in Singapore whom the Tunku regards as politically
unreliable at the least. The Tunku considers, therefore, that we are shedding our
responsibilities in this region and that Malaya, which has already had 12 years of
emergency and three more of struggle against subversion, is now taking over from
us a new front in the battle against Communism in South-East Asia. He thinks this
entitles him to a good deal of assistance from us and his other anti-Communist
friends.
8. At the first talks on Malaysia defence in London, Tun Razak made it clear that,
to the extent that we could not supply needed financial assistance, the Malayans
would look to other Commonwealth Governments, Australia, New Zealand and
Canada, and also to America, to fill the gap. Australia and New Zealand regard
Malaysia as their first line of defence and there are strong reasons why both should
make some contribution to the Malaysian defence programme. The Australian
Government have been sensitive lately on the score of Indonesia but now seem to be
taking a more robust line and I hope that we shall not feel precluded from urging
both them and the New Zealand Government to live up to their responsibilities.
Canadian concern with Malaysia is obviously not so great but Tun Razak, who is
visiting Ottawa from 28th–30th April, has some hope of persuading them to supply
certain items of military equipment.
9. The Americans have lately shown clearly that they regard the successful
launching and early support of Malaysia as a Commonwealth and primarily British
responsibility and that they will be unwilling to make any contributions unless
convinced that the British and other Commonwealth countries have first ‘scraped
the barrel’. If the Malayans are to get worthwhile help from America, and it is surely
in our interests that they should, we must at least appear to be making a substantial
offer.
10. Whatever we may say about the comparative wealth of the Malayans, we are
agreed that the main requirement now is for foreign exchange which they
themselves can do little about. I believe that if we were to offer to meet the whole of
the outstanding foreign exchange element in the Malaysia defence bill for capital
expenditure up to 1965, estimated by us at about £18.7 million, and to undertake a
review early that year, as recommended by Sir Henry Lintott’s mission, the
Malayans would realise we had done all we could. Certainly the Malayans are
hoping that the British offer, together with whatever Australia and New Zealand
can be persuaded to give, will cover this foreign exchange element. A British offer
of anything less than £10 million would, in my view, cause resentment and would
have an adverse effect on our political relations with Malaya. I hope, therefore, that
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Ministers, on reflection, will feel able to come to a generous conclusion on the basis
of the very cogent analysis of Malaya’s financial need as submitted by Sir Henry
Lintott.
11. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Commissioner-General for South-
East Asia in Singapore, the High Commissioners in Canberra, Wellington and
Ottawa, Her Britannic Majesty’s Ambassadors in Washington, Djakarta, Manila and
Bangkok, the Governors of North Borneo and Sarawak and the High Commissioner
for Brunei.
171 DO 169/226 25 Apr 1963
[British representation in the region after the inauguration of
Malaysia]: minute by Sir S Garner, recording a discussion with Sir B
Trend, Sir H Caccia and Lord Selkirk
[Selkirk was anxious that Britain’s presence in Southeast Asia should be led by a political
representative rather than the military head of a unified command and he argued in
favour of the appointment of a high commissioner who, in addition to his normal
functions in Kuala Lumpur, would have a wider regional role, co-ordinating British
interests and enjoying some responsibility over the unified commander. Selkirk put these
points directly to Macmillan on 25 Apr. Although the office of commissioner-general
lapsed on the inauguration of Malaysia, the appointment of Lord Head (a former minister
of Defence and Britain’s first high commissioner to independent Nigeria) as high
commissioner to Malaysia indicated the significance of the post and went a long way to
meet Selkirk’s concerns. Indeed, when Sandys first approached Head about the position,
he stressed that it would be greatly enhanced compared with the high commissioner’s
status between 1957 and 1963, see Sandys to Head, 25 Mar 1963, Sandys Papers, 8/13. For
the directive relating to the functions of the British high commissioner as from 16 Sept
1963, see DO 169/226 no 140; for Head’s first impressions as high commissioner of
Malaysia, see DO 169/231.]
Sir Burke Trend, Sir Harold Caccia and I had a general discussion with Lord Selkirk
about the post-Malaysia set up earlier this week.
Today Lord Selkirk called on me for a further talk, in the course of which he
reiterated the following points:—
(1) He thought that it was vital that there should be continuity in the staffing of
our various posts in Malaysia after the 31st August.
(2) He insisted on the importance of the High Commissioner in the new set up
being completely in the picture as far as any action taken by the United
Commander was concerned, which could cause any repercussions in Malaysia; and
on Lord Selkirk’s definition, virtually any step could possibly have implications for
Malaysia.
On the first point Lord Selkirk emphasised how primitive the Borneo Territories
were, and how utterly inadequate the Malayan administrative machine. If Malaysia
were to succeed it was vital that we should be able to exert our influence and help
things along, but this could only be done if we had people in the key posts of the right
stature and of the right experience, particularly after the Governors departed from
Kuching and Jesselton. It would be most important that our Deputy High
Commissioners should be people who gained the confidence of the local inhabitants
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and were able tactfully to guide things in the right direction (see further note
attached about staff).1
On (2) Lord Selkirk emphasised his anxiety that our presence in South East Asia
should be seen primarily as a political, and not as a military, one, and his concern
that the Unified Commander should not be in a position to initiate any military
action unless it had the approval of the High Commissioner who, Lord Selkirk
thought, must have the responsibility for viewing the problem of the area as a whole.
I suggested to Lord Selkirk that there were two requirements which we somehow
had to reconcile:—
(a) The High Commissioner was the British Government’s representative to the
Malaysian Government, and it would be incorrect to saddle him publicly and
formally with responsibilities of relations with the Unified Commander, or
otherwise, which took him into the field of SEATO, or of relations with other
foreign countries in the area.
(b) At the same time, it was vitally important that the High Commissioner should
be fully aware of all that was going on, and in a position to make his views known
to the Unified Commander.
Lord Selkirk accepted these two propositions, and I commented that I did not think
it would be impossible to take care of the position, though in the last resort
everything depended on the relationship which the individuals concerned work out.
Lord Selkirk said that we must be very careful not to put too great a strain on human
frailties, and that he would prefer to see matters written out with the greatest
precision; (so far as I am aware, Lord Selkirk did not know at that time the name of
the proposed new High Commissioner).2
I concluded by saying that in working out the arrangements I would, of course,
bear very carefully in mind what Lord Selkirk had said, but that I thought myself we
could probably adequately meet the situation:—
(a) by writing into the charter of the Unified Commander an instruction that he
was required to consult the High Commissioner on all matters likely to affect
Malaysia; and
(b) ensuring that any instructions to the Political Adviser sent from the Foreign
Office should be repeated to the High Commissioner, so that he would have an
opportunity of putting his oar in if he wanted to.
1 Not printed. 2 Garner later added at this point in his minute: ‘in fact he did apparently’.
172 PREM 11/4347 26 Apr 1963
[Indonesian opposition to Malaysia]: letter from T E Bridges1 to P F
de Zulueta, explaining the FO’s apparent appeasement of Indonesia
[In the opinion of the new British ambassador in Jakarta, Andrew Gilchrist, so
determined was Sukarno to block Malaysia that Britain, in its efforts to keep the peace,
1 T E Bridges, son of Sir Edward (Lord) Bridges (former secretary to the Cabinet) and assistant private
secretary to the Foreign Secretary.
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was liable to lose control over its policy. ‘We misunderstand this at our peril’, he had
added. Macmillan saw Gilchrist’s telegram and asked de Zulueta to seek clarification of
the FO’s policy towards Indonesia. On reading this letter from Bridges, Macmillan noted,
‘it is now all quite clear to me’. Meanwhile, the foreign secretary, who recalling the
ineffectiveness of Dutch complaints about Indonesian activities in West Irian felt that any
public protest might aggravate Sukarno’s hostility and ‘alarm our friends’, arranged for ‘a
dossier of our evidence to be collected, so that we shall be ready for a fully documented
denunciation of the Indonesians if this later seems advisable’ (Home to Sandys, 14 May
1963, FS/63/43 in PREM 11/4348).]
You mentioned to me the Prime Minister’s interest in Djakarta telegram No. 327 of
April 22 about Indonesian opposition to Malaysia. What obviously worries the
Ambassador is that elaborate diplomatic efforts are being made (notably by tripartite
talks with the Malayan and Philippine Governments and through the mediation of
Mr. Narasimhan of the United Nations) to persuade the Indonesians to accept the
idea of Malaysia. Mr. Gilchrist is sceptical about these efforts since he considers, with
good reason, that there is no hope of persuading President Sukarno to support a
project bound to frustrate Indonesian territorial ambitions.
In fact, however, we are not trying to convert the Indonesians, but to justify
ourselves in the eyes of our friends, particularly of the Americans and Australians,
whose wholehearted support will be essential to the long-term viability of Malaysia.
At the Quadripartite talks in Washington in February, for instance, both the
Americans and Australians expressed the view that we had made insufficient effort to
explain Malaysia to the Indonesians and to answer all the apprehensions and
objections raised (however insincerely) by the Indonesians. It was in return for
promises of American and Australian political support (whose public manifestation
has been most valuable to us) that we undertook to do what we could to reduce
tension between Malaya and Indonesia by encouraging all the diplomatic
manoeuvres now in progress.
It is also quite true, as the Ambassador says, that the British Government are
taking a back seat in the more public aspects of these diplomatic manoeuvres and are
leaving the lime-light to the Malayans. This is deliberate. One of the main objects of
the whole Malaysia project is to transfer political responsibility from ourselves to the
Malayans. Not only do we want them to make more and more of the running as
Malaysia Day comes nearer, but the main Indonesian argument against Malaysia is
that we intend to retain effective power as the ‘neo-colonialist’ ruler of a puppet
federation.
We are explaining all this to the Ambassador and telling him that, for the present,
we do not want a public show-down with Indonesia of the kind he suggests, though
we shall continue to make clear to the Indonesians in private, as we have repeatedly
done in the past, our determination to see Malaysia through at all costs.
173 CAB 131/28, D(63)18 7 May 1963
‘Malaysia: British financial aid’: memorandum by Mr Sandys.
Appendix: ‘Malaysia—British financial aid. Report and
recommendations of British official delegation’
[In briefing Macmillan on Sandys’ memorandum, Trend suggested that consideration
should be given to ways of extracting contributions from Australia and New Zealand and
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of levering some compensating concession from Malaya. The Cabinet Defence Committee
considered this paper on 10 May and accepted its recommendations. The subsequent
Anglo-Malayan ministerial discussions, however, proved inconclusive (see 174–176; Trend
to Macmillan 9 May 1963, PREM 11/4347; COS 31(63)6, DEFE 4/154; CO 1030/1509.]
An official delegation led by Sir Henry Lintott of the Commonwealth Relations Office
visited Malaya from 8th to 11th April, 1963, to examine what financial assistance
might be offered by Britain towards the cost of the Malayan defence programme on
the establishment of Malaysia.
2. The delegation’s report is attached. Their conclusion is that defence aid to
Malaysia should be limited to the capital element of the defence programme for the
period 1963 to 1965 with agreement to hold a review in 1965. They recommend that
Britain’s contribution on this basis should be £121⁄2 million but that in negotiating a
settlement we should make an opening bid of £10 million; they consider that
Malayan Ministers would reject an offer of less than £10 million as totally inadequate.
3. I am in agreement with these recommendations and hope the Committee will
approve them.
4. Tun Razak, the Malayan Minister of Defence, will be in London for financial
talks on Monday, 13th May, and a decision is therefore urgently needed.
Appendix to 173
There has never been any doubt that there are strong political arguments in favour of
our giving generous financial assistance to Malaysia, particularly for defence. The
difficulty so far has been to satisfy ourselves that there is any prima facie need for
such assistance, given the apparent health of the Malayan economy.
2. The Mission’s purpose was, therefore, to establish the degree of financial need;
to ascertain what economies could be made in the Malaysian defence programme
without damage to its effectiveness and to assess the ability of the Malayans to pay,
having regard to their budgetary and balance of payments prospects. The Mission was
instructed to concentrate in its examination of the Defence Programme on the first
three years (i.e. 1963–1965 inclusive) on the assumption that any British offer of
assistance would be related to these first three years, with a review in 1965. The
Mission accordingly discussed the Defence Programme with the Malayans on this
basis. But the financial and economic background was considered in terms of the five
year period 1963–1967, which was the basis on which the Malayans had prepared
their estimates.
3. The memoranda at Annexes A and B contain the Mission’s findings on (Annex
A) the Defence Plan itself, and the possibility of economies in it and (Annex B) the
financial and economic prospects of Malaysia.1 The salient features of these findings
are as follows.
4. Defence plan
(a) The Malayans accept that any assistance given to the expansion of their
defence forces can be of limited duration only, and that the Malaysians must
1 Annexes A and B are not printed.
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themselves maintain these forces at the level to which they are built up. They do
not, however, yet accept that aid should be limited to capital costs only during this
period of build-up.
(b) The capital cost over the first three years, 1963–1965, is estimated at £26.7 m..
This would generate recurrent costs totalling about £23 m. in this period. The
foreign exchange element of these figures is estimated at about £20 m. capital, and
about £11.5 m. recurrent.
(c) The detailed capital costings show, however, that on the one hand the
Malayans have under estimated costs to the extent of approximately 10 per cent,
and on the other hand experience suggests that they will probably fail to achieve
the programme in these first three years to the extent of about 20 per cent.
Probable expenditure during this period is therefore £24.5 m. capital and £21 m.
recurrent. The foreign exchange content of these figures is approximately £18.5 m.
capital and about £11 m. recurrent.
(d) Given the substantial new commitments in respect of internal security
throughout Malaysia that the new Federation will be undertaking, the plan is a
modest one. Its implementation is also frugally conceived. We could find no
grounds for questioning the standard of provisioning. Any reduction by slowing
down the programme would presumably slow down the rate at which British
forces can expect to shed responsibility for internal security.
Financial and economic prospects
5. Any future estimate of financial and economic prospects must be subject to
wide margins of uncertainty. This is particularly true of the future Federation of
Malaysia which does not yet exist, and will derive most of its earnings from rubber,
tin and forest products, the prices of which are very volatile. (A change of 10 cents in
the price of rubber would mean a difference of over £20 m. in exports earnings in
1963.) It seems clear, however, that the future Federation will have substantial
deficits, both in its budget and in its balance of payments for a number of years: these
arise mainly from the cost of development and partly from the increased costs of
defence.
6. On the assumption that any further aid given by the United Kingdom will
have regard to the problem of foreign exchange and will not be given to finance
domestic expenditure, it is the balance of payments deficit which falls to be
considered.
(a) The figures for the balance of payments show a foreign exchange deficit of
£427 m..
(b) The expenditure attributable to defence is discussed in paragraph 4 above.
(c) The expenditure on development is large. It is argued, however, that this is
necessary:—
(i) in order to maintain and perhaps to increase slightly the income per head in
Malaya and Singapore, in view of the rise in population.
(ii) To cover increased development in North Borneo and Sarawak which was
offered as the main inducement to these territories to join the future
Federation.
7. On the question of bridging the foreign exchange gap, the following
considerations are relevant:—
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(a) If expenditure on development and defence are not reduced and the deficit
remains at £427 m. this might be reduced, on the Malayan Government’s (possibly
rather optimistic) estimates by an estimated inflow of £95 m. of private capital and
of £65 m. of Government borrowing (including our outstanding loan aid to
Singapore). This would leave £267 m. to be found: of this it is suggested by the
Malayan Government that a maximum amount of £175 m. would be found by
running down the existing external reserves (at present estimated by them at
£565 m.); the remaining £92 m. is represented by the external cost of the defence
programme (£37 m.) and a residual figure (£55 m.) representing what is needed in
foreign grant aid.
(b) The only contribution at present in sight towards this figure of £92 m. is our
promised contribution of £7.5 m. to the development expenditure of the Borneo
territories. The Malayan Government intend to approach other friendly countries
besides Britain—especially Australia and New Zealand—for aid but it is a matter of
conjecture how much they will get.
(c) The Malayan Government is anxious to keep substantial reserves because of
the great importance of external trade to the Federation, because of the
fluctuations in export earnings, and in order to maintain confidence in the
Malayan dollar, which is vital as a medium of exchange for the area as a whole.
The Bank of England emphasises also the need to maintain its standing as a
borrower. Moreover, a considerable part of these holdings belongs to individual
territories and the Federal Government’s access to them is likely in practice to be
restricted. The Malayans have, nevertheless, included in their estimates a much
larger possible running-down of reserves than those suggested by Mr. Ross2
(£100 m.) or the International Bank (£80 m.). The Bank of England would
consider a running-down by £175 m. as exceeding very considerably the limits of
prudence. The Malayan Finance Minister has himself expressed the view that the
reserves could not be run down by more than £100 m.. He might well, however,
come under pressure to expose the external financial position to more serious
risks in order to maintain the standard of living. The conflict of arguments is not
unfamiliar in this country.
Conclusions and recommendations
8. Whatever the uncertainties of the estimate referred to above, it seems clear
that Malaysia will experience severe budgetary and balance of payments problems at
least for a number of years. The Malayans estimate their foreign exchange gap (after
making what is certainly the maximum possible allowance for running down
reserves for private investment and for Government borrowing) at £92 m. over the
five year period 1963–1967; we cannot say that this order of magnitude is
exaggerated.
9. In so far as this gap cannot be closed by foreign assistance the Malaysian
Government is likely to be faced at some stage with difficult decisions about whether
to cut defence, development, or both. As indicated above we accept that the defence
programme is reasonable to meet the commitments of Malaysia. But the Malayans
feel strongly that development is equally essential as a bulwark against Communism;
2 See 165, n 4 and n 7.
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their programme is designed to provide no more than a maintenance of the existing
standard of living for a rapidly rising population. If they were forced to make cuts
now, it might well be that the Malayans would choose to reduce defence rather than
development.
10. Malayan Ministers will measure whatever financial assistance we offer
against this estimated gap of £92 m. This of course is not entirely reasonable, since if
Malaysia were not created the existing Federation would be faced with substantial
payments difficulties. But they can reasonably claim that a substantial part of the
deficit (and notably that attributable to the defence programme) is the result of their
taking over from Britain military and economic commitments in respect of
Singapore and the Borneo territories.
11. It can of course be contended that with Britain’s limited capacity to give
overseas aid, Malaya as a relatively rich country should be at the end of the queue.
Against this it can be argued that the relative prosperity of the Federation of Malaya
is a principal cause of her political stability, and that in any case if she were less
prosperous she could not be expected to shoulder the new burdens which the
creation of Malaysia will involve for her even after any contribution which we may
make.
12. Our immediate interest is to ensure that Malaysia is established in conditions
in which her security and stability can be maintained. An essential element in this is
that the Malaysian defence programme should go ahead as planned; if it does not, the
date when we can finally shed our responsibility for internal security for Malaysia will
be retarded.
13. The more general political considerations which must be borne in mind in
considering this problem are set out in the British High Commissioner’s Despatch
No. 4 (reproduced at Annex C).3 This despatch also calls attention to the large
financial stake represented by British investment in Malaya.
14. In the light of the above considerations our conclusions are as follows:—
(a) We continue to think that it is right to limit our present offer to the period
1963–65, with agreement to hold a review in 1965, in the light of which any
further financial contribution would be determined.
(b) We also continue to think it right that (although Malayans’ hopes will be
much more ambitious) any offer should be related to the capital element of the
defence programme in that period; this type of aid will provide the best
encouragement to the Malayans to get ahead with the defence programme. We
now estimate this capital cost in 1963–65 as about £24.2 m. of which the foreign
exchange component might be about £18.5 m.
(c) We agree with the High Commissioner’s assessment that an offer of less than
£10 m. would be rejected by the Malayans as totally inadequate and would cause
resentment; but we think that Ministers might make an opening bid of £10 m.
Malayan Ministers will certainly argue strongly for a much larger figure; we would
hope that agreement might be reached at about £121⁄2 m. (which was the figure
which we recommended that we should be authorised to offer for a quick
settlement in Kuala Lumpur).
3 See 170.
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(d) The Malayan Government have asked us to support them in an approach to
Australia and New Zealand for contributions by those countries to the Malaysian
defence programme, and we should agree to do so.
174 CO 1030/1509, no 13 13 May 1963
‘Financial and defence talks with Malayan ministers’: minutes of the
first meeting
[Chaired by Sandys, the meeting was attended by Thorneycroft (minister of Defence),
John Boyd-Carpenter (chief secretary to the Treasury), Lord Lansdowne, Sir H Lintott
and other officials on the British side. The Malayan delegation consisted of Tun Razak,
Tan Siew Sin, the Malayan high commissioner and officials from the Malayan Treasury
and Ministry of Defence. No British officials were present from SE Asian postings.]
The Commonwealth Secretary welcomed the Malayan Delegation on behalf of his
colleagues and himself. He was sure this meeting of Ministers was the best way to
follow up the Lintott Mission1 and to get the problem of Defence Aid out of the way so
as to move on to certain more difficult matters involved in setting up Malaysia, such
as the discussions between Singapore and Malaya.
The British Government had already agreed to give aid of up to £5.78 m. to
Singapore; development aid to North Borneo and Sarawak of £71⁄2 m.; for the
compensation scheme for expatriates in North Borneo and Sarawak, £31⁄2 m.; and the
scheme for subsidised secondment and training of military personnel would cost us
about £3 m. over the first three years. All this could total nearly £20 m.
The object of the present talks was to decide what aid could be given to help the
Malaysians over the build up of the defence forces needed to enable them to meet
their internal security and external responsibilities. The Lintott Mission had agreed
with the Malayans to concentrate on the first three years of the Defence Expansion
Programme, i.e. the calendar years of 1963–65 inclusive. It was not quite clear how
quickly the expansion programme would be implemented as the execution of
Defence programmes rarely came up to the expectations of the planners. Moreover,
other factors such as the rate of implementation of the development programme and
the availability of foreign exchange were difficult to foresee over a longer period.
Hence the British side thought it more profitable to concentrate these discussions on
the period 1963–65 with a review of the situation in 1965. They also considered that
British help should be related to the capital costs of building up forces rather than
the recurrent costs, and assumed that as the Malayan forces were already supplied
with British equipment, a substantial portion of the Malayan expenditure would be
on further British equipment.
Tun Razak said that the Malayans were hoping for somewhat more than this. In
1957 when Malaya became independent and inherited an Emergency, Britain had
given her £30 m. in aid.2 Malaysia would now inherit an emergency situation in
Brunei, in Sarawak and on the Indonesian border.
1 See 170 and 173. 2 See BDEE: Malaya, lxxviii-lxxix and part III, 440 and 441.
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Mr. Tan Siew Sin observed that the Malayans were facing in Malaysia the following
problems:—
(i) Sarawak could not balance her budget;
(ii) while North Borneo could, she could not provide the money required for her
own development;
(iii) Brunei had reserves, but was unwilling to make them available;
(iv) Singapore had her own well known problems.
The Commonwealth Secretary said that the British Government could help with
the capital costs but could not give budgetary aid. The former was a more appropriate
form of assistance to independent sovereign countries. He understood officials had
agreed that the capital costs up to the end of 1965 could be about £24.2 m.
(approximately S/205 m.). The original estimate of S/229 m. produced by the Malayans
had been agreed with the Lintott Mission to be probably under-costed by about 10
per cent, but did not take account of a probable slippage of 20 per cent.
Malaya was a richer country than many in the Commonwealth, but he recognised
that foreign exchange was likely to be a major problem in the early years of Malaysia.
The foreign exchange element of the S/205 m. was likely to be some S/157 m.
(£181⁄2 m.). He suggested that this was the figure on which the talks should
concentrate, and he proposed that this cost should be shared equally between Britain
and Malaya, i.e. Britain should contribute £91⁄4 m.3
The Malayan Ministers said that Malaya would have been in difficulties even if she
had not taken on Malaysia. Her reserves were being run down owing firstly to the
lowering of the price of rubber, and secondly to the increased expenditure on
development. In the years 1961–62 there was an adverse swing of nearly £60 m. in
her foreign exchange earnings. With Malaysia they estimated there would be
increased expenditure of S/100 m. a year because of Brunei and Sarawak and the
Indonesian confrontation. However, it was their opinion that once the teething
troubles of the first few years were over, the situation would improve.
The Minister of Defence said that Malaysia could call on Britain to help under the
Defence Agreement if she became involved in external aggression from Indonesia.
Britain had to incur very heavy expenditure in keeping her forces east of Aden for
contingencies such as these.
Mr. Tan Siew Sin said that the Malayans, while agreeing that the figure of £18 m.
was the important one, hoped that Britain would meet all of it. Malaya’s political
stability depended on economic expansion and the development programme; defence
and internal security had been pared down to a minimum to pay for development,
but now under Malaysia Defence and Internal Security forces would have to be built
up from scratch. Development aid and economic expansion must nonetheless
continue, and all the more so in the new States.
The Chief Secretary said that Britain had enormous demands on her from the
Commonwealth; Malaya after all was a rich country. She had big reserves. Even if
3 This sum was smaller than the opening bid of £10 million agreed by the Cabinet Defence Committee on
10 May.
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they were not all within the control of the Central Government (e.g. those with the
Banks) they could nevertheless be mobilised for development purposes as indeed
they were in Britain.
The Commonwealth Secretary said it would be easier for Britain to help with
equipment than with cash. Some of the equipment might already be available, and
more could probably be provided from industries which the British Government
wanted to assist, i.e. those with surplus capacity. He suggested, therefore, that the
officials of both sides meet to establish what equipment needed by the Malayans was
already available from existing stocks and what would involve new production. He
then suggested that Ministers should try to narrow the remaining gap at a meeting
next day.
Mr. Tan Siew Sin said, however, that there were two further ‘gaps’. Malaysia
needed a ‘launching ground’ of development aid. Within the Commonwealth,
Cyprus, even though much richer in per capita income than Malaya, had been much
better treated in terms of aid. There was also a third gap. Malaysia had now run into
difficulties, as a result of the Brunei revolt, the Indonesian confrontation policy and
the opposition of the Communists in Sarawak. If she were simultaneously faced with
a revolt in Sarawak and Indonesian infiltration, she would just go bankrupt. When
Malaysia was first planned, the idea had been to have only a couple of companies in
the Borneo States, but now three battalions were going to be necessary. In Singapore
the British had five battalions in an Internal Security role, Malaysia would only be
able to provide three. Suppose there had been no Malaysia, Britain would have had to
pay far more than now was being suggested in the Malaysia settlement. The Malayans
were already committed to making available to the Borneo Territories a very large
figure, some S/500 m., for development aid and Britain had agreed only to provide
some S/64 m.
The Commonwealth Secretary said that he thought it was agreed that these talks
were concerned only with Defence. Mr. Tan Siew Sin by speaking of development
appeared to be reopening questions which he thought were already settled.
Mr. Tan Siew Sin said that he certainly did not wish to reopen any questions
already settled but he had thought that these talks were to discuss all aspects of
financial aid; not just defence aid. If, however, they were confined to defence he must
ask that they take account of the need to meet recurrent expenditure on defence; for
example even though Britain had agreed to meet the extra cost involved in the
secondment scheme, the Malayans still had to provide a very large sum. Even
internal expenditure had a large import content to it. However, Tun Razak added
they were glad to be offered equipment and in particular were looking forward to
obtaining Patrol Craft.
Conclusions
It was agreed that the officials on both sides should meet later that evening and the
next day to discuss what equipment could be available to the Malayans (i) out of
stock, (ii) by new production, and what the Malayan requirments were. Ministers
would then meet again.
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175 CO 1030/1509, no 20 15 May 1963
‘Malaysia financial discussions’: minutes of the third and final formal
meeting at which Tun Razak and Tan Siew Sin reported their
reactions to the British offer
The purpose of the third and last formal meeting of Ministers in these discussions
was for the Malayan delegation to report their reactions to the offer of assistance by
the British Government which the Commonwealth Secretary had made at the
previous meeting.1
2. Tun Razak said that, after careful consideration, he had come to the
conclusion that he must report personally to the Tunku on the offer which the
British Government had made. It was not, of course, sufficient to enable the defence
programme to be carried out, although he had not expected that the British
Government would be able to fulfil the requests which had been made. He was
pleased that the Commonwealth Secretary had been able, at their previous meeting,
to undertake to approach the Australian, Canadian and United States Governments
about their providing assistance. The Commonwealth Secretary said that he fully
accepted that the British Government’s offer had not fully met the Malayan
Government’s requirements, but he hoped that Tun Razak would not lead the Tunku
to expect that we could increase our offer beyond the level discussed. He did not
think it would be helpful to give the Tunku the impression that there was now much
elasticity in the amount of aid which could be provided. He had not yet sought the
Chancellor of the Exchequer’s approval to offer £15 m., but he was prepared to make
out a case for improving upon the offer of £12.35 million which would be put to the
Tunku. His personal view was that the Malayan Government might be advised to
settle for £15 million and to rely upon approaches to other Governments to meet the
gap in financing their defence programme. It would not, however, be useful to make
such approaches until the amount of financial assistance to be given by the British
Government had been financially decided. Tan Siew Sin said that he felt it necessary
to repeat that the position about financing the defence programme had been made
worse, since, as a result of the Brunei revolt and the Indonesian threat, it would not
be possible to spread out expenditure evenly over a long period, but large sums would
have to be spent immediately. The limited taxing powers of the Federal Government
over the Borneo Territories (accepted on the British Government’s advice) also made
it much more necessary to have external assistance to finance the defence
programme. The British Government’s total offer—about £30 million including all
forms of aid for Malaysia—fell far short of meeting the cost of the defence
programme. The Commonwealth Secretary pointed out that it was to the Federal
Government’s advantage to have the Borneo Territories as willing members of
Malaysia and that, if this could only have been achieved by coming to financial
arrangements already agreed, that seemed a fair price to pay.
1 On 10 May the Cabinet Defence Committee had authorised an upper limit of £12.5 million (see 173). On
14 May Sandys offered the Malayans £12.35 million but agreed to make a case for £15 million to the
chancellor.
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3. The Minister of State said that the offer of aid which we had originally had in
mind had been revised in the light of the Brunei revolt. Sir Henry Lintott, referring
to what Tan Siew Sin had said about the inadequacy of the British Government’s
offer, considered that the agreement to a review of their financial assistance after
three years was important.
Press communique
4. The following points were agreed in considering the terms of a Press
communique:—
(1) that it should not refer to the figures of financial assistance which had been
discussed;
(2) that it should avoid giving the impression that there was an opportunity for
much more bargaining about the proposals which had been discussed;
(3) that it should reiterate that the Anglo–Malayan Defence Agreement was to be
extended to cover the whole of Malaysia;
(4) that it should indicate that certain proposals had been made in the discussions
which were now to be referred to the Malayan and British Governments.
5. It was accepted that the Malayan delegation, in dealing with press enquiries
about the discussions, might have to say that the offer of assistance made by the
British Government did not meet the Malayan Government’s requests.
6. The Commonwealth Secretary then had to leave the meeting and the Minister
of State secured the meeting’s approval to the attached communique.2 It was agreed
that this should be available to the press before Tun Razak held his Press Conference
on the following day, 16th May.
2 Not printed.
176 CAB 128/37, CC 34(63)8 23 May 1963
[Malaysia financial discussions]: Cabinet conclusions
[Chaired by R A Butler for this agenda item, a thinly-attended Cabinet heard a report from
Sandys on the inconclusive Anglo–Malayan discussions and a statement of the Treasury
view from the chief secretary, Boyd-Carpenter. Stalemate in London on the financial
issue was matched locally by lack of progress in negotiations between the Tunku and the
Sultan of Brunei, on the one hand, and, on the other, in the attempts by the Malayan and
Singapore governments to resolve outstanding constitutional and economic questions.
Consequently, on 27 May Lansdowne departed for Kuala Lumpur on a mission to
arbitrate between the various parties.]
The Commonwealth Secretary said that the recent discussions with the Government
of Malaya about the level of defence aid to be provided by the United Kingdom had
been inconclusive. With the agreement of the Chief Secretary, Treasury, he had
offered a contribution of £15 million towards the capital expenses of the Malayan
defence programme up to 1996; but the Malayan Government had not accepted this
offer, which they claimed was insufficient to enable them to provide for the defence
of the Borneo Territories after their forthcoming incorporation in Malaysia. They
were unwilling to contemplate the alternative course of curtailing their development
programme; and the United Kingdom therefore faced the choice of either accepting a
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greater liability for the defence of Malaysia or offering more generous defence aid.
The Malayan Prime Minister would probably expect to discuss the matter further
with the Minister of State, Colonial Office, who would be visiting Malaya in the near
future.
The Chief Secretary, Treasury, said that the offer of £15 million, which exceeded
the £121⁄2 million authorised by the Cabinet, covered the whole of the foreign
exchange element in the Malayan defence programme so far as purchases to be made
in the United Kingdom were concerned. The Malayan Government intended to spend
a further £3 million on purchases of defence equipment from other countries; but
there was no reason why the United Kingdom should assume this additional liability.
Malaya was the richest country in South-East Asia; and any increase in our present
offer of aid would be liable to have serious repercussions elsewhere, particularly in
India.
In discussion it was suggested that it might become essential to offer some further
measure of defence aid to Malaya. The military threat which would face Malaysia, on
its creation, would be liable to be more grave than had been foreseen when the
financial implications of this constitutional change had been first considered.
Moreover, under present plans United Kingdom forces in Singapore would be
reduced as a result of the transfer to the Government of Malaysia of responsibility for
internal security; but, if the local forces were not built up to the necessary level,
these reductions might not be secured. On the other hand, it would be premature to
commit ourselves, without further consideration, to any specific amount of
additional defence aid to be offered to Malaya; and, in so far as such aid might
eventually be given, it might be desirable to consider how far it should be related to
additional purchases in the United Kingdom.
The Cabinet:—
Invited the Commonwealth Secretary and the Chief Secretary, Treasury, to
consider further, in the light of their discussion, the extent of any additional
defence aid that might be offered to the Government of Malaya and to arrange for
the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, during his forthcoming visit to Malaya, to
ascertain, without commitment, the scope for further negotiation with the
Government of Malaya on this subject.1
1 Later the same day Sandys wrote to Boyd-Carpenter suggesting either a little more defence aid directly
connected with the raising of the Borneo battalions or development aid in North Borneo and Sarawak
(over and above the £7.5 million already committed), possibly in the form of a £5 million Commonwealth
assistance loan. Sandys Papers, 8/13, 23 May 1963.
177 CAB 134/2371, OP(63)11, annex A 29 May 1963
‘Financial assistance for Malaysia’: inward telegram no 929 from Sir G
Tory to Mr Sandys, forwarding a message from Tunku Abdul Rahman
to Mr Macmillan
[The Tunku ensured that Tory and Lansdowne (who had now arrived in Kuala Lumpur)
were given a copy of his letter to Macmillan before he left for Tokyo on 30 May for a
meeting with Sukarno (see 181, n 4 and 200, note). The signed version of the letter not
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only arrived in London later than this telegram but was also given the later date of 31 May
(PREM 11/4348). In his next telegram, Lansdowne advised Sandys that the Malayans
sought £30 million for the three years, 1963–1965, and he requested authority to raise
the offer to a grant of £16 million plus a loan of £5 million. Although this fell far short of
Malayan expectations, Lansdowne thought it had ‘a chance of enabling us to reach a
friendly settlement’, particularly when other factors were taken into account such as the
review promised for 1965, possible contributions from other Commonwealth countries
and British commitments to development aid for North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore
(Lansdowne to Sandys, tel no 930, 30 May 1963, CAB 134/2371, OP(63)11 annex C).
Ministers next discussed this question on 17 June, see 179 and 181.]
Following is text of letter which Tunku has sent today to the Prime Minister. Begins:
I am writing to you on the subject of financial assistance from the United Kingdom
Government for Malaysia.
Recently my Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance had talks with your
colleagues in London on the subject of British financial aid for Malaysia. They
unfortunately did not come to an agreement because the offer made by your
Government fell far short of our requirements. I have no doubt that your colleagues
have briefed you fully on the position. However I enclose herewith an aide memoire
for your information.1
If I may put it briefly the new Federation will have to spend something of the order
of dollars 430 to 460 million per annum on defence and internal security. Of this
figure at least dollars 200 million is directly attributable to the four States of
Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei. Over a 3-year period, i.e. 1963 to
1965 which is the period agreed upon as the period for which financial aid should be
determined in the first instance (herein after referred to as ‘the agreed period’) the
total figure directly attributable to the four newly joining States of Malaysia will
therefore be approximately dollars 600 million or £70 million. Your Government has
offered us a total of about £15 million for this 3-year period all of it in equipment
which will be either obtained or purchased in Britain.
In the field of economic development the report of the Inter-Governmental
Committee on Sarawak and North Borneo had specified a figure of dollars 100
million per annum as essential for the two territories.2 Even if we take only two years
of the agreed period viz 1964 and 1965 the amount required would be dollars 200
million or £23.3 million. The British Government has offered £1 and a half million
per annum for 5 years as its contribution towards this total. For a 2-year period the
British contribution would therefore be £3 million.
It will be seen that the needs of the newly joining territories of Malaysia in the
sphere of defence, internal security and economic development in Sarawak and
North Borneo would be £93.3 million for the agreed period against the total
suggested British contribution of £18 million. The reason for this unusually large
outlay on defence is that we are inheriting an emergency in these new territories
particularly in Sarawak where there are growing indications of the Communist
activities within the territory and in the Sarawak Indonesian border.
1 Not printed.
2 Malaysia. Report of the Inter-Governmental Committee, 1962 (Cmnd 1954, Feb 1963); see also 141 and
146.
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On the other hand the financial position of the present Federation of Malaya is
much weaker than is generally believed and in the circumstances we can see no way
of closing this gap from our own available resources. I should add that the
assessment and figures given by me above have not been disputed by your
Government. The only point at issue lies in the quantum of aid. Without the
assurance of a reasonable amount of financial aid from the United Kingdom
Government we would have no alternative but to ask you to continue and bear full
financial responsibility for the defence forces of Sarawak and North Borneo even
after Malaysia is formed or until such time as we are able to take over this
responsibility ourselves. This would include the cost of maintaining the 2 infantry
battalions which are now being raised there on our behalf and for which we have
been asked to pay.
It will therefore be seen that Malaysia could be a grave financial liability to the
existing Federation of Malaya. Our burden is aggravated further by the fact that
whilst it is the intention that the level of Federal taxation in the Borneo States
should be brought to the Federation of Malaya levels in graduated stages over a
period of years political expediency would likely dictate that the taxation level could
only be significantly raised when the result of greater expenditure is apparent. Our
effort to carry out economic development on which our political stability largely
depends would be severly jeopardise and Malaysia would have the end result of
defeating the very objectives of political and economic stability which it was designed
to establish.
In the circumstances I request Britain to give far greater aid during at least the
first few critical years of the new nation’s existence than she appears disposed to give
at the moment. I would therefore be grateful if you could intervene personally and
cause a reappraisal to be made of your present offer. Ends.
178 CO 1030/1505, no 40 30 May 1963
‘Formal agreement relating to Malaysia’: minute from Sir J Martin to
Mr Sandys
[The formal agreement signed on 9 July would consist of eleven articles running to just
over two printed pages plus eleven annexes totalling some 230 pages, see 192, note. In
this minute Martin draws the secretary of state’s attention to five key points in the draft
agreement which require a further gloss here:
a) On the assumption that all three Borneo territories would join Malaysia, there had been
discussion over whether North Borneo and Sarawak (not being sovereign) could be
parties to the agreement, and whether Brunei should be. For their part, North Borneo
and Sarawak did not wish the Sultan to be given undue prominence in the formal
agreement. Although the British government was empowered by the 1959 treaty to act
for the Sultan in external affairs, to do so would have been completely contrary to the
frequently-made declaration that Brunei’s entry into Malaysia was a matter for the
Sultan’s government. For similar, presentational reasons, it was vital that the leaders of
indigenous peoples should be signatories for North Borneo and Sarawak.
b) While it was essential to avoid the impression that Malaysia was the product of Malayan
expansionism, the British wished to establish Malaysia by amending the constitution of
the Federation of Malaya rather than by creating a wholly new state. One reason for this
was to escape the requirement of election to UN membership and thus reduce the risk of
rejection by the international community. Instead, they hoped to get away with a simple
notification of change of title and boundaries.
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c) The FO was anxious not to weaken Britain’s legal position in the dispute with the
Philippines and had even suggested the retention of sovereignty in Borneo which, of
course, would be impossible after Malaysia Day.
d) & e) Sandys had article 5 redrafted in order to avoid making British tenure of the
Singapore bases directly dependent on the Malayan Defence Agreement and to safeguard
Britain’s right to dispose of surplus property in Singapore at the market rate. The issue
of whether certain crown lands were surplus to military requirements and how they
might be released to the government of Singapore government was settled on 7 July and
the agreed scheme was adopted as annex F (not G as referred to here) to the final version
of the formal agreement.]
Your approval is sought to transmit to the Malayan Government (and the other
governments concerned) the attached draft Formal Agreement on Malaysia. A full
explanatory note is also attached.1 Briefly, the points of which you should be aware
are:—
(a) The Sultan of Brunei is made a party to the main Agreement. Opinion in
Borneo may not welcome this, but we can see no satisfactory way round. The
important thing presentationally from the Borneo point of view is that their
representatives will initial the Formal Agreement at a public ceremony. The actual
signature will be by plenipotentiaries of the British, Malayan and Brunei
Governments and will take place in relative obscurity (probably in Kuala Lumpur).
(b) Article I has been drafted to establish that Malaysia is in law an expansion of
the present Federation, while at the same time it avoids wording which might
make North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore feel that they were being handed over
to Malaya.
(c) Article I(1) of the draft refers to the establishment of Malaysia on 31st August
1963 or such other day as the two governments agree. There would be advantage
in fixing the 31st August without qualification, but the Foreign Office feel that so
long as there is a possibility of the Philippine Government obtaining an interim
injunction from the International Court it is better to retain the flexible wording. I
hope that, if it came to the pinch, Foreign Office Ministers would agree to
disregard such an injunction. It would probably be better not to put the point to
Foreign Office Ministers until the Law Officers’ advice on the merits of the claim
and the jurisdiction of the International Court, which is now being sought, has
been received. For the time being I think we can accept the present wording.
(d) Article V deals with the extension to Malaysia of the Anglo–Malayan Defence
Agreement. The Ministry of Defence, Commonwealth Relations Office and Foreign
Office consider that it would be imprudent to elaborate on this wording, which
reproduces that in the Joint Statement of November 1961, even though it does not
cover all contingencies. The matter is described in more detail in paragraph 7 of
the note. A submission is being made on this point to the Minister of Defence.
(e) Ministry of Defence, Treasury and Treasury Solicitor are anxious to safeguard
our present rights in Singapore to dispose of surplus land at market value. The
Colonial Office and C.R.O. would prefer to make no reference to this in the draft
Agreement (it is dealt with at Annex G) and to negotiate the matter in parallel with
the Malayans and Singapore. We do not want to run the risk of complicating the
negotiation of the Formal Agreement by introducing what may be a contentious
1 Not printed.
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issue. The form of words in Annex G may well not be negotiable and the views of
Sir Geofroy Tory and Lord Selkirk on the point are being sought. The Ministry of
Defence recognise that we may have to drop the point. Subject, however, to any
strong objections from Sir Geofroy Tory and Lord Selkirk I think we can acquiesce
in the present draft.
179 CAB 134/2371, OP(63)11 11 June 1963
‘Malaysia: British financial aid’: memorandum by Mr Sandys for
Cabinet Oversea Policy Committee
[The pressure upon the British government to cultivate Malayan goodwill by improving
its financial offer was increasing since two sets of negotiations—between Malaya and
Singapore, and between Malaya and Brunei—were in deadlock. Another disturbing
development was the recent joint proposal of the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia
and the Philippines to appoint an assessor charged with ‘ascertaining’ the wishes of the
peoples of Singapore and the Borneo territories. One way out of his defence dilemma
might have been for the Tunku to cut his costs by entering a confederation with
Indonesia and the Philippines. Most British officials deplored such a suggestion, though
some saw the case for encouraging a démarche which might enable Britain to reduce its
defence commitments as a result of ‘some accommodation between Malaysia and
Indonesia (for both are Malay peoples) against their common Chinese enemy’ (A L M Cary
to Mr Butler, 14 June, PREM 11/4348).]
Existing British offer
Since the Chief Secretary and I last discussed with our colleagues, on 23rd May,1
the question of British financial aid for Malaysian defence, the Tunku has sent to
the Prime Minister a message (copy attached at Annex A)2 requesting his personal
intervention to secure a reappraisal of our latest offer. This was a contribution of
£15 m. towards the capital expenses of the Malaysian defence expansion
programme (details of which are in Annex A of D. (63) 18)3 up to the end of 1965,
with a review in that year. We also offered to pay certain costs of British seconded
service personnel, a commitment estimated at about £3 m. In addition we have
already offered assistance outside the Defence field which might total as much as
£16 m. in loans and grants over the next five years. This (except for £3 m.
representing the cost of the compensation scheme in the Borneo territories)
broadly reflects what we should probably have spent had Malaysia not been
contemplated. Details of non-military aid offered to Malaysia are attached at
Annex B.4
2. The £15 m. which we have already offered would cover all the defence orders
which the Malayans propose to place in Britain, and also the buildings etc. in Malaya
and Singapore which we have already agreed to transfer to the Malayans.
1 See 176. 2 See 177.
3 D(63)18 has been printed without its annexes as document 173.
4 Not printed. There were three non-military commitments: aid to Singapore; development aid to North
Borneo and Sarawak; compensation for expatriate officers in North Borneo and Sarawak.
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Malayan expectations
3. Although the Tunku’s message contains no specific bid, there is good reason
to think that the Malayans hope we shall give them about double what we have so far
offered for Defence.
Lord Landowne’s recommendations
4. My colleagues asked me to arrange for Lord Lansdowne, during his recent
visit to Malaya, to ascertain, without commitment, the scope for further negotiation
with the Government of Malaya on this subject. He reported (Kuala Lumpur
telegram No. 930 attached at Annex C5) that he believed that an obvious attempt by
us to get away with the minimum will only provoke lack of confidence and illwill in
the States concerned, and will call our resolution in question not only by the
enemies of Malaysia, but also by those who we hope will support it. He did not
recommend that we should go to the length which the Malayans wanted, but he was
convinced that an appreciable addition to our present offer is necessary to help
Malaysia through its difficult early years. He recommended that our further
assistance should take the form of aid over the raising of the two extra battalions
which are planned in Borneo, and a Section 3 loan for development in Borneo.
5. I agree with Lord Lansdowne’s assessment, and in general accept his
recommendations, although it will be seen from paragraph 7 below that I propose a
different formula for assistance in financing the Borneo Battalions from that which
he has suggested. There are still a number of difficult hurdles to be surmounted in
the very near future if Malaysia is to be achieved by 31st August, notably in the
Malayans’ negotiations with Singapore and Brunei. Against this background, it is in
my view, urgently necessary to return a quick and forthcoming reply to the Tunku.
Borneo battalions
6. The Tunku’s most telling argument in favour of a greater British contribution
is the extra cost of what he chooses to call the Borneo emergency. It is certainly in
our interest, as the Malayans are well aware, to ensure that they are able to take over
our existing responsibilities for internal security in the Borneo territories as well as
in Singapore after Malaysia. Otherwise we shall be left with a most uncomfortable
commitment, unprecedented in an independent country, for an indefinite period. We
are having, in any case, to plan on the assumption that British forces will be required
in support of Malaysian security forces in Borneo until the end of 1965. If this
situation is not to be further prolonged, the Malayans must be enabled to raise the
multi-racial battalions which they want in Borneo but which they now say they
cannot afford.
7. Part of the cost of equipping these battalions is already covered by our £15 m.
offer. The remaining costs, which are so much worrying the Malayans, are almost
wholly local. Nevertheless, I recommend that we should, in this special case, increase
our present offer by agreeing to pay the cost of raising, training and equipping these
units ourselves on behalf of the Malaysian Government, meeting all costs for two
years, except for the cost of permanent accommodation in Borneo. In practice these
units would largely be under training by our own forces in Malaya during this period.
5 Not printed, but see document 177, note.
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8. The extra cost to us of such an arrangement would, I understand, be unlikely
to exceed £11⁄2 m., i.e. the current costs of training and maintenance for two years.
The cost of initial equipment is estimated at £1⁄2 m. but this is largely covered already
in our present £15 m. offer. (These costs account for £2 m. of the £31⁄2 m. referred to
in paragraph 5 of Lord Lansdowne’s telegram as the total cost of raising the Borneo
Battalions; the remaining £11⁄2 m. represents the capital cost of permanent
accommodation, which need not fall within the period 1963–65). However, we could
hope to gain more credit with the Malayans by avoiding putting a monetary value on
our offer.
Development in Borneo Territories
9. In addition to the argument in paragraph 6 above, the Tunku has drawn
attention in his message to what he regards as the low level of British assistance
towards development in Borneo. The development programmes of North Borneo and
Sarawak over the next five years provide for expenditure totalling £58.4 m. towards
which we have already promised a £7.5 m. grant. The probable sources are as
follows:—
British grant £7.5
British technical assistance, say 1.4
Federal assistance/expenditure (based
on an indication given last year of
what they would try to make available) 11.5
Local budgetary sources including
reserves 23.5
Loans (local and external) 7.5
Total 51.4
£7 m. remains therefore to be found, or the programmes will remain 12 per cent
uncompleted.
10. The Federation are committed to supporting a programme of this order, and
they have sold the Malaysia concept to the Borneo Territories largely by the promise
of greatly enhanced development. It is important that their promises should be
translated into performance, and that there should be the least possible friction over
development finance between the new States and the Federal Government during the
early years of Malaysia.
11. Although Singapore is likely to offer substantial assistance to Borneo
development, the Federation is going to have great difficulty in finding the money to
enable the £51.4 m. programme to be carried out.
12. Recommendations
What I recommend, therefore, is that in replying to the Tunku we should offer the
following further assistance.
(i) Borneo battalions. We should undertake to make a free gift of the following items
in the Malaysian defence expansion programme in so far as it is implemented in the
three years 1963–65 inclusive:—
(a) All the arms and equipment etc. to be supplied from British sources.
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(b) All the buildings and facilities which we have undertaken to make available in
Singapore and Malaya.
(c) The extra cost of Service seconded personnel in the scheme already offered to
the Malayans.
(d) The whole cost of raising, equipping and training the two Borneo battalions
(but not their permanent accommodation in Borneo).
The cost of (a) and (b) would be approximately £15 m., and the cost of (c) about
£3 m.; they are in fact our existing offer, and these figures could be announced. The
extra cost of (d) would probably not exceed £11⁄2 m. but this figure should not be
revealed, at least for the present.
(ii) Development loan. In addition, as recommended by Lord Lansdowne, we should
offer to make available a loan of up to £5 m. for development in Borneo. Although the
import content of the Development Plans of the territories has not yet been fully
worked out, I understand that there is a good prospect that a Section 3 loan (tied to
British goods and services) could be used.
13. I invite my colleagues’ concurrence in these recommendations.
180 CAB 131/28, D(63)19 14 June 1963
‘Future defence policy’: note by Sir B Trend for Cabinet Defence
Committee. Annex: ‘Future defence policy’, memorandum by Sir B
Trend, 14 June [Extract]
[Trend’s memorandum was followed by papers from Thorneycroft (D(63)20, 14 June),
Maudling (D(63)21, 17 June) and Home (D(63)22, 17 June). Thorneycoft’s ‘broad view’
was that Britain’s military role should be: ‘(1) Taking a proper share in the defence of
Western Europe. (2) Providing what is necessary for defence of our own overseas
territories. (3) Providing for some assistance to our friends and allies as far as we can
afford it.’ He pointed out, however, that defence costs were rising faster than the GNP.
Maudling was ‘sure that it is not realistic to form our defence plans for the next 5–10
years on a scale of resources which cannot be comfortably accommodated within a rate of
growth of GNP on which we can prudently rely, year by year’. He warned: ‘If we try to
persuade ourselves that we can do more, all that will happen is that there will be more
economic failure—and we all know that this does much more harm to our international
position and influence than any technical weakness in defence.’ While Home recognised
the need to ‘set some limit’ to defence expenditure, he warned against being dogmatic on
the exact percentage of the GNP to be allocated to defence and reminded his colleagues
that they had rejected the idea of choosing between Europe and a world role: ‘We have
world wide interests and must therefore have available a world wide presence to protect
them. Our recent commitments to India and Malaysia are cases in point.’ Although he
found it ‘hard to conceive any foreseeable circumstances in which we should, in the
1970’s, and entirely on our own, want to land forces in the Middle East or Far East against
entrenched opposition’, he argued that reduction of ‘our forces in the Middle or Far East
in an attempt to anticipate events’ would ‘encourage our enemies, dismay our allies and
precipitate the disorder we are anxious to avoid’. The Defence Committee considered all
these papers on 19 June and, as regards the Far East, concluded that commitments to
Malaysia meant that there could be no question of an early or major withdrawal from
Singapore during the remainder of the 1960s. Macmillan, however, felt that reliance on
British forces in the defence of Malaysia might be mitigated by drawing further on the
support of Australia and New Zealand and also by negotiating a political understanding
with Indonesia (CAB 131/28, D(63)8th meeting.]
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By direction of the Prime Minister I circulate the attached memorandum on Future
Defence Policy.
This memorandum has been prepared as the result of discussions which I have had
with the Permanent Secretaries of the Departments mainly concerned and of the
Chief of the Defence Staff, in the light of the decision of the Committee at their
meeting on 9th February, 1963 (D. (63) 3rd Meeting). But, while it takes account of
points which have been raised during those discussions, it does not commit any
Department and has been prepared simply as a basis for Ministerial discussion of
some of the main issues involved.
Annex to 180
The cost of defence
1. At their meeting at Chequers on 9th February (D.(63) 3rd Meeting)1 the
Defence Committee agreed that defence expenditure should, if possible, be contained
within a limit of 7 per cent of the Gross National Product (G.N.P.); and, in order to
test the realism of this hypothesis, they commissioned studies on:—
(i) the cost of maintaining our base at Aden in relation to the value and
importance of the interests which it is designed to protect;
(ii) the political and economic consequences of a withdrawal or substantial
reduction of the forces at present deployed in the Far East, particularly at Hong
Kong and Singapore.
2. Since the discussion at Chequers, the revised forward costings for defence
have become available. These indicate that defence expenditure in 1965–66 will
exceed the target for that year (agreed by the Defence Committee in April 1962 at
£1,850 million) by about £170 million at current prices. Beyond that date the
forecast is speculative; but the costings suggest that, by 1970, expenditure may rise
to a level between £2,200–£2,400 million (again at 1963 prices). These figures
assume that present strategy and weapons programmes continue unchanged; but
they make no allowance for any new defence programmes—e.g. participation in a
mixed-manned NATO nuclear force or the development of a space capability, even if
only for purposes of military reconnaissance and communications. Even without
these potential additions, however, the lowest of the two figures for 1970 would be
likely to be well above 7 per cent of G.N.P. on any reasonable estimate of the way in
which things are likely to develop.
3. In the light of the prospect disclosed by the forward costings we have thought
it best to translate the Defence Committee’s original remit into a rather wider
enquiry, extending over the whole range of defence expenditure, in an attempt to
ascertain where we should seek to secure economies if the total outlay is not to
exceed 7 per cent of G.N.P.
4. Any enquiry of this kind raises both military and political issues; and,
1 See 166, note.
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although these can be discussed separately, they are closely connected.
Geographically, our capability in one theatre reinforces, and is reinforced by, our
capability in other theatres; and the weapons systems in any one theatre are
themselves interdependent. Any economy must therefore be considered in terms of
its indirect, as well as its direct, consequences. Moreover, we have always sought
hitherto to maintain balanced forces—i.e. forces which are reasonably self-contained
and are capable, if necessary, of some degree of independent action. Insofar as we
have succeeded in this purpose, any substantial economy which we may effect may
result in ‘unbalancing’ our forces and may therefore reduce disproportionately our
ability to intervene, single-handed, in certain types of situation in which we regard
our interests as threatened. This capacity for independent action lies near the root of
the problem of the cost of defence; and the possibility of effecting defence economies
on any significant scale depends largely on our willingness to forego it to a greater
extent than at present.
5. There is one further dilemma—of timescale. A precipitate withdrawal, from
any of our positions overseas, would be liable to increase the danger of attack; and it
would certainly undermine the confidence of our allies. It would inevitably be some
time, therefore, before the effect of any economies decided now could become
apparent. Nevertheless, unless they are decided now and implemented gradually
thereafter and unless we are prepared to accept the additional risks which will
inevitably arise during this period in which our forces are being run down, it will be
too late to effect any worthwhile saving.
The military choice
6. In terms of forces and weapons systems, the scope for substantial economies
appears to be confined to:—
(a) the Polaris programme;
(b) Army man-power, primarily in Germany;
(c) the TSR.2, i.e. the replacement for the Canberra;
(d) the naval carrier programme, with which is linked the P.1154, i.e. the
replacement of the R.A.F’s Hunter and the Fleet Air Arm’s Sea Vixen.
In practice even this limited range of choice may not really be open to us. . . .
The political choice
7. An alternative approach to the problems outlined above would analyse them
by reference not to the weapons systems involved but to the political and
geographical assumptions on which any military strategy must rest. From this point
of view, there are two ways of seeking economies in our defence expenditure:—
(a) We could reduce our forces without purporting to disavow any of our
obligations or to abandon any of our interests.
(b) We could explicitly shed our obligations and interests in some parts of the
world and tailor our defence effort accordingly.
8. The first course is hardly practicable. We could not conceal for long the
reduction in our military strength; and the implications of a decision to this effect—
in terms of orders cancelled or not placed and troops withdrawn or not reinforced—
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would become evident, to both our friends and our enemies, relatively quickly. If we
claimed to be able still to protect interests that we could no longer in fact defend, we
should merely invite the attack which our defence policy must be designed to avert.
We must not create a vacuum without arranging for it to be filled by some other
means.
9. If we adopt the second course and seek, by the exercise of a deliberate choice,
to eliminate some of our obligations and to reduce some of our existing military
capacity to safeguard our interests, we are bound to assume—for the reasons briefly
indicated above—that we cannot afford, politically, to curtail our effort in Europe.
The field of possible economy is therefore limited to the Middle East and the Far
East. What are our main interests in those areas? And how far is it realistic to assume
that a continuation of our present strategy will suffice to protect them, and to enable
us to discharge obligations related to them, in the political circumstances which may
have developed by the mid 1970s?
The Middle East
10. Here our interests are:—
(a) to ensure the maintenance of our oil supplies on favourable terms
by defending the independence of the rulers of the oil states, particularly
Kuwait;
(b) to contain the southward expansion of the Soviet Union by our participation in
CENTO and by our support for Iran; and to continue to support Jordan.
(c) to protect, so far as possible the white populations in Africa, particularly in
Kenya and Rhodesia; and to discharge our commitments to the High Commission
Territories.
(d) to keep open if possible, the direct sea route to the Far East. . . .
14. Nevertheless, it would be wise to contemplate the possibility that we may not
be able to retain our base at Aden indefinitely; that, even if we do retain it, we may
find ourselves debarred by local political circumstances from using it effectively for
the purposes for which it was designed, i.e. mainly the defence of our interests in the
Gulf; and that, in any event, we may be unable for more than a relatively short time
to support the continued existence of the Gulf sheikhdoms against the rising force of
Arab nationalism. A military policy which has to be planned five-ten years ahead
must take account of these possible political developments during the same period.
But are they only possible? Or are they probable? And, if the latter, what changes in
our strategic policy do they suggest?
The Far East
15. Here our interests are:—
(a) To contain the expansion of Communism (Chinese as well as Russian),
particularly in relation to India, Pakistan and Malaysia, partly by participating in
SEATO and partly by retaining the capability to take independent military action,
if necessary. Essentially, such action would consist, in the Far East as in the
Middle East, of landing troops in the face of opposition, probably in the
Malaysia/Indonesia theatre.
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(b) To maintain our links with Australia and New Zealand and to contribute to
their defence.
(c) To secure a stable and independent Malaysia.
(d) To protect Hong Kong and our Pacific colonies.
16. The cost of the military effort involved is of the order of £300 million a
year, which is likely to rise by 1970 to £400 million. Here, as in the Middle East, it
would be unrealistic and misleading to try to measure this expenditure
quantitatively against the value of the interests which it is designed to protect. But
it is relevant that, although those interests comprise, as in the Middle East, a wide
range of commercial connections, they do not include any single economic interest
of the same importance as the oil of the Middle East. Our expenditure in the Far
East, at a level more than twice that of our expenditure in the Middle East, is
therefore devoted primarily to maintaining a politico-military position, based on
Singapore.
17. The consequences of withdrawing from that position, or of reducing our
expenditure on maintaining it, cannot be forecast in any detail. But they can be
summed up in the single word ‘instability’, with all that that might imply for the
future of Malaysia, and the older members of the Commonwealth. Against this
imponderable risk, however, we have to set the same doubt as applied to Aden. We
are thinking in terms of the 1970’s, some ten years ahead. Can we assume that at
that date we shall still be able not only to hold and to control Singapore but also
to use it as a base from which to conduct military operations anywhere in the Far
East? And can we assume—again, looking ten years ahead—that we shall still
need, and be able, to land a brigade group in the Far East in the face of
opposition? . . .
20. . . . But the issues involved are, in fact, both political and military
simultaneously; and any questions which attempt to reflect this fact are bound to
appear to do less than justice to arguments that can properly be advanced from the
point of view of individual Departments—if only because they must try to address
themselves to the one central issue, i.e. the future military role of the United
Kingdom in world affairs. It is this issue which we must seek to clarify first,—not the
individual questions, which it would be premature, in some cases, to try to answer
without further examination of the alternative policies or alternative weapons
systems which we might adopt. 
21. The central issue can perhaps be summarised thus. So long as we try to
discharge the full range of our existing commitments, by means of a strategic policy
which includes maintaining some degree of single-handed and independent military
capability, there appears to be no escape from the fact that the defence budget will
absorb more than 7 per cent of the G.N.P.—and, indeed, that, in the light of the
increasing cost of sophisticated weapons system and the associated programmes of
research and development, the excess over 7 per cent will itself continue to rise.
There is no means of significantly arresting this process without reducing our
capabilities to some extent; and a reduction in capabilities implies abandoning some
options, without which some types of operation cannot be mounted. Which options,
if any, should we abandon?
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181 CAB 134/2371, OP(63)6th meeting 17 June 1963
‘Malaysia: British financial aid’: Cabinet Oversea Policy Committee
minutes1
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Commonwealth Secretary
(O.P.(63) 11) on British financial aid for Malaysia.2
The Commonwealth Secretary said that on 29th May the Prime Minister of Malaya
had written to the Prime Minister asking for his personal intervention to secure an
increase in the aid which the United Kingdom had previously offered to Malaysia.3
The negotiations for setting up Malaysia were entering a critical phase and it was still
possible that the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, might abandon
the attempt to establish it by 31st August; this in turn might involve the progressive
abandonment of the whole project. The Tunku was known to have discussed
alternative solutions with President Sukarno at their recent meeting.4 The Malayans
were particularly concerned with the cost of defence and development of the Borneo
Territories, where it was greatly in the British interest that they should relieve us of
our defence responsibilities as soon as possible. For this purpose, it would be
necessary for the Malayans to raise, equip and train two Borneo battalions. Part of
the cost of equipping these battalions was already covered by our offer of £15 million
for the equipment of the Malayan forces. The additional cost of raising, training and
maintaining the Borneo battalions until the end of 1965 would be unlikely to exceed
a further £11⁄2 million. The Tunku had also drawn the Prime Minister’s attention to
the low level of British assistance towards development in Borneo. Although it was
hoped that Singapore would provide a substantial sum of money for this purpose,
there was some doubt whether it would be as much as the Malayans expected and the
Federation would have great difficulty in finding elsewhere the money for their
present ambitious programme. On his return from a recent visit to Malaya the
Minister of State for Colonial Affairs had recommended that the United Kingdom
should offer a loan, tied to British goods and services, of up to £5 million for
development in Borneo.
The following points were made in discussion:—
(a) £11⁄2 million was not an excessive extra sum to pay if it enabled the Malayans to
take over present United Kingdom defence responsibilities in Borneo. However, for
tactical reasons it would be unwise to make this further offer until the Malayan
Government had come forward with a total figure of their own on which further
negotiations could be based.
1 The meeting was chaired by Butler and attended by Home, Maudling, Sandys, Boyd-Carpenter,
Lansdowne, and James Ramsden (parliamentary undersecretary and financial secretary, War Office).
2 See 179. 3 See 177.
4 While in Tokyo (31 May–1 June) Sukarno had asked the Tunku whether 31 Aug could be varied or
postponed as the date for Malaysia Day. The Tunku had replied that change would be undesirable to which
Sukarno was not reported to have objected. They issued a joint statement and reaffirmed a desire to settle
differences and to meet together with Macapagal in Manila. But alternative proposals, such as the
appointment of an assessor of Borneo opinion, were revealed at the tripartite meeting of foreign ministers
in Manila, 7–11 June, when the agenda for a meeting of heads of government acquired a firmer shape, see
200, note.
14-Malaysia-175-227-cpp  21/9/04  9:08 AM  Page 509
510 CONFLICT, DEADLOCK AND AGREEMENT [182]
(b) It would be necessary to avoid at this stage any commitment beyond the end of
1965 when the Defence Aid Programme was to be reviewed.
(c) It was not envisaged that the United Kingdom should incur any expenditure
on the provision of accommodation for the Borneo battalions.
(d) It was unfortunate that the British team which had advised the Malayan
Government on their defence programme should have recommended the purchase of
foreign military equipment, including aircraft.
(e) The cost of raising, training and equipping the Borneo battalions would be
considered as part of the aid programme and would not fall on Defence Votes.
The Committee:—
Took note, with approval, of the statement by the Commonwealth Secretary and
invited him to resume negotiations with the Malayan Government on the lines set
out in O.P. (63) 11 and in the light of their discussion.
182 DO 169/221, no 2 19 June 1963
[Deadlock in Malaya’s negotiations with Singapore and Brunei]:
inward telegram no 1095 from Lord Selkirk to Mr Sandys
[Frustrated by the stalemate in negotiations, the Tunku decided to issue ultimatums to
Singapore (see 183) and Brunei. The Sultan took offence and left Kuala Lumpur on 21
June. Lee replied moderately (see 185) but the following matters remained unresolved:
Singapore’s request for a Malaysian common market; the apportionment of federal
revenues arising in Singapore; control of broadcasting and television in Singapore;
financial assistance by Singapore to the Borneo territories. Sandys decided to intervene
and invited both heads of government for arbitration in London (see 184). Lee agreed and
left for London on 25 June. A Malayan delegation also departed for London on 25 June
and was led by Tun Razak, Tan Siew Sin and Dr Lim Swee Aun (minister of Commerce).
The Sultan followed a few days later. Nevertheless, the Tunku insisted that only North
Borneo and Sarawak would be in a position to join Malaysia by 31 Aug and informed
Macmillan that the Malayan delegation would be coming to London only in order to
discuss terms for the later entry of Singapore and Brunei (see 186).]
With Tory I saw Tunku, Razak and Tan Siew Sin, who attended Malay [sic] Cabinet
today which had resolved with firm determination to bring to a close the prolonged
and irritating negotiations with Lee Kuan Yew and the Sultan of Brunei whom
Tunku described respectively as a snake and an old woman.
2. The Cabinet decided to present ultimatums both to Singapore and Brunei. I
persuaded him to defer the one to Brunei until I had had a further talk with
Sultan.
3. Tunku intimated that he would be requesting the agreement of H.M.G. to
proceed with Malaysia on a basis of Sarawak and North Borneo only, and it is his firm
belief that both Singapore and Brunei would be asking to come in in a matter of
months. I told him that I did not believe that this was the case, and that Lee would go
back to Singapore and stir up as much trouble as he could and possibly put himself at
the head of a United Socialist front.
4. Tunku however was adamant and he said in his opinion both territories would
come to heel in the not too distant future. He would of course be very willing to
come to London if necessary with Lee Kuan Yew at Mr. Macmillan’s invitation. I
believe it would also be the wish of the Sultan of Brunei to come too. It is possible
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that press statements on the at least partial collapse of Malaysia may be expected
shortly.
5. The points at issue are trivial in the case of Brunei and in the case of
Singapore Federation are choosing in the Common Market a bad subject on which to
present an ultimatum. Singapore proposals are basically sensible. But the Federation
refuse to consider enshrining them in the Constitution and insist on giving the Rueff
Report a very much slower examination.
6. My telegram No. 1094 contains gist of announcement by Tunku.
183 CO 1030/1515, no 3 20 June 1963
[Financial arrangements for merger with Singapore]: letter from
Tunku Abdul Rahman to Lee Kuan Yew, making a final offer on terms
The Cabinet at its meeting this morning agreed to offer the following terms to
Singapore:—
‘(1) The two Governments having agreed in principle to the establishment
of a common market, an advisory Tariff Board will be established by
Malaysia Day under a Chairman to be nominated jointly by the two
Governments. The Chairman is to be appointed as early as possible and
official discussion on the terms of the common market will commence
under his chairmanship.
(2) Authority in respect of the collection of Customs and Excise duties and
income tax in Singapore will be conferred upon the Singapore Government in
accordance with Article 80(4) of the Federal Constitution subject to the
reservation of certain powers specified in the Annexure to the Federal
Government. This authority will not extend to customs duties and other
charges collected in Singapore on goods exported from or to be imported into
Malaysia outside Singapore.
(3)(a) All taxes collected in Singapore, other than those specified below, will
be paid into a separate fund and the fund would be divided annually between
the two Governments, or more frequently by agreement between the two
Governments in the proportion of 60% to the Singapore Government and
40% to the Federal Government:—
(i) taxes specified in Part III of the Tenth Schedule to the Federal
Constitution;
(ii) customs duties and other charges collected in Singapore on goods
exported from or to be imported into Malaysia outside Singapore;
(iii) income tax collected in Singapore and attributable to income derived
from the Federation of Malaya; such tax will be paid into the Treasury of
the Federal Government.
(b) Income Tax attributable to income derived from Singapore and collected
in the Federation of Malaya; with respect to such tax 40% should be retained
by the Federal Government and 60% should be paid into the Treasury of the
Singapore Government.
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(c) Income tax attributable to income derived from Singapore and collected
by an Agent in the United Kingdom; such tax, upon receipt in Singapore, will
be paid into the separate fund referred to in (a) above.
(d) When Part VII of the Federal Constitution is applied to any Borneo State
the application of sub-head (a)(iii) and sub-head (b) shall be extended as if for
references to the Federation of Malaya there were included references to that
State.
(4) The Singapore Government will pay to the Federal Government the cost
of capital development of Federal projects in Singapore other than projects
for Defence and Internal Security.
(5) The Singapore Government will make available to the Federal
Government by way of grant during the first five years of Malaysia, a sum of
S/50 million for development expenditure of the underdeveloped states of
Malaysia.
(6) The financial arrangements specified in paragraphs (1) to (4) above will
come into operation on the 1st September, 1963, and will be subject to
review by agreement in respect of the period commencing 1st January,
1965, and thereafter in respect of each subsequent period of two years. In
default of agreement, review will be by an independent assessor appointed
jointly by the two Governments and his recommendations will be binding
on both.’
2. The Annexure referred to above is attached herewith.1
3. I am to inform you and your Government that these represent our final terms
and the Federation Government will not find itself able to make any further
concessions. Therefore, I hope to have your reply within the next 48 hours. In case
you are unable to accept them within the period specified above, our Government
would feel free to withdraw these terms.
4. Finally, I should add that Cabinet has considered the whole question
carefully and has come to the conclusion that it cannot go beyond what was
offered on 4th June last, as our Government has been very generous in the terms
offered to you in an endeavour to reach agreement. In regard to the proposed
grant of S/50 million for development expenditure of the underdeveloped states of
Malaysia for five years I wish to emphasise that this sum is an extremely small
contribution on the part of a State having the financial strength of Singapore, and
bearing in mind, as stated by the World Bank, that ‘even allowing for increased
taxation and also for domestic borrowing possibilities, the further slide in rubber
prices assumed here may mean a gap during 1963–1965 between spending
requirements and domestic resources of S/900 or S/1,000 million, above and beyond
funds which may be expected for special defence financing and private foreign
investment’.
5. I hope you will be able to accept these terms so that Singapore can come into
Malaysia on 31st August next.
1 Not printed.
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184 DO 169/221, ff 4–5 21 June 1963
[Deadlock in Malaya’s negotiations with Singapore and with Brunei]:
minute from D F Milton to A A Golds, recording a meeting held by Mr
Sandys on 21 June1
The Secretary of State held a meeting this morning to discuss what action should be
taken on Kuala Lumpur telegram No. 1102, reporting that there would be almost
certain deadlock in the Malaysia negotiations and suggesting that the Tunku and Mr.
Lee Kwan Kew should be invited to London in order to seek to resolve it.
The Secretary of State thought that if it was not possible to bring about
agreement between Malaya and Singapore, three alternative courses would present
themselves; to force Singapore to join Malaysia against its will, to abandon the
Malaysia project, and to allow North Borneo and Sarawak to join a reduced
Malaysia, leaving the door open to subsequent membership by Singapore. The
Secretary of State thought it would probably be necessary to threaten the Tunku
with separate independence for Singapore and it was agreed that this might force
the Tunku to reach agreement with Singapore since without her the Malaya
Defence Agreement would not continue for long and our free use of the Singapore
base would soon be put in jeopardy.
If we decide to abandon Malaysia or to allow it to be formed without Singapore, it
was pointed out that we should have to consult the North Borneo territories since
they had now come to expect that Malaysia would be formed and that Singapore
would form part of it. At the same time it was also pointed out that it would still be to
our advantage to have North Borneo and Sarawak (if the outcome of the forthcoming
elections confirmed that she would still be a starter) join Malaysia since it would be
increasingly difficult to deal with Indonesian subversion, especially if we were unable
to retain our base in Singapore.
There was, however, some slight evidence that the Tunku was possibly thinking
that if he developed more friendly relations with Indonesia that would serve him
better in combating the Chinese influence in Singapore than would the
establishment of Malaysia.
As a result of discussion the Secretary of State directed that the Department
should work out what we should do in the event of various situations arising e.g. that
there was a Sarawak Government opposed to joining Malaysia, that Sarawak and
North Borneo only would join Malaysia (either 31st August or later), that there was
an immediate demand for independence by Singapore etc. He also wanted
reconsidered the question of whether we should force Singapore and possibly
Sarawak to join Malaysia against their wishes especially if the points in their
disagreement were very slight. After the Secretary of State had spoken to Mr. Bligh
(Admiralty House)2 it was agreed that a telegram should be sent to the High
Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur asking him on behalf of the Secretary of State and
1 This minute by D F Milton, assistant private secretary to Sandys 1962–1964, is quoted at some length in
Lee Kuan Yew’s Memoirs, p 479. Lee was not privy to this internal departmental document in 1963 but
was provided with PRO material by the research team assisting the preparation of his memoirs.
2 T J (later Sir Timothy) Bligh, one of the prime minister’s private secretaries.
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the Prime Minister to invite the Tunku to visit London in order to resolve the
disagreement between Malaya and Singapore. It should be made clear to the Tunku
that we were not prepared to see him on the basis that Malaysia should be formed
without Singapore and he should be told that we would also invite Mr. Lee to
London. The Tunku should also be told that we should want to invite the Sultan of
Brunei to London but that he should arrive a few days after the Tunku. The Tunku
should also be asked to bring Tun Razak with him. The High Commissioner should
be asked to speak immediately to the Tunku in this sense provided that the situation
reported in his telegram No. 1102 had not changed. (It was noted that Mr. Lee Kwan
Yew had today said in public that the establishment of Malaysia without Singapore
was unthinkable).
It was agreed that no further action should be taken on the question of defence aid
for Malaysia until the Tunku’s visit when it would be desirable to try to find out more
exactly what the Malayans wanted.
185 CO 1030/1515, no 4 22 June 1963
[Financial arrangements for merger with Malaya]: letter from Lee
Kuan Yew to Tunku Abdul Rahman. Enclosure: ‘Paragraph to
paragraph reply [to] federation government’s proposals’
I discussed the letter of the Federation Government dated 20th June1 with my
colleagues on my return to Singapore on the 21st June. We met again today the
22nd, and carefully considered again all the points made in the letter.
I append hereto a reply to the six proposals made in the first paragraph of the
letter.
As a government my colleagues and I feel obliged to make a detailed reply to each
point. But in my personal capacity I would like to add that so little divides us. We are
in broad agreement with you on all the major points. Only the details remain to be
resolved and spelt out. The percentage is not important because as the Federation
Cabinet has stated, there will be periodic reviews and no doubt justice will be done in
the reviews.
It is very difficult for any Prime Minister elected by the people of Singapore, to
explain how we are to give away $50 million to the Federal Government, when the
Federation Government in the Inter-Governmental Committee Report for North
Borneo and Sarawak has made no such commitment for themselves as stated in
paragraphs 10 and 11. The Federation Government with much larger resources have
not promised any grants for development expenditure. But it is only fair that we
should be prepared to assist in the development of Malaysia. And loans from
Singapore for North Borneo and Sarawak’s development up to $150 million will give
a greater impetus on their economic growth.
Singapore being what it is, a little island of thrifty workers, shop-keepers and
merchants, my colleagues and I would find ourselves in an invidious position if I
committed Singapore in Malaysia without constitutional safeguards embodying the
terms for a common market in return for which we have agreed to give 39% of our
1 See 183.
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national taxes. I am sure that with good faith on both sides, as there has been for so
long, we can reduce the Rueff Recommendations to simple forms, and present them
as a complete whole before 31st August.2
I am sure the important thing to remember is that our enemies are the
Communists, the abiding source of mischief, and that these small differences will be
forgotten as we combine forces to keep Singapore stable, secure and prosperous, in a
happy and peaceful Malaysia.
Two to three years after Malaysia, when unity has been established, and men’s
minds focussed on the broader horizons of a bigger nation, all these present
problems will be dwarfed into insignificance as we forge ahead, united and free, to
higher goals which Malaysia’s enormous human and natural resources make possible
for all of us.
Enclosure to 185
1. The Singapore Government welcomes the decision of the Federation
Government in agreeing to the establishment of a Common Market and an Advisory
Tariff Board by Malaysia Day under a Chairman to be nominated jointly by the two
Governments. However, in order to allay the anxiety of the Government and the fears
of the people of Singapore about the future of the entrepot trade, it is felt that
constitutional amendments consequential upon Malaysia should embody agreements
covering the establishment of a Common Market and the powers and functions of a
Tariff Board. A proposed first draft of such agreements, based mainly on the Rueff
recommendations, is attached at Annex A.3 It is proposed that officials from both
Governments should immediately examine this draft and complete their work in
time for it to be promulgated together with the constitution on the 31st August,
1963. Copies of this draft have been made available to the Federation since 18th
June.
2. The Singapore Government agrees in principle with the proposal to delegate
authority in respect of the collection of Customs and Excise duty and Income Tax to
the Singapore Government in accordance with Article 80(4) of the Federal
Constitution. However, this delegation of authority should be stated in the
Constitution that such delegation of authority shall not be revocable except by
mutual agreement. The details in the annexures attached to the proposals of the
Federation Government could be discussed and agreed by the official teams.
3. (a) The Singapore Government working on papers submitted to the Inter-
Governmental Committee has arrived at a figure of 34.3% of 1964 estimated yield of
national taxes as adequate to cover the cost of Federal Services in Singapore and
inside and outside of Malaysia. In the computations enclosed in the letter TRY.Y.
9041/111 of 6.6.63, the Federation has arrived at an estimate of 40.4%. The position
can be summarised as follows:—
2 For the appointment of the Rueff mission, see 143, n 4. Rueff recommended a common market but
Malaya feared competition from Singapore. Eventually a common market was agreed subject to safeguards
and concessions on aid to the Borneo territories, see 191. See also IBRD, Report on the Economic Aspects
of Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, July 1963).
3 Not printed.
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Singapore Federation
Estimates Estimates
1964 Yield of
National taxes $311.6 m $303.6 m
Expenditure
Defence & Internal
Security 75.0 75.0
External Affairs,
Parliament, etc. 5.0 7.5
Federal Departments
in Singapore 36.9 50.0
$116.9 m $132.5 m
Less Currency Profits 10.0 10.0
$106.9 m $122.5 m
34.3% 40.4%
(b) The Singapore Government’s view is that estimated expenditure on Defence
and Internal Security is unlikely to be realised in practice. The figure of $75
million is based on two assumptions, an annually recurrent expenditure of $57
million and a development expenditure of $18 million. These figures are based on
an expansion programme of the Malaysian armed forces and the police which is
estimated to attain the following targets:—
Defence—recurrent $176.6 m in 1964 rising to
$224.9 m in 1970
Defence—capital $328.4 m for 4 years
Internal Security— $149.4 m in 1963 rising to
recurrent $164.0 m in 1967
Internal Security—
capital $97.5 m for 4 years.
These figures are estimates submitted by the Federation Government to the Inter-
Governmental Committee 4 on the 18th March, 1963. The figure of $75 million has
been accepted by the Singapore Government as its share of the expenditure should
this sum be actually spent and subject also to deduction for British Defence
contributions. This has been agreed as subject to subsequent review provided for
in paragraph (6) of the Federation Government letter of 20th June, 1963 so any
errors or omissions on either side can be corrected at the end of the 1st, 3rd and
5th years, as originally proposed by the Federation Government.
(c) As regards the other major item of expenditure on Federal Departments in
Singapore, the Federation estimate of $50 million, we believe is an over-estimate.
This, however, can be looked after in the review.
(d) As the matter stood before the 11th June, 1963, there is a difference of some 6%
between the estimates of the Singapore and Federation Governments. The Singapore
4 ie, a committee of representatives from the Malayan and Singapore governments, not to be confused with
Lansdowne’s Inter-Governmental Committee on North Borneo and Sarawak that reported in Feb 1963.
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Prime Minister in his letter to the Federation Prime Minister on 11th June, 1963
proposed that the difference be split, i.e. a percentage of 37% be agreed upon.
(e) It is understood that our proposal is not acceptable to the Federation Government.
In a sincere attempt to reach agreement, the Singapore Government is now prepared
to accept 39%, the additional 2% to represent the ‘prosperity element’ consequent
upon the Federation Government agreeing to a Malaysian Common Market.
(f ) However, since Singapore’s future economic growth depends on satisfactory
terms of the Common Market, such as those recommended in the Rueff Report,
this offer is conditional on agreement on the Common Market terms referred to in
paragraph 1 above.
4. The Singapore Government agrees that it will bear the cost of the expenditure in
respect of development projects of Federal Departments in Singapore which have already
been entered in the Singapore development plan and which have been approved by the
Singapore Treasury or projects already in progress. The Fiscal Sub-Committee agreed
that in regard to the Public Debt, the Federal Government should service outstanding
liabilities in respect of those Singapore assets taken over by the Federal Government on
merger. These include, inter alia, the Airport development scheme and the round-the-
world Commonwealth Cable scheme all of which will involve a total expenditure of more
than $20 million. The Singapore Government agrees that the loans already incurred in
connection with these items of capital expenditure need not be a charge on the Federal
Government. After the completion of these projects, the Singapore Government agrees
to bear the cost of future development expenditure in Singapore (other than Defence
and Internal Security development expenditure) up to a maximum of $3 million or about
1% of taxes of a national character collected in any one year. Any expenditure above this
amount should be with prior agreement of the Singapore Government.
5. The Singapore Government is required to make available a grant of $50
million during the first five years to the Federal Government. This proposal
developed out of discussions as to how the development expenditure of Sarawak and
North Borneo can be financed as their internal resources are likely to prove
inadequate to their needs, estimated at $300 million and $200 million respectively
for the first five years of Malaysia. The Singapore Government is unable to agree to
the payment of a grant but is prepared to enter into an undertaking on the same lines
as that given by the Malayan Government in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Report of
the Inter-Governmental Committee on Malaysia. In these paragraphs the Malayan
Government, subject to certain conditions, ‘undertook to use its best endeavours to
enable this amount ($300 million) of development expenditure to be achieved’.
Similarly the Malayan delegation recognised that additional funds from outside
North Borneo would be required. There is no firm commitment in these paragraphs
to extend grants to the Borneo territories. The Singapore Government considers that
it is inequitable that an undertaking should be asked of the Singapore Government
which the Federal Government itself was not prepared to give.
6. The Singapore Government agrees that the financial arrangements should be
subject to review by agreement and in default of agreement by an independent
assessor appointed jointly by the two governments. This review should take place at
the intervals originally proposed by the Federation Government, that is after the 1st,
3rd and 5th years. It proposes that a list of assessors be agreed as soon as possible
before 31st August, 1963.
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186 PREM 11/4348 24 June 1963
[‘Little Malaysia’]: letter from Tunku Yaacob to Mr Macmillan,
enclosing a personal message from Tunku Abdul Rahman
I have been asked by my Government to convey to you the following personal
message from the Hon’ble Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, our Prime Minister:—
‘My dear Prime Minister,
Thank you for your kind invitation which was conveyed to me by Sir Geofroy Tory
to come to London early this week.
It is clear that it will not be possible to reach agreement with Singapore and
Brunei on a number of basic issues in regard to terms of their entry into Malaysia on
31st August. The Cabinet therefore decided that agreement of British Government
should be sought to go ahead with Malaysia with North Borneo and Sarawak only and
on scheduled day.
The terms for entry of Singapore and Brunei at a later stage could be discussed in
London. For this purpose a Federation Delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister
consisting of Minister of Finance and Minister of Commerce and Industry will meet
representatives of British Government in London. If this is agreeable to you
Delegation will leave immediately. So far prepared to come myself as soon as I
receive advice from my delegation.
Yours sincerely,
TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA.’
Please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, the assurance of my highest respect.
187 DO 169/221, no 15, FS/63/58 24 June 1963
[‘Little Malaysia’]: minute from Lord Home to Mr Sandys
You must be very concerned at the difficulties which have arisen between Malaya and
Singapore over the negotiations for Malaysia, and also with the deadlock over Brunei. I
see that it has been suggested that the Prime Minister should invite the Tunku, Lee
Kuan Yew and the Sultan of Brunei to London, and you are no doubt considering what
should be said to them, and in particular how we should handle the Tunku’s suggestion
that, in the last resort, Malaysia might be formed on August 31 without Singapore and
Brunei. I presume that you will be strongly opposed to this, but I thought it might be
helpful if I were to summarise the foreign policy implications of any solution of this
sort. They would also apply to a decision to allow Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak to
federate temporarily while pursuing the negotiations with Singapore and Brunei with a
view to bringing the whole of Malaysia into being later on:—
(i) If Singapore fails to get into Malaysia, now or at a later date, there is a strong
likelihood that any arrangements for the continued use of our base there would
fairly soon become unworkable. This would undermine our relationship with the
Americans in the area and our ability to carry out our obligations to SEATO, and
would greatly weaken our whole position in South East Asia.
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(ii) The failure of our policy would lead the Indonesians and Filipinos to abandon
any restraint and to go all out for their own territorial ambitions in Borneo. I do
not know what our defence commitments would be towards a lesser Malaysia of
this kind, but I would doubt whether we should be justified in getting involved in
serious military operations with the Indonesians in defence of a Malaysia which
did not include our base at Singapore.
(iii) While the Americans and Australians have made it clear that in the last resort
they would be prepared to help us to defend Malaysia, I am not at all sure that they
would wish to do so if it no longer served the purpose of giving a stable and
permanent future to Singapore.
(iv) The idea of Malaysia is by no means popular with the uncommitted countries,
but if it comes into existence rapidly and as now planned I think it will be widely
accepted and will be received by the United Nations. But a lesser Malaysia would
risk being considered a trick to terminate our own difficulties and would leave so
many problems unresolved that neutral opinion might swing sharply against it,
and I can foresee a very difficult time in the United Nations.
4. I am sending copies of this minute to the Prime Minister, the Minister of
Defence and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
188 CO 1030/1469, no 360 25 June 1963
[Obduracy of the Sultan of Brunei]: inward telegram no 182
OCULAR1 from A M MacKintosh to Mr Sandys
Sultan had Marsal and Ali with him.
2. On behalf of Prime Minister and Secretary of State I invited Sultan to visit
London at once in a final effort, with help of U.K. Ministers, to reach agreement with
Malayans, adding that, even if agreement on Malaysia were not reached, visit would
be useful opportunity to discuss Brunei’s future outside Malaysia. I explained that
Malayan and Singapore delegations were going to London in similar effort, and
outlined time-table now envisaged.
3. I said that Brunei and Malaya appeared at present to have adopted rigid
positions from which, although little of real substance divided them, neither looked
like departing unaided. The only hope of agreement in the time available was further
discussion in London with U.K. help.
4. I have never known Sultan more obdurate. He said categorically that he would
concede nothing and stood absolutely firm on his own terms. Malayans had gone
back on terms previously agreed and had vouchsafed no explanation for so doing. He
had already twice visited Kuala Lumpur in vain search for agreement: he had been
more than once bitten and was now more than twice shy. He saw no object in visiting
London now without prior assurance from both Malayans and H.M.G. that his terms
had been accepted unchanged. He did not believe that Malayan delegation would
1 For the significance of OCULAR see 164, n 4.
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listen to advice of U.K. Ministers if it were favourable to Brunei or that they would
have authority to accept his terms even if, so advised, they wanted to do so.
5. He was willing to send delegation to London at once in order to explain Brunei
stand to U.K. Ministers in hope latter might bring Malays round. But in reply to Ali
(who throughout long discussion gave me full support, whereas Marsal, for once
vocal, consistently opposed me) he refused to give delegation any authority to
consider compromise, saying that, even if U.K. Ministers produced new solutions
which in substance met Brunei’s demands they would be unacceptable because mere
fact that they were new would imply Brunei had given way to some extent.
6. He made it clear that he regarded Lawson2 as indispensable in any discussion
in London of Brunei affairs.
7. He said that, if Brunei did not join Malaysia now, he would like to visit London
for discussion of Treaty, either before or after Parliament’s Summer Recess, in either
case at convenience of U.K. Ministers.
8. In short, prospects for Brunei’s entry into Malaysia now seem nil unless
Malayans surrender. I am about to discuss Razak’s letter to Sultan of 21st June with
Attorney-General and State Financial Officer. If I have anything helpful to add as a
result I will telegraph again.
9. Meanwhile, only hope of getting Sultan to London in time (and it is slight)
seems to me personal appeal in message from Prime Minister which I could hand
over as such. Sultan and Marsal are clearly much offended by what they regard as
Malayan outrage of dignity of former and his state. If we are to get anywhere with
Brunei over Malaysia the best U.K. butter will have to be applied without stint both
here and in London (if we do after all contrive to bring Sultan there).
10. Without Sultan, I doubt whether visit to London by a Brunei delegation
would achieve anything but in this desperate situation we cannot afford to neglect
any expedient, however unhopeful. If therefore, we fail to get Sultan to London at
once I should still be grateful for request from U.K. Ministers that he should at least
send delegation and be ready to follow it without delay if solid prospect of agreement
with Malayans were reported back.
11. I see no point in my coming to London unless Sultan does.3
2 Neil Lawson QC was constitutional adviser to the Sultan; he had acted as rulers’ representative during
the Reid Commission to Malaya, 1956–1957, see BDEE: Malaya, part 3, 442.
3 In fact the Sultan did come to London and on 3 July entrusted Sandys with the task of reactivating
negotiations with the Malayans (CO 1030/1469, no 387 and CO 1030/1516, no 9).
189 DO 169/221, no 31, COS 235/63, Annex 27 June 1963
‘Military implications of establishing Malaysia without Singapore and
possibly Brunei’: minute from Lord Mountbatten1 to Mr Thorneycroft
[J D Higham, assistant secretary at the Colonial Office, attended the meeting of the Chiefs
of Staff on 27 June when he speculated as follows on the future of Singapore: ‘It was
impossible at this stage to forecast what line the Prime Minister of Singapore would take
1 Mountbatten was chief of the defence staff and chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 1959–1965.
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if a solution was not found. He might demand independence for Singapore, or he might
resign and request us to include Singapore in Malaysia by executive action. In the former
case, Singapore could not remain self-supporting and would inevitably come under the
influence of Communist China. In the latter case, it was possible that there might be so
much trouble in Singapore that Lee Kuan Yew could return as Prime Minister in which
case he might be in a stronger position to ensure that Singapore’s position in Malaysia
was arranged on terms more favourable to him.’ (COS 42(63)1, DO 169/221; see also
DEFE 4/156)]
In view of the threat by the Prime Minister of Malaya that, if necessary, he would be
prepared to form Malaysia without Singapore or Brunei, the Colonial Office, at the
request of the Colonial Secretary, asked the Ministry of Defence for an early
assessment of the military implications of establishing Malaysia without Singapore
or possibly without Brunei.
2. At their meeting to-day, the Chiefs of Staff approved the attached Note on this
subject.2
3. The Chiefs of Staff concluded that:—
(a) Whether or not Singapore became independent immediately, its exclusion
from Malaysia would make its use as a United Kingdom base uncertain in the short
term and probably impossible in the long term.
(b) There is no practicable alternative to Singapore as a United Kingdom base, if
we are to meet our existing commitments; it is unlikely that adequate facilities
could be established elsewhere, even if we were prepared to meet the cost. Despite
doubts about the security of the United Kingdom base in an independent
Singapore, we should therefore try to remain there as long as it was productive to
do so because of its supreme military importance in the area.
(c) If the United Kingdom was forced to leave Singapore, we would:—
(i) Suffer a general reverse to our military standing in the Far East.
(ii) If our commitments elsewhere remained unchanged, have to establish
forward operating points north of Indonesia. The provision of these facilities
would be very expensive, difficult to negotiate and might well prove impossible.
(iii) Have to re-arrange at great cost our back-up facilities for the area, in
Australia and/or the United Kingdom.
(d) If Brunei were excluded from Malaysia and the United Kingdom remained
responsible for her external defence and internal security, a United Kingdom
garrison would be required there, but the establishment of forward operating
facilities would be subject to the Sultan’s continuing goodwill.
(e) It is unlikely that we shall be able to extricate our forces from Sarawak, North
Borneo, and Brunei for some time to come whether or not Singapore or Brunei is
excluded from Malaysia.
4. We have not considered the military implications of a compromise solution
whereby Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak form a ‘Little Malaysia’ on 31st August,
with discussions proceeding with Singapore and Brunei with a view to resolving the
differences and their joining Malaysia at some later date. In view of the uncertainties
that surround such a course, we should need further political advice, before we could
assume that the military difficulties shown in the paper would not equally apply.
2 Not printed.
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190 CO 1030/1469 28 June 1963
[Oil discovery off Brunei coast]: minute from J D Higham to W I J
Wallace and Sir J Martin
[The major issue in the negotiations between Brunei and Malaya was Brunei’s revenues
(especially from oil) and the federal government’s right to their taxation. Just before the
June talks began, Brunei Shell announced the discovery of considerable, off-shore oil
resources.]
1. Mr. Mackintosh1 [sic] of Shell called yesterday and saw Mr. Harris and myself.
He thought that it would be helpful if he gave us some more information about the
possible effects of the new oil discovery 7 miles off the Brunei coast.
2. He explained that it might be as much as a year before they were able to say
whether oil was present in commercially exploitable quantities. So far, only one well
had been drilled, and it would be necessary to drill 3 or 4 more before they were able
to give any firm estimate of the probable size of the field.
3. If this proved to be a 200 million barrel field (and Mr. Mackintosh thought this
was a maximum estimate) increased revenue to the Brunei Government during the
latter part of the first 10-year period would compensate for the decline in revenue
from the present field. During the first few years, however, when there would be
heavy capital investment, there might even be a net reduction in revenue to Brunei.
After the 10-year period it could be expected that there would be a steady increase of
revenue, assuming the oilfield was still productive.
4. Mr. Mackintosh had it in mind that the S/M.40 million contribution from the
Brunei Government to the Federal Government had been worked out as a fixed
percentage of Brunei’s revenue from investments and oil. He thought that it might
be possible to apply a similar percentage to the revenue from the new field, and to
agree this in advance. We explained that the S/M.40 million had not been worked out
on any such basis.
5. It is a little difficult to see what the effect of this possible new field on the
financial negotiations is going to be. Whether oil is discovered in exploitable
quantities or not, Shell obviously intend to go ahead with large scale exploration
which will be a very expensive business, and this in itself will have an adverse effect
on Brunei’s revenue.2 Mr. Mackintosh has promised to let me have early next week
their best assessment of this.
6. The Federation are insisting that if new sources of revenue (including oil)
become available in [? any] time after the first five years, Brunei should accept a
binding obligation to pay the tax equivalent to Federal revenues. Brunei have agreed
to a review during the 10-year period at the request of the Federal Government, with
a view to raising the level of annual payment. There is no question of the payment
being less than S/M.40 million even if the financial forecasts are worse than expected.
7. At the end of the 10-year period the Malayans are asking for a review and in
default of agreement that the arrangements then subsisting would continue until
1 Charles Macintosh represented the SE Asia department of the London office of Shell International
Petroleum Co Ltd; P M Linton was general manager of Brunei Shell in Seria.
2 Wallace minuted at this point in the margin: ‘Mr Lawson [the Sultan’s constitutional adviser] made this
point this morning.’
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agreement is reached. Brunei advisers are prepared to advise the Sultan to agree to
this, but not to the further Malayan condition that Brunei should have accepted the
Federal case on new oil revenues.
8. Until Mr. Mackintosh’s figures are available it is difficult to see how this new
oil situation may affect the attitude of both territories. It would seem that we should
stress to the Malayans that the further capital expenditure that will be incurred over
the next few years (whether or not large scale exploitation is possible) may well lead
to a decline in Brunei revenue. As far as the revenue from new oil is concerned, if it is
shown to exist in commercially exploitable quantities, the Bruneis will no doubt
argue that the review formula (with a view to an increase) will take care of that. But if
the field proves to be a rich one, and Brunei’s oil revenue is maintained at its current
level of over S/M.100 million a year instead of declining to less than half that amount
by the end of the 10-year period, the Malayans have a strong case, in equity, for
insisting that they should have a firm assurance that at least a proportion of the
revenue from the new field should be automatically available for Federal purposes.3 I
wonder if it would be worth trying to persuade both territories that such a
percentage should be fixed now.
9. I am a little surprised that the Bruneis should be willing to agree that, if there
is failure to agree at the 10-year review, the present arrangements should continue.
This had been their line before the possible new oil field had broken, and I should
have thought that it was risky for Brunei to accept the possibility of having to
continue to pay S/M.40 million a year when it was almost certain that her revenue
from oil would be declining steeply, at that time—a decline that could scarcely be
offset by an increase in investment income.4
3 Wallace minuted at this point in the margin: ‘As already agreed, they will have control of its investment,
so that it can be used for Federation purposes.’
4 Having considered this minute Sir John Martin advised Lansdowne that the CO should investigate
further the financial terms being negotiated between Malaya and Brunei on the ground that, ‘We have a
responsibility to see that Brunei gets a square deal and it is not at all easy to judge what this should be.’
‘The basic difficulty’, as A N Galsworthy pointed out to the secretary of state, ‘is that the Sultan is
absolutely determined that the ultimate decision as to what shall happen about revenue from oil and
oilfields shall always lie with the Brunei Government’, whereas the ‘Malayans now maintain that if new
sources of revenue (ie from new oilfields) become available after five years, Brunei should pay a tax
equivalent to the Federal Government.’ Galsworthy continued: ‘The argument turns around the Malayans’
desire to get a right of taxation over oil revenues in Brunei after not more than ten years, and the Sultan’s
refusal to concede any such right, unless the Government of Brunei so agrees at the time’ (Galsworthy to
Sandys, 5 July 1963, CO 1030/1470, no 422).
191 CO 1030/1515, no 80 4–5 July 1963
‘Talks on Malaya/Singapore financial negotiations’: CRO minutes of
all-night discussions. Annex: ‘Draft agreement between the
governments of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore on common
market and financial arrangements’
[The Malaysia project nearly foundered over the common market recommended by the
Rueff mission and favoured by Lee Kuan Yew. The apportionment of revenues arising in
Singapore proved highly contentious and the talks oscillated between hard-fought
negotiations and deadlock. Sandys frequently adopted the ploy of late-night meetings to
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drive participants into compromise and force agreement. That of 4–5 July was the
longest, starting at 9.30 pm and ending at 8 am. ‘It was’, recalled Lee Kuan Yew, ‘his
method of dealing with stubborn parties’ and ‘not unlike what the communists did to us
at committee meetings’ (Memoirs, p 480). On the Malayan side, Razak and his colleagues
later spoke ‘with awe’ of their experience and joked with Tory back in Kuala Lumpur that
Tan Siew Sin would ‘never be the same again’ (Tory to Sandys, 19 July 1963, Sandys
Papers, 8/14). When they adjourned for breakfast on 5 July, the delegates agreed to
reconvene for another two hours at 11 am and they met again that evening at 7 pm. Two
days later the evening session got underway at 10.15 pm and lasted until 4.15 the next
morning. For the meeting on 4–5 July the British team was led by Sandys and
Lansdowne, supported by Garner, Lintott, Tory, Moore, Higham, Golds, H P Hall and six
others. The Malayan team was led by Tun Razak, Tan Siew Sin and Dr Lim Swee Aun,
supported by eight officials (including the expatriate attorney-general, C M Sheridan).
The Singapore team was led by Lee Kuan Yew and Dr Goh Keng Swee, supported by six
officials. When the session was over, Sandys informed Selkirk that agreement had been
reached on most of the major issues, the crisis point having been reached at about four in
the morning when he ‘finally managed to bridge the gap between Lee and Razak’. On 10
June the banner headline of the Straits Budget ran, ‘Malaysia is on and Singapore is part
of it’. The paper’s London correspondent, Leslie Hoffman, reported Sandys’ patience
when caught in the cross-fire as well as his capacity to ‘give as good as he got’ in ‘some of
the fiery exchanges’. The agreement on common market and financial arrangements
became Annex J of the Malaysia document signed on 9 July. Even so, differences rumbled
on, requiring the intervention of Sandys in Sept and culminating in a supplementary
agreement to the Agreement of 9 July, see 220, note. In addition to the protracted
negotiations over the common market and finance, an all-night session was needed to
finalise arrangements for service lands in Singapore, see Annex F to the Agreement of 9
July and Release of Crown Lands made available to the Armed Services in Singapore
(Cmnd 2117) also CO 968/761]
Consideration was given to a further revised draft of the Agreement on Common
Market and financial arrangements prepared by the British side after discussions
with the Malayan and Singapore sides separately.
2. The draft was considered paragraph by paragraph. A number of separate
meetings were held between the British and the Malayan and Singapore sides
respectively on points of particular difficulty, and agreement between the Malayan
and Singapore sides was finally reached on the revised draft annexed,1 in which the
following matters (paragraphs (i) and (ix) below) remain unresolved:—
(i) Paragraph 4(3)—concurrence of Singapore government to imposition of new
revenue duties
3. It was noted that the Singapore side wished to add at the end of this paragraph
the words: ‘on [?or] trade with the rest of the Federation’.
(ii) Paragraph 4(4)—Singapore veto on the imposition of revenue duties
4. A compromise providing that this veto would cease to have effect after the end
of 1975 was considered. The Singapore side felt it would be impossible to defend in
Singapore the ultimate abolition of their power of veto, which the Rueff Report had
envisaged as perpetual, and the increase in the cost of living which would ensue. The
Malayan side emphasised that the entrepot trade would not be affected and observed
that for their part they would find it politically difficult to defend an arrangement
insulating Singapore from duties affecting the cost of living.
1 The revised draft records what had been agreed by the close of the all-night session of 4–5 July.
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(iii) Paragraph 8—financial review
5. The Singapore side proposed a revision which would define in more detail the
matters to be considered at these reviews, and in particular would mention the
revenue estimates put forward by the Malayans during the abortive negotiations in
the Interdepartmental Committee about the apportionment of Federal revenue in
Singapore.
(iv) Paragraph 9—finance for Borneo development
6. Mr. Lee said that if it was necessary to import skilled temporary labour into
Borneo to erect works, e.g. schools, financed from the loans offered by Singapore, the
labour should be from Singapore. He considered this would be a necessary selling
point for the arrangement in Singapore. The Secretary of State said it was assumed
that this would not be a condition of the loan: it could be covered separately in an
exchange of letters between the two Governments.
(v) Annex Part I. Customs and excise (4) 2
7. The Singapore side considered that the grounds on which the Federation’s
power to prohibit imports and exports should be specified, e.g. trading with the
enemy, etc., since they could otherwise, contrary to the 1961 White Paper,3 encroach
on the free port status of Singapore.
(vi) Annex I (6)
8. The Singapore side considered that since executive authority rested with
Singapore it would be inconsistent to reserve to the Federal Government the power
to determine appeals from decisions of the Controller of Customs.
(vii) Annex part II. Income tax—section 92(2)
9. The Singapore side felt that the proposed recognition of the right of the
Federal Minister to issue directions was sufficient to cover the question of remission
of tax.
(viii) Annex Part II. Section 19(2)
10. The Singapore side were concerned at the possibility that income tax
allowances affecting capital investment might be immediately brought in line with
the Malaya scale.
(ix) Annex Part II. Sections 95(3) and 96(3)
11. The Singapore side objected to the proposal to transfer to the Comptroller-
General the Comptroller’s powers to compound any offence for fraudulent or
incorrect returns.
12. The Secretary of State requested the Malayan side to consider whether it was
essential to take Federal powers in all the matters included in the annex, and asked
the two sides to reach a settlement on these points.
2 The annex to the draft agreement is not printed here.
3 Memorandum setting out the Heads of Agreement for a Merger between the Federation of Malaya and
Singapore (Cmd 33) adopted by Singapore’s Legislative Assembly on 6 Dec 1961.
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13. Attention was drawn to a paper by the Singapore side on outstanding points in
connection with the Malaysia Bill to be introduced in the Federation Parliament. The
Secretary of State said he was planning that the Malaysia Agreement would be signed
on Monday, 8th July—he would be leaving for British Guiana on 9th July 4—and
hoped that meanwhile the Malayan and Singapore sides would reach agreement on
issues outstanding. The Singapore side confirmed that they had no other points to
raise.
14. It was agreed that the three sides would meet again at 11 a.m. on 5th July.
15. The discussions were adjourned at 8 a.m.
Annex to 191
Common Market
1(1). The Federal Government, in order to facilitate the maximum practicable
degree of economic integration of the territories of Malaysia, while taking account
of the interests of the entrepot trade of Singapore, Penang and Labuan and those of
existing industries in Malaysia, and the need to ensure a balanced development of
these territories, shall progressively establish a common market in Malaysia for all
goods or products produced, manufactured or assembled in significant quantities in
Malaysia, with the exception of goods and products of which the principal terminal
markets lie outside Malaysia.
1(2). Where the same protective duties or revenue duties are applicable
throughout Malaysia in the case of any class of goods or products, then no tariff or
trade barrier or trade restriction or discrimination shall be applied to such goods or
products in regard to their circulation throughout Malaysia.
1(3). The provisions of the preceding sub-paragraph shall not be construed to
prevent the imposition of:—
(a) any special production tax on producers in a low-tariff State which would
offset the cost inequalities arising from the differential import duties; or
(b) any export duty or export restriction on primary products where the principal
terminal market lies outside Malaysia.
Tariff Advisory Board
2(1). The Malayan Government shall take steps to establish by law before
Malaysia Day a Tariff Advisory Board 5 to advise the Federal Government generally on
the establishment of the common market as defined in paragraph 1 above, including
the establishment and maintenance of a common external tariff for the protection
(where required) of goods for which there is to be a common market.
2(2). Appointments to the Board shall be made by the Federal Government but
until five years from Malaysia Day the appointment of the Chairman shall require the
4 British Guiana had been discussed at the meeting between Macmillan and President Kennedy at Birch
Grove (Macmillan’s home) on 30 June. The US were adamant that Cheddi Jagan’s left-wing government
should be removed before Britain granted independence. See Ashton and Killingray eds, BDEE: The West
Indies, lxxvii, 215.
5 For its appointment see 220, note.
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concurrence of the Singapore Government; the first Chairman shall be appointed as
soon as possible after the conclusion of this Agreement. During the first five years,
there shall be three Deputy Chairmen, one of whom shall be nominated by the
Singapore Government. In appointing members of the Board regard shall be had to
the areas and interests involved.
2(3). The Board shall sit in public to receive evidence except where the Board
deems it necessary to receive evidence in camera. Within six months after their
receipt the Federal Government shall publish the reports and recommendations of
the Board other than those of which publication is not in the public interest.
Protective duties
3(1). For the purposes of this Agreement a protective duty shall be defined as a
duty which is levied in respect of a class of goods or products which are or are to be
produced, manufactured, assembled or prepared and used or consumed in the
Federation in significant quantities, or which are used or consumed in the
production, manufacture, assembly or preparation in the Federation of goods or
products of such a class or which are of a description providing a substitute for or
alternative to goods or products of such a class. All other duties shall be defined as
revenue duties. A duty shall be regarded as imposed in Singapore, if it is imposed on
goods imported into Singapore for use or consumption there and not otherwise.
3(2). Except in cases where it deems preventive action to be urgently necessary,
the Federal Government shall not in Singapore make any class of goods or products
subject to a protective duty or vary any protective duty before receiving the advice of
the Tariff Advisory Board. In cases where a duty has been imposed or varied without
prior reference to the Tariff Advisory Board, the Federal Government shall seek the
advice of the Board thereon as soon as practicable thereafter.
3(3). For a period of 5 years from Malaysia Day the Singapore Government shall
have the right to require a delay not exceeding 12 months in the imposition in
Singapore of any protective duty on the grounds that the duty would significantly
prejudice the entrepot trade. In any enquiry by the Tariff Advisory Board on a
proposal to impose such a duty, the Singapore Government shall inform the Board of
any item on which it may wish, in the interests of the entrepot trade, to avail itself of
this option. In regard to such items, the Tariff Advisory Board shall consider the
possibility of anticipatory action in Singapore and shall, if necessary, include in its
recommendations proposals to prevent such action. During the period of delay, the
Singapore Government shall not grant any licence, concession or inducement to any
industry which may be affected by the proposed protective duty without the
concurrence of the Federal Government.
3(4). The Tariff Advisory Board shall be required within six months after
Malaysia Day to make its first report as to what protective duties should be imposed.
For this purpose it shall consider any proposals made to it by the Federal
Government or a State Government.
Revenue duties
4(1). In formulating its policy relating to the harmonisation of revenue duties, the
Federal Government shall pay due regard to any representations made by the Singapore
Government on the economic, financial and social implications of such harmonisation.
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4(2). Revenue duties in force in Singapore on 1st July, 1963, and the
corresponding duties in force in the Federation of Malaya shall be harmonised as
soon as practicable.
4(3). Until the end of 1968, no revenue duty shall, except at the request and with
the consent of the Singapore Government, be imposed in Singapore by the Federal
Government in respect of any class of goods or products not chargeable with such a
duty on the 1st July, 1963. Such consent shall not be withheld except on the grounds
that the duty would significantly prejudice the entrepot trade of Singapore (or trade
with the rest of the Federation.)6
4(4). Before 31st December 1968, the Tariff Advisory Board shall review the
revenue duties in force at that time in Singapore and in the remainder of Malaysia
and shall make recommendations regarding the amendment of such duties or the
imposition of additional duties. As from 1st January 1969, the Singapore
Government shall be entitled to withhold its consent to the amendment or
imposition in Singapore of any revenue duty for any period up to 31st December
1975, on the grounds that it would significantly prejudice the entrepot trade,
provided that the Singapore Government shall pay to the Federal Government
annually compensation equal to the loss of revenue suffered by the Federal
Government as a result of the withholding of such consent.7
4(5). For the purposes of this Agreement, the entrepot trade of Singapore means
trade in goods and products imported into Singapore from outside Malaysia and
primary products imported into Singapore from other parts of Malaysia, which goods
or products, whether further processed or not, are subsequently re-exported from
Singapore to destinations outside Malaysia.
Tax collection
5. Subject to the provisions of the Annex to this Agreement, executive authority
in respect of the collection in Singapore of customs duties and excise and income tax
shall be delegated to the Singapore Government. The Federal Government may revoke
this authority if the Singapore Government fails to comply with any direction properly
given to them by the Federal Government for the collection or protection of these
taxes or shows itself unwilling or unable to discharge these functions efficiently. This
authority may extend to customs duties and other charges collected in Singapore on
goods exported from or to be imported into Malaysia outside Singapore.
Division of revenue
6(1). All revenues collected in Singapore, with the exceptions specified below,
shall be paid into a separate fund in a branch of the Central Bank to be established in
Singapore and the fund shall be divided between the two Governments and paid to
them at least once in every year, in the proportion of 60% to the Singapore
Government and 40% to the Federal Government. The exceptions are:—
(a) the revenues specified in Part III of the Tenth Schedule to the Federal
Constitution, including property tax in lieu of rates, (to be paid into the State
Consolidated Fund);
6 This matter remained unresolved at the closure of this all-night session. 7 idem.
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(b) customs duties and other charges (including excise not in force at the date of
this Agreement and any production tax imposed in respect of goods to which a
protective duty is applicable) collected in Singapore on goods to be exported from
or imported into Malaysia outside Singapore (to be paid into the Federal
Consolidated Fund);
(c) income tax collected in Singapore and attributable to income derived from the
States of Malaya (to be paid into the Federal Consolidated Fund).
6(2) 60% of income tax collected in the States of Malaya but attributable to
income derived from Singapore shall be paid to the Singapore Government.
6(3) Income tax attributable to income derived from Singapore and collected by
an Agent outside Malaysia shall be paid into the separate fund referred to in
paragraph 6(1) above.
6(4) From the beginning of 1964 paragraphs 6(1)(c) and 6(2) shall apply as if
references to the States of Malaya included references to the Borneo States.
6(5) The provisions of Article 109 and Clauses (3), (3A) and (4) of Article 110 of
the Federal Constitution shall not apply in relation to Singapore.
Federal projects in Singapore
7. The Singapore Government shall pay to the Federal Government the cost of
capital development of Federal projects in Singapore other than projects for defence
and internal security. The two Governments shall agree together on projects to be
covered by this paragraph which do not provide predominantly local services.
Financial review
8. The arrangements specified in paragraphs 6 and 7 above shall remain in
operation until 31st December 1964. The two Governments shall then review these
arrangements and shall decide upon any amendments to be made to them in respect
of the two year period commencing 1st January 1965. There shall be a similar review
in respect of each subsequent period of two years. In default of agreement between
the two Governments, any issue in dispute shall be referred to an independent
assessor appointed jointly by the two Governments. In default of agreement between
the two Governments on the choice of an assessor, the Lord President of the Federal
Court, after considering the views of both governments, shall appoint an assessor
from among persons recommended by the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development as being persons enjoying an international reputation in finance.
The recommendations of the assessor shall be binding on both governments. Such
reviews shall have regard to changes in the relation between Federal revenue
accruing in Singapore, State revenue and the revenue of the Federation as a whole,
to any relevant changes in Federal or State expenditure, and to the progress made in
establishing the common market as defined in paragraph 1 above, and to any
considerations which either government may wish to have taken into account.8
Finance for Borneo territories
9. To assist development in the Borneo territories the Singapore Government
shall make available to the Federal Government:—
8 idem.
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(a) a 15-year loan of S/100 million, bearing interest at current market rates in the
Federation, subject to the proviso that the loan shall be free of interest during the
first 5 years and that if, having regard to the economic growth in Singapore, it is
so recommended in the financial review under paragraph 8 above, the loan shall be
free of interest for a second period of 5 years; and
(b) a 15-year loan of S/50 million bearing interest at current market rates in the
Federation.
The above loans shall be drawn in equal annual instalments over a period of 5 years,
commencing in 1964.9
Disputes as to interpretation or application of this agreement
10. Any dispute between the Federal Government and the Singapore
Government as to the interpretation or application of this Agreement may be
referred by either Government to the Federal Court for determination by that
Court in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article 128 of the
Federal Constitution.
9 idem.
192 CO 1030/1511, no 170 8 July 1963
[Agreement at the Ritz Hotel]: Lee Kuan Yew’s notes signed by Tunku
Abdul Rahman
[The Tunku played no part in the haggling over trade and finances; he relied on Tun
Razak and Tan Siew Sin for that. He chose not to arrive in London until a few days before
the signing ceremony which was scheduled for the evening of 8 July. There still
remained, however, a few matters which Lee Kuan Yew wished to clarify with the Malayan
premier and he did so at the Ritz Hotel just before the ceremony at Marlborough House.
Lee scribbled these points on the back of an envelope, which the Tunku then signed but
dated incorrectly as 7 July (see 192). Lee provided the British government with a
photostat of the envelope and on 10 July confirmed the agreement in a fuller note (see
193) which the Singapore government published later in the month. The last-minute
bargaining at the Ritz, dinner with Macmillan and speeches at Marlborough House meant
that it was not until after mid-night on 8–9 July that the Malaysia agreement was signed
by representatives of the United Kingdom, Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak
and Singapore. The agreement and its eleven annexes provided for: the end of British
sovereignty and jurisdiction in North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore; a Malaysia Bill to
be enacted by the parliament of the Federation of Malaya; constitutions (including
transitional provisions) for Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore to be enforced by Britain
through orders in council; the extension of Malaya’s immigration ordinance to the whole
of Malaysia; the extension of the Anglo–Malayan defence agreement of 1957 to the whole
of Malaysia; continuing British rights to bases, facilities and Service lands in Singapore;
compensation and benefits for British officers retiring from public service in North
Borneo and Sarawak; terms and conditions of expatriate officers continuing in the public
service of Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore; agreement between Malaya and Singapore on
common market and financial arrangements; arrangements with respect to broadcasting
and television in Singapore. Macmillan, who was pictured in London’s Evening Standard
of 9 July with head in hand above the caption ‘Mac signs at midnight’, reported the event
to the Oversea Policy Committee later that day and the agreement and annexes were then
published as a parliamentary paper (OP 8(63)2, CAB 134/2371; FO tel no 385 to oversea
diplomatic representatives, 9 July 1963, CO 1030/1507, no 212; Malaysia. Agreement
14-Malaysia-175-227-cpp  21/9/04  9:08 AM  Page 530
[193] JULY 1963 531
concluded between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the
Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore, Cmnd 2094, July 1963).]
Ritz Hotel 8.7.63
Loan: Labourers—none outside Malaysia—50% S’pore
S’pore L. Assemblyman: resignation or expulsion—vacate seat so long as does not
conflict with Parliamentary practice
Immigration: restriction Order movement reciprocal
Gangsters Ordinance: detention delegate to us in S’pore
Last part out—Inter-Governmental-Committee
Sgd. Tunku Abdul Rahman
7.7.63
193 CO 1030/1511, no 170 10 July 1963
[Agreement at the Ritz Hotel]: letter from Lee Kuan Yew to Tunku
Abdul Rahman
[A note prepared by the CO’s Far Eastern Department on 25 July commented on the
‘envelope agreement’ which was concluded at the Ritz Hotel on 8 July and confirmed
by Lee Kuan Yew two days later. Whereas the third and fourth points appeared
uncontentious so far as the British were concerned, the others were controversial.
Political leaders of North Borneo were anxious about the first proposal, regarding the
labour force for the development of the Borneo territories, which had not been raised
in previous discussions with the secretary of state. The second point was ‘quite
contrary to British practice’ and would in any case require an amendment to the draft
Singapore constitution at annex D of the Malaysia agreement. If point 2 were to be
included in the order in council containing the constitutions of Sabah, Sarawak and
Singapore, Lee and the Tunku would need to approve the revised formulation by about
10 Aug. Because no progress had been made by the end of Aug, Lee made his
agreement to the postponement of Malaysia Day to 16 Sept conditional upon the
written acceptance of, amongst other things, points 2, 3 and 4 of the ‘envelope
agreement’ (see 215 and 216).]
I refer to our discussion on the evening of 8th July at the Ritz Hotel as a result of
which we agreed:—
(i) in respect of the loan for the development of the Borneo States, no labourers
will be engaged from outside Malaysia for the development projects and that 50%
of such labourers shall be supplied from Singapore;
(ii) that the Federation will not object to the amendment of the Singapore
Constitution so that where a member of the Legislative Assembly resigns or is
expelled from the political party for which he stood as a member, he shall vacate
his seat, so long as this does not conflict with Parliamentary practice;
(iii) that where the Federation enacts any law restricting movement or residence
such order shall be reciprocal as between Singapore and the States of Malaya;
and
(iv) that the power of detention under the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions)
Ordinance be delegated to Singapore.
I attach a photostat copy of the notes of the agreement which you signed.
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194 PREM 11/4349 11 July 1963
[Brunei: future policy]: minute from Lord Lansdowne to Mr
Macmillan, providing a brief for the prime minister’s meeting with the
Sultan
[Although the Sultan of Brunei had been persuaded to attend the final round of talks in
early July (see 188), when the Malayan delegation had wooed him with substantial
concessions, in the end he declined to sign the Malaysia agreement. He issued a
statement regretting the government of Malaya’s refusal to give effect to previously
agreed terms. The Tunku’s view was that negotiations had broken down purely over the
question of precedence. Whether the prime concern of His Highness was his status in the
hierarchy of rulers, or control of oil revenues, or popular hostility in Brunei to merger
with Malaya, Angus MacKintosh was of the view that ‘if all the difficulties raised by the
Sultan could have been overcome at the wave of a hand, he would have invented others’. I
H Harris of the CO’s Far Eastern Department also concluded that he ‘would have found
some pretext or other for refusing’ (see 197). This point was added as a confidential note
to a parliamentary brief, which the secretary of state was advised not to use in the House:
‘Our view is now that the Sultan never intended to sign the Agreement and would have
found some pretext even if his demands on the question of precedence had been fully met’
(CO 1030/1510, no 137, 16 July 1963). Similarly, P M Linton, general manager of Brunei
Shell in Seria, commented in mid-Sept, ‘everyone here now accepts that the Sultan had
no intention in July of joining Malaysia and pitched his demands at a level which he
believed would never be conceded. When they were conceded he fell back on the
precedence issue; had that been conceded he intended to insist on a Malay translation of
the documents to be signed!’ Observing developments from New Delhi, Sir Paul Gore-
Booth was prompted ‘to implore whatever gods may be to use everything up to and
including thumbscrews to oblige the Sultan to decide to join Malaysia before August
31st,—for his own good, certainly, but more importantly for the good of more important
people like ourselves’. Sir Saville Garner replied that it was ‘a little difficult for us to adopt
your excellent suggestion of using thumbscrews’ on account of the fact that the Sultan
had ‘succeeded in getting public opinion in Brunei behind him as a result of his refusal to
join Malaysia’. Therefore, he continued, ‘a lesser but more lingering form of treatment
will be necessary to induce him to enter Malaysia’. This meant further talks, during which
the British grew increasingly impatient with His Highness’s complacent belief that
Brunei’s treaty relationship with Britain would continue indefinitely. During a four-hour
stop-over in Brunei on 14 Sept Sandys warned the Sultan that, unless constitutional
progress was volunteered, he might have to instruct the high commissioner to tender
formal advice under the 1959 treaty. The fear was that continued British ‘protection’
would make Brunei a target of Indonesian subversion; the hope was that progress towards
independence might draw Brunei into Malaysia. Determined to resist any temptation to
‘recolonise’ Brunei, the British government transferred responsibility for the sultanate
from the CO to the CRO in Nov 1963. See 195, 197 and 199, and also CO 1030/1457, 1469,
1470 and 1530.]
Talking points
1. H.M.G. continues to be convinced that the best future for Brunei (and for the
Sultan’s dynasty which dates from the 16th century) is to join Malaysia.
2. It is unfortunate that the recent negotiations should have broken down
primarily on a question of precedence.1 It is our belief that the Sultan may have
1 The question of precedence hinged on whether the Sultan’s seniority dated from his accession to the
throne of Brunei or from Brunei’s membership of Malaysia. The Sultan’s legal adviser, Neil Lawson,
provided Landowne with notes on the discussions between Brunei and Malaya on the question of
precedence and the place of the Sultan on the election list for Yang di-Pertuan Agong, see CO 1030/1470,
no 426 and also 165, note.
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misunderstood the position as he was asking the Tunku for agreement on a matter
which has to be referred to the Malayan Conference of Rulers.
3. We understand that the Sultan wishes to leave the door open for a resumption
of negotiations and it is, therefore, of great importance that there should be no
recriminations which might be damaging to good relations between Brunei and
Malaya.
4. With the formation of Malaysia, British colonial rule will be ended in this area.
Our continued protection of Brunei will, therefore, attract considerable attention
and will be regarded, not only in the world outside, but also in Brunei itself, as a form
of colonialism.
5. If we are to continue our protection, there will have to be constitutional
reform at an early date. We could not again use British troops to suppress a revolt
against an unpopular and autocratic regime.
6. The position of the Sultans in the Federation of Malaya is secured by the
Constitution. By joining Malaysia His Highness would fortify his own position and
ensure the succession of his heirs.
195 PREM 11/4349, M246/63 12 July 1963
[Brunei: future policy]: minute from Mr Macmillan to Lord
Lansdowne
I spoke to His Highness the Sultan of Brunei on the lines of your talking points,1
including the problem of Brunei as a relic of colonialisation after the formation of
Malaysia. He said that he regarded the negotiations as closed. I asked if they could
not be reopened? He said that would depend on whether there was an agreement or
not, and I said there could not be an agreement without the reopening of
negotiations. He did not seem very impressed by this argument. He is coming back
to see the Colonial Office but I would judge that he would be pretty obstinate and
ultimately pressure will have to be exerted by the threat that we cannot protect him
indefinitely.
1 See 194.
196 PREM 11/4349 12 July 1963
[Financial assistance for Malaysia]: letter from Mr Macmillan to
Tunku Abdul Rahman
We have been considering here the letter which you wrote to me on May 291 about
British financial assistance for Malaysia. I have delayed my reply while the other
financial questions arising out of Singapore’s future membership of the Federation
have been under discussion.
1 177.
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I understand your concern over the financial problems which the new
Federation of Malaysia will have to face. I hope that you for your part will
appreciate the limitations on our ability to help. As you may know, the claims on
Britain for overseas aid and the total of that aid are increasing very significantly.
Nor, I am afraid, can we count on savings in defence expenditure as a result of
the establishment of Malaysia. In fact, welcome as the increase in Malaya’s own
forces will be to us and to our friends, it will not reduce, at least during the next
few years, the very heavy burden on the British taxpayer of the defence effort
which we maintain as our contribution to the security of South-East Asia,
including, of course, our obligations under the Defence Agreement as extended to
Malaysia.
I had certainly thought that the offer which we made to your Deputy Prime
Minister and Finance Minister last May, which was the outcome of careful and
sympathetic study by my colleagues and myself, was a reasonably generous one. The
main figure mentioned was £15 million in capital aid for defence up to the end of
1965, with provision for review before that time. We had already offered aid towards
the employment of service personel seconded from this country, which would
amount to £3 million during the agreed period.
In effect, under the arrangements for defence aid, we should be covering the
whole cost of the arms and equipment supplied from British sources; we should be
transferring free of charge the buildings and other installations which we have been
asked to make available to your forces in Singapore and Malaya; and we should be
meeting more than half the emoluments of the British service personnel you
require.
To this we must add aid for development in Singapore of nearly £6 million which
we had already promised, and aid for development in North Borneo and Sarawak of
£7.5 million which we had offered during the negotiations for the establishment of
Malaysia. We have also offered to pay the cost of compensation for expatriate officers
in North Borneo and Sarawak (£3 million), half of which would in the normal course
have fallen to the two territories. These three items will add a further charge on the
British Exchequer of perhaps as much as £161⁄2 million during the next five years or
so. Thus you will see that we have already undertaken to help the new Federation to
the tune of over £34 million.
We have, nevertheless, considered, in the light of your letter, what more we can do
to assist. We are prepared to do so in two ways:—
(i) In order to help with the raising of the two new battalions in the Borneo
territories, we would be willing to meet all the costs of raising, maintaining and
training these units up to the end of 1965 by which time they should be ready for
active duty. The only cost which would fall upon you (and this, I understand,
would not happen until after the end of 1965) would be the cost of their
permanent accommodation in the Borneo territories.
(ii) We should also be prepared to make available over the next five years a loan,
under Section 3 of the Export Guarantees Act, of up to £5 million for the purchase
of goods from Britain to assist the economic development of Malaysia as a whole.
Alternatively, if you should prefer it, we would be prepared to increase to £10
million the grant of £7.5 million which we have already agreed to make to assist
the development of North Borneo and Sarawak during that period.
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Perhaps you would let me know which of these two alternatives you would prefer.2
As you know, we have agreed to review the position before the end of 1965 and to
consider in the light of that review whether we could give further aid for the defence
programme.
I hope that this additional help, together with what we have already offered and the
contribution from Singapore, will go a long way to solve the two problems which you
particularly mention in your letter, namely the financing of your additional defence
programme and development in North Borneo and Sarawak.
2 The Tunku replied from the Ritz Hotel on the same day stating a preference for the second alternative,
although he pointed out that his minister of finance (Tan Siew Sin) had advised that the additional grant
should have been £5 million instead of £2.5 million.
197 FO 371/169691, no 38 18 July 1963
‘Brunei: future policy’: notes by I H Harris in preparation for Mr
Sandys’ meeting with the Sultan of Brunei
[Sandys was briefed at a meeting with CO officials and Angus MacKintosh, High
Commissioner of Brunei, on the afternoon of 24 July before talks with the Sultan and
his party on 29 July, see 199. While it recommended British dis-engagement from
Brunei, the CO’s Far Eastern Department pointed out the military and political risks of
immediate withdrawal. In accepting that Britain should continue to work for Brunei’s
membership of Malaysia, officials recognised that this could take some years to achieve,
that threatening the Sultan would be of limited value and that the democratisation of
Brunei’s government might strengthen rather than weaken local opposition to
Malaysia.]
Present position
Our view is that the Sultan came to London without any intention of signing the
Malaysia agreement, and that he would have found some pretext or other for
refusing. Public statements by the Sultan since he returned to Brunei suggest that
he has no thought of re-opening the negotiations, which he regards as closed, and
that he intends to wait and see how Malaysia shapes before re-considering the
question of joining. This may take a long time. The Sultan’s attitude is reported to
have shaken the most convinced adherents of Malaysia in Brunei. There is thus no
early prospect either of the Sultan carrying his people into Malaysia, or of the people
sweeping the Sultan in.
Factors
2. Once Malaysia is formed Brunei will be an embarrassment to Britain and
Malaysia. Its external defence ought to be undertaken as part of the external defence
of Malaysia. Its internal security will be of great concern to surrounding Malaysian
territory and ought to be a Malaysian responsibility. Brunei will be an obvious target
for Indonesian intrigue and a potential source of subversive activity where Malaysia is
most vulnerable. Its quasi-dependent status will be an anachronism and increasingly
difficult to justify to world opinion. Britain cannot remain committed to protect the
Sultan’s autocratic and inefficient regime indefinitely.
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Basic policy
3. The potential political and military embarrassment for Britain in continuing
to protect Brunei after Malaysia is formed points clearly to a basic policy of
disengagement.
4. We must also take account of the interests of Malaysia, both because we shall
be militarily involved and because from an international point of view we want
Malaysia to be stable and successful. Malaysia’s best interests will be served if Brunei
joined the Federation. There is no obvious advantage to Malaysia in Brunei
remaining outside, whilst there are real difficulties and dangers.
5. Our basic policy should therefore be, in co-operation with the Government of
Malaysia, to end our present bilateral relationship with Brunei and to steer the latter
into Malaysia. This is, of course, a continuation, in changed circumstances, of the
policy which we have been pursuing for the last two years.
6. It will not be politically possible for us to wait indefinitely for Brunei to join
Malaysia. If the Sultan remained obdurate, or too content with British protection, or
if popular opinion in Brunei hardened permanently against Malaysia, we might have
to consider pulling out and leaving Brunei to her own devices.
Action to implement policy
7. By words, and increasingly by deeds, we should aim to convince the Sultan
that the days of British protection are numbered and that he must soon choose
between joining Malaysia and taking his chance outside, on his own. His most
sensitive point may be his concern for his own future and that of his dynasty. He
needs to be persuaded that his best, if not only, chance of survival is by joining
Malaysia, and that he must cease toying with any unrealistic idea which he may still
entertain of riding to power over ‘Northern Borneo’ with the support of Indonesia
and ‘rebel’ elements in Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak.
8. We should tell the Sultan now that, whilst we are prepared to continue
external protection for the time being, he cannot count on British aid in future in an
internal security situation.
9. We should put pressure on the Sultan to democratise Brunei but should allow
an opportunity for the ‘right’ party (preferably pro-Malaysia) to develop before
pushing him into a fully elected Legislature. If the ‘right’ party does not emerge, it
may be necessary to insist on full responsible Government, thus either frightening
the Sultan into Malaysia or providing a setting in which Britain could pull out
entirely.
10. We should persuade the Tunku that his suggested policy of ‘freezing out’ the
Sultan is wrong and would prejudice any remaining chance there may be of getting
Brunei into Malaysia. We should also express the hope that the Tunku will not
withdraw his Malayan officers from Brunei at least for the time being.1
11. The Sultan is likely to press H.M.G. for professional and technical assistance
and other help. His main idea is probably to show how well Brunei can get on
without Malaysia. This would not further our basic aims and we should not allow
ourselves to become an instrument of the Sultan’s policy. On the other hand, it
would be difficult for us to refuse all assistance.
1 In fact the Tunku requested their return in Oct 1963.
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Questions
12. In pursuing paragraphs 5 and 7–8 above, should we attempt to amend the
Brunei Agreement or should we merely tell the Sultan how we propose to interpret
and implement it in future?
13. Is it realistic for us to distinguish between external defence and internal
security in the circumstances of Brunei today? Can we avoid being involved in
internal security if we wish to retain control over the Special Branch?
14. What are our responsibilities towards Shell and how are these to be
discharged now and in the long term?
15. Is the policy discussed in this paper too uncertain of success and difficult to
execute? Should we perhaps, despite the possible dangers, end our present
relationship with Brunei now or within a specified period, e.g. one year?
198 CO 1030/1494, no 50A 20 July 1963
‘Sarawak elections’: inward telegram C362 OCULAR from Sir A
Waddell to Mr Sandys
[Elections were crucial both to the validation of Malaysia and the preparation of North
Borneo and Sarawak for independence within Malaysia. North Borneo’s first elections were
held in late 1962 and early 1963. There were direct, popular elections to local councils
which chose electoral colleges that in turn voted for legislative councillors. The Sabah
Alliance, consisting of USNO, UNKO, BUNAP, UNPMO, and SIC, campaigned for Malaysia
(see 26, n 8). Since the Alliance was returned unopposed, it was a foregone conclusion that
Dato Mustapha (leader of USNO) and Donald Stephens (leader of UNKO) would be
designated respectively the first governor and the first chief minister of Sabah, as North
Borneo was now to be called. In Sarawak, by contrast, there was a contest for control of the
legislature and over the nomination of the governor. The Sarawak elections were held
between Apr and July. As in North Borneo, there was a three-tiered electoral process, with
direct elections to district councils and thereafter indirect elections from district to
divisional councils and from divisional councils to the Council Negri (legislature). There
had been elections in 1959; the principal innovation in 1963 was a ministerial system. Thus
the Supreme Council (Executive Council) would be led by a chief minister chosen by a
majority of the elected members of the Council Negri. Six parties contested the elections:
a four-party Alliance (of BARJASA, PESAKA, SCA, and SNAP, see 26, n 4) favoured Malaysia
which was opposed by a marriage of convenience between SUPP (socialist and largely
Chinese) and PANAS (right-wing and largely Malay). PANAS had recently defected from the
Alliance, partly as a result of historic enmity with Malays of BARJASA. After complicated
manoeuvres, which focused on wooing independent members, the Sarawak Alliance won
control of the Council Negri. Although neither a charismatic leader, nor an experienced
administrator, nor a deft politician, Stephen Kalong Ningkan emerged as Sarawak’s chief
minister, as Waddell explains in this telegram to Sandys. The selection of Sarawak’s post-
colonial governor, however, would provoke a crisis, see 210 and 224.]
With adhesion of four independent members from Fourth Division, Alliance now has
23 seats in Council Negri out of 36.
2. Alliance caucus met Tuesday in Sibu with Malayans in attendance. I sent
emissary to summon them to Kuching and at the same time to stress importance of
forming a broad based government including independents and indeed moderate
leaders of non Alliance parties in interests of national unity, efficient administration
and security. I had in mind James Wong1 as Chief Minister and ministerial
1 James Wong Kim Ming was from the Fifth Division and leader of the Sarawak Chinese Association; he
became deputy chief minister.
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representation of S.U.P.P./PANAS in hope of breaking communist grip on S.U.P.P.
and avoiding split in Malays through leaving PANAS out.
3. I started preliminary discussions with Alliance delegation today and deployed
arguments in support of above. The Malayan influence, however, was evident and I
was informed that at no price would they have dealings with S.U.P.P./PANAS, as this
would compromise their principles, give communists a Trojan horse, confuse the
native electorate who hated S.U.P.P. and dissuade bulk of moderate Chinese from
supporting Alliance. I do not expect any change from this position. They are,
however, having discussions with independents [?of] Fifth Division and James Wong
is coming to Kuching.
4. Delegation unanimously recommended for my approval appointment of
Stephen Kalong Ningkan as Chief Minister. Meeting adjourned until tomorrow,
when rest of Alliance recommendations will be mentioned. I understand they have in
mind Temonggong Jugah for Governor. These two appointments are clearly linked
and represent compromise between Second and Third Division Ibans. Rejection of
either would, I fear, put Alliance back in melting pot.
5. Kalong Ningkan, who has some slight history of collaboration with Japanese,
is strongly Iban nationalistic and previously inclined to brashness and swollen head.
Light-weight intellectually, he is personable and could get by if supported by
adequate ministerial team. In any case, there is no choice.
6. There is uneasiness amongst Chinese in Third Division who fear a pogrom
after 31st August and some tenseness is reported in Kuching with Barjasa/PANAS
incidents and apprehension of rule by inexperienced natives. We can no doubt expect
more of this in situation where Kuching is centre of opposition and with no
responsibility.
7. I have as yet made no appointments.
199 CO 1030/1470, no 433 29 July 1963
[Brunei: future policy]: note of a meeting between Mr Sandys and the
Sultan of Brunei
[Sandys’ team consisted of Sir J Martin, W I J Wallace, A M MacKintosh, J D Higham, R F
A Shegog and I H Harris. The Sultan was accompanied by Dato Setia Marsal bin Maun
(chief minister), Pangiran Kerma Indra (director of telecommunications), Dato Setia
Pengiran Haji Yussof (deputy state secretary), Mohd Taib bin Awang Besar (establishment
officer), Isa bin Ibrahim (deputy public prosecutor, acting as interpreter), Pehin Abbas bin
Ibrahim (ADC), Neil Lawson (constitutional adviser) and Idris Talog Davies (attorney
general).]
The Secretary of State said that he understood that the Sultan wished to raise
certain matters with him.
Mr. Lawson referred to the paper circulated by the Brunei delegation. The paper
was divided into two parts, the first part dealing mainly with requests for staff and the
second part dealing with constitutional and other matters. Mr. Lawson said that the
Sultan was relying on the 1959 Agreement which placed obligations on Her Majesty’s
Government to assist Brunei in filling key posts and other posts if required. Mr.
Lawson asked the Secretary of State to authorise action at departmental level on
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Brunei’s requests for staff. Brunei also wished H.M.G. to tie up arrangements with
the Malayan Government regarding the Police and the Brunei Regiment.
The Secretary of State expressed the hope that Brunei would maintain good
relations with the Malaysian Government and thus secure their co-operation in
filling vacant posts. It was also necessary to make Malaysian officers feel welcomed in
Brunei. Anti-Malayan or anti-Malaysian incidents would make this more difficult.
The Sultan said that it had been his intention since 1959 to look to Malaya for
officers.1 In present circumstances, however, he believed that Malaysia would not be
able to spare officers for Brunei.
The Secretary of State said that Britain would discharge its responsibilities to
Brunei but must look to Brunei to go on trying to obtain officials from Malaya to the
maximum extent possible. As far as H.M.G. knew the Malayans were still prepared to
supply officials and he would seek confirmation from them that this was so. The
Sultan must not be surprised if, in view of his decision not to join Malaysia, the
Malayans sent their best people to Malaysia.
The Sultan said that he understood this. The Brunei Government would have to
review the position of Malayan officers already in Brunei but he intended to retain
those who were sufficiently experienced.
The Secretary of State warned the Sultan that H.M.G. could not undertake to
replace Malayan officers whom the Sultan pushed out of Brunei.
The Sultan said that he had no intention of declaring all Malayan officers to be
unsatisfactory. He had come to seek help in accordance with the 1959 Agreement
and in the light of the Secretary of State’s own undertaking to him that H.M.G.
would do everything it could to help Brunei.
The Secretary of State emphasised that the first duty of Brunei was to obtain help
from the Malayans.
The Sultan said that if he was satisfied that Malayan experts were genuinely ready
to help Brunei, then Brunei would not refuse them. On the other hand experience
since 1959 had shown the need for officers other than Malayans.
The Secretary of State said that after its rejection of Malaysia Brunei could not be
too choosy about Malayan officers. H.M.G. could not provide experts on an increased
scale with the implication that we were increasing the scale of colonial
administration in Brunei. The Secretary of State suggested that Brunei’s detailed
requirements as set out in the Brunei delegation’s paper should be studied at
departmental level by the Colonial Office and the Department of Technical Co-
operation.
The Sultan said that his decision not to join Malaysia would not affect Brunei’s
friendly relations with Malaya or Malaysia. Brunei merely wanted expert assistance to
enable her to advance economically and constitutionally.
Mr. Lawson thought that it was unrealistic for Brunei to look to Malaya for
persons of the calibre she needed. The Sultan was taking his stand on the 1959
Agreement.
The Secretary of State said that Britain must be the judge whether experts could
be found from sources other than Malaya.
1 See, for example, 52, n 4 and 91.
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The Secretary of State referred to the Sultan’s insistence on H.M.G.’s obligations
under the 1959 Agreement and reminded the Sultan that he too had obligations
under the Agreement. One such obligation was to accept H.M.G.’s advice on the good
government of his country.
The Sultan agreed.
The Secretary of State said that as a result of not joining Malaysia Brunei was
likely to be subjected to subversion from Indonesia which was determined to break
up Malaysia. Brunei was an obvious bridgehead into Malaysia. It was therefore of the
utmost importance that His Highness should command the fullest loyalty of his
people. If he did not there would be internal political discontent and subversion from
outside and a situation might well develop which neither the Sultan nor H.M.G.
could handle. The Secretary of State might therefore find it necessary to advise the
Sultan formally under the Agreement that the rate of constitutional progress
proposed in his paper was totally inadequate. The Secretary of State said that he was
not giving formal advice now. This was a warning and he wished to give the matter
further consideration. He would, however, like to hear the Sultan’s views on the
whole problem of political advance in Brunei.
The Sultan said that it was his intention to remove the sources of discontent.
The Secretary of State said that it was his impression that Brunei would have to go
a lot faster than was contemplated in the paper.
The Sultan said that he desired advice on an increased rate of progress.
Mr. Lawson thought that premature elections would produce an anti-Malaysia
Government.
The Secretary of State remarked that this could hardly be more anti-Malaysia than
His Highness The Sultan. After so many concessions had been made to the Sultan by
the Malayans the only explanation he could find for the Sultan’s rejection of Malaysia
was that he had come to London with his mind made up not to join.2
The Sultan said that this was not the case.
The Secretary of State said that he did not wish to conduct a post-mortem on what
H.M.G. believed was a very grave mistake.
The Secretary of State said that with regard to the political situation in Brunei it
would be difficult for Brunei to lag behind North Borneo and Sarawak.
The Sultan said that he was not fully conversant with politics in Brunei. Political
questions rarely reached him. Perhaps the Brunei Government might know more
about the political situation.
The Secretary of State said that it would be easier for H.M.G. to help Brunei to
deal with Indonesian subversion than to put down purely internal disturbances
arising from the denial of political rights.
The Sultan said that he appreciated the position. He believed that progress would
remove discontent and he looked to H.M.G. for help.
The Secretary of State said that he wanted time to consider this. Brunei must keep
abreast of her neighbours politically. Politics went with economics and Brunei had
great economic strength (relatively few people and plenty of money). It would help to
give the people a very good standard of living. This was one of the best safeguards
against discontent. If Brunei could not go fast politically it was more than ever
2 Compare the first sentence of the notes provided by Harris, 197.
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necessary to go fast economically. His Highness should not think that material
benefits alone would long be accepted in Brunei as a substitute for a share in the
political management of the country.
The Sultan indicated assent.
The Secretary of State said that he himself wished to think about all this in
the light of the present talks and of the Brunei paper. He would like to speak to the
Sultan again and suggested that he might call at Brunei perhaps for a night at the
end of August when he would be going to Malaysia for the celebrations.3 Meanwhile
he agreed that there should be detailed discussion on the Brunei paper with the
Colonial Office and the Department of Technical Co-operation.
The Sultan welcomed the Secretary of State’s intention to visit Brunei. The Sultan
added that he wished again to make it clear that he had come for help from H.M.G. to
enable Brunei to implement its development plans and to remove the sources of
discontent.
Mr. Lawson referred to a letter which the Sultan had sent to the Secretary of State
asking for the return of the Limbang district of Sarawak.
The Secretary of State stated that H.M.G. could not consider this request.
Limbang was part of Sarawak and would shortly become part of Malaysia. Any claim
respecting Limbang would have to go to the Government of Malaysia. The Secretary
of State added that he was not encouraging the Sultan to make a claim; he merely
wished to make it clear that if any such claim were to be made then it should be
addressed to the Government of Malaysia and not to H.M.G.
The Sultan and Mr. Lawson said that in fact the letter constituted a claim.
The Secretary of State said that he would pass the correspondence on to Kuala
Lumpur.4
3 In fact Sandys visited the Sultan on 14 Sept, two days before Malaysia Day.
4 The Sultan had written to Sandys about the Limbang claim on 27 July, two days before this meeting.
Sandys replied on 14 Aug, referring to the discussion on 29 July and informing the Sultan that he would
send the correspondence to the government of Malaya. Sandys Papers, 8/14.
200 CAB 128/37, CC 51(63)4 1 Aug 1963
[Manila summit]: Cabinet conclusions
[The Manila summit of Macapagal, Sukarno and the Tunku took place between 30 July
and 5 Aug. A series of meetings had paved the way for it: tripartite talks at sub-ministerial
level in Manila, 9–17 Apr; encounters between the Tunku and Macapagal in early April
and between the Tunku and Sukarno in Tokyo, 31 May–1 June; a conference of foreign
ministers in Manila, 7–11 June. Their stated aim was to improve relations through closer
association (to be known as Maphilindo) and, in particular, the resolution of problems
arising from the Malaysia project and the international status of North Borneo. The
British government followed these developments closely and, while opinion was divided
on the value of the Maphilindo concept, there was no sympathy for the proposal to re-
examine the Malaysia question by holding a UN-sponsored referendum, or plebiscite, or
any independent assessment of the wishes of Borneo peoples. The British argued that the
legitimacy of Malaysia had already been established; it rested on the Cobbold enquiry,
the report of the IGC, the Singapore referendum, resolutions in the legislatures of the
territories involved and recent elections in North Borneo and Sarawak. While the Tunku
accepted this, he claimed that the results of the Manila summit (ie the Manila Accord of
31 July, the joint statement of 5 Aug and the joint declaration of 5 Aug) were far more
favourable to the cause of Malaysia than the British suggested. Indeed, the outcome could
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have been much worse since Sukarno was incensed at the speed of developments and
alleged that the Tunku had reneged on a promise made at Tokyo not to bring about
Malaysia until the three leaders had met to discuss it. Nevertheless, the British Cabinet
saw Manila as a serious threat to the inauguration of Malaysia and Sandys, who did not
disguise his view that the Tunku had lost his nerve, tried to prevent the Malayan
government from agreeing to the postponement of Malaysia Day (see 201–203). As a later
FCO survey put it, the Manila summit was accompanied, ‘by some anxious back seat
driving’ from the British in an attempt ‘to stiffen the Tunku’ (‘The origins and formation
of Malaysia’, 10 July 1970, FCO 51/154; see the appendix to this volume, para 259).
Sandys’ anxiety was aggravated by a report from Selkirk that any substantial change in
the timetable might force Lee Kuan Yew to hold a general election which could result in a
Barisan victory and the end to hopes of merger between Singapore and Malaya. In fact,
Lee responded to the delay in the inauguration of Malaysia by declaring independence
unilaterally and arrogating powers on 31 Aug (see 209, 215–221; also Selkirk to Sandys,
telegram OCULAR 541, 2 Aug 1963, DO 169/222, no 4). In addition, the Manila Accord
threatened to drive a wedge between the British and American governments, and it was to
prevent this that Macmillan was persuaded to accept a UN mission to North Borneo and
Sarawak (see 204–208).]
The Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, had apparently been persuaded
by the Prime Minister of the Philippines, Mr. Macapagal, and the President of
Indonesia, Dr. Sukarno, to ask the Secretary-General of the United Nations how long
it would take him to ascertain the attitude of the inhabitants of the North Borneo
territories towards Malaysia. He had also indicated that, if some enquiry for this
purpose could be conducted under United Nations auspices in the immediate future,
he might be prepared to postpone for a short period the establishment of Malaysia, at
present fixed for 31st August.
In discussion it was agreed that any postponement of the creation of Malaysia at
this stage would be more likely to lead to an indefinite postponement of the project
than to promote an early resolution of the current differences between Malaya and
Indonesia. Moreover, a survey under United Nations auspices would not only be
liable to take a considerable time but would also merely confirm that the inhabitants
of North Borneo endorsed the concept of Malaysia. We should therefore impress on
the Prime Minister of Malaya the importance of adhering to 31st August as the date
for the formation of Malaysia and warn him of the dangers implicit in any further
delay.
201 FO 371/169724, no 26 2 Aug 1963
[Manila summit]: outward telegram OCULAR 1002 from Lord Home
to T Peters,1 giving instructions regarding Mr Sandys’ personal
message for Tunku Abdul Rahman
My immediately following telegram contains the text of a further personal message
from Mr Sandys to the Tunku which you should deliver as soon as possible. In
doing so please draw attention to the third paragraph and say that a plebiscite
would not only arouse political doubts in Borneo, but that we also cannot foresee
1 Theophilus Peters, head of chancery at the British embassy in Manila, was at the time acting for the
ambassador, J (later Sir John) Pilcher.
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what the result of it would be if it were conducted in this atmosphere. We should
have great difficulty in reaching agreement on a satisfactory wording of the
question to be put to the local populations, the Indonesians would interfere in
every possible way with propaganda and subversion, and we should be faced with
many unacceptable demands such as perhaps the withdrawal of British troops
during the voting, complete freedom for Azahari to organise opposition, freedom to
vote for the alien Indonesian population in North Borneo etc. We should be
involved in every sort of dispute and the result might conceivably be different from
the recent free elections.
2. Under no circumstances should you commit the above views to writing. . . .
202 FO 371/169724, no 26 2 Aug 1963
[Manila summit]: outward telegram OCULAR 1003 from Lord Home
to T Peters, forwarding a personal message from Mr Sandys for Tunku
Abdul Rahman
My immediately preceding telegram.1
Please pass following further personal message to Tunku from Commonwealth
Secretary.
Begins: I was glad to learn from the report which you asked our Chargé d’Affaires
to send us this morning that you are standing firm against Indonesian pressure for a
pre-Malaysia plebiscite.
2. As you know, we are much concerned about the possible effects of postponing
Malaysia. If you feel it necessary to agree to a representative of the United Nations
Secretary-General visiting North Borneo and Sarawak before 31st August, we would
concur even though you and we would naturally not regard any such perfunctory
assessment of opinion as more reliable than the clear results of the recent elections
in both territories.
3. However, if Malaysia Day were postponed for the sake of a plebiscite, it would
create doubts and uncertainty throughout the area and would encourage everyone to
have second thoughts.
4. No amount of plebiscites will alter Sukarno’s basic hostility to Malaysia. His
ultimate objective is clearly to round off his empire by absorbing into it the three
North Borneo territories. He sees in Malaysia a serious obstacle to his ambitions and,
whatever he may say, he will continue to try and undermine it. Therefore it seems to
us that for the sake of papering over the cracks in a conference communiqué it would
be unwise to run the risk of unsettling and possibly upsetting altogether the new
association which we have negotiated with such difficulty.
5. If as a result of your stand, your relations with Indonesia become more
difficult you know you can count on us to back you
With all good wishes,
DUNCAN SANDYS Ends.
1 See 201.
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203 FO 371/169724, no 26 3 Aug 1963
[Manila summit]: inward telegram OCULAR 593 from T Peters 
to Lord Home forwarding Tunku Abdul Rahman’s reply to 
Mr Sandys
Your telegram No. 1003.
I gave the Tunku Mr. Sandys’ personal message this morning, and following is text
of his personal reply to Mr. Sandys.
Begins. I agree with you that his motive is not sincere and I think he is being
forced into obstructing our Malaysia plan by Communist followers in his country. I
am just trying to manoeuvre in the hope of reaching a compromise. I realize only
too well that any postponement of Malaysia would be tantamount to a surrender,
which will be used to advantage by the Communists. Now that I am assured of your
support, I will know what steps to take at the next meeting of heads of State. You
can rest assured that Malaysia will be announced on the 31st of August as
scheduled. Ends.
204 PREM 11/4349, T430/63 4 Aug 1963
[Manila summit]: outward telegram no 7462 from the FO to
Washington Embassy, forwarding a personal message from President
Kennedy to Mr Macmillan
Following message received by Prime Minister from President Kennedy early
morning August 4.1
Begins. ‘I am quite concerned that hopefully successful Manila summit will be
torpedoed unless 31 August date for Malaysia can be postponed briefly to give
Sukarno a fig leaf. If in fact the Tunku is willing, and if there is a good chance
Sukarno can be bought this cheaply, we would urge you give this an urgent look. I
well realize that kowtowing to Sukarno is a risky enterprise, but a little give now
may be worth the risk, especially if the likely alternative is a further step-up of
subversive pressures. This is your show, but I feel we ought to place our worries
frankly before you.’
2. Draft reply to President is being submitted to Prime Minister at Chatsworth2
this afternoon.
1 It was despatched on 3 Aug and is also printed in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963,
XXIII (Washington, 1994), doc 333, p 725.
2 Chatsworth House was the seat of the Cavendish family into which Macmillan had married.
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205 PREM 11/4349, T432/63 4 Aug 1963
[Manila summit]: inward telegram no 1742 from Lord Home to Mr
Macmillan
Following for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary.1
Malaysia.
I have read the President’s message to you.2
2. I think we should assume the worst of Sukarno, and should not agree to a
delay over Malaysia on his account. There are, however, two points which you may
wish to take into consideration. Sukarno will cause us trouble after Malaysia, but if
we agree to a small postponement to meet American wishes, we are more likely to
obtain full American support afterwards. There is also the subsidiary point that we
should not let the Tunku shuffle the blame on to us for any possible failure to agree
at the Manila Summit now and for subsequent trouble with Indonesia.
3. U Thant will be here in Moscow for the next day or two. Please let me know if
there is anything you think I could usefully say to him. I do not myself see why he
should not send Narisimhan [sic] to make his investigation before August 31.
1 Home was in Moscow, negotiating the nuclear test ban treaty signed by Britain, USA and USSR on 5 Aug.
2 See 204.
206 PREM 11/4349, T434/63 4 Aug 1963
[Manila summit]: outward telegram no 2459 from the FO to Lord
Home, forwarding Mr Macmillan’s message to President Kennedy
My immediately preceding telegram [of August 4].
Following for Secretary of State.
Following is text of personal message sent by Prime Minister to President Kennedy
tonight in reply to latter’s message about Malaysia in my telegram No. 7462 to
Washington.1
2. Begins.2 ‘Many thanks for your message about Malaysia.
If the three Heads of State were to agree on a proposal of the kind you mention and
were to put this to us, we should certainly give it careful consideration. So far,
however, the Tunku (who has been in close touch with us) has not put such a
proposal to us and we have no reason to suppose that he now favours it. We should
not think it right to advise him to do so.
I too share your concern about the outcome of this Manila meeting, but I do not
believe that Sukarno can be bought off with a fig leaf. He would need something
much bigger to cover him effectively. A slight postponement in the date of August 31
may seem an attractive face saver if we were dealing with a man of good faith but
poses considerable difficulties for us in that the original date was agreed not only
with the Tunku, but also with the North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore leaders.
Moreover, a delay in bringing about what has been so painstakingly prepared could
1 See 204. 2 This is also printed in FRUS, 1961–1963, XXIII, doc 333, p 725n.
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sew just that confusion which Sukarno would like to see. There is an old French
saying—what is postponed is lost.
The Tunku is well aware of the risks involved. He is battling hard and tells us he is
working for a compromise but will not make any major concessions liable to affect
the future of Malaysia. We must let him play the hand in Manila.
Incidentally, our information from Manila indicates that the latest Indonesian
move reveals that Sukarno’s real intention is to obtain a veto on use of our bases.
This is very dangerous for us all. It would make nonsense of all our defence
arrangements east of Suez and is intended to prevent us fulfilling our S.E.A.T.O.
obligations.’ Ends.
207 PREM 11/4349, T443B/63 5 Aug 1963
[Manila summit]: outward telegram no 2488 from Mr Macmillan to
Lord Home
Following from Prime Minister for Foreign Secretary.
Having now studied the terms of the agreement reached at Manila I consider that
we should accept a visit by the Secretary-General’s representative of the kind
proposed in Manila telegram No. 608 on the following assumptions:—
(a) That the Secretary-General can complete this task in time to permit the
establishment of Malaysia on August 31;
(b) That the Secretary-General’s report shall not be subject to confirmation by
the United Nations or by the Governments of Malaya, Indonesia and the
Philippines.1
2. The Manila agreement has many vexatious and disagreeable features,
particularly the proposal for Indonesian and Philippine observers in paragraph 7
and the reference to foreign bases in paragraph 11.2 I think we should try to resist
the first, though we need not perhaps make it a breaking point. We are not called
on to accept the second, though we should seek assurances from the Tunku that
he will so interpret it as to enable us to discharge defence commitments in South
East Asia.
3. Nevertheless in view of President Kennedy’s message and the considerations
set out in your own message to me (Moscow telegram No. 1742)3 I do not think we
should risk forfeiting future American support against Indonesia (which we shall
certainly need notwithstanding this agreement) by adopting an intransigent
attitude.
4. I should be grateful if you would take the opportunity of explaining our initial
reactions (our formal reply must await the approach from the Tunku envisaged in
paragraph 6 of Manila telegram No. 608) to U Thant and seek his views on our two
conditions.
1 On 6 Aug, Home reported that U Thant saw no difficulty with assumption (b) but that it would be highly
unlikely that the enquiry would be over in time to inaugurate Malaysia on 31 Aug.
2 The Manila joint statement, one of the three documents issued at the summit, proposed a UN mission to
assess the wishes of the Borneo peoples regarding Malaysia. Paragraph 7 proposed that observers from the
Philippines and Indonesia should accompany the UN mission. Paragraph 11 stated: ‘The three Heads of
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Government further agreed that foreign bases—temporary in nature—should not be allowed to be used
directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries. In accordance
with the principle enunciated in the Bandung Declaration, the three countries will abstain from the use of
arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers.’
3 See 204 and 205.
208 PREM 11/4349, T442/63 6 Aug 1963
[Manila summit]: outward telegram 7525 from Mr Macmillan to
President Kennedy [Extract]
[This telegram, which Macmillan addressed to his ‘Dear Friend’, was largely devoted to
the nuclear test ban treaty. The extract printed here refers to Malaysia and picks up the
reference to the fig leaf made in documents 204 and 206.]
. . . We are still not quite clear what has happened about Malaysia but it looks as if
you may have been right about Sukarno’s fig leaf. However, it may all have turned
out for the best. The Tunku does seem to have made some concession, but I still
feel it better that he should have done this on his own rather than at our instance.
If anything had gone wrong he could certainly have put the blame on us: now we
can hold his hand. There are some rather dubious phrases about foreign bases
which I don’t like. For that means Singapore and Singapore is of course vital to
both our interests in the Far East. However, we are covered by our Treaty with
Malaya. . . .
209 DO 169/222, no 17 9 Aug 1963
[Lee Kuan Yew’s proposal to declare independence on 31 Aug]: inward
telegram OCULAR 554 from Lord Selkirk to Mr Sandys
I saw Lee Kuan Yew again last night just before his departure for Kuala Lumpur and
he elaborated on the idea contained in paragraph 2(2) of my above quoted telegram.
He suggested that Stephens, Ningkan and himself should at once publicly declare
their intention to proceed with their own independence on the 31st August with a
view to joining Malaysia as soon as the Tunku was ready to accept them. The three of
them would then fly to New York to make their views known to U Thant. Thence to
Moscow, where Lee thought they would be able to confirm that Khruschev [sic]
would not oppose Malaysia, and finally to London where he would hope to get the
agreement of the British Government. His whole theme was that it was vital to stand
up to Soekarno and that this expression of self-determination by the territories
concerned would be a slap in the eye for the Indonesians. Lee hoped that he would be
allowed later to visit Sarawak where he was quite sure that he could destroy the
influence of S.U.P.P.
2. I agreed with Lee that it was valuable at this stage to give the maximum
impression of support for Malaysia and determination to see it through by the Prime
Minister and Chief Ministers of the three territories concerned. I pointed out,
however, that:—
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(a) it would not be possible for Britain to agree to the independence of Singapore,
Sabah1 and Sarawak on 31st August except as part of Malaysia; and
(b) that there was not time for Stephens and Ningkan to make the length of tour
proposed by Lee, since they would have to be in Borneo for the visit by U Thant’s
representative.
3. I believe there is a great deal in what Lee is saying. Soekarno has tarnished
(possibly irretrievably) Tunku’s image by making Tunku bend to Soekarno’s will
before all the world, The obvious deduction which will be made is that Soekarno
could do it again whenever he so desires. The Chinese particularly are worried that
Tunku’s weakness may eventually hand them over to Indonesia. Our armed forces
now preserving the independence of Malaysia cannot do that indefinitely unless there
is strong national unity and leadership. The Malays are not providing it. I hope,
therefore, we shall not find it necessary to clamp down on any expression of
nationalism and desire for self-determination shown by Lee, Stephens and Ningkan.
While it may be necessary for us to play a fairly passive part publicly, there seems to
be every advantage in the national leaders of the territories concerned taking a
forceful line. Indeed, we can hardly expect them to be passive while Soekarno is
actively trying to wreck Malaysia.
4. I have asked Lee to discuss his ideas with Tory when he is in Kuala Lumpur
today. When he returns to Singapore tomorrow, I should like to be able to tell him
that while it would not be possible to implement the independence of Singapore,
Sabah and Sarawak outside Malaysia on 31st August, we privately welcomed the
general line he is taking. I see from Governor North Borneo’s telegrams Nos. 424 and
426 that Sabah is taking a similar line. I would also suggest that serious
consideration is given to Lee’s suggestion of a visit by the three leaders to New York
and London to make their views known to U Thant and yourself although I doubt
whether the visit to Moscow is practicable in the circumstances. It is only by allowing
the three leaders of the territories concerned to speak for themselves that we can
hope to persuade U Thant to complete his task by 31st August.
1 The pre-colonial name of Sabah had been applied to the area in an English-language document of 29 Dec
1877 when a group of European traders won concessions from the Sultan of Brunei. The Sultan granted to
Baron Gustav von Overbeck a number of specific territories and appointed him ‘Maharajah of Sabah and
Rajah of Gaya and Sandakan’. Thereafter the term ‘North Borneo’ was used in British documents. When
North Borneo acquired de facto self-government on 31 Aug 1963 (sixteen days before the inauguration of
Malaysia) it was officially re-named Sabah. See Allen, Stockwell and Wright, A collection of treaties, II, p
434; D S Ranjit Singh, The making of Sabah 1865–1941 (Kuala Lumpur, 2000) pp 3–5; and CO
1030/1453.
210 CO 1030/1494, no 66 9 Aug 1963
[Sarawak’s head of state]: telegram OCULAR C400 from Sir A Waddell
to Mr Sandys
[The new constitutions for North Borneo and Sarawak provided for a head of state. The
office holder was to be recommended jointly by the Queen and the Agong but appointed
by the Agong alone. Dato Mustapha had for some time been lined up as Sabah’s head of
state, but the selection of Sarawak’s post-colonial governor proved controversial.
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Although Temenggong Jugah, the paramount chief of the Ibans, was the front-runner,
the Tunku insisted on a Malay and favoured Dato Haji Openg. Sandys responded to
Waddell’s telegram by urging the Tunku to accept Jugah so as not to risk losing Iban
support for Malaysia and thereby jeopardising the outcome of the UN mission to Sarawak
(Sandys to Tory, tel 1976, 12 Aug 1963, DO 189/219, no 179). The problem was not
resolved until 13 Sept when Sandys brokered a compromise whereby Openg became the
governor while Jugah was appointed federal minister for Sarawak Affairs with a seat in the
federal Cabinet (see 224).]
There is no hope of budging me on this either. I repeat that my advice has been
tendered after full consideration of all factors involved including repeated
intelligence reports which indicate the possible trouble if Jugah not appointed. This
is not a matter of personal pique or agitation by Jugah but is deep seated
spontaneous feeling amongst Ibans who are now thoroughly awake politically,
particularly after success at elections. They are, after all, largest racial block and
only race which has voted unanimously and unequivocally for Malaysia. It should
also not be forgotten that there are two millions of them on the other side of the
border.
2. It is nonsense to say that Malays are most politically conscious community
here. They are the most politically tortuous and divided, and Malayans1 have not
helped matters by vehement denunciation of Datu Bandar and Panas during
elections.2 Appointment of Malay Governor would certainly be ascribed to Barjasa
intrigue (which is doubly deplorable as Barjasa part of Alliance which unanimously
recommended Jugah) and people here are well aware that Abdul Rahman Yakub3
has remained on in Kuala Lumpur no doubt for this purpose. Such appointment
would (a) divide Malays even more (b) wreck the Alliance (c) turn Ibans anti-
Malaysia and (d) give rise to internal and external security situation of utmost
gravity which could involve H.M.G. in the most distasteful security action in
history. And Malay troops even if available would make matters worse. I am sure
strength of Iban feeling well appreciated by Lord Lansdowne and the Cobbold
Commission.
3. Against this Jugah’s comparative illiteracy is of no account and was certainly
no apparent bar to his being strenuously courted by Malays when the Ibans were
being won over.
4. It is quite unrealistic for Tunku to force a nominee not supported by Alliance.
This I am not able or willing to do. I can only suggest invitation to Alliance to visit
Kuala Lumpur but see my telegram No. C67 on last occasion. Time is now
desperately short before arrival of U.N. Mission. Failure to reach decision could be
fatal to Malaysia and to Sarawak.
1 ie, those in the Federation of Malaya.
2 This refers to disputes within Sarawak’s Malay community which, while dating back to the cession crisis
of the late 1940s, came to a head in the 1963 elections when PANAS (led by Dato Bandar) defected from
the pro-Malaysia Sarawak Alliance.
3 Dato Abdul Rahman Yakub was the leader of BARJASA, the Malay party that favoured Malaysia and was a
member of the Sarawak Alliance.
14-Malaysia-175-227-cpp  21/9/04  9:08 AM  Page 549
550 MALAYSIA POSTPONED [211]
211 PREM 11/4349 9 Aug 1963
[UN mission and the postponement of Malaysia Day]: inward telegram
no 1503 from Sir G Tory to Mr Sandys, reporting the Tunku’s attitude
Your telegram No. 1926:
U Thant and Malaysia
Spoke accordingly to Tunku this morning.
2. Tunku recognises that postponement of Malaysia day requires agreement of
all signatories. He authorised me to convey his absolutely firm undertaking ‘that he
will go ahead with Malaysia on whatever later date may now be agreed between the
signatories. For his part, and subject to agreement of others concerned, he would
like this date to be 16th September irrespective of nature of the Secretary-General
report’. He also accepts that should Secretary-General’s report be unfavourable any
further ascertainment of Bornean wishes would then be his responsibility and would
not take place until after establishment of Malaysia. He would be prepared to face the
consequences provided that we stood by him.
3. Tunku understands that admission of Secretary-General’s representatives may
create dangerous precedent for us. He says however that it is already absolutely clear
that if we receive teams we do so at special request of Malayan Government in order
to help them. This carries with it other implications you mention i.e. we should not
ourselves be associated with the request or with the report. The report would not be
addressed to us and we should not be committed to recognising the validity of its
findings. For obvious reasons the Tunku would not wish us to say anything publicly
at this stage about not accepting the validity of U Thant’s report.
4. As regards observers Tunku believes this would be a breaking point for the
Indonesians and that if we do not concede this the Indonesians will repudiate the
Manila Agreement.1 Subandrio begged Tunku to accept request for observers to
enable Soekarno to placate the Indonesian Army who were becoming extremely
tough in their determination to destroy Malaysia.
5. Tunku firmly believes that if Indonesians repudiate Manila Agreement there is
serious danger that the Indonesian Army will get out of hand and that there will be
major military incursions into Borneo Territories. He says Army are discontented
because they are not paid regularly and have been stirred up into emotional and
aggressive frame of mind towards Borneo Territories. Nasution2 is making openly
hostile statements which are bound to make Army even more difficult to restrain.
Over all is Soekarno whom the Tunku found to be more unbalanced, irresponsible
and ill informed than he had feared and who could easily set off aggression by angry
and intemperate reaction to anything he chose to interpret as departure from
understandings at Manila. If real trouble started in Borneo Territories British Forces
would have to bear the blunt [? brunt] of dealing with it.
1 Indonesia and the Philippines wished to send observers to accompany the UN mission. The British
government at first opposed, but later conceded, this request.
2 General Abdul Harris Nasution was minister co-ordinator for defence and security and deputy
commander-in-chief of Indonesian armed forces; he narrowly avoided assassination during the abortive
coup of Oct 1965 and then supported General Suharto.
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6. Tunku is distressed that his friends do not seem to understand his difficulties
or his achievements at Manila. He went there to show he was prepared to do anything
for peace in this region not really believing that there would be any genuine change
of heart in Indonesia but hoping that if they could be brought to accept and endorse
the Manila Agreement this would at least make it more difficult for them openly to
pursue their aggressive designs against Malaysia. If we are intransigent about
observers or about the date he believes Summit Agreement will be destroyed and
that, [sic] the situation will then be far worse then if the Summit conference had
never taken place. He hopes that we and the other Governments concerned will be
able to see matters in this perspective as he does himself. Tunku denies that he is
appeasing Indonesians. He is simply playing them along quietly in the hope that the
fires will die down.
7. There is a further important point which Tunku did not make on this
occasion, that about one third of the Malays have close ties and considerable
sympathy with Indonesia and that for his own domestic political reasons he must
demonstrate to these people that he is doing his best to get along with Indonesia and
that he is not just being a British stooge.
8. As regards statement on bases see my telegram No. 1504.
212 PREM 11/4349 10 Aug 1963
[UN mission and the postponement of Malaysia Day]: outward
telegram no 1946 from Mr Sandys to Sir G Tory, replying to
document 211 and enclosing a message for the Tunku
Your interview with Tunku is reassuring. It is, however, important to have written
confirmation of Tunku’s undertakings in paragraph 2 of your telegram under
reference.
2. Please therefore send following letter immediately to Tunku:—
Begins: ‘I have communicated to the Commonwealth Secretary the
assurances which you gave me at our conversation yesterday, in the following
terms: I reported that you asked me to convey your absolutely firm assurance
that irrespective of the nature of the Secretary-General’s report, you will
inaugurate the Federation of Malaysia on whatever later date may now be
agreed between the signatories. I informed Mr. Sandys that you suggested the
revised date should be 16th September. I have reported that you have also
assured me that should the Secretary-General’s report be unfavourable it
would be entirely your responsibility to decide whether there should be any
further ascertainment of Bornean wishes and that any such ascertainment
would not take place until after the establishment of Malaysia.
I should be grateful if you would now confirm that I have correctly
reported the assurances which you gave me orally.
I have been authorised to give you the firm assurance that, if the
undertakings set out above are confirmed by you, the British Government, for
their part, will give you their full support in the implementation of this
policy.’ Ends.
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3. Please telegraph emergency when you have Tunku’s written confirmation of
his undertakings.
4. You should inform Tunku that you require this written assurance most
urgently since the action authorised in my three immediately following telegrams
cannot be taken until you receive it.1
1 Before Sandys’ telegram 1946 reached Tory, the high commissioner had informed the Tunku of Sandys’
views (as conveyed in the secretary of state’s telegram 1926 of 8 Aug) with which the Tunku had concurred
in writing. Assuming that this exchange met Sandys’ more recent requirement, Tory did not pass on the
message enclosed in telegram 1946 but communicated to London the text of his own letter to the Tunku
(see 213 and also DO 169/222, no 11 and FO 371/169713, no 99).
213 DO 169/222, no 23 10 Aug 1963
[UN mission and the postponement of Malaysia Day]: inward telegram
no 1515 from Sir G Tory to Mr Sandys, enclosing the text of Tory’s
letter to the Tunku and the notes from which he spoke at his meeting
with the Tunku on 9 Aug
Text of letter dated 9th August from British High Commissioner Kuala Lumpur to
Prime Minister of Malaya.
Begins: As agreed I enclose the notes from which I spoke this morning in conveying
to you the various points which Mr. Duncan Sandys had instructed me to make in a
telegram which I had just received from him. I have sent a telegram to Mr. Sandys
reporting your observations as follows.
As regards postponement of M Day I said you had authorised me to convey your
firm undertaking that you would go ahead with Malaysia on whatever later date
might now be agreed between the signatories irrespective of the Secretary-General’s
report. This was on the understanding that the British Government stood by the
Federation Government whatever the consequences. I added that you accepted that
any further consultation in the Borneo Territories if the Secretary-General’s report
should prove to be unfavourable would then be your responsibility after the
establishment of Malaysia.
I said you regarded it as already absolutely clear that if we received teams from the
United Nations in the Borneo Territories we should be doing so only at the special
request of your Government in order to help you.
I went on to say that you also confirmed that this would mean that the British
Government would not themselves be associated with a request for an enquiry or
with the eventual report. This report would not be addressed to them and they would
not be committed to recognising the validity of its findings. I said here that for
obvious reasons you would not wish the British Government at this stage to say
anything about not recognising the validity of the Secretary-General’s report.
As regards observers I reported your view that the Indonesians would be likely to
repudiate the Manila Agreement if they and the Filipinos were not allowed to send
observers. I explained that Dr. Subandrio had particularly asked you to accept this
provision for purposes of presenting the Manila Agreement to the Indonesian Army
who were being increasingly tough in their opposition to Malaysia.
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I then quoted you as saying that the Manila Agreement represented an
achievement which should not be lightly thrown away. You had gone to Manila to
show your determination to do everything within reason to secure peace in this area.
You had not been very sanguine about any genuine change of heart on the part of
Indonesia’s leaders but felt that the very fact of their subscribing to the Manila
Declaration would inevitably have the effect of putting some restraint on their efforts
to subvert Malaysia and would at least make it more difficult for them to pursue any
sinister objectives in an open manner.
On the Indonesian army I said you thought they were in a very dangerous frame of
mind, underpaid, over-excited, and egged on by General Nasution and that if
President Soekarno were to repudiate the Manila Agreement in a fit of temper at
what he chose to regard as some departure from understandings with you at Manila
this might easily touch off a conflagration which it would be difficult to put out. You
were not appeasing the Indonesians but rather playing them along quietly in the
hope that the fires would die down.
I hope that this accurately represented what was in your mind.1
As regards the Singapore base and the Defence Agreement I enclose also the
gist of what Mr. Sandys said in his telegram about the statement which he
intended to issue to the press. I simply informed Mr. Sandys that you would not
object to this. Ends.
2. Following is full text of enclosure.
Begins: Tunku’s message of the 3rd August said that Malaysia would be announced
on the 31st August as scheduled. The date of M Day is in the Malaysia Agreement and
alteration needs the consent of all signatories.
Before British Government can consider any question of postponement they need
an absolutely firm undertaking from the Tunku that he will go ahead with Malaysia
on whatever later date may now be agreed between the signatories irrespective of the
Secretary-General’s report. Any further ascertainment of Bornean wishes if the
report were unfavourable would then be the Tunku’s responsibility after
establishment of Malaysia (cf. West Irian after interval of three years). In any event
we could not agree to the postponement of merger between Malaya and Singapore
beyond a date in September.
The British Government do not recognise that the Manila Conference or anyone
else has the right to invite U Thant’s representatives into territories for which we are
still responsible. This is most important because of the danger of precedents
elsewhere notably British Guiana and British Honduras. If we receive teams it must
be absolutely clear that we do so only at the special request of the Malayan
Government in order to help them.
This means that the British Government do not wish themselves to be associated
with the request for an enquiry or with the eventual report. They do not wish the
Secretary-General’s decision on the report to be addressed to them nor do they wish
to be committed to recognising the validity of its findings.
1 The Tunku confirmed this in writing.
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As regards observers the British Government see serious objection to accepting
Indonesian and Philippine observers in North Borneo and Sarawak:—
(a) neither Indonesia nor the Philippines has any status in these
territories;
(b) the admission of observers would increase the danger of delay and
subversion;
(c) the North Borneo Government have already objected strongly to this
proposal;
(d) the Manila communique only says the observers are ‘desirable’ not a
condition of the enquiry.
The British Government have sent the following message to Sir Patrick Dean the
British Representative on the United Nations on this question of observers: ‘You are
not authorised to tell U Thant that we are prepared to agree to observers. We regret
that there should have been a request for observers to supervise the Secretary-
General’s task and you should use all your influence to persuade him not to accept
this himself. It is clear that the Malayan Government do not like the idea of observers
and strong objection has been expressed to them in North Borneo. We have
experience of Indonesian subversive operations and have recently been obliged to
expel two Indonesian Consuls from North Borneo. We do not accept that the
Indonesians or Filipinos have any status in the Borneo Territories. It is only at the
special request of the Government of the Federation of Malaya that we are prepared
to agree to the enquiry being carried out.’
Bases: Mr. Duncan Sandys proposes to issue a statement to the press that the
Malaysia agreement which includes the arrangements about the Singapore Base can
be terminated or amended only with the consent of both parties and that we have
confirmed this with the Tunku. As stated by the Tunku the joint declaration would
not limit the use of British bases and our defence arrangements are therefore in no
way affected. [Ends.]
214 DO 169/216, no 176 27 Aug 1963
[Sandys’ mission to SE Asia]: inward telegram SOSLON 62 from Mr
Sandys to CRO, reporting developments since his arrival in Kuala
Lumpur
[On 16 Aug, the day when the UN mission of enquiry arrived in Kuching, Sandys spoke
with Macmillan who was pessimistic about the prospects for Malaysia. Opinion in the
region veered this way and that; while the Tunku appeared to waver over the
inauguration of Malaysia, leaders in the Borneo territories and Singapore were reluctant
to accept delay. On 22 Aug Donald Stephens and Stephen Kalong Ningkan flew to Kuala
Lumpur to lobby for the original date. Sandys, too, felt the need to apply direct pressure
on the Malayan prime minister. On 23 Aug he departed London for Kuala Lumpur in
order, as he put it to the Australian prime minister, to ‘hold the Tunku’s hand’. A few
days after his arrival, the Malayan Cabinet agreed to fix 16 Sept as Malaysia Day which
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong formally proclaimed on 29 Aug. Macmillan thanked Sandys
for ‘stiffening the resolution of the Malayans at this critical point’ and left him to decide
‘how best to play the hand’ with respect to the UN mission. By 30 Aug Sandys seemed
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confident that the ‘pieces of the Malaysian jigsaw puzzle now seem to be falling into
place’, but then a fresh crisis flared up over Singapore (see 215–221 and also PREM
11/4349).]
2. On my arrival on Saturday, I had a meeting with Malayan Prime Minister.
After preliminary cordialities I told Tunku very frankly that we considered that we
had not been properly consulted over the Manila Agreement and that this was the
cause of most of the subsequent difficulties. I reminded him that we heartily
disliked the idea of a United Nations enquiry in a British territory, which was
without precedent. Nevertheless, since he had committed himself we had
reluctantly agreed to accept the enquiry and a reasonable number of observers.
3. The Tunku did not attempt to reply to my complaint about lack of
consultation, but murmured something about wanting peace with his neighbours.
On the question of observers, he said we had made too much fuss about this. It did
not really matter how many there were.
4. I said that we took a different view. At a moment when Indonesia was
actively conducting subversive activities and border raids we should not permit a
large number of agents to be introduced into the two territories under the cloak of
observers. Nor could we allow military aircraft to overfly the two territories, take
photographs, possibly drop supplies to dissident elements and no doubt fly low
over primitive villages to demonstrate Indonesian presence. I emphasised that we
had no intention of making any further concessions. Having agreed a formula with
the Secretary General we were on firm ground and we did not intend to move off
it.
5. He then discussed the steps to be taken to establish Malaysia. The Tunku
reaffirmed that he intended to bring in Malaysia irrespective of what the Secretary
General’s report might say. I told him that I had been informed that he had told the
Representatives from North Borneo and Sarawak only a few hours earlier that if the
report was unfavourable Malaysia would have to be abandoned. He seemed a little
embarrassed and said they must have misunderstood him. But I have no doubt that
this is what he did say to them since they all told me that this had greatly disturbed
them.
6. On the question of the date he said that the Malayan Government had in mind
to issue a proclamation to fix the date in accordance with a flexible formula i.e. a date
between 16th September and 30th September.
7. I emphasised to the Tunku that any apparent wavering about the date would
create serious uncertainty in the two territories and would lead the inhabitants to
think that he was having second thoughts about Malaysia. If they were led to fear that
Malaysia might be abandoned their natural inclination would be to try and reinsure
with the Indonesians. I stressed that this might have a most damaging effect on
morale in both territories.
8. At the end of our talk the Tunku said that he would consider dropping the idea
of a flexible date and settle instead firmly on September 16th. However the way he
said it left me with the impression that he was still wavering on this point.
9. The Tunku was occupied the whole of Sunday with his Party Conference. But I
saw him again on Monday (26th August). This was the most difficult meeting I ever
had with him. He was throughout in a highly emotional and touchy state.
10. He pointed out that under the Malayan–Indonesian Treaty of Friendship
which had been reaffirmed in Tokyo in May the two countries were obliged to discuss
14-Malaysia-175-227-cpp  21/9/04  9:08 AM  Page 555
556 MALAYSIA POSTPONED [214]
together any possible cause of misunderstanding.1 He had therefore decided to send a
telegram to Subandrio the Indonesian Foreign Minister inviting him to come to
Singapore in a day or two to review the situation with him.
11. I pointed out that unless a firm date for Malaysia Day were fixed
beforehand a meeting between him and Subandrïo would lead the people in the
North Borneo territories to feel that he was appeasing Indonesia and that possibly
he was contemplating abandoning Malaysia altogether. If the people of the two
territories thought that Malaysia might after all not go through they would be
anxious not to get on the wrong side of the Indonesians and this might affect their
evidence before the Secretary General’s teams. The Ministers of Singapore,
Sarawak and North Borneo would in any case view a meeting between him, and
Subandrio with great suspicion unless a firm date for Malaysia had been
announced beforehand.
12. The Tunku was very intractable and said he must be allowed to conduct his
relations with Indonesia in his own way. This was his ‘cold war’ which he must
handle as he thought best. If things went wrong there would be a ‘hot war’ which we
would have to deal with. He went so far as to say that it was no concern of the British
what he said to Subandrio.
13. I took strong exception to this language and made it clear that as parties to
the Malaysia Agreement and as the Sovereign power in the three territories we
expected to be fully consulted about any further moves. The fact (?that, as) he said,
we had joint military responsibilities for the defence of the area made it more than
ever necessary that he should coordinate his action with us.
14. He said that all the anxiety in the Borneo territories merely showed the
silliness of the local inhabitants who were very immature; and that they should trust
him.
15. On the question of the date he reverted to the idea of a flexible formula which
he had put to me on Saturday. I re-emphasised the dangers of creating any
uncertainty about our intention to establish Malaysia and urged him strongly to
announce September 16th as a firm date.
16. I said it would of course be necessary to show the Secretary General
beforehand the text of any announcement that was to be made and to consider any
comments that he might wish to make.
17. I said that if the Tunku felt it necessary to see Subandrio I could not object
but I emphasised that it was essential that before they met a date for Malaysia should
have been irrevocably agreed between the five Governments who had signed the
London Agreement.
1 The Treaty of Friendship was signed in Kuala Lumpur in Apr 1959 and (after the Anglo–Malayan Defence
Arrangement of 1957) was the first international treaty concluded by independent Malaya. Article 4 was
explicit on the resolution of disputes: ‘The two High Contracting Parties agree that in case any dispute on
matters directly and exclusively affecting them should arise they shall endeavour to settle such dispute
through usual diplomatic channels in a true spirit of friendship and goodwill. If a settlement cannot be
found through such channels within a reasonable time, they shall endeavour to settle them by other ways
and means in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the principles enunciated at the
Asia–African Conference in Bandung in 1955.’ Government of Malaysia, Malaya/Indonesia Relations, 31st
August, 1957 to 15th September, 1963, 1963, appendix II, p 29.
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18. The Tunku would not give me any assurance on this point but said that he
would call a special Cabinet at once to consider what I had said.
19. He was in a very nervy state and finished by saying ‘I have reached the end of
my tether and I do not want to discuss anything further with anybody’.
20. I was accompanied at this talk by the High Commissioner and Warner.2 We
all got the impression that the Tunku realised that at Manila and since he had been
guilty of failure to consult us as he should have and that he knew quite well that his
efforts to appease Indonesia had lost him a good deal of respect inside and outside his
country.
21. It seemed to us that as Malaysia Day approaches the Tunku is getting
increasingly aware of the magnitude of the new responsibilities he is taking on. He
realises that Malaysia is a very small fish compared with Indonesia and he is worried
about the prospect of living alongside a powerful and aggressive neighbour who has
designs upon his territory.
22. At the Cabinet meeting it seems that the Tunku was stiffened up by some of
his colleagues and events took a decided turn for the better.
23. As reported in my telegrams referred to above it was decided:—
(a) that the Deputy Prime Minister Tun Razak who is much more dependable, and
not the Tunku should offer to see Subandrio at Singapore not later than
Wednesday;
(b) that the purpose of the talk would be strictly confined to explaining to
Subandrio the Malayan Government’s position about the observers which was that
they considered the formula agreed between the British Government and the
Secretary General as reasonable and to inform the Indonesian Government in
advance of a public announcement that Malaysia would be established definitely on
September 16th;
(c) that the text of the public announcement should be telegraphed to New York
and shown at once to the Secretary General;
(d) that the new date of September 16th should be agreed at once with the British
Government and the Governments of the three territories (i.e. that the date should
be firmly fixed before any meeting with Subandrio) and
(e) that the proclamation announcing the date should be issued on Thursday and
published on Friday.
24. Together with Razak I informed the Ministers of North Borneo and Sarawak
who were much relieved to hear this news. Lee Kuan Yew is arriving from Singapore
today and the (?position) will be explained to him.
25. Now that all the other signatory Governments have been officially notified
that Malaysia is to be (?established) on September 16th I think it will be very hard for
the Malayan Government to engage in any last minute backsliding. Nevertheless, I
will keep in close touch with them to see that nothing goes wrong until the new date
is officially proclaimed.
2 F A Warner, head of the SE Asia Department, FO, 1960–1964.
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215 PREM 11/4349 30 Aug 1963
[Unilateral declaration of independence by Singapore]: inward
telegram OCULAR 612 from Lord Selkirk to the CO forwarding the
text of Lee Kuan Yew’s letter of 29 Aug to Mr Sandys
[The postponement of Malaysia Day to 16 Sept 1963 required a short supplementary
agreement by the governments of Britain, Malaya and Singapore to the agreement of 9
July which had provided for the establishment of Malaysia by 31 Aug. Not only would this
measure regularise the delay, but Sandys felt it was also ‘necessary in order to get the
Malayans completely tied down to the new arrangements’. Lee Kuan Yew, however, used
the need for a supplementary agreement as an opportunity to press home some last
demands. Amongst his conditions were points from the ‘Ritz Hotel agreement’ of 8 July
(see 192 and 193). Meanwhile, he went ahead with a ceremony for Singapore’s
independence which he declared at a rally outside the City Hall: ‘Our act follows the
traditions of the great anti-colonial revolutions in Asia. The only difference is, I hope, that
unlike the French, or worse, the Dutch, the British are a more pragmatic people. So they
concede the inexorable, and hope that by withdrawing from an already untenable
position, they can become friends with those over whom they once were masters. Let us
not deceive ourselves, and believe that they do this for reasons of altruistic charity. But
their enlightened self-interest makes our transition to freedom that much easier.’ A few
days later, he dissolved the Legislative Assembly in order to hold elections, fixing
nomination day for 12 Sept. It became clear that, if Lee had not achieved satisfaction on
outstanding issues with Malaya by 12 Sept, he would go to the polls on a programme for
Singapore’s independence. At the eleventh hour, the whole Malaysia project appeared to
be on the point of collapse. It should be noted in the case of documents 215–219 that the
standard form of address – ‘inward telegram to the secretary of state for the colonies’—is
misleading since Sandys was in Singapore, not London, and using Selkirk’s channel of
communication to maintain contact with the CO.]
Following is text of Lee’s letter of 29th August to Secretary of State.
‘Dear Secretary of State,
After our meeting last night you assured me over the telephone that the sum of S/10
million which you, on behalf of the British Government, agreed to pay to the
Singapore Government will be paid to us without deductions before 16th September
1963. I should like to place this assurance of yours on the record.
I refer to my draft letter of today’s date1 in which I have set out the conditions
precedent on which I have agreed to initial the supplementary agreement amending
the Malaysia Agreement signed in London on 9th July 1963. I should like to receive
your assurance that, in the event that the conditions set out in that letter are not
accepted by any of the other parties to the Agreement, the British Government will
ensure that the State of Singapore is not forced into joining the Federation on terms
which are at variance with what has been agreed with the Federation Government
and accepted by the Government, the Legislature and the people of Singapore.
I expect that you personally will be present at the Malaysia celebrations in
Singapore on the 31st August 1963.
On receiving your confirmation of the matters referred to in this letter I shall hand
you the supplementary agreement initialled subject to ratification by me within one
week on receipt of the written acceptance of the conditions by the other parties to
the Malaysia Agreement.
Yours sincerely,
Lee Kuan Yew.’
1 See 216.
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216 PREM 11/4349 30 Aug 1963
[Unilateral declaration of independence by Singapore]: inward
telegram OCULAR 613 from Lord Selkirk to the CO, forwarding a
draft letter that accompanied document 215
Following is text of enclosure to Lee’s letter.
‘Dear Sir,
I should like to state and to place it on the record that my agreement to the
amendment to Article II of the Agreement relating to Malaysia1 is conditional on
the written acceptance of the conditions set out in this letter. My signature to the
agreement for the amendment should therefore be regarded as a conditional
initialling to be ratified by me within one week of the date of such initially [?initialling]
on being satisfied that the conditions precedent for the Agreement have been fulfilled.
2. The conditions on which I have agreed to such amendment to Article II are as
follows:—
(a) That Section 7 of the Tariff Advisory Board Act of the Federation will be
amended to be in accordance with the Malaysia Agreement signed in London on
the 9th July, 1963: formation of the Board as a revision of revenue duties at end of
1968.
7. (1) It shall be the duty of the Board before the end of the year 1968 to
review the revenue duties in force in Malaysia at the end of that year and as soon
as may be after the end of that year the Board shall make recommendations for
the amendment or removal of such duties or the imposition of additional
revenue duties.
(2) The recommendations of the Board under this Section may include
provision for revenue duties to be imposed or altered or removed after an
interval or progressively.
(b) That Article 30 of the Draft Singapore Constitution will be amended by the
addition to Clause (2) of the following:—
(b) If, in the case of a member other than the present members elected to the
Legislative Assembly established by the Singapore (Constitution) Order in
Council, 1958, he ceases to be a member of or is expelled or resigns from the
political Party for which he stood in the elections.
(c) That the Malaysia Act will be amended to provide:—
(I) That the Singapore Government will exercise legislative and executive
powers under the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Ordinance 1955 and
that the powers given to the Singapore Government under this provision will
not be revoked without the consent of the Singapore Government;
(II) That any restriction on the right of movement implied under Article 9(3) of the
Federal Constitution will be reciprocal. (Drafts of these amendments are attached.)2
1 Article 2 of the agreement of 9 July stipulated that legislation enacting Malaysia be ‘brought into
operation on 31st August, 1963’.
2 Not printed.
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(d) That the date agreed for Malaysia Day, that is the 16th September 1963 will be
final and irrevocable.
(e) That Singapore will celebrate Malaysia Day on the 31st August 1963 when a
proclamation of de facto acceptance of Malaysia will be read by me, in the presence
of the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Commonwealth and Colonies and the
Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation.
3. The Singapore Government desires to receive written acceptance of the
conditions set out in this letter before the agreement is ratified by me. It is also the
view of the Singapore Government that the signing of the supplementary agreement
by the Singapore Government should be a public occasion as was the signing of the
Malaysia agreement in London. The Secretary of State should be present to attest his
signature to the document.
Section 39 – insert immediately after subsection (2) the following new
subsection:—
‘(3) (a) The Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall by order to be made before Malaysia
Day make provision:—
(I) For authorising the legislature of the State of Singapore to make
amendments to the Criminal Law (temporary provisions) Ordinance 1955
of Singapore;
(II) For extending the executive authority of the state so as to enable the
Government of Singapore to administer the provisions of the Criminal Law
(temporary provisions) Ordinance 1955 of Singapore.
(b) Clause (3) of Article 76A shall apply in relation to an order made under
paragraph (a) (I) of subsection (1) of this section as it applies in relation to an
Act of Parliament.
(c) The order of The Yang di-Pertuan Agong made under this subsection
shall be laid before each House of Parliament.
(d) The order made under this subsection shall take effect on Malaysia Day
and shall not be revoked without the concurrence of the Governor’.
Section 60(1) – insert immediately after the word ‘Malaya’ appearing at the end
thereof the words ‘and any such restriction shall apply reciprocally to the States of
Malaya and the State of Singapore’.
217 PREM 11/4349 30 Aug 1963
[Unilateral declaration of independence by Singapore]: inward
telegram OCULAR 614 from Lord Selkirk to the CO, forwarding
Sandys’ reply of 29 Aug to document 215
Following is text of S. of S.’s reply of 29th August to Lee Kuan Yew.
‘Thank you for your letter of 29th.
Last night I left with you copies of the agreement regarding the postponement of
Malaysia until 16th September which had been signed at different times during the
day by the representatives of the Governments of Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak
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and by myself on behalf of the British Government. You told me that by 10 o’clock
this morning you would be sending me a copy of this document signed by yourself,
accompanied by a letter setting out certain matters which your Government required
to have settled before Malaysia Day.
When I explained to you that, in view of the timing of the interview between the
Malayan representative and the Indonesian Foreign Minister in Djakarta, and an
announcement could not be delayed beyond 11 a.m., you told me that, if I did not
receive your signature in time, you would have no objection to it being said that the
change of date for Malaysia had been decided ‘with the concurrence of all the
Governments concerned’. I informed the Malayan Government accordingly and a
statement to this effect was duly issued at about noon, by which time I had not as yet
received your letter.
With regard to the first paragraph of your letter of today’s date, I am asking U.K.
Commissioner to make arrangements which will ensure that your Government
receives the sum of S/10 million referred to in my letter of 8th July without
deduction, before the entry of Singapore into Malaysia.
With regard to the second paragraph of your letter, I have naturally not had time
to study the detailed points contained in the draft of the letter which you propose to
send to all the signatories of the London Agreement; but when we receive it, it will be
given most careful attention. In the meantime I fully understand that you reserve
your position in the event of the non-fulfilment of the Agreement.
With regard to the third paragraph of your letter you will remember that when I
said that I would be willing to attend a meeting which you were planning to celebrate
Malaysia, you told me that this would take place on Friday evening. In order to make
myself free, I cancelled plans which the Commissioner-General had made for me and
made arrangements to leave Singapore that evening after your meeting. As I
explained to you last night, my programme requires me to leave Singapore at the
latest on Saturday morning and I should find it very difficult to rearrange things at
this late stage.1 I should, however, in any case be interested to see the precise terms
of the proclamation which you have it in mind to read out to the assembled people.
Perhaps you would care to send it to me.
(Signed) Duncan Sandys’
1 Sandys was spared the embarrassment of being present at the declaration of Singapore’s independence by
a prior engagement: a four-day cruise with his wife aboard Mutiara (pearl), a former British mine-sweeper
left to the Malayan navy at the time of independence. He explained to Macmillan: ‘I am very much in need
of a rest and am spending a long weekend on a yacht which has been lent to me by the Malayan
Government. It has radio equipment and Royal Navy Cypher Officer, so I shall be able to keep in touch’
(Sandys to Macmillan, 30 Aug, PREM 11/4349).
218 PREM 11/4349 30 Aug 1963
[Unilateral declaration of independence by Singapore]: inward
telegram OCULAR 618 from Lord Selkirk to the CO, forwarding Lee
Kuan Yew’s reply to document 217
Text of further letter to Secretary of State for [?from] Lee Kuan Yew received at noon
today, 30th August, is as follows:—
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My dear S. of S.
I received your letter dated 29th instant at 5.30 p.m. yesterday. From this letter it
is not clear whether you have in fact received a copy of the draft letter1 I proposed
sending you on receiving a satisfactory reply to my letter of yesterday’s date. I handed
the letter and the draft letter to the Deputy U.K. Commissioner at 12.10 p.m.
yesterday. In view of the inconclusiveness of your reply, I have to make the position
of my Government absolutely clear.
We discussed many things on Wednesday night. The important matters that we
had discussed I set out in note form to you. What I told you about the proposed
announcement was that you could proceed without specifically naming the
Singapore Government. But the news which was announced at 1.30 p.m. yesterday
quite erroneously reported that the Singapore Government had concurred. I have no
desire at this stage to upset the show of unity amongst the partners of Malaysia by
making it known that my Government has not, as Federation of Malaya Government
announced, agreed to the postponement of the date for Malaysia, until the matters
set out in the draft letter have been settled.
After careful consideration, my colleagues and I have decided that on the evening
of the 31st August at 5 p.m. we shall celebrate another milestone in Singapore’s
history towards independence, an independence within Malaysia if we are able to
agree, but outside Malaysia if there is no choice.
In any event I must ask you to agree that tomorrow, 31st August, I will announce
that H.M.G. has delegated to my Government powers in matters of foreign relations
to the extent and in order that my Government can, between the 31st August and
16th September, settle the question of the nature and substance of the Japanese
gesture of atonement for atrocities committed during Japanese occupation.
It has been the policy of my Government to have this independence within
Malaysia. But the relationship between State and the Federal Government must be
one in accord with the Malaysia Agreement signed by Government of Singapore in
London on 9th July. The lighthearted manner in which solemn agreements in
writing have been set aside under one pretext or another is most disturbing. I cannot
believe that it can be in the interest of the Federation of Malaya, or of the Federation
of Malaysia, if these solemn agreements were to be abandoned unilaterally by one of
the parties.
I am obliged to inform you that if I do not receive a clear and categorical assurance
from you that Singapore will not be forced into Malaysia unless the terms set out in
my draft letter of the 29th August are settled by Monday, 2nd September, it is the
intention of my Government to resign and seek a new mandate from the people.
Needless to say in the general election these issues could well become the crucial
points on which the people of Singapore will make a stand.
It would be difficult then to conceal the fact that Singapore had not concurred to
join Malaysia on 16th September. The position would then be wide open.
Whilst I had proposed a weeks time for a settlement of these matters set out in my
draft letter (another copy herewith enclosed), the tenor of your reply makes it
necessary that these matters be clarified before your proposed departure.
1 See 216.
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The nature of the proclamation on Saturday night will depend on the nature of
your reply to this letter.
Yours sincerely,
Lee Kuan Yew
219 CO 1030/1465, no 372 1 Sept 1963
[Unilateral declaration of independence by Singapore]: inward
telegram OCULAR 130 from Lord Selkirk to the CO, forwarding a
message from Mr Sandys
From Colonial Secretary.
I have just heard over radio Lee’s announcement that all Federal powers
(including defence and external affairs) have been transferred to the Head of State of
Singapore. Since Singapore Government already possesses all other powers, this
amounts to a unilateral declaration of independence.
2. As you know, Lee assured me (when I dined with him) that he would drop this
idea and would give today’s ceremonies the character of a demonstration of
Malaysian solidarity. Furthermore, on the telephone on Friday, Lee promised ‘to play
it cool’ and to do nothing which would exaggerate feelings and make it more difficult
for me secure a satisfactory settlement of the outstanding difficulties between
Singapore and Kuala Lumpur.
3. In the last remaining fortnight of British rule, I have no wish to spoil relations
with the Government and people of Singapore. Nevertheless, I assume that we will be
able [?unable] to avoid answering questions in Singapore and in London as to the
significance of Lee’s announcement.
4. Subject to what you may already have said, I think it would be best to confine
ourselves to a simple statement of facts, namely:—
(a) That a grant of independence to a territory under British sovereignty requires
an act of Parliament at Westminster.
(b) That the British Malaysia Act (which comes into force on 16th September)
provides for the transfer of British sovereignty over Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak
to the new Federation of Malaysia but does not provide for the separate
independence of these territories.
(c) That the announcement made by the Prime Minister of Singapore that future
Federal powers (including external affairs and defence) have been transferred from
Britain to the Government of Singapore has no legal validity.
(d) That the British Government regard Lee Kuan Yew’s statement as in the
nature of symbolic expression of spontaneous enthusiasm for Malaysian solidarity
intended for internal consumption only.
(e) That the division of responsibilities between the British Government and the
Government of Singapore up to Malaysia will, of course, remain unaffected.1
5. Please repeat the above to London and Kuala Lumpur.
1 As regards North Borneo and Sarawak, the colonial governors had announced on the authority of the
secretary of state that, from 31 Aug to 16 Sept, they would act only on the advice of their chief ministers
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with respect to matters which would be within the province of the state government after the
inauguration of Malaysia. All those existing powers in the two territories which would be federal powers in
the future would continue to be retained by the respective governors until Malaysia Day. In other words,
there had been no legal change. On 2 Sept the Tunku protested to Macmillan about the arrogation of
powers on 31 Aug by North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore and called for the repudiation of any changes
in the status of these states prior to the establishment of Malaysia (CO 1030/1514, no 9; cf DO 169/249).
220 CO 1030/1465, no 398 5 Sept 1963
[Unilateral declaration of independence by Singapore]: inward
telegram OCULAR 651 from Lord Selkirk to Mr Sandys, assessing the
aims and tactics of Lee Kuan Yew
[Selkirk sent this telegram to the CO and repeated it to Sandys who was en route to
Colombo. Alarmed by deterioration in relations between Singapore and Malaya, the
secretary of state cancelled a planned visit to Aden and returned to Kuala Lumpur in
order to see Malaysia through to inauguration (see 221). On 11 Sept he reported that
‘after several days of hard argument’ Malaya and Singapore had settled their differences. A
supplement to the Agreement of 9 July was signed by Sandys, Razak, Ismail and Goh
Keng Swee and later published in Singapore and in Britain (see Agreement concluded
between the Federation of Malaya, the United Kingdom Government of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and Singapore Supplementary to the Agreement relating to Malaysia
of 9th July 1963, between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the
Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore, Cmnd 2150). It dealt with
the tariff advisory board bill, reciprocity of immigration restrictions and the delegation to
Singapore of powers of detention under the criminal law (temporary provisions)
ordinance of 1955. Sandys now felt ‘reasonably confident’ that Singapore would join
Malaysia on 16 Sept. As regards the common market, Kuala Lumpur dragged its feet; for
example, it was not until Dec 1963 that the government was ready to appoint a chairman
of the tariff board that was to advise on its establishment which never materialised. See
Sandys to Macmillan, 11 Sept 1963, SOSLON 139, PREM 11/4350; see also CAB 21/5520;
CAB 128/37, 52(63)1; DO 169/249; DO 189/122.]
My preliminary comments on my conversation with Lee yesterday are as follows.
2. I consider he is now playing a supreme act of brinkmanship. He believes his
position is inviolable. He believes that either he comes into Malaysia on his own
terms or he declares independence and can make any terms he likes with us because
he is satisfied we would under no circumstances give up our military position in
Singapore. He believes, probably rightly that he could win an election on the slogan
of independence interspersed with bitter comments on the Malays1 and ourselves
who he will say are seeking to destroy the hard won position of advantage of the
Chinese in Singapore. The electorate would be confused and it is not easy to be
certain what would happen.
3. I believe he still basically wants to come into Malaysia. We should therefore
press the Malays to meet him fully on the relatively small points still outstanding.
Once he is in, the police and army come under Federation control.
4. We should by all means we can play this whole subject on a low key. If no one
answers Lee, his remarks lose much of their sensational value. His speech on
Saturday passed practically unnoticed in Singapore until the Malayan protest came
in. I hope B.B.C. will comply.
1 ie, Malay ministers in the Malayan government.
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5. We must, I think, almost at all costs avoid suspending the constitution. We
could do it but the operation would mean virtually a military reoccupation of
Singapore and once accomplished the accusations of neo-colonialism would be so
strong that in the end our whole position here would be undermined.
6. Our course should be to let 16th September dawn as quietly as possible when
control of the forces passes to Kuala Lumpur and then base our subsequent action on
the clear opinion already expressed in Singapore:—
(a) by referendum,
(b) by decisions of the Singapore Assembly,
(c) by the signature of the Prime Minister on the Malaysia Agreement,
(d) by Singapore’s concurrence with the Agong’s announcement of 16th
September,
(e) by Lee’s speech on 31st August when he said that 16th September was an
‘irrevocable date’,
(f ) by the Order in Council, of which Lee has been informed and has made no
comment.
7. Lee cannot call the Assembly together because it is dissolved. In the
circumstances, therefore, we could not break our undertaking now fully
substantiated by constitutional processes, on the grounds that the Singapore
Government had changed their minds, revoked all previous solemn undertakings
and resorted to measures unsupported by any constitutional law.
8. This procedure will, of course, depend on the full co-operation of the
Malayans. If their nerves give way we will, I believe, have no alternative but to
negotiate with Lee on the basis of the independence.
221 PREM 11/4350, T470/63 5 Sept 1963
[Unilateral declaration of independence by Singapore]: inward
telegram SOSLON 109 from Mr Sandys to Mr Macmillan
For Prime Minister from Commonwealth Secretary.
Situation in Singapore
As you will have seen, a potentially explosive situation is developing in Singapore.
2. Lee Kuan Yew (Prime Minister of Singapore) is unashamely [sic] exploiting
the delay in the establishment of Malaysia to further his personal ambitions. Political
blackmail or ‘brinkmanship’ (as he described it to me himself) is his normal method
of achieving his ends. While expressing enthusiasm for Malaysia, his objective is to
show up the Tunku as feeble and wooly [sic] minded and to build up his own
reputation as a tough, clear sighted leader whose will it would be dangerous for
anyone to oppose. He speaks freely about his wish to get rid of the Tunku within the
next two or three years when his usefulness has been exhausted. Although he
professes to believe that a Chinaman could not become Prime Minister of Malaysia, I
have little doubt that is his goal.
3. It is against this background that we must view his recent unilateral
declaration that he had taken over Britain’s remaining powers in Singapore.
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4. He realises that his declaration has no legal validity and that the British
Government would not tolerate any attempt by him actually to exercise powers
which he purports to have assumed. On the other hand, this act of public defiance
towards Britain and Malaya has no doubt helped to strengthen the public image of
himself which he wishes to create.
5. I naturally considered with Selkirk the advisability of immediately denouncing
Lee Kuan Yew’s arrogant statement. But whilst it was very tempting to cut him down
to size we felt that the all important thing was to get over the remaining fortnight
before Malaysia Day without an open clash with Lee.
6. He is not a man who climbs down. Once he has committed himself to a
definite course and has accepted a carefully calculated risk, he is likely to go through
with it, for better or worse. Therefore if we were to humiliate him publicly, he would,
I believe, retaliate with further acts of defiance of one kind or another and we might
very quickly be forced to suspend the constitution.
7. If the transfer to Malaysia of sovereignty over Singapore were to take place at a
time when the constitution was suspended we would be accused throughout the
world of handing over the people of Singapore against their will. Thus it seemed to
me that, even at the risk of appearing feeble, it was in our interest to do everything
possible to avoid that situation.
8. That is why I did not immediately react in any way to Lee Kuan Yew’s
declaration.
9. Unfortunately, the Malayan Government did not feel able likewise to lie quiet.
As you know, without consulting me, they issued a public protest in which they
asked the British Government to clarify the position. In the joint statement
subsequently issued by Tun Razak (Deputy Prime Minister of Malaya) and myself, I
was able to avoid any direct reference to Lee’s declaration and to confine myself to a
factual statement of the constitutional position which without saying so showed that
Lee’s assumption of powers had no legal effect. (See telegram No. 1825 from Kuala
Lumpur).
10. Now that the immediate excitement has subsided, I am sending Lee a letter
which will put briefly on the record that we do not recognise that his declaration has
any validity. This letter would not be published unless further developments made it
necessary.
11. So much for past events. More serious difficulties lie ahead.
12. Lee’s declaration of 31st August is only the first round we have several more
rounds to get through before Malaysia Day.
13. In recent weeks Lee threatened that, if the Malayan Government did not give
him what he demanded, he would hold elections and seek a vote of confidence from
the people. Now he has done it. The Singapore Parliament has been dissolved.
Nomination day has been fixed for September 12th. Polling day will probably be
about ten days later (i.e. after Malaysia Day).1
14. Lee has so far not announced the issues on which he will fight the election.
But he is threatening that, unless the Malayan Government give him satisfaction on
1 Elections to Singapore’s Legislative Assembly were held on 21 Sept, five days after the inauguration of
Malaysia. The results (PAP 37, Barisan Sosialis 13, United People’s Party 1) shattered the Tunku’s hopes
for Alliance control and restored the PAP to the commanding position which it had lost in July 1961 when
rebels defected to form the Barisan Sosialis, see 49, note.
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various points connected with the Malaysia Agreement, he will declare independence
on September 12th and will ask the electors of Singapore to endorse this with their
votes.
15. His line would probably be:—
(a) That he is still whole heartedly in favour of Malaysia, but that he wishes to
ensure that Singapore is given a fair deal.
(b) That since the date of 31st August contained in the London agreement, was
not adhered to, he does not consider himself any longer bound by the agreement;
(c) that, as head of an independent sovereign nation, he will renegotiate the terms
on which Singapore will enter Malaysia.
16. If he were to do this, we would be faced with most awkward situation. His
declaration of independence would of course, be just as invalid as his recent
declaration about the transfer of powers, and it is probable, though not certain, that
between September 12th and September 16th (Malaysia Day) he would take no
physical action to flout British authority in Singapore. We would have to settle
publicly that his unilateral declaration was legally meaningless. But it might not be
possible to stop there. If he were openly inciting the populace to rebellion, we might
find it extremely difficult not to arrest him and suspend the constitution.
17. However in my opinion Lee will not wish to provoke the British
Government into suspending the constitution before Malaysia Day and that, while
behaving in an insolent fashion, he will try and avoid action which would force us
to take this step.
18. The real difficulty is more likely to arise on Malaysia Day itself, when the
Kuala Lumpur authorities come in to take over those functions which, under the
Malaysia constitution, would be the responsibility of the Federal Government. These
include the control of the police, and it’s quite possible that Lee will tell his police
not to take orders from the Chief Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur. He would
doubtless give the same instructions to Civil Servants in those Government
Departments which are due to be taken over by the Federation.
19. As from Malaysia Day, it would of course be for the Government in Kuala
Lumpur to deal with this ugly situation. Unless they were prepared to capitulate,
they would have no option but to declare a state of emergency, and remove Lee’s
administration from office and probably arrest him. There would no doubt be
disorders among the Chinese population, the seriousness of which would depend
upon how far the police, who are mainly Malays, would obey Lee’s instructions to
defy the Federal authority. In any case it is more than likely that British troops would
be needed to help the civil power in maintaining law and order.
20. I discussed this possibility frankly with Tun Razak yesterday. He agreed with
my suggestion that the Malayan Security authorities and the British authorities from
Singapore should concert plans to deal with this eventuality. A first meeting is taking
place today.
21. Tun Razak assured me that the Malayan Government were irrevocably
committed to Malaysia, and that they would go through with it whatever happened. I
believe that he speaks for most of the Ministers but I am not so completely confident
about the attitude of the Tunku himself. As I told you in an earlier telegram he is
suffering seriously from cold feet and although I think it unlikely, it is just possible
that at the last moment he might refuse to take over Singapore. This would obviously
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face us with a most awkward dilemma which I will not discuss now.
22. With these uncomfortable possibilities in mind, it is of the utmost
importance to avoid if at all possible a head-on collision with Lee between now and
September 16th. I have therefore strongly urged the Malayan Government to
concede as far as they possibly can the demands which Lee has made regarding the
Malaysia Constitution. Most of them are not unreasonable and are based upon rather
loosely worded undertakings given by the Tunku to Lee in London, though
admittedly Lee is trying to interpret these undertakings in a manner excessively
favourable to himself.
23. With this in view I have helped the Malayan Government to draft a letter to
Lee in a placatory tone, and to meet him on as many points as possible, they will no
doubt argue these points by correspondence during the next few days. At the end I
hope we shall reach the position where the Malayan Government have succeeded in
reducing Lee’s unsatisfied requirements to one or two points on which his demands
can be seen to be unreasonable and which would not justify him in taking so drastic
a step as a declaration of independence.
24. But even if he gets his way on all points I do not put it past Lee to think up a
new set of demands. Think therefore that it is wise to assume that we are going to
have trouble and to prepare for the worst.
25. I am dictating this on my way from Kuala Lumpur to Colombo where I shall
be spending two days to try and impress upon Mrs. Bandaranaike2 the short
sightedness of her policy towards British commercial interests in Ceylon. I am then
going on to the Maldives to try and settle our differences with the Sultan.3 After that I
was due to go to Aden. But in view of the critical situation created by Lee Kuan Yew I
have cancelled my visit to Aden and am instead returning to Kuala Lumpur on
Monday.
26. The concessions which I hope to persuade the Malayan Government to make
may induce Lee to go into Malaysia quietly. But unless I mistake his character, he
will bluff, bully and blackmail up to the eleventh hour. In these circumstances it
seems to me essential that I should remain on the spot. This will I hope enable
me:—
(a) To restrain the Malayan Government from adopting a provocative or
overintransigent attitude towards Lee.
(b) To try and help the two of them reach agreement, and
(c) To stiffen the Tunku’s resolve to go through with Malaysia if he should show
signs of wavering. It would seem silly for the sake of a few days not to do
everything in my power to save Malaysia from the possibility of collapse, with all
that that would imply.
2 Mrs Sirimavo R D Bandaranaike, leader of Sri Lanka Freedom Party after assassination of her husband,
Solomon W R D Bandaranaike, in 1959; prime minister, 1960–1965, 1970–1977—the world’s first woman
prime minister.
3 The development of a joint strategy with the US in the Indian Ocean depended on the island bases,
notably Gan in the Maldives, see Hyam and Louis, eds, BDEE: The Conservative government, 1957–1964,
xliv and document 60. The purpose of Sandys’ visit was to restore the authority of the Maldives
government over Addu Atoll where Gan was situated.
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27. Consequently, if you approve, I propose to remain in this area until we have
put Singapore safely in the bag on 16th September. In that case I could stay on the
extra two days for the Malaysia celebrations. This would make it unnecessary to find
another Cabinet Colleague to take this on.4
4 Macmillan approved Sandys’ request to return to Kuala Lumpur and reported developments to Cabinet
on 12 Sept (CAB 128/37, CC 52(63)1).
222 PREM 11/4440 5 Sept 1963
[Difficulties with Malaysia]: letter from Mr Macmillan to HM the
Queen [Extract]
[Macmillan recounted the difficulties in a letter in which he also commented on his
recent visit to Finland and Sweden, the prospects for an improvement in East-West
relations in the aftermath of the test ban treaty, Lord Denning’s imminent report on the
security aspects of the Profumo affair, the future leadership of the Conservative Party, the
life of the present parliament, and the state of the economy.]
. . . Malaysia
Your majesty will have been following the complicated story of Malaysia. Our
immediate difficulties began with the Tunku’s acceptance at the Manila meeting,
which was attended by the Malayans, Philippinos and Indonesians, of the idea of a
United Nations supervised plebiscite with ‘observers’ from the three Manila
countries. I am not entirely clear why the Tunku accepted this plan but it seems to
have been an attempt to gain greater international support for the view that the
Indonesians were being unreasonable. However, the result was to cause doubt about
the possibility of achieving Malaysia at all and certainly about the date on which it
should start. The Commonwealth Secretary, with his usual energy and decisiveness,
went out to the area. He has, I feel, been remarkably successful, first in securing
general agreement to the date of September 16 for the establishment of Malaysia, and
secondly in keeping the rather difficult constituent parts of Malaysia more or less
together. The Tunku seems to have behaved in his characteristically impulsive way;
Mr. Lee Kwan Yew has tried to exploit the difficulties to his own advantage. The
Indonesians were particularly unreasonable in trying to bring more ‘observers’ in
than had been agreed and in trying to insert into their party a majority of
intelligence officers with a view to causing as much mischief as they could. However,
the Commonwealth Secretary was very successful in preventing this and the
Indonesians have finally accepted something not too different from the original
proposal. Meanwhile the United Nations team have been doing their work and ought
to submit their report in a few more days. We hope that it will be favourable to
Malaysia, although the Indonesians will of course say that the enquiry was not
properly conducted or was hampered by British colonial rule. However, I trust that
Malaysia will in fact come into being on the new date. Since the Commonwealth
Secretary proposes to come back before then it may be necessary to ask Your
Majesty’s permission for another Cabinet Minister to go out to represent Your
Majesty’s Government at the celebrations.1 . . .
1 On the same day, however, Sandys reported a ‘potentially explosive situation’ requiring him to remain in
the area until the successful inauguration of Malaysia, see 221.
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223 PREM 11/4350 12 Sept 1963
[Report of UN mission to Malaysia]: inward telegram OCULAR 1431
from Sir P Dean to Lord Home
[Led by Lawrence Michelmore (the American deputy director of the UN Office of
Personnel) the mission consisted of Czech, Argentinian, Ceylonese, Ghanaian, Pakistani,
Japanese, Jordanian and Brazilian members of the UN Secretariat. It was accompanied by
observers from Indonesia and the Philippines. The mission arrived in Kuching on 16 Aug
and divided into two teams, one for Sarawak and the other for Sabah. From 24 Aug to 4
Sept they conducted formal hearings for the ‘ascertainment’ (as it was called) of the
wishes of Borneo peoples. In case the mission found against Malaysia, Sandys supervised
the drafting of a joint Anglo–Malayan statement setting out the history of consultations.
In the event, it was not required: the report and U Thant’s assessment of it were in general
highly favourable to Malaysia (see 225). The parties concerned were given copies of the
ascertainment before publication day on 14 Sept. While Macmillan regarded it as
‘satisfactory, if pedantic’, the Philippines and Indonesia attacked the report, and Indonesia
went so far as to criticise the UN itself. For the UN mission see FO 371/169712–169719.]
I saw the Secretary-General this afternoon. He had had a very rough time with the
representatives of the three Manila Powers in the afternoon and was rather
depressed.
2. The Indonesians and Filipinos had not submitted written views. Lopez1 had
complained about the delay in issuing visas to observers. The Secretary-General had
replied that this was none of his business and did not relate to Michelmore’s report.
Lopez went on to complain about the announcement of September 16 as the date for
Malaysia, which he represented as a slight to the Secretary-General, and he made a
great thing of contrasting a British-sponsored Malaysia with a Malaysia born of the
goodwill of the three countries in the area. Lopez had hoped that Michelmore’s
report would enable Malaysia to take the latter form, but this was not now to be.
3. The Indonesians echoed Lopez’s points. In addition they said Michelmore’s
team had been too small and the time too short for thorough ascertainment. The
Manila joint statement2 had asked for a fresh approach. Michelmore had clearly not
adopted such an approach and simply confined himself to rubber-stamping the
actions of the imperialists. At this point doubts were cast on Michelmore’s
impartiality.
4. Both Lopez and the Indonesians made it clear that they resented the
categorical tone of the report, a tone which could not be justified in the light of the
superficial approach adopted by the team. The Indonesians said that they would have
accepted U Thant’s findings if a comprehensive ascertainment had been made, since
they would then have been able to persuade their population that Malaysia did
represent the will of the people of the Borneo territories. Michelmore had frustrated
this ambition by conducting such a haphazard investigation.
5. The Indonesians and Filipinos were united in blaming the British as the
villains of the piece. If the Malayans had been left alone an accommodation between
them and the Indonesians and Filipinos would have been easily reached.
6. The Indonesians and Filipinos asked for a further meeting with the Secretary-
General tomorrow. He told them that this was impossible and said that if they had
any further views they should put them in writing by 10.30 tomorrow morning.
1 Salvador P Lopez, foreign secretary of the Philippines, 1963, and representative at the UN, 1964.
2 See 200, note.
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7. The Filipino and Indonesian observers left written aide-mémoires with the
Secretary-General which he has not yet read, incorporating their comments on the
ascertainment team’s activities. The Secretary-General is wondering whether to
append these aide-mémoires to the report when published. I discouraged him.
8. I asked the Secretary-General whether, in his view, the Indonesians and
Filipinos intended to reject his conclusions and to continue stirring up trouble in the
area. He was inclined to think that this would be the case, although he thought it
possible that their fire and fury was directed to trying to influence the form and
content of his conclusions and that when these were out they would acquiesce in
Malaysia’s formation. He is not optimistic, however. I took the opportunity to stress
again that a short categorical report from him would be the best way to persuade the
Indonesians and Filipinos that there was no profit for them in continuing to make a
fuss about Malaysia.
224 PREM 11/4350 13 Sept 1963
[Sarawak’s head of state]: inward telegram SOSLON 152 from Mr
Sandys for Mr Macmillan, reporting resolution of the crisis
I much appreciated your message in LONGSOS [LONSOS] No. 209.1 I have delivered
your letter to the Tunku.2 This came at a timely moment and he was most gratified
by your good wishes and support on the eve of his assumption of new and rather
frightening responsibilities.
2. Now that the Secretary General’s report has given us a completely clean bill of
health I think we are entitled to ask the Americans to use their influence to the full at
Djakarta and at the United Nations to deter the Indonesians from further
intervention.3
3. If after Malaysia Day the Indonesians repeat their accusation that British or
Malaysian troops are carrying out raids across their border I think we should
consider urging the New Malaysian Government to propose to the Indonesians that
they should jointly request the United Nations to establish observers on both sides of
1 Macmillan congratulated Sandys on having ‘done wonders’ in bringing about agreement between Malaya
and Singapore, see 220, note.
2 Macmillan’s letter was to soothe the Tunku’s feelings. De Zulueta informed the prime minister that ‘Mr
Sandys’ victory has been rather a Pyrric [sic] one’ because the Tunku ‘was rubbed up the wrong way by the
Commonwealth Secretary’. As a result of rough treatment, the Tunku ‘apparently indicated that he would
do whatever the British wanted but that he washed his hands of the results. In other words, he no longer
feels personally responsible for Malaysia and if he can do a deal with the Indonesians by himself, he will’.
Addressing the Tunku as ‘Dear Friend’, Macmillan credited him with inspiring ‘the conception of Malaysia’
and expressed great admiration for ‘your subtlety and your courage in pursuing the main aim while
seeking so far as possible to disarm the opponents of Malaysia and deprive them of good propaganda
positions’. Notwithstanding Macmillan’s cordial message, Sandys’ conduct rankled and four months later
the Tunku recalled in a conversation with Robert Kennedy how ‘Sandys came as a friend and became a
nuisance’ (de Zulueta to Macmillan, 11 Sept; Macmillan to Sandys, 11 Sept; Macmillan to the Tunku, 12
Sept, PREM 11/4350; DO 169/266; Matthew Jones, Conflict and confrontation in South East Asia,
1961–1965, Cambridge, 2002, p 252).
3 Howard P Jones, US ambassador in Jakarta since 1958, was central to American efforts to cultivate the
Sukarno regime, and Britain’s ambassador in Jakarta, Andrew Gilchrist, blamed him for America’s
coolness towards the Malaysia project, see FO 371/169888.
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the Sarawak border so that mutual accusations may be verified and the facts made
known to the world. The Indonesians would no doubt refuse but this would show
that they had something to hide and put them in a bad light.
4. You will have seen that we have been through a short but really explosive crisis
over the choice of the new Head of State for Sarawak (to be known as ‘Governor’).4
5. Under the London agreement the first Governor has to be nominated jointly
by The Queen and the King of Malaya (Agong).
6. Although the Government party in Kuching which has a large majority
unanimously urged the appointment of the Dyak leader Jugah the Tunku adamantly
opposed it and insisted upon the appointment of a Malay. His party has been
becoming increasingly nervous about the prospect of other races securing a position
of undue influence in the new Federation. In fact an emergency meeting of the
Executive was held yesterday at which it was made clear that the party would not
support the Tunku in any further concessions to non-Malay interest.
7. The Malayan Cabinet also had a special meeting to discuss this matter.
Afterwards the Tunku told me that the situation had got to the point where his
Government would collapse if a Malay did not get the job in Sarawak. The Cabinet
had decided that unless a Malay was appointed Governor they would have to go ahead
without Sarawak or alternatively if we would not agree to that Malaysia would have
to be abandoned altogether.
8. I said I could not seriously believe he would throw everything overboard at the
last moment on account of party political pressures and that he ought to lead his
party and not follow it. I instanced the leadership which you had given to the
Conservative Party over the Common Market and at the same time I made it clear
that we would not be prepared to allow Malaysia to go forward without Sarawak.
9. However, it was clear to me that the Tunku was seriously afraid of being
overthrown by his party executive that very day and that the other Ministers present
shared this fear. There was therefore no hope of his giving way.
10. For my part I was not prepared to make a recommendation to The Queen
which ran directly counter to the wishes of the Dyaks upon whom our troops are so
dependent for information about Indonesian movements and for guidance through the
jungle. Thus it was evident that the only way out was to try and persuade the Dyaks to
change their mind. I therefore got the governor to fly over to Kuala Lumpur with a
strong delegation of 15 Sarawak leaders including the Chief Minister and Jugah.
11. After a variety of meetings and many rough (? words) on all sides the matter
was finally settled on the basis of a compromise which I suggested namely:—
(a) that a Malay should be appointed as first Governor for two years;5
(b) that it should be clearly understood that the Agong would appoint as his
successor whomsoever the Chief Minister of Sarawak recommended (i.e. a Dyak) and
(c) that in return Jugah should be appointed Minister of Sarawak Affairs resident
in Sarawak with a seat in the new Malaysian Federal Cabinet (on the lines of our
own wartime pattern).6
4 See 210. 5 Dato Abang Haji Openg was appointed.
6 In addition, Peter Lo was made minister for Sabah Affairs in the federal Cabinet, but Singapore was not
represented in this way. The ‘wartime pattern’ refers to Churchill’s appointment of, for example,
Macmillan as minister resident in North Africa.
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12. This arrangement has just been confirmed at a signing ceremony with
speeches of mutual congratulation and the Dyaks are returning to Sarawak in a
smiling mood.7
13. I obtained The Queen’s approval during the night and the appointment of a
respected Malay personality, Openg, will be announced later today.
14. Now that (touch wood) all outstanding questions seem to have been
resolved I have decided to pay a three day farewell visit to the Borneo Territories. I
am leaving today Friday for Jesselton. On Saturday I shall fly to Kuching stopping
off for a few hours in Brunei to talk to the Sultan. I will spend Sunday in the
jungle in Sarawak visiting our troops with the Commander in Chief. On Monday
morning (Malaysia Day) I will attend the flag raising ceremony in Kuching. Then I
will fly on to Singapore and attend the Malaysia Day rally in the afternoon,
returning to Kuala Lumpur in the evening for the Federal celebrations on Tuesday
and Wednesday.
15. I plan to arrive back in London on Friday just in time to open the Zanzibar
Independence Conference that morning.8
7 The agreement, dated 13 Sept 1963, was presented as a ‘Joint Statement’ and signed by the Tunku,
Sandys, Dr Sockalingham (speaker of the Council Negri or state legislative assembly) and Temenggong
Jugah. The British, signed copy is at DO 118/266. The statement runs as follows:—
‘The London Agreement on Malaysia provides that the first Governor of Sarawak shall be appointed
on the nomination of the Queen and the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.
‘The Malayan Government have maintained that since the Chief Minister in Sarawak is an Iban, the
first Governor should be a Malay. For the sake of unity and goodwill on the eve of the formation of
Malaysia, Temeggong Jugah has generously asked that his name should not be considered for the first
Governorship. This has enabled general consent to be given to the appointment of a Malay, it being
understood that, when the term of office of the first Governor expires, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong will
be graciously pleased to give favourable consideration to the appointment as Governor of the person
whom the Chief Minister may recommend.
‘Meanwhile, recognising the outstanding position which he holds in the life of Sarawak, the
Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, has offered Temenggong Jugah a post in the Federal
Malaysian Cabinet as Minister for Sarawak Affairs resident in Sarawak, which he has been pleased to
accept.’
A photostat of the statement in the papers of Sir Alexander Waddell is accompanied by the following
unsigned and undated explanation in Waddell’s hand:—
‘On the eve of Malaysia deadlock was reached over the question of the Governorship of Sarawak—
due to insistence by Tungku Abdul Rahman that a Malay should be Governor, and equal determination
in Sarawak that an Iban (Sea Dayak) should be. Duncan Sandys summoned all to Kuala Lumpur for 3
days of gruelling negotiation.
‘Temenggong Jugah, leader of the Ibans, withdrew in order to save Malaysia.
‘This paper was signed by Tungku Abdul Rahman, Duncan Sandys, Dr Sockalingham (Speaker
Sarawak) & the Temenggong.’
See Waddell Papers, file 7, ff 150–151.
8 See Hyam and Louis, eds, BDEE: The Conservative government, 1957–1964, part I, 137.
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225 PREM 11/4350 13 Sept 1963
[Report of UN mission to Malaysia]: inward telegram OCULAR 1441
from Sir P Dean to Lord Home, forwarding the text of U Thant’s final
conclusions
Following is text of the Secretary General’s final conclusions:—1
Begins: In response to the request made by the Governments of the Federation of
Malaya, the Republic of Indonesia, and the Republic of the Philippines, on 5 August
1963, I agreed to ascertain, prior to the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia,
the wishes of the people of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak. As foreseen in my
communication of 8 August 1963, a mission was established, comprising two teams,
one for Sarawak and the other for Sabah (North Borneo), working under the
supervision of my personal representative. The mission has now completed the
inquiry assigned to it, and has reported to me.
I wish, first of all, to express my gratitude to the three Governments for the
confidence they placed in me by requesting that I should undertake the task of
ascertaining the wishes of the population of Sarawak and North Borneo (Sabah) prior
to the establishment of Malaysia. I also wish to express my appreciation to the
Government of the United Kingdom and of the authorities of the two territories for
having given their agreement to the inquiry and their full cooperation to the
mission.
It was always understood that the ascertainment would be completed within a
limited period of time, and my communication of 8 August noted that every effort
would be made to complete the task as quickly as possible. I later informed the
Governments concerned that I would endeavour to report my conclusions by 14
September. During the course of the enquiry, the date of 16 September 1963 was
announced by the Government of the Federation of Malaya with the concurrence of
the British Government, the Singapore Government and the Governments of Sabah
and Sarawak, for the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia. This has led to
misunderstanding, confusion and even resentment among other parties to the
Manila agreement, which could have been avoided if the date could have been fixed
after my conclusions had been reached and made known.
There was no reference to a referendum or plebiscite in the request which was
addressed to me. I was asked to ascertain the wishes of the people ‘within the context
of General Assembly resolution 1541 (xv), principle ix of the annex, by a fresh
approach’ which in my opinion was necessary ‘to ensure complete compliance with
the principle of self determination within the requirements embodied in principle ix’,
taking into consideration certain questions relating to the recent elections. The
mission accordingly arranged for consultations with the population through the
elected representatives of the people, leaders of political parties and other groups and
organisations, and with all persons who were willing to express their views, and every
1 These conclusion were printed as the preface of the mission’s report which was published on 14 Sept. The
UN report was the first publication of Malaysia’s Department of Information which produced it as a
pamphlet for wide circulation on Malaysia Day itself.
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effort was made to ascertain the wishes of the special groups (political detainees and
absentees) mentioned in the Manila joint statement. The mission gathered and
studied all available documents, reports and other material on the governmental
institutions, political organisation, electoral processes in the two territories, and
other matters relevant to its terms of reference.
Federation of Malaya, the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines
deemed it desirable to send observers to witness the carrying out of the task, and the
Government of the United Kingdom decided that it also wished the same facility.
Although I did not consider the arrangements for observers to be part of the Secretary
General’s responsibility, I endeavoured to help the Governments concerned to reach
agreement, and I am pleased that an understanding was finally arrived at so that
observers of all the Governments concerned could be present during at least part of
the enquiry. It is a matter for regret that this understanding could not have been
reached earlier, so that all observers could have been present in the territories for the
entire period of the enquiries, and that questions of detail pertaining to the status of
the observers unnecessarily delayed even further their arrival. A more congenial
atmosphere would have been achieved if the necessary facilities had been granted more
promptly by the administering authority. The mission, however, made its records,
including tape recordings of all its hearings, available for the use of the observer teams
to enable them to inform themselves as fully as possible of what had occurred before
their arrival.
The basic assessment which I was asked to make has broader implications than the
specific questions enumerated in the request addressed to me by the three
Governments. As mentioned previously, I was asked to ‘ascertain, prior to the
establishment of the Federation of Malaysia, the wishes of the people of Sabah (North
Borneo) and Sarawak within the context of General Assembly resolution 1541 (xv),
principle ix of the annex, by a fresh approach which in the opinion of the Secretary
General is necessary to ensure complete compliance with the principle of self
determination within the requirements embodied in principle ix.’
Concerning the integration of a non-self-governing territory with an already
independent State, principle ix provides:—
‘Integration should have come about in the following circumstances:—
(a) The integrating territory should have attained an advanced stage of self
government with free political institutions, so that its peoples would have the
capacity to make a responsible choice through informed and democratic
processes.
(b) The integration should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the
territory’s peoples acting with full knowledge of the change in their status,
their wishes having been expressed through informed and democratic
processes, conducted and based on universal adult suffrage. The United
Nations could, when it deems it necessary, supervise these processes’.
I have given consideration to the circumstances in which the proposals for the
Federation of Malaysia have been developed and discussed, and the possibility
that people progressing through the stages of self government may be less able
to consider in an entirely free context the implications of such changes in their
status, than a society which has already experienced full self government and
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the determination of its own affairs. I have also been aware that the peoples of
the territories are still striving for a more adequate level of educational
development.
Having reflected fully on these considerations, and taking into account the
framework within which the mission’s task was performed, I have come to the
conclusion that the majority of the peoples of Sabah (North Borneo) and of Sarawak,
have given serious and thoughtful consideration to their future, and to the
implications for them of participation in a Federation of Malaysia. I believe that the
majority of them have concluded that they wish to bring their dependent status to an
end and to realize their independence through freely chosen association with other
peoples in their region with whom they feel ties of ethnic association, heritage,
language, religion, culture, economic relationship, and ideals and objectives. Not all
of these considerations are present in equal weight in all minds, but it is my
conclusion that the majority of the peoples of the two territories having taken them
into account, wish to engage, with the peoples of the Federation of Malaya and
Singapore, in an enlarged Federation of Malaysia, through which they can strive
together to realize the fulfilment of their destiny.
With regard to the more specific questions referred to me, my conclusions, after
the examination and verification reported by the mission, are:—
(a) Malaysia has been the subject of wide-spread and intensive public debate and
was a major issue in the recent elections in the two territories.
(b) Electoral registers were properly compiled.
(c) The elections took place in an atmosphere free enough to enable the
candidates and political parties to put their case before the electorate, and the
people were able to express themselves freely by casting their votes in a polling
system which provided the basic safeguards for secret balloting, and measures for
the prevention and correction of abuses.
(d) The votes were properly polled and counted.
(e) Persons otherwise eligible to vote but who were unable to do so because of
detention for political activities or imprisonment for political offences numbered
somewhat less than 100 in Sarawak, and even less in Sabah (North Borneo) at the
time of the elections. Testimony given by this group, especially in Sarawak,
indicated that they would have opposed the Federation of Malaysia if they had
participated in the election. The actual votes of this group would not have been
sufficient to have had a material effect on the result. The mission has given much
attention to the possible effect which the absence of these persons, some of whom
were officials of the anti-Malaysia party, might have had on the campaign. The
mission considered the similar question concerning some 164 persons whose
activity was restricted to some extent, but who retained the right to vote. Noting
that the anti-Malaysia party scored convincing electoral victories in many of the
areas to which these persons belonged, I accept the mission’s conclusion that a
substantial limitation of the campaigning potential of the group opposed to the
Federation of Malaysia has not occurred, so as seriously and significantly to have
affected the result of the election.
(f ) The mission made special efforts to obtain reliable information regarding
persons who were absent from the territories at the time of the election,
particularly as a result of possible political or other intimidation. The evidence
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available indicated that the number of such persons, other wishes [?otherwise]
qualified to vote, did not exceed a few hundred, and that their number could not
have affected the results of the election. I note that the principal officials of the
Sarawak United Peoples Party, which is opposed to the Federation of Malaysia,
agree with this assessment, and I accept it.
Bearing in mind the fundamental agreement of the three participating Governments
in the Manila meetings, and the statement by the Republic of Indonesia and the
Republic of the Philippines that they would welcome the formation of Malaysia
provided that the support of the people of the territories was ascertained by me and
that, in my opinion, complete compliance with the principle of self determination
within the requirements of General Assembly resolution 1541 (xv), principle ix of the
annex, was ensured, my conclusions, based on the findings of the mission, is that on
both of these counts there is no doubt about the wishes of a sizable majority of the
peoples of these territories to join in the Federation of Malaysia.
In reaching my conclusions, I have taken account of the concern expressed with
regard to the political factors resulting from the constitutional status of the
territories, and about influences from outside the area on the promotion of the
proposed Federation. Giving these considerations their due weight, in relation to
the responsibilities and obligations established in article 73 and General Assembly
resolution 1541 (xv) in respect of the territories, I am satisified that the conclusions
set forth above take cognizance of the requirements set forth in the request
addressed to me on 5 August 1963 by the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of
Indonesia, the Federation of Malaya and the Republic of the Philippines.
Before concluding, I would like to pay a tribute to my personal representative, Mr.
L. Michelmore, my deputy representative, Mr. G. Janecek,2 and to all the members of
the United Nations Malaysia mission who accomplished a sensitive and difficult task
in a relatively short period, but at the same time in a thorough and wholly adequate
manner. In a sense, it was a pity that the work of the mission had to be accomplished
within certain deadlines. But I do feel that, while more time might have enabled the
mission to obtain more copious documentation and other evidence, it would not
have affected the conclusions to any significant extent.
From the beginning of this year I have been observing the rising tension in South
East Asia on account of the differences of opinion among the countries most directly
interested in the Malaysia issue. It was in the hope that some form of United Nations
involvement might help to reduce tension that I agreed to respond positively to the
request made by the three Manila Powers. I would hope that the exercise in which my
colleagues and I have been involved in this regard will have this effect, and that the
coming into being of Malaysia will not prove to be a continuing source of friction and
tension in the area.
The emergence of dependent territories by a process of self-determination to the
status of self government, either as independent sovereign States or as autonomous
components of larger units, has always been one of the purposes of the Charter and
the objectives of the United Nations.
Whatever the origins of the proposal of Malaysia may have been, it seems to me in
2 Michelmore led the mission, assisted by Janecek of Czechoslovakia.
14-Malaysia-175-227-cpp  21/9/04  9:08 AM  Page 577
578 MALAYSIA POSTPONED [226]
the light of actual events, including the present exercise, that we have witnessed in
Sarawak and North Borneo the same process leading to self government. I fervently
hope that the people of these territories will achieve progress and prosperity and find
their fulfilment as component States of Malaysia. Ends.
226 DO 169/223, no 31 18 Sept 1963
‘Britain’s gift to Malaysia’: inward telegram no 2011 from Sir G Tory
to the CRO, forwarding the text of Mr Sandys’ message to Tunku
Abdul Rahman on the inauguration of Malaysia
[Governors Waddell and Goode departed Borneo on the eve of Malaysia Day. On Malaysia
Day itself, 16 Sept 1963, Sandys attended the flag-raising ceremony in Kuching in the
morning, flew to Singapore for a rally in the afternoon and returned to Kuala Lumpur for
the federal celebrations on 17–18 Sept. Alastair Morrison, Sarawak’s information officer,
has recalled that the new era for Sarawak ‘did not get off to a very auspicious start. The
new Governor, Datu Abang Haji Openg, almost collapsed during the inauguration
ceremony. It was understandable. He was not in strong health; it was a moment of great
emotional stress for him; and he was a very religious man who had been occupied with
his devotions for most of the previous night.’ Duncan Sandys, however, was a ‘satisfied
spectator’ who ‘looked like a well-pleased midwife who has brought a difficult
accouchement to a successful conclusion’, although he did comment privately that ‘after
agreement had been reached with such pain, I did not bargain for the new Governor
collapsing at his inauguration!’ (Alastair Morrison, Fair land Sarawak. Some
recollections of an expatriate official, New York, 1993, p149; Sandys to Waddell, 20 Sept
1963, Sandys Papers, 8/14). Later that day, Sandys and Ismail (representing Malaysia)
stood on the steps of City Hall, Singapore, alongside Lee Kuan Yew who celebrated both
the fulfilment of a political ambition to achieve independence through merger and his
fortieth birthday (Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore story, pp 504–505). The following day
Lee joined Sandys, Lansdowne and Selkirk (making his last appearance as commissioner-
general for SE Asia) in celebrations in Merdeka Stadium, Kuala Lumpur, where six years
and sixteen days previously the Tunku had proclaimed Malayan independence.
Meanwhile, Indonesia refused to recognise the new state and on 18 Sept the British
embassy in Jakarta was looted and burned in the climax to several days of demonstrations
against Malaysia.]
In making the presentation to the Prime Minister of Malaysia the Commonwealth
Secretary read the following message:—
Begins: ‘I have pleasure in presenting to you this gift from the British
Government to the Government of Malaysia. This piece of modern silver specially
designed by British craftsmen for the occasion brings with it the greetings of the
people of Britain.
In your person we salute the man who conceived the inspiring idea of Malaysia and
who possessed the skill and determination to bring it to fruition. Her Majesty The
Queen has transferred to His Majesty the Agong Her Sovereignty over Singapore,
Sabah and Sarawak in the knowledge that this is the clear wish of their peoples. The
inhabitants of these three territories have freely decided to achieve their
independence as self-governing states in the Federation of Malaysia. I am sure that
they have chosen wisely and that Malaysia will offer to them and all its citizens
widening opportunities for progress and prosperity.
We have all admired the patient efforts which you have made to explain and justify
Malaysia to other nations and to remove doubts and fears in the minds of your
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neighbours. We are glad that you have been rewarded by the congratulations and
good wishes of almost the entire world. If there are one or two exceptions the fault
certainly does not lie with you.
For a number of years Britain and Malaya have worked constructively for peace
and progress and when necessary we have stood firmly together in the defence of
freedom. As it was with Malaya so it will be with the enlarged Federation of Malaysia.
Insofar as you need it Britain will be ready to help in any way she can to defend
Malaysia’s independence and integrity.
As members of the Commonwealth Malaysia and Britain will maintain a
continuous and intimate contact with one another; through this multi-racial
fellowship of free nations Britain and Malaysia will together play their part in
promoting understanding between the nations and in strengthening the cause of
freedom and peace throughout the world.
The friendship and confidence between us have been further cemented by the
common efforts we have made to build Malaysia. On behalf of the British
Government and the British people I express to the Government and people of
Malaysia our warm good wishes for the future.
227 DO 169/223, no 32 19 Sept 1963
‘Britain’s gift to Malaysia’: inward telegram no 2026 from Sir G Tory
to the CRO, forwarding the text of Tunku Abdul Rahman’s reply to 
Mr Sandys
Following is text of Tunku’s reply to Commonwealth Secretary’s presentation
speech.
‘I can assure you that I am most grateful for this message.1 Expressed in most
sincere and beautiful terms it touches the bottom of my heart. I can assure you that
we will stand together linked as we have been over past years. You can rest assured
that as far as we are concerned we have always expressed ourselves in the terms that
we sink or float together.
I am grateful for the confidence of Her Majesty’s Government in passing their
rights over the Territories (Singapore Sarawak and Sabah) to us. We shall do
everything possible to justify the trust you have placed in us.
This gift will enjoy a special place in our Parliament House where it will be on
show for all men for all time. We reiterate our stand with you that we will co-operate
with you within the Commonwealth to the best of our ability’. The Tunku then
presented Mr. Sandys and the Marquess of Lansdowne each with a silver mounted
ivory handled kris asking in return a coin so that Malay custom could be honoured
the custom being that one never gives an outright gift of a weapon to a friend. Both
Mr. Sandys and Lord Lansdowne paid the tribute.
1 See 226.
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A. Introduction
I. The background
Pre-war Administration
The British Malayan and Borneo Territories before the Second World War displayed a
wide variety of constitutional arrangements. The Straits Settlements, including
Singapore, Penang, Malacca and Labuan, were directly ruled as Crown Colonies. The
four Federated Malay States were protectorates, but with a substantial degree of
administrative unity and direct British control. The Unfederated Malay States, of
which Brunei was one, were individually and separately required to accept the advice
of British residents, except on matters of religion and Malay custom, but their Rulers
retained greater control over the direction of government. The senior British
representative in both Federated and Unfederated Malay States, the High
Commissioner, was also Governor of the Straits Settlements. Sarawak was a
protected State ruled by a rajah of the Brooke family without direct British advice,
except on questions of foreign relations. North Borneo was in a similar position, but
was governed by a chartered company.
Wartime planning and the Malayan Union proposals
2. During the war, while all the territories were under Japanese control, it was
decided in London to take the opportunity of reoccupation to try to tidy up this
confusion of régimes. As Mr. Arthur Creech Jones, who was Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State in 1945 and thereafter until 1950 Secretary of State for the
Colonies, subsequently remarked, it was ‘ardently desired’ to create a unified
administrative structure. So far as the peninsular Malay States were concerned
this had indeed been an aim of British policy for many years before the war. There
was also some feeling that the Chinese in the Malay States and Straits
Settlements, who had certainly been more active in resisting the Japanese than
the Malays, deserved an improved political position. Before the war the States had
been treated as purely Malay kingdoms. The Chinese and the Indians, though
overall more than half the population and more active economically, were, unlike
Indonesian immigrants, considered intruders of inferior political standing who
could only hope for political advance if they could come to terms with the Malay
Rulers.
3. The outcome of this wartime planning was the proposal, announced in
October 1945, for a Malayan Union which would unify and centralise the
administration of the nine peninsular Malay States together with the Straits
Settlements of Penang and Malacca. In the Malay States sovereignty was to be
transferred from the Rulers to the Crown. It was expected that the Union would, by
its citizenship arrangements, give the Chinese much greater political power. None of
the Borneo Territories was included in this arrangement, while provision was made
for Singapore, with its great base installations, to remain as a Crown Colony. This
initial decision to exclude Singapore from the Malayan Union had substantial
political as well as economic consequences. Not only would the communal balance in
Malaya have been very different if Singapore had been included, but it might have
been unnecessary to rush the Borneo Territories quite so rapidly into Federation in
1963.
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Malay reactions and the formation of UMNO
4. The Malayan Union proposals were brusquely presented to the Malay Rulers
individually in an attempt to press them through in the aftermath of war before
opposition could develop. They came into effect on 1 April, 1946. They had already
however aroused bitter criticism amongst Malay supporters in London and this was
paralleled by a great increase of political consciousness amongst the Malays
themselves. This in turn led early in 1946 to the formation of the United Malays
National Organisation (UMNO) which subsequently became the dominant partner in
the ruling Alliance in Malaya. Mr. Creech Jones believed that if he had had the
support of any substantial body of Chinese for the Malayan Union proposals, it would
have been possible to maintain them. But the Left-wing Chinese, led by the Malayan
Communist Party (MCP), were preoccupied with preparations for the violent seizure
of power which they attempted in 1948 and the Right wing with re-establishing the
economy and their dominance within it. Both at this time were equally indifferent to
constitutional progress, while those few Chinese and Indians who did interest
themselves in constitutional advance, rejected the Union proposals as insufficiently
liberal. The Malays on the other hand were terrified that the granting of citizenship,
and so political equality, to the Chinese would rapidly reduce their own people to a
subordinate position in a Chinese-run State—this fear was, and is, probably well
justified.
The Federation of Malaya
5. Since they were the only community really engaged in the debate, the Malays
succeeded in securing the replacement of the Union on 1 February, 1948, by the
Federation of Malaya. This arrangement entrenched the political pre-eminence of the
Malays and this is the basis on which Malaya has since been ruled. Maintenance of
this position is an issue on which no Malay leader can easily compromise—the
founder and first president of UMNO, Dato Onn bin Ja’afar, was in 1951 cast
permanently from leadership because he took too liberal a view of the Chinese place
in Malayan society. His successor as leader of UMNO was Tunku Abdul Rahman, a
brother of the Sultan of Kedah and a relatively unknown barrister before he became
president of UMNO, who subsequently became the first Chief Minister and, on
independence in 1957, the first Prime Minister. The lesson of Dato Onn’s sudden fall
has certainly not been lost on the Tunku.
Citizenship and Singapore
6. The debate on the form of the Federation in 1946–47 centred around
questions of citizenship—in effect on the numbers of Chinese who could be excluded
from political rights. The Malay anxiety to reduce the numbers of Chinese eligible for
citizenship, Singapore’s own wish to maintain its free port status, and the British
belief that it would be necessary to maintain long-term control of the Singapore
bases, led to the city, which had already been divided from the other Straits
Settlements under the Malayan Union proposals, being once again left as a separate
colony.
The Grand Design
7. A desire ultimately to unite the territories remained however a continuing
facet of British intentions towards the area. In 1949 and 1950, for instance, Mr.
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Malcolm MacDonald, then United Kingdom Commissioner-General for South–East
Asia, did not conceal his enthusiasm for a ‘Grand Design’ which should eventually
bring together all the British Malayan and Bornean Territories. Efforts were also
made to unify the Bornean Territories. North Borneo and Sarawak had come under
direct British rule after the war and during the 1950s proposals were made for a
closer association of these two territories with Brunei, a tiny protected State with
very large per capita revenues originating from oil, of which in 1948 the Governor of
Sarawak had become High Commissioner in place of the High Commissioner for the
Malay States. Brunei, characteristically, proved reluctant to make any change, but
the first steps were taken to draw the Administrations of the other two territories
together.
Chinese attitudes
8. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s the position of the Chinese community was
weakened by its own lack of homogeneity. There were long-standing divisions
between the English-speaking ‘Straits Chinese’ and the more recent Chinese-speaking
immigrant groups, which were in turn subdivided by dialect. Moreover the
Communist insurrection, the ‘Emergency’, which was not formally ended until
August 1960, was primarily conducted by Chinese, while the local forces of law and
order were primarily Malay. Traditionally Chinese had come to Malaya seeking
economic opportunities—it used to be said with only slight exaggeration before the
war that the Chinese did not care who held the cow so long as they could milk it. But
in Chinese tradition the status of the official has always been greatly superior to that
of the merchant and inevitably many younger Chinese had begun to take the
economic opportunities for granted and to resent the advantages given to Malays in
the public services, so that there was also something of a division between age groups.
9. These divisions amongst the non-Communist Chinese were marked by
differences of view in regard to the place of their community in a Malayan State.
Some wished to press on to a situation of real equality, in which of course the more
competitive training and outlook of the Chinese would give them an immense
advantage. This group came latterly to be principally represented by the People’s
Action Party (PAP) in Singapore, led by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew. Mr. Lee had secured a
double first in law at Cambridge and had worked closely with the trade union
movement on his return to Singapore in 1950; he founded the PAP in 1954. Even
within the much more conservative Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) however
there was increasing challenge to the Malay political predominance. In the spring of
1958 this led to division within the MCA and in the summer of 1959 to a crisis within
the ruling Alliance between UMNO and the MCA over the allocation of Parliamentary
seats and the use of the Chinese language in examinations. As a result of this conflict
the President of the MCA, Dr. Lim Chong Eu, and the Secretary-General, Mr. Too
Joon Hing, resigned; in April 1962 they were prominent in the formation of the
United Democratic Party which at the end of the 1960s formed a constituent of the
Gerakan Ra’ayat Malaysia.
10. A majority of the MCA held to the more traditional view that the overriding
Chinese concern should be with the maintenance of their economic position. This
group considered that the Malay leadership could not be expected to surrender
overriding political predominance while Malays were economically so weak. They
were also anxious to do nothing which might revive the intercommunal violence
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which had occurred in the aftermath of the Japanese occupation. They were
concerned therefore to achieve a working relationship which would leave the Malays
feeling politically secure and the Chinese free to expand the economy to the benefit
of both Chinese and Malays. This viewpoint came to be represented in Malaya by Mr.
Tan Siew Sin and in Singapore by Mr. Lim Yew Hock, who was Chief Minister from
June 1956 until defeated in the elections at the end of May 1959. It should be said
that, of the more radical Chinese groups, the PAP at least did not envisage an overtly
Chinese State. Mr. Lim, as Chief Minister, had called for the building up of a Malayan
consciousness in Singapore and laid some stress on the learning of the Malay
language. When they secured power the PAP followed up and intensified this line.
Economic interests
11. The separation of Singapore gave Mr. Tan’s group an increased interest also
in developing the economy of the peninsula and in reducing the overwhelming
economic dominance hitherto enjoyed by Singapore. This was an issue on which the
interests of the Tan group of peninsular Chinese and of the Malays appeared to
coincide and it has proved one of the most intractable sources of difference between
Singapore and Malaya. Already at the end of 1958 Mr. Tan opposed, unsuccessfully, a
proposal to include eventual merger with Singapore as one of its objects in the draft
constitution of the MCA—on the ground that this would lead to a clash with UMNO.
12. The Malayan Central Bank started operations in January 1959 and efforts to
attract existing companies and new investment to the Federation from Singapore
were by then beginning to take effect. During 1959 Mr. Tan also opposed proposals,
which originated in Singapore and were at the end of the year mentioned in Dr. Goh
Keng Swee’s Budget speech, for a common market or free trade area between
Singapore and Malaya. Throughout the following years, as discussion on merger with
Singapore accelerated, action to disentangle the economies nevertheless continued
and in this Mr. Tan and his group were usually prominently in the lead. A continuing
example of this has been the effort to build up Port Swettenham in place of
Singapore—the contract for the first North Klang Straits development of the port
was awarded in January 1960.
II. Attitudes to merger up to 1960
The Tunku and Singapore
13. The Tunku was widely said in the late 1950s to be consistently and adamantly
opposed to any prospect of merger with Singapore. The record however suggests that
the Tunku’s opposition was either not so absolute or not so consistent as was
supposed. Merger with Singapore alone he regularly excluded in the short term and
his attitude became stiffer after the success of the PAP in the City Council elections
in February 1958 had made it seem probable that he would have to deal with Mr. Lee
Kuan Yew rather than Mr. Lim Yew Hock. By the end of 1958 he was telling the Press
that merger was out of the question and a year later that there could be no merger in
the foreseeable future because Singapore had a Left-wing Government and Malaya a
Right-wing one. In June 1959, as soon as he had formed a Government in Singapore,
Mr. Lee took some of his Ministers to Kuala Lumpur for talks with Malayan Ministers
led by Tun Razak, then temporarily Prime Minister while the Tunku devoted himself
to organising the Alliance electoral effort.
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14. Despite these efforts to foster contact between the two Governments and to
develop a Malayan spirit in Singapore, the Tunku undoubtedly himself remained
from the outset suspicious of Mr. Lee’s intentions. These suspicions were excited
later in June 1959 by the PAP decision to release four Communists from detention
without prior consultation with the Singapore Internal Security Council, of which
Britain and Malaya were the other members. The Tunku must also have been under
constant pressure from those Malays within UMNO, later commonly referred to as
the ‘ultras’, who did not wish the Government to take any step which would in any
way strengthen the position of Chinese within the Federation. Singapore is
overwhelmingly Chinese in population and its connection with the Federation,
however hedged about, could not fail to do this.
15. Singapore within a wider grouping seems however to have been thought less
indigestible. The Tunku told Mr. Malcolm MacDonald in 1958 that ‘he would readily
agree’ to merger with Singapore ‘if the three Borneo Territories came into a super
Federation at the same time’ and he expressed much the same view to Sir Geofroy
Tory, the British High Commissioner, who was however briefed to persuade him that
to ventilate this proposal would be damaging to the constitutional development of
the Borneo Territories. This may in consequence have left the impression that the
Grand Design was not then well regarded in London.
The Tunku’s view of Borneo
16. Mr. MacDonald, in the course of his conversation with the Tunku in 1958,
had delivered the, possibly mistaken, judgment that ‘not only the Malays but also
most of the other non-Chinese peoples in the Borneo Territories would generally be
more sympathetic to Malay than to Chinese opinion in various political matters.’
This assessment the Tunku seems to have translated, at least for the benefit of his
Malay supporters if not in his own mind, into a conviction that the Ibans, Dusuns
and other non-Chinese peoples in Borneo were virtually Malays and could be counted
as such in calculations of communal balance within a wider federation.
17. At the same time the prospect of acquiring Brunei oil and investment
revenues and the income from the North Borneo timber exports, which had begun to
rise rapidly by the middle of 1960, must have had some attraction. From the
sometimes misleading vantage point of hindsight, it is possible to wonder if
acquisition of the three Borneo territories without Singapore may not have been in
the Tunku’s mind, if only subconsciously, throughout. The fact that possession of
Sarawak and North Borneo (Sabah) proved a political and military and, initially, an
economic burden, and that Brunei, which would have been financially the most
attractive acquisition, declined to join the Federation, were matters he clearly did not
foresee in 1960.
Economic and defence considerations for Malaya
18. By the beginning of 1960 some of the initial euphoria in Malayan
Government circles following independence had begun to evaporate. The success of
the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP) in the state elections in Kelantan and
Trengganu in June 1959 had served warning on the Tunku and UMNO of the danger
of seeming to neglect the Malay peasant on whom their political position was based
and a new emergency plan to attack rural poverty was started. This was significant in
relation to proposals for merger with Singapore, since there was an obvious prospect
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of conflict between an economic policy of achieving maximum growth, which would
involve allowing the largely Chinese towns, and above all Singapore if merger had
taken place, to form growing points, and the political need to assure the rural Malays,
not merely that their economic lot was improving, but that the gap between their
conditions and those of the Chinese was narrowing. The consciousness of poverty is
relative, not absolute.
19. This too was at a time when the development of stereo-regular synthetics had
begun to make the growth prospects for natural rubber and so for the Malayan
economy as a whole, and especially for the agricultural economy, much less
encouraging. Moreover independence had not yet led to a significant growth in the
Malay stake in the economy. A report on Malay participation in business in Malaya
had shown that they owned less than 10 per cent of the number of businesses
registered and these were mostly small concerns—Malays owned only 1 per cent of
the total capital invested. In consequence in October 1960 a special secretariat was
established to help Malays in commerce. In the communal field the language and
education issues were beginning to build up, though the Singapore Government, by
its stress on the need to learn Malay, was doing something to prevent this being an
issue in the event of merger. Both issues, as in India and Ceylon, are of course related
to questions of economic opportunity.
20. In the external field merger was seen to involve the issue of British use of the
Singapore bases for SEATO or similar purposes. The existing defence agreement
between the United Kingdom and Malaya limited British use of bases in Malaya to
Commonwealth defence. Even so the agreement at that time attracted little popular
backing in Malaya, was openly attacked by the opposition and was regarded as
suspect in UMNO itself. There seemed therefore substantial reasons for the Tunku to
be reluctant to take on Singapore.
Singapore’s need for merger
21. The Singapore Government on the other hand had at the beginning of 1960
good reasons for wishing to merge. The city was faced with increasing economic
problems. The population was expanding rapidly, while the traditional entrepôt trade
seemed to be faced with rapid decline; that with Indonesia had already dropped
substantially and the Malayans were considering plans to divert their trade from its
traditional channels. The city had begun to try to offset this decline by developing
local industry beyond the processing trades; but this in turn demanded markets and
there were already signs that investors would wait to see if the Malayan market would
be open to industries based in Singapore. The Grand Design may also have suggested
to the Singapore leaders a prospect of attracting some North Borneo trade away from
Hong Kong.
22. Mr. Lee and his Government had moreover what seemed pressing political
reasons for merger with Malaya. It might be the quickest way to reach full
independence and so would help to blunt the challenge of the extreme Left, still at
this stage within the PAP. And after merger it could be expected that the staunchly
anti-Communist Malayan Government would take firm steps to prevent any extreme
Leftist take-over—the need to be able to do this was indeed later believed to be one of
the main motives which induced the Tunku to consider taking Singapore on. Mr. Lee
and his colleagues were by no means sure of their position—the short history of
democratic elections in Singapore suggested that each successful Left-wing group
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would, on allowing its views and policies to be moderated by the responsibilities of
office, then be trumped from further to the Left. Another problem was that the
British bases, which provided a substantial proportion of the national income, were
thought at the time to be difficult, if not impossible, to defend politically.
The Borneo Territories in 1960
23. The Borneo Territories were still in 1960 well back along both the economic
and political roads. The boom in North Borneo induced by the Japanese demand for
timber was however beginning and the territory in consequence suffered from a
labour shortage which led to immigrant labour being attracted from Indonesia, the
Philippines, Sarawak and Hong Kong. Sarawak’s economy was stagnant and the low
quality of its surplus labour inhibited emigration even to North Borneo; trade,
hitherto very largely with or through Singapore, was beginning to be a little more
diversified, if only by going directly to Thailand, Hong Kong and Japan. Brunei had
oil, though the on-shore fields were declining and those off-shore had not yet been
proved; but much of the earlier revenues had been invested and the level of the joint
income from oil royalties and investment permitted consideration of heavy
expenditure on development and social services.
24. Political awareness was at last stirring in all three territories. A group
officially described as the Clandestine Communist Organisation (CCO) existed in
Sarawak and the Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP), was formed in the middle of
1959. SUPP was largely Chinese in membership and some of its members certainly
had CCO connections. It was in 1959 supposed by outside observers, erroneously as it
turned out, to be capable of commanding general popular support. The first elections
were held in Sarawak at the end of 1959 on a multi-tier system and SUPP did much
less well than had been expected. Sarawak had by 1960 an executive council, known
as the Supreme Council, and a legislative council, known as the Council Negri, each
with an unofficial majority, the majority of which in turn was composed of members
elected by a process of indirect election.
25. There was by 1960 some evidence of unsuccessful CCO attempts to penetrate
North Borneo, where no parties as yet existed, but even here political debate was
beginning. There were no elected members in either the Executive Council or the
Legislative Council, but there was an unofficial majority in the Legislative Council
and an equal balance between officials and others was about to be introduced in the
Executive Council. Some co-operation was developing with the parallel Government
departments in Sarawak, though slowly.
Brunei
26. The Sultan of Brunei signed a new agreement with the United Kingdom on
29 September, 1959, and at the same time promulgated a written Constitution. The
agreement continued, in form at least, to give the British Government complete
control over external affairs and defence, including in effect internal security, and
control over appointments to ‘key posts’, while the Sultan agreed to accept the advice
of the High Commissioner on all matters of state except the Muslim religion and the
customs of the Malays. The Administrations of Brunei and Sarawak were divorced,
and a separate High Commissioner for Brunei was appointed instead of this being a
combined post with that of Governor of Sarawak. The Sultan had the right to be
consulted on the appointment of the High Commissioner, who was financially
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dependent on the Brunei Government. This and the Constitution, with its apparatus
of Privy Council, Executive Council and Legislative Council, greatly reduced in
practice the degree of control which could be exercised by the High Commissioner.
The mandatory advice clause has in consequence proved to be a dead letter.
27. The Legislative Council had a large elected element and was presided over by
a Mentri Besar, or Chief Minister, appointed by the Sultan, while some elected
members of the Legislative Council served on the Executive Council. Under the new
system the Mentri Besar in effect replaced the former British Resident, who had been
in charge of the general administration of the State. British civil servants of the
Sarawak service were also replaced by seconded Malayan civil servants; this in due
course proved inimical to membership of Malaysia, since the Brunei Malays did not
find the peninsular Malay officials congenial and complained that they had
exchanged experienced for inexperienced expatriates. The Parti Ra’ayat, led by
Sheikh A. M. Azahari, which held its first congress in April 1957, had something of a
monopoly of political activity in Brunei. The party congress early in 1960, which was
attended by SUPP and PMIP representatives, proved to be primarily concerned with
proposals for ‘Borneo unity’ to be followed by ‘pan-Malayan federation’ of the vague
kind advocated by the PMIP and designed to include Indonesia as well as Malaya.
28. Generally however there was little popular interest in the Borneo Territories
in the idea of federation, whether with Malaya or with other Borneo Territories, and
there was some distaste for such ideas. In Brunei there was a dislike of the prospect
of sharing the oil revenues—an income which could provide a high level of free
welfare for the State’s population of about 60,000 would certainly not do so if some of
it were to be diverted to the needs of other territories. The Sultan himself had to
balance the prospect of becoming Agong of Malaya against the loss of income and
independence. In Sarawak and North Borneo there was the fear that unity and a rapid
‘localisation’ of Government posts would result in Chinese or Malays getting most of
them.
The state of British policy in 1960
29. In January 1960 the process of reducing or eliminating British colonial and
defence commitments all over the world was rapidly gathering momentum—the
Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, launched his ‘wind of change’ theme in Ghana on 9
January, 1960, and repeated it in Cape Town on 3 February, when it effectively
caught public attention. It was already accepted policy for the Borneo Territories that
they should ultimately achieve independence, subject within limits to their own
wishes. At the same time they were being gently pushed towards federation with each
other.
30. The real British interest in the future of Singapore was less easy to decide.
Under the existing situation the United Kingdom held naval, air and military
facilities in the territory by sovereign right, but to attempt to maintain a colonial
status in face of increasingly Left-wing and extreme local political leadership might
well result in the Singapore base becoming an albatross. In an independent
federation with Malaya on the other hand the bases would be held only by treaty and
there had already been some indication of the limitations this might impose on their
use. The possibility of developing a base in North Borneo and even of stationing a
brigade there was under discussion, but did not arouse great enthusiasm. There was
in January 1960 as yet no thought of avoiding this dilemma by a complete
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withdrawal, although by June 1963 views at official level had changed enough for it
to be asserted without challenge, in an exchange of minutes between two Foreign
Office departments, that: ‘Everyone in Whitehall would like us to adopt a foreign
policy of abandoning our Far East commitments and running down Singapore.’
31. On 23 January, 1960, an informal meeting of British Foreign,
Commonwealth Relations, Colonial and Armed Service representatives from the
surrounding countries and territories was held at Phoenix Park, Singapore, to
discuss problems in Borneo. Sir Denis Allen, who was in the chair, raised the related
problems of the prospect of Brunei joining the Federation of Malaya, which at that
point seemed very probable, of the programme of closer association between Sarawak
and North Borneo, and of the Grand Design. Objections to the Grand Design,
especially the relative backwardness of the Borneo Territories and the fears and
ambitions of Indonesia and the Philippines, were raised, but the general conclusions
reached were that the Grand Design might have advantages, that in any case it was
dangerous merely to await developments, and that consideration should be given to
policy on this issue, especially in relation to the prospect of Brunei seeking to join
the Federation.
32. This discussion stimulated consideration of the issues in London and by May
1960, though no submission had been made to Ministers, the general trend of official
thinking was that, however much they might wish to be left as Crown Colonies,
Sarawak and North Borneo must in due course become self-governing. This they
were too weak to sustain individually or even jointly, and so the most hopeful
ultimate solution would be in a grouping of the Federation of Malaya and all three
Borneo Territories, together if possible with Singapore. This view was expressed in a
letter of 18 May, 1960, from Sir John Martin to Sir Denis Allen [see document 20]. It
was generally welcomed by British officials in the area, on the explicit assumption
however that progress towards the Grand Design would be deliberate in view of the
considerable political leeway to be made up by the Borneo Territories.
B. Preliminary discussions and agreement in principle
III. The Tunku’s first initiative, June 1960
The Tunku’s visit to Lord Perth, 10 June, 1960
33. On 10 June, 1960, the Tunku paid a visit to the Minister of State, Lord Perth,
at the Colonial Office. His stated purpose was that the British Government should
know that he was prepared to face the possibility of a Federation of Malaya,
Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei—in other words the full Grand
Design. Lord Perth’s reaction was to say that the matter had not been given ‘a great
deal of thought’ by his Government and to recite the difficulties, and in particular the
unwisdom of haste. In face of this damping reception the Tunku enquired how Her
Majesty’s Government would view the prospect of Brunei joining the Federation;
Lord Perth replied that this must be a matter for the people of Brunei themselves to
decide and that it was important first to see how the new Constitution worked out
[see 21 and 22].
34. The Tunku then tried the suggestion that Brunei and Sarawak might join the
Federation, while the British remained in North Borneo to develop it economically
and to use it as a military base. Lord Perth ‘pointed out the real economic difficulties
that faced development in Sarawak’ and tried to indicate that the British
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Government was ‘neither for nor against the general principle, that it was early times
to say anything more, although naturally the linking up of our friends would be a
logical course to see followed.’ On 19 July, 1960, Sir Geofroy Tory reported that since
his return from London the Tunku had twice raised the general issue, was now firmly
in favour of his last alternative, and had stressed the advantages of a British base in
North Borneo.
British assessments of the Tunku’s intentions
35. Lord Home, the Commonwealth Secretary, commenting on the original
interview in a minute of 21 June, 1960, to the Foreign Secretary, had doubted if the
Tunku was ‘seriously thinking of Singapore as a partner in a Federation’, but had
thought that he might do so ‘if through it he could mobilise enough Malays to be an
effective counter-weight to the Chinese in Singapore.’ In his letter of 19 July,
however, Sir Geofroy Tory concluded that the Tunku had abandoned his earlier view,
expressed to Mr. MacDonald and himself, that the acquisition of the Borneo
Territories would enable him to receive Singapore also, and ‘that the Tunku’s mind is
still closed on the subject of closer association with Singapore under its present
régime.’
36. A minute of 16 August, 1960, by Mr. F. A. Warner suggested that Sir Geofroy
Tory’s letter showed that the Tunku had no real intention of absorbing Singapore
‘and merely mentioned it in the first place to make his idea of gobbling up the
Borneo Territories seem more attractive.’ In an earlier minute, of 26 July, Mr.
Warner had expressed the fear ‘that what he means to do is to commit us to giving
him the Borneo Territories and that he will then refuse to absorb Singapore, which
he will leave on our hands.’ Within a few weeks of the interview with Lord Perth
British official despatches and minutes were unanimous in taking the view that the
Tunku was immovable on the issue of merger with Singapore, whether alone or in
combination with other territories.
37. In his letter of 19 July, 1960, Sir Geofroy Tory, however, had mentioned that
the Tunku had ‘twice lately gone close to admitting to me by implication that he does
not rule out eventual merger’, and expressed a fear that ‘he has necessarily been left
with the impression that we are cool about the Grand Design’. It remains at least
possible that the Tunku had genuinely intended to take up the Grand Design in full,
had once again met with an, as he thought, discouraging British response and had
reacted to this by putting on a show of having never contemplated a merger
involving Singapore. The split in the PAP from the middle of June, and the prospect
of an even more Left-wing Government in Singapore, may also have temporarily
induced greater caution. By May 1961, when the Tunku next mentioned his interest
in the Grand Design, this time publicly, British official opinion was so convinced that
he was adamant on the subject of Singapore that the new initiative was greeted with
astonishment.
The initial British reaction: ‘Benevolent neutrality’
38. Whatever the Tunku’s intentions, his 1960 initiative had the effect of greatly
stimulating British official discussion of the issue. Lord Selkirk, the recently
appointed Commissioner-General in South-East Asia, who was visiting London, in a
minute of 17 June, 1960 [see 23], to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary, argued
that a direct merger between Malaya and Singapore did not seem practical and that
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the full Grand Design Federation was the only development which might give some
stability to the area. He recommended therefore ‘that these proposals be examined
very closely and urgently’. In the course of his argument he met the objection that
there would be a loss of defence facilities by claiming that the Tunku ‘could not
possibly take over Singapore and then seek to denude it of the economic advantages
of defence installations’, though he agreed that it might be necessary to detach
Labuan from North Borneo as a British naval and air base for certain specific
functions.
39. The Colonial Office argued that the wishes of the peoples of the Borneo
Territories must be ‘a paramount factor’ in any consideration of the issue and that
‘we cannot force Borneo opinion’. In a Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee
memorandum of 15 July, 1960, [see 25] therefore Mr. Macleod, the Colonial
Secretary, expressed a feeling that ‘we ought to go slowly’. He suggested taking up an
attitude to the Tunku of ‘benevolent neutrality’ and awaiting the outcome of
informed discussions amongst the Governors and other British officials concerned at
the time of the meeting of the Borneo Inter-Territorial Conference and the Joint
Advisory Defence Committee (Borneo) in Kuching in October. The Foreign Secretary
also had doubts about the wisdom of disturbing convenient defence arrangements.
40. Lord Selkirk, however, in a letter of 22 July, 1960, to the Prime Minister,
stressed the urgency of action if the position in Singapore was to be held even for five
years. He expressed the view that Mr. Lee’s was the best Government of Singapore
that could be expected from the British point of view, that Mr. Lee himself
recognised the necessity of the bases to Singapore for security as well as economic
reasons, and that it was essential to help the PAP Government maintain its position
by providing both adequate economic assistance and apparent constitutional
advance. At a meeting in London on 27 July, 1960, [see 27] between Lord Selkirk and
the Prime Minister and other senior Ministers it was also noted that Singapore could
not be expected to be content with the existing constitutional position for long and
that it might be easier to maintain British defence facilities under a defence treaty if
Singapore were to be federated with Malaya. This meeting nevertheless went no
further than to agree to adopt an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards any
suggestion of association of the Borneo Territories with Malaya and to await further
discussion of the issue in Kuching in October.
Tariff protection and common market proposals
41. Some concern was however expressed at this Ministerial meeting in London
about problems of surplus population in Singapore and at the possibility that the
Singapore Government might, in view of the United Kingdom’s inability to meet its
full demands for economic aid, seek assistance from Soviet bloc countries. Lord
Selkirk was therefore invited to discuss with the Tunku the possibility of Malaya
adopting a policy of closer economic co-operation with Singapore.
42. Malayan and Singapore officials had already been meeting to consider
proposals for common market arrangements since 10 June, 1960. These meetings
were however adjourned sine die on 25 August. On 21 September the Singapore
Assembly passed a revised Customs Ordinance permitting the provision of tariff
protection for local industries against outside, including Malayan, producers. It was
thought that the Malayan attitude towards a limited common market then became
even less forthcoming in consequence of action under this ordinance. Certainly Mr.
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Tan’s Budget in November raised the tariff wall for a number of local industries and,
although he denied that this marked the beginning of a tariff war, one import tax was
a clear response to tariff action in Singapore.
The Kuching meeting, October 1960
43. The informal meeting between the Commissioner-General, the Governors of
Sarawak and North Borneo and the High Commissioner for Brunei, which the
Ministerial meeting in July had asked to discuss the possibility of future association
of the Borneo Territories with a wider Malayan Federation, took place in Kuching on
20 October, 1960. Lord Perth and General Sir Richard Hull, Commander-in-Chief
Far East Land Forces, together with officials of the Colonial Office and Commission
General, were also present.
44. It was agreed to recommend to Her Majesty’s Government that the Grand
Design should be the ultimate goal of British policy in the area, and that closer
association of North Borneo, Sarawak and possibly Brunei should be a first step in
this direction. The Grand Design was thought to provide the only real prospect of
safeguarding the security and welfare of the territories themselves and British
defence interests. Discussion in confidence should be begun with the Tunku, Mr.
Lee, the Sultan of Brunei and other interested parties as occasion offered and the
prospect of the Grand Design should be used as an argument with them to resist any
further movement towards the disintegration of the economic unity of the area. In
such discussions it should be made plain that progress towards the ultimate goal
must be gradual and adjusted to the rate of political evolution in the Borneo
Territories.
45. It was suggested in the course of the discussion that a major process of
education would be needed in North Borneo and Sarawak before the necessity for
such an association could be widely appreciated and that any public impression that
Her Majesty’s Government were ‘actively pushing such a solution or seeking to
impose it upon the peoples concerned’ should be avoided. If the matter had to be
mentioned in public at all no more should be said than that a broad association was
one possible outcome which Her Majesty’s Government ‘would not themselves
regard as excluded from consideration’.
46. Sir William Goode, then Governor of North Borneo and a former Governor of
Singapore, in commenting, in a despatch of 11 November, 1960, on Lord Selkirk’s
despatch of 25 October [see 30] reporting these conclusions, suggested that this
proposed public posture was too negative and would be interpreted as
discouraging—he suggested that any public statement should be on the lines that
the Grand Design ‘has great possibilities for the future provided it is acceptable to the
peoples concerned’. In the event no decision was taken even to open the subject in
confidence with the Tunku before he broached it publicly himself in May 1961. In
consequence the impression that Her Majesty’s Government did not favour the
project could only be dispelled to the satisfaction of the Tunku by abandoning the
insistence on gradual progress for the Borneo Territories.
Improved relations between the Malay leaders and Mr. Lee
47. Meanwhile the movement towards economic autarky continued unchecked.
The personal relations between the Malay leaders and Mr. Lee and his colleagues had
however begun to improve somewhat. On 7 October, 1960, the Singapore Internal
15-Malaysia-Appendix-cpp  21/9/04  9:09 AM  Page 596
[Appendix] JULY 1970 597
Security Council met in the Cameron Highlands and provided opportunities for Mr.
Lee to improve his standing with the Tunku and to persuade him that for Malaya, as
well as for Britain, any probable alternative Government of Singapore would be
much less attractive. Mr. Lee and Dr. Goh Keng Swee also spent the Christmas week-
end in Kuala Lumpur playing golf with Malayan Ministers and it became clear that
Mr. Lee was becoming increasingly interested in the Grand Design as a means of
resolving many of his political and economic problems. It was also reported by Sir
Geofroy Tory that the Malayan Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister, Tun
Razak, was thought to be coming to the conclusion that Malaya would have to accept
responsibility for Singapore with the Borneo Territories as a counterweight.
48. Mr. Lee’s cultivation of the Malayan Government bore public fruit on 30
January, 1961, when, in a Press interview, the Tunku stated that the Singapore
Government was ‘as good a Malayan Government as mine is’. He did so while
explaining that merger would have to wait for ‘some’ time and that ‘we cannot have
merger with them at this moment . . ., because certain elements among Chinese
there are China minded’; meanwhile the Federation believed in close co-operation
with Singapore without effecting actual merger. It was also noted that the workings
of the Internal Security Council had become much smoother.
Continued British caution, January–May 1961
49. On 30 January, 1961, in the light of these developments and of a further
discussion with the Governors, High Commissioners and Ambassadors in the area,
Lord Selkirk sent a despatch to Mr. Macleod [see 32], the Colonial Secretary. In this
he pointed out that there was a distinct possibility that some kind of Grand Design
would sooner or later be launched by the Federation or by Singapore and again
pressed for urgent consideration by the Government of its attitude to a Grand Design
‘in order to be in a position to influence its shape and character during the formative
period’. He suggested that the British Government should ‘in the near future, after
consultation with the Governments involved’, make a public statement of policy on
the issue, on the lines favoured by Sir William Goode. One reason for urgency was ‘to
prevent the pressure for separate independence for Singapore, which is
accumulating under the surface and by which Mr. Lee Kuan Yew is plainly
embarrassed, from becoming unmanageable.’
50. Sir Geofroy Tory still thought that the Tunku had ‘a closed mind on the
subject of Singapore’, having been told ‘firmly’ by Tun Razak that the Tunku’s
remarks at the Press interview on 30 January, 1961, did not represent any change in
attitude towards merger with Singapore alone. Nevertheless Sir Geofroy believed
that ‘There is a lot to be said for gaining and keeping the initiative in this matter. I
can see some risk that, once the penny drops with the Tunku, he will want to go
galloping ahead in all sorts of impossible directions, and far faster than we wish.’ A
draft Cabinet paper prepared in the Colonial Office before receipt of Lord Selkirk’s
January despatch, followed his and Sir William Goode’s proposals, except that it was
thought desirable to avoid if possible making any public statement at all. The draft
did however suggest broaching the matter with the Tunku during March, when he
would be in London for a Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference.
51. Mr. Macleod however saw reasons for caution. He was already under fire for
his policy of pressing on with the grant of independence to the British colonial
territories in Africa and did not wish to increase his difficulties over that policy by
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announcing an intention to liquidate the remaining British colonial commitments in
South-East Asia. On 10 March, 1961, he therefore sent an informal letter to Lord
Selkirk saying that he had decided to postpone putting proposals to the Cabinet until
April and that he was not convinced of the need for a public statement.
52. This letter drew a reply of 23 March, 1961, from Lord Selkirk expressing the
hope that some instructions could be issued in time for the Borneo Inter-Territorial
Conference in the last week of April and that at least confidential discussions with
the Tunku and Mr. Lee, and possibly also with the Sultan of Brunei and local
notables in Sarawak and North Borneo, should be authorised. Lord Selkirk
concluded that ‘If we are to attempt any steering at all we must at least know what
our eventual goal is and be authorised to tell our partners what course we propose to
set in company with them. Our ability to influence the course of events declines with
the passage of time.’
53. Interim instructions were issued to Lord Selkirk on 21 April, 1961, following
a discussion in the Colonial Policy Committee of the Cabinet on 18 April [see 35].
These permitted him to be guided by the assumption that the ultimate aim of British
policy was the gradual ‘development of a political association between Malaya,
Singapore and the three Borneo territories’. But this was to be subject to a final
decision which would not be taken until the Governments of Australia and New
Zealand had been given an opportunity of expressing their views; pending this ‘we
should not volunteer discussion on the subject with other parties’. Nor did Her
Majesty’s Government ‘contemplate making any public statement for the present
since it is essential that we should avoid all appearance of trying to impose a political
association’. On 9 May, 1961, despite the length of time the matter had been under
discussion, the Ministry of Defence asked that consultation even with Australia and
New Zealand should be held back until the Chiefs of Staff had considered and
expressed their views on the defence implications of the Grand Design—the Chief of
the Defence Staff had only now instructed the Joint Planning Staff to prepare a
report for the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
Political difficulties in Singapore
54. Throughout this period the internal position of the Government of
Singapore appeared to weaken. The split in the PAP in the previous summer was led
by Mr. Ong Eng Guan who wanted more ‘anti-colonialism’ and as Mayor of Singapore
had been responsible for some striking gestures against established society. Mr. Ong
and two supporters were expelled from the party on 28 July, 1960, and on 29
December he resigned his seat in the Legislative Assembly. This resulted in a by-
election in the Hong Lim constituency which Mr. Ong won on 29 April, 1961, with
7,747 votes to the PAP candidate’s 2,820 votes. It was assumed at the time that this
would set back the prospects of merger by revealing the strength of Leftist opinion in
Singapore, but it may in fact have had the opposite effect on the Tunku.
55. When asked why he had been so forthcoming on 30 January, 1961, about Mr.
Lee, the Tunku was reported by Sir Geofroy Tory to have said: ‘Poor man, he has so
many troubles. I thought he needed a little assistance. These fellows are not so bad,’
Mr. Macleod, in explaining to the British Cabinet why Lord Selkirk wanted an early
public statement, stated that ‘Mr. Lee Kuan Yew’s policy of independence through
merger with the Federation of Malaya has come under fire because the Federation’s
unwillingness to merge in the foreseeable future is only too clear . . . Lord Selkirk
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thinks it would fortify Mr. Lee and frustrate his and our enemies if the possibility of
independence through a wider association were to be produced as an attainable goal.’
[See 34.] It seems probable that the Tunku had in the preceding months become
increasingly accustomed to Mr. Lee and confident of his intentions and therefore
correspondingly less willing to see him displaced by a much more extreme group.
Political developments in Borneo
56. The situation with regard to Borneo had also changed. In the Cabinet Mr.
Macleod came down firmly against holding on to North Borneo while allowing
Sarawak to be merged with Malaya. In North Borneo itself Mr. Donald Stephens,
proprietor and editor of the Sabah Times and Chairman of the Kadazan Society, had,
in the Legislative Council on 7 December, 1960, urged the need for federation with
Sarawak and later possibly Brunei, and had discussed the probability that political
parties would soon be formed in the territory as they had already been in Sarawak.
He had also in private conversation with the Governor mentioned the possibility of
association with Malaya. The decision to form the United National Kadazan
Organisation (UNKO) was taken at a meeting at Mr. Stephens’ house on 26 March,
1961, though the party was not formally inaugurated until August.
57. In Brunei the Sultan, while still inclined to accept a link with Malaya, was
becoming more aware of the arguments against, and of opposition to, the proposal.
At the same time the Parti Ra’ayat was trying to arouse enthusiasm for closer
association amongst the Borneo Territories themselves. By the beginning of 1961
there was also increasing ill-feeling between the seconded Malay police and the local
Brunei Malays. The prospects of Malaya getting the ‘plum’ of Brunei without the
other territories was therefore receding.
Mr. Lee’s proposals for a Grand Design, 9 May, 1961
58. On 24 April, 1961, Mr. Lee told Lord Selkirk that on the previous day he had,
for the first time, had a talk with the Tunku on a Grand Design. Dr. Goh, Tun Razak
and Tun Ismail had also been present at this meeting which had taken place in Kuala
Lumpur. At the end of the meeting the Tunku had invited him to prepare a paper
setting out his ideas on the way in which a Grand Design could be achieved. On 28
April Mr. Lee discussed the shape of his proposed paper with Mr. P. B. C. Moore. He
insisted that the fact that he had told British officials of these talks should be kept from
the Tunku. Mr. Lee showed his paper [see 37] in confidence to Lord Selkirk on 9 May
before giving it to Tun Ismail on the same day for transmission to Tun Razak and the
Tunku.
59. In his paper Mr. Lee laid great stress on the danger that without merger
Singapore would pass into the hands of a China-minded group and become a
Communist Chinese base. He mentioned the need for care not to arouse fears in the
Borneo Territories that they would be ‘swamped by more active and sophisticated
people’, but stressed that an early agreement in principle was essential if the position
in Singapore was to be held. On the question of racial balance the paper included the
indigenous population of the Borneo Territories with the Malays making a total of
4,480,900, as against 4,108,000 Chinese, 904,800 Indians and 213,000 ‘others’.
60. Mr. Lee’s constitutional suggestions were designed to persuade the Malay
leaders that there need be no threat to the Malay political predominance in a wider
‘Federation of Malaysia’, despite the large increase in the numbers of Chinese. He
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proposed that there should be indirect elections to the Federal Parliament, with 68
seats for Malaya, 16 for Singapore and 12 for Borneo. He claimed that with indirect
election, so that the majority group in each territory could take all its Federal seats,
the Malays could always be sure of control of at least 68 out of the total of 96 seats.
He also proposed that citizens should only be able to vote in their own state, so
preventing the Singapore Chinese from swamping the indigenous majority in either
Malaya or the Borneo Territories. In Malaya, on his figures, ‘Malays and Indigenous’
were already fractionally fewer than half the total population, but this point was not
brought out in the paper. Mr. Lee suggested that the powers of the Federation should
include defence, foreign affairs, police and security and matters such as currency and
common economic development.
61. In his letter of 10 May, 1961, covering Mr. Lee’s paper, and in a letter of 16
May reporting a further meeting between Singapore and Malayan leaders, Lord
Selkirk expressed the view that the readiness of the Tunku to discuss the Grand
Design was a very considerable advance, but doubted if any very concrete progress
was being made, despite the belief, held by Mr. Lee, that Tun Razak was himself
convinced of the necessity of the Grand Design and was pushing the Tunku towards
acceptance of it. At the second meeting in particular the Tunku, according to Mr.
Lee, kept harking back to the proposal that the Sultan of Brunei should take over
Sarawak and then join Malaya, which would in turn then consider the arrangements
to be made with Singapore.
IV. The Tunku’s second initiative, May 1961
The Tunku’s speech of 27 May, 1961
62. On 26 May, 1961, however, the Tunku informed Sir Geofroy Tory that ‘he
had now come to realise that . . . in Malaya’s interests she should find some means of
absorbing Singapore safely and constructively’. [See 39.] The Grand Design seemed
to offer the only means of doing this and he proposed to include a passage in a speech
to the Press Club in Singapore on the following day indicating this. He made it clear
that he was thinking of absorbing the Borneo Territories into the Federation of
Malaya as integral States, with Singapore alone enjoying substantial self-
government, and Sir Geofroy told him that he thought that the Federation would
have to give North Borneo and Sarawak as well a considerable measure of self-
government. Sir Geofroy also suggested that there might be some danger of adverse
reaction to the speech in North Borneo and Sarawak ‘where public opinion still
needed to be conditioned’, and this drew from the Tunku the retort ‘that nothing
would happen at all unless someone gave a lead.’
Reactions in Borneo
63. The lead given by this speech of 27 May, 1961, produced immediate and
widespread effects. It was widely welcomed in Sarawak, subject to prior unity with
North Borneo, but, opinion in the Borneo Territories, as Sir Geofroy Tory had
predicted to the Tunku, rapidly hardened against absorption in the Federation with
the same status as the existing States. This view was strengthened by a disastrous
visit to Borneo by the Tunku early in July during which he quite misjudged the
temper of the Territories, spoke as if all non-Chinese in Borneo were Malays, and
took an over-bearing and uncompromising stance which alarmed opinion in North
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Borneo and Sarawak and may well have finally convinced both the Sultan and his
people in Brunei that they should stay out of the Federation.
Reactions in Singapore: The founding of the Barisan Sosialis
64. In Singapore the speech immediately precipitated a fierce political struggle.
So long as merger had seemed remote the Left wing of the PAP had paid lip service to
it; but the Tunku’s support made it a genuine prospect and they had therefore to
come out in open opposition to it. On 3 June, 1961, six trade unionists, all PAP
members and led by Mr. Lim Chin Siong, issued a statement strongly attacking the
substitution of projects for merger in place of the earlier demand for ‘full and
complete self-government by 1963’. They stated that they would not support the PAP
candidate in the imminent Anson by-election unless the Government undertook to
demand complete internal self-government in the constitutional talks which had
been promised for 1963. They subsequently followed this up with demands which
included the release of all detainees.
65. On 14 July, 1961, eight PAP members of the Assembly, led by Dr. Lee Siew
Choh, issued a public declaration supporting the stand of these trade union leaders
and demanding that a party conference be held to discuss the whole issue. They were
supported in this by a number of PAP branches. On 21 July there was a vote of
confidence in the Assembly. 26 PAP members and 1 independent voted for the
Government, 8 Opposition members voted against it, and 13 PAP members and the 3
members of Mr. Ong Eng Guan’s United People’s Party abstained. Dissident PAP
members were then dismissed from the party and on 29 July they announced the
formation of a new party, the Barisan Sosialis, or Socialist Front, with Dr. Lee Siew
Choh as Chairman.
66. Mr. Lee’s political position now became precarious in the extreme and
remained so for over a year. For a short period in the summer of 1962 indeed the
Government lost its majority in the Assembly. On 14 July, 1961, the PAP lost the
Anson by-election to Mr. David Marshall of the Workers Party, a former Chief
Minister, though by a smaller margin than most observers had expected, given the
split in the PAP. Nevertheless, on 30 January, 1962, the Legislative Assembly passed
by 35 votes to 13 a motion moved by Mr. Lee declaring its support in principle for the
Tunku’s proposed plan for a Federation of Malaysia, with the Barisan Sosialis isolated
in opposition.
Irritants in the relationship between Malaya and Singapore
67. The Anson by-election was marked by the intervention of an Alliance
candidate. The Singapore Alliance had been formed in June 1961 by the Singapore
UMNO, MCA and MIC with the open support of the Tunku and under the leadership
of Mr. Lim Yew Hock. The Tunku’s support foreshadowed the uneasy record of
political intervention by both the Tunku and Mr. Lee in the other’s bailiwick which
helped to destroy confidence between them and was in the end a principal cause of
the break-up of Malaysia.
68. Confidence between the Malayan and Singapore Governments was also
damaged by Mr. Lee’s efforts to transfer the odium for the continued detention of a
number of leaders of the Left wing in Singapore to the British and Malayan
Governments. He informed Lord Selkirk on 19 July, 1961, that he proposed on the
following day to publish a confidential memorandum to the Internal Security
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Council of 12 August, 1959, in which he had recommended the release of 30
detainees. He also proposed to advise the Head of State to make orders for the release
of these detainees in batches. Mr. Lee’s decision to break the rules under which the
Internal Security Council was run greatly annoyed the Tunku, who was well aware
that Mr. Lee wanted detention to continue, but did not wish himself to take
responsibility for this, though he was the chief beneficiary. On 8 August therefore the
Malayan Government gave formal notice to withdraw from the ISC in six months’
time, though this intention was not in the end carried out. Lord Selkirk was also
‘becoming increasingly disturbed by Lee Kuan Yew’s irresponsibility’ and thought it
‘clear that he is seriously considering the possibility of forcing a constitutional crisis,
in which I should have to suspend the Constitution rather than allow the
Government of Singapore to pass into the hands of people whom he believes will be
Communist-manipulated.’
Reactions in Malaya: The Alliance recovers support
69. At the time of the Tunku’s speech Malaya had been in the middle of town
council elections. These had gone well for the Alliance in the Malay areas and the
speech followed encouraging results from Kelantan, the main stronghold of the
PMIP. After the speech the Alliance was if anything even more successful in the town
council elections in Trengganu, the other state in which the PMIP had earlier had
substantial support. Over Malaya as a whole the Alliance won 423 seats against only
17 won by the PMIP and, although it did less well in the bigger, largely Chinese,
towns against other groups, the elections suggested that it had recovered a firm hold
on the loyalties of the Malays. Public comment in Malaya on the Grand Design
proposal after the speech was cautious but not hostile.
The British response
70. Having publicly launched the Grand Design proposal, the Tunku, as Sir
Geofroy Tory had expected, proved anxious to hurry on with it urgently. In view of the
fragility of his political position, Mr. Lee also had reason for haste. North Borneo and
Sarawak, however, had some considerable way to go before they would be ready for
full self-government or able to stand up for their own interests in a federation. Nor did
the British Chiefs of Staff show any wish to see an early change in the existing defence
pattern in the area. The four British Departments of State involved all therefore took
the view that it was desirable to restrain the impetuosity of the Tunku somewhat and
the initial British response, while positive, was distinctly cautious.
71. The Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, in answer to questions in the Commons
on 20 June, 1961, said that ‘I have observed with interest the recent constructive
suggestion of the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya’ and that Her Majesty’s
Government would wish to take Bornean ‘reactions into account in their own
consideration of the suggestion’. He concluded his answers to supplementary questions
by remarking that ‘There are . . . very widely differing stages of political and economic
development, and obviously there are great problems in going too rapidly to what might
not be a successful conclusion of any discussions.’ In answer to a message from the
Tunku of 17 June, the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Sandys, sent a reply which drew
attention to Mr. Macmillan’s answers and stated that ‘The British Government are
indeed interested, and are going into the whole subject’, but also emphasised the British
‘anxiety not to seem to be putting pressure on the people of the Borneo Territories’.
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72. At a dinner on 20 June, 1961, Lord Selkirk enquired of the Tunku whether he
was prepared to administer the Borneo Territories as a sort of colony, to accept the
defence of the whole area, and to provide the necessary financial assistance. It was
clear that these were issues which the Tunku had not as yet fully considered or
preferred to ignore. In a meeting with Tun Razak on the following day Lord Selkirk
mentioned a period of 10 to 15 years for the scheme to mature. This led Tun Razak to
remark that Malaya would be unwilling to contemplate confederation with
Singapore, which he accepted would have to come into operation by 1963, without
confederation with the Borneo Territories at the same time.
V. Initial ideas on a Grand Design
The Tunku’s memorandum on a Grand Design, June 1961
73. On 26 June, 1961, the Tunku sent Mr. Macmillan a memorandum outlining
his ideas on the Grand Design. [See 46.] This suggested that the Borneo Territories
should first merge as States of the existing Federation and only then should ‘a greater
federation’ be formed with Singapore. The Tunku envisaged Singapore as having a
unique status and its own Civil Service within an otherwise homogeneous federation—
Ulster’s position within the United Kingdom seems to have been in his mind. The
Tunku urged that these arrangements should be brought into operation ‘in the near
future’ and mentioned the Currency Agreement as an example of existing unified
arrangements which Malaya could not accept much longer without political
unification. Attached to this memorandum was a ‘Breakdown of Population Figures’
with the same figures quoted earlier by Mr. Lee, but with the ‘Malays and Indigenous’
column simply headed ‘Malays’ qualified only by a footnote stating that ‘ “Malays” here
includes the Dayaks, Dusuns, etc.’.
Influences making for a less cautious British approach
74. Mr. Macmillan replied to the Tunku’s letter covering this memorandum on 3
August, 1961 [see 51]. He said that the Tunku’s ideas ‘could have an encouraging effect
for the political stability of South-East Asia’ and warmly welcomed the stimulus they
had given to discussion. But he went on to say that ‘I cannot at this stage commit the
British Government on the possibility of a wider association. In particular, there are
some points, on defence and on the Borneo Territories, on which they will need to be
reassured.’ He concluded by proposing that the Tunku and Mr. Lee should visit London
at the end of October or early in November to talk these matters over as a preliminary
to a formal conference at a later date at which the Borneo Territories would be included.
75. Despite its cautious tone, by the time this letter was sent a number of
influences had combined to induce or permit a greater willingness to accept more
rapid progress. At the end of July 1961 Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, by now Chancellor of the
Exchequer, introduced an interim Budget and made a statement on the balance of
payments situation in which he insisted that it was imperative for the United
Kingdom to secure substantial savings in overseas expenditure, in the short term as
well as in the long term. In Singapore there was a pressing need to do everything
possible to strengthen the hand of the Government in its struggle to retain popular
support in face of the bid for power by the Barisan Sosialis. Meanwhile it seemed
increasingly probable that the later the Grand Design was introduced the easier and
more tempting it would be for the Indonesians to resist it.
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The Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee
76. At the same time one of the two chief arguments against haste, the fear
that the interests of the peoples of Borneo would be virtually ignored and their
case go by default, was mitigated a little. A Commonwealth Parliamentary
Association regional conference in Singapore from 21 to 26 July, 1961, provided an
opportunity to remedy the impression left by the Tunku’s visit to Borneo and to
enable representatives from North Borneo and Sarawak to convince Malayan and
Singapore Ministers that the Tunku’s original proposals had been ungenerous. At
the meeting Mr. Donald Stephens proposed that a consultative committee of
representatives from all five territories should continue informal discussions and
make recommendations to their respective Governments on steps to be taken to
achieve an acceptable Grand Design. The first meeting of this Malaysia Solidarity
Consultative Committee was held in Jesselton on 24 August. It met again in
Kuching on 18 December and in Kuala Lumpur on 6 January, 1962. Its fourth and
final meeting was held in Singapore on 1 February, 1962. The meetings, if they
achieved nothing else, stimulated the crystallisation of ideas on federation in the
Borneo Territories.
Greater political awareness in Borneo
77. The Federation was also able during this period to impress on delegations
from Borneo the real or apparent advantages merger might have both for the
peoples of the territories as a whole and for leading individuals in them and so to
generate some enthusiasm for the idea. Within North Borneo, which had been well
behind Sarawak, political organisations began to proliferate following the
inauguration of UNKO in August 1961. In October Datu Mustapha announced the
intention of forming the United Sabah National Organisation (USNO) which should
be open to all natives of the territory, though the leadership was predominantly
Muslim—the nature of party leadership in Borneo is perhaps illuminated by the
1962 accounts of USNO, which showed an income of M$65,000 and a loan of over
M$34,000 to Datu Mustapha. Other groups formed were the United National Pasok
Momogun Organisation (UNPMO) in the Interior Residency, the Democratic Party
and the Social Democratic Party, which later changed its name to the United
Party. The Democratic and United Parties were primarily Chinese in composition.
A North Borneo Chinese Association, which claimed to be non-political, was also
formed.
78. The Governors of North Borneo and Sarawak, Sir William Goode and Sir
Alexander Waddell, were already pressing for greater safeguards for the territories in
any federation than the Tunku had originally proposed. The Tunku himself had
begun to move a little from his earlier view that the Borneo Territories should be
incorporated into the Federation on exactly the same footing as the existing States
and by 16 October, 1961, when speaking on Malaysia in the Malayan Parliament, he
had come to accept that they should have special powers on immigration, customs,
Borneanisation and control of state franchise rights. In mid-November delegates
from the two territories to a Colombo Plan meeting were said to have spoken ‘very
bluntly’ to the Tunku and Mr. Lee and to have made some impression on the Tunku,
although on 22 November, in London, he still seemed determined to make education
a federal subject in Borneo.
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Further influences in reducing British caution
79. By the end of August 1961 the influences operating on Her Majesty’s
Government which made greater haste more acceptable had increased. In a letter of
24 August [see 55] Lord Selkirk argued strongly for ‘a crash programme for the
“Greater Malaysia” scheme’ on the twin premises that Mr. Lee would certainly be
overthrown unless merger were to be agreed rapidly and that it was impossible to wait
for association of the Borneo Territories on the basis of popular representation, since
this would take 10 years in the case of Sarawak and 20 in the case of North Borneo—
Lord Selkirk was of course based in Singapore and therefore, despite his wider
responsibilities, perhaps tended to give special weight to the problems of the city.
80. Lord Selkirk repeated these views at greater length in a letter of 16
September, 1961, [see 58] stressing inter alia the need to make it clear to the
Federation Government that they would be responsible for the defence of the Borneo
Territories. Meanwhile on 26 August the Tunku stated publicly in Kuala Lumpur that
Britain would have to be allowed continued use of her bases in Singapore in the
event of merger and that so far as the problem of the use of the bases for SEATO
purposes by Britain was concerned ‘things will have to be worked out’. On 19 August
he had told the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Singapore that merger between
Singapore and Malaya was inevitable because their economies were inseparable.
The Malaya–Singapore discussions, August/September 1961
81. On 25 July, 1961, it was announced that the Tunku had invited Mr. Lee to
start preliminary discussions on the future constitutional relationship of Malaya and
Singapore. The two countries also agreed to seek the services of two international
experts to advise on problems involved in establishing a common market. A common
market which included Singapore never in fact materialised and failure to introduce
one was a major source of frustration for Mr. Lee’s Government while part of
Malaysia. But a constitutional relationship proved easier to agree, largely because Mr.
Lee, who believed himself to be under the necessity of achieving the apparent
political triumph represented by union with Malaya if he was to retain control, was
willing to make important political concessions.
82. Mr. Lee and Dr. Goh met the Tunku and Tun Razak, together with the
Permanent Secretary of the Malayan Ministry of External Affairs, Enche Mohamed
Ghazali bin Shafie, in Kuala Lumpur on 24 August, 1961,1 and agreed in principle
that the new Federation should be responsible for defence, external affairs and
security, but that Singapore should retain local autonomy, especially on matters of
education and labour. They also agreed to set up a working party to go into financial
and related arrangements. The Tunku and Mr. Lee met again for three days in Kuala
Lumpur in September and announced that the working party would be instructed ‘to
work out the details of a merger with a view to bringing about integration of the two
Territories and its people in or before June 1963’.
Malaya and Singapore: The proposed basis for merger
83. On 22 September, 1961, Mr. Lee gave the United Kingdom Acting
Commissioner in Singapore for information a paper setting out the proposed basis
for agreement. This provided for the existing Federal Constitution to be amended to
1 23 Aug, according to the Cobbold Report, para 3.
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permit the Federal Parliament to admit States on such terms and conditions as it
thought fit. Elections to the Singapore Legislative Assembly and for Singapore
representation in the Federal Parliament were to be based on Singapore citizenship
and election laws, but only to be about two-thirds of the number the proportion of
the population would have warranted in view of the greater degree of retention of
powers and revenues as compared with other States. Both Singapore and Federation
citizens were to be Federal nationals with a common passport.
84. Suggested modifications of the Federal Legislative List were to give
Singapore exclusive powers over civil and criminal law and the administration of
justice, prisons, national registration, Singapore citizenship in relation to electoral
rights in Singapore, conduct of elections in Singapore, public utilities, education,
medicine and health, labour and social security; and concurrent, but subordinate,
powers on a number of other items on the Federal list, including banking, trade,
commerce and industry. The Federation was to have exclusive control of taxes of a
national character, but the proceeds of both Federal and State taxation would accrue
to Singapore which would then make a contribution to the Federation towards
defence and other expenditure.
Malayan insistence on simultaneous transfer
85. The Tunku had already claimed, in a letter to Mr. Macmillan of 11 August,
1961, [see 53] that his ability to convince his own people of the wisdom of merger
with Singapore depended on his gaining the Borneo Territories at the same time. He
therefore now began to insist on full and simultaneous transfer of sovereignty over
the Borneo Territories as a condition for accepting merger with Singapore. He
declined to attend a London meeting with Mr. Lee for fear this should commit him to
merger before he could assure his supporters that he would get the Borneo.
Territories as well.
86. On 4 September, 1961, he sent a message to Mr. Macmillan asking ‘whether
the British Government would agree to relinquishing its sovereignty over the Borneo
Territories and Singapore in the immediate future to enable them to become
member States of Malaysia’ [see 57]. He also asked ‘whether the British Government
would contemplate the use of the Singapore base within the framework of our
mutual defence agreement’. A further message sent on 20 September stressed the
need for ‘some clear indication on the part of the British Government’ on the Borneo
Territories and the difficulty of proceeding ‘without some such commitment’. Enche
Ghazali, in passing on this message to Sir Geofroy Tory, indicated that unless Her
Majesty’s Government would commit the Borneo Territories without reservation to
Malaysia the Malayan Government would abandon the whole idea and leave Britain to
cope with a Communist Singapore.
87. Mr. Macmillan’s reply of 23 September, 1961, to these messages was still too
cautious to satisfy the Tunku. The British view was that the Grand Design would
prove ‘an important factor for stability in the area’ and Lord Selkirk expressed the
fear, in a letter of 16 September, that ‘there is a serious risk that unless Greater
Malaysia can be achieved in the near future, the opportunity may be lost for good’
[see 58]. It was nevertheless thought that, although, by raising the issue publicly, the
Tunku had stimulated political expectations and activity in Borneo and had thereby
made maintenance of the existing slow and steady rate of constitutional progress
slightly less attractive, a deliberate rate of advance remained in the best interests of
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the peoples of these territories. It was in any event considered that the United
Kingdom could not properly promise transfer of sovereignty over the heads of the
inhabitants. It was believed moreover that excessive haste in Sarawak might even
produce an insurrection by the Ibans who had historical reasons for being suspicious
of their prospects under Malay rule.
88. On balance the danger of missing the opportunity of achieving the Grand
Design was thought to be the greater, but British policy was if possible, in discussion
with the Tunku, to achieve a compromise which should secure the Tunku the counter-
balance he sought for the Chinese of Singapore, but should give the Borneo Territories
time to find their feet. Various proposals therefore began to be considered, first for
some sort of condominium and then, when that was abandoned as impracticable, for
schemes by which sovereignty should be transferred, but British Administrators
should be retained for a time. Mr. Macmillan therefore agreed that the Tunku’s
questions ‘about our possible early relinquishment of sovereignty over the Borneo
Territories and Singapore and about including Singapore within the framework of the
Malayan Defence Agreement are, of course, fundamental to the whole issue’, but went
on to say that further study was needed before Her Majesty’s Government could give
its views on them and that only at a meeting between the Tunku and himself could
there be hope of making any real progress on these questions.
89. The Tunku, in a sharp reply received in London on 28 September, 1961, [see
64] insisted that the only issue was whether the British Government would
relinquish sovereignty over the Borneo Territories ‘before or at least simultaneously
with Singapore in favour of Malaysia’ and that ‘Any preliminary discussion between
us would serve no useful purpose unless this issue is first settled.’ His Government
‘would not be able to carry the idea of merger of Singapore unless the Borneo
Territories are merged . . . as well’ and ‘in terms of balances, even the Borneo
Territories would not be an adequate compensation for our trouble.’ Questions such
as the future of the bases, constitutional procedures and administrative
arrangements he regarded as subsidiary and ‘not insurmountable.’
90. This reaction by the Tunku was read in London and amongst British
representatives in the area as reflecting a fear that the British intention was to get
him to commit Malaya to merger with Singapore by using the lure of the Borneo
Territories and then to withhold the prize. A further message from Mr. Macmillan,
designed to restore his confidence, was therefore sent on 4 October, 1961 [see 67,
dated 3 Oct]. In this Mr. Macmillan stated that ‘the British Government welcome and
accept the concept of a Greater Malaysia which would incorporate . . . the three
Borneo Territories’ and that ‘we believe that the best future for the Borneo
Territories lies in close political association with the Federation and Singapore.’
There were however in the Territories ‘anxieties, which we cannot ignore, about the
form of the association and about timing. We must therefore bend our efforts, in
close consultation with you, to bring the peoples of the Borneo Territories freely to
join with you.’ He added that he wished to discuss with the Tunku the constitutional
position, economic development and administrative arrangements, including the
staffing of the public services, in the Territories.
The defence issue
91. Mr Macmillan added that ‘It will, as you appreciate, be necessary to ensure
that future defence arrangements are on the right lines.’ Defence issues had not
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hitherto caused difficulty in discussions on the Grand Design between Britain and
Malaya. In a broadcast on 2 October, 1961, Tun Razak explained the need for the
stationing of British and Commonwealth troops in Malaya for ‘the defence of this
country and the United Kingdom territories in the Far East’, while on 11 October Mr.
Lee expressed the hope, in a Press conference, that if the bases were to be run down
this would be done slowly over ‘10, 15, or 20 years’. Earlier, in his letter of 11 August,
the Tunku had assured Mr. Macmillan ‘that I am equally concerned that the defence
arrangements of this region should not be jeopardised’, but had foreseen ‘no
difficulty in arriving at some suitable arrangement within the framework of the
existing Mutual Defence Agreement’ which ‘would, at the same time, remove any
possible fears that we are drawn unwittingly into SEATO’. This proviso on SEATO
was the point which subsequently caused difficulty.
92. On 30 September, 1961, however Mr. Lee, for reasons apparently connected
with his internal political situation, tried publicly to suggest that any delay in merger
talks would be due to British determination to retain the status quo in the bases. In
fact the British Ministry of Defence was already considering the possible advantages
of withdrawing all direct commitments in South-East Asia, even in the short term,
since this had begun to seem inevitable in the long term, and were therefore
reluctant to engage in early concrete discussions on the defence facilities the United
Kingdom might want in Malaysia. It was certainly hoped that British forces would no
longer have to be maintained in the area for internal security purposes and Ministers
had yet to decide whether they ‘were prepared to continue to assist in the external
defence of Greater Malaysia’.
The Tunku’s attitude to the Borneo peoples
93. Mr. Macmillan’s message of 4 October, 1961, to the Tunku had included a
proposed public announcement in which Her Majesty’s Government ‘welcomed’ the
Tunku’s proposals and finished with a sentence stating that ‘The wishes of the
peoples concerned must be taken fully into account’ and that they would be
consulted on ‘any commitment affecting their future’. In his message of 7 October
accepting the invitation to visit London, the Tunku suggested that this sentence
should be omitted. It would, he thought, ‘over-emphasise the need for consultation
with the people of the Borneo Territories who are at this moment not sufficiently
advanced in their political outlook to give an unbiased opinion of their own as they
are very much under the influence of the British Colonial administrators’ [see 69].
94. This attitude, which became evident also in his public utterances, lent a
certain appearance of substance to Indonesian claims that the transfer of sovereignty
lacked the consent of the peoples of the territories and led to difficulties with the
emerging local political leaders when the territories became part of Malaysia. It even
began to seem possible that the Ibans and other indigenous peoples, far from acting
as a counter-weight to the Singapore Chinese, might actually support them, as
against the Malays, in pressing for political and constitutional change. The reference
to colonial administrators in the message foreshadowed a line of explanation for
political difficulties in the territories which was subsequently a source of some
tension in relations between Britain and Malaysia.
95. In the Borneo Territories themselves steps were being taken to speed up
constitutional advance. Public statements by the Sultan of Brunei still gave the
impression of favouring federation, but he showed increasing caution in face of local
15-Malaysia-Appendix-cpp  21/9/04  9:09 AM  Page 608
[Appendix] JULY 1970 609
opposition to the proposal; the extent of this opposition had already led the Colonial
Office to think that there might be a prospect of disturbances in the State if the
decision was taken to join Malaysia. Among British officials concerned with Borneo
there was discussion of the possibility of a commission to ascertain the views of the
local people and Sir William Goode urged that the Tunku or his close advisers,
including some Chinese, should pay a longer visit to North Borneo and Sarawak so
that he could be brought to appreciate the anxieties of the local people.
96. On 30 September, 1961, Lord Selkirk had reported that he and the Governors
were agreed that ‘Greater Malaysia offers the best future for the Borneo
Territories’—indeed in a letter of 3 November Sir Alexander Waddell urged that the
idea should be pursued even if Singapore did not come in. But Lord Selkirk and the
Governors were convinced that in order to secure acceptance of federation in Borneo
it was desirable to provide for the retention of existing British staff, for a large
measure of internal self-government, including control over immigration,
education, language, citizenship and land development, for retention of all local
revenues, for freedom to pursue closer association amongst themselves and for some
form of British guarantee for a period after which the territories could opt out of
federation. They recognise that some compromise on these desiderata might be
necessary; the last in particular can never have been acceptable to the Tunku.
Considerable thought was nevertheless given to forms of condominium or treaty
commitment; apart from Malayan objections these all presented the danger that the
United Kingdom might be left in an anomalous position similar to that in the Central
African Federation.
The Singapore White Paper, November 1961
97. Meanwhile Mr. Lee and Malayan leaders had been haggling over the content
and provenance of a White Paper on the proposed terms for the merger of Singapore,
which Mr. Lee wished to issue with the Tunku’s agreement, and over the alternatives
to be put to the Singapore electorate in a referendum to which the PAP were by now
publicly committed. Mr. Lee believed that his chances of securing a majority in this
referendum for an Ulster-type solution would be greatly strengthened if he could
include as another choice complete merger as a State of the Federation. The Tunku
had privately made it clear that in practice this would be unacceptable to the Federal
Government, but it seemed at first that he might nevertheless be willing to see it
voted on; Tun Razak however was entirely opposed to its inclusion as an apparent
alternative. On the details of the proposed terms Mr. Lee had conceded to the
Federation complete control of the Singapore Police Force, but resisted Tun Razak’s
desire to reduce the State’s representation in the Federal Parliament still further to
12 seats, while there were substantial unresolved differences between Mr. Tan Siew
Sin’s views of the powers required by the Federation in the financial field and those
held by the Singapore Government.
98. The White Paper, as finally agreed and issued in November 1961, proposed
that defence, external affairs and internal security should be Federal subjects, with
the Singapore Judicial and Legal Services becoming a separate branch of the Federal
Services under the ultimate control of the Federal Chief Justice. Education and
labour would be State subjects. The Singapore Legislative Assembly would continue
as a State Legislature and the Civil Service as a State Civil Service. The existing
separate Singapore citizenship and voting rights would be retained, but, in view of its
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greater autonomy as against the founder States, Singapore would only be entitled to
15 members of the Federal Legislature instead of the 25 the numbers of its electorate
would otherwise warrant. In other respects Singapore citizens would enjoy the same
rights and have the same passport as Federal citizens.
VI. The London talks, November 1961
The Tunku’s mandate to negotiate
99. The announcement of the Tunku’s proposed visit to London was made on
Friday, 13 October, 1961. The last sentence originally proposed in Mr. Macmillan’s
message of 4 October was omitted and replaced by a phrase designed to retain its
substance while toning down the degree of emphasis on consultation. On 16 October
the Tunku moved a resolution in the House of Representatives in Kuala Lumpur
agreeing with the concept of Malaysia in principle; this was carried on 18 October.
The PMIP opposed the Tunku’s proposals in the debate, on the ground that they
would jeopardise the special position of the Malays, but a weakening of their
influence was demonstrated on 30 October when the PMIP Government of
Trengganu was defeated on a vote of confidence and was replaced by an Alliance
Government. On 4 November an extraordinary General Assembly of UMNO also
discussed the Grand Design and, although fears were expressed about the Malay
position, the Tunku was given a mandate to negotiate the formation of Malaysia.
100. The precaution was nevertheless subsequently taken of introducing a
constitutional amendment to make it more difficult for non-Malays to acquire
citizenship and to give much heavier weighting to the rural electorate. This was passed
by the Malayan House of Representatives on 31 January, 1962, by 80 votes to 11.
British preparations and policy
101. On 24 October, 1961, a report by an official committee on Greater Malaysia
[see 73] was circulated to the Cabinet in preparation for the talks with the Tunku.
Much of this was concerned with the dilemma that, while there was a clear obligation
to the peoples of Borneo, reaffirmed as recently as 1960 in the case of Sarawak, to
advance them socially, economically and politically until they were able to take full
responsibility for their own future, amalgamation into Malaysia appeared the only
way to secure their future viability and the Federation could not wait until they were
ready. They were therefore in danger of exchanging a temporary colonial status
under the British for a potentially much more permanent colonial status under the
Malayans. This dilemma was accentuated by the Tunku’s bland inability to realise
that there might be genuine reasons for hesitation on the part of the Bornean
peoples.
102. The official committee recommended that ‘the earliest possible
achievement of Greater Malaysia should be regarded as an aim of British Government
policy’, but the Government should not commit itself to firm dates for the accession
of Sarawak and North Borneo. It should welcome the Tunku’s suggestion in his
memorandum of 26 June, 1961, for a commission to work out the constitutional
details of the new Federation; the functions of this commission should however be
extended so that it could both assess the state of opinion in Borneo on the Grand
Design and make recommendations on the manner and timing of the association
between the territories and Malaysia.
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Defence issues
103. The committee also discussed defence issues. Ministers had already
decided that it should be made clear to the Tunku that it was intended to hand over
all internal security responsibilities in Malaysia, but to seek to retain defence
facilities. The general aim was to be to reduce British forces to the Commonwealth
Strategic Reserve, including the Commonwealth Brigade Group stationed near
Malacca, and existing naval and air facilities. Two questions arose—whether the
Tunku was fully alive to the implications of taking over responsibility for internal
security in Singapore and the Borneo Territories, and whether he would accept use
of the bases for SEATO purposes. On the latter question there was some evidence
that he had been influenced by the arguments for unfettered use and was preparing
Malayan public opinion to accept this, despite a public remark on 24 October, 1961,
to the effect that Singapore could never be used as a base in war because of the
danger to the civilian population and a statement by Tun Razak to the UMNO
Assembly on 4 November that the bases ‘should not be used for SEATO purposes’.
The committee however did not think it necessary to press for immediate
agreement on this point; general policy was still undetermined, a new addition to
the possibilities under consideration being a suggestion by Mr. Holyoake for a
quadripartite defence agreement between the United Kingdom, Australia, New
Zealand and Malaysia.
The November 1961 discussions and joint statement
104. A meeting of British Ministers on 15 November, 1961 [see 78], agreed, in
the light of this official committee’s report, on the way in which the talks with the
Tunku should be handled and, in particular, to press for the setting up of the
proposed commission on the Borneo Territories. These decisions were reported to
the Cabinet on 16 November. The discussions with the Tunku began in London on 20
November [see 79–84]. The Tunku at once stated that the change of sovereignty need
have little effect on the lives of the peoples of the Borneo Territories and that the
present British civil servants could be retained. He still envisaged however a status
and degree of autonomy similar to that of the founder States, except for special
provision for local control over immigration. The Colonial Secretary, Mr. Maudling,
proposed the setting up of a commission composed of a British Chairman, two
members appointed by the British Government and two members appointed by the
Malayan Government and this was agreed to.
105. The Malayan representatives left no doubt however that they wished the
deliberations of this commission to be little more than a formality and the terms of
reference originally proposed were revised ‘in order to include a note of urgency and
to give more of a lead in favour of Greater Malaysia’. In the process reference to
‘safeguards’ for North Borneo and Sarawak and, in a later version, to ‘an acceptable
plan’ for merger were omitted. British representatives nevertheless pressed the point
that there might be a need to ensure that the terms on which the Borneo Territories
entered Federation could not be altered without the agreement of their Legislatures.
A joint statement issued on 22 November, 1961, stated that both Governments were
convinced that Malaysia was ‘a desirable aim’, that ‘Before coming to any final
decision it is necessary to ascertain the views of the peoples of North Borneo and
Sarawak’ and that a commission would be set up to do this and to make
recommendations.
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The agreement on defence
106. On defence the Tunku accepted that in the event of war Britain must have
full use of her bases in both Malaya and Singapore; but he did not want a formal
written agreement which related the bases in any way to SEATO. The point was made
by the British Minister of Defence, Mr. Watkinson, however, that the bases were of
value to Britain only if it could be said openly that they could be used freely and this
point was stressed by other British Ministers. It appears, from the British minutes of
the discussions, that it was agreed at the third meeting, on 21 November, 1961 [see
81] that ‘the Federation Government would in practice not wish to impede the full
use of the bases by British and allied forces in the event of their being required for
defence operations in the region’.
107. The minutes of the fourth meeting, [see 82] when dealing with the joint
statement on defence which was to be issued on 22 November, 1961, express the
understanding that ‘The description in the agreed text of how the bases might be
used would enable Britain to employ them for all likely purposes, including that of
meeting her SEATO obligations (both operationally and for exercises) and the use of
the bases by her allies. There was no reference in the statement to the consent of the
Federation Government being required for the use of the Singapore bases as was
necessary under a similar clause of the existing Defence Agreement. On the use of
the Singapore bases for purposes strictly outside South-East Asia it was felt that the
reference to the protection of the territories of “other Commonwealth countries”
provided adequate cover.’ It was also thought that the statement would permit
satisfactory use of the Borneo Territories for defence purposes. Within the Foreign
Office the view continued to be expressed that it would have been wiser to have taken
the opportunity to remove British forces to Australia, while Lord Selkirk suggested
on 25 November that ‘The reality of the matter is that, whatever the words of any
agreement might say, we should only be able to use the bases on one occasion for
purposes which did not carry the consent of the Government and people of the new
independent Malaysia . . .’; in other words that after one such use it would be
impossible to maintain the agreement.
108. The statement itself recorded that the two Governments had agreed that the
1957 Agreement should be extended to the whole of Malaysia ‘subject to the proviso
that the Government of the Federation of Malaysia will afford to the Government of
the United Kingdom the right to continue to maintain the bases and other facilities
at present occupied by their Service authorities within the State of Singapore and
will permit the United Kingdom to make such use of these bases and facilities as the
United Kingdom may consider necessary for the purpose of assisting in the defence
of Malaysia, and for Commonwealth defence and for the preservation of peace in
South-East Asia.’ It is perhaps worth noting in this connection that the Tunku had
been reported in the Straits Times of 26 October, 1961, as having said during his visit
to Saigon that ‘I have always regarded Viet-Nam as a first line of defence for Malaya.’
At the fifth meeting [see 83] it was agreed to state in answer to Press enquiries that
the bases at Singapore would be British bases and would not be transferred to the
control of SEATO or to any other nation or group of nations and that the new
arrangement would not prevent Britain carrying out her international and
Commonwealth obligations.
109. It was also agreed at the fifth meeting that neither Government should
make any public statement which might conflict with this position. In the following
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days however both the Tunku and Tun Razak in public statements suggested that the
United Kingdom could not use the bases without the agreement of the Federation,
which would only give permission for use for SEATO purposes if its own interests
were involved. On 1 December, 1961, Mr. Sandys felt compelled to warn the Tunku
‘very firmly’ that such interpretations would destroy the entire value of the
agreement [see 86]. In consequence in January 1962, following his return to Malaya,
the Tunku made it clear, in a series of answers to questions in Parliament, that the
United Kingdom had the right to use the Singapore bases without the consent of the
Government of Malaysia; he would nevertheless expect consultation but would not
oppose use of the bases ‘for SEATO purposes for the maintenance of security in this
area’, that is South-East Asia.
VII. The Cobbold Commission, 1962
Membership and programme
110. Agreement on the membership of the commission to assess opinion in
Borneo and to recommend the manner and timing of association was reached by
mid-January 1962. The Chairman was Lord Cobbold, a former Governor of the Bank
of England. The British members were Sir Anthony Abell, Governor of Sarawak and
High Commissioner in Brunei until 1959, and Sir David Watherston, Chief Secretary
of the Federation of Malaya until 1957. The Malayan members were Enche Ghazali
and Dato Wong Pow Nee, Chief Minister of Penang. Lord Cobbold flew straight to
Borneo by way of Singapore, where he met the other members on 18 February. The
Commission arrived in Sarawak on 19 February and reached North Borneo on 25
February; Brunei did not come within the Commission’s purview, but its members
paid a courtesy call on the Sultan on 11 March. Lord Cobbold returned to London on
19 April and reconvened the Commission at Knebworth early in May to write its
report, which was signed on 21 June, 1962.
Opinion in Borneo
111. The immediate effect of the Commission’s work was to reveal to the Tunku,
through Enche Ghazali and Dato Wong, the deep doubts and fears which existed in
Borneo at the prospect of Malayan rule, based on a widespread dislike and distrust of
Malays. He reacted on 11 March, 1962, by accusing British civil servants of
discourtesy to the Malayan members of the Commission and of apathy towards
Malaysia [see 96]. Later, on 27 March, in a speech to the Chinese Chamber of
Commerce in Singapore, he accepted that the Borneo Territories thought of the
Federation as having a purely Malay Government, with other races bullied into
submission and no freedom of speech, worship or social intercourse. Lord Cobbold’s
own initial reaction was that, if the territories were to be persuaded that Malaysia
would be in their own interest, the Malayans would have to move a long way on
constitutional detail and that they and Her Majesty’s Government would have to
provide funds to ensure that economic conditions improved under the new
arrangements.
112. In practice, in Sarawak and North Borneo, although many people were still
very hesitant about the prospect, others were coming round to the view that the
Grand Design was inevitable and that what mattered was to secure the best possible
position for the territories in Malaysia. In its report the Commission suggested that
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perhaps a third of the people of the territories were in favour of Malaysia without too
much concern about terms and conditions, that another third would accept it
subject to safeguards of various kinds and that the remaining third either wanted
independence first or the continuation of colonial rule. The Commission thought
that about 20 per cent in Sarawak and somewhat less in North Borneo were opposed
to federation on any terms, unless preceded by independence and self-government—
the Tunku in a speech on 9 August, managed to translate this into the assertion that
80 per cent agreed with the concept of Malaysia.
Opposition to merger in Brunei
113. In Brunei, on the other hand, opinion was crystallising against association.
So far as his public statements went the Sultan still appeared to be attracted by the
idea of an arrangement with the Federation. In November 1961, however, he had
instructed his Government to study proposals for association and to canvass popular
opinion on the subject. There seems little doubt that by the beginning of 1962 the
incompetence of the Malay officials sent earlier to the State and the overbearing
tactics adopted by the Tunku had already cooled any enthusiasm the Sultan may
earlier have had for co-operation with the Federation.
114. The Colonial Office view, both at this time and in 1963, was that from
January to April 1962 Sheikh A. M. Azahari did not regard the Malaysia proposal as
incompatible with his aim of unifying the three Borneo territories under the Sultan
as constitutional ruler. The Colonial Office believed that, having met the Tunku in
April 1962, he was on the point of convening a meeting with others from North
Borneo and Sarawak to consider entering Malaysia as a single constitutionally-
governed unit, when, in May, the Brunei Government foreclosed on its loans to him;
he then left the State and only returned briefly in October before going to Manila. His
opposition to Malaysia was believed to be due to the fear that it might perpetuate the
autocratic and inept rule under the Sultan of the Pengirans, rather than to
disapproval of the concept itself.
115. There seems however considerable evidence that the Parti Ra’ayat and
popular opinion had already been alienated by the Tunku and that the party was in
consequence becoming increasingly favourable to Indonesian claims. Certainly by
March 1962 its leaders were reported to have been paying frequent visits to Indonesia
for some months. A Reuter report of 31 January, 1962, quoted ‘reliable sources’ in
Brunei as saying that the State’s official commission canvassing popular reaction had
found stiff and virtually unanimous opposition to association. The Parti Ra’ayat was
already active in stirring-up opposition to Malaysia in January and by 24 March the
High Commissioner, Sir Dennis White, was envisaging the possibility of ‘a situation
arising, beyond the ability of the Brunei Police Force to control’, if a decision to join
Malaysia seemed in prospect. During March the Sultan asked the Malayan
Government to postpone the departure of the Malayan police detachment until the
end of the year.
116. Despite these indications of widespread opposition, on 18 July, 1962, the
last meeting of the old Legislative Council passed by 22 votes to 4 a motion
supporting the principle of participation in the proposed Federation and negotiation
with Malaya and Britain on terms ‘which will bring benefits to the State of Brunei
but not diminish the status of Brunei as a constitutional State’—a formulation
which cannot have been welcome to the Malayan Government. Both the Sultan and
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others in Brunei also began to raise again the long-standing claim to the Limbang
area, annexed by Sarawak in 1890.
Malaya and Singapore: security and political and economic co-operation
117. The British Minister of Defence, Mr. Watkinson, visited Kuala Lumpur on 22
March, 1962, and then Singapore for talks on the transfer of responsibility for internal
security in Singapore and the Borneo Territories and subsequent external defence—
these talks were concluded in June 1962 and focused attention on the need to expand
the Malayan defence forces and on the cost of expansion. On 25 March, 1962, and again
on 30 March, the Tunku spoke of closing the causeway between Singapore and Johore
if extremists caused trouble in Singapore and emphasised the economic damage this
would do to Singapore. Mr. Tan, on 4 April, explained that the Tunku had had principally
in mind immigration controls, but that if the security situation deteriorated other
controls would have to be considered, including exchange control.
118. Lord Selkirk suggested that this attitude indicated that the Tunku was
experiencing some qualms about taking on the internal security problem in
Singapore—Sir Geofroy Tory had expressed a similar view on 19 February, 1962.
Throughout the first half of 1962 the Tunku and Mr. Lee tried to persuade the British
Government that it should place leading Barisan Sosialis leaders under preventive
arrest, but this they declined to do. By the summer however the PAP at least was
recovering its confidence. The Tunku had also been disconcerted by Mr. Lee’s failure
to dovetail his policies generally with those of the Federal Government—he was
particularly incensed by a proposal by Mr. Lee to visit Moscow and Peking. These
proposed visits, which Mr. Lee abandoned for the time being in view of the Tunku’s
attitude, were arranged as part of an international tour which Mr. Lee made in April
and May 1962 to gain support for the idea of Malaysia.
119. Meanwhile the difficult issue of a common market was also under
discussion; during April 1962 Tun Razak had asked the United Nations to suggest a
team to look into the issue. In Singapore, hitherto a free port, a Bill was introduced
to provide for a Tariff Advisory Commission and to permit the imposition of tariffs on
selected imports to protect local industries.
The Cobbold Commission and the transitional period
120. The main difference of opinion within the Cobbold Commission related to
the view held by the British members that there should be a transitional period
during which responsibility should be shared. The British members thought it
essential that there should be continuity of administration if local confidence was to
be retained and in particular that there should initially be British Governors, if
necessary appointed by the Agong on the nomination of the Agong and The Queen, in
order to make it easier to retain the services of expatriate officers, which all were
agreed was essential; these Governors should continue to have executive powers. The
Malayan members wanted authority to be in the hands of Chief Ministers with the
confidence of the Legislatures, but with expatriate State Secretaries.
121. On 3 June, 1962, the Tunku told Sir Geofroy Tory that he had instructed the
Malayan members to withdraw from the Commission if the other members insisted
on recommending a division of responsibility. In a separate memorandum recording
these differences the British members said that they ‘were greatly concerned by the
reluctance of our Malayan colleagues, apparently supported by their Government, to
15-Malaysia-Appendix-cpp  21/9/04  9:09 AM  Page 615
616 THE ORIGINS AND FORMATION OF MALAYSIA [Appendix]
make any concessions in favour of non-Muslim susceptibilities and national pride’
[see 120].
122. In its report the Commission recommended that the formation of Malaysia
should be welcomed and made a number of agreed recommendations on terms.
Particular proposals recommended were that the existing Constitution of Malaya
should be adapted to the new Federation instead of being replaced; that it should
provide for a strong central Government, but with additional autonomous powers
and safeguards for the new Borneo States and some form of guarantee to prevent
amendment, modification or withdrawal of these special powers and safeguards
without the positive concurrence of the State Government concerned; and that the
power of amending the Constitution of each State should belong exclusively to the
people in that State. The Commission however left the contentious issues to be
decided in negotiation between the British and Malayan Governments. It also
privately urged on both Governments the need for swift action in the light of the
emergence in Sarawak of some communal feeling.
123. On 4 July, 1962, having studied the report, the Tunku sent a message to Mr.
Macmillan stating that any proposal for maintenance of a degree of British authority
during a transitional period was unacceptable and that in the circumstances it would
be best to put the whole question into abeyance until the British Government had
decided that the territories were ready for merger [see 125]. This aspect of the issue
was at once settled, following a meeting of the Overseas Policy Committee of the
British Cabinet [see 126], by a reply from Mr. Macmillan, sent the same day, in which
he stated flatly that ‘The British Government has not the slightest desire to maintain
its authority during the transitional period over the Borneo Territories’ and that it
was in no way bound by the recommendations of the Commission or of any of its
members [see 128].
124. On 5 July, 1962, Mr. Macmillan reported on the issue to the full Cabinet. He
took the view that it was important that the United Kingdom Government should not
retain responsibility for the administration of the Borneo Territories if a Federation
was established, since, if it did, it would then be answerable for events without having
effective control over them. The Cabinet then agreed that negotiations should be
urgently pursued during July with the aim of bringing Malaysia into being at the
earliest practicable date and agreeing on solutions of the transitional problems which
would protect the interests of the peoples of the Borneo Territories.
VIII. Agreement in principle 1962
The London talks and joint statement, July 1962
125. The Tunku arrived in London on 16 July, 1962. Substantive discussions
between British and Malayan Ministers began on 17 July, 1962, and were concluded
on 31 July, while Mr. Lee joined the discussions on 29 July. On 1 August, 1962, a joint
statement was issued by the British and Malayan Governments [see 140, appendix D].
126. The statement announced that the two Governments had decided in
principle that Malaysia should come into being by 31 August, 1963, and that a formal
agreement should be concluded during the following six months. This agreement
should provide for the transfer of sovereignty over North Borneo, Sarawak and
Singapore to the new Federation by the set date; for the terms of the relationship
between Singapore and the new Federation as agreed between the Governments of
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Malaya and Singapore; for defence arrangements as set out in the joint statement of
22 November, 1961; and for detailed constitutional arrangements, including
safeguards for such matters as religious freedom, education, representation in the
Federal Parliament, the position of the indigenous races, control of immigration,
citizenship and the State Constitutions in relation to North Borneo and Sarawak, to
be drawn up after consultation with the Legislatures of the two territories.
127. It was also stated that during a transitional period a number of the Federal
constitutional powers would be delegated temporarily to the State Governments in
Borneo and that an Inter-Governmental Committee, on which the Governments of
Britain, Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak would be represented, would be set up to
work out the necessary constitutional arrangements and safeguards. The Minister of
State for the Colonies, Lord Lansdowne, as Chairman of this Committee, and Tun
Razak would go to Borneo to conduct these discussions and to consider how best the
services of as many expatriate officials as possible could be retained.
128. Amongst other points agreed, though not publicly announced, were that
under Federation North Borneo and Sarawak should each have a constitutional
Governor; that the Governor should appoint as Chief Minister to preside over the
Executive Council a person likely to enjoy majority support in the Assembly; and
that, until the Assembly was fully elected, the State Secretary, Legal Adviser and
Financial Officer, all for some years probably expatriates, should ex officio be
members of both the Legislative Assembly and the Executive Council. It was also
agreed that there should be no right of secession; that representation in the Federal
Parliament should be weighted to take account of size of territory as well as
population; that there should be freedom of religion; that English should continue as
an official language in North Borneo and Sarawak for as long as the territories
wished; and that the two States should have special powers to control immigration
both from abroad and from other parts of Malaysia. Borneans would be citizens of
Malaysia; citizens of Singapore would also be automatically ‘citizens’—and not just
‘nationals’—of Malaysia, though there would be reciprocal restrictions on franchise
rights as between Singaporean and other Malaysian citizens.2
129. On 18 July, 1962, the North Borneo Executive Council had unanimously
agreed that there should be detailed discussions and agreement on terms and
safeguards amongst all the parties concerned before a final decision to transfer
sovereignty was taken and that the Constitution should provide for substantial State
powers. The two Governors in a joint Note of 26 July had taken a similar view and
had insisted that there must be ‘a genuine willingness by the Malayans to treat the
Borneo Territories differently from existing States of the Federation’. Several of the
points agreed in London represented new concessions by the Malayan delegation to
the needs of the Borneo Territories, while other points were left open for discussion
in the Inter-Governmental Committee which now became the centre of activity.
The referendum in Singapore
130. Mr. Lee, who had already made his bargain, gained an improvement in
London in the wording of the citizenship provisions by an exchange of letters with the
Tunku on 30 and 31 July, 1962 [see 137, note]. On 4 August he recovered his majority
2 This account omits reference to the secret agreement providing for Malaysia’s inauguration earlier than
31 Aug 1963 ‘if for any reason it appeared desirable’, see 140, para 3.
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of one in the Singapore Assembly and on 14 August he announced the terms of the
citizenship arrangement and that the long-promised referendum would be held on 1
September. This resulted in a resounding endorsement of the proposals set out in the
Singapore Government’s White Paper of November 1961, with 71 per cent of the votes
cast in favour. There were two alternative choices on the ballot paper—complete
merger with the same status as the existing States of the Federation and merger on
terms no less favourable than those for the Borneo Territories. The Opposition
however, apart from the Alliance, called on their supporters not to mark their ballot
papers and 26 per cent of the ballots cast were blank. This result considerably eased
the internal political pressure on the Singapore Government and by extension the
urgency of the negotiations for Malaysia, but these had now acquired a momentum
which was not dependent on fears for security in Singapore.
C. The interests of Indonesia and the Philippines
IX. Indonesian reactions
Early objections to the Grand Design
131. There were arguments for urgency in events elsewhere. Indonesian intentions
had been a matter of concern for some time. In an article published in March 1965 Dr.
Mohammad Hatta, one of the most moderate and sensible of Indonesian leaders, has
stated that as early as November 1949 he had told Mr. MacDonald, who had mentioned
the Grand Design to him, that, if unified, the British territories would inevitably
become a second China, probably in complicity with mainland China, and that this
would be dangerous for Indonesia. He claimed that, when Prime Minister, he had
issued instructions that objections to these territories being united ‘should be
considered as one of the most important aspects of our Government’s foreign policy’.
Malaya and Indonesia
132. Relations between Malaya and Indonesia were subject to strain from the
first. Some expressions of Indonesian national claims in the 1940s included Malaya
in their scope and within weeks of Malaya becoming independent in 1957 there was
strong criticism in Indonesia when Malaya abstained in the United Nations General
Assembly on the West Irian issue. There were Indonesian complaints about the
barter trade between the Outer Islands and Malaya, and suspicion that Malaya might
prove attractive to Sumatra. There was also dislike of Malayan proposals for regional
arrangements in South-East Asia and indeed for any initiative by other countries in
what Indonesians regarded as their sphere of influence. A Treaty of Friendship was
signed in 1959 and finally ratified on 30 April, 1960, but relations remained uneasy
and the Tunku’s offers of mediation on the West Irian issue in the autumn of 1960
were not well received.
Indonesia and British Borneo
133. On the specific issue of the British Borneo Territories the public Indonesian
position, so long as the West Irian issue remained unresolved, was that Indonesian
claims were limited to territory formerly part of the Netherlands East Indies.
Nevertheless the Phoenix Park meeting in January 1960 was well aware that, although
the Indonesians might have their hands full for the moment, should pan-Malaysian
sentiment develop, Indonesian suspicions might grow, if only because a prosperous
15-Malaysia-Appendix-cpp  21/9/04  9:09 AM  Page 618
[Appendix] JULY 1970 619
and expanding Malayan Federation would have obvious attractions for those, especially
in Sumatra, who had reasons for wishing to break away from Javanese control.
134. Concern was reinforced when Professor Mohamed Yamin, Indonesian
Minister for Special Affairs and Chairman of the National Planning Council, who had
it was true made similar claims before and been repudiated by his Government, in a
speech on 18 February, 1960, suggested ‘eliminating the enclaves in Portuguese
Timor and British North Borneo which were still not free’. Commenting to the Press
on 10 March, 1960, on Professor Yamin’s remarks, Dr. Subandrio said that ‘Indonesia
would definitely not put forward a claim to foreign territories adjacent to the
Indonesian archipelago’ and that ‘the current geographical status quo must be
recognised as the basis for establishing firm national boundaries’. He added that ‘It is
a law laid down by history that every colonised territory will gain emancipation, but
this does not mean that it will become part of Indonesia.’ The significant passage
here was probably not the disclaimer, but the insistence on maintenance of the
geographical status quo—the Indonesian Government had no objection to a number
of small weak independent States as neighbours which it could dominate.
135. The British official view of the Indonesian interest in the summer of 1960
was that it reinforced arguments for haste—the longer the Grand Design was delayed
the more likely Indonesia was to work up opposition to it. The increasing Indonesian
bellicosity towards the Dutch in the latter part of 1960, and their action in securing
massive arms supplies from the USSR, strengthened this view. In North Borneo itself
most opinion at this time was still in favour of retaining the existing separate
colonial status. Mr. Stephens, however, had begun to be worried that on its own the
territory would be vulnerable. He told the Governor in December 1960 that Dr.
Subandrio had asked him when North Borneo would get self-government and if it
would then join Indonesia. By February 1961, in a draft Commonwealth Relations
Office brief for the forthcoming Prime Ministers’ Conference, increased Indonesian
interest in the Borneo Territories was the only reason cited for greater urgency.
Nevertheless, though the possibility of Indonesian reaction was always listed as a
problem in early British discussions of the Grand Design, it was never given great
prominence.
Attacks on the Tunku’s speech of 27 May, 1961
136. Dr. Subandrio, passing through Singapore on 13 June, 1961, was reported
as having said sourly, with reference to the Tunku’s proposal for a form of the Grand
Design, that ‘so long as no Indonesian territory is involved, and there is no conflict of
interest, we are not-concerned with it’. Early in August he told Lord Selkirk and Sir
Leslie Fry that the project was entirely a matter for the territories concerned to
decide upon and that Indonesia had no claim on any of them. Sir Leslie, however,
doubted if the proposal was welcome to the Indonesian Government and reported his
Malayan colleague as being quite clear that it was not. Left-wing Indonesian papers
such as Suluh Indonesia attacked the speech and the June issue of the Communist
Malayan Monitor launched the view, later taken up by the Indonesian Communist
paper Harian Rakjat, the Afro–Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO), the
Barisan Sosialis in Singapore and other similar journals and bodies, that the Grand
Design would mean ‘the physical encirclement of Indonesia’.
137. When in January 1962 the Singapore Legislative Assembly passed a motion
approving Malaysia in principle opposition came entirely from the Barisan Sosialis.
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In winding up the debate Mr. Lee claimed that this was because they took their
orders from the Communist Party—the PKI—in Indonesia. The Barisan had good
reasons of their own to oppose the incorporation of Singapore into Malaysia, but
their attitude was no doubt stiffened by a resolution passed by the PKI at the end of
December 1961 condemning Malaysia as ‘a form of neo-colonialism’.
The influence of the West Irian issue
138. The official Indonesian attitude remained more cautious. On 20 November,
1961, Dr. Subandrio told the General Assembly of the United Nations that though
‘ethnologically and geographically speaking, this British part is closer to Indonesia
than to Malaya’. Indonesia had ‘told Malaya that we have no objections to such a merger
based upon the will for freedom of the peoples concerned’. At this stage of course the
Indonesian Government was still preoccupied with its efforts to secure West New
Guinea—in December 1961 Dr. Sukarno called for the liberation of West Irian in 1962.
139. By the beginning of 1962, however, the Indonesians were said to be
enrolling volunteers in Malaysia ‘for the liberation of West Irian’; this may well really
have been with a view to action against Malaysia, as may preparations to open a
consulate in Jesselton. Mr. Macmillan mentioned a possible irredentist threat from
Indonesia to a Ministerial Meeting on 21 March, 1962, [see 98] and by May there were
even Press reports that an Indonesian-led ‘Borneo Liberation Army’ was present in
the area of the border between the Fifth Division of Sarawak and Indonesian
Kalimantan. In April Dr. Hatta, who some weeks earlier had in Singapore publicly
described the Grand Design as ‘a sound idea’, told the Tunku that the Indonesians
were becoming very afraid of the gravitational attraction of the Federation of Malaya
for the Sumatrans. Mr. Lee subsequently expressed the view to Lord Home that the
Indonesians might lay claim to the Borneo Territories.
140. The Foreign Office view by the summer of 1962 was that this threat was a
distinct future possibility if not immediately pressing, and a successful effort was
made to have a favourable reference to the progress being made towards the
formation of Malaysia in the final communiqué of the Commonwealth Prime
Ministers’ Meeting in September 1962. Already by August 1962, however, it had
begun to seem that there was prospect of a peaceful transfer of West Irian to
Indonesia and therefore that that country might soon be in a position to turn its
attention to Borneo and Malaya.
X. The Filipino claim
The Sulu inheritance
141. The claims of the Philippines in Borneo were based on those of the heirs
to the Sultans of Sulu to parts of the coast of North Borneo and of adjoining
areas of Indonesian Borneo or Kalimantan. These claims were mentioned at the
Phoenix Park meeting in January 1960, but as late as May 1961 it was thought
that the Philippine Government would welcome the Grand Design and, in the
words of a minute by Mr. E. H. Peck, ‘will not press the doubtful claim of the
Sultan of Sulu to parts of North Borneo, provided we keep the Indonesians out’.3
3 At this point in para 141, approximately two and half lines of text have been removed and retained under
section 3(4) of the Public Records Act, 1958.
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As for the Malayan Government, it seemed determined to ignore the possible
existence of either Indonesian or Filipino interest in the Borneo Territories.
Filipino assertion of the claim and the British response
142. By the beginning of 1962 however a public campaign on the Sulu claim was
developing in the Philippines. In the course of 1962 the claim was implicitly
extended from the areas on the east and north-east coasts over which former Sultans
had had some authority for a time to the whole modern territory of North Borneo,
despite a disclaimer by the Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Salvador P. Lopez, in a
Press interview in October. On 24 April, 1962, the Philippines House of
Representatives unanimously adopted a resolution urging the President ‘to take the
necessary steps . . . for the recovery of a certain portion . . . of Borneo and adjacent
islands which appertain to the Philippines’. On 24 May, 1962, therefore the
Philippine Ambassador in London was handed an aide-mémoire which asserted
undisputed British sovereignty over North Borneo and made it plain that it was the
British intention to support the formation of a Federation of Malaysia of which North
Borneo would be a part.
143. Nevertheless in June 1962 President Macapagal, who had been personally
concerned with the matter at an earlier stage in his career, took up the claim
publicly and on 22 June Mr. Lopez addressed a note to the British Ambassador, Mr.
John Pilcher, stating that ‘it is clear . . . that there is a dispute between the Sultanate
of Sulu and the Philippine Government on the one side and Her Majesty’s
Government on the other regarding the ownership and sovereignty over North
Borneo’, and asking for conversations on the subject. A reply to this Note dated 3
August, 1962, pointed out that ‘in so far as this refers to a dispute with the
“Sultanate of Sulu”, Her Majesty’s Government had understood that the existence of
the Sultanate of Sulu had not been recognised by the Government of the Philippines
for many years and that even the residual spiritual authority enjoyed by Sultan
Jamalul Kiram had lapsed with his death in 1936.’ The Philippines’ reply of 12
September spoke of establishing the Sultanate’s status in conversations and of
‘other documents whose contents will be revealed at the proper time’ and called
again for such conversations.
Reactions in Malaya and North Borneo
144. The Tunku’s first reaction to these exchanges was to say that Malaya was in
no way involved in Filipino claims, which were in his view a matter between the
Philippines and the United Kingdom. The reaction in Borneo to the claim was hostile
and did much to swing opinion to an acceptance of the need for Malaysia. These
developments helped also both to make the Tunku more conscious of the possible
disadvantages and difficulties inherent in the Grand Design and the British
Government more anxious to have Malaysia well launched before Indonesia was free
to turn its attention away from West Irian.
145. On 4 August, 1962, the Philippine Government sent an aide-mémoire to the
Federation Government insisting that North Borneo was held only on lease and
could not be transferred by the United Kingdom to another party. On 10 August,
during a discussion with the Vice-President and Foreign Minister of the Philippines,
Dr. Pelaez, Dr. Subandrio seems to have encouraged the Philippine Government to
pursue the issue with Malaya.
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146. The Malayan reply to the Philippine aide-mémoire, sent on 3 October, 1962,
stated that ‘At present North Borneo is under effective and direct rule of the British
Government and to the British Government the question of sovereignty over North
Borneo has at no time been in doubt’. It went on to say that the Malayan Government
accepted this as sufficient to justify acceptance of transfer. On 1 October, however,
the Tunku, at a Press conference on his departure for a visit to Ceylon, had spoken in
approving terms of a Philippine proposal that the people of North Borneo should
decide their future by referendum. These remarks and the initial Malayan attempt to
remain uninvolved to some extent undermined the hitherto apparently firm legal
position.
XI. Opposition to Malaysia
Petitions to the United Nations
147. Opponents of the Grand Design had meanwhile begun to appeal to a wider
audience. The United Nations ‘Committee of Seventeen’ had in July 1962 questioned
a number of petitioners from Singapore who opposed merger, as well as Mr. Lee, but
had taken no action. On 9 September the Chairman of UNPMO had joined the
Chairmen of SUPP and of the Brunei Parti Ra’ayat in sending the United Nations a
joint petition seeking intervention to prevent the transfer of sovereignty without the
exercise of the right of self-determination. Other leading members of UNPMO
repudiated its Chairman’s action and reaction in North Borneo to the Filipino claim
was in general sharply hostile—indeed in October 1962 the leaders of all parties,
including UNPMO, sent a joint letter to the President of the Philippines rejecting the
claim.
148. In January 1963 SUPP also repudiated the joint petition, but submitted a
separate one of its own asking for a referendum before merger, while in September
1962 Mr. Lee submitted a petition reporting the results of the Singapore referendum
and the fact that Mr. David Marshall, one of the earlier opposition petitioners, had
come to support the Anglo–Malayan Agreement. Nevertheless the Tunku’s reference
to a referendum and the petitions opposing federation made it somewhat less easy to
resist demands for some form of popular consultation and to refute Indonesian
arguments that rights of self-determination were being overridden.
Indonesia and Brunei
149. The Indonesian arguments were fortified by events in Brunei. During July
and August 1962 the Parti Ra’ayat, the only organised party, won 54 out of the 55
District Council seats, so gaining control of all the District Councils and ensuring
that its candidates would secure the 16 Legislative Council seats elected by the
District Councils. The party, though not in a majority in the Legislative Council,
since there were 17 ex officio, official and nominated members, could therefore well
lay claim to represent popular feeling. It advocated unity amongst the three Borneo
Territories under the constitutional rule of the Sultan and opposed merger into
Malaysia, though it seems to have been prepared to bargain with the Malayans. By
September 1962 the Mentri Besar, Dato Marsal, was also hostile to merger. In
discussions with a Malayan delegation led by Tun Razak, the official Brunei
representatives proposed a form of association, instead of incorporation in a
federation; they also insisted that Brunei should suffer no loss of sovereignty. This
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was summarily rejected by the Malayans and the discussions ended, though the
Sultan himself avoided a complete break by reserving his own position.
150. Meanwhile evidence was accumulating that Bruneis had received training
in Indonesia and that Indonesian officials had for some time in all these territories
been urging Indonesian claims and the rejection of proposals to join Malaysia. On 24
September, 1962, the Tunku reacted sharply to reports that Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo,
Chairman of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), who was not at the time a
member of the Indonesian Government, had suggested that the country should be
‘vigilant’ towards Malaysia and that areas bordering on Indonesia ‘might be used for
military bases’. Dr. Subandrio, who was passing through Kuala Lumpur on 25
September, said that Indonesia had not made any territorial claims on Malaysia, but,
since she had a common frontier with the constituent territories, it was natural that
she should not remain indifferent. On 26 September in Singapore he was less
restrained—‘If Malaysia should permit a military base to be established then we are
certain to take counter-action. . . . We have made repeated statements that West Irian
was the only territory which we would claim as ours. . . . But if our neighbours
continue to provoke us and to doubt our sincerity, then things may change. . . . I am
not prepared to commit myself or my Government.’
D. Negotiation of the agreement
XII. The Inter-Governmental (Lansdowne) Committee
Membership and organisation
151. It was against this background that Lord Lansdowne and Tun Razak started
their consultations with political and community leaders and representatives of civil
servants’ associations in Sarawak and North Borneo in the middle of August 1962
and subsequently began the work of the Inter-Governmental Committee. A
preparatory meeting of the Committee was held in Jesselton on 30 August, 1962. The
Committee and its sub-committees were composed of delegations from Sarawak and
North Borneo, as well as from Malaya and the United Kingdom, while the Sultan of
Brunei accepted an invitation to send observers. Although the delegations from
Sarawak and North Borneo were widely representative in character most of the
actual negotiation to secure arrangements acceptable to the unofficials from these
territories was conducted by the British officials on the two delegations. The
Chairmen of all sub-committees were drawn from the United Kingdom delegation.
Constitutional, Fiscal, Public Service, Legal and Judicial, and Departmental
Organisation Sub-Committees were set up and it was agreed that a plenary session of
the full Committee should be held in Jesselton in the middle of October.
152. Tun Razak subsequently suggested that a sub-committee to consider and
co-ordinate future plans for economic development should be added, though he
admitted that this was not strictly within the terms of reference of the Lansdowne
Committee. Lord Lansdowne’s response to this proposal was non-committal, but in a
report to the Cabinet on his visit to Borneo, dated 10 September, 1962, [see 141] he
expressed the view that since ‘Her Majesty’s Government is giving up its
responsibility for the territories before they are ready to achieve independence on
their own, we have a continuing obligation to help them. I consider that we cannot
honourably discharge this obligation to the peoples of the territories whom we are
persuading to accept Malaysia, unless we maintain our assistance after federation at a
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level not lower than the existing Colonial and Welfare Grants. This should not
include the cost of any compensation scheme’. Tun Razak’s proposal was however
resisted in London on the grounds that the Lansdowne Committee was not equipped
to undertake a study of development aid and that in any case the question of British
financial support for Malaysia in both the development and defence fields was
deliberately being left open to be used if necessary to provide some financial
inducement to overcome difficulties which might arise in the Committee’s main
discussions.
Malayan attitudes to the Borneo peoples
153. Having set the work of the Committee in motion—though the first sub-
committee did not meet until 8 October, 1962—Lord Lansdowne visited the Tunku
in Kuala Lumpur to emphasise that if Malaysia was to endure it must start off with
the support of the local people and to persuade him to visit Borneo himself [see 142].
He also pressed Tun Razak to accompany the Tunku, initially at least, on this visit
and not to take Enche Ghazali, whose attitude he thought unhelpful. Enche Ghazali,
when on the Cobbold Commission, had presumably been responsible for the Tunku’s
outburst in March 1962 about British civil servants in the territories and had
evidently been offended rather than impressed by the doubts of the local people.
154. Tun Razak and the Malay officials with him on the other hand seemed to
have been convinced during their tour in August 1962 that there were real
difficulties in merger. One of them, Dato Abdul Aziz bin Haji Abdul Majid, Permanent
Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department, even told Sir William Goode that,
whereas in London he had thought the Governors’ attitude obstructive, he now
realised that they had only been representing the true views of the people. He later
repeated this assessment in Kuala Lumpur. Lord Lansdowne, in reporting this, said
that he believed that the Malayans on the Committee ‘now realise that British
concern over the form of Malaysia is directed solely towards the determination to
create a federation which will stick’. But it remained to convince the Tunku of the
realities of the situation.
Reactions in North Borneo and the Twenty Points
155. In North Borneo, in the words of Lord Lansdowne, ‘the London
announcement had come as a great shock’ and had caused ‘consternation’. On 13 and
14 August, 1962, Mr. Stephens convened a meeting in Jesselton which was attended
by the leading representatives of UNKO, USNO, the Democratic and United Parties
and of UNPMO, except its Chairman, who was hostile to the Malaysia proposals.
These representatives drew up a fourteen-point programme of minimum safeguards
which should be met before North Borneo joined Malaysia. The list was extended at a
later meeting to twenty points and a memorandum incorporating these points and
signed by three representatives of each of the five parties was presented to Lord
Lansdowne and Tun Razak when they visited Borneo. These Twenty Points, which
gained weight by attracting general support also in Sarawak, went well beyond what
the Malayans had appeared to be prepared to concede in London.
156. The more important of the Twenty Points provided in essence: (1) that
while Islam might be the national religion of Malaysia there should be no State
religion in North Borneo and that the provisions in the Malayan Constitution
relating to Islam should not apply in North Borneo; (2) that English should be an
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official language of North Borneo for all purposes without time limit; (3) that the
Malaysian Constitution should be a completely new document even if based on the
existing Malayan Constitution; (6) that North Borneo should have unfettered control
of immigration into the State, except for those the Federal Government itself
employed or wished to exclude on strictly security grounds; (7) that there should be
no right of secession; (8) that Borneanisation of the public service should proceed as
quickly as possible; (9) that British officers should be encouraged to remain until
they could be suitably replaced by Borneans; (11) that North Borneo should retain
control of its own finance, development and tariff and the right to raise loans and
should be compensated for the loss of Colonial Development and Welfare Grants;
(13) that a proper Ministerial system should be introduced in North Borneo; (14) that
during a seven-year transitional period legislative power should remain with the
State and not merely be delegated; (15) that the existing educational system in North
Borneo should be maintained and remain under State control; (16) that no
amendment, modification or withdrawal of any special safeguard relating to North
Borneo should be made without the positive concurrence of the Government of the
State and that the power of amending the State Constitution should rest exclusively
with the people of the State; and (17) that representation in the Federal Parliament
should take account of North Borneo’s size and potentialities and should not be less
than that for Singapore. Point 19 proposed the adoption of the ancient name of
Sabah for the State in place of North Borneo.
Formation of an alliance and elections in North Borneo
157. The North Borneo Legislative Council passed unanimously on 12
September, 1962, a resolution welcoming Malaysia in principle ‘provided that the
terms of participation and the constitutional arrangements will safeguard the special
interests of North Borneo’. On the following day the Council also adopted a
resolution calling for the introduction of a Member System by the end of the year, in
order to give members more knowledge and experience of administration in
preparation for entry into Malaysia.
158. Meanwhile, on 4 September, 1962, USNO and UNKO had agreed to the
formation, on the Malayan model, of a Sabah Alliance Party with provision for other
groups to join. By the middle of October, the United and Democratic parties, which
had decided to merge, were jointly linked with this proposal and the Chairman of
UNPMO had announced that that group had withdrawn its support of the joint
petition to the United Nations and also wished to join the proposed Alliance. UNPMO
was admitted to membership of the Alliance in November 1962, but was allocated
only 5 seats on the National Council as against 12 each for the other three parties
and 2 seats as against 5 each on the Executive Council of the Alliance. The tiny Sabah
Indian Congress was also admitted in November and given 1 seat on the National
Council.
159. Nominations for elections to 4 Town Boards and 11 District Councils in
North Borneo were completed on 26 November, 1962. 53 seats were uncontested and
there was no valid nomination for 1 seat where the election had in consequence to be
postponed into January. The remaining 65 seats were contested amongst the
members of the Alliance and by independents. The elections took place on 16
December, except in Tawau, where all the seats were uncontested; in Sipitang
district, where it was necessary to postpone the election to 3 March, 1963, owing to
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preoccupation with the aftermath of events in Brunei; and in three rural districts
where it had been impossible to prepare rolls in time.
160. Of those successful in December 1962, 57 represented the Alliance as a
whole, 21 UNKO, 13 USNO and 4 UNPMO. 15 seats were secured by independents,
most of whom aligned themselves with parties in the Alliance. Overall USNO secured
the largest number of seats. 75 per cent of the adult population were on the electoral
rolls and these 80 per cent voted, with only 3 per cent of spoilt papers. Two
independents known to be affiliated to the Brunei Parti Ra’ayat, who stood in
Labuan, were heavily defeated. These local elections were significant since seats were
contested on national issues and the new councils were also to perform the function
of electoral colleges for the Legislative Assembly. The elections postponed to March
1963, if anything, accentuated the display of popular support for the Malaysia
concept.
Reactions in Sarawak and the Tunku’s visit to Borneo
161. In Sarawak the Council Negri, on 26 September, 1962, passed a resolution
welcoming Malaysia in principle ‘on the understanding that the special interests of
Sarawak will be safeguarded’. The issue had previously been discussed in the five
Divisional Advisory Councils. In the Council Negri one SUPP member spoke, but did
not vote, against the motion and the Chairman of SUPP, a moderate, managed to
support both the motion and the joint petition to the United Nations. But, although
no vote was cast against the motion, the view that the whole issue was being unduly
rushed was widely expressed, as was a feeling that the Council was being presented
with a fait accompli.
162. All communities in Sarawak seem by this time to have accepted the
inevitability of merger but there still remained general support for safeguards on the
lines of the Twenty Points and, especially amongst the Sea Dyaks, or Ibans, a deep-
seated fear that Malaysia would mean domination by the Malays. Some groups who
had been entirely opposed at the time of the Cobbold Commission enquiry, however,
had been impressed by the economic benefits promised for the rural areas by the
Malayans and had come to favour merger. The Chinese moderates within SUPP
probably accepted merger, but the Left wing remained entirely opposed and the party
now began to lose its Malay and Dyak members and some moderate Chinese. On 23
October, 1962, the five other political parties in Sarawak formed a united front to
support Malaysia.
163. A visit by the Tunku to both Sarawak and North Borneo in the second half
of November 1962 helped to consolidate support for merger in both territories. His
reception amongst the Malay and other Muslim communities was, however,
noticeably warmer than amongst the bulk of the population in both Sarawak and
North Borneo, while his incautious statement that they would together have 40 seats
in the Federal Parliament certainly caused some embarrassment to the Government
of Singapore and probably to his own colleagues.
XIII. Inter-territorial negotiations, winter and spring, 1962–63
The Lansdowne Committee Report
164. Throughout the winter negotiations on the final form of merger continued
unchecked in the Lansdowne Committee and its sub-committees. There were
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plenary meetings of the full Committee from 22–24 October, 1962, from 23–26
November and again, despite the Brunei revolt, from 18–20 December. The last
major points at issue were agreed at the plenary meetings in December and the
remaining points of detail were left to an ad hoc committee of specialists to resolve.
The draft report was initialled on 22 January, 1963, and, after some discussion of
amendments, arising largely from the Federation Cabinet’s anxiety over the
deterioration in the security situation, the report was published on 27 February. That
agreement was reached, in the words of Lord Lansdowne, ‘owed much to the wisdom
and tact of Tun Abdul Razak . . . who always showed himself ready to consider
reasonable concessions . . .’; indeed he came to be known in the Committee as ‘Tuan
Bersetuju’ or ‘Mr. Agreement’.
165. Early in December 1962 a deadlock seemed to have been reached on
financial issues. The representatives of North Borneo demanded that the State
‘should retain control of its own finance, development and tariff, and should have the
rights to work up its own taxation and to raise loans on its own credit.’ Sarawak had
accepted that taxes and tariffs must be Federal matters, but had secured Malayan
acceptance of a formula which should enable the State to meet its current
expenditures and provide for steady growth in these. Mr. Tan Siew Sin seems to have
been convinced that the United Kingdom would compel the territories to accept
agreement and so saw no reason to compromise. With the help of a British promise
of £1,500,000 a year for five years for development in the territories, which had been
held back earlier to be used in case it should be needed to resolve just such a
deadlock, agreement was reached on the basis of Malayan proposals which assigned
additional items of revenue to the territories; these included the assignment to North
Borneo of 40 per cent of any increase in the Federal share of revenue derived from
the State.
166. In general the territories secured the essence of almost all the requirements
laid down in the Twenty Points, including provisions for fiscal growth, subject to
review by an independent assessor before the sixth and eleventh anniversaries of
Malaysia Day, and the right to raise internal loans. They did not, however, secure
their proposal that, for an initial seven-year period, legislative power should remain
within the State and not merely be delegated to it. They did secure a number of
safeguards and the provision that these should not be changed without the
concurrence of the Government of the State. North Borneo was conceded an initial
allocation of 16 seats in the Federal House of Representatives and Sarawak 24 seats,
as against 15 for Singapore, and only 104 for Malaya itself. The estimated populations
at the end of 1963 were North Borneo 498,031, Sarawak 809,737, Singapore
1,799,400 and Malaya 7,703,520—population numbers in relation to each Federal
seat were therefore roughly North Borneo 31,000, Sarawak, 34,000, Singapore
120,000 and Malaya 74,000. These seat allocations gave the three new States together
just sufficient votes to enable them in concert to prevent amendment of the Federal
Constitution.
Reactions to the Lansdowne Report in Borneo
167. In Sarawak the increasing loss by the Communists of non-Chinese support,
and even of some Chinese support, had made both political and armed struggle more
difficult, while most of the constitutional political parties had managed, for the
moment at least, to combine in the Sarawak Alliance, which strongly supported the
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Malaysia concept. On 8 March, 1963, the Council Negri, which had 24 elected
members out of a total of 43, passed a motion adopting the recommendations of the
Lansdowne Committee Report and welcoming the creation of Malaysia by 31 August,
1963. No vote was cast against the motion and most of the very few abstentions seem
to have been due to doubts on the language issue and about the continuation of full
religious freedom after merger. On 9 March the Council unanimously passed a
resolution calling for a Ministerial system and providing for the next Council Negri
to be composed of a Speaker, 36 elected members, 3 ex officio members, 1 life
member and up to 3 nominated members following elections. These arrangements
were brought into force during the summer of 1963.
168. The North Borneo Legislative Council carried a unanimous motion
adopting the Lansdowne Committee Report on 13 March, 1963, and the Member
System was brought into operation on 25 March. Earlier, following a meeting in
Jesselton, North Borneo, on 16 and 17 February, representatives of political parties
in all five potential partners in Malaysia had unanimously passed a resolution
condemning the Brunei revolt, rejecting the Filipino claim to Sabah and expressing
the determination to see Malaysia established by 31 August. A similar convention was
held in Kuala Lumpur on 30 and 31 March and proposed the setting up of a ‘Grand
Alliance Party’ for the whole of Malaysia after merger.
Renewed Malayan negotiations with Brunei, January–May 1963
169. This convention was attended by representatives from Brunei and for a time
following the revolt it seemed that the prospect of the Sultanate joining the Federation
had if anything improved. In a public statement in December 1962 the Sultan had
made it clear that, although the Legislative Council had accepted the concept in
principle in July, he had as yet taken no final decision since terms had not been agreed.
It was still British policy to persuade and not force Brunei into Malaysia and therefore
to persuade the Tunku to offer acceptable terms. Early in January Tun Razak told Sir
Geofroy Tory that he assumed these terms would be at least as favourable as those for
Sarawak and North Borneo and might possibly even provide for financial autonomy.
On 21 January the Sultan, in a statement, described Malaysia as a sound and attractive
proposal and on 27 January the Brunei Government announced that discussions on
merger would be resumed in Kuala Lumpur.
170. On 28 January, 1963, the High Commissioner, Sir Dennis White, reported
that he thought that the Sultan was convinced that entry into Malaysia was inevitable,
but was in no hurry. The Sultan himself arrived in Kuala Lumpur on 31 January, an
Inter-Government Committee was set up and on 7 February he announced that he was
satisfied that the future prospects of Brunei would best be advanced by joining
Malaysia on terms to be negotiated. By 4 March Heads of Agreement on terms had been
drawn up, which provided for Brunei to retain control of oil revenues and its existing
investments at least for the initial 10-year period, and it was being reported publicly
that agreement had virtually been reached. The initialling was however then held up,
ostensibly by failure to agree on the amount of the annual ‘voluntary donation’ to be
paid by Brunei to the Federal Government, though this was subsequently fixed as
M$45 million for the first year and M$40 million thereafter.
171. The Sultan returned to Brunei on 24 March, 1963, with the outstanding
financial issues still unresolved. These now included the taxation of revenues from and
control of any future discoveries of oil or ‘other products of the soil of Brunei’, the
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automatic right of the Federation to receive full Federal rates of taxation or their
equivalent after five years on new sources of revenue and, in respect of existing sources
of revenue, a continuation of the annual ‘donation’ or ‘contribution’ after the first 10
years if a new arrangement had not been agreed upon. The Sultan’s advisers took the
view that the Malayans had reopened issues, notably disposal of future revenues from
oil, already settled, while the Brunei proposal that other mineral rights should be, like
oil, free of Federal taxation also seems to have been a new point.
172. A difference of view also developed in April 1963 as to whether the Sultan’s
precedence should count from Malaysia Day or from his own accession, although he
did not himself pursue the point at this stage. The Sultan’s intention still however
seemed to be to join Malaysia and the High Commissioner and Mr. Narasimhan, who
visited the State in April, urged him to press forward with policies of constitutional
advance and economic development and to present these and the arguments for
joining Malaysia more clearly to the people of Brunei. Some steps in this direction
were taken—the Emergency (Suspension of the Constitution) Order was revoked and
the Executive and Legislative Councils were reconstituted, although with nominated
instead of elected unofficial members, while in May the Deputy Mentri Besar was
visiting kampongs to explain the advantages of merger and was arguing that the
trend of opinion in the world at large would not allow the State to remain a British
protectorate. But these efforts to explain the advantages of Malaysia were short-lived
and insufficient to reverse a growing antagonism to merger and the Sultan at no
time permitted detailed explanation of the terms proposed or agreed.
Malayan negotiations with Singapore, November 1962–March 1963
173. On 17 November, 1962, Tun Razak proposed to Mr. Lee the setting up of an
Inter-Governmental Committee between Singapore and Malaya. Mr. Lee agreed to
this proposal on 20 November and on 26 November Enche Ghazali suggested the
establishment of five sub-committees—constitutional, fiscal, internal security,
information and broadcasting, and establishment and organisation. Despite some
foreboding on the part of Mr. Lee, the Malayan Government appeared to accept the
November 1961 White Paper arrangements as in general settled. There was some
discussion as to whether the United Kingdom should ask to have an observer on this
Committee, but Lord Selkirk took the view that it was better not to be ‘involved
unnecessarily in the inevitable disputes between the two Governments’.
174. Meanwhile there had been two related developments. In the early hours of 2
February, 1963, 97 people, including leading Left-wing members of the Barisan
Sosialis, were detained in Singapore at the instance of the Internal Security Council,
which had authorised this step on 1 February; a further 20 arrests were made later.
On 3 February Mr. Lee managed to create the public impression that this was an
action which his Government would not itself have contemplated, but that he had
felt compelled to fall in with the wishes of the other members in line with his
intention, when within Malaysia, of always co-operating with the Federation on
national issues, while remaining ready to protect the interests of the people of
Singapore on local or economic issues.
175. The Federation Government had itself arrested 50 people in Malaya on 16
December, 1962, on charges of subversive activity in support of the Communist
Party. It had strongly advocated arresting the Barisan leaders and in general taking a
firm hand with Communists and their sympathisers in Singapore. Mr. Lee made
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much to Lord Selkirk’s deputy, Mr. P. B. C. Moore, of his fear that, having achieved
this, the Tunku would now be less interested in merger or at least determined to
drive a harder bargain in the economic field.
176. The arrests accelerated the decline in the influence of the China-oriented
Left wing in Singapore; symptomatic of this at the time was the decline in
enrolments in Chinese-language schools as against English-language schools. They
also seem greatly to have increased Mr. Lee’s confidence in his ability to handle his
opponents—there was remarkably little public reaction to their detention. By March
1963 he was, during constituency tours, vigorously defending the retention of
British bases on the argument that a third of the people of Singapore were directly or
indirectly dependent on the bases for their livelihood, though he advocated a phased
withdrawal over 10 or 20 years.
177. On 10 April, 1963, the Singapore Assembly passed a motion supporting the
decision of the Internal Security Council; the motion was passed without a division
despite a six and a half hour speech by Dr. Lee Siew Choh, Chairman of the Barisan
Sosialis. On 22 April a number of leading Barisan members took part in a violent
demonstration at Mr. Lee’s office and subsequently 12, including 10 members of the
Assembly, were arrested. They were released on bail in May and brought to trial in
August for trying to overawe the Prime Minister.
178. The second development was perhaps more fundamental. This was the
arrival of an International Bank mission to report on the economic implications of
Malaysia, and especially the possibilities for a common market. Its leader, M. Jacques
Rueff, made a preliminary visit to Kuala Lumpur and Singapore in October 1962. The
whole mission arrived in February 1963, but jockeying for position in relation to its
work began well before this. The Singapore Government strengthened its Tariff
Advisory Commission and set it to examining items on which protective tariffs might
be imposed, while the Federation pressed on with a policy of protecting new local
industries.
179. In December 1962 the Federation introduced restrictive new regulations
affecting the import of day-old chicks and eggs for hatching from Singapore. On 9
January, 1963, the Singapore Government retaliated by requiring specific import
licences on imports from Malaya of various foodstuffs and much stricter regulations
on the import of meat for re-export to Malaya. After some discussion it was agreed as
from 15 February that each would exempt the other from the operation of these rules
and regulations and would co-operate on related veterinary issues. However the zest
with which each inflicted pin-pricks of this kind on the other suggested that
economic co-ordination might prove difficult.
180. As with the Borneo Territories the main difficulty in the merger discussions
between Malaya and Singapore related to finance. On 1 March, 1963, in the middle of
discussions in Kuala Lumpur, Mr. Lee claimed publicly that it had been agreed that
Singapore should itself carry out the collection of taxes in its territory, paying a lump
sum over to the Federation. This was a position which seemed consonant with the
White Paper and earlier exchanges between Mr. Lee and the Tunku. Mr. Tan however
disputed this interpretation and Mr. Lee in turn reaffirmed his position. On 18 March
Mr. Lee suggested to Lord Selkirk that Sir Geofroy Tory should try to persuade the
Tunku that any modification of the White Paper provisions would have to be
balanced by increased parliamentary representation for Singapore if they were not to
be regarded in the State as unacceptable. In view of the way in which the Federal
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Government had used control of revenues in Kelantan and Trengganu there was
some reason for Mr. Lee’s determination not to be placed in a similar position, unless
Singapore was given sufficient parliamentary representation effectively to influence
Federal policy. In Mr. P. B. C. Moore’s view this was an issue on which Mr. Lee was
prepared to refuse merger.
XIV. The Malaysia agreement
Domestic political pressures on the Tunku
181. In October 1962 the Alliance won a by-election with an improved majority,
but in December came under attack from the opposition in Parliament for opposing
an ‘anti-colonialist’ revolt in Brunei. In January 1963 the former Minister of
Agriculture, Enche Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, who was relieved of his portfolio on 1
October, 1962, and who was thought to enjoy considerable popularity amongst the
rural Malays, launched into vigorous political opposition. In April 1963 the Opposition
parties formed a ‘Joint Opposition Conference’ with Enche Aziz as Chairman. On 26
April they presented Mr. Narasimhan with a memorandum which complained, not so
much of the proposed formation of Malaysia, as of the manner in which it was being
brought into being. The town and district council election results during the summer
of 1963 suggested that UMNO retained Malay support, but that the position of the MCA
had weakened amongst the Chinese. This decline in support for MCA was due to
differences as to the degree to which Chinese rights and interests should be asserted
against the Malays. This in turn contributed to the hostility displayed by MCA leaders
towards Mr. Lee and the PAP, who clearly hoped to supplant them by taking up a
somewhat less compromising position in regard to Chinese claims.
182. In these elections the Alliance lost seats in some largely Chinese towns,
especially in Perak, but did well elsewhere. Nevertheless, overall its percentage of the
poll dropped slightly and was still a little below the combined votes of all its
opponents. These, despite the Joint Opposition Conference, were too diverse in
interest and policy to unite effectively against the Alliance, but their number and the
fact that many of his own supporters had sentimental ties with Indonesia induced the
Tunku to be more conciliatory to Indonesia in June and July 1963. Where he had
earlier, in the British view, been unduly robust, he was now thought insufficiently so.
183. The effective restraint on the Tunku’s ability to make concessions to the
other prospective partners in Malaysia was however exercised not by the opposition
groups but by his own party and cabinet colleagues. Many Malays in UMNO remained
profoundly suspicious of the Singapore Chinese and doubtful of the wisdom of
allowing them into the Federation. The Borneo Territories they had accepted purely
as a counter-weight to Singapore and were therefore anxious that Malay and not just
indigenous groups should be in controlling positions in North Borneo and Sarawak.
The MCA leaders, who were drawn from the business class in the peninsula, had no
wish to be supplanted politically by the PAP or economically by the Singapore-based
entrepreneur and were equally dubious about some of the concessions extracted
from the Tunku and Tun Razak.
Malayan negotiations with Singapore, April–July 1963
184. By the middle of April 1963 the discussions on finance between Singapore
and Malaya were at a standstill and there were mutual accusations of bad faith. The
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public debate between Mr. Lee and Mr. Tan had shifted from the control of revenue
in Singapore to the proportion of it that should be paid to the new federation. On 27
April Mr. Tan talked at a Press conference of the possibility of going ahead with
Malaysia without Singapore, while Mr. Lee said that no final financial settlement
could be made until the Rueff mission’s recommendations on a common market had
been received—it was already clear that on economic grounds the mission would
favour making progress towards a customs union. Mr. Tan had laid claim to part of
Singapore’s financial surpluses; Mr. Lee was only willing to pay ‘part of Singapore’s
prosperity over to the Federation’ if good common market terms had been arranged.
185. The Malayan Government was unwilling to agree to common market
proposals except perhaps gradually over a period of many years. On 15 May, 1963,
Tun Razak, talking to Lord Home in London, seemed to envisage promoting another
Government in Singapore if Mr. Lee proved obdurate—the British Government had
consistently made it clear to the Malayans that formation of Malaysia without
Singapore was unacceptable. Mr. Lee made public complaint of intrigues against him
by leading Malayan Chinese Association members. The MCA in Singapore was at this
time trying to revitalise itself as part of the development of a Singapore Alliance, the
formation of which was announced on 24 April and Mr. Lee claimed that it was trying
to force a collision between him and the Tunku.
186. On 27 May, 1963, Lord Lansdowne left London for Kuala Lumpur to try,
together with a representative of the International Bank, to bring the two sides
together. This mediation produced some progress. Financial negotiations were
resumed on 28 May, and on 29 May Malaya agreed publicly to the principle of a
common market, though remaining very vague about its form and timing, and put
forward a ‘package’ proposal on this and the apportionment issue. This marked a
considerable advance on previous proposals, but was described by the Tunku as final
and by Mr. Lee, privately, as inadequate. In the middle of June the Malayans were
demanding that Singapore should contribute 40 per cent of its revenues and in
addition should make a grant for use in the Borneo Territories of S$50 million in the
first five years of Malaysia. Singapore was willing to contribute 39 per cent of its
revenues and to loan the Borneo Territories S$150 million at special rates. The
control of broadcasting and television in Singapore was also a subject of dispute. By
the third week in June the Malayan Cabinet was insisting that its final terms should
be accepted within 48 hours [see 183]; Mr. Lee still wanted detailed provision for a
common market to be written into the Constitution [see 185].
187. By the middle of June 1963 therefore it was believed in London that Malaya
and Singapore might well fail to reach agreement on the financial arrangements for
Malaysia and urgent thought was in consequence being given by the Ministries
concerned to future British policy. To judge by a remark by Enche Ghazali to Mr. M.
J. Moynihan of the British High Commission in Kuala Lumpur, however, many other
Malayans were by now ‘tired of Tan Siew Sin’s obstinacy’. In an effort to avert a
breakdown the Tunku and Mr. Lee were invited to meet with British Ministers. The
Tunku was preceded by a delegation, including Tun Razak, Mr. Tan and Dr. Lim
Swee Aun, the Minister for Commerce and Industry, which left for London on 25
June, as did Mr. Lee. The function of Mr. Tan and Dr. Lim was, in Sir Geofroy Tory’s
view, to restrain Tun Razak from making undue concessions. Agreement was reached
on the main points at issue on 5 July [see 191] and only then did the Tunku himself
leave for London.
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Defence and British financial aid
188. While Malaya was haggling with Singapore over financial arrangements,
parallel negotiations were in progress with Britain on assistance for economic
development and for the additional defence programme which would be necessary. A
British team, including representatives of the Treasury and the Ministry of Defence
and led by Sir Henry Lintott of the Commonwealth Relations Office, visited Kuala
Lumpur from 6 to 14 April, 1963 [see 173, appendix]. Malayan financial resources were
under pressure owing to falling prices of rubber, but the Malayan Government
proposed to accept a running down of the country’s reserves by some M$1,500 million
or £175 million. The programme of capital expenditure on defence was estimated to
cost some £55 million, of which £24.5 million would be spent in 1963–65. It was
estimated that, with a minimum defence and development programme, the proposed
running down of reserves and the use of external resources, a foreign exchange gap of
about £92 million over five years would still be left.
189. The British team concluded that Malayan reserves could not be reduced
further without endangering confidence in the Malayan dollar and that the defence
capital programme was modest in the circumstances. They proposed however that
British aid for the defence programme should be limited to the secondment of
officers, to the capital programme and initially to 1963–65. It was clear that the
United Kingdom could not hope to reduce its own defence expenditure in the area in
the immediate future and it was already committed over the following five years to
about £13 million for development aid for the Borneo Territories and Singapore and
to pay the whole cost, which was expected to be £2.5 million to £3 million, of the
compensation scheme for expatriate officers in Borneo.
190. These official talks prepared the way for Ministerial talks in London from 13
to 15 May, 1963, at which Tun Razak and Mr. Tan Siew Sin represented the Malayan
Government [see 174 and 175]. The Malayan delegation expressed disappointment at
the initial British offer of £12,350,000 for the defence capital programme for 1963–65
and on his return Tun Razak stated publicly that the British proposals fell far short of
Malayan needs. The Tunku then wrote to Mr. Macmillan to ask for more generous aid
and suggested that without this Britain would have to bear financial responsibility for
the internal security and defence of the Borneo Territories for some time [see 177]. It
was already recognised in London that the United Kingdom would have ‘to provide the
military and economic backing essential to keep Malaysia in being’. The British
Government therefore increased its offer during the final discussions in June and a
figure of M$255 million, or almost £30 million, for aid in 1963–65 was accepted by
Tun Razak. He noted however that it would still fall short of Malaysia’s needs and there
was subsequently renewed haggling over the cost of operations in Borneo.
The Malaysia agreement, 9 July, 1963
191. The agreement for the establishment of Malaysia was signed by the United
Kingdom, Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore on 9 July, 1963. Attached
to it as annexes were the forms of Bills to be passed by the Malayan Parliament
amending the existing Federal Constitution to provide for the arrangements under
which Singapore and the Borneo Territories were to join the Federation and to
extend and adapt the existing immigration ordinance, particularly in relation to the
special needs of the Borneo Territories. Also annexed were constitutions for Sabah,
Sarawak and Singapore to be introduced by British Orders in Council before Malaysia
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Day and forms for Orders in Council providing for compensation and retiring
benefits for officers of the existing North Borneo and Sarawak Governments and for
agreements between Britain and Malaysia on conditions of service for public servants
continuing to hold office in Singapore and the Borneo Territories. There were about
350 pensionable members of the Overseas Civil Service in North Borneo and Sarawak
and the compensation scheme was designed to encourage them to continue to serve.
192. The timetable envisaged at this stage was that the British legislation—
which which was introduced on 11 July, 1963—should be passed in July and the
Malayan in August, that the formal agreement should be signed at the end of July or
the beginning of August and that the British Orders in Council and the appointment
of the Heads of State of Sabah and Sarawak should be made in August. Malaysia Day
could then be on 31 August, 1963. The British legislation included provision for the
transfer of sovereignty, for the new Constitutions of Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore
and for the withdrawal of citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies from those
in Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo who would automatically acquire
Malaysian citizenship on Malaysia Day.
The extension of the defence agreement
193. Article VI of the main agreement gave effect to the undertakings of the
British and Malayan Prime Ministers in November 1961 to extend the existing defence
agreement (see paragraphs 106–109). The article provided that ‘The Agreement on
External Defence and Mutual Assistance . . . of 12th October, 1957, and its annexes
shall apply to all territories of Malaysia, . . . subject to the proviso that the
Government of Malaysia will afford to the Government of the United Kingdom the
right to continue to maintain the bases and other facilities at present occupied by
their Service authorities within the State of Singapore and will permit the
Government of the United Kingdom to make such use of these bases and facilities as
that Government may consider necessary for the purpose of assisting in the defence of
Malaysia, and for Commonwealth defence and for the preservation of peace in South-
East Asia.’ The application of this article was to be subject to Annex F to the
agreement which related mainly to Service lands in Singapore (see paragraph 199).
194. In response to a Malayan request the United Kingdom also agreed secretly,
subject to certain conditions, such as freedom from prosecution and indemnity
against damage, to provide limited assistance to measures to secure internal order in
Singapore after Malaysia Day. This was to include helicopters, administrative units,
skilled civilian volunteers to maintain essential services and, for a few months after
Malaysia Day, a company of troops for use from the outset of trouble and possibly
also a stand-by battalion. It was also anticipated that counter-insurgency and other
assistance would be required in Borneo for some time, since the existing Malayan
forces would have to be expanded before they could take over these tasks.
195. Subsequent examination of the terms of the November 1961 statement had
suggested that they would not prevent the Malaysian Government from arguing that
the Singapore base could not be used under the agreement for purposes of which it
disapproved, such as support for internal security operations in British dependencies.
No attempt was however made to tighten up the agreement, since the existing
wording would avoid political embarrassment at home for the Malayan Government.
Moreover British pressure to make the terms more precise might have led to the
Malayans stating objections to certain uses of the base in advance or to press for
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safeguards themselves such as guarantees that the United Kingdom would maintain
agreed force levels in Malaysia.
196. On 6 August, 1963, the Tunku took the public position that ‘our defence
arrangements with Britain are not perpetual or permanent. They can be revoked by
either party’. The formal British view at this time was that the termination or
amendment of the defence agreement could only be done with the consent of both
parties and posts were instructed to say so if asked. It was recognised however that
effective use of the bases would depend in practice on local consent and it was
believed that the wording of Article VI would permit satisfactory use so long as the
existing Alliance Government, or one of similar complexion, was in office. The
Malayan Government was in general anxious to play down the defence aspects of
the agreement and to avoid the impression that any new commitments had been
entered into. Australia and New Zealand took a similar view and on 18 September
exchanged letters with Malaysia recording joint agreement that their former
association with the Anglo–Malayan Defence Agreement should in future be regarded
as applying to Malaysia.
197. Nevertheless, because of the development of confrontation, defence co-
operation became more active. While engaged in discussions with Malaysia on the
role of British forces in Borneo, Mr. Macmillan, in a message to the Australian and
New Zealand Prime Ministers towards the end of September 1963, expressed the
hope that their forces would be available to participate in this effort. It was however
regarded as important that the United Kingdom should seem to be helping Malaysia’s
own defence effort rather than to be running the war itself. Invocation of the Defence
Agreement was expected to be at Malaysian request. At meetings of the Malaysian
National Defence Council, the first of which was held on 10 October with the Tunku
in the chair, the British Commander-in-Chief, Far East, his Political Adviser and the
Defence Adviser to the United Kingdom High Commission were ‘in attendance’ only,
while it was proposed to set up a separate ad hoc quadripartite body to discuss
external assistance to the Malaysian defence effort, including the Australian, New
Zealand and United Kingdom High Commissioners and the Commander-in-Chief,
under the chairmanship of Tun Razak.
The agreement with Singapore
198. Attached to the main Malaysia Agreement as Annex J was an agreement
between Malaya and Singapore providing for the progressive establishment of a
common market. It had been agreed in May 1963 that a common market must entail
an erosion of Singapore’s free port status as Malaysia industrialised, but the Annex
provided for the harmonisation of revenue tariffs in such a way as not significantly to
harm Singapore’s entrepôt trade. The agreement in Annex J also provided for the
setting up of a Tariff Advisory Board, whose chairman for the first five years was to be
acceptable to the Singapore Government, for the apportionment of 40 per cent of
Singapore revenues to the Federation, for periodical reviews of these financial
arrangements with the help of an independent assessor if necessary, and for two 15-
year loans totalling S$150 million to the Federation by Singapore to assist
development in the Borneo Territories—the largest of these, of S$100 million, was to
be interest-free for five or possibly 10 years. Annex K to the agreement provided for
delegation to Singapore of day-to-day control of broadcasting and television
programmes in the State.
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199. Annex F to the Malaysia Agreement provided for British Service authorities
in Singapore to have security of tenure of lands held in Singapore, while a letter of 8
July, 1963, expressed the intention of the British Government to release some lands
in excess of Service requirements to the Singapore Government. This was a matter of
which Mr. Lee had made a considerable public issue. He had in March 1963
threatened in effect to seize one such piece of land which he claimed was wanted for
a new road to Jurong. The British view at this time was that this was essentially a
matter on which Her Majesty’s Government could only deal with the Malaysian
Government. In London Mr. Lee put forward a list of 1,947 acres of ‘land made
available’, that is Crown land to which the Services had no normal title, and which he
considered not to be in use by the Services. On such land for which use or contingent
use had not been established he demanded rent at market rates. In the course of the
discussions his demands were lowered to 1,365 acres and a M$15 million
contribution to the cost of raising the Second Battalion of the Singapore Infantry
Regiment. He finally secured promise of the release of some 1,300 acres and M$10
million; he subsequently disputed with the British Government as to whether this
sum was rent or a ceiling for a British contribution towards the battalion, the raising
of which in practice seemed likely to cost only M$7 million. Mr. Lee claimed publicly
to have reduced his claims for the sake of the Tunku and endeavoured to convey the
impression that he had been tougher and more effective in bargaining than the
Malayans. This was in turn no doubt responsible for Mr. Tan Siew Sin’s public
statement that Singapore had made a bad bargain.
200. During the course of the discussions in London there were a number of more
informal meetings as a result of which Mr. Lee secured further concessions by
exchange of letter. In particular on 7 July, 1963, the Tunku signed a very brief and
loosely-worded note, written on the back of an envelope at the Ritz Hotel, of points
agreed. Mr. Lee sent his expanded version of these notes to the Tunku on 10 July [see
192 and 193]. The four points he listed provided: (i) that labourers for the development
projects in Borneo to be undertaken with the Singapore loans should not be engaged
from outside Malaysia and that half should come from Singapore; (ii) that Singapore
should be entitled to amend its Constitution so as to require a member of the Assembly
to resign his seat if he left the party for which he stood when elected; (iii) that any
Federal law restricting movement should be reciprocal between Singapore and
Malaya; and (iv) that powers of detention under the ordinance dealing with gangsters
be delegated to Singapore. These undertakings later gave rise to some dispute when
Mr. Lee refused to accept postponement of Malaysia Day unless they were formalised
in a supplementary agreement. This was done in an agreement signed on 12
September, 1963, though the Federal Government declined to write delegation of the
gangster ordinance into the Constitution.
The end of negotiations with Brunei, June–July 1963
201. The Sultan of Brunei visited Kuala Lumpur again in June 1963, but found
the Malayans still insufficiently flexible. On 19 June a statement was issued that the
Malayan Government proposed to deliver final terms for the entry of Brunei—and
Singapore—into the new federation and would request an answer within 48 hours.
The Sultan, and the Press, read this as an ultimatum and he left for Brunei on 21
June. The British Government then invited him to London to take part in discussions
with the Tunku, but this he at first declined to do unless he received an assurance of
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prior agreement to his terms. The Federation terms, contained in a letter of 21 June
from Tun Razak, included, amongst other points unacceptable to the Sultan, a new
proposal for a binding legal obligation to pay the equivalent of full Federal tax on new
sources of revenue, including new oilfields, which might become available after the
first five years of the agreement.
202. On 2 July, 1963, nevertheless the Sultan left to take part in the talks in
London, while indicating that if these should fail to produce agreement on entry into
Malaysia he would wish to discuss with British Ministers the ‘strengthening of
Brunei’s Defence Treaty with the United Kingdom’. Agreement was not reached
between Brunei and Malaya. The Malayans claimed that discussions broke down,
after agreement had been reached on all other matters, only when the Sultan raised
the question of his precedence within Malaysia too late for the Tunku to consult the
Conference of Rulers, but this was strongly denied in Brunei. There was in fact at
least one financial point unresolved—the wording of the terms of reference for the
eventual review of the financial arrangements—but the Malayans had made
substantial concessions. It seemed evident however that the Sultan had finally
concluded that he did not sufficiently trust the Malayans to enter Malaysia and that
the State would be better off under the existing arrangements—a Brunei spokesman
was quoted as saying that ‘it was the principle of it all that Brunei found
unacceptable’. In October 1963 the Tunku requested the return of the Malayan
officers seconded to Brunei; there is no doubt that these officials had been one cause
of revulsion against merger amongst the Bruneis.
203. The Sultan’s refusal to enter Malaysia seems to have been received in the
State with satisfaction—one official report from Brunei spoke indeed of ‘a certain
amount of jubilation’. There were several reasons for this reaction. Amongst the
general population there was a fear that merger would in effect mean becoming a
vassal state of Malaya and losing the existing welfare advantages, while, owing to
higher tariffs, prices would rise. There was also a naive popular belief that refusal to
enter Malaysia might preserve Brunei from the Indonesian threat to Malaysia. In
more sophisticated circles there was a realisation that the relatively low standard of
education in the State would probably greatly reduce the opportunities open to
Bruneis and this was compounded by the widespread misconception that common
citizenship would result in an uncontrolled influx of more highly qualified people
from Malaya and Singapore. It was suggested that this appreciation of the threat to
personal prospects extended even to the Mentri Besar, Dato Marsal bin Maun.
E. The international repercussions of the negotiations
XV. The Brunei revolt
The course of the revolt
204. At the beginning of November 1962 Sheikh A. M. Azahari and Enche Zaini
bin Hadji Ahmad of the Brunei Parti Ra’ayat were in Manila, apparently under the
auspices of Mr. Nicasio Osmena, who was promoting the Kiram family claim to parts
of North Borneo. While there they saw Vice-President Pelaez. During the following
month increasing evidence accumulated of activity in the Brunei Bay area by the
‘Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara’, or National Army of North Borneo, and other
bodies connected with the Brunei Parti Ra’ayat, and also possibly with Enche Ahmad
Boestamam, the leader of the Malayan Parti Ra’ayat. It was known that their aims
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included unification of the British Borneo territories under Brunei sovereignty and
opposition to Malaysia, by force if necessary, and it was thought, correctly as it
turned out, that, though the TNKU had Indonesian affiliations and though some of
its members had trained in Indonesia, it had not as yet acquired modern arms.
205. Information was also received which suggested that Philippine Army
personnel were being recruited for infiltration into North Borneo. Camps or parade
grounds were discovered in Brunei and neighbouring areas of North Borneo and
Sarawak and, towards the end of November, a number of arrests were made in the
Fifth Division of Sarawak and uniforms, badges, charms against bullets and
documents, including a plan of attack on the police station at Lawas, were seized.
There were no British troops in Brunei, but small police mobile or field force units
were moved into the neighbouring districts of North Borneo and Sarawak and the
heads of the police Special Branch in each of the three territories met together on 28
November, 1962, to co-ordinate counter-measures, while the Governor of Sarawak
offered to send a field force detachment to Brunei if requested. The strength of the
TNKU was, before the revolt, thought to be somewhere between 500 and 2,000 men,
but was later estimated at 2,000 to 3,000.
206. On 1 December, 1962, the Tunku sent urgently for Sir Geofroy Tory to tell
him that he had received clear evidence from the Legal Adviser in Brunei and a Malay
working for Radio Brunei that an insurrection was imminent. The High
Commissioner in Brunei had been on leave for some weeks—he returned as soon as
the revolt broke out—and the Tunku suggested that Lord Selkirk should himself at
once visit Brunei and that emergency action should be taken. He urged the same
course on the Commissioner-General in person in Singapore on the following day.
207. Lord Selkirk’s first assessment of the situation was reassuring. It seems to
have been based largely on the belief in the Borneo territories that the reports
received by the Tunku partly reflected the hostility with which Malayan seconded
civil servants were faced in Brunei, and so were greatly exaggerated, and on a lack of
anxiety on the part of the Sultan and his Government. This initial optimism led the
Colonial Secretary to inform Mr. Macmillan that ‘there is no reason at present to
expect an emergency’, though the situation would have to be carefully watched and
there were arrangements to bring in police forces from Sarawak and North Borneo
and troops from Singapore at short notice. Lord Home’s comment on all this after
the event, in a minute of 11 December, 1962, was ‘I think they were all very blind and
complacent’. Lord Selkirk also noted, in a letter of 20 December, a certain failure to
assess the situation, but added ‘Nevertheless, if we had acted strongly on such
evidence as we had, it might well have led to the movement being pushed
underground with more serious long-term results . . . .’ [See 151.]
208. Having visited Brunei Lord Selkirk was less confident. He reported on 7
December, 1962, that he had found there a general air of complacency which he had
sought to dispel; he thought the loyalty of the police ‘very open to question’ and their
discipline uncertain, while in his view the Parti Ra’ayat represented the vast majority
of the people. In general he judged the State to be ‘potentially in a dangerously
revolutionary condition’ and noted that as he left reports had come in that an armed
attack was planned on the oil installations at Miri in Sarawak for 2 a.m. on the
following morning, Saturday, 8 December. He agreed on a number of counter-
measures with the Brunei Government, which however were overtaken by events.
209. It is possible that this sudden visit by the Commissioner-General to Brunei,
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coupled with the arrests at Lawas, action by the police in Sarawak and North Borneo
aimed at disrupting TNKU, and the postponement of the meeting of the new Brunei
Legislative Council, due to be held on 19 December, 1962, ‘owing to the
Government’s preoccupation with the situation which culminated in the revolt’, may
have persuaded the Parti Ra’ayat leaders to advance the date of the rising—in that
event the outbreak had perhaps originally been planned to take place over Christmas.
There was however no certain evidence of this and 2 a.m. on 8 December had its own
significance as the time and date of the Japanese attack on Malaya in 1941.
210. On learning of the intended attack at Miri on 7 December, 1962, the
Government of Sarawak informed the Services in Singapore who were therefore
placed at 48 hours’ notice on the morning of 7 December and were in the event able
to move within about 12 hours of a call for assistance being received from the Sultan.
A police platoon from North Borneo was despatched even more rapidly and played an
important part in holding the airfield. The High Commission in Brunei had also been
warned and the Brunei police were on the alert on the night of 7 December.
211. Nevertheless, although the crucial Brunei Town Police Station, under the
command of the British Commissioner of Police, repulsed the rebels and prevented
them capturing the Sultan himself, the police at the main police station at Seria,
under a Malayan seconded officer, were, in the High Commission’s view, inert and
elsewhere police stations fell, with little if any resistance, to the rebels, who thereby
acquired modern arms. The authorities were clearly unprepared for the weight and
co-ordination of the revolt and the degree of training acquired by the TNKU forces in
Indonesia. The oilfields at Seria, much of Brunei Town itself and of the rest of the
State and parts of the Fourth and Fifth Divisions of Sarawak, including Limbang,
were temporarily overrun; there was also minor rebel activity in several hamlets
across the border in North Borneo, but Labaun, where the Government of North
Borneo had expected trouble, remained quiet and was used as a staging post for
Gurkha and other British troops from Singapore.
212. The arrival of a battalion of Gurkhas and of other Army and Marine units
rapidly reversed the situation. The most important centres in Brunei had been
recovered by midday on 11 December, 1962, by which time some 1,600 British troops
had been brought in, and the back of the revolt was broken in the next two days. By
18 December only a few rural centres had not been cleared and all hostages had been
released. At this stage it was thought that casualties were, amongst civilians, at least
2 killed and 7 wounded, amongst the armed services, 7 killed and 28 wounded, and,
amongst the rebels, between 50 and 60 killed and 600 to 700 taken prisoner. By 21
December no centre of population remained in rebel hands and the remnants of the
TNKU were being pursued or were surrendering in jungle areas. By the end of
December 1962 2,700 had been captured or had surrendered, probably comprising
all but a handful of the total number engaged, but the last few dissidents were not all
rounded up until 18 May, 1963, by which time many of those originally detained had
been released. The British force employed consisted of the equivalent of six battalions
with armour and artillery and supporting air and naval forces.
The motives of the Brunei rebels
213. There seems no doubt that the revolt initially had the sympathy of a high
proportion of Brunei Malays and of the submerged Kedayan community in the three
territories and that the rebels believed that they had the support of both the Sultan
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and the Indonesian authorities. Their motives seem to have been mixed. The less
privileged groups were probably interested in destroying the influence of the Brunei
nobility—the people of Brunei are all entitled to enjoy certain benefits such as free
education, old-age pensions, medical facilities and allowances, and freedom from
taxes, but the pengirans have great advantages. Others may have wished to restore
some of the former influence of the State and to prevent merger with Malaya—the
Tunku, who had privately offered to send both police and a battalion of infantry to
Brunei, later withdrew the offer of troops, it was thought because he recognised that
hostility to Malaysia was an important reason for the revolt.
214. The rebels do not appear to have been hostile to Britain or to individual
Britons, at least until British forces began to arrive. In Manila, at a Press conference
held on the afternoon of 8 December, 1962, Sheikh Azahari announced that the
Sultan had declared the independence within the Commonwealth of a state
composed of the three Borneo territories and had designated him Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence and Enche Zaini Minister of Economics,
Commerce and Industry. This was promptly denied by the Sultan in a broadcast, but
British officials concerned did not at once exclude the possibility that he had had
some forewarning of the Parti Ra’ayat’s plans, even if he had not given them his
blessing.
The aftermath of the revolt in Brunei
215. The Parti Ra’ayat was declared illegal as soon as the revolt broke out, the
Constitution was suspended and the Legislative and District Councils were dissolved.
British officials, who placed much of the blame for the revolt on the failings of the
‘Palace Party’, subsequently spent considerable effort and thought on pressing for
reforms in the State, but to little effect. The Parti Ra’ayat’s recourse to violence,
when it had not even tested the substantial opportunities open to it under the
existing constitution, had confirmed the Sultan in his doubts about the wisdom of
rapid advance to a more democratic system.
216. In this the Sultan seems to have been of one mind with Sheikh Azahari,
who was reported in the Straits Times of 19 January, 1963, as having stated that his
‘Government’ would not have elections, but would appoint a ‘People’s Council’ and
introduce ‘guided democracy’. Around the turn of the year there was some discussion
of the possibility of using Sheikh Azahari to reduce the Indonesian ability to create
difficulties for the Malaysian proposals. This course was however not pursued and his
departure for the safety of Manila before the revolt was started, the failure of the
revolt itself and an interview with Nicasio Osmena in the Straits Times of 18 January,
1963, did much to discredit him, as did the defection of Enche Zaini, who was
granted protective custody in Hong Kong towards the end of January 1963.
Precautionary measures in Borneo and the CCO
217. After the Brunei revolt a War Executive Council was set up to coordinate
operations in all three Borneo Territories with a subordinate State War Executive
Committee in each. A small body of British troops had already before the revolt been
spread along the east coast of North Borneo, where there had been increasing armed
raids and piracies originating mostly in the Philippines. There were somewhat under
7,500 Filipino and around 31,000 Indonesian immigrant workers in this area and
entry of unsponsored workers from these countries was stopped in December 1962
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and January 1963—the restriction on Filipino unsponsored labourers was relaxed in
April 1963. Troops were also now moved to the Kuching area of Sarawak and some 60
CCO leaders were arrested. This largely Chinese organisation was not thought to
have been forewarned of the revolt. Nevertheless some of its more important leaders
managed to escape arrest, while some SUPP branches in the Miri area were said to
have been used as cover for TNKU activities.
218. Whether privy to the intentions of the TNKU leaders or not, there seems
little doubt that throughout the winter and spring of 1962–63 the CCO in Sarawak
was engaged in preparations for armed insurrection, and it was clear by the end of
January that the arrests of CCO suspects had not reduced the determination of the
Communist leaders within the Chinese community, while continuing a
constitutional struggle through front organisations, to prepare for armed revolution.
By April 1963 Chung Tui, or companies, were known to have been formed in several
areas and it was believed that, despite the detentions in December, an active strength
of 3,500 had been organised, which might be able to count on the support of some
20,500 sympathisers. These CCO groups were thought to be centred in the Chinese
rural areas of the First and Second Divisions and in the Sibu and Lower Rejang areas
of the Third Division. They were also assumed to have Indonesian links, probably
with the PKI, and to be receiving training in Indonesian Borneo. In April 1963 the
Special Branch listed the threats to Sarawak as, in order of importance, the CCO,
Indonesian action, native chauvinism, and racialism.
XVI. Indonesian resistance and allied anxiety
Indonesian intentions
219. On 14 December, 1962, the Colonial Office was told that the Prime Minister
wanted a most careful examination made of the part being played by Indonesia and
whether a build-up of guerilla action from Indonesian Borneo could be expected. The
real anxiety now related to Indonesian intentions and the lengths to which the
Indonesian Government would go to prevent the formation of Malaysia, whether
because they genuinely believed the Grand Design to be as they claimed an
imperialist device to perpetuate British influence and military power in the area or
because it might effectively prevent eventual Indonesian dominance. It was already
clear that there were a variety of motives inducing influential groups in Indonesia to
promote a long drawn out guerilla war along the Borneo border—expansionist
ambition, a desire to divert attention from failures in the economic field, the need to
have an excuse for maintaining the over-inflated armed forces, the fear that Malaya
would eventually be Chinese dominated and that the formation of Malaysia would
extend this threat to Borneo, anxiety over a potential source of attraction for the
Outer Islands, especially Sumatra, and, not least, a desire on the part of the
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) to create confusion from which they might
profit.
220. President Sukarno, who passed through Manila on 21 November, 1962, was
reported by the Ambassador, Mr. Pilcher, to have told President Macapagal that he
would not tolerate the creation of Malaysia. Sheikh Azahari and Enche Zaini, while in
Manila, maintained close contact with the Indonesian Embassy and it was plain that
the TNKU rebels had received both training in and encouragement from Indonesia—
indeed when Bekenu, near Miri in Sarawak, was recaptured the Indonesian flag was
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flying over the Government offices. On 15 December the Governor of West
Kalimantan, a Dyak, was reported as saying that he fully supported the struggle of his
brothers in North Kalimantan and that the Dyak people had never recognised the
division of their land into two parts; he again attacked the division of Borneo by ‘the
Dutch and British white-skinned imperialists and colonialists’ in a speech on 10
January, 1963. Some caution was displayed by Her Majesty’s Government about
publicising these indications of hostile activity by the Indonesians, but Malayan
papers at least seem to have had no doubt that Sheikh Azahari had had Indonesian
aid.
221. On 12 December, 1962, in Parliament, the Tunku referred to ‘jealousy and
hatred in foreign lands’ from parties trying to stop Malaysia. Dr. Subandrio replied by
accusing Malaya of a persistently hostile attitude towards Indonesia and on 18
December the Malayan Government issued an announcement taking ‘very strong
exception’ to his statements. On 19 December President Sukarno, in a broadcast,
called upon the Indonesian people to support the Brunei rebellion; the Indonesian
representative to the United Nations was at this time pressing for an early meeting of
the Committee of Seventeen, now Twenty-four, to take up the issue. On 23 December
the Tunku, in a speech to the UMNO Youth Convention, claimed that the Indonesian
Government and political leaders wanted to destroy the Malaysia plan; in his New
Year message however he concentrated his criticisms on the PKI, rather than the
Indonesian Government.
222. Lord Selkirk, in a letter to Mr. Macmillan of 20 December, 1962, [see 151]
expressed the view that military reinforcements would almost certainly be needed.
He indicated that he thought the Tunku’s ‘provocative remarks’ unwise, but said that
he had himself been ‘pressing the Foreign Office to make the strongest protests
before Sukarno starts down the slippery path—it may well be that it is too late now’.
In Djakarta Sir Leslie Fry was also urging the need for a personal message to Dr.
Subandrio from the Secretary of State, while the American Ambassador had already
made strong representations. These warnings, however, failed to deter the
Indonesians and, in a speech on 20 January, 1963, Dr. Subandrio announced that his
country was adopting a policy of ‘confrontation’ towards Malaya.
223. On 24 January, 1963 the Tunku told Sir Geofroy Tory that ‘intelligence
from his own sources’, reinforced by British and American information, had
convinced him that the Indonesians intended to start guerilla activity in the next few
days unless deterred by British troop movements. This view was not at the time, or
subsequently, supported by British intelligence assessments, but it elicited from the
Commonwealth Secretary in London a personal message to Lord Selkirk which said
in part that ‘Since Tunku was right on last occasion about trouble in Brunei, I am
sure you will agree that we should pay some heed to his latest warning even though
it may not correspond entirely with our own intelligence assessment’. Precautionary
measures were thereupon taken by the Commander in Chief Far East and a brigade
of the Strategic Reserve in Britain was put on 72 hours alert.
224. The Minister of Defence, Mr. Thorneycroft, in a statement on 28 January,
1963, said that none of these troops would leave Britain for the present and made no
mention of Indonesia. On the same day, however, the Tunku told a Press conference
that 2,000 additional British troops were being sent to the Far East and linked these
precautions directly to strained Indonesian–Malayan relations. The effect was to raise
the temperature in the area to the extent that at a Press conference on 29 January U
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Thant expressed concern. On 30 January the Indonesian news agency, Antara,
announced that ‘the legation of the Unitary State of Kalimantan Utara today
disclosed the members of the complete cabinet of the Revolutionary Government’
and Antara bulletins on 5 and 8 February spoke of some 10,000 Dyaks being ‘ready to
conduct guerilla warfare’ in northern Borneo.
225. Both the Sabah and Sarawak Alliances sent messages to President Sukarno
in January 1963 asking him to refrain from intervening in Borneo. Some of the
substance of the Sarawak Alliance letter was published by Antara on 8 February.
When the United Nations Chef de Cabinet, Mr. C. V. Narasimhan, visited Djakarta the
Indonesians complained to him about the liberty allowed by Malaya to Indonesian
political refugees, about supposed Malayan designs on Sumatra and complicity in
smuggling from Indonesia, and about tactless comments by the Tunku. In Kuala
Lumpur Mr. Narasimhan counselled a ‘ceasefire on speeches’, a suggestion which
was well in tune with opinion in the United States, Australia and New Zealand, as
well as in Britain. By the middle of February therefore relations had deteriorated
further. Sheikh Azahari had arrived in Djakarta, the Malayan Embassy had been left
in charge of relatively junior staff and Dr. Subandrio had categorised Malaya under
the Tunku as a hostile power, while Indonesian gunboats had begun to be
provocatively active in the Straits of Malacca.
Malayan politics and the Tunku’s attitude to Indonesia
226. The reasons for the Tunku’s ‘provocative’ outbursts in December 1962, and
his actions in first inducing and then exaggerating British military precautions in
January 1963, were not only temperamental. He was anxious to rally the country in a
way that would create patriotic fervour. The opposition had attacked the Government
in December for its attitude to the Brunei revolt, while Enche Ahmad Boestamam,
the leader of the Parti Ra’ayat in Malaya, was arrested in February for having
engaged, with encouragement from Indonesia, in preparations for violent action. In
view of the widespread sympathy amongst Malays for Indonesia the Tunku may have
felt that he had over-riding internal reasons to identify President Sukarno and Dr.
Subandrio as hostile, under Communist influence and envious of Malaya’s
prosperity.
American and Australian anxieties and quadripartite talks
227. The Tunku’s remarks to this end, though successful in their immediate
purpose, caused concern in the United States, Australia and New Zealand and, in
quadripartite talks to discuss Indonesian intentions in Washington in February 1963,
[see 160–162] these countries joined in asking the United Kingdom to urge restraint
on him. This was done as soon as the talks had ended. All three countries were also
anxious that merger should be clearly in accordance with the principle of self-
determination and should be convincingly presented as such to the world and,
especially, to the United Nations Committee of Twenty-Four, the members of which
the Malayans were already vigorously and effectively lobbying. All three countries
tended to favour a plebiscite in Borneo and the holding of tripartite talks between
Indonesian, Filipino and Malayan representatives in order to dissipate
misunderstanding.
228. The United Kingdom had no confidence in either proposal, but, in order to
be sure of American, Australian and New Zealand diplomatic, and possibly even
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military, support, had to appear flexible and accommodating. Objections to a
plebiscite included problems of administration and timing and, above all, the belief
that constantly renewed consultations might suggest to the people of Borneo that
the British Government itself doubted the wisdom of proceeding with merger. It was
nevertheless recognised in London that it might not be possible to resist pressure for
a further consultation. On the related procedural question of Malaysian membership
of the United Nations there was general agreement at the talks that the Malayan
delegation should merely announce a change of name to Malaysia.
229. The basic purpose of this first round of quadripartite talks was, on the British
part, to persuade the United States and Australian Governments not to veer away from
support of Malaysia in face of Indonesian objections. The Americans, for their part,
wished to avoid a situation in which they might be asked to participate in the task of
resisting guerilla operations in Borneo and to ensure that if the Indonesians resorted
to heavy infiltration adequate British forces would engage them. Both British and
American minimum objectives were achieved, though little more than that in the
British case. The British emphasised their intention and capacity to reinforce the area
sufficiently to cope with infiltration. The Americans declined to take part in any joint
warning to the Indonesians or in police action against infiltration, but reaffirmed their
support for Malaysia and insisted that if infiltration turned to overt aggression their
attitude of reserve would no longer apply. Meanwhile the Committee of Twenty-Four
showed little interest in taking up the issue with any urgency.
XVII. Discussions with the Philippines
Filipino policy
230. Malayan–Filipino relations were little better, if less menacing, and this led
to the Association of South-East Asia (ASA) conference due to be held in Manila in
December 1962 being postponed, first to January 1963 and then to April, despite the
good offices of the Thais. The concern expressed by the Filipinos in public was at the
prospect of Malaysia being created without the consent of the people affected and
they raised the issue in this form in the United Nations General Assembly. Whether
this concern was real or not, Mr. Pilcher put forward the view on 20 November, 1962,
that President Macapagal and Vice-President Pelaez were genuinely worried by the
strategic implications of merger.
231. But President Macapagal seems primarily at this time to have been
interested in projecting a new ‘Asian identity’ for the Philippines in the eyes of other
Asian countries and a dispute with Britain as a colonial power must in this context
have appeared to offer advantages and little danger. He was also in effect reinsuring
with the Indonesians in case the United States should withdraw from the defence of
the area and was naturally encouraged in this by the Indonesians themselves. Mr.
Pilcher had no doubt that if the Brunei revolt had been successful the President
would at once have recognised the State as independent. Amongst politicians
recorded by Mr. Pilcher at this time as being strongly in favour of Sheikh Azahari was
Mr. Marcos, then leader of the Liberal Party in the Senate.
Anglo–Filipino talks in London, January 1963
232. Nevertheless, in the hope of persuading the Philippine Government of the
strategic dangers inherent in any delay to the Grand Design and of providing them
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with a face-saving way of disengaging from the active promotion of their claim, Her
Majesty’s Government invited a Filipino delegation headed by the Vice-President to
visit London in January 1963 ‘for talks on problems of mutual interest affecting the
security and stability of South-East Asia’. President Macapagal, however, in his State
of the Nation speech on 28 January, just as the talks opened, reiterated the claim in
stronger terms than before and went on to assert that Malaysia ‘is not in accordance
with the principle of self-determination, . . . but appears to be a continuation of
colonialism’. This both destroyed the point of the London talks so far as the British
Government was concerned and in Malayan eyes frustrated plans they had in train to
invite President Macapagal to pay a State Visit to Malaya and for the Tunku to visit
Manila.
233. In London no real progress was made; it was however agreed to exchange
documents in the case, and in particular the agreements under which Esmail Kiram
and other heirs of the Sultanate of Sulu were claimed to have transferred sovereignty
to the Philippine Government during 1962. A report in the Manila Times of 15
December, 1962, that Esmail Kiram had conferred powers of government on Sheikh
Azahari suggested some confusion about the transfer. The Philippine Government in
any case subsequently proved unwilling to produce these documents. This in turn
enabled the British to avoid any action which might promote the wish of the
Philippines, put forward at the talks and formally proposed in a note dated 21 August,
1963, to submit their claim to the International Court.
British and Malayan positions and the International Court
234. Since the United Kingdom had, unlike Malaya, accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court, subject to certain reservations, it would have
been possible for the Philippine Government to refer the issue unilaterally to the
Court. It was in consequence the British purpose during the summer of 1963 to
avoid an application by the Philippines for interim measures by the Court so long as
the administration of North Borneo still remained in British hands. The reply of 9
September, 1963, to the Philippine note therefore, while appearing to take this
seriously, did no more than to ask for clarification of Filipino intentions and to
express a continued willingness to exchange documents.
235. The Malayan Government agreed in August 1963 that the British
Government should play for time until 16 September, 1963, when sovereignty would
be transferred and any claim would lie against Malaysia. The Malayans had been
given the documents on which the arguments in the case were based, but not the full
British assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the case. There was some
discussion after 16 September between the Foreign Office, the Commonwealth
Relations Office and the High Commission in Kuala Lumpur as to what the Malayans
should be told. The Commonwealth Relations Office and the High Commission
wished to give them a complete picture, but the view of the Foreign Office Legal
Advisers that this was inadvisable, because inadequate Malayan security and the
consequent probability of a leak to the Filipinos might prejudice the case, prevailed.
As a result a bowdlerised version of the Research Department paper by Professor
Pearn on the Sulu claims was prepared for the Malaysians.
236. Meanwhile, on the basis of what they had been told, and no doubt their own
study of the documents, the Malayans had modified their position on the claim and
the basis of British sovereignty. They had at first said that they would only take the
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territories on a ‘clean slate’ and had accepted the simple view that the 1878 Sulu
document was a lease in perpetuity which clearly involved transfer of sovereignty to
the British. In an aide-memoire of 3 October, 1962, to the Philippine Government
however they justified their belief that the United Kingdom was entitled to transfer
sovereignty by reference to effective British possession over a long period and to the
wishes of the inhabitants, rather than to the cession of sovereignty in the 19th
century. This was a position which accorded with the British official line on the issue
and also with the published views of a number of Nacionalista opposition leaders in
the Philippines, notably the former Foreign Secretary, Felixberto Serrano, and the
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Senator Sumulong. It did,
however, make it easier for President Macapagal to press for a plebiscite in North
Borneo.
XVIII. Tripartite relations, February 1963–June 1963
Preliminary discussions, February–March 1963
237. Indonesian pressure slackened slightly towards the end of February 1963. On
22 February Dr. Subandrio’s reply to the Foreign Secretary’s personal message sent in
December was delivered in London. It was designed to suggest that Indonesia had no
dispute with the United Kingdom, but only with the Tunku. The Commonwealth
Relations Office assessment of the Indonesian Government’s purpose at this stage was
that they hoped to frighten the Tunku out of the Malaysia project.
238. Early in March 1963 Tun Razak, Dr. Subandrio, Sir Garfield Barwick, the
Australian External Affairs Minister, and Mr. Peter Thomas, the British
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, were all in Manila for
an ECAFE conference. The Malayans intended that Tun Razak’s visit should pave the
way for a rapprochement between the Tunku and President Macapagal at the ASA
Foreign Ministers’ Conference, which was now to be held on 2 April and which the
Tunku had agreed to attend. Mr. Thomas had informal talks on the Philippine claim
to North Borneo, while Sir Garfield Barwick renewed Australian efforts with Dr.
Subandrio to promote a détente between Indonesia and Malaya in the context of a
proposal by President Macapagal on 10 March for a tripartite summit meeting
between the heads of government of these two countries and the Philippines. Dr.
Subandrio did not attempt to conceal that his purpose was to concert action with the
Philippines to prevent the formation of Malaysia; he did not meet Tun Razak.
239. On 13 March, 1963, at a Press conference in Manila, Dr. Subandrio said that
Indonesia would relax its opposition to Malaysia if relations between Malaya and
Indonesia could be clarified and it could be shown that Malaysia would not be used to
subvert Indonesia. The Tunku at once welcomed this statement and on 14 March the
Malayan Government made known its agreement to the appointment of a new
Indonesian Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur, Lieutenant-General G. P. H. Djatikusumo,
and that the Malayan Ambassador would return to Djakarta. On 26 March, following
discussions in Manila between Mr. Salvador P. Lopez, the Philippines Under-Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, and Dr. Suwito Kusumowidagdo, the Indonesian First
Deputy Foreign Minister, the Malayan Ambassador was called in for informal talks.
The Malayan Government showed some caution about this approach—they were
anxious that if formal tripartite talks should take place at Ministerial level they should
be well prepared and should not delay the formation of Malaysia.
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240. There was an exchange of incivilities between the Tunku and Dr. Subandrio
at the end of March 1963 and statements which each country affected to regard as
hostile. During March nevertheless the Indonesians welcomed reports of Malaya’s
willingness to take part in a tripartite meeting in Manila and there was some
reduction in tension. The Indonesian interest in a tripartite meeting was partly no
doubt that it provided a means of deciding the future of the area without the
participation of outside Powers. This and the elimination of British and American
bases seemed to be a major long-term objective of Indonesian policy at this time.
Such a meeting and the negotiations leading up to it might also be used to delay or
even prevent the formation of Malaysia.
Increased Indonesian pressure and the first armed action, April 1963
241. General Djatikusumo presented his credentials as Indonesian Ambassador
to Malaya on 15 April, 1963. When formally appointing him, on 11 April, President
Sukarno had used the occasion to reaffirm his Government’s continued opposition to
the establishment of Malaysia. By the end of May there were reports that the new
Ambassador was engaged in trying to stir up Malay feeling against the Chinese
community in Malaya.
242. On 12 April, 1963, a force of uniformed men, some of whom were clearly
Indonesian Army personnel, made an attack on the police station at Tebedu, in
Sarawak, 3 miles from the border—a policeman was killed, two others were wounded
and some arms were removed from the post. On 23 April a Royal Marine position at
Gumbang was attacked and Tebedu was fired on again on 27 April. Over 1,000 men of
the Royal Marine Commandos and the Green Jackets had returned from Brunei on 1
April, but after the first Tebedu raid the flow of units from Borneo was reversed. Two
other minor incursions into Sarawak were also reported in April. These incursions
were mostly by groups of Indonesian ‘volunteer’ and TNKU guerillas stiffened or led
by Indonesian Army officers and men and with a few CCO elements. A curfew was
therefore imposed on areas in the First and Second Divisions of Sarawak within three
hours walking distance of the frontier and in these Divisions and in the Lower Rejang
area all firearms and ammunition in the hands of ‘non-Natives’, that is mainly
Chinese, were called in. Steps were also taken to recruit a body of Volunteer Border
Scouts to support the regular police and military and to supply border villages with
shotgun ammunition for self-defence.
243. Meanwhile in North Borneo the Indonesian Consulate appeared to be
engaged in trying to centralise the local Indonesian Associations and to develop them
into an intelligence network. Its staff were also thought to be encouraging local
people to go to Indonesia for training, drawing up plans for sabotage and organising
petitions against Malaysia. The Indonesian Government was therefore asked in May
to withdraw Major Moenardjo, the Additional Consul, and Bambang Sumali, the
Publicity Officer, who had been conducting these activities. They nevertheless
remained. On 19 July, 1963, they were therefore declared personae non gratae and
left on 26 July. On 23 July 22 Indonesians were arrested in North Borneo and on 6
August the Indonesian Associations in Sandakan and Jesselton were declared illegal.
The wooing of international opinion
244. Efforts were also made in the spring and summer to bring the case against
the formation of Malaysia into a wider arena and to appeal to anti-colonialist
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sentiment. In general however Indonesia and the Philippines were surprisingly
inactive and ineffectual in this endeavour. A number of petitions for and against the
Malaysia concept were outstanding before the United Nations Committee of Twenty-
four in March 1963—its predecessor, the Committee of Seventeen, had heard Mr.
Lee Kuan Yew in support of the concept in September 1962. A petition, dated 28
March, 1963, calling on the General Assembly to condemn the idea of Malaysia and
requesting an oral hearing as a representative of Sheikh Azahari, was sent to the
United Nations Secretariat from Djakarta by Mr. Achmad Fadillah. The United
Kingdom Mission to the United Nations proposed to play this down and it was
decided to suggest to the Indians and Australians, who were members of the
Petitions Sub-Committee, that they should indicate that they could not recognise
the claim which Mr. Fadillah made to be representing a government in exile, but
would raise no objection to the request being granted in a personal capacity.
245. On 17 April, 1963, the Sub-Committee agreed to allow a hearing in place of
that they had in September 1962 granted for Sheikh Azahari. The Committee of
Twenty-four approved this on 18 April, but deleted from the report of the Sub-
Committee a description of Mr. Fadillah’s status as ‘Minister of State of the
Government of Kalimantan Utara’. Meanwhile a request from SUPP to be granted a
hearing had already been accepted. The Committee had however a number of items
on its agenda which aroused much more interest than the merger of the Borneo
Territories into Malaysia. The Malayans, and especially Mr. Radhakrishna Ramani,
who had been newly added to the delegation for this purpose, were effective in
putting the case for Malaysia in the United Nations and Malayan and Singapore
Ministers actively explained the project in the United States, Egypt and elsewhere.
246. The ‘standing and reputation’ of the Malayans in the United Nations at this
time was described by the United Kingdom Mission as ‘far superior to that of the
Indonesians’. Pakistan, after at first welcoming the proposals for merger, had, with
an eye to relations with Indonesia, taken up a non-committal attitude, but countries
such as India and Cambodia had come out in favour of Malaysia and the Indonesians
were able to attract almost no positive support. A broadcast by Mr. Narasimhan, U
Thant’s Chef de Cabinet, over Radio Sabah on 22 April, 1963, was regarded as giving
valuable support to the British and Malayan case. The issue was due to be discussed
in June in the Committee, but was then postponed in view of the tripartite Foreign
Ministers’ conference and was not reviewed. Mr. Narasimhan told the United
Kingdom Mission on 14 September that the bureau of the Committee had firmly
rebuffed an attempt by Indonesia and the Philippines to have the matter taken up
again.
Preparatory discussions, Manila, April 1963
247. The Tunku arrived in Manila on 1 April, 1963, for the ASA meeting and
subsequently had talks with President Macapagal which were reported to be cordial.
The Indonesians however delayed their arrival for the tripartite talks at official level
to discuss an agenda and procedure for a Foreign Ministers’ meeting and these did
not start until 9 April. The delegations were headed by Enche Ghazali, Mr. Lopez and
Dr. Suwito. It was agreed on 16 April that a Foreign Ministers’ meeting should be
held in Manila in May and that there should be a prior exchange of explanatory
memoranda on questions to be discussed at the meeting. It was also decided, in
principle, that a meeting of Heads of Government should be held at a later date.
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248. Enche Ghazali visited Manila again on 29 April, 1963, in order to
persuade the Filipinos that his Government was anxious that the Ministerial
tripartite talks should be held in Manila and that the Indonesians hoped to provoke
the Malayans into refusing to attend. By this time, for internal as well as external
reasons, the Malayan Government was anxious to seem conciliatory and still hoped
to detach the Filipinos from the Indonesians. In the second half of April 1963
therefore the Tunku’s responses to hostile Indonesian statements were distinctly
muted.
249. During the spring and summer of 1963 Indonesian pressure was reduced
before and during tripartite talks and the United Nations ‘ascertainment’ process,
and in each case resumed immediately afterwards. In May there was only one armed
attack, but a spate of hostile statements by Indonesians, notably President Sukarno
himself, to which on the whole the Malayans did not react publicly, and by
‘Lieutenant-General’ Abang Zulkifli, the commander of the TNKU, some of whose
statements however gave the impression of being designed to stir up Indonesian
support even though ostensibly directed to urging his own men on. There was also a
substantial increase in the number of young Chinese crossing into Indonesian
Borneo. This flow was checked in June and, especially during the tripartite Foreign
Ministers’ Meeting in Manila from 7–11 June, the general pressure was reduced,
though incursions did not cease.
Proposals for popular consultation in Borneo
250. During the spring of 1963 U Thant’s Chef de Cabinet, Mr. Narasimhan,
had been active in trying to ease tension. In April he visited Malaya, Singapore, the
Borneo Territories, Indonesia and the Philippines. In public he emphasised the
degree of support for Malaysia in the Borneo Territories. In private he seems to
have tried to deflate Malayan optimism and to promote the idea of some form of
popular consultation in the Borneo Territories as a means of enabling the
Indonesians and Filipinos, if they wished, to retire gracefully from the positions
they had taken up; these positions were based publicly on the right of the people of
the Territories to self-determination. In the course of this round of visits Mr.
Narasimhan was unfavourably impressed by the conduct and intentions of
President Sukarno and Dr. Subandrio and by July the Indonesians were aware of
this.
251. Mr. Narasimhan’s favourite version of these consultation proposals seems
to have been that of a plebiscite to be held some time after the establishment of
Malaysia on the lines of that agreed for West Irian, although this idea does not
seem to have commended itself to U Thant. Mr. Narasimhan did not however
encourage a suggestion by Mr. Macapagal in April 1963 that the United Nations
should take over the administration of the Borneo Territorities as they had, briefly,
in New Guinea. Another suggestion, put forward by Mr. Lopez to Mr. Hilsman of
the United States State Department, was that the Philippines should administer
North Borneo until a plebiscite could be held. The Tunku had already, in October
1962, appeared to endorse a Philippine proposal that a referendum should be held
in North Borneo to decide its future. This proposal was taken up again by
President Macapagal in a statement, on 22 May, 1963, that ‘we will accept the will
of the people concerned’ if expressed in a ‘plebiscite, preferably supervised by the
United Nations.’
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The Maphilindo proposal
252. On 27 July, 1962, President Macapagal had also suggested a confederation
of the Philippines with Malaya, Singapore and the individual Borneo Territories. This
proposal was politely received in Malaya and Indonesia. In the Anglo–Philippine talks
in London in January 1963 Mr. Lopez urged it as an alternative to Malaysia and on 28
February at a Press conference Mr. Macapagal raised the suggestion again in the
form of a loose grouping, which should include the Borneo Territories as individual
States, thereby preventing their federation in Malaysia; he also proposed the addition
of Indonesia to the original group of Territories.
The Tokyo meeting
253. The Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, which had originally been arranged for 24
May, 1963, in Manila, was postponed at the request of the Indonesians. On 25 May Dr.
Subandrio told the Malayan Ambassador to Japan that it was desirable for Indonesia
and Malaya to smooth out their differences and handed him a note for the Tunku
signed by Dr. Sukarno. This suggested a personal meeting in Tokyo where Dr.
Sukarno and Dr. Subandrio were to be until 2 June. The Tunku informed the
Malayan Lower House of this approach on 28 May and left on 30 May for the meeting.
The Tunku’s natural optimism was greatly strengthened by this meeting, from which
he concluded that the Indonesians had called off confrontation without any
concession by Malaya.
The foreign ministers’ meeting, 7–11 June, 1963
254. This optimism was further strengthened by a tactical softening of the
attitude of the Indonesians at the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting which was held in
Manila from 7–11 June, 1963, with Tun Razak representing the Tunku. The
recommendations of this meeting were designed to be presented to a meeting of
Heads of Government to be held by the end of July 1963. They included agreement to
the formation of Malaysia on 31 August in return for what the Malayans regarded as
merely face-saving concessions. Indonesia and the Philippines, in the context of the
principle of self-determination, ‘stated that they would welcome the formation of
Malaysia provided the support of the people of the Borneo Territories is ascertained
by an independent and impartial authority, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations or his representative’. The Malayans undertook to approach the
Governments of the United Kingdom and the Borneo Territories to enable this to be
done. The Tunku, in a letter drawing U Thant’s attention to this recommendation,
made it clear that any move to send an assessor to the Territories would have to carry
the consent of the Government of the United Kingdom and of the local
Administrations and had yet to be confirmed by the Heads of Government.
255. The three Ministers also ‘supported President Macapagal’s plan envisaging
the grouping of the three nations of Malay origin working together in closest
harmony but without surrendering any portion of their sovereignty’, and agreed to
establish ‘machinery for frequent and regular consultations’. In particular each
country was to set up a ‘National Secretariat’. At this meeting the proposed grouping
acquired the name of ‘Mapilindo’, which was soon changed to ‘Maphilindo’. Its chief
function subsequently was to enable the Indonesians to claim that Malayan actions
contravened ‘the spirit of Maphilindo’ which was promoted as a valuable non-
colonialist concept despite its lack of content.
15-Malaysia-Appendix-cpp  21/9/04  9:09 AM  Page 650
[Appendix] JULY 1970 651
256. The Filipinos maintained their right to pursue their claim to North Borneo
and it was agreed ‘that the inclusion of North Borneo in the Federation of Malaysia
would not prejudice either the claim or any right thereunder’. Moreover ‘the three
countries agreed to exert their best endeavours to bring the claim to a just and
expeditious solution by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation,
arbitration, or judicial settlement’. From the British point of view this had at the
time the advantage that it reduced any sense of urgency the Filipinos might have had
about taking their claim to the International Court while the United Kingdom was
still responsible for the territory. A principal, though unofficial, promoter both of the
Kiram claim and of Sheikh Azahari’s revolt, Mr. Nicasio Osmena, son of a former
President of the Philippines, died on 21 June, 1963, and this too may have helped to
reduce the Filipino sense of urgency.
XIX. The Tripartite heads of government meeting and ascertainment
The continuation of confrontation, June–July 1963
257. It became clear soon after the tripartite Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in
Manila in June 1963 that the Indonesians did not feel themselves committed to
accept anything less than a referendum in Borneo. Dr. Subandrio was soothing, but
the Defence Minister, General Nasution, made plain his disapproval. He was quoted
in Merdeka of 13 June as saying that ‘There have been various interpretations given
to the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting . . ., but to us this is a matter of principle. We
oppose Malaysia because it is neo-colonialism’; that confrontation would continue;
and that ‘We will assist our brothers in North Borneo to attain their right to self-
determination.’ The Communist Party (PKI) and its Chairman, Mr. Aidit, went
further and rejected both Maphilindo and ascertainment; even a referendum was
rejected unless held as well in Malaya and Singapore and after the withdrawal of
British troops and the release of detainees.
258. On 15 June, 1963, the TNKU leader, ‘General’ Zulkifli, spoke of launching
guerilla operations in preparation for a general offensive and late in June and early in
July there were incursions into Sarawak in which civilians were killed. On 10 July, as
a reaction to the signing of the Malaysia Agreement, President Sukarno reaffirmed
the policy of confrontation and on 16 July the Indonesian Government announced
the formation of a new naval command to ‘confront’ Malaysia. The prospects for a
summit meeting did not therefore appear encouraging. The Tunku announced on 6
July that he had told Presidents Sukarno and Macapagal that he would agree to a
meeting at Manila around 30 July and on 10 July Mr. Macapagal announced that it
would be held from 30 July to 2 August, but it remained uncertain until the last
moment whether Dr. Sukarno would even attend.
The tripartite summit meeting, Manila, 30 July–5 August, 1963
259. The Tunku and the two Presidents met in Manila from 30 July to 5 August,
1963. The discussions were mainly conducted by the deputies, Enche Ghazali and
Senator Khaw Kai Boh, Dr. Subandrio and Dr. Suwito, and Mr. Lopez and Dr. Pelaez.
Most of the heat was generated by Mr. Lopez, who, as at the Foreign Ministers’
meeting, seems to have appeared much more extreme than the Indonesians. The
talks were also accompanied by some anxious back seat driving—by the United
Kingdom to stiffen the Tunku and by the United States and, to a much lesser degree,
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Australia to urge flexibility and a willingness to accept a brief postponement of
Malaysia Day in order ‘to give Sukarno a fig leaf’ or ‘face saver’. The British position
was tempered by the view, expressed by Lord Home to the Prime Minister on 4
August, [see 205] that a small postponement might be acceptable if thereby full
American support could be obtained afterwards and the Tunku could be prevented
from laying the blame on the United Kingdom if there was failure to agree at Manila
and subsequent trouble with Indonesia. The Tunku himself was willing to accept
either a form of ascertainment which took account of the results of previous
elections and missions, in which case he would not object to a brief postponement of
merger until the Secretary-General had completed his enquiries, or a plebiscite some
years after Malaysia had come into being on the lines of that proposed for West. Irian.
260. U Thant was also represented in Manila and was consulted on the length of
time it would take, if the conference thought this desirable, to ascertain the wishes of
the people of North Borneo and Sarawak ‘through informed and democratic
processes, impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage’, in
accordance with Principle IX of the Annex to United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 1541 (XV) and without taking account of the results of previous elections
or fact-finding missions. His reply seems to have been that this would require four
months, US$400,000 and United Kingdom approval, which was known to be unlikely
to be forthcoming, or two months, if an immediate start could be made with British
consent and the General Assembly could give approval after preparatory work had
been begun. U Thant subsequently pointed out, in response to a request for advice on
a short method of ascertainment more in line with the recommendations of the
Foreign Ministers’ meeting, that the newly-elected representatives in North Borneo
and Sarawak appeared to fulfil the requirements of Resolution 1541 (XV).
261. In the event the Tunku succeeded in excluding mention of a plebiscite or of
delay as such. It was agreed that ascertainment should take into consideration the
recent elections in Borneo, but should verify whether Malaysia had been a major
issue, whether the elections had been free and what the numbers and wishes were of
those unable to vote for any reason: ascertainment was moreover to take place before
the establishment of Malaysia. The Tunku also undertook to try to persuade the
United Kingdom to admit observers of the process of ascertainment from Indonesia,
the Philippines and Malaya—this was a new point on which the Indonesians had
begun to insist.
262. The Tunku accepted a clause in the joint statement by which the
participants bound themselves to ‘abstain from the use of arrangements of collective
defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers’. He subsequently
pointed out publicly that the Anglo–Malayan Defence Agreement was a ‘mutual’ and
not a ‘collective’ agreement and would not therefore be affected, though SEATO
would be to some extent. This clause was clearly directed at foreign bases and the
State Department believed that it was inserted at the suggestion of the Philippines
and directed more at bringing pressure on the United States than on the United
Kingdom. Dr. Subandrio however was reported as having insisted on 3 August, 1963,
that Malaya should agree that the base in Malaysia ‘cannot be used in the
preservation of peace in South-East Asia without the express permission of the
Indonesian and Philippine Governments.’ Moreover the statement insisted ‘that
the responsibility for the preservation of the national independence of the three
countries and of the peace and security in their region lies primarily in the hands of
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the Governments and the peoples of the countries concerned’ and that ‘foreign
bases—temporary in nature—should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly
to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries’. This was read in
London as enshrining the Indonesian determination to be a major South-East Asian
Power in her own right, entitled to be consulted and accommodated on any defence
arrangements in the area.
263. The Tunku himself regarded the meeting as a success, since he had
managed to hold the Indonesians to the main lines of the Foreign Ministers’
agreement, which was formally approved. He does not seem to have been under the
illusion that there was any sign that confrontation would be called off. In London
also there was some relief that President Sukarno had abandoned insistence on a
plebiscite and had for the moment agreed, on paper at least, to accept ascertainment
in some form not clearly stated, but taking previous elections into account. But Mr.
Lee, who had of course an interest in presenting the Tunku as weak and irresolute,
Mr. Gilchrist in Djakarta, the BBC, and Mr. Hilsman of the State Department all took
the view that the meeting had been an Indonesian triumph. In the case of Mr.
Hilsman this had, from the British point of view, the advantage that it made him
subsequently concerned to propose firmness in dealing with such issues arising as
the manner of confirmation of ascentainment by observers.
264. In addition to these central subjects the meeting agreed to establish
national secretariats for the Maphilindo project, but no attempt was made to breathe
real life into this concept. Once again it was agreed that the inclusion of North
Borneo into Malaysia did not prejudice the Filipino claim or any right under it. A
‘Manila Declaration’ was issued from the meeting over the signatures of the three
Heads of Government as well as the joint statement. This declaration was clearly
Indonesian in inspiration and spoke of its signatories’ determination ‘to put an end
to the exploitation of man by man or of one nation by another’, and to ‘combine their
efforts in the common struggle against colonialism and imperialism’ in their
capacity ‘as new emerging forces in the region’.
The British attitude to ascertainment
265. The initial British reaction to proposals for ascertainment was negative. A
plebiscite in Borneo before merger or a transitional United Nations Administration
had been firmly rejected in the spring of 1963, and Lord Home told Mr. Narasimhan
in May that, although no formal objection could be raised to a plebiscite after Malaysia
had come into being and Britain had ceased to be responsible for the territories, this
was not a course which his Government could recommend to the Tunku. Mr. Sandys,
in a conversation with the Malayan High Commissioner on 24 June, had taken an
unfavourable view of the Manila proposal for ascertainment, though he did not reject
the idea out of hand. The results of the Sarawak elections however made a form of
ascertainment which took account of the elections in Sarawak and North Borneo
much less unattractive to the Colonial Office. By August ascertainment was seen in
London as a means of making it difficult for Indonesia and the Philippines to withhold
formal acquiescence in the creation of Malaysia except by clearly accepting
responsibility for a break. It was not supposed that ascertainment would persuade the
Indonesians to abandon confrontation, but it was expected to consolidate American
and Australian support for Malaysia and to diminish Indonesian international support
by making it clear that they were the aggressors.
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266. The United Kingdom was not willing to invite ascertainment itself, but the
Embassies in Manila and Djakarta were instructed on 12 July, 1963, to say that ‘we
foresee no objection to Mr. Narasimhan paying a return visit to North Borneo and
Sarawak to complete his fact-finding mission’. After the Summit meeting, on 8
August, U Thant was informed that the United Kingdom would co-operate in such
measures as he thought necessary to carry out ascertainment, on the assumptions
that he could complete this task in time to allow Malaysia to be established on 31
August and that the report would not be subject to confirmation by the United
Nations or by the Government of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines. The British
Government however remained hostile to any proposal for observers. Nor did it wish
the report of the Secretary-General’s mission to be addressed to it—this was because
it did not want to be committed to recognising the validity of the report’s findings,
although this was not said to the Secretary-General.
267. U Thant’s response on 8 August, 1963, to this message was that he had
already made it clear that he could not complete the task before 9 September, though
he hoped to finish by 14 September. In order to achieve this he proposed to enlarge
his teams and to divide them between Sarawak and North Borneo. His report would
not be subject to confirmation by the Manila Powers and he intended merely to
inform the General Assembly of the action he had taken. He was not willing to refuse
to accept observers. He would however not attach the observers to the assessment
teams or permit them any advisory functions—he made this clear to the Malayan,
Indonesian and Filipino Foreign Ministers on the same day—and the terms on which
they would be allowed to operate in North Borneo and Sarawak would be entirely a
matter for the local Governments. The United Kingdom was later persuaded by Mr.
Harriman that it would be more satisfactory if U Thant were to lay down the
regulations for conduct by the observers. When the observers eventually arrived in
Borneo the mission itself informed them in clear terms of the limitations on their
functions.
268. On 9 August, 1963, Sir Geofroy Tory saw the Tunku and told him that
before considering any question of postponement of Malaysia Day the British
Government must have ‘an absolutely firm undertaking’ that Malaya would go ahead
with merger on whatever later date should be agreed between the signatories and in
any event by the end of September 1963 [see 213]. The Tunku gave this undertaking
on the understanding that the United Kingdom would ‘stand by the Federation
Government whatever the consequences’. On the same day U Thant was told that in
view of the explanations he had given he could carry out his investigation on the
basis he proposed—the formal reply to the request for facilities for ascertainment
was made to the Malayan Government from which the formal request had come. U
Thant was also told that Her Majesty’s Government wished, in consultation with the
other signatories of the Malaysia Agreement, to fix a new date for merger, in order to
avoid the risks involved in leaving the peoples of the territories in a state of suspense.
The issue of observers
269. In their message of 9 August, 1963, to U Thant the British Government also
agreed to the despatch of one Malayan, one Indonesian and one Filipino observer for
each of the two United Nations teams; they subsequently pointed out that this was
the highest number permissible if observers were not to outnumber the United
Nations teams and parity was to be maintained amongst the Manila countries. The
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British objection to observers was based on the conviction that the purpose of the
Indonesians would be to create trouble and apprehension in Borneo, to weaken
British standing in the area, and to conduct subversive and espionage activities. On
13 August, 1963, the Indonesians were informed of this British decision by the
Malayans. On the same day the Indonesian Government applied to the British
Embassy in Djakarta for four visas for Borneo and indicated that an application for
visas for a further 15 officials was on its way. They informed the Malayan
Government that they wished to send a team of not less than 30. The Filipinos were
somewhat more modest in their requests. Both Governments were told that they
could only be permitted one observer for each territory.
270. During the discussions which ensued the British Government agreed to
allow two observers from each country in each territory, having been told by U Thant
that the two United Nations teams might both often operate in two parts; British
observers would also now be attached to the United Nations teams. This concession
did not satisfy the Indonesians. On 20 August, 1963, they told U Thant that they
would not co-operate unless allowed five observers for Sarawak and four for North
Borneo, or, in effect, parity with the United Nations teams. The Philippines
supported this demand—throughout this wrangling the Filipinos, with it was
suggested some embarrassment, tried to keep in step with the Indonesians. U Thant
then suggested that the United Kingdom might permit each country to send, in
addition to four observers, four assistants of ‘junior executive or
clerical/stenographic grade’. He subsequently deferred formal commencement of the
ascertainment process, although the teams were already in Borneo, having told a
British representative that if the United Kingdom could accept his proposal for
assistants he would tell the Indonesians and Filipinos that he would proceed with the
investigation whether they accepted this compromise or not—this he subsequently
did.
271. On this understanding the United Kingdom agreed, on 21 August, 1963, to
permit four assistants ‘of a clerical grade’ for each country. There was some
discussion with U Thant as to how these assistants should be described, but
agreement that he would leave the Indonesians in no doubt that they must be of
genuinely clerical status. This was also made plain in a British statement issued on
23 August which was designed to mollify political opinion in the Borneo Territories,
where Mr. Donald Stephens was threatening to resign over concessions made on the
observer issue. The Philippines accepted the compromise on 23 August and on 24
August the Secretary-General issued instructions for ascertainment to proceed.
272. The Indonesians accepted the compromise, but then put forward as
assistants men some of whom were known to be intelligence officers and tried to
insist on flying their teams into Sarawak and North Borneo themselves; the
Philippines also asked for, and were refused, clearance for air force planes to fly their
observers to North Borneo and Sarawak. Both U Thant and the United States pressed
the United Kingdom to be flexible on membership of these observer teams, but
neither supported demands for the right to fly in in the observer countries’ own
military aircraft. It was not until 29 August, 1963, that Dr. Subandrio proposed what
were thought to be acceptable names for the Indonesian assistants—though two of
them were subsequently reported to be military officers from Indonesian Borneo. On
31 August agreement was reached, the Philippine Government having also proposed
assistants who appeared to be of genuinely clerical grade—the assistants originally
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proposed by the Filipinos included two full members of the Philippines Commission
on Elections. The Indonesian teams, which included at least two intelligence officers
as observers, finally arrived in Singapore to be flown on in British aircraft on 1
September, by which time ascertainment was nearing completion. The Indonesian
purpose in these manoeuvres was evidently to put Britain into the position of
appearing to haggle childishly over trivialities, to delay ascertainment and to cast
doubt on its validity—in this they had some success.
Ascertainment, August–September 1963
273. It had originally been supposed that ascertainment would be carried out by
Mr. Narasimhan. All the parties had indeed supported this in June 1963, but by the
middle of July the Indonesians and Filipinos had come to doubt whether Mr.
Narasimhan would produce a report hostile to Malaysia and had informed U Thant
that he would be unacceptable. The task was therefore given to Mr. Lawrence
Michelmore, the American Deputy Director of the United Nations Office of
Personnel, assisted by Czech, Argentinian, Ceylonese, Ghanaian, Pakistani, Japanese,
Jordanian and Brazilian members of the Secretariat. The mission arrived in Kuching
on 16 August, while the team for North Borneo reached Jesselton on 19 August. In
announcing the appointment of the Mission on 12 August U Thant stated that he
hoped ‘that the Mission will be able to complete its work in approximately four
weeks’. Both teams began formal hearings on 26 August and completed them on 4
September.
274. The Sarawak United People’s Party had announced on 22 August, 1963, that it
would boycott the hearings, but, in Sibu, Miri and, to a lesser extent, Kuching, SUPP
members organised violent, although relatively small, demonstrations to greet the
United Nations Sarawak team. These demonstrations were reported to have affected the
Mission’s assessment of SUPP adversely. Apart from this reaction by the Left wing of
SUPP, the evidence given in Sarawak was generally in favour of Malaysia. In North
Borneo the teams were everywhere met with peaceful demonstrations in favour of
Malaysia and the great preponderance of the evidence given favoured merger.
275. In general the report and U Thant’s assessment of it, which were published
on 14 September, 1963, were highly favourable to Malaysia. Regret was expressed
that a new date for merger had been fixed before the Secretary-General had reached
and made known his conclusions and that facilities for observers had not been
granted more promptly. Nevertheless the Secretary-General concluded that Malaysia
was a major issue at the elections in Sarawak and North Borneo; that the electoral
registers had been properly compiled; that the elections had been freely and
impartially conducted; that votes were properly polled and counted; that the votes of
those detained or absent, even if all had been hostile to Malaysia, would have had no
significant effect on the result; that a majority in both territories understood and
were in favour of Malaysia; that the procedures fully met the requirements of United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV); and finally that the Mission itself
had heard a cross-section of opinion, had had adequate time for its task and had been
fully able to carry out its terms of reference. There was, in U Thant’s view, ‘no doubt
about the wishes of a sizeable majority of the peoples of these territories to join in
the Federation of Malaysia’ [see 225].
276. The Philippines and Indonesia had before the event indicated that they
would be bound not by the Mission’s findings, but by those of their own observers.
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The leader of the Indonesian observers, Brigadier-General Abdul Rachman, passing
through Singapore on his way home on 4 September, 1963, and later in Djakarta,
said that he thought the enquiry fairly conducted, but the time allowed too short.
The report of the Philippine observer team accepted that the hearings in Sarawak
had been conducted ‘fairly and impartially’ but insisted that the Mission allowed
insufficient time to complete its enquiry. Of North Borneo the Filipinos complained
that the British colonial administration was so efficient and helpful that the United
Nations team ‘became captive’ in their hands on a ‘virtual guided tour’. The
Indonesian observers also complained of the ‘highly efficient colonial machinery’ in
North Borneo.
277. Indonesia and the Philippines both subsequently concentrated their
criticism on the length of the ascertainment process and the failure to adopt a ‘fresh
approach’ and in particular to get away from the results of ‘the existing colonial
electoral system’. The Indonesians also claimed that the United Nations team had
been too small to do a thorough job and cast doubts on Mr. Michelmore’s
impartiality. Dr. Subandrio said on 6 September that he did not believe that the
United Nations Mission could have accomplished their task in accordance with the
basis established at Manila and by the beginning of October Dr. Sukarno was talking
of the need for a new and ‘genuine’ United Nations investigation. At the same time
the Indonesians began to develop their attack on the United Nations itself.
F. The establishment of Malaysia and its aftermath
XX. International reactions to the establishment of Malaysia
The new date for merger, 16 September, 1963
278. The proposed date for the establishment of Malaysia had, since 1 August,
1962, been 31 August, 1963. 31 August had also been written into Article II of the
Malaysia Agreement, although in preparing the British and Malayan Acts care had
been taken to make it possible to postpone Malaysia Day without the need for
amending legislation. In the Borneo Territories and in Singapore there was
reluctance to accept any postponement of this date and an increasing hostility to
ascertainment and to the proposals for Indonesian and Filipino observers. On 22
August, 1963, Mr. Donald Stephens and Mr. Ningkan flew to Kuala Lumpur with the
declared intention of insisting that 31 August should remain Malaysia Day. Mr. Lee
Kuan Yew encouraged them and himself refused to accept the postponement, which
he claimed released Singapore from its obligations under the Malaysia Agreement,
until he had secured further concessions from Malaya.
279. The Tunku’s difficulty was that it was essential, if the Manila Agreement
should break down, to be able to show conclusively that the blame lay with the
Indonesians and that Malaya had been the reasonable party in the dispute. The time
available for effective ascertainment was too short for this to be completed in August
and he had therefore to accept some delay. On 15 August, 1963, U Thant informed
the three Manila Powers that he hoped to complete ascertainment by 14 September.
The British were anxious not to delay the formal establishment of Malaysia beyond
17 September for fear that once the representatives of the Afro–Asian States had
come together for the United Nations General Assembly Indonesian opportunities for
mischief would be multiplied.
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280. The State Department was urging at the end of the Manila Heads of
Government Conference that, although Malaysia must go ahead on a set date
whatever the results of ascertainment, the United Kingdom should not say so
publicly when consenting to the Secretary-General’s role. This was accepted in
London, but the Foreign Office told the United States Embassy that once a new date
had been agreed upon this could not possibly be suppressed, though it would not be
necessary to indicate what would happen if the report should prove unfavourable. It
was argued that postponement from 31 August, 1963, could not be announced
without a new date, since the growing resentment of people in North Borneo and
Sarawak would certainly not permit indefinite postponement; a firm date was also
desirable to enable invitations for the inaugural celebrations to be issued.
281. The Malayan Government were at first anxious to fix a date not later than 14
September, 1963, since some of the guests they wished to invite would be unable to
attend if the celebrations clashed with the beginning of the United Nations General
Assembly session. Mr. Sandys also favoured 14 September unless the Malayans
themselves proposed a later date. U Thant appreciated the arguments for fixing a
date, but in a discussion on 12 August insisted that 14 September was too early and
suggested 20 September or a day or so later. In the course of this discussion,
however, Mr. Narasimhan implied that a date in the third week in September,
beginning on 16 September, would be acceptable. U Thant did not dissent from this
and appears himself to have indicated to the Malayan Representative on 16 August
that 16 September would be a suitable new date; he remained, however, unwilling to
give any public hint of this and subsequently, in his conclusions on the Michelmore
Mission’s report, expressed regret that a new date had been fixed beforehand.
282. In the light of these discussions the Governments of the United Kingdom,
Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore agreed to 16 September, 1963, and on
29 August the Yang di-Pertuan Agong signed a proclamation providing for Malaysia
Day to be on 16 September. On 28 August Enche Ghazali flew to Djakarta to give
advance notice of the promulgation of this proclamation. Djakarta, however, was not
to be appeased. The Malayans published their notes to the Indonesians and the
Filipinos explaining the announcement on 29 August and on 3 September the
Indonesians responded with a strongly-worded note of protest. The Malayans, who
were becoming increasingly robust in their attitude, replied firmly on 6 September,
arguing that they had been scrupulous in keeping to the Manila Agreement. The
Filipinos reacted more mildly. Mr. Lopez did not protest formally but on 4
September at a Press conference described the announcement as ‘premature’ and
said that ‘it does not appear to be in conformity with the letter and the spirit of the
Manila Agreements to have set a new date for the establishment of Malaysia in
advance of the completion of the United Nations survey’.
Indonesian reactions
283. On 14 September, 1963, the day that U Thant’s report was published, Dr.
Subandrio told the Malayan Ambassador in Djakarta that ‘there would be no
recognition of Malaysia’. On the following day he told Press correspondents that
‘Indonesia could not recognise Malaysia as it is now’ and the Indonesian Ambassador
in Kuala Lumpur was withdrawn to Djakarta ‘for consultations’. On 16 September
Dr. Subandrio informed the Malaysian Ambassador that ‘You have no status here.’ In
consequence, on 17 September, the Tunku told the Press that the Malaysian
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Embassy would be withdrawn from Djakarta and the Indonesians were given seven
days to remove all their diplomatic and consular staff from Malaysia. Despite this
sequence of events the Indonesians had some success in suggesting that it was the
Malaysians who had broken off relations.
284. The Indonesians did not confine themselves to diplomatic action. On 12
September, 1963, demonstrators invaded the grounds of the British Consulate at
Surabaya and destroyed the Union Flag; a protest was made, but no apology was
received. On 16 September a mob attacked British and Malaysian Embassy buildings
in Djakarta causing considerable damage; despite a formal request on 13 September
no attempt was made by the Security Police to give protection to the British
Embassy. On 16 September also the British and Malaysian Consulates at Medan were
almost completely wrecked and trade unions took over a number of British firms in
the Djakarta area; these were subsequently put under ‘supervision’ by the
authorities. Dr. Subandrio deplored the damage done at the Embassies, but declared
that the Indonesian Government appreciated the militant attitude of various groups
of Indonesian society and the fact that the people had shown their indignation at the
formation of Malaysia.
285. There was some reaction to these events on 17 September, 1963, in Malaya
when there were demonstrations at the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur and
the Consulate in Penang and the Indonesian Ambassador’s residence was invaded. On
the following day, 18 September, in Djakarta the Malaysian Embassy was taken over
by the Indonesian Youth Front, the British Embassy was ransacked and destroyed by
fire, and British property throughout the city was systematically looted and burnt.
On 19 September only action by the Diplomatic Corps prevented the British
Ambassador’s residence being taken over. On 21 September President Sukarno
announced an economic and commercial boycott of Malaysia, which inter alia
involved stopping the entrepôt trade through Singapore.
Filipino reactions
286. In Manila the President’s Office issued a Press release on 15 September,
1963, which stated that the President had decided ‘to defer action on the question
of the recognition of the proposed Federation of Malaysia’ which, ‘in effect, means
that the Philippines will have no relations with the new state of Malaysia.’ On the
same day Mr. Lopez summoned the Malayan Ambassador and informed him of this
decision and the Philippines Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur was withdrawn ‘for
consultation’. The Philippine Foreign Ministry subsequently told the Malaysian
Embassy that they could only be recognised as a Consulate. On 17 September
therefore the Tunku announced that the Embassy in Manila would also be
withdrawn and the Filipino diplomatic and consular staff would have seven days to
leave Malaysia.
287. On 18 September, 1963, in New York, Mr. Lopez told the Malaysian
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Dato Ong, that he had tried to
persuade the Indonesians to welcome Malaysia, but without success, and that the
Philippines had had therefore to withhold their own welcome for the time being.
He asked that the Embassy staff in Manila should not be withdrawn. Mr. Lopez
admitted that his Government had been heavily criticised for its attitude to
Malaysia, but this seemed to be more a matter of disagreement over tactics and of
internal political differences than of real hostility to the policy being followed by
15-Malaysia-Appendix-cpp  21/9/04  9:09 AM  Page 659
660 THE ORIGINS AND FORMATION OF MALAYSIA [Appendix]
the Administration. The Malaysians hoped at first to be able to reach agreement
with the Filipinos and maintained a moderate tone in references to the Philippines
attitude. By the end of 1963 however the Tunku made it plain that he had
concluded that President Macapagal and Mr. Lopez were too tied to the claims in
Sabah and to the desire to present a new ‘Asian’ image in collaboration with
Indonesia to present any real basis for hope of a satisfactory resumption of
relations in the immediate future.
The development of confrontation
288. The Malaysians had by October 1963 no illusions about the Indonesian
attitude towards the Federation, even though in the General Assembly on 27
September Mr. Palar had painted the British as the villains of the piece with the
Malayans acting under British pressure. Soon thereafter Dr. Sukarno told the
Japanese Ambassador that, unless the Tunku agreed to a new tripartite Summit
meeting and a new investigation in Borneo and the British gave up their bases, he
would have to consider allowing Russian bases in Indonesia. The Tunku’s immediate
response to this was that he could not consider attending such a meeting unless
Malaysia was recognised and aggressive actions ceased. His attitude hardened further
in the following months.
289. The Tunku’s greater firmness was related to the increasingly open nature of
Indonesian military ‘confrontation’. On 5 August, 1963, General Nasution stated that
Indonesia was providing arms and training for rebels in the Borneo Territories and
that the policy of confrontation would be maintained until Malaysia was ‘smashed’.
Raiding continued actively until 24 August, but two days earlier Dr. Subandrio told
the American Ambassador that instructions had been issued to General Nasution to
stop all activities on the border. After the United Nations ascertainment, however,
confrontation resumed in earnest. In the middle of September the Indonesians
imposed a ban on goods, ships and aircraft moving between Indonesia and the
Malaysian Territories and on 25 September President Sukarno, in a speech at
Jogjakarta, said that the ‘Indonesians will crush Malaysia to [the] end because it is a
form of neo-colonicalism’. By early October Indonesian bands of up to 200 men were
being recorded on the border.
290. On 18 September, 1963, the Tunku announced that a Malaysian Defence
Council was to be set up and that the Malaysian armed forces were to be increased.
By late September there were six British battalions with supporting troops in
Borneo, while two battalions of the Royal Malay Regiment were under orders for
Borneo. The Indonesians also took over Malaysian assets in Indonesia. This probably
chiefly affected a few Chinese businessmen in Singapore, while the trade boycott
damaged the interests of Singapore and to a lesser extent Penang, another Chinese
city, and may not therefore have been seen as excessively damaging in Malay circles.
There seems also to have been a body of opinion which regarded confrontation as
playing a useful role in helping to forge national unity—already, during his visit to
the Borneo States in April, Mr. Narasimhan had formed the view that ‘the Indonesian
attitude had frightened most of the local people out of any desire for independence
on their own.’ Moreover the view was held by some Malayans that even without
Malaysia they were bound to have trouble with the Indonesians sooner or later and
that it was better to face it when they still enjoyed determined Commonwealth
support.
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The provenance of Malaysia
291. An issue which had caused some concern in London in the spring and
summer of 1963 was the question of whether Malaysia would be an entirely new
‘international personality’ or merely the existing Federation of Malaya with its name
changed to take account of additional territories. For Commonwealth and United
Nations reasons continuity would be simpler and would provide less opportunity for
obstruction, but North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore would be better placed in,
and therefore naturally preferred, an arrangement which seemed to be a compact
between equal partners. The former considerations prevailed and efforts were made
to avoid speaking of the ‘establishment’ of Malaysia. The form used in Article I of the
Malaysia Agreement was that ‘The Colonies of North Borneo and Sarawak and the
State of Singapore shall be federated with the existing States of the Federation of
Malaya . . . and the Federation shall thereafter be called “Malaysia”.’
292. On 16 September, 1963, the Malaysian Permanent Representative notified
the United Nations that ‘the name of the State . . . has been changed from “Federation
of Malaya” to “Malaysia”.’ The Malayan High Commission had earlier told the
Commonwealth Relations Office that the Malayan Government proposed to try to
avoid issuing Malaysian Representatives abroad with new letters of accreditation. As
with their earlier attempts to raise the issue of Malaysia in the Committee of Twenty-
four, here too Indonesia and the Philippines were neither very active nor very
effective. The Indonesian Representative had intended to challenge the seating of
Malaysia in the General Assembly. He was however apparently told by Sir Mohammed
Zafrulla Khan that the Chairmen had agreed between themselves that, if a point of
order were raised, whichever was in the Chair would rule that Malaysia was properly
seated. He therefore protested at what he described as a procedural fait accompli
without endeavouring to reverse it on a point of order. By early October it was
thought that the Malaysian United Nations seat was well established.
293. Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak all to some extent nevertheless
satisfied their own need for status. On 31 August, 1963, the original Malaysia Day,
the Governors of both North Borneo and Sarawak announced that they would in
future follow the advice of the territory’s Chief Minister or Chief Minister Designate
in matters which would be State subjects under the Malaysia Constitution. In
Singapore Mr. Lee, having been restrained from declaring full independence,
announced that his Government had taken powers over defence and foreign affairs
and was ‘holding them in trust’ until 16 September for the Malaysian Government.
These moves were reported to have thrown the Malayan Government and the Tunku
into a fury. Mr. Sandys however managed to persuade them that none of these
announcements involved any legal change, or in Singapore even a de facto change. A
joint statement by Mr. Sandys and Tun Razak confined itself to a factual recital of the
constitutional position. Again on 16 September Mr. Lee issued a high-sounding
proclamation repeating that Singapore on 31 August ‘asserted her right to freedom
and took over powers over defence and foreign affairs’. Although of no legal effect,
this may well have given the popular impression that the State had entered Malaysia
freely from an independent status.
The United States attitude, February to October 1963
294. After the quadripartite talks in Washington in February 1963 the
maintenance of American official support for the Malaysia proposals, both in public
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and in private, remained a constant preoccupation of Her Majesty’s Government. In a
Press conference on 14 February President Kennedy said that ‘We have supported the
Malaysia Federation . . . I am hopeful that it will sustain itself because it is the best
hope of security for that area.’ Nevertheless the United States Administration
throughout doubted, on the basis of the American experience in Viet-Nam, whether
the British would be able easily to contain Indonesian-promoted guerilla warfare and
feared that they might be unwilling to stick to the task, so that the United States
would be drawn in. There was British concern over the Mansfield Report to Congress
on South-East Asia, which seemed hostile to Malaysia and suggested that the United
States should pursue a policy of ‘non-involvement’ in the problems arising from its
creation. This was however offset to some extent by robust remarks about South-East
Asia made by the President with reference to the Mansfield Committee’s views at a
Press conference on 6 March. At a meeting with Lord Home on 7 April in Paris
moreover Mr. Rusk was more reassuring than in February.
295. By May 1963 however there was some anxiety that the luke-warm character
of American support for Malaysia, especially in public, and willingness to consider
further aid for the Indonesians, even if only as a lever to restrain them, might be
encouraging Indonesian and Filipino intransigence. Early in May there were
indications that the State Department was attracted by proposals for a plebiscite after
Malaysia and they urged the British Government to keep an open mind on this
proposal as a possible ‘germ of a solution’. The American position was that their
policy had been clearly laid down in President Kennedy’s statement of 14 February.
Mr. Harriman told the British Ambassador, in a letter of 23 May, that he had recently
informed the Indonesians that this remained United States policy and ‘that, while we
were playing no part in the formation of Malaysia, we consider it the best solution
available’. The ANZUS communique of 6 June, 1963, signed by Sir Garfield Barwick,
Mr. Harriman and Mr. Holyoake, said that the Ministers ‘noted with satisfaction that
the final steps were now being taken for the early formation of the new State. They
welcomed the establishment of Malaysia . . .’.
296. On 16 July, 1963, Mr. Gilchrist was told by the French and Canadian
Ambassadors in Djakarta that the American Ambassador, Mr. Howard Jones, had
been advocating a postponement of Malaysia to give time for a full-scale referendum.
These views seem however to have been unrepresentative of the American
Administration’s position. During the Manila Summit Meeting President Kennedy
suggested a brief postponement to enable Dr. Sukarno to save face if he was so
minded [see 204]. Thereafter the American position became firmer. Mr. Jones was
instructed to make strong representations to Dr. Sukarno to persuade him to stick to
the Manila Agreement and similar representations were made to the Filipinos. Mr.
Harriman and Mr. Hilsman were anxious that nothing should be done to give the
Indonesians an excuse for avoiding their Manila commitments, by, in particular, any
statement that Malaysia would come into being on a fixed date whatever U Thant’s
ascertainment report might say. Mr. Hilsman agreed on 9 August that this was what
must in fact happen, but on 30 August the Americans expressed the view to the
Foreign Office that ‘having accepted the role of the Secretary-General . . . it is
inconceivable that his findings could simply be brushed away if they proved to be
adverse’.
297. Mr. Hilsman expressed the view to Mr. Greenhill of the Embassy in
Washington on 3 August, 1963, that the Indonesian proposal for observers during
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ascertainment was totally unacceptable and on 6 August that President Sukarno had
been allowed to get away with far too much at Manila, including observers, that the
United Kingdom should work on the assumption that ascertainment could be
completed by 31 August and that there could be no question of the resulting report
being subject to confirmation either by the General Assembly or the three Manila
Powers. On 12 August U Thant was apparently strongly discouraged by the
Americans when he suggested that it might be wiser to fix Malaysia Day after the
Michelmore teams had reported.
298. On the issue of observers Mr. Harriman agreed on 21 August, 1963, that U
Thant should if necessary be told that the United States understanding of their
function was that they were to stay with the United Nations teams and observe the
manner of their enquiries and not to engage in independent investigations or other
activities; he agreed that British consent to the addition of four clerical assistants to
each observer team should be dependent on the laying down of bench rules by U
Thant, and that if the rules were broken the attempt to reach a solution in co-
operation with Indonesia might have to be abandoned. The State Department
subsequently took steps to press the Indonesian Government to accept the British
concession of two observers and two assistants to each territory subject to these rules
and gave no countenance to the Indonesian request to be allowed to fly their
observers into the Borneo Territories in their own aircraft.
299. On 30 August, 1963, Mr. Harriman sent Mr. Sandys in Singapore a ‘roughly
worded’ message, based apparently on what Mr. Gilchrist described as
‘misrepresentations’ by Mr. Howard Jones in Djakarta. This message spoke of
‘arbitrary and inflexible tactics’ and urged Mr. Sandys to allow the Indonesian
observers and assistants to proceed ‘without further dispute over their identities.’ On
the previous day however the American Minister in Manila had, on instructions,
spoken to Mr. Lopez of his Government’s ‘sharp disappointment’ at the Philippine
Government’s behaviour over the British Government’s ‘perfectly reasonable
requirements’ on observers and assistants. On 10 September Mr. Harriman agreed in
principle that the United States would support publicly a favourable report by the
Secretary-General as soon as it was published and this was done. It also appeared that
President Kennedy had rejected a proposal for interim American aid to keep the
Indonesian economy going.
300. The violent Indonesian reaction to the formation of Malaysia led the United
States again to urge conciliation. The Tunku had, in a broadcast on 20 September,
1963, while welcoming a Filipino proposal for a new summit meeting, insisted that
the Indonesians and Filipinos must first resume normal diplomatic relations with
Malaysia and that the Indonesians must ‘stop any aggressive actions, direct or
indirect, and all troops now concentrated on the border of Sarawak must be
withdrawn.’ The United States however pressed in Manila, Djakarta and Kuala
Lumpur for a summit meeting without preconditions, though warned by Mr.
Baldwin, the American Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur, that this would be pointless
and dangerous, unless the Indonesians accepted the Tunku’s conditions beforehand.
301. On 27 September, 1963, President Kennedy sent a message to President
Sukarno proposing ‘a temporary standstill on any further provocative words and
actions’ and on 28 September invited Mr. Macmillan to join with him in urging
restraint on the Tunku; this Mr. Macmillan agreed to do. Both in Mr. Macmillan’s
reply and in a subsequent talk between Sir David Ormsby-Gore and Mr. Rusk and Mr.
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Hilsman in Washington it was argued that the Tunku was not, as President Kennedy
believed, in a pugnacious mood and could hardly be expected to make any further
concession, such as attending a new tripartite summit meeting, without at the least
Indonesian recognition of Malaysia, in view of the domestic political atmosphere in
Malaysia and Indonesia’s continual verbal and military attacks and failure to honour
previous undertakings. The chief British interest in these exchanges however was to
urge an early resumption of quadripartite talks.
302. The Tunku’s reply to President Kennedy agreed to his suggestion that
President Macapagal be privately informed that Malaysia would abide by its promise
to consider the question of the Philippines’ claims in North Borneo, but said that ‘we
have no further reliance on Indonesian promises’ and that the Communists were
strong enough to prevent any hope of successful talks with Indonesia. His earlier
remarks seem already to have suggested to the Americans that the Tunku was
unwilling under any circumstances to negotiate with President Sukarno and on 4
October, 1963, in New York, Mr. Rusk brusquely insisted to Dato Ong and Mr.
Ramani that there must be no preconditions, that an early meeting was essential and
that this would in itself amount to a recognition of Malaysia by the other two
participants. In the following week the United States increased its pressure on the
Tunku. He was asked again to cease making provocative statements, to demonstrate
his willingness to accept further negotiation, and in particular to agree to a tripartite
meeting at ministerial level. He was told that it looked as though the situation was
drifting towards war, that Britain and Australia might be unable to cope and that
American help might then have to be sought; before such help could be given
Malaysia would have to demonstrate that it had pursued negotiation to the end.
The Australian attitude, February to October 1963
303. The Australian position became increasingly robust after the quadripartite
talks in February 1963. Sir Garfield Barwick engaged in a round of discussions early
in March in Manila during which he urged moderation on Dr. Subandrio, whom he
found ‘evasive’, and on President Macapagal, and tried to promote tripartite talks at
ministerial level. He seems to have concluded that firmness in support of Malaysia
was more likely to get results than any other policy. Nevertheless, so far as their
claims in North Borneo were concerned, he did at this stage suggest to the
Philippines that they should aim at submission of the claim to the International
Court after Malaysia had been formed to be followed, if the claim succeeded there, by
a referendum to resolve the issue. By early in May however the Australians were
opposed to any idea of a plebiscite before or after Malaysia Day and were lobbying
vigorously against the idea in Washington, using the argument that any sign of an
American weakening on this point would encourage the Indonesians to increase
their opposition.
304. This firm position was maintained during the summer of 1963. In the
United Nations General Assembly general debate on 3 October Sir Garfield defended
the formation of Malaysia and reiterated Australia’s intention of going to its defence
if necessary, while Sir Robert Menzies also publicly stated that Australia had offered,
if requested by the Malaysian Government, in the event of attack or externally incited
subversion, to add Australian military efforts to those of the United Kingdom in aid of
Malaysia. The Australians were also convinced that the Tunku had, for internal
political reasons, no further room for manoeuvre and so could not be expected to
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make further concessions. In discussions before the quadripartite talks in
Washington they seem to have brought Mr. Harriman round to this view.
The quadripartite talks, October 1963
305. The Americans accepted the British proposal for new quadripartite talks,
though without notable enthusiasm. There was some informal discussion between
British and Australian officials beforehand as to the best way of leading the United
States to take a serious view of long-term Indonesian policy, and some inclination to
think that emphasis on the broad threat posed by the Maphilindo concept to United
States as well as British bases in the area might well prove more effective than
concentration on the immediate Indonesian action in Borneo. It was also thought
that it would be as well to paint a black picture of Indonesian intentions in order to
offset an American tendency, following Mr. Howard Jones, to believe that President
Sukarno was open to persuasion and looking for a way of escape from an untenable
position and that further concessions by the Tunku were needed to permit this.
306. The talks took place from 16 to 18 October, 1963, in Washington. The
agenda covered an assessment of the current situation, including Indonesian and
Filipino intentions and the Malaysian internal political situation, the political and
military implications of this situation and Commonwealth action to deal with them,
and Western policy in the area in general. It was hoped in London that, in trying to
reach an agreed assessment of Western interests in the area and of Indonesian
intentions towards them, it might be possible to persuade the Americans that efforts
to reach a quick solution were unlikely to bring about a satisfactory settlement,
either for Malaysia or for Western long-term interests. In the British view the basic
Western interest was to have as wide an area as possible in South-East Asia in which
to deploy military power against a Communist threat undistracted by other threats,
and especially to retain full use of British and American bases. British officials were
however by no means certain that the United States Administration regarded the
maintenance of Singapore and other British bases as being an American interest.
307. The British inclination was to believe that the Indonesian threat could only
be abated by standing up to it firmly and so demonstrating that countries with
Western guarantees would be supported effectively by the United States as well as by
the United Kingdom. The Americans on the other hand were expected to press the
view that an effective Western presence was dependent on the goodwill of Indonesia,
as the largest, most vigorous and most powerful country in South-East Asia, and that
concession was therefore essential. There was also a fundamental difference of view
on the internal effects within Indonesia of Western action. The Americans tended to
fear that, if frustrated, Indonesia would go Communist; the British that the
continued success of the existing Indonesian policy of imperial expansion would
submerge moderate opinion and so play into the hands of the PKI. It was the British
purpose at the talks to persuade the Americans, not so much to put pressure on the
Indonesians, as to demonstrate support for Malaysia. In particular it was hoped to
correct a situation in which the United States gave economic aid to Indonesia,
although it gave none to Malaysia.
308. The talks proved more satisfactory from the British viewpoint than had
been expected, the Americans having evidently been impressed by Australian and
British insistence on the Tunku’s lack of freedom for manoeuvre. The Australian and
New Zealand representatives suggested that the policy of concessions to Sukarno was
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leading to a Munich situation and the Americans agreed not to pursue the project of
a new tripartite meeting. They still however pressed for support for Thai efforts to see
if conditions for such a meeting could be created and declined to interrupt
outstanding aid deliveries to Indonesia. They did agree on the other hand to consider
various ways of indicating a positive United States support for Malaysia, including the
sale of military equipment on credit terms, mutual visits by Malaysian and American
leaders, a naval visit to Malaysia, continued full support for Malaysia’s candidacy for
the Security Council of the United Nations, reiterated public support for Malaysia
and open encouragement of United States investment.
309. The Americans also in effect agreed that renewed quadripartite talks should
be held before they took any fresh initiatives. The United Kingdom, Australia and
New Zealand for their part agreed to continue to urge on the Tunku a policy of
restraint and moderation in his public statements and actions. They also accepted
Commonwealth responsibility for economic and military support of Malaysia and the
British confirmed their intention of maintaining their military effort in the Borneo
Territories ‘at such a level as the situation might require’. On balance there seemed
some justice in the view expressed by both Mr. Harriman and Mr. Rusk that the
decisions reached entailed ‘a lot of action by the United States and very little by
anyone else’. Nevertheless, although some members of the State Department and of
the United States Embassy in Djakarta may have remained unconvinced, the general
American attitude, and especially that of the President as expressed to Mr. Warner by
Mr. McGeorge Bundy, proved to be more robust than had appeared before the talks.
XXI. The local political scene, autumn 1963
Malaya
310. The London Agreement was endorsed in the Malayan Lower House by 67
votes to 18 on 12 August, 1963, and the Malaysia Bill was passed on 20 August by 73
votes to 16. Nevertheless the Alliance leadership felt compelled to make a vigorous
effort to rally support for Malaysia and against the Indonesian regime. During the
autumn ‘Malaysian Solidarity’ rallies were held throughout Malaya; these included
the burning of effigies of President Sukarno, of Dr. Subandrio and of the PKI leader,
Mr. Aidit. This campaign, and Indonesian actions, had the desired effect of rallying
Malay, and Chinese, support behind the Government and was largely responsible for
a considerable improvement in the proportion of votes secured by the Alliance in the
1964 elections as compared with those held in 1959.
Sabah
311. Despite the unanimous adoption of the Lansdowne recommendations, there
were still in April 1963 elements in North Borneo, especially in the Pasok Momogun,
who were not reconciled to the Malaysia proposals. On 22 April O.K.K. Sundang sent
Mr. Narasimhan, who was visiting Borneo, a letter in which he claimed that most
people in North Borneo would prefer self-determination first and were worried about
religious freedom in Malaysia and at opposition from neighbouring countries.
Although he was subsequently persuaded to broadoast, on 12 June, a talk
emphasising the safeguards in the Malaysia arrangements, there were rumours that
there might be ‘trouble’ in the Interior Residency and it was thought wise to
despatch two platoons of Gurkhas to Keningau, an area in which Pasok Momogun
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was influential, to take part in the Malaysia Day celebrations—their presence was
reported to have had a marked effect.
312. The decision to grant North Borneo and Sarawak self-government, as from
31 August, 1963, in respect of rights which would later fall to them as states under
Malaysia did something to assuage the desire for self-determination before merger,
though it annoyed the Malayans. There were extensive and apparently virtually
unanimous demonstrations in favour of Malaysia and against delay in establishing it
when the Michelmore Mission team arrived in North Borneo in August 1963. At least
one British Foreign Service observer in North Borneo at this time took the view,
however, that for many in the State Malaysia was still only regarded as a second best
alternative to continuation of British rule.
313. On 16 May, 1963, the Sabah Alliance decided to nominate Datu Mustapha as
Head of State and Mr. Donald Stephens as Chief Minister. It was by this time evident
that Datu Mustapha and his Muslim supporters expected to secure a predominant
position in the State in Malaysia. This was partly because of support from Federation
Malay leaders and partly because Mr. Stephens had to some extent alienated the local
Chinese, who were now uneasily united in the Borneo Utara National Party, or
BUNAP. There were also reports that members of political parties, in disputes with
the Administration, expected to benefit from party support and that USNO had
attracted supporters because it seemed likely to be able to be more effective in this
respect than the other parties. By October 1963 there were even rumours that USNO
might affiliate directly to UMNO. In July the Alliance as a whole secured all 18 elected
seats on the Legislative Council, USNO getting 8, UNKO 5, BUNAP 4 and the Pasok
Momogun 1; the Council also had 4 ex officio and 3 nominated members. These
shares were repeated on 26 September for the 16 Sabah seats in the Federal House of
Representatives, except that the USNO share was cut to 6 seats.
Sarawak
314. The unity of the parties in the Sarawak Alliance evaporated rapidly and on
15 April, 1963, the Party Negara Sarawak of PANAS, whose leader was the Datu
Bandar, withdrew to fight the election on its own. Its attitude bore some
resemblance to that of the Pasok Momogun, in its inclination to favour self-
determination for the territories rather than direct merger. On 1 July it joined with
SUPP in calling for a referendum before the creation of Malaysia, though the Datu
Bandar himself subsequently said that he wanted ascertainment of the wishes of the
people by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and not a referendum. On 9
July he signed the Malaysia Agreement in London. Some PANAS candidates had
nevertheless talked of looking to Indonesia for support and the party was on bad
terms with the other primarily Malay party, Barisan Ra’ayat Jati Sarawak, or
BARJASA. By September however the Secretary-General of UMNO, Senator Ghazali
bin Jawi, was trying to bring these two parties together and, it was said, to link them
directly to UMNO; as a result PANAS began to lose its Chinese members.
315. The Sarawak National Party, or SNAP, which was primarily Iban in
membership, suffered from internal dissensions and from lack of funds. There were
also Ibans in Party Pesaka Anak Sarawak, or PAPAS, and in SUPP, which was however
primarily a Chinese party. Within SUPP the moderates were thought to have
strengthened their position at the centre, largely because the CCO was preoccupied
with preparations for armed action. In Sarawak, as in North Borneo, the initial
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effects of Indonesian incursions, when they started in April 1963, was unsettling, but
counter-action was already in May reported as having produced a recovery in public
morale.
316. The first stage of elections in Sarawak, on the three tier electoral college
system, took place from 26 April, 1963, to 15 July. In the primary District and
Municipal Councils, elected by full adult suffrage, the Sarawak Alliance won 138
seats, SUPP 116 seats, PANAS 59 seats and Independents, none of whom were
believed to have adopted a platform hostile to Malaysia, 116 seats. These figures
somewhat underrepresented the voting support for Independents and the Alliance.
During July the primary level Councils elected the members of the Divisional
Advisory Councils and these in turn the members of the new Council Negri. In this
body, Sarawak’s Legislative Assembly, the Alliance secured 19 seats, PANAS 5, SUPP
5, and Independents 7; there were also to be up to 7 nominated, ex officio and life
members. Alliance support amongst elected members of the Council Negri
subsequently rose to 23. Of the 36 elected members 9 were Chinese, 7 Malays and
Melanaus, and 20 other races, especially Ibans. SUPP and PANAS had an electoral
arrangement for these higher level elections.
317. The Federal leadership had shown itself somewhat dissatisfied with some of
the earlier results in Sarawak and the Tunku would not allow the election of
members of the Federal House of Representatives to go ahead until he had himself
approved the Alliance list. This round of the elections was therefore postponed until
22 October, 1963. Of those then elected 18 represented the Alliance, 3 SUPP and the
remaining 3 PANAS.
Relations between the federal government and the Borneo Territories
318. The Federal Government seems in general to have been contemptuous of
the emerging political leaders in Borneo. Tun Razak was said to give the impression
that he had a poor opinion of Datu Mustapha in Sabah. In Sarawak the Alliance
unanimously elected Mr. Stephen Kalong Ningkan, an Iban, to be Chief Minister
Designate and the Federation Government accepted this nomination, though its
members seem to have had little confidence in Mr. Ningkan. The Sarawak Alliance
however also proposed the Temenggong Jugah, the leader of another group of Ibans,
as Governor—the post of Governor was on the first occasion to be filled by joint
nomination by the Federation and United Kingdom Governments. The Tunku
rejected the Alliance proposal on the ground that, with an Iban as Chief Minister, a
Malay must be appointed Governor. He also claimed that the Temenggong was
illiterate and personally unsuitable.
319. The Temenggong nevertheless carried considerable weight with the Iban
community, which was the largest racial stock [?block] in Sarawak and was
becoming increasingly politically aware and active. Their importance was moreover
enhanced by the presence of 2 million or so Dyaks across the border in Indonesian
territory. The Governor, Sir Alexander Waddell, feared that, if Temenggong Jugah
was not appointed, PAPAS and SNAP might combine to oppose Malaysia. He took the
view that the Tunku should either accept the choice of the Sarawak Alliance or
should convince them to the contrary.
320. The Tunku however was under pressure from Malay feeling in the
Federation. The more cautious UMNO members, who had throughout had doubts of
the advantages of the Grand Design, were becoming increasingly uneasy as the
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disadvantages of the scheme became more apparent and were in no mood to permit
the Tunku to agree to a non-Malay Governor. They were no doubt encouraged in this
attitude by the representatives in Kuala Lumpur of the Malay Barjasa Party.
321. The Tunku therefore remained immovable throughout a series of meetings
between leaders of the Sarawak Alliance, Malayan Ministers and the Secretary of
State for Commonwealth Relations, Mr. Sandys, and on 7 September, 1963, he stated
publicly that the nomination of the Temenggong was unacceptable. The issue was
eventually resolved, on 13 September, [see 224] by appointing a Malay prominent in
Islamic affairs in Sarawak, Datu Abang Haji Openg, to be Governor and by creating
for Temenggong Jugah a new post of Federation Minister for Borneo Affairs 4 resident
in Sarawak. At the same time an agreed statement provided that, when two years
later the next Governor was to be chosen, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong would give
‘favourable consideration’ to the nominee of the then Sarawak Chief Minister. The
episode was nevertheless not a good augury for the future.
Reactions in Singapore to the Malaysia agreement
322. The London Agreement was criticised in Singapore by the Barisan Sosialis,
by Mr. Ong Eng Guan of the United People’s Party, and by Mr. David Marshall, the
former Chief Minister. Their attacks were directed at the terms secured, rather than
at the fact of merger, though it was this that the Barisan at least really opposed. The
terms were described as ‘a sell out of Singapore’ a view given gratuitous support by
Mr. Tan Siew Sin who claimed that the State had made a bad bargain. On 24 July,
1963, the Government, with Mr. Lee and Dr. Goh absent paired, was frustrated three
times in the Assembly on Bills connected with the formation of Malaysia, including
one to provide for election to the Singapore seats in the Federal Parliament. On each
occasion the Singapore Alliance members voted against the Government.
323. There was however little doubt that merger commanded wide popular
support in Singapore and Mr. Lee’s motion calling for adoption of the London
Agreement, as amended by the Singapore Government in the light of the various
exchanges between Mr. Lee, Mr. Sandys, the Tunku and Tun Razak, was passed by the
Assembly by 25 votes to 17. On this occasion the 7 Alliance members and an
independent abstained. Mr. Lee subsequently announced that the Assembly would be
dissolved and the writ for new elections was issued on 31 August, 1963. The PAP
fought the election on an anti-Communist platform, while the Barisan Sosialis
argued that Malaysia should be limited to the Malaya–Singapore merger to the
exclusion of the Borneo Territories, an arrangement they well knew to be
unattainable. Polling took place on 21 September and the Government was
triumphantly successful, winning 37 of the 51 seats as against 25 held earlier. The
percentages of the poll secured by the parties were PAP 47 per cent, Barisan Sosialis
33 per cent, UPP 8 per cent and Singapore Alliance 8 per cent.
324. On 26 September, 1963, the police, acting on the orders of the Federation
Government, but with the backing of the Singapore Government, arrested a number
of Nanyang University students. Seven trade unions affiliated to SATU were also
asked to show cause why their registration should not be cancelled. In reaction to
this pressure on the Left wing, Mr. S. T. Bani, President of SATU and a Barisan
4 In fact for Sarawak Affairs.
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Sosialis Assembly member, announced that the unions threatened with
deregistration and 30 others would strike. He and 15 other leaders were arrested on 8
October and the Federation Government moved troops into the island. Attempts at
illegal assembly were firmly dealt with and the strike collapsed, leaving Mr. Lee in a
very strong position within Singapore.
Relations between the federal government and Singapore
325. The Alliance did not secure a seat in the Singapore elections. It failed in
constituencies with both Malay and Chinese majorities, despite public support by
the Tunku, and Mr. Lim Yew Hock subsequently offered his resignation as its leader.
The formation of the Alliance with the Tunku’s active encouragement did nothing to
improve Mr. Lee’s relationship with the Malayan Government. Its abject failure,
even in the Malay areas, and the PAP’s success, had a disastrous effect on Mr. Lee’s
future conduct. Earlier he had accepted that it must be some years before he could
begin to extend his party’s influence into Malaya. Even so he had already alarmed
not only the conservative Chinese partners in the Alliance, whom he aimed to
displace, but, more important, the Malays, and his manner of conducting the
negotiations with Malaya had led the Tunku greatly to mistrust him—at a meeting
with Mr. Sandys just before the signing of the London Agreement the Tunku
referred to Mr. Lee as a paranoiac.
326. On his return to Singapore from London Mr. Lee told a welcoming crowd
that the PAP would do what was right for the people, not only in Singapore, but
also in the rest of Malaysia. His subsequent manoeuvres to secure changes in the
London Agreement caused irritation in Kuala Lumpur, which had by now come to
regard him as an untrustworthy partner and an unscrupulous opponent, as did his
success in making common cause with North Bornean and Sarawak leaders and his
claim on 31 August, 1963, to have taken over powers of defence and foreign affairs
in trust for Malaysia. Mr. Sandys, in a message to Mr. Macmillan, spoke of Mr. Lee
as ‘unashamedly exploiting the delay in the establishment of Malaysia to further his
political [personal] ambitions . . . his objective is to show up the Tunku as feeble
and woolly-minded . . . He speaks freely about his wish to get rid of the Tunku
within the next two or three years when his usefulness has been exhausted.’ [See
221.]
327. A new Cabinet was announced in Singapore on 17 October, 1963, and Mr.
Lee pledged that it would work closely with the Federal Government in the higher
interests of Malaysia. On 30 October he told reporters that the PAP Federal Members
of Parliament would form a loyal and constructive opposition. Mr. Lee’s gesture of
independence on 31 August had already led influential Malays to question whether it
was worth going into Malaysia with ‘new friends who might be worse than their
enemies.’ In October the chauvinist leader, Syed Ja’affar Albar, who had been
concerned with the promotion of the Singapore Alliance, was appointed Secretary-
General of UMNO, a post in which he was well placed to renew his efforts to organise
opposition to Mr. Lee in Singapore.
328. On 11 November, 1963, Mr. Lee reiterated the importance of good relations
with the Federal Government and insisted that the PAP would not take part in the
coming elections in Malaya. The whole Malaysia arrangement rested on the
agreement to limit Singapore’s representation in the Federal Parliament to 15 seats.
In the eyes of the Malays at least the election of PAP members for Malayan
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constituencies would break this agreement. Success in the Singapore elections
seemed however to have suggested to Mr. Lee that he could win both Chinese and
Malay seats in Malaya in the near future. On 9 December in the Assembly he
speculated on the prospect that the MCA would do so badly in the 1964 elections that
UMNO would have to come to terms with the PAP on a Malaysian basis if they wished
to hold the urban Chinese in the Alliance. As Mr. P. B. C. Moore, the Deputy High
Commissioner in Singapore, reported in a letter of 2 December, 1963, ‘He is already
behaving like a caged animal, pacing up his room and restless to play a full part in
the government of Malaysia. . . . But he will not be prepared to wait long for a star
part in the Kuala Lumpur cast and yet I can see no sign at all that Kuala Lumpur
have any serious intention of letting him play an effective role. In many ways I see
the Singapore/Kuala Lumpur relationship as potentially a greater threat to Malaysian
stability than Indonesian confrontation.’
Appendix A
Biographical Notes
Dato Abdul Aziz bin Haji Abdul Majid
Malaya; born 1919; Principal Assistant Secretary, Defence Branch, Federal Government;
State Secretary and Mentri Besar, Selangor; 1957 Permanent Secretary, Prime Minister’s
Department; Chairman, Public Services Commission.
Abdul Aziz bin Ishak
Malaya; born 1914; Minister of Agriculture and Co-operatives 1955–62; chaired ‘Joint
Opposition Conference’ and formed National Convention Party 1963; arrested on political
grounds 1965; released on probation 1966.
Brigadier-General Abdul Rachman
Indonesia; leader of Indonesian observer team for ‘Ascertainment’ in Borneo 1963.
Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj (Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra ibni Almarhum Sultan
Abdul Hamid Halim Shah)
Malaya; born 1903; brother of former Sultan of Kedah; 1933 District Officer; barrister; 1951
President of UMNO; 1955 first Chief Minister of Malaya and 1957 Prime Minister; 1963 first
Prime Minister of Malaysia; retired 1970; also Minister for External Affairs for most of the
period 1957–70.
Sir Anthony Abell
United Kingdom; born 1906; Governor, Sarawak 1950–59 and High Commissioner,
Brunei; Member, Cobbold Commission 1962.
Dipa Nusantara Aidit
Indonesia; born 1923; 1947 member, Central Committee and Politbureau, PKI; 1951
Secretary-General, PKI, the title being later changed to Chairman; reported killed shortly
after the abortive coup in 1965.
Sir Denis Allen
United Kingdom; born 1910; Deputy Commissioner-General for South-East Asia 1959–63.
15-Malaysia-Appendix-cpp  21/9/04  9:09 AM  Page 671
672 THE ORIGINS AND FORMATION OF MALAYSIA [Appendix]
Sheikh A. M. Azahari bin Sheikh Mahmoud
Brunei, but not a citizen; born 1928; started unregistered film company which was declared
illegal and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment for leading a demonstration against this
in 1953; further unsuccessful business enterprises, some supported by Government loans;
1955 organised Parti Ra’ayat in Brunei and elected Brunei representative of Parti Ra’ayat
Malaya; convicted for failing to keep proper accounts for Parti Ra’ayat Brunei; 1960
organised labour union; December 1962 in Manila proclaimed ‘Unitary State of North
Kalimantan’ to cover North Borneo and Sarawak as well as Brunei; subsequently mostly in
Indonesia.
Charles F. Baldwin
United States; born 1902; 1927 Foreign Service; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Economic Affairs 1954–55; Ambassador, Kuala Lumpur 1961–64.
The Datu Bandar (Abang Haji Mustapha)
Sarawak; the traditional leader of the Malay community in Sarawak; founder of Parti
Negara Sarawak (PANAS); signed Malaysia Agreement 1963; died 1964.
S. T. Bani
Singapore; born 1934 in Negri Sembilan; 1954 Government teacher; 1958 full-time union
and PAP work; 1959 MP (PAP); 1961 joined Barisan Sosialis and became president of SATU;
1963 detained; released and resigned from Parliament and Barisan Sosialis 1966.
Sir Garfield Barwick
Australia; born 1903; MP 1958–64; Attorney-General 1958–63; Minister for External Affairs
1961–63; 1964 Chief Justice of the High Court.
Ahmad Boestamam bin Raja Kechil
Malaya; born 1920; 1945 Malay Nationalist Party; detained 1948–55; 1955 first president,
Parti Ra’ayat Malaya; federal MP 1959–64; detained 1963–67; formed Parti Marhaen Malaya
1968.
Sultan of Brunei (Sir Muda Omar Ali Saifuddin Sa’adul Khairi Waddin)
Brunei; born 1916; succeeded as 28th Sultan 1950; introduced Constitution providing for
Privy Council, Executive Council and Legislative Council 1959; introduced proposals for
election of Legislative Council members and a Ministerial system 1964; abdicated in favour
of son, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah Mu’izzaddin Waddaulah, 1967, becoming Seri Bagawan.
McGeorge Bundy
United States; born 1919; Lecturer, Professor and Dean, Harvard, 1949–61; 1961 Special
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; 1966 President, Ford Foundation.
Lord Cobbold (1st Baron Cobbold of Knebworth)
United Kingdom; born 1904; Governor, Bank of England 1949–61; Chairman of Cobbold
Commission 1962.
Lt.-Gen. G. P. H. Djatikusumo
Indonesia; born 1917; from 1946 divisional commander and other senior military posts,
including Defence Minister in the Djogjakarta Revolutionary Government in 1948; Consul-
General, Singapore 1958–59; Minister of Land Communications 1960; appointed
Ambassador, Kuala Lumpur, and withdrawn 1963; 1963 supervising subversive activities in
Malaya; 1965 Ambassador, Rabat.
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Achmad Fadillah
Brunei, but resident in Djakarta; petitioned United Nations Committee of Twenty-four on
behalf of Sheikh Azahari 1963 under title of ‘Minister of State of the Government of
Kalimantan Utara’, earlier described as ‘Minister Without Portfolio’.
Sir Leslie Fry
United Kingdom; born 1908; Ambassador, Djakarta 1959–63.
Mohamed Ghazali bin Jawi (Tuan Haji Mohamed Ghazali bin Haji Jawi)
Malaya; born 1924; 1957 Mentri Besar, Perak; 1960 Ambassador, Cairo; 1963 Senator and
Secretary-General, UMNO; 1964 Assistant Minister of Lands and Mines; 1965 Minister of
Agriculture and Co-operatives; 1970 Minister of Agriculture with responsibility for Land
and Forests.
Mohammad Ghazali bin Shafie (now Tan Sri Mohammad Ghazali bin Shafie)
Malaya; born 1922; family connections in Indonesia; 1956 Commissioner, New Delhi; 1957
Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs; 1959 Permanent Secretary; 1969
Member, National Operations Council; 1970 Minister With Special Functions and Senator.
A. G. Gilchrist (now Sir Andrew Gilchrist)
United Kingdom; born 1910; Ambassador, Djakarta 1963–66.
Dr. Goh Keng Swee
Singapore; born 1918, Malacca; 1940 Singapore Government Service; 1955 Director of
Social Welfare; 1958 Economic Adviser to the Chief Minister; 1959 elected MP; 1959
Finance Minister; 1965 Defence Minister; 1967 Finance Minister; 1970 Defence Minister;
permanent member of the Presidential Council.
Sir William Goode
United Kingdom; born 1907; 1957 Governor and later United Kingdom Commissioner and
Yang di-Pertuan Negara, Singapore; Governor, North Borneo 1960–63.
D. A. Greenhill (now Sir Denis Greenhill)
United Kingdom; born 1913; 1956 Counsellor, Singapore; Counsellor and then Minister.
Washington 1959–64.
W. Averell Harriman
United States; born 1891; 1943 Ambassador, Moscow; 1946 Ambassador, London; 1946
Secretary of Commerce; 1948 Special Representative in Europe; 1950 Special Assistant to
President; Director of Foreign Aid 1951–53; Governor, New York State 1955–58; 1961
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; 1963 Under-Secretary for Political
Affairs; Ambassador-at-Large 1965–69; Representative, Vietnam Peace Talks, Paris
1968–69.
Dr. Mohammad Hatta
Indonesia; born 1902; former Vice-President and Prime Minister; resigned Vice-Presidency
1956; Special Adviser to the President on corruption 1970.
Roger Hilsman
United States; born 1919; 1956 Library of Congress; 1961 Director, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State; 1963 Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs; 1964 Professor of Government, Columbia University.
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Keith J. Holyoake
New Zealand; born 1904; MP National Party 1932–38 and since 1943; 1949 Deputy Prime
Minister; 1957 Prime Minister; 1957 Leader of the Opposition; 1960 Prime Minister and
Minister for External Affairs.
Lord Home (14th Earl of Home; now Sir Alec Douglas-Home)
United Kingdom; born 1903; 1955 Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations; 1960
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Prime Minister 1963–64.
General Sir Richard Hull (now Field Marshal)
United Kingdom; born 1907; 1958 C.-in-C. Far East Land Forces; CIGS 1961–64.
Tun Dr. Ismail bin Dato Haji Abdul Rahman
Malaya; born 1915; 1955 Minister of Commerce; 1957 Ambassador, Washington and
Permanent Delegate, United Nations; 1959 Minister for External Affairs; 1960 of Internal
Security; 1961 of Internal Security and Interior; of Home Affairs and Justice 1964–67; 1969
of Home Affairs and 1970 Deputy Prime Minister.
Syed Ja’affar Albar (Tan Sri Syed Ja’affar bin Hassan Albar)
Malaya, born 1913 in Indonesia; 1952 Chief Information Officer, UMNO; 1959 Assistant
Minister in Prime Minister’s Department for Information and Broadcasting; Secretary-
General, UMNO 1963–65; retired from UMNO Central Executive Committee 1967–68.
Arthur Creech Jones
United Kingdom; born 1891; 1945 Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies;
Secretary of State 1946–50.
Howard P. Jones
United States; born 1899; 1921 journalism; 1933 lecturing in School of Journalism,
Columbia University; New York State Civil Service Commissioner 1939–43; 1947 Foreign
Service; 1954 Head of Foreign Operations Mission to Indonesia; 1955 Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Economic Affairs; 1958 Ambassador, Jakarta; 1965 East-
West Center, Honolulu; 1968 Stanford University.
Temenggong Jugah anak Barieng (now Tan Sri Temenggong Jugah anak Barieng)
Sarawak; born 1900; Iban leader, Third Division of Sarawak; 1955 appointed Temenggong
(Paramount Chief); Chairman, PAPAS (Pesaka) and Sarawak Alliance; 1963 federal Minister
for Sarawak Affairs.
John F. Kennedy
United States; born 1917; 1947 Congressman; 1953 Senator; 1961 President; assassinated 1963.
Khaw Kai Boh
Malaya; born 1918; Special Branch Officer. Malaya and Singapore; retired 1959; 1963
Senator and Minister Without Portfolio; 1964 elected to House of Representatives; 1964
Minister for Local Government and Housing; 1969 Minister with Special Duties; 1970
asked not to be considered for Ministerial post; Secretary-General 1966–67 and later Vice-
President, MCA.
Lord Lansdowne (8th Marquess of Lansdowne)
United Kingdom; born 1912; 1958 Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Foreign Office; Minister
of State for Colonial Affairs 1962–64 and for Commonwealth Relations 1963–64.
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Lee Kuan Yew (Harry Lee)
Singapore; born 1923; 1954 a founder and Secretary-General, PAP; 1955 Member,
Legislative Assembly; 1959 first Prime Minister and 1965 of the Republic of Singapore;
appointed one of the six permanent members of the Presidential Council 1970.
Dr. Lee Siew Choh
Singapore; born 1917 in Selangor; 1959 MP; 1961 Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of
Home Affairs; 1961 Chairman, Barisan Sosialis; resigned 1964; 1965 Chairman, Barisan
Sosialis.
Lim Chin Siong
Singapore; born 1933; accountant; 1954 secretary of various unions; 1955 Member,
Legislative Assembly; detained 1956–59; 1959 Political Secretary, Ministry of Finance;
Secretary-General, Barisan Sosialis 1961–69; 1963 detained; released 1969 and left
Singapore.
Dr. Lim Chong Eu
Malaya; born 1919; 1953 Penang Radical Party; Alliance Chief Whip; 1958. President, MCA;
resigned 1959; formed UDP 1962; merged UDP in Gerakan 1968; 1969 Chief Minister of
Penang.
Dr. Lim Swee Aun
Malaya; born 1915; 1953 Perak State Executive Council; 1959 MP; 1962 Minister of
Commerce and Industry; lost seat and Ministry 1969; 1966 Deputy President, MCA.
Lim Yew Hock
Singapore; born 1914; 1948 nominated Member, Legislative Assembly; elected Member
1951–63; Minister of Labour and Welfare 1955–59 and Chief Minister 1956–59; 1963
Malaysian High Commissioner, Canberra; Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1966–68.
Sir Henry Lintott
United Kingdom; born 1908; Deputy Under-Secretary, Commonwealth Relations Office
1956–63.
Selwyn Lloyd (J. S. B. Lloyd)
United Kingdom; born 1904; 1955 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Chancellor of the
Exchequer 1960–62.
Salvador P. Lopez
Philippines; born 1911; 1946 Foreign Service; 1956 Ambassador, Paris, United Nations and
elsewhere concurrently; 1962 Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs; 1963 Foreign Secretary;
1964 Representative, United Nations; 1969 President, University of the Philippines.
Diosdado P. Macapagal
Philippines; born 1910; 1946 Foreign Service; 1949 Member (Liberal), House of
Representatives and Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs 1949–53; 1958 Vice-
President; President 1962–66.
Malcolm MacDonald
United Kingdom; born 1901; a former Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs and for the
Colonies; 1946 Governor-General, Malayan Union, Singapore and British Borneo:
Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South-East Asia 1948–55.
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Iain Macleod
United Kingdom; born 1913; Secretary of State for the Colonies 1959–61.
Harold Macmillan
United Kingdom; born 1894; Prime Minister 1957–63.
Michael J. Mansfield
United States; born 1903; 1933 Professor of Latin American and Far Eastern History,
Montana State University; 1943 Congressman; 1953 Senator; 1957 Senate Majority Whip;
1961 Leader of Senate.
Ferdinand E. Marcos
Philippines; born 1917; elected to House of Representatives 1949 and 1953; President of
Liberal Party 1956; elected to Senate 1959; President of Senate; joined Nacionalista Party
1964; elected President 1965 and re-elected 1969.
Dato Marshal bin Maun (Awang Marshal bin Maun)
Brunei; Mentri Besar 1962–68.
Reginald Maudling
United Kingdom; born 1917; Secretary of State for the Colonies 1961–62.
David Marshall
Singapore; born 1908; businessman and lawyer; a founder of Labour Front Party 1954;
Member, Legislative Assembly 1955–57; Chief Minister 1955–56; formed Workers’ Party
and won by-election 1961; lost seat 1963; 1970 a permanent member of the Presidential
Council.
Sir John Martin
United Kingdom; born 1904; Deputy Under-Secretary, Colonial Office 1956–65.
Sir Robert Menzies
Australia; born 1894; 1934 Commonwealth Attorney-General; Prime Minister 1939–41,
1949–66 (and other portfolios concurrently, including Treasurer, Trade, Defence and
External Affairs).
Lawrence Michelmore
United States; born 1909; Relief and Works Progress Administrations 1934–36; Wayne
University and Government Research 1936–42; 1942 United States Budget Bureau; 1946
United Nations Secretariat; 1952 Deputy Controller; 1955 Senior Director, Technical
Assistance Board; 1959 Deputy Director of Personnel; United Nations Mission on Malaysia
1963; 1964 Commissioner-General of UNRWA.
Major Moenardo
Indonesia; 1963 appointed Additional Consul in North Borneo; declared persona non grata
1963.
Philip B. C. Moore
United Kingdom; born 1921; 1960 Counsellor, United Kingdom Commission, Singapore;
1961 Deputy Commissioner, Singapore; Deputy High Commissioner 1963–65.
M. J. Moynihan
United Kingdom; born 1916; Deputy High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur 1961–63.
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Datu Mustapha bin Datu Harun (now Tun Mustapha bin Datu Harun)
North Borneo (Sabah); born 1918; 1958 Member, North Borneo Legislative Council;
formed USNO 1961; 1963 first Head of State, Sabah; 1966 Malaysian Federal Minister for
Sabah Affairs; elected State Legislative Assembly 1967; 1967 Chief Minister of Sabah.
Chakravarthi V. Narasimhan
India; born 1915; 1936 Indian Civil Service; 1937 District Officer, Madras; 1942 Secretariat,
Madras; 1950 Central Secretariat; 1956 Executive Secretary, United Nations ECAFE; 1959
Under-Secretary, United Nations; 1961 Chef de Cabinet to Secretary-General; 1968 Under-
Secretary-General.
General Abdul Haris Nasution
Indonesia; born 1918; 1949 Chief of Staff, Army; 1959 Defence Minister; 1962 Minister Co-
ordinator for Defence and Security and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces;
1966 Chairman, Provisional People’s Congress.
Dato Stephen Kalong Ningkan
Sarawak; born 1920; Secretary-General of SNAP 1961–64; 1962 Secretary-General of the
Sarawak Alliance; Chief Minister 1963–66.
Ong Eng Guan
Singapore; born 1925, Malacca; accountant; Treasurer, PAP; 1957 Mayor of Singapore;
1959 elected to Legislative Assembly; Minister of National Development 1959–60; expelled
from PAP and resigned seat 1960; won by-election 1961; formed United People’s Party;
elected on UPP ticket 1963.
Dato Ong Yoke Lin
Malaya; born 1917; nominated to Legislative Council 1954; elected Member, House of
Representatives 1955; 1955 Minister of Posts and Telecommunications; 1956 of Transport;
1957 of Labour; 1959 of Health; 1962 Minister Without Portfolio and concurrently Permanent
Representative at the United Nations 1962–64 and Ambassador, Washington, from 1962; still
Minister Without Portfolio in Tun Razak’s Cabinet 1970; Vice-President, MCA 1965.
Dato Onn bin Ja’affar (Dato Sir Onn bin Ja’affar)
Malaya; born 1895; 1936 Member, Johore State Council; founder and first President,
UMNO, 1946; Mentri Besar, Johore, 1947–50; negotiated Federation Agreement 1949;
launched Independence of Malaya Party and resigned from UMNO 1951; Member
Legislative Council, 1948–55; Chairman, Rural and Industrial Development Authority
1950–55; Member for Home Affairs, Federal Executive Council 1951–55; reformed IMP as
Party Negara 1953; elected Member, House of Representatives 1959; died 1962.
Dato Abang Haji Openg bin Abang Sapi’ee (later Tun Abang Haji Openg bin Abang Sapi’ee)
Sarawak; born 1905; 1940 Member, State Assembly; 1955 Supreme Council; 1963
Governor; died 1969.
Sir David Ormsby Gore (now 5th Baron Harlech)
United Kingdom; born 1918; 1957 Minister of State, Foreign Office; Ambassador,
Washington 1961–65.
Nicasio Osmena
Philippines; son of late President Osmena; lawyer; encouraged members of the Kiram
family (the descendants of Sultans of Sulu) to make claims in North Borneo; died 1963.
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L. N. Palar
Indonesia; born 1915; Member, Dutch Second Chamber 1945–47; Indonesian Permanent
Representative at the United Nations 1950–53 and 1962–65; Ambassador, New Delhi
1953–56, Bonn and later Moscow 1956, Ottawa 1957–62, Washington 1965–66.
B. R. Pearn
United Kingdom; born 1900; Lecturer and Professor of History, Rangoon University
1938–47; Head, South-East Asia Section, Foreign Office Research Department 1947–64.
E. H. Peck (now Sir Edward Peck)
United Kingdom; born 1915; 1958 Counsellor, Singapore; Assistant Under-Secretary,
Foreign Office 1961–65.
Dr. Emmanuel Pelaez
Philippines; born 1915; 1949 Member (Liberal) House of Representatives; joined
Nacionalista Party 1953; Senator 1954–60; joined Liberal Party 1961; 1962 Vice-President;
also Foreign Secretary 1962–63; joined Nacionalista Party 1963; 1966 Member, House of
Representatives; 1968 Senator.
Lord Perth (17th Earl of Perth)
United Kingdom; born 1907; Minister of State for Colonial Affairs 1957–62.
John Pilcher (now Sir John Pilcher)
United Kingdom; born 1912; Ambassador, Manila 1959–63.
Radhakrishna Ramani
Malaya; born 1901 in India; constitutional lawyer; Member, Legislative Council 1948–54;
Deputy 1963–64 and Permanent Representative to the United Nations 1964–68; 1969
adviser on citizenship to National Operations Council.
Tun Haji Abdul Razak bin Dato Hussein
Malaya; born 1922; 1939 Malay Administrative Service; 1950 Malayan Civil Service; 1951
Deputy President, UMNO; 1952 State Secretary and 1955 Mentri Besar, Pahang; 1955
Minister of Education; 1957 of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister; 1959 Prime Minister;
1959 Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence and of Rural Development; 1969
Director of Operations and Chairman of the National Operations Council; 1970 Prime
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence.
Jacques Rueff
France; born 1896; 1923 Inspector of Finance; 1927 Secretariat, League of Nations; 1930
Financial Attaché, London; 1934 Assistant Director and Director, Treasury, Ministry of
Finance; Vice-Governor, Bank of France 1939–41; 1946 President, Inter-Allied Reparations
Agency; 1952 Judge, Court of the European Steel and Coal Community; and of the
European Communities 1958–62.
Dean Rusk
United States; born 1909; Associate Professor of Government and Dean, Mills College
1936–40; Army and Department of Defence 1940–46; Assistant Secretary of State for
United Nations Affairs, Deputy Under-Secretary and Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern
Affairs 1947–51; President, Rockefeller Foundation 1952–61; Secretary of State 1961–69.
Duncan Sandys
United Kingdom; born 1908; Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations 1960–64 and
for the Colonies 1962–64.
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Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo
Indonesia; born 1903; Prime Minister 1953–55, 1956–57; Permanent Representative to
United Nations 1957–60; Permanent Deputy Chairman, Provisional People’s Consultative
Assembly 1960–66; General Chairman, PNI to 1966; Chairman of the Bandung Conference
1955.
Lord Selkirk (10th Earl of Selkirk)
United Kingdom; born 1906; Commissioner for Singapore and Commissioner-General for
South-East Asia 1959–63.
Felixberto Serrano
Philippines; born 1906; Congressman 1946–49; Secretary for Foreign Affairs 1957–61;
Chairman United Nations Commission on Human Rights 1957; 1962 Senator.
Donald Stephens
North Borneo (Sabah); born 1920; 1955 proprietor, editor and publisher of Sabah Times;
Member, Legislative Council; 1958 Chairman, Kadazan Society; 1961 founder President,
UNKO (later UPKO); 1963 Chief Minister, Sabah; 1965 Federal Minister for Sabah Affairs;
dissolved UPKO 1967; 1968 High Commissioner for Malaysia, Canberra.
Dr. Subandrio
Indonesia; born 1914; 1945 Secretary-General, Ministry of Information; 1947 unofficial
representative, London; 1950 Ambassador, London; 1954 Ambassador, Moscow; 1956
Acting Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 1957 Minister; Second Deputy First
Minister in charge of Foreign Affairs 1960–66; since 1966 under sentence of death.5
Dr. Sukarno
Indonesia; born 1901: first President, Commander-in-Chief and from 1959 also Prime
Minister; lost most of his powers in 1966; died 1970.
Sultan of Sulu (Sultan Jamalul Kiram)
Philippines; the last Sultan of Sulu; claims to parts of North Borneo (Sabah) made on
behalf of some of his heirs.
Bambang Sumali
Indonesia; 1963 Publicity Officer, Indonesian Consulate, North Borneo; declared persona
non grata July 1963.
Lorenzo Sumulong
Philippines; born 1905; 1946 Congressman (Liberal); Chairman, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs; elected Senator (Liberal) 1949: re-elected (as Nacionalista) 1955, 1961 and
1969; former Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Dato G. S. Sundang (also Orang Kaya Kaya or O. K. K. Sundang)
North Borneo (Sabah); born 1909; 1960 Assistant District Officer; 1961 formed Pasok
Momogun (UNPMO); 1964 Joint President, UPKO; 1964 Minister of Local Government;
Deputy Chief Minister 1964–67.
5 Sentence commuted to life imprisonment in 1980; pardoned and released in Aug 1995 on the fiftieth
anniversary of Indonesia’s independence.
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Dr. Suwito Kusumowidagdo
Indonesia; born 1917; 1957 Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 1962 First
Deputy Foreign Minister: 1966 Ambassador, Washington; 1968 Ambassador, Stockholm,
Oslo, Copenhagen and Helsinki.
Tan Siew Sin (now Tun Tan Siew Sin)
Malaya; born 1916; 1946 Municipal Commissioner, Malacca; 1948 Member, Legislative
Council; member, Rubber Producers’ Council 1951–57; Honorary Treasurer, Alliance
Party 1958–65; 1957 Vice-President and 1961 President, MCA; 1957 Minister of Commerce
and Industry; 1959 of Finance; 1969 with Special Duties; 1970 of Finance.
(U) Thant
Burma; born 1909; 1949 Secretary, Ministry of Information; 1954 a Secretary to the Prime
Minister; 1957 Permanent Representative at the United Nations; 1961 Acting Secretary-
General, United Nations; 1962 Secretary-General.
Peter Thomas
United Kingdom: born 1920; 1961 Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Foreign Office; Minister
of State 1963–64.
Peter Thorneycroft (now Baron Thorneycroft of Dunston)
United Kingdom; born 1909; Minister of Defence 1962–64.
Too Joon Hing
Malaya; born 1911; 1936 tin mining and rubber planting; Commandant, Perak Police
Volunteer Reserve 1949–54; Member, Legislative Council 1955–59; Assistant Minister for
Education 1955–57; 1959 Member, Perak State Legislative Assembly; Secretary-General,
MCA; resigned from MCA 1959; won by-election 1961; helped to found UDP.
Sir Geofroy Tory
United Kingdom; born 1912; High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur 1957–64.
Sir Alexander Waddell
United Kingdom; born 1913; Governor, Sarawak 1960–63.
F. A. Warner
United Kingdom; born 1918; Head, South-East Asia Department, Foreign Office 1960–64.
Sir David Watherston
United Kingdom; born 1907; 1952 Chief Secretary, Federation of Malaya; Special
Counsellor. Malayan High Commission in the United Kingdom 1957–59; member, Cobbold
Commission 1962.
Harold A. W. Watkinson (now 1st Viscount Watkinson of Woking)
United Kingdom; born 1910; Minister of Defence 1959–62.
Sir Dennis White
United Kingdom; born 1910; High Commissioner, Brunei 1959–63.
Dato Wong Pow Nee (now Tan Sri Wong Pow Nee)
Malaya; born 1911; teacher 1937–57; 1955 Member, Penang State Assembly; Chief
Minister, Penang 1957–69; 1970 Ambassador, Rome.
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Professor Mohamed Yamin
Indonesia; born 1903; Member, Volksraad 1938–42; adviser, Propaganda Department,
Japanese administration; member, Independence Preparatory Committee 1945; involved in
Communist Madiun Rising 1948; 1950 Member, Republican Parliament and 1956 MP; 1951
Minister of Justice; 1953 of Education; 1958 of State; 1959 of Social and Cultural Affairs
(later Special Affairs) and Chairman of National Planning Board; died 1962.
Sir Mohammed Zafrulla Khan
Pakistan; born 1893; member, Punjab Legislative Council 1926–35; delegate, Indian Round
Table Conferences 1930, 1931, 1932; President All-India Muslim League 1931; Member,
Viceroy’s Executive Council; 1941 Judge, Indian Federal Court; 1947 Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Pakistan; 1954 Member, International Court of Justice;
1961 Permanent Representative at United Nations; President, United Nations General
Assembly 1962–63; 1964 Member, International Court; 1970 President, International Court.
Zaini bin Haji Ahmad
Brunei; son of Brunei Privy Councillor; Member, Parti Ra’ayat; with Sheikh Azahari in
Manila 1962 and named by him ‘Minister of Economics, Commerce and Industry’; sought
and granted political asylum, United Kingdom Embassy, Manila 1963; in protective
custody, Hong Kong 1963; sent to Brunei at own request 1963; in detention from 1963.
Abang Zulkifli
Sarawak; ‘Lieutenant-General’, commander of TNKU and ‘Defence Minister’ in the ‘United
State of North Kalimantan’ proclaimed by Sheikh Azahari 1962; 1964 relieved of his duties;
thereafter mostly in Indonesia.
Appendix B
Notes on Political Parties
The Alliance
Malaya; formed early 1952 by UMNO and MCP [sic; MCA] to oppose Dato Onn’s
Independence of Malaya Party in the Kuala Lumpur municipal elections; won 51 out of 52
elected seats in 1955 and a majority in all subsequent federal elections; in Malaya its
constituents include also MIC; related bodies also formed in other Malaysian territories.
Barisan Ra’ayat Jati Sarawak (Barjasa)
Sarawak; registered December 1961; original members mostly Malays in Government
service led by Abdul Rahman bin Yacob, a Crown Counsel; originally at odds with the other
Malay party, Panas, but in 1967 the two merged to form Party Bumiputra.
Barisan Sosialis
Singapore, formed summer 1961 by Communist-influenced members of PAP led by Lim
Chin Siong and Dr. Lee Siew Choh, with Dr. Lee as Chairman; registered August 1961;
leading Left-wing members detained during 1963; in 1963 elections won 13 seats out of 51
in Singapore Assembly, but subsequently abandoned electoral activity.
Borneo Utara National Party (Bunap)—later Sabah National Party
North Borneo (Sabah); formed October 1962 by amalgamation of United and Democratic
Parties; joined Sabah Alliance November 1962; an uneasy coalition of North Borneo
Chinese. (See also Democratic Party and United Party.)
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Clandestine Communist Organisation (CCO)—later Sarawak Communist Organisation (SC)
Sarawak; name given by Government to the almost wholly Chinese terrorist organisation
in Sarawak: connections with the Left wing of SUPP; unsuccessful efforts to infiltrate
North Borneo; from 1963 engaged in small-scale guerilla warfare with Indonesian
assistance.
Democratic Party
North Borneo (Sabah); formed 1961; primarily Chinese in the Jesselton and Tawau areas
in membership, but also tried to attract a lower stratum of Chinese from Sandakan than
the United Party and Indonesian and Filipino workers on the east coast; October 1962
agreed to merge with United Party as Bunap, which subsequently joined the Sabah
Alliance.
Gerakan Ra’ayat Malaysia (Gerakan)
Malaya; formed 1968 as a multi-racial party, though primarily Chinese in composition,
with the UDP as one of its components; formed the State Government of Penang following
the 1969 elections.
Joint Opposition Conference
Malaya; formed April 1963 with Abdul Aziz bin Ishak as Chairman; led to formation of
National Convention Party which later formed a part of the Malayan People’s Socialist
Front.
Malayan Chinese Association (MCA)—later Malaysian Chinese Association
Malaya; founded 1949; main interest the maintenance of Chinese economic interests and
the achievement of a working relationship with the Malays to that end; formed the
Alliance with the leading Malay party UMNO in 1952; 1959 a division of view in the MCA
over the allocation of parliamentary seats within the Alliance and the use of the Chinese
language in examinations led to the resignation of members who went on to form the UDP
and the Gerakan; hostility to Singapore PAP which was a potential rival for the support of
the Chinese and as a partner with UMNO: its position was weakened by Alliance losses in
the 1969 elections.
Malayan Indian Congress (MIC)—later Malaysian Indian Congress
Malaya; formed 1949; a minor partner in the Alliance in Malaya and Singapore.
Malayan Communist Party (MCP)
Malaya and Singapore; formed 1930; in 1948 began guerilla-style revolt, the ‘Emergency’,
which dwindled away after 1951 and was officially ended in 1960; the party however
remained illegal and small groups continued occasional guerilla activity around the
Malayan–Thai border.
North Borneo Chinese Association
North Borneo (Sabah); formed 1961; claimed to be non-political.
Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP)
Malaya; founded 1951; won the only elected seat not taken by the Alliance in the 1955
federal elections; secured control of Kelantan and Trengganu states in the 1959 elections;
lost control of Trengganu in 1961; improved position in 1969 federal elections; a strongly
Malay nationalist and Islamic party with its main centres of strength in the less-developed
east coast states; the main rival to UMNO for Malay support and the principal Opposition
party; Indonesian connections.
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Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)
Indonesia; formed 1920, re-established 1945 and reformed in an expanded and reorganised
form in 1948; the Indonesian Communist party; involved in 1948 Madiun rising and 1965
Gestapu abortive coup; banned 1966, but efforts have been made to revive it.
Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI)
Indonesia; formed 1927 under chairmanship of Sukarno and reformed 1945; the
Indonesian Nationalist party; Nationalist, primarily Javanese, radical and with especial
appeal to the bureaucracy.
Party Negara Sarawak (Panas)
Sarawak; registered April 1960; Right-wing, Malay; failed to hold initial Iban support; at
first on ill-terms with the other Malay party, Barjasa; in the 1963 elections had an
arrangement with SUPP for the higher level elections; subsequently merged with Barjasa
into the Party Bumiputra.
Party Pesaka Anak Sarawak (Papas or Pesaka)
Sarawak; formed June 1962; primarily based on the Third Division (or Rejang) Ibans;
joined the Sarawak Alliance in October 1962 but continued to show a tendency to put up
separate candidates in elections.
Parti Ra’ayat Brunei
Brunei; first congress April 1957; 1962 won 54 out of 55 District Council seats and all 16
elected seats in the Legislative Council; December 1962 organised revolt in Brunei and
thereafter ceased to operate.
Parti Ra’ayat Malaya
Malaya; formed 1955; allied with the, largely Chinese, Labour Party in the Malayan People’s
Socialist Front until 1966; Left-wing, primarily Malay party with little following.
People’s Action Party (PAP)
Singapore; formed 1954; trade union background; largest party in the City Council after
1958 elections; won 3 seats in Legislative Assembly 1955; 43 out of 51 seats 1959; Ong Eng
Guan and some supporters left party 1960; the Left-wing left the party 1961; won 37 out of
51 seats in Legislative Assembly 1963; thereafter increasingly monopolised political power
in Singapore.
Sabah Alliance Party (Sabapa)
North Borneo (Sabah); set up October 1962 with USNO, UNKO and Bunap as members;
joined November 1962 by UNPMO and SIC; successful in December 1962 elections;
thereafter increasingly dominated by USNO.
Sabah Indian Congress (SIC)
North Borneo (Sabah); joined Sabah Alliance November 1962; insignificant.
Sarawak Alliance
Sarawak; formed October 1962 as Sarawak United Front and took name of Alliance
November 1962; its purpose was to support the concept of Malaysia in opposition to SUPP;
constituents Barjasa, Panas, Pesaka and Snap, together with the Sarawak Chinese
Association which was formed in July 1962 by a group of moderate Chinese; throughout a
very loose alliance from which Panas withdrew almost immediately.
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Sarawak National Party (Snap)
Sarawak; formed early 1961; primarily Second Division Ibans (or Sea Dyaks) especially
from the Saribas district, but later moved its headquarters from Betong to Kuching and set
out to broaden its support amongst Land Dyaks and others; member of the Sarawak
Alliance until June 1966 and provided the first Chief Minister; subsequently a leading and
in 1970 the only Opposition party.
Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP)
Sarawak; formed 1959; a primarily Chinese party which lost many of its Iban supporters
after 1962; contained both moderates and an extremist wing linked with the CCO; entered
the Government of Sarawak in 1970.
Singapore Alliance
Singapore; formed June 1961 by Singapore UMNO, the Singapore branches of MCA and
MIC and the Singapore People’s Alliance, which had been formed by Lim Yew Hock from
the Labour Front, the rump of which dissolved in February 1960; formation of the
Singapore Alliance led to defections from the SPA; a new announcement of the formation
of the Alliance was made in April 1963 and it contested the September 1963 elections but
failed to win a seat.
Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU)
Singapore; formed 1961 as a Left-wing breakaway from the PAP-linked Singapore Trade
Union Council (STUC) which was shortly afterwards replaced by the National Trade Union
Congress (NTUC).
Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara (TNKU)
Brunei, the ‘National Army of North Borneo’ formed as the military wing of the Parti
Ra’ayat Brunei and its instrument in conducting the 1962 Brunei revolt.
United Democratic Party (UDP)
Malaya; formed April 1962 by dissidents from the MCA dissatisfied with the Chinese
position within the Alliance; became a constituent of the Gerakan in 1968; its leader, Dr.
Lim Chong Eu, became Chief Minister of Penang in 1969.
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO)
Malaya; formed 1946; formed the Alliance in 1952 with the MCA and has since been in
effect the ruling party in Malaya and Malaysia.
United National Kadazan Organisation (UNKO)
North Borneo (Sabah); the first party in North Borneo formed following a meeting in
March 1961 and inaugurated in August 1961; formed the Sabah Alliance in 1962 with
USNO and other groups; merged with the other non-Muslim native party, UNPMO, to form
the United Pasok-momogun Kadazan Organisation (UPKO); under increasing pressure
from USNO which had Malay federal support; dissolved December 1967. (‘Kadazan’ is a
name for the largest indigenous group in North Borneo, the Dusuns.)
United National Pasok Momogun Organisation (UNPMO or Pasok Momogun)
North Borneo (Sabah); formed late 1961; main support amongst Muruts in the Interior
Residency; after healing of a split changed name to United National Pasok Momogun Party
in April 1962; subsequently joined Sabah Alliance and merged with UNKO into UPKO.
(‘Pasok Momogun’ means ‘Sons of the Soil’.)
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United Party
North Borneo (Sabah); originally United Democratic Front, then Social Democratic Party;
held first conference as United Party February 1962; its main supporters were the
‘Towkays’6 of Sandakan, but it also had supporters amongst the Chinese of Jesselton; united
with the other main Chinese party in Bunap in October 1962.
United People’s Party (UPP)
Singapore; formed June 1961 by dissidents from PAP led by Ong Eng Guan; one of three
members of Legislative Assembly rejoined PAP August 1962; only secured one seat in
September 1963 elections.
United Sabah National Organisation (USNO)
North Borneo (Sabah); formed December 1961; membership primarily Muslim though
open to all natives of North Borneo; joins UNKO in Sabah Alliance October 1962;
subsequently becomes the dominant group under the leadership of Datu Mustapha.
Workers Party
Singapore; formed 1957 by dissidents from Labour Front led by David Marshall, who won a
by-election for the party in July 1961; Marshall resigned from the party in January 1963
and it failed to win a seat in the September 1963 elections.
6 ie, Chinese traders.
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Abang Haji Openg see Openg
Abdul Kadir bin Shamsudin, b 1920 
Kajang High School (Selangor), Raffles
College (Singapore), one of the Inns of
Court (London, 1948–1951) and Yale
(1954); assistant superintendent of posts,
1939; promoted to Malayan Civil Service;
secretary to the representatives of their
highnesses, the Malay rulers, at the
London constitutional conference, 1956;
acting principal assistant secretary,
Malayan Ministry of Internal Defence and
Security, May 1956; seconded to the War
Office, London, Oct 1956; assistant
secretary, Malayan cabinet, 1957; the first
Malayan to attend a course at the Imperial
Defence College, 1959; deputy secretary
for defence, 1960; succeeded Robert
Thompson as secretary for defence, Apr
1961
Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Tunku (Tunku
Abdul Rahman), 1903–1990
CH 1961; son of Sultan Abdul Hamid
Halim Shah of Kedah; schools in Bangkok
and Alor Star, Penang Free School, St
Catharine’s College, Cambridge, and
Inner Temple, London;  entered Kedah
government service, 1931; served as
director of education (Kedah) and director
of passive defence during Japanese
occupation; resumed law study at Inner
Temple, 1946, and called to the Bar;
returned to Malaya, 1949, joined Kedah
legal department and became chairman of
UMNO, Kedah division; seconded to
Federal legal department as deputy public
prosecutor, 1949; president of UMNO, Aug
1951, and left government service;
unofficial member of Federal Executive
Council, 1952; leader of Alliance, 1952;
elected to Federal Legislative Council,
July 1955; became chief minister and
minister for home affairs, Aug 1955;
acquired portfolio of minister for internal
defence and security, 1956; led Alliance
delegation in independence talks in
London, Jan–Feb 1956, Dec 1956–Jan
1957 and May 1957; prime minister of
Malaya, 1957–Apr 1959 and Aug
1959–1963; led Malayan missions in
London talks leading to formation of
Malaysia, Nov 1961, July 1962 and July
1963; prime minister of Malaysia,
1963–70; after retirement from politics he
served as secretary-general of the Islamic
Secretariat in Jeddah, 1970–1973, and
contributed a weekly column to The Star
newspaper, Penang
Abdul Razak bin Hussein, Tun (Tun Razak),
1922–1976
Son of a Pahang chief; Malay school,
Pekan, and Malay College, Kuala Kangsar,
Raffles College, Singapore (1940) and
Lincoln’s Inn (1947–1949); joined Malay
Administrative Service, 1939; captain in
Wataniah (Malay anti-Japanese force);
ADO, Raub, 1945; secretary of Malay
Society of Great Britain, 1947–1948;
president, 1948–1949; appointed to MCS
and attached to state secretariat, Pahang,
1950; leader of UMNO Youth and a vice-
president of UMNO, 1951; Federal
Legislative Council from 1951; state
secretary, Pahang, 1952; mentri besar,
Pahang, 1955; resigned government
service to contest federal elections, 1955;
minister for education, 1955–1957;
minister of defence and deputy prime
minister, 1957–Apr 1959; prime minister,
Apr–Aug 1959; deputy prime minister,
minister of defence and minister of rural
development, 1959–1969; director of
operations and chairman of National
Biographical Notes
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Operations Council, 1969; prime minister,
minister of defence and minister of
foreign affairs, 1970–1976
Abell, Anthony Foster, 1906–1994
Knighted 1952; Repton and Magdalen,
Oxford; Colonial Administrative Service,
Nigeria, 1929–1949; governor, Sarawak,
and high commissioner, Brunei, 1950–
1959; member, Commission of Enquiry
North Borneo and Sarawak (Cobbold
Commission), 1962
Azahari, Sheikh A M Azahari bin Sheikh
Mahmoud, b 1928
Son of a father of Arab descent and a
Brunei Malay mother; educated in Brunei;
during the Japanese occupation he was
sent to study veterinary science in
Indonesia; participated in the nationalist
struggle against the restoration of Dutch
rule, 1945–1949; returned to Brunei in
1952; founded the Party Rakyat Brunei,
1956; appointed to Brunei’s Legislative
Council 1962; advocate of the United State
of North Kalimantan; lived in Indonesia
after the abortive Brunei rising, Dec 1962
Brook, Norman Craven (Lord Norman-
brook), 1902–1967
Knighted 1946; cr 1st Baron
Normanbrook, 1963; Wolverhampton
School and Wadham, Oxford; Home
Office, 1925–1940; personal assistant to
lord president of the Council, 1940–1942;
deputy secretary (civil) to War Cabinet,
1942; permanent secretary, Ministry of
Reconstruction, 1943–1945; additional
secretary to the Cabinet, 1945–1946;
secretary to Cabinet, 1947–1962; joint
secretary to Treasury and head of Home
Civil Service, 1956–1962
Clutterbuck, (Peter) Alexander, 1897–1975
Knighted 1946; Malvern College and
Pembroke, Cambridge; military service,
1916–1919; Home Civil Service,
1919–1961; entered Colonial Office in
1922; secretary, Donoughmore Commis-
sion on Ceylon constitution, 1927–1928;
private secretary to permanent under-
secretary, Dominions Office, 1928–1929;
member of UK Delegation to League of
Nations assembly, 1929, 1930 and 1931;
deputy high commissioner, South Africa,
1939–1940; assistant secretary, Domin-
ions Office, 1940, and assistant under-
secretary, 1942–1946; high commissioner,
Canada, 1946–1952, and India, 1952–1955;
ambassador, Ireland, 1955–1959;
permanent under-secretary, Common-
wealth Relations Office, 1959–1961
Cobbold, Cameron Fromanteel (Lord
Cobbold), 1904–1987
cr 1st Baron Cobbold of Knebworth, 1960;
Eton and King’s College, Cambridge;
entered the Bank of England 1933; adviser
to the governor; governor of the Bank of
England, 1949–1961; chairman of the
Commission of Enquiry into North
Borneo and Sarawak, 1962; lord
chamberlain of Her Majesty’s Household,
1963–1971
Dean, Patrick Henry, 1909–1994
Knighted 1957; Rugby and Gonville &
Caius, Cambridge; Fellow of Clare
College, 1932–1935; entered FO as
assistant legal adviser, 1939; deputy
under-secretary of state, FO, 1956–1960;
permanent UK representative to UN,
1960–1964; ambassador in Washington,
1965–1969
Eastwood, Christopher Gilbert, 1905–1983
Eton and Trinity, Oxford; entered CO
1927 as assistant principal; private
secretary to the high commissioner for
Palestine, 1932–1934; secretary,
International Rubber Regulation Com-
mittee, 1934; private secretary to Lord
Lloyd and Lord Moyne when secretaries of
state for Colonies, 1940–1941; principal
assistant secretary, Cabinet Office,
1945–1947; assistant under-secretary of
state, CO, 1947–1952; commissioner of
crown lands, 1952–1954; assistant under-
secretary of state, CO, 1954–1966
Garner,  (Joseph John) Saville (Lord Garner),
1908–1983
Knighted 1954; life peer cr 1969
(Baron); Highgate School and Jesus,
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Cambridge; entered Dominions Office,
1930; private secretary to successive Ss
of S; served in High Commission,
Canada, 1943–1948; assistant under-
secretary of state, CRO, 1948–1951;
deputy high commissioner in India,
1951–1953; deputy under-secretary of
state, CRO, 1952–1956; high com-
missioner in Canada, 1956–1961;
permanent under-secretary of state,
CRO/Commonwealth Office, 1962–
1968; head of Diplomatic Service,
1965–1968
Ghazali Shafie, Muhammad (later Tan Sri),
b 1922 
Clifford School (Kuala Lipis), Raffles
College (Singapore), University College of
Wales, Aberystwyth, and London School
of Economics; member of Malay
resistance organisation during the
Japanese occupation; government service
after 1945; assistant state secretary in
Negri Sembilan and later Selangor;
seconded for external affairs training to
the office of UK high commissioner, New
Delhi (Malcolm MacDonald), 1955–1956;
Malayan commissioner, New Delhi, 1957;
deputy permanent secretary, Ministry of
External Affairs, Aug 1957; permanent
secretary, 1959; member of Commission
of Enquiry North Borneo and Sarawak
(Cobbold Commission), 1962; member,
National Operations Council, 1969; held
senior ministerial office in the
governments of Abdul Razak, Hussein
Onn and Mahathir, 1970–1984
Goh Keng Swee, Dr, b 1918
Born in Malacca; educated at Singapore’s
Anglo-Chinese School, Raffles College,
Singapore, and London School of
Economics; founder and first chairman of
the nationalist Malayan Forum (whose
members included Lee Kuan Yew, Toh
Chin Chye and Abdul Razak); civil service
in Singapore until May 1959 when he
resigned to stand as a candidate for the
People’s Action Party; minister of
Finance, Singapore, 1959–1965 and
1967–1970; minister of Defence, Republic
of Singapore, 1965–1967 and 1970–1979;
deputy prime minister, 1972–1984;
minister of Education, 1979–1984
Goode, William Allmond Codrington,
1907–1986
Knighted 1957; Oakham School and
Worcester College, Oxford; barrister-at-
law, Gray’s Inn, 1936; entered Malayan Civil
Service 1931; prisoner of war, 1942–1945;
deputy economic secretary, Federation of
Malaya, 1948; chief secretary, Aden,
1949–1953; acting governor, Aden,
1950–1951; chief secretary, Singapore,
1953–1957; governor, Singapore, Dec
1957–2 June 1959; yang di-pertuan negara
(head of state) of the State of Singapore and
UK commissioner, Singapore, 1959;
governor, North Borneo, 1960–1963;
chairman, Water Resources Board,
1964–1974
Hall, Harold Percival, b 1913
Portsmouth Grammar School and Royal
Military College, Sandhurst;
commissioned Indian Army 1933; Indian
Political Service, 1937–1947; principal,
CO, 1947; assistant secretary and head of
Pacific and Indian Ocean Dept, CO,
1955–1962; seconded to Reid Commission
to Malaya, 1956; seconded to Office of UK
commissioner-general, SE Asia, 1962–
1963; secretary, Inter-Government
Committee for Malaysia, 1962–1963;
British deputy high commissioner for
Eastern Malaysia, Kuching, Sarawak,
1963–1964; assistant secretary, CO,
1965–1966; assistant under-secretary of
state, Commonwealth Office, 1966–1968;
assistant under-secretary of state, MoD,
1968–1973; director of studies, Royal
Institute of Public Administration,
1974–1985
Home, Alexander Frederick Douglas- (Lord
Home), 1903–1995
14th Earl of Home, 1951–1963
(renounced peerage), Sir Alec Douglas-
Home, 1963–1974, cr life peer 1974
(Baron Home of the Hirsel); Eton and
Christ Church, Oxford; MP (Con-
servative), 1931–1945, 1950–1951,
1963–1974; parliamentary private
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secretary to prime minister, 1937–1940;
joint parliamentary under-secretary of
state, FO, 1945; minister of state, Scottish
Office, 1951–1955; S of S for
Commonwealth relations, 1955–1960;
leader of House of Lords, 1957–1960; lord
president of the Council, 1957,
1959–1960; S of S for foreign affairs,
1960–1963; prime minister, 1963–1964; S
of S for foreign and Commonwealth
affairs, 1970–1974
Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman, Dr Dato
(later Tun), 1915–1973
English College, Johore Bahru, and
Melbourne University; private medical
practice in Johore Bahru, 1947–1953;
member of Johore State Council,
1948–1954, and Johore Executive Council
from 1954; member of Federal Legislative
Council; member for lands, mines and
communications, Federal Executive
Council, 1953; member for natural
resources, 1954–1955; minister for
natural resources, 1955; minister for
commerce and industry, 1956–1957;
minister plenipotentiary (without
portfolio), delegate to UN and ambassador
to Washington, 1957; minister for
external affairs, 1959; Malayan
representative on Singapore’s Internal
Security Council, 1959–1963; minister for
internal security, 1960; minister for
internal security and interior, 1961;
minister for home affairs and justice,
1964–1967; resigned from the Malaysian
Cabinet to work in the private sector;
member of Tun Razak’s National
Operations Council, 1969; deputy prime
minister, minister for home affairs, and
minister of trade and industry in Tun
Razak’s government, 1970–1973
Lansdowne, George John Charles Mercer
Nairne Petty-Fitzmaurice (Lord Lansdowne),
1912–1999
8th Marquess of Lansdowne, 1944; Eton
and Christ Church, Oxford; military
service, 1939–1945; joint parliamentary
under-secretary of state, FO, 1958–1962;
minister of state for Colonial affairs,
1962–1964, and for Commonwealth
relations, 1963–1964; chairman, Inter-
Governmental Committee on Malaysia,
1962–1963
Lee Kuan Yew, b 1923
Raffles College, Singapore, Fitzwilliam,
Cambridge and Middle Temple, London;
member of nationalist Malayan Forum
(with Goh Keng Swee, Toh Chin Chye
and Abdul Razak); legal practice in
Singapore, 1950–1959; played leading
role in foundation of the People’s Action
Party, Nov 1954; elected to Legislative
Assembly, 1955; member of con-
stitutional missions to London, 1956,
1957 and 1958; led PAP to victory in
1959 elections; prime minister of self-
governing state of Singapore, 1959–1963,
of Singapore within Malaysia, 1963–1965,
and of the independent Republic of
Singapore, 1965–1990; senior minister
since Nov 1990
Lennox-Boyd, Alan Tindal (Lord Boyd),
1904–1983
cr 1st Viscount Boyd of Merton 1960;
Sherborne and Christ Church, Oxford
(president of Oxford Union, 1926); MP
(Conservative), 1931–1960; parliamentary
secretary, Ministry of Labour, 1938–1939,
of home security, 1939, of Ministry of
Food, 1939–1940, of Ministry of Aircraft
Production, 1943–1945; minister of state,
CO, 1951–1952; minister of transport and
civil aviation, 1952–1954; S of S for
colonies, 1954–1959
Lim Chin Siong, 1933–1996
Catholic High School , Singapore, and
Chinese High School, Bukit Timah,
Singapore; secretary, Changi Bus
Workers Union, and Spinning Workers
Union, 1953; secretary, Singapore
Factory and Shop Workers Union, 1954;
elected as PAP candidate to Singapore
Legislative Assembly, 1955; with Lee
Kuan Yew represented PAP at London
constitutional talks, 1956; detained
1956–1959; political secretary in PAP
government, 1959; expelled from the
PAP and became secretary-general of
the Barisan Sosialis, 1961; arrested
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under operation ‘Coldstore’, Feb 1963;
released from detention and went into
exile in London, 1969; returned to
Singapore, 1979
Lim Yew Hock (Tun Haji Omar Lim Yew
Hock), 1914–1984 
Third-generation Straits Chinese; Raffles
College, Singapore; general secretary,
Singapore Clerical and Administrative
Workers Union; founder-member,
Singapore Trade Union Congress;
nominated by the governor to represent
the interests of labour in the Legislative
Council, 1948; president, Singapore
Labour Party; entered the Labour Front
for the 1955 elections; deputy chief
minister and minister for labour and
welfare, 1955–1956; succeeded David
Marshall as chief minister, Singapore,
1956–1959; took strong action against
Chinese high school student rebels and
communist supporters in TUs, Sept–Nov
1956; led the second and third all-party-
delegations to London for constitutional
talks, 1957 and 1958, resulting in internal
self-government; leader of the Singapore
People’s Alliance in the Legislative
Assembly, 1959–1963; Malaysian high
commissioner to Australia, 1963–1965;
converted to Islam and moved to Jeddah
MacDonald, Malcolm John, 1901–1981
OM 1969; son of James Ramsay
MacDonald (prime minister, 1924,
1929–1931 and 1931–1935); Bedales
School and Queen’s College, Oxford;
member of the London County Council,
1927–1930; MP (Labour) 1929–1931,
(National Labour) 1931–1935, National
Government) 1936–1945;  parliamentary
under-secretary of state for dominions,
1931–1935; S of S for dominions,
1935–1938 and 1938–1939; S of S for
Colonies, 1935 and 1938–1940; minister
of health, 1940; high commissioner,
Canada, 1941–1946; gov-gen, Malaya,
1946–1948; commissioner-general, SE
Asia, 1948–1955; chancellor, University of
Malaya, 1949–1961; high commissioner,
India, 1955–1960; co-chairman,
International Conference on Laos,
1961–1963; gov, Kenya, 1963; gov-gen,
Kenya, 1963–1964; British high
commissioner, Kenya, 1964–1965; British
special representative in East and Central
Africa, 1963–1966; special envoy to Sudan
and Somalia, 1967
MacKintosh, Angus MacKay, 1915–1986
Knighted 1972; Fettes, Edinburgh
University and New College Oxford;
military service, 1942–1946; principal,
CO, 1946; private secretary to the
secretary of state (Lyttelton), 1950;
assistant secretary, 1952; seconded to FO
as deputy commissioner-general, SE Asia,
1956–1960; seconded to Cabinet Office,
1961–1963; high commissioner, Brunei,
1963–1964; assistant secretary, MoD,
1964–1965; assistant under-secretary,
MoD, 1965–1966; senior civilian
instructor, Imperial Defence College,
1966–1968; assistant under-secretary,
FCO, 1968–1969; high commissioner,
Ceylon/Sri Lanka, and ambassador,
Maldives, 1969–1973
Macleod, Iain  Norman, 1913–1970
Fettes and Gonville & Caius, Cambridge;
military service, 1939–1945; joined
Conservative Party Parliamentary
Secretariat, 1946; head of Home Affairs
Research Dept of Conservative Party,
1948–1950; MP (Conservative), 1950–
1970; minister of health, 1952–1955;
minister of labour and national service,
Dec 1955–Oct 1959; S of S for colonies,
1959–1961; chancellor of Duchy of
Lancaster and leader of House of
Commons, 1961–1963; chairman,
Conservative Party Organisation, 1961–
1963; editor, The Spectator, 1963–1965;
chancellor of the Exchequer, June 1970
(died 20 July 1970) 
Macmillan, (Maurice) Harold (Lord
Stockton), 1894–1986 
cr 1st Earl of Stockton 1984; Eton and
Balliol, Oxford; military service,
1914–1918; MP (Conservative) 1924–1929,
1931–1964; parliamentary secretary,
Ministry of Supply, 1940–1942; parlia-
mentary under-secretary of state, CO,
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1942; minister resident at Allied HQ in NW
Africa, 1942–1945; secretary for air, 1945;
minister of housing and local government,
1951–1954; minister of defence, Oct
1954–Apr 1955; S of S for foreign affairs,
Apr–Dec 1955; chancellor of the
Exchequer, Dec 1955–Jan 1957; prime
minister, Jan 1957–Oct 1963
Marsal bin Maun, Dato Seri Paduka Awang
Haji, b 1913/1914
Sultan Idris Training College; super-
intendent of education, Brunei, 1935;
observer on State Council, Brunei,
1954–1956; member, legislative council,
1959; deputy state secretary, May 1960;
mentri besar, Brunei, Aug 1961–May 1967
Marshall, David Saul, 1908–1995
A Sephardi Jew and Singapore
businessman, lawyer and politician; a
founder of the Labour Front Party, 1954;
member, legislative assembly, 1955–1957;
chief minister of Singapore, 1955–1956;
formed Workers’ Party, 1957; won the
Anson by-election, July 1961; lost seat in
elections, Sept 1963; permanent member
of the Presidential Council, 1970;
ambassador, Paris, 1978
Martin, John Miller, 1904–1991
Knighted 1952; Edinburgh Academy and
Corpus Christi, Oxford; entered
Dominions Office, 1927; seconded to
Malayan Civil Service, 1931–1934;
secretary, Palestine Royal Commission,
1936; seconded as private secretary to
prime minister (Churchill), 1940–1945
(principal private secretary, 1941–1945);
assistant under-secretary of state, CO,
1945–1956; deputy permanent under-
secretary of state, CO, 1956–1965;
member, Inter-Governmental Committee
(Lansdowne Committee), 1962–1963;
high commissioner, Malta, 1965–1967
Maudling, Reginald, 1917–1979
Merchant Taylors’ School and Merton,
Oxford; joined the Conservative
Parliamentary Secretariat 1945; MP
(Conservative), 1950–1979; parliamentary
secretary, Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1952;
economic secretary to the Treasury,
1952–1955; minister of supply, 1955–1957;
paymaster-general, 1957–1959; president
of the Board of Trade, 1959–1961; S of S for
the colonies, Oct 1961–July 1962;
chancellor of the Exchequer, 1962–1964;
home secretary, 1970–1972
Melville, Eugene, 1911–1986
Knighted 1965; Queen’s Park School,
Glasgow and St Andrews University;
entered CO, 1936; Colonies Supply
Mission, Washington, 1941–1945; private
secretary to S of S for colonies (G H Hall),
1945–1946; financial adviser, Control
Commission for Germany, 1949–1952;
assistant under-secretary of state, CO,
1952, and FO, 1961; diplomatic postings
to Bonn, EFTA and GATT, 1962–1965;
ambassador and permanent UK
representative to UN and other inter-
national organisations, Geneva, 1966–
1971
Moore, Philip Brian Cecil (Lord Moore), b
1921
Knighted 1976; life peer cr 1986 (Baron);
Cheltenham College and Brasenose,
Oxford; RAF Bomber Command,
1940–1942; prisoner of war, 1942–1945;
assistant private secretary to first lord of
the Admiralty, 1950–1951; England rugby
union international, 1951; principal
private secretary to first lord of the
Admiralty, 1957–1958; deputy UK
commissioner, Singapore, 1961–1963;
British deputy high commissioner in
Singapore, 1963–1965; chief of public
relations, MoD, 1965–1966; assistant
private secretary to the Queen,
1966–1972; deputy private secretary,
1972–1977; private secretary and keeper
of the Queen’s archives, 1976–1986;
permanent lord-in-waiting to the Queen,
1990
Mustapha bin Datu Harun, Datu (later Tun),
1918–1995
A Suluk and a Muslim born in Kudat
district of North Borneo (Sabah); primary
education only; succeeded father as
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headman (orang kaya kaya); member of
pre-war North Borneo Legislative
Council; guerrilla leader during Japanese
occupation; founding president of USNO,
1961; early supporter of Malaysia;
governor/head of state (Yang di-Pertua
Negri) on Sabah’s entry into Malaysia,
1963–1965; federal minister for Sabah
affairs, 1965–1967; chief minister, Sabah,
1967–1975; made Islam official religion
and conducted mass conversions, 1973;
his attempt to secede from Malaysia led to
fall from power and years in the political
wilderness; reconciliation with the
government in Kuala Lumpur resulted in
his reappointment as federal minister for
Sabah affairs, 1991–1994 
Ningkan, Stephen Kalong, 1920–1997
Worked with police at Kapit, Sarawak,
during Japanese occupation; hospital
assistant in Shell Hospital, Kuala Belait
(Brunei), 1950–1961; honorary secreatary,
Shell Dayak Club, Brunei, 1955–1956 and
1958–1959; founder-president, Dayak
Association, Brunei, 1958–1960; founding-
member of Sarawak National Party (SNAP),
1961; secretary-general, SNAP, 1961–1964;
president, SNAP, 1964–1975; chief
minister, Sarawak, 1963–1966; ejected
from office, 1966; opposition leader,
Sarawak State Assembly, 1966–1974
Omar Ali Saifuddin Wasa’dul Khairi Waddin
(HH Sultan Haji Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin
III),  1914–1986
Malay College, Kuala Kangsar; 1937
entered service of government of Brunei,
working in the forestry department and
judiciary; succeeded his brother as Sultan
of Brunei, 1950; introduced written
constitution and new agreement with
Britain, 1959; abdicated in favour of his
son, 4 Oct 1967
Ong Eng Guan, b 1925
Singapore politician, born in Malaya;
trained as an accountant in Australia;
founder-member and treasurer of the
PAP; mayor of Singapore, 1957; elected to
legislative assembly, 1959; minister of
National Development, 1959–1960;
expelled from PAP, July 1960; resigned
seat; won the Hong Lim by-election, Apr
1961; formed United People’s Party, June
1961; elected to legislative assembly as
sole representative of the UPP, Sept 1963;
resigned seat, 1965
Ong Kee Hui (later Tan Sri Datuk), b 1914
Member of a prominent and wealthy
Hokkien family of Sarawak; St Thomas’s
School, Kuching, St Andrew’s School,
Singapore and Serdang Agricultural
College; entered Department of
Agriculture, Sarawak, 1935; left
government service for family business,
1946; member of Kuching Municipal
Council from 1953 (president,
1960–1965), Council Negri (legislature)
from 1955, and Supreme Council from
1957; founding chairman of the Sarawak
United People’s Party (SUPP), 1959;
opposed Sarawak’s membership of
Malaysia but in 1970 SUPP joined the
ruling coalition
Ong Yoke Lin, Dato (later Tun Tan Sri
Omar Yoke Lin), b 1917
Victoria Institution, Kuala Lumpur;
businessman; secretary-general, MCA;
member of the Alliance Roundtable and
special committee of the Alliance National
Convention, 1953; nominated member,
Federal Legislative Council, 1954; elected
member, Federal Legislative Council,
1955; minister for posts and
telecommunications (later transport),
1955–1957; minister of labour and social
welfare, 1957; minister of health, 1959;
minister without portfolio and
concurrently permanent representative at
UN, 1962–1964 and ambassador to
Washington, 1962–1972; vice-president,
MCA; retired as minister without portfolio
after the formation of Tun Razak’s
government in 1970 and was appointed
president of the Senate, 1973–1980
Openg bin Abang Sap’iee, Abang Haji (Dato,
later Tun, Abang Haji Openg), 1905–1969
Member of Sarawak State Assembly, 1940;
member of Sarawak Supreme Council,
1955; governor/head of state (yang di-
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pertua) of Sarawak on entry into Malaysia,
1963
Ormsby-Gore, (William) David (Lord
Harlech), 1918–1985
Knighted 1961; 5th Baron Harlech,
1964; Eton and New College, Oxford;
military service, 1939–1945; Conser-
vative MP, 1950–1961; parliamentary
private secretary to minister of state,
FO, 1951; parliamentary under-
secretary, FO, Nov 1956–Jan 1957;
minister of state, FO, 1957–1961;
ambassador, Washington, 1961–1965;
deputy leader of the Opposition, House
of Lords, 1966–1967; deputy chairman,
Commission on Rhodesian Opinion,
1972; president, British Board of Film
Censors, 1965–85
Perth, John David Drummond (Lord Perth),
1907–2002
17th Earl of Perth, 1951; Downside and
Trinity, Cambridge University; lieuten-
ant, Intelligence Corps from 1940
(seconded to War Cabinet Offices,
1942–1943, and Ministry of Production,
1944–1945); partner, Schroder’s, 1945–
1956; representative peer for Scotland,
1952–1963; minister of state, CO,
1957–1962; 1st crown estate com-
missioner, 1962–1977; chairman,
Reviewing Committee on Export of
Works of Art, 1972–1976
Poynton, (Arthur) Hilton, 1905–1998
Knighted 1949; Marlborough and
Brasenose, Oxford; entered CO, 1929;
seconded as private secretary to minister
of supply and minister of production,
1941–1943; assistant secretary, CO,
1943–1946; assistant under-secretary of
state, 1946–1948; joint deputy under-
secretary of state, 1948–1959; permanent
under-secretary of sate, CO, 1959–1966
Sandys, Duncan  (Lord Duncan-Sandys),
1908–1987
Life peer cr 1974 (Baron); Eton and
Magdalen, Oxford; Diplomatic Service,
1930; married Diana Churchill, 1935
(until 1960); MP (Conservative),
1935–1945 and 1950–1974; parliamentary
secretary, Ministry of Supply, 1943–1944;
minister of works, 1944–1945; founded
European Movement, 1947; minister of
supply, 1951–1954; minister of housing
and local government, 1954–1957;
minister of defence, Jan 1957–Oct 1959;
minister of aviation, 1959–1960; S of S for
Commonwealth relations, July 1960–Oct
1964 and S of S for colonies, July
1962–Oct 1964
Scott, Robert Heatlie, 1905–1982
Knighted 1954; Queen’s Royal College,
Trinidad, and New College, Oxford;
entered Consular Service in China, 1927;
served in Peking, Shanghai, Canton, Hong
Kong, Singapore; Ministry of Information
and member of governor’s War Council,
Singapore, 1941–1942; interned by the
Japanese, 1942–1945; on staff of the UK
special commissioner, SE Asia (Lord
Killearn), 1946; entered FO, 1948
(attached to the Imperial Defence
College); head of SE Asian Department,
1948; assistant under-secretary with
responsibility for Far Eastern affairs,
1950; minister, Washington embassy,
1953; commissioner-general, SE Asia,
1955–1959; commandant, Imperial
Defence College, 1960; permanent
secretary, MoD, 1961–1963
Selkirk, George Nigel Douglas-Hamilton
(Lord Selkirk), 1906–1994
10th Earl of Selkirk, 1940; Eton and
Balliol, Oxford, and universities of Bonn,
Vienna, Paris (Sorbonne); member,
Edinburgh Town Council, 1935–1940;
commissioner, General Board of Control
(Scotland), 1936–1939; commissioner for
Special Areas in Scotland, 1937–1939;
military service, 1939–1945; Scottish
representative peer, 1945–1963; lord-in-
waiting to the King, 1951–1952, and to
the Queen, 1952–1953; paymaster-
general, Nov 1953—Dec 1955; chancellor
of the Duchy of Lancaster, Dec 1955 – Jan
1957; first lord of the Admiralty, 1957–Oct
1959; UK commissioner for Singapore
and commissioner-general, SE Asia,
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1959–1963; UK council representative to
SEATO, 1960–1963; chairman, Con-
servative Commonwealth Council, 1965–
1972
Snelling, Arthur Wendell, 1914–1996
Knighted 1960; Ackworth School,
Yorkshire and University College, London;
study group secretary, Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1934–1936;  entered
Dominions Office, 1936; joint secretary to
UK delegation to International Monetary
Conference, Bretton Woods, 1944;
accompanied Lord Keynes on missions to
USA and Canada, 1943 and 1944; deputy
high commissioner in New Zealand,
1947–1950 and South Africa, 1953–1955;
assistant under-secretary of state, CRO,
1956–1959; high commissioner in Ghana,
1959–1961; deputy under-secretary of
state, CRO/FCO, 1961–1969; ambassador
to South Africa, 1970–1972
Stephens, Donald, Datuk (later Tun
Mohammad Fuad), 1920–1976
Born in Kudat (Sabah), son of Australian
father and Kadazan mother; on leaving
school became a pupil-teacher; father was
shot and he was imprisoned and tortured
by Japanese during the occupation of
1942–1945; proprietor, editor and
publisher of Sabah Times from 1955;
member, North Borneo Legislative
Council, 1958; member, Executive
Council, 1959; chairman, Kadazan
Society, 1958; founder-president, UNKO,
1961; initially opposed to Malaysia but
later converted to it; chairman, Malaysia
Solidarity Consultative Committee,
1961–1962; joint leader of North Borneo
delegation, Inter-Governmental Com-
mittee, 1962–1963; elected to North
Borneo Legislative Council, 1963; first
chief minister of Sabah on entry into
Malaysia, 1963; federal minister for Sabah
affairs, 1965; retired from politics and was
appointed Malaysian high commissioner
to Australia, 1968; converted to Islam,
1971; head of state, Sabah, 1973–1975;
returned to politics to lead federal
supported, inter-communal party, Berjaya
(Sabah People’s Union), 1975; chief
minister after elections of 1976; killed
with four of his ministers and son in plane
crash, 6 June 1976
Tan Siew Sin (later Tun Tan Siew Sin),
1916–1988
Son of Tan Cheng Lock, a leading Straits
Chinese and founder-president of MCA;
Malacca High School, Raffles College,
Singapore and Inner Temple; businessman
particularly in rubber; spent Japanese
occupation in India; adviser to British
Military Administration, 1945; municipal
commissioner, Malacca, 1946; member of
Federal Legislative Council from 1948,
elected member from 1955; founder-
member of MCA, 1949, and played a leading
part in the formation of the Alliance with
UMNO from 1952; vice-president of MCA,
1957 and president, 1961–1974; minister of
commerce, 1957–1959; minister of
finance, 1959–1969, special functions,
1969, and finance, 1970–1974 
Thorneycroft, (George Edward) Peter (Lord
Thorneycroft), 1909–1994
Life peer cr 1967; Eton and Royal Military
Academy, Woolwich; Royal Artillery,
1930–1933; called to bar and practised
law, 1935; MP (Conservative), 1938–1966;
parliamentary secretary, Ministry of War
Transport, 1945; president of the Board of
Trade, 1951–1957; chancellor of the
Exchequer, 1957–1958, resigned; minister
of aviation, 1960–1962; minister of
defence, 1962–1964; S of S for defence,
Apr–Oct 1964; president of the
Conservative Party, 1975–1981; president,
Pirelli General Plc, 1987–1994
Toh Chin Chye, Dr, b 1921
Born in Taiping, Malaya; Raffles College,
Singapore and University of London
(physiology); succeeded Goh Keng Swee
as chairman of Malayan Forum (London);
lecturer and reader, University of Malaya;
first chairman of People’s Action Party,
1954; elected member, Singapore
Legislative Assembly, 1959–1988; deputy
prime minister, Singapore, 1959–1968;
realigned PAP on a pan-Malaysian basis,
1964–1965, for participation in the
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Malaysia Solidarity Convention and
federal elections; opposed Singapore’s
withdrawal from Malaysia, 1965; vice-
chancellor, University of Singapore,
1968–1975
Tory, Geofroy William, b 1912
Knighted 1958; King Edward VII School,
Sheffield and Queens’, Cambridge;
entered Dominions Office, 1935; private
secretary to the permanent under-
secretary, 1938–1939; military service,
1939–1943; principal private secretary to
S of S for the Dominions (Addison),
1945–1946; served in Ottawa,  1946–1949
and Ireland 1949–1952; deputy high
commissioner in Pakistan, 1953–1954 and
Australia, 1954–1957; assistant under-
secretary, CRO, 1957; high commissioner
in Malaya, 1957–1963; ambassador to
Ireland, 1964–1966; high commissioner
in Malta, 1967–1970
Trend, Burke Frederick St John,
1914–1987 (Lord Trend)
Knighted 1962; life peer cr 1974 (Baron);
Whitgift School and Merton, Oxford;
entered the Ministry of Education 1936;
transferred to the Treasury, 1937;
principal private secretary to the
chancellor of the Exchequer (Hugh
Dalton and Stafford Cripps), 1945–1949;
under-secretary, 1949–1955; seconded to
the office of the lord privy seal (R A
Butler); deputy secretary of the Cabinet,
1956–1959; second secretary, Treasury,
1960–1963; secretary of the Cabinet,
1963–1973; rector of Lincoln College,
Oxford, 1973–1983
Turnbull, Roland Evelyn, 1905–1960
Knighted 1956; King’s College, London
and St John’s, Oxford; entered Malayan
Civil Service, 1929; served in Federated
Malay States, Trengganu and as secretary
to high commissioner for  Unfederated
Malay States; resident, Brunei, 1934;
seconded to CO, 1937; controller of
foreign exchange, Malaya, 1939; colonial
secretary, British Honduras, 1940–1943;
colonel (civil affairs), WO, 1943–1945;
colonial secretary, Cyprus, 1945–1950;
chief secretary, High Commission
Territories, 1950–1953; governor, North
Borneo, 1954–1960
Waddell, Alexander Noel Anton, 1913–1999
Knighted 1959; Fettes, Edinburgh
University and Gonville & Caius,
Cambridge; entered Colonial Admini-
strative Service and posted to British
Solomon Islands, 1937; district officer,
1938; naval service, 1942–1944; district
commissioner, 1945; transferred to
Malayan Civil Service, 1946; principal
assistant secretary, North Borneo,
1947–1952; colonial secretary, Gambia,
1952–1956; colonial secretary, Sierra
Leone, 1956–1958; deputy governor, Sierra
Leone, 1958–1960; governor, Sarawak,
1960–1963; UK commissioner, British
Phosphate Commissioners, 1965–1977
Wallace, (Walter) Ian (James), 1905–1993
Bedford Modern School and St
Catharine’s, Cambridge; entered Indian
Civil Service and posted to Burma, 1928;
deputy commissioner, 1933; settlement
officer, 1934–1938; deputy commissioner,
1939–1942; defence secretary, 1942–1944;
colonel and deputy director, Civil Affairs,
Military Administration of Burma,
1944–1945; commissioner, 1946; chief
secretary, Burma, 1946–1947; joined CO,
1947; assistant secretary, 1949–1962;
assistant under-secretary of state,
1962–1966
Watherston, David Charles, 1907–1977
Knighted 1956; Westminster School and
Christ Church, Oxford; entered Malayan
Civil Service, 1930; seconded to CO,
1939–1944; member, Malayan Planning
Unit, 1944–1945; British Military
Administration, Malaya, 1945–1946;
secretary of constitutional working
committee which negotiated the
Federation of Malaya Agreement,
1946–1948; secretary for defence and
internal security, Malaya, 1948; chief
secretary, 1952–1957, and administered
the government of Malaya on occasions;
special counsellor, Malayan high
commission in the UK, 1957–1959;
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member, Commission of Enquiry North
Borneo and Sarawak (Cobbold
Commission), 1962
Watkinson, Harold Arthur (Lord Watkin-
son), 1910–1995
1st Viscount of Woking cr 1964; Queen’s
College, Taunton and King’s College,
London; family business, 1929–1935;
technical and engineering journalism,
1935–1939; active service in the Second
World War; chairman, Production
Efficiency Panel for South England,
Machine Tool Trades Association, 1948;
MP (Conservative), 1950–1964; parlia-
mentary private secretary to minister of
transport and aviation, 1951–1952;
parliamentary secretary, Ministry of
Labour and National Service, 1952–1955;
minister of transport and civil aviation,
Dec 1955–1959; minister of defence,
1959–1962; president of the Con-
federation of British Industries, 1976–
1977
White, Dennis Charles, 1910–1983
Knighted 1962; Bradfield; joined Sarawak
Civil Service, 1932; senior resident, 1955;
resident, Brunei, 1958, high commis-
sioner, Brunei, 1959–1963; Brunei
government agent in the UK, 1967–
1983
Wong Pow Nee, Dato (later Tan Sri Wong
Pow Nee), 1911– 2002
Born in Penang and Roman Catholic; St
Xavier’s Institution, Penang; teacher of
English in a Chinese school; town
councillor in 1930s; elected member
(MCA), Penang State Assembly, 1955;
chief minister, Penang, 1957–1969;
member of Razak’s Educational Review
Committee, 1960; member, Commission
of Enquiry North Borneo and Sarawak
(Cobbold Commission), 1962; ambassador
to Italy, 1970
Yaacob ibni Almarhum Sultan Abdul Hamid
Halim Shah, Tunku (Tunku Yaacob),
1899–1990
Son of the Sultan of Kedah and half-brother
of Tunku Abdul Rahman; Malay College,
Kuala Kangsar, Queens’, Cambridge and
Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture,
Trinidad; entered Kedah agricultural
service, 1930; state agricultural officer,
1946; keeper of rulers’ seals, 1950–1951
and 1954–1955; regent of Kedah, 1951;
member for agriculture, Federal Executive
Council, 1951–1953; chairman, Public
Service Commission, 1955–1958; Malayan
high commissioner in London, 1958, and
later Paris
Zulueta, Philip Francis de, 1925–1989
Knighted 1963; Beaumont and New
College, Oxford; military service,
1943–1947; entered foreign service, 1949;
posted to Moscow, 1950–1952; private
secretary to successive prime ministers
(Eden, Macmillan, Home), 1955–1964;
assistant secretary, Treasury, 1962;
resigned from foreign service in 1962;
various directorships etc, including chief
executive, 1973–1976, and chairman,
1976–1981, Antony Gibbs Holdings Ltd;
chairman, Tanks Consolidated
Investments Plc, 1983–1989
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Bibliography 1: Sources searched at the National
Archives
The following classes of files were searched for the period 1957–1963 using the relevant
indexes. Not all documents within these series were available for consultation.
1. Cabinet
(i) Cabinet Committees
Colonial Policy Committee: CAB 134/1555–1561 (1957–1962)
Defence Committee: CAB 131/19, 23–28
Future Policy Committee: CAB 134/1929
Greater Malaysia Committee: CAB 130/179, 191
Oversea Policy Committee: CAB 134/2370, 2371 (from June1962)
(Official) Committee on Future Developments in SE Asia:
CAB 134/1644, 1645
(Official) Greater Malaysia Committee: (1961–1963): CAB 134/1949–1951
(Official) Oversea Co-ordinating Committee (July–Dec 1962): 
CAB 134/2276–2278, 2281
(ii) Cabinet Office
Cabinet conclusions (minutes): CAB 128/31–37 (1957–1963)
Cabinet memoranda: CAB 129 /85–114 (1957–1963)
Cabinet Office registered files: CAB 21/4626, 4770, 4847–4851, 4867, 
5350, 5520
(iii) Other papers
Greater Malaysia Discussions (Anglo–Malayan talks in London), 
Nov 1961: CAB 134/1952, 1953
Joint Intelligence Committee:
papers: CAB 158/39–50
minutes: CAB 159/28–39
weekly reviews: CAB 179/3–11
2. Colonial Office
(i) CO original correspondence: geographical classes
Far Eastern: CO 1030/412–1712 (1957–1963) 
(ii) CO original correspondence: subject classes
Information: CO 1027/405, 588–592
International Relations: CO 936/839–841
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Cobbold Commission: CO 947/1–61
Defence: CO 968/758–761, 807, 811
Private Office: CO 967/391, 407, 410, 413–421
3. Commonwealth Relations Office
(i) CRO original correspondence
General: DO 35/6297, 8831–8833, 8864–8866, 9817, 9818, 9864, 
10019, 10034, 10035
(ii) CRO registered departmental files
Economic Relations (from 1959): CO 189/109–111, 122, 149, 151–153, 
158–163, 195, 219–223, 256–259, 260–262, 267, 275, 351, 352, 360, 361
Far East and Pacific: DO 169/10, 11, 18, 19, 20, 24–36, 38–43, 82, 95–101,
212–237, 247–249, 255, 266, 269, 271–273, 280, 284, 287–291, 307, 
320, 329, 335, 336, 338
Information Policy Department: DO 191/34, 37, 49–51, 64
United Nations: DO 181/11, 118
(iii) CRO registered files
Agreements, Treaties and Miscellaneous Documents: DO 118/227, 258,
265, 266, 293
Untitled series: DO 187/2, 3, 4, 14–17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25–29, 30, 31, 32, 33
4. Foreign Office
Original correspondence, political: FO 371
particular attention was given to files from 1962–1963, viz: 166599–
166602, 169680, 169691, 169694, 169695, 169698, 169700, 
169702, 169703, 169706, 169712–169717, 169719, 169722–
169724, 169734, 169888, 169898–169901, 169906, 169908, 
169911, 169978, 173492, 173493, 173496, 175267
Commissioner-general in SE Asia: FO 1091/69, 71, 79–83, 88–91, 97, 
99–101, 104–114
Information Department: FO 953/2128–2132
Private papers, Lord Selkirk (1961–1963): FO 800/897 
Research, South and SE Asia: FCO 51/154
5. Ministry of Defence, Chiefs of Staff and Service Departments
Chiefs of Staff Committee, minutes: DEFE 4/124, 126, 127, 129, 136, 137,
139, 141, 146, 150–160, 165, 167–175
Chiefs of Staff Committee, memoranda: DEFE 5/89, 92, 104, 105, 114, 115,
128, 130–133, 143, 150–152, 154, 161
Chiefs of Staff Committee, reports of Joint Planning Staff: DEFE 6/61, 71
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Chiefs of Staff Committee, registered files: DEFE 11/419, 509 
Ministry of Defence, general series: DEFE 7/1187, 1698, 1724, 1726, 2190,
2193, 2232, 2235
Ministry of Defence, private office: DEFE 13/311, 399, 542 
6. Prime Minister’s Office
Correspondence and papers: PREM 11/2659, 2661, 3240, 3274, 3276, 
3418–3422, 3717, 3735, 3737, 3739, 3865–3869, 4146, 4182–4184,
4187–4189, 4310, 4341–4350, 4440, 4763, 4870, 4904–4910
Correspondence and papers: PREM 13/2194
7. Treasury
Defence policy and material division: T 225/2353, 2354, 2407, 2431–2433, 
2551, 2552, 2554, 2555
Overseas financial division: T 236/6368, 6369, 6694
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Bibliography 2: Official publications, unpublished
private papers, published documents and secondary
sources
1. Official publications
(a) United Kingdom
Exchange of Letters on Internal Security Council of Singapore, Cmnd 620 
(1958) *
Federation of Malaysia. Joint Statement by the Governments of the United 
Kingdom and of the Federation of Malaya, Cmnd 1563 (1961) *
Report of the Commission of Enquiry: North Borneo and Sarawak, 1962, 
Cmnd 1794 (1962) *
Malaysia. Report of the Inter-Governmental Committee, 1962, Cmnd 1954, 
(1963) *
Malaysia. Agreement concluded between the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak 
and Singapore, Cmnd 2094 (1963) *
Release of Crown Lands made available to the Armed Services in Singapore, 
Cmnd 2117 (1963) *
Supplementary Agreement to the Agreement concluded between the Federation 
of Malaya, the United Kingdom Government of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and
Singapore, Cmnd 2150 (1963) *
Public Officers’ Agreement between Her Majesty’s Government in the 
United Kingdom and the Government of Malaysia in respect of 
Singapore, Cmnd 2468 (1963–1964) *
Public Officers’ Agreement between Her Majesty’s Government in the United 
Kingdom and the Government of Malaysia in respect of Sabah, Cmnd 
2469 (1963–1964) *
Public Officers’ Agreement between Her Majesty’s Government in the United 
Kingdom and the Government of Malaysia in respect of Sarawak, Cmnd 
2670 (1963–1964) *
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons
Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords
The Colonial Office List (1957–1963)
The Commonwealth Relations Office List 
* Also published by the government presses of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak, or Malaysia
as appropriate.
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(b) Governments of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, 
Sarawak, Malaysia
Brunei constitutional documents (Kuala Lumpur, nd [1960])
Lee Kuan Yew, The Battle for Merger (Singapore, 1961)
Memorandum setting out the Heads of Agreement for a Merger between the 
Federation of Malaya and Singapore, Cmd 33 (Singapore, 1961)
Malaysia and North Borneo (Jesselton, 1962)
Malaysia and Sarawak (Kuching, 1962)
The Danger Within. A History of the Clandestine Communist Organisation, 
(Kuching, 1963)
Tripartite Summit Meeting – Manila, July 30 – August 5, 1963 (Kuala Lumpur,
nd [1963])
Malaya/Indonesia Relations, 31st August, 1957 to 15th September, 1963
(Kuala Lumpur, 1963)
Malaya/Philippine Relations, 31st August, 1957 to 15th September, 1963 
(Kuala Lumpur, nd [1963])
Malaysia’s Case in the United Nations Security Council. Documents 
reproduced from the Official Record of the Security Council Proceedings
(Kuala Lumpur, 1964)
(c) Other official publications
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Report on the 
Economic Aspects of Malaysia (Rueff Report), (Government Printing
Office, Kuala Lumpur, 1963)
United Nations, United Nations Malaysia Mission (Department of Information, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1963)
2. Unpublished collections of private papers in the UK
Goode Papers (Rhodes House Library, Oxford, MSS Ind Ocn s 323)
Sandys Papers (Churchill College Archive Centre, Cambridge, DSND)
Waddell Papers (Rhodes House Library, Oxford, MSS Pac s 105)
3. Published selections of documents and documentary guides
J de V Allen, A J Stockwell & L R Wright, eds, A collection of treaties and 
other documents affecting the states of Malaysia 1761–1963, vol II
(London, Rome, New York, 1981)
Peter Boyce, ed, Malaysia and Singapore in international diplomacy:
documents and commentaries (Sydney, 1968)
British Documents on the End of Empire Project (BDEEP) (London):
S R Ashton & David Killingray, eds, The West Indies (1999)
S R Ashton & Wm Roger Louis, eds, East of Suez and the Commonwealth
1964–1971 (2004)
Ronald Hyam & Wm Roger Louis, eds, The Conservative government and
the end of empire 1957–1964 (2000)
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John Kent, ed, Egypt and the defence of the Middle East (1998)
A J Stockwell, ed, Malaya (1995)
A Thurston, Sources for colonial studies in the Public Record Office, 
2 vols (1995 & 1998)
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 (Washington):
E C Keefer & G W LaFantasie, eds, Vol XXIII, Southeast Asia (1994)
J M Gullick, ed, Malaysia and its neighbours (London, 1967)
Nicholas Mansergh, ed, Documents and speeches on Commonwealth
Affairs, 1952–1962 (London, 1963)
A N Porter & A J Stockwell, eds, British imperial policy and
decolonisation, vol II 1951–1964 (London, 1989)
J Turner, ed, Macmillan: Cabinet papers, 1957–1963, on CD-ROM (set of
three, Adam Matthew Publications, Marlborough, Wilts/Public Record
Office, 1999), ‘Decolonisation’ intro by P Murphy
Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, ed, The People’s Party of Brunei. Selected
documents (Kuala Lumpur, 1987)
4. Select list of published books and unpublished theses
Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Looking back: Monday musings and
memories (Kuala Lumpur, 1977)
Richard Allen, Malaysia: prospect and retrospect. The impact and aftermath of 
colonial rule (London, 1968)
Thomas J Bellows, The People’s Action Party of Singapore: emergence of a
dominant party system (New Haven, Conn, 1971)
Chan Heng Chee, A sensation of independence. David Marshall—a political 
biography (Singapore, ed 2001)
Cheah Boon Kheng, Malaysia. The making of a nation (Singapore, 2002)
Chin Kin Wah, The defence of Malaysia and Singapore: the transformation of a
security system, 1957–1971 (Cambridge, 1983)
Richard Clutterbuck. Riot and revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 1945–63
(London, 1973)
Philip Darby, British defence policy east of Suez, 1947–1968 (Oxford, 1973)
John Darwin, Britain and decolonisation: the retreat from empire in the 
post-war world (London, 1988)
Saki Dockrill, Britain’s retreat from east of Suez: the choice between Europe 
and the world? (Basingstoke, 2002) 
David Easter, ‘British defence policy in South East Asia and Confrontation 
1960–66’, unpublished PhD thesis (London, LSE, 1998)
Joe Garner, The Commonwealth Office 1925–68 (London, 1978)
Ghazali Shafie, Ghazali Shafie’s memoir on the formation of Malaysia (Bangi, 
1998)
Willard A Hanna, The formation of Malaysia: new factor in world politics (New 
York, 1964)
T N Harper, The end of empire and the making of Malaya (Cambridge, 1999)
Heng Pek Koon, Chinese politics in Malaysia: a history of the Malaysian 
Chinese Association (Kuala Lumpur, 1988)
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Alistair Horne, Macmillan 1957–1986 (London, 1989)
A V M Horton, Negara Brunei Darussalam: a biographical dictionary 
(1860–1996) (ed 1996)
B A Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Saifuddin III and Britain: the making of Brunei 
Darussalam (Kuala Lumpur, 1995)
Michael Jackson (ed by Janet Jackson), A Scottish life: Sir John Martin,
Churchill and empire (London, 1999)
Matthew Jones, Conflict and confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965:
Britain, the United States and the creation of Malaysia (Cambridge, 2002)
A H M Kirk-Greene, On crown service: a history of HM colonial and overseas
civil services 1837–1997 (London, 1999)
A H M Kirk-Greene, Britain’s imperial administrators, 1858–1966 (Basingstoke,
2000)
Albert Lau, A moment of anguish: Singapore in Malaysia and the politics of 
disengagement (Singapore, 1998)
Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore story: memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore, 1998)
Michael Leifer, The Philippine claim to Sabah (London, 1967)
Michael Leifer, Dictionary of the modern politics of South-East Asia (London,
1995)
Michael B Leigh, The rising moon: political change in Sarawak (Sydney 
University Press, 1974)
J A C Mackie, Konfrontasi: the Indonesia–Malaysia dispute 1963–1966 (Kuala 
Lumpur, 1974)
Harold Macmillan, Memoirs: volume VI. At the end of the day 1961–63 
(London, 1973)
Gordon P Means, Malaysian politics (London, 1970)
R S Milne & K J Ratnam, Malaysia—new states in a new nation. Political 
development of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia (London, 1974)
Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore separation:
political unification in the Malaysia region, 1945–65 (Kuala Lumpur,
1974)
Alastair Morrison, Fair land Sarawak: some recollections of an expatriate
official (Ithaca, 1993)
Philip Murphy, Alan Lennox–Boyd: a biography (London, 1999)
Ong Kee Hui, Footprints in Sarawak: memoirs of Tan Sri Datuk (Dr) Ong Kee
Hui, 1914 to 1963 (Kuching, 1998)
J P Ongkili, The Borneo response to Malaysia 1961–1963 (Singapore, 1967)
Naimah S Talib, Administrators and their service: the Sarawak Administrative 
Service under the Brooke Rajahs and British colonial rule (New York,
1999)
Phuong Pham, ‘The end to “east of Suez”: the British withdrawal from Malaysia
and Singapore, 1964 to 1968’, unpublished DPhil thesis (Oxford, 2001)
Vernon L Porritt, British colonial rule in Sarawak, 1946–1963 (Kuala Lumpur,
1997)
Greg Poulgrain, The genesis of Konfrontasi: Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia,
1945–1965 (Bathurst, NSW and London, 1998)
Robert Pringle, Rajahs and rebels: the Ibans of Sarawak under Brooke rule,
1841–1941 (New York, 1970)
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Bob Reece, Datu Bandar. Abang Hj Mustapha of Sarawak: some reflections of
his life and times (Kuala Lumpur, nd)
R H C Reece, The name of Brooke: the end of white rajah rule in Sarawak (Kuala
Lumpur, 1982)
Margaret Clark Roff, The politics of belonging: political change in Sabah and 
Sarawak (Kuala Lumpur, 1974)
Said Zahari, Dark clouds at dawn: a political memoir (Kuala Lumpur, 2001)
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William Shaw, Tun Razak: his life and times (Kuala Lumpur, 1976)
B Simandjuntak, Malayan federalism, 1945–1963 (Kuala Lumpur, 1969)
D S Ranjit Singh, Brunei 1839–1983: the problems of political survival
(Singapore, 1991)
D S Ranjit Singh, The making of Sabah 1865–1941 (Kuala Lumpur, 2000)
John Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New 
Zealand diplomacy in the Malaysian–Indonesian Confrontation, 1961–5
(Basingstoke, 2000)
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(Kuala Lumpur, 1972)
Tan Jing Quee & Jomo K S, eds, Comet in our sky: Lim Chin Siong in history
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5. Select list of published articles and chapters in books
S J Ball, ‘Selkirk in Singapore’, Twentieth Century British History, 10, 2 (1999)
pp 162–191
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Amin and Malcolm Caldwell, eds, Malaya: the making of a neo-colony
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Studies, 20, 2 (1988) pp 353–374
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27, 2 (1999), pp 27–52
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Commonwealth History, 28, 2 (2000) pp 61–86 
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